

PRECURSORS TO MODERNIZATION THEORY IN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
POLICY: A STUDY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, JAPANESE
OCCUPATION, AND POINT FOUR PROGRAM

by

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Abstract

In the 1960s, modernization theory became an important analytical tool to conceptualize change in the Third World. As opposed to rebuilding societies that had already attained industrialization as was done with the Marshall Plan, modernization theorists focused on creating a total theory that encapsulated the entire arc of development from a traditional agricultural society to a modern industrial society. Aware that a colonial relationship subordinating nations on the periphery to the West was impossible, modernization theorists sought to create an amicable bond based on consent. Modernization theory served as the underlying logic of the Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam. This thesis argues that although modernization theory certainly had novel aspects, notably its social and psychological elements, much of the theory simply consisted of the coalesced logic, assumptions, and methods acquired from three previous American experiences with development, particularly the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Point Four Program, and occupation of Japan after World War II. I argue that thought concerning development from the 1930s through the 1960s should be seen as a continuum rather than view modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s as completely novel. Modernization theorists both intentionally and unknowingly incorporated into modernization theory the logic, assumptions, and methods developed in previous development schemes.

Chapter Two examines how the democratic decentralized structure of the TVA became embedded in post-World War II thought about development as an alternative to communist models of development. The chapter also explores TVA director David Lilienthal's and modernization theorists' emphasis on technology as both harbingers of modernization and evidence of modernity. Chapter Three investigates how Chester Bowles, the director of the Point Four Program in India, and modernization theorists used Keynesian economics in their development model, arguing that modernization could be induced by government spending in agriculture, education, infrastructure, and health and sanitation. Chapter Three also explores how Bowles and modernization theorists used an evolutionary theory of development derived from America's past to guide their development in the Third World. Chapter Four examines the

similarity between what officials of the Japanese occupation and modernization theorists considered traditional and modern. The chapter also explains that both groups believed in the universal applicability of the principles of American society.

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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction

In his freshman year at Yale, Walt Whitman Rostow declared his intention to create a theory of development to counter Karl Marx. Over the next twenty-five years Rostow developed his theory, resulting in the publication in 1960 of his *summum*, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Rostow was part of a group of intellectuals who, in the 1960s, became known collectively as the modernization theorists. Inclusion in the group came by contributing to a theory of development known as modernization theory. Among the ranks were political scientists such as Lucian Pye and Cyril Black, sociologists including Daniel Lerner and Talcott Parsons, university presidents such as Clark Kerr, and economists such as Rostow and Max Millikan. The central goal of the modernization theorists was to construct a theory of development that encapsulated all economic, political, social, psychological, and cultural changes that occurred during transition from a traditional to a modern society. Although each modernization theorist constructed a unique theory of development, they all centered on the same fundamental principles. All posited that societies develop along a universal path from an agrarian-based traditional society and converge as industrially based modern societies. All agreed that the transition entailed change in technology, bureaucratic institutions, and social and political structures.¹ In addition, all believed that the modernization process could be accelerated by concerted intervention.

The historiography of modernization theory is a difficult subject because the line differentiating primary from secondary sources is imprecise. Many of the scholars who attempted to historicize modernization theory were themselves scholars with their own theories of development, taking part in the debate, initiated by modernization theorists. An early group of critics, often linked to the New Left in the United States, became known as the dependency theorists. Dependency theorists, such as Raúl Prebisch, Paul Baran, and Andre Gunder Frank, took issue with modernization theorists' argument that all nations were destined to converge on a

¹ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 3.

universal end state.² Dependency theorists argued that all countries were part of a common economic system that produced different outcomes or “positions” for different countries. Not all countries could become like the contemporary First World because industrialized countries had achieved their prosperity at the expense of countries that produced primary products. Without another set of countries to play the role they had played in the development of the West, the current Third World had little chance of becoming equally industrialized.³

Conservative critics such as Samuel Huntington, often mistaken for a modernization theorist, accepted dependency theorists’ disbelief in development as an inevitable and convergent process, but went further by rejecting the “modernity” described by modernization theorists. Huntington has pointed out that, in modernization theory, “Increased participation is the key element of political development.”⁴ Huntington, in contrast, described the level of political modernization as “the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures,” or amount of control the centralized government exerted over its people.⁵ Absolute control by the government was Huntington’s modernity. By his definition, increased participation actually caused “political decay” because it often produced ethnic conflicts and civil wars, reducing government control and political stability. Huntington’s argument that modernization could both progress and regress challenged modernization theorists’ supposition that development was a one-way road leading toward modernity. Modernization theorists’ modernity based on full political participation became anathema to Huntington and his concept of modernity. Rather than promote democracy, he actively defended the usefulness of military dictatorships in the Third World.⁶

Huntington is identifiable as a scholar that both criticized modernization theory and proposed his own theory on development; however, in the twenty-first century, historians

² Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (London: Penguin, 1957); Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” *Monthly Review* 18:4 (1966); Raúl Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problem* (New York: United Nations, 1950).

³ Gilman, 234-237.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” *World Politics* 17:3 (April 1965): 388.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 393.

⁶ Huntington fully developed his themes in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

produced a wealth of new scholarship attempting to understand modernization theory within the post-World War II context, without attempting to formulate their own theories of development. The two most important works were Michael Latham's *Modernization as Ideology* (2000) and Nils Gilman's *Mandarins of the Future* (2003).⁷ Latham's major contribution was to identify modernization theory as an ideology, "a broader worldview, a constellation of mutually reinforcing ideas that often framed policy goals through a definition of the nation's ideals, history, and mission."⁸ Latham objected to scholars such as Gabriel Kolko who argued that America's confrontation with the Third World was little more than an "overwhelming pursuit of its national interests, economic above all," and marginalized policymakers' "declarations of belief" by describing them as cant.⁹ Latham also objected to scholars such as George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and John Lewis Gaddis, who focused on the "state as a central actor" globally pursuing and exercising power. Latham has pointed out that these scholars often referred to "national interests," "vital interests," and "international realities," evaluating policymakers by their success protecting America from "clear, external threats."¹⁰ *Modernization as Ideology* is a reaction against scholars who divorced or insulated presidential administrations from American culture and claimed that policymakers reacted to objective and clearly defined threats. In agreement with anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who argued that ideologies are the "rational ordering of cultural symbols to determine behavior in any given circumstance," Latham argued

⁷ Other important works include: David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael Latham, eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); David Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Christian Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000); Ron Theodore Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Mark Haefele, "Walt Rostow, Modernization, and Vietnam: Stages of Theoretical Growth." (Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 2000).

⁸ Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 12.

⁹ Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 12, 128; quoted in Latham, 12. William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber were other historians that emphasized policymakers' economic concerns over all other criteria. In *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 10th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006). LaFeber claimed: "U.S. aid was given in such a way that it made the rich richer and the poor poorer."

¹⁰ Latham, 12.

that ideology served as the cognitive framework, determining threats and providing acceptable solutions.¹¹ He illustrated his point by examining how modernization theory helped identify the issues, define the goals, and determine the efforts, within the Peace Corps, Alliance for Progress, and Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam.

Latham was first to identify modernization as an ideology but Nils Gilman has thus far provided the most comprehensive study of modernization theory in *Mandarins of the Future*. Gilman, an intellectual historian, first argued that modernization theory was a “manifestation of American postwar liberalism.”¹² Gilman delineated the way in which the theory was a continuation of intellectual debates (i.e., the “end of ideology” debate within sociology, nature of democracy in political science, and consensus in history) that dominated scholarly discourse in the decades following World War II. To illustrate his point, Gilman traced the institutional development of modernization theory in “an academic think tank (the Harvard Department of Social Relations), a funded research committee (the Social Science Research Council), and an academic think tank with strong government ties (Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies).”¹³

Collectively Latham and Gilman demonstrated the way in which modernization theory was not only a product of the postwar period, but also a manifestation of assumptions and ideological traditions “deeply embedded in American culture” stretching back to Manifest Destiny, the frontier thesis, and New Deal Liberalism.¹⁴ While Latham identified modernization theory as an ideology, and Gilman positioned it in the intellectual milieu of the postwar era, I intend to extend the historiography by revealing evidence of this kind of thinking in the TVA, Point Four Program, and occupation of Japan after World War II. I argue that the reemergence of similar logic, assumptions, and beliefs demonstrates a pervasive American culture that resurfaced when Americans were confronted with the perceived need to modernize in the mid-twentieth century. By examining both domestic and international projects of development, directed by both liberals (David Lilienthal and Chester Bowles) and a conservative (Douglas

¹¹ Christopher T. Fisher, “Nation Building and the Vietnam War: A Historiography,” *Pacific Historical Review* 74:3 (2005): 443.

¹² Gilman, 4.

¹³ Gilman, 4.

¹⁴ Latham, 6, 13-14, 91, 93-94, 108, 145, 211, 220.

MacArthur), I hope my work will help identify the ubiquitous American culture that shaped and influenced theorists on development. By identifying similar logic, assumptions, and beliefs, I argue that the thinking about development in the 1950s and 1960s must be understood as a continuation of thought spanning back to the New Deal. Rather than view the history of thought on development on an administration-by-administration basis, this work suggests that it must be understood as a culminating effort, reflecting American thought and culture in general, not as the work of any specific administration. Modernization theory, as it manifested in the 1950s and 1960s, did not exist in its totality during the 1930s and 1940s, but enough similar ideas and methods were present to distinguish an evolving American ideology of development present during these four decades.

Scholars who focus on domestic American history may find my work helpful because a similar set of ideas, assumption, and beliefs can be found in domestic reform efforts such as the Great Society.¹⁵ Scholars of foreign policy may find my work helpful because it is an effort to break down analytical barriers that separate international policy from domestic culture. Latham started the effort of breaking down established barriers by identifying “modernization for peace” (the Peace Corps) and “modernization at war” (the Strategic Hamlet Program). Historian Christopher T. Fisher has explained that the connection of modernization theory to the Strategic Hamlet Program is important because “historiography has traditionally assigned it distinctly to pacification, which was synonymous with both combat and counterinsurgency.”¹⁶ Latham’s effort breaks down the barrier between military historians and social and cultural historians as I hope to break down barriers between domestic culture and foreign policy. The cumulative effort may bring a fresh perspective to American history in the twentieth century and reveal the value of studying development.

Although modernization theory certainly had novel aspects, notably the social, cultural, and psychological elements, much of it was simply the coalesced logic, assumptions, and methods acquired from previous American experiences with development including the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Point Four Program, and the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II. Examination of these three programs reveals within them some common

¹⁵ Christopher T. Fisher, “ ‘The Hopes of Man’: The Cold War, Modernization Theory, and the Issue of Race in the 1960s” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 2002).

¹⁶ Fisher, 449.

aspects of an enduring American method of development. Modernization theorists continued the tradition, whether intentionally or unknowingly, by incorporating logic, assumptions, and methods developed in previous development schemes into modernization theory. Modernization theorists derived from the TVA an emphasis on democratization, decentralization, and science and technology as both evidence of and harbingers of modernization. TVA director David Lilienthal emphasized material prosperity as a prerequisite to modernization. The Point Four Program director in India, Chester Bowles, also argued for the necessity of material abundance and democracy but added a concept called the Community Development Program. Bowles' idea of Community Development, in which individuals contributed to planning the program for their own village, not only fostered democracy and nationalism by connecting villagers to the government but also simultaneously sought to improve agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure to accelerate development. Both Bowles and modernization theorists founded their theories in Keynesian economics. John Maynard Keynes, a British economist that was influential in America during the mid-twentieth century, identified areas, such as agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure, which the government could improve in order to stimulate the economy. Modernization theorists also prescribed improvement in these specific areas. From the occupation of Japan, theorists took an example of modernization imposed by a military, led by a single leader, Douglas MacArthur. Embedded in occupation authorities' efforts in Japan were conceptions about modernity and tradition that were very similar to those later identified by modernization theorists.

Development of the Third World became a major U.S. policy objective during the Cold War. Historian Christopher Simpson has claimed that, "contrary to common assumptions, the 'ideological offensive' has been at least as central to U.S. national security strategy since 1945 as the atomic bomb."¹⁷ Although the invention of nuclear weapons escalated war's potential scope and destructiveness, it also pushed policymakers toward less bellicose strategies. Less bellicose strategies were important because policymakers desired some form of control over the world situation and from 1945 to 1960 forty independent nations, with a population of more than 800 million, emerged from colonial rule. Within the context of the global Cold War, U.S.

¹⁷ Christopher Simpson, ed., *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), xvii.

policymakers believed it was imperative to prevent the spread of communism into the Third World including the newly independent countries. Kennedy's and Johnson's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated in a news conference on May 4, 1961: "If you don't pay attention to the periphery, the periphery changes. And the first thing you know the periphery is the center."¹⁸ Or as Lyndon Johnson said in a speech on April 20, 1964, "surrender anywhere threatens defeat everywhere."¹⁹ Policymakers sought to deny Soviet influence and turn emerging countries into friendly democratic nations. Development attained strategic significance. In the global setting, American policymakers sought the allegiance of the greatest part of the globe. They figured that the more capitalist countries there were, the easier it would be to prevent the spread of communism, and the more isolated and weaker the Soviet Union would be.²⁰ To achieve this end, the government funded academics and their research.

Funding provided modernization theorists with the opportunity to develop their ideas. From 1955 to 1959 federal funding to university research doubled and by 1968 funding sextupled from its 1959 level. In addition, private foundations such as the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and various Rockefeller brothers' organizations sponsored university research.²¹ Policymakers realized that nuclear weapons were impotent in the battle for the Third World. Therefore they provided funding to academics to formulate a nonviolent method to win the hearts and minds of the Third World. They also wanted to prevent socialist or communist nationalistic aspirations and revolutions. The result was a growing linkage of government with the academic community. All three of the institutions instrumental in the creation of modernization theory received vast amounts of government funding.

Inspired by a need to provide useful knowledge to their government, modernization theorists engaged in an effort to create a systematic blueprint of development by synthesizing all changes—psychological, social, economic, and cultural—that occurred in the transition from an agriculturally based traditional society to an industrially based modern society. Theorists who were convinced that all societies develop along a universal path and converge at the exact same

¹⁸ Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 152.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 152.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 152.

²¹ Howard Brick, *Age of Contradiction: American Thought & Culture in the 1960s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 8.

end state were interested in what modernization theorist Daniel Lerner called “the historical sequence of Western growth.”²² Theorists used the categories of traditional and modern to measure each society’s level of development and promote modernization in areas deemed traditional. Modernization theorist James Coleman characterized a modern society as one with

a comparatively high degree of urbanization, widespread literacy, comparatively high per capita income, extensive geographical and social mobility, a relatively high degree of commercialization and industrialization of the economy, an extensive and penetrative network of mass communication media, and in general, by widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic processes.²³

Traditional society and individuals within it, by contrast, were non-scientific or characterized by a pre-Newtonian rationality, locally oriented, tenaciously connected with an extended family network, neither geographically nor socially mobile, religious, agrarian, non-industrialized, unable or unopen to adapt, stratified along social and gender lines, respectful of age over merit, economically simple, holding no adherence to universal time or strict schedules, unconnected to national or international media, and non-participatory in politics.²⁴

Many of these traits that modernization theorists considered traditional had already been classified as such in the occupation of Japan after World War II. To identify Japanese characteristics in need of reform for the Japanese to become a fully modern nation, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur and other occupation authorities relied on cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*.²⁵ Benedict described Japanese society as permeated by feudalism, which arrested Japan’s modernization. Predating but anticipating the concept of “traditional” that was used in modernization theory, Benedict claimed that feudalism, held together by the imperial system,

²² Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, with an introduction by David Riesman (London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1958; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 46.

²³ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 532.

²⁴ C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 9-25; Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 19-32.

²⁵ Olivier Zunz, *Why the American Century?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 164; Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, with a forward by Ian Buruma (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005).

stunted the growth of a scientific critical spirit, maintained a religious society, prevented a participatory polity, encouraged peerage, denied social and economic mobility, and maintained a cohesive family structure including extensive involvement with extended relatives. Each of these categories was, in turn, targeted for reform through revision of the Japanese Constitution. As in modernization theory, occupation authorities' target was epitomized by the contemporary United States society, conveniently the opposite of Benedict's Japan.

Modernization differed from *Modernism*. Modernism was a culture—a collection of related “ideas, beliefs, values, and modes of perception”—that emerged around the beginning of the twentieth century.²⁶ Modernism included writers like James Joyce and T. S. Eliot, painters like Theo van Doesburg and Piet Mondrian, architects like Walter Gropius and Mies van der Rohe, and philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche and William James. Modernization, by contrast, was a process of development and transition. Although modernization theorists used the term modernism, they intended it to signify the process of becoming like the modern nations of the West—technologically advanced, industrialized, economically complex, and urban—not the process of becoming a Modernist. Western countries were “modern,” Western experts working on Third World development were “modernizers,” and the zenith of development was “modernity”; modernization was the manifestation of rather than the response to, as Gilman puts it, “the technological and material dimension of bourgeois society” that characterized Modernists.²⁷ While modernization theorists believed that they could uncover universal objective truths, Modernists distrusted most forms of definite knowledge. Victorianism, the culture against which Modernism rebelled, attempted to permanently dichotomize the world. A person was either a savage or civilized. The savage could acquire Victorian traits and attitudes but could never truly become civilized.²⁸ Modernists sought to eliminate the compartmentalization of knowledge and reality. Historians Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane argue that Modernists held the threefold goal of fragmenting Victorian categories and absolutes, re-integrating the fragments in novel ways, and finally blending the pieces into a

²⁶ Daniel Walker Howe, “American Victorianism as a Culture,” *American Quarterly* 27:5 (December 1975): 528.

²⁷ Gilman, 7.

²⁸ Howe, 528.

seamless creation.²⁹ In this sense modernization theorists benefited from Modernists' effort to break down Victorian barriers. Savages could now become civilized. Modernism made modernization theory possible.³⁰

If Modernism paved the way, the intellectual milieu of the postwar United States was the immediate spur to modernization theory. The complexity of the modernization process demanded a "total" theory. To explain development fully, modernization theorists used all fields of knowledge including sociology, history, political science, psychology, and anthropology. As a result, theorists' ideas were in line with the prevalent trends and interpretations within each subject. Theorists took from and became involved in the debate over the "end of ideology" within sociology, consensus history within the historical profession, and the "elite theory of democracy" within political science.

The "end of ideology" debate inspired and solidified modernization theorists' belief that their theory was an objective and accurate formulation. The term first appeared in an American setting in Edward Shils' paper "The End of Ideology?" describing the 1954 Congress of Cultural Freedom in Milan. The meeting included an amalgam of Western intellectuals devoted to combating ideology, specifically that of the Soviets.³¹ Shils, a future modernization theorist, borrowed the term from French philosopher Raymond Aron and used it to describe the apparent lack of ideological disagreement among the intellectuals in attendance. Shils interpreted the consensus to signify that Western-style social democracy had surpassed all intellectual discord over fundamental questions. By eliminating discord, Western society proved itself to be the only way to properly organize society. Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset furthered Shils' logical conclusion. Lipset argued that the West had solved all major systematic disagreements. He claimed: "the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left has recognized that an increase in overall state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions to economic problem."³² Bell and Lipset concluded that all remaining problems were technical and would be solved by

²⁹ Daniel Joseph Singal, "Toward a Definition of American Modernism," *American Quarterly* 39:1 (1987).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 7-26.

³¹ Peter Watson, *The Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the 20th Century* (New York: Perennial Press, 2001), 447-448.

³² Gilman, 58.

objective social scientists and technocrats. In identifying the end of ideology, Bell was referring to the West. He recognized that ideology remained prevalent in Asia, South America, and Africa. He believed that the task of the West was to lead non-Western countries toward the inevitable final result, a post-ideological welfare democracy comprised of decentralized power, mixed economy, and political pluralism.³³ Modernization theorists took from the debate on the end of ideology a confirmation that the West embodied the end state of development. They also thought that Western intellectuals and technocrats stood above ideology and could lead non-Western countries toward modernity.

In addition to drawing from sociology, modernization theorists participated in and borrowed from developments within the historical profession. What was called consensus history dominated American historical scholarship from the late forties until the early sixties. The consensus interpretation of history replaced the Progressive interpretation personified by Charles Beard. Progressives had emphasized conflict and struggle between the haves and have-nots as the driving force of history. In contrast, consensus historians, including Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, and David Potter, emphasized what unified Americans, not what divided them. Historians minimized major conflicts within American history and portrayed American history as amicable progress. For example, in *The Age of Reform*, Richard Hofstadter described Populists not as agriculturalists with legitimate grievances but as nostalgic nativists and anti-Semites suffering from what psychologist Erik Erikson called an “identity crisis.” Hofstadter thought that the conflict that these people had experienced did not represent a truly ideological conflict within American history.³⁴ Allan Nevins removed labor conflict from American history by transforming the image of the robber barons from avaricious businessmen to individuals whose contributions to American’s military power and victory in World War II far outweighed their shortcomings.³⁵ Few radical interpretations appeared in the mainstream historical scholarship of the 1940s and 1950s. Modernization theorists accepted the conception of

³³ Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 401-404.

³⁴ Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 337-39.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 342; Allan Nevins, “Should American History be Rewritten?,” *Saturday Review of Literature* 38 (February 1954): 177-78.

American history confidently offered by consensus historians and used it to construct the category of “modern” within modernization theory. The acceptance of an American past with little conflict allowed modernization theorists to concoct confidently a theory of development free of violence and revolution. The premise that development could be non-violent attracted policymakers who feared revolutions; they worried not only because revolutions could not be controlled by current authorities but also because revolutions might escalate into a global hot war.³⁶

One historical development that offered encouragement to modernization theorists and became prominent with them was the Tennessee Valley Authority. The TVA was a New Deal program that constructed dams on the Tennessee River for the benefit of the valley and its residents. Historian David Ekbladh has claimed that most Americans considered the valley and its residents backward compared to the rest of the “modern” country.³⁷ The TVA generated and distributed electricity, manufactured fertilizer, improved agriculture, and enhanced educational programs. To modernize the region, director David Lilienthal relied on a formula combining science and technology, democracy, and decentralization. After World War II, inconsistencies between Lilienthal’s democratic rhetoric and the actual operation of the TVA were marginalized. The material successes of the TVA endeared it to modernization theorists who were considering the problems of development of the poverty-beset Third World. The TVA became a distinctly American, yet supposedly universal, model of development to be emulated throughout the world.

The increased material prosperity from the TVA resounded with modernization theorists such as Walt Rostow and Max Millikan because, relying on consensus historian David Potter’s *People of Plenty*,³⁸ they believed abundance was required for a peaceful development process and stable end state. Here Potter attempted to identify democracy as the fundamental element in American national character. He argued that history shaped culture which in turn shaped

³⁶ Hunt, 159.

³⁷ David Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of The Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-1973,” *Diplomatic History* 26:3 (2002): 337.

³⁸ Gilman, 67. Historian Nils Gilman pointed out that Rostow relied specifically on *People of Plenty* for his argument in a book-length unpublished essay entitled “The Making of Modern America.”

national character.³⁹ Secure in the consensus belief that there was relatively little conflict in the American past, Potter argued that the United States' abundance had mitigated conflict, enabled social mobility and equality, and made democracy in the United States particularly effective.⁴⁰ Abundance prevented socialism and secured democracy. Potter's argument convinced Rostow and Millikan that, as historian Nils Gilman has put it, "economic growth provided the solution to political strife."⁴¹ In contrast to Boorstin's and Hartz's arguments for American exceptionalism and a unique past, Potter's abundance thesis supported development programs, like the TVA, that aimed at augmenting material prosperity and gave a justification for a universal model for producing democracy, a model modernization theorists considered ideal to export worldwide.

In addition to drawing from sociology and history, modernization theorists used ideas prevalent in political science in the late 1940s and 1950s. Postwar political scientists redefined democracy. They did so for two reasons: first, the rise of "People's Republics" and "People's Democracies" alarmed Americans who considered individual liberty and freedom to be the centerpieces of democracy; and, second, the popularity of European communist parties prodded political scientists to rethink the supposed "universal" appeal of democracy and decipher why many Europeans were turning to socialist and communist remedies. A book published during World War II but which gained high popularity in the postwar period among political scientists was economist Joseph Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942). Schumpeter, a leading conservative and anti-communist economist, encapsulated what would become known as the revisionist conception of democracy. Schumpeter fashioned a new conception of democracy predicated upon the belief that it was impractical for common citizen to have complete participation in every aspect of the political decision-making process. Schumpeter believed that common citizens could not participate in everything for two reasons: first, because of the government's esoteric rules and regulations; and, second, because mass participation could create dangerously volatile swings in policy. According to historian Irene Gendzier, Schumpeter called for a "procedural rather than substantive definition of

³⁹ David Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 37.

⁴⁰ Robert Collins, "David Potter's *People of Plenty* and the Recycling of Consensus History," *Reviews in American History* 16:2 (1988): 323-324.

⁴¹ Gilman, 67.

democracy”⁴² and focused “less on the objectives of democratic systems than on the processes involved in their implementation. Attention was paid to institutions, electoral processes, and to the nature of leadership, its [leaders’] decision making skills, and prerogatives.”⁴³ Because complete participation caused capriciousness and required time and effort to educate citizens on how government works, Schumpeter delegated to the polity only the responsibility to elect the representatives with the expertise most relevant to the present situation.⁴⁴ Politics simply became a competition among elites, or experts, for political positions. Upon election, representatives—actually, members of elite groups—would make all decisions for the people.

Postwar political scientists also reinterpreted the meaning of participation. Whereas pre-World War II scholars interpreted nonvoting as a sign of dissatisfaction with the political system, postwar scholars, including Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in *The Civic Culture*, interpreted voters’ choice to not vote as support for the political process.⁴⁵ Almond and Verba believed that if dissatisfaction existed the polity would actively participate in the political process to change the situation. The revisionist scholars’ problem was that their elitist and non-participatory model seemed like the “People’s Republics.” To distinguish themselves, scholars emphasized pluralism. Pluralism meant that elites within a democracy did not constitute a monolithic group as they did in communist countries; instead, various elites, as Gilman put it, “would compete and share political power.”⁴⁶ The elite, non-participatory, pluralist model perfectly suited modernization theorists, who were convinced that a combination of qualified experts could lead traditional societies through a peaceful and controlled transition toward modernity.

A belief in pluralism also prevailed in the policies used in the American occupation of Japan, notably with reference to the Japanese educational system. Modernization theorists recapitulated an elitist theory of democracy similar to that which authorities of the occupation tried to create in Japan without acknowledging it. Colonel Kermit R. Dyke, the director of the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), in charge of educational reform, acknowledged

⁴² Ibid., 48.

⁴³ Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

⁴⁴ Brick, 18.

⁴⁵ Gendzier, 118-119.

⁴⁶ Gilman, 49.

the effects of feudalism and peerage on the Japanese leadership. At the time of Japan's surrender, eighty-five percent of government bureaucrats had graduated from Tokyo Imperial University.⁴⁷ Feudalism allowed the same families and groups to retain power generation after generation. Furthermore, the military had overwhelming control over the educational curriculum and the accepted interpretation within each subject. The interpretation of history, geography, and ethics was especially nationalistic and militaristic and was intended to facilitate the war effort. The CIE sought to remove militaristic influences and to break Tokyo Imperial University's monopoly on education by increasing the number and importance of institutions of higher learning and by encouraging local and regional development of educational curricula.⁴⁸ CIE intended not to exclude educated elites from positions of power but create pluralism by providing a cross-fertilization of knowledge, derived from various institutions of higher learning.

As illustrated by the impact of political science, history, and sociology on modernization theory, the theory was as much a product of the contemporary American intellectual milieu and Americans' definitions of themselves as it was about the Third World countries they described. By placing America at the apex of development, theorists described all other countries by whether they fulfilled the theorists' conception of America.⁴⁹

The theorists' ethnocentrism was unconscious. During the Cold War the belief of most Americans that they alone held and promulgated the truth was particularly acute. They believed that the Soviets were dishonest and that they upheld a positive image of their communist utopia only through propaganda and the truth-repressing "Iron Curtain." Modernization theorists differed little from the American public; theorists believed that only their theory represented objective analysis while ideology tainted communist schemes for development. Modernization theory developed with a "positivist persuasion" in academia in an era that University of

⁴⁷ Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), xxxi.

⁴⁸ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, "Education in the New Japan. Volume 1," (May 1948), 142, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 264.

⁴⁹ Gilman, 12-13; Latham, 14-16.

California Chancellor Clark Kerr termed the New Enlightenment.⁵⁰ Grounded in the Enlightenment ideals of order, planning, and mastery—and influenced by Enlightenment thinkers such as Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Jacques Rousseau—theorists believed that their theory, like science, uncovered universal laws of development and the existence of a master design. The laws were derived from the Western experience and were applicable worldwide.⁵¹ For example, Daniel Lerner argued in 1964 that the “same basic model reappears in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed.”⁵²

Modernization theorists’ claims of objectivity had financial benefits as well. The hard sciences, such as physics, chemistry, and engineering, were receiving the bulk of federal research funding because their discoveries offered tangible contributions to the Cold War effort; modernization theorists’ insistence on the scientific character of their own research and on its supposed objectivity partly came from a need to justify their contributions to the Cold War effort and secure federal research funding. Theorists argued that the vexing problem of development required an objective analysis and explanation that only they could provide. The objectivity argument made modernization theory appear relevant to policymakers.⁵³ Rather than a scam to secure funding from the government, theorists truly believed that their theories were objective and wanted the government to recognize their objectivity, as the hard sciences had achieved.

As self-proclaimed objective experts, theorists believed that they could identify the catalysts of progress and then peacefully, safely, and efficiently accelerate the modernization of traditional countries while avoiding pitfalls discovered during the West’s historical development. In a speech at Dobbs Ferry, New York in 1959, Karl Deutsch claimed that traditional societies could achieve generations’ worth of development in mere decades. Although theorists were in basic harmony on the characteristics of a modern and traditional society, many differed on which catalyst best stimulated modernization. Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, relying on Potter’s ideas about the impact of abundance, argued that modernization depended on the accrual of

⁵⁰ Brick, 24, 26-27, 35.

⁵¹ Gilman, 7-8.

⁵² Lerner, 46.

⁵³ Latham, 6-7, 22, 50.

wealth.⁵⁴ They identified five areas that, with the help of the West, could be improved to spur modernization. Traditional societies needed to mobilize capital, develop technical know-how to use efficient new technology, use science to conquer nature's perils, expand trade to create surpluses, and solidify partnerships with modern societies.⁵⁵ Daniel Lerner argued that increasing the amount of information from the mass media combined with literacy best stimulated modernization. He asserted that mass media increased peoples' awareness of their political and material situation, which in turn drove them to demand democracy and capitalism. Lerner also argued that international awareness inspired empathy among the people of the country and inspired them to act and formulate opinions based on modern international, as opposed to local, standards.⁵⁶ Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith argued that industrialization and the impact of factory regimentation, technocracy, rationalization, and division of labor on the population instilled modernity.⁵⁷ Although modernization theorists disagreed on what exactly spurred modernization, they all agreed that traditional societies were malleable and that qualified experts would guide the transition from a traditional to a modern society.

Both the belief in a model of universal development and a commitment to the specific catalysts to hasten development that would later be outlined in modernization theory had already appeared in the Point Four Program. Chester Bowles, the American ambassador and director of the Point Four Program in India from 1950 to 1953, had formulated a three-stage universal model of development. He claimed that the first stage had started in the United States around 1800. At that time America could best be classified as ruggedly individualistic but accepting of an effective federal government. America moved to the second stage during the 1860s. The second stage was marked by an increased social cohesiveness ushered in by industrialism and by new methods of transportation and communication. America moved into the third and final phase

⁵⁴ Gilman, 67. Historian Nils Gilman pointed out that Rostow relied specifically on *People of Plenty* for his argument in a book-length unpublished essay entitled "The Making of Modern America."

⁵⁵ Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, "Notes of Foreign Economic Policy," in *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, ed. Christopher Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1998).

⁵⁶ Lerner, 4, 49-51.

⁵⁷ Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 5-6.

during the New Deal. The third phase was characterized by an acceptance of a strong federal government and public intervention in the economy.⁵⁸ Bowles went on to argue that the American experience was “similar in many ways to what we now see being undertaken in much of Asia, Africa, and South America, where the social structure is beginning to feel the full impact of the industrial revolution which we faced a century ago.”⁵⁹

Bowles also aimed at the same pillars of tradition to accelerate development. Through the activities of the Community Development Program, Bowles demonstrated to both Americans and Indians the advantages of science and technology. Within Community Development projects, American technicians demonstrated how science and technology could improve agriculture, education, and health. Technicians also sought increase the technical know-how of Indians through the demonstrations and by enrolling them in educational programs. In the logic of Bowles and later modernization theorists, these two things stimulated and accelerated modernization. The bond between American experts and Third World populations was also vital in both Point Four and modernization theory.

Modernization theory relied on enlightened experts to accelerate the modernization process to “engender a new consciousness as well as a new society.”⁶⁰ Although the people never held much power themselves to direct modernization, historian Nils Gilman points out that the little power they did have steadily eroded as modernization moved from technocosmopolitan to a revolutionary and finally to an authoritarian form.⁶¹ Advocates of technocosmopolitan modernization, which dominated immediately after World War II, believed that modernization could occur through existing institutions and social dynamics.⁶² These advocates agreed with the rhetoric of both Harry Truman’s and John Kennedy’s inaugural addresses that the U.S. should simply “help people help themselves.” Educators should help to spread literacy,

⁵⁸ Chester Bowles, *American Politics in a Revolutionary World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), ix, 12, 26.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁶⁰ Nils Gilman, “Modernization Theory: The Highest Stage of American Intellectual History,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization Development, and the Global Cold War*, eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 9.

⁶¹ Gilman, 9.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 9.

agronomists should improve crop yields, and sanitation experts should ameliorate health, all components of modernization, but the existing institutions should remain. The reform agenda of technocosmopolitanism was gradually replaced by revolutionary modernization. The revolutionary modernists sought to replace immediately the antiquated organization of traditional society with modern Western organization. Relying on their belief that all humans are the same, revolutionary modernists believed that modern organization would take root and flourish if immediately imposed on traditional societies. The new state apparatus would then guide society toward modernity. As the modernization process proved to be slower than expected in the high-stakes Cold War, theorists such as Lucian Pye advocated authoritarian modernization. Pye accepted authoritarianism and military dictatorships as viable methods to force traditional societies through a rapid transition to modernity; democracy could justifiably be deferred until the social, cultural, and economic setting had taken root.⁶³

Pye and other theorists took MacArthur's actions in Japan as evidence that authoritarian modernization could succeed. As Supreme Commander, MacArthur had full control over the occupation. Accordingly he instituted immediate constitutional reform to eliminate Japan's feudalistic structure and rapidly accelerate Japan toward modernity. The fact that the Japanese had only hesitantly accepted the new constitution but later came to enthusiastically embrace its principles demonstrated the way in which imposed foreign concepts could flourish in a non-modern society. The occupation lent credence to the view that Western modernity was universal and to a sense of how it could be achieved.

In the turbulent times of the late 1960s, modernization theorists approved MacArthur's method of politically imposing modernization; economically, theorists accepted Keynesianism and rejected neo-classical economic theories of purely economic development. Geographers Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick have described neo-classical economists' theories as "a science shorn of sociological and historical material, abstract in conception, universal in application, technical and mathematical in methodology."⁶⁴ Neo-classical economists such as W.S. Jevons, Carl Menger, Leon Walras, Friedrich von Wieser, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, and J.B. Clark used the idea of marginal utility to theorize how prices for labour and commodities

⁶³ Ibid., 185-189.

⁶⁴ Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, *Theories of Development* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), 34.

were set by supply and demand. Jevons, Menger, and Walras essentially argued that demand determined price. Wieser, Bohm-Bawerk, and Clark accepted that demand was a factor in determining price, but added that production was just as important. A person's dissatisfaction with work might lead him or her to reduce their hours, therefore decrease their income, and hence their demand for various luxury products. Despite their differences, they agreed that the economy could best be analyzed by model-based formalist rigor.⁶⁵ Modernization theorists contested neo-classical economists' argument that social factors were subordinate to economics. Although industrialization could be imposed on traditional societies, modern social values could not. Neo-classical economists lacked a method to account for social forces and non-rational individuals. Talcott Parsons and Walt Rostow argued that non-rational social propensities existed within each society and that these propensities dictated the penetration and effectiveness of industrialization. According to Rostow societies without the propensities to consume, accept innovations, seek material advance, or apply science for economic ends had little chance of achieving economic modernity.⁶⁶ Historian Nils Gilman has explained that Rostow believed that "the economies of these largely peasants societies were inseparable from local cultures, social structures, and political institutions."⁶⁷ Theorists agreed with neo-classical economists that economic growth was vital to development, but, if they were to confidently control growth, they required a theory that would account for non-economic factors that hindered or stimulated growth. Lucian Pye explained that "economic criteria are not unimportant and certainly should not be casually disregarded, but they are not adequate for...our policy toward the underdeveloped areas."⁶⁸ Theorists required an omni-disciplinary approach to measure modernity, one that understood development as a conceptual whole including economic, social, and psychological factors.

Modernization theorists' confidence can also be characterized as a product of and response to the "Age of Anxiety." In 1947, Anglo-American poet W.H Auden wrote the "Age of Anxiety," describing a man's quest to discover his own identity and mission within a rapidly

⁶⁵ Ibid., 31-34.

⁶⁶ Kimber Charles Pearce, *Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 40; Gilman, 162.

⁶⁷ Gilman, 82.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 83.

changing and industrializing New York. Like Auden's character, modernization theorists suffered from a deep-seated anxiety as they developed and carried out their ideas. With postwar Europe devastated, temporarily diminishing its ability to lead, and the Cold War under way, Americans believed that they were thrust into a global leadership role. Government officials often depended on academics to define America's national identity and mission within the postwar context. However from the mid-forties to the mid-sixties Americans suffered from an identity crisis. Americans at once embraced the image of governmental competence and McCarthyism, policy-creating academics and intellectual autonomy and objectivity, social conformity and racial conflict, promising nuclear-powered inventions and nuclear holocaust, increased participation in mass society and augmented individualism, and adherence to systems theory and anti-systemic sentiment.⁶⁹ Modernization theorists, believing themselves global leaders and the world's best hope, chose to highlight the positive and deny the negative aspects of their unstable identity. The theorists were more influenced by the congratulatory and affirmative trend in postwar America than by negative self-images.

The various works of modernization theorists coalesced into a general theory by the end of the 1950s. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations then used the conceptual framework provided by theorists as a guidepost for the Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps, and Strategic Hamlet Program.⁷⁰ However, embedded in modernization theory were assumptions, methods, and logic already in existence in previous American development schemes, notably, the TVA, occupation of Japan, and Point Four Program.

Modernization theorists sometimes knowingly and sometimes unintentionally replicated previously developed themes. From the TVA, theorists found a model of development distinctly American and, in their eyes, universally applicable. The themes expounded on by Lilienthal—democratization, decentralization, and science and technology as catalysts to development—struck a cord with modernization theorists. Democracy simultaneously fulfilled an essential characteristic of modernity, set the American theory of development apart from Soviet schemes, and eased the mind of former colonial subjects. America's scientific and technological

⁶⁹ Brick, xii, 23-27, 98-121, 124-134; Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon, 1985).

⁷⁰ See Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*.

wonderland was to enhance the desire of Third World populations to become more like the U.S. and not the U.S.S.R.

The Point Four Program also brought American scientific and technical expertise into contact with the Third World population but added a plan of action. The plan, founded on Keynesian economics, directed Third World governments to invest public money in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure to spur economic growth. Economic prosperity, wrought by government spending, would provide the foundation for sustained and irreversible transition into full modernity.

The structure of authority in the occupation of Japan convinced authoritarian modernizers of the 1960s of the likely success of similar projects in the future. In addition, the reforms in the educational system during the occupation provided a means to achieve a pluralist democracy after the occupation ended. Rather than just being a coincidence, the re-emergence of certain themes may lend credence to enduring cultural assumptions about what was traditional, modern, and how the transition between them could best take place.

CHAPTER 2 - TVA in the Depression Years: American Archetype of Grass-Roots Democracy for Global Application

Political Scientist James C. Scott aptly described the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as the “granddaddy of all regional development projects.”⁷¹ Created within the chaotic first hundred days of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term, the TVA was an organization designed to bring prosperity to an area of the United States that, according to historian David Ekbladh, was commonly thought of as economically backward and stagnant.⁷² To accomplish this goal, TVA directors used economic, agricultural, and educational experts to promote prosperity through the construction of dams, the generation of electricity, flood control, agricultural development, manufacturing of fertilizer, and educational improvement.

The TVA encapsulated several themes that became embedded in postwar thinking on modernization and the ways to accelerate it. The first pertained to science and technology. The TVA relied on an abundance of applied science and technology to shape and control nature toward human ends. Both the construction of dams and development of new phosphate fertilizers to suit the conditions in the valley required an abundance of scientific knowledge. Encouraged by the TVA’s success, modernization theorists posited that all modern society must be founded on rational science and technology. Second was grass-roots democracy. TVA director David E. Lilienthal argued that the people impacted by development should have control of it. Accordingly he emphasized that the TVA provided the tools while local people chose and carried out each development project. The impersonal forces of applied technology and scientific management were supposedly made accessible to the valley residents through democratic participation. Modernization theorists also championed democratic participation to differentiate their development programs from communist centralized development and to gain the adherence

⁷¹ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 6.

⁷² The Tennessee Valley covers nearly all of Tennessee, parts of Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, and small portions of Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia.

of Third World nations skeptical of colonialism. The theme of grass-roots democracy was thus connected to decentralization. Within the TVA structure, ultimate power resided in Washington D.C. but regional authorities held the power to change existing or formulate new policies. Post-World War II theorists such as Walt Rostow, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, and Edward Shils keyed in on the TVA structure as a viable method to provide programs of modernization. Also, the perceived flexibility of the TVA structure attracted postwar theorists who needed a model that would work in a variety of circumstances throughout the world. Finally, prosperity created by technologically advanced techniques and structures, controlled by democratic participation, and operated through a decentralized organization formed a distinctly American alternative to Soviet development. Theorists such as Walt Rostow argued that Soviet schemes might provide material well-being but that communists required the people to be regimented and to be deprived of input in the decision-making process; in contrast, the American method gave the people a part in the decision-making process. In 1949, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., argued in *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* that:

No other people in the world approach the Americans in mastery of the new magic of science and technology. Our engineers can transform arid plains or poverty-stricken river valleys into wonderlands of vegetation and power....The Tennessee Valley Authority is a weapon which, if properly employed, might outbid all the social ruthlessness of the Communists for the support of the people of Asia.⁷³

American prosperity produced by technological mastery would ease social and political tensions while eliminating any desires by Third World leaders for radical communist redistributive schemes.

From the start the TVA was an experimental project. The drafters of the TVA act included no definite vision or plan other than to ameliorate the conditions in the Tennessee Valley for the benefit of its residents through regional development. Historian Paul Conkin has stated that the TVA Act “was essentially a blank check.”⁷⁴ When asked to comment on what precisely the TVA was, Roosevelt responded that it was “neither fish nor fowl” but “whatever it

⁷³ David Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of The Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-1973,” *Diplomatic History* 26:3 (2002): 350.

⁷⁴ Paul K. Conkin, “Intellectual and Political Roots,” in *TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy*, ed. Erwin Hargrove (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 15-25.

is, it will taste awfully good to the people of the Tennessee Valley.”⁷⁵ While governor of New York, Roosevelt had begun to consider establishing a publically owned and controlled authority on the St. Lawrence River. The St. Lawrence River project never got off the ground, but, once he became president, Roosevelt jumped at the opportunity to create a river authority. Expanding on Nebraska Senator George Norris’s idea of a regional development plan centered on the Muscle Shoals Dam in Alabama, Roosevelt sought to encapsulate the entire Tennessee Valley.

As an experimental project, the TVA was controversial because it was a federally owned corporation. It held no legal accountability to any federal bureaucracy nor to any of the seven states in whose territory it operated.⁷⁶ TVA directors answered directly to the President. Prior to the TVA’s creation the United States had few—and mainly unsuccessful—experiences with federally owned enterprises. For example, Woodrow Wilson nationalized the railroads on December 29, 1917, to assist in the mobilization for World War I.⁷⁷ Once the railroads were under government control, Treasury Secretary and Director General of the new Railroad Administration William Gibbs McAdoo raised railroad laborers’ wages to “pacify the restless railway brotherhoods” and secure a stable workforce. McAdoo raised railroad rates to pay for the \$300 million wage hike, thereby mitigating the reason for the government take-over: affordable transportation rates. McAdoo drew vast amounts of criticism and the railroads were returned to private ownership after the war.⁷⁸ As had been the case with the railroads, the TVA drew attacks from privately owned enterprises, notably utility companies. The TVA power program drew the most protest because it consisted of government-owned generation facilities selling power to government-owned distribution utilities, eliminating the need for private distributors of electricity such as Wendell Willkie’s Commonwealth and Southern (C&S). In two separate Supreme Court cases, *Ashwander v. TVA* (1936) and *Tennessee Power Company v. TVA* (1940), TVA attorneys successfully defended the constitutionality of the TVA’s power program

⁷⁵ Amity Shlaes, *The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 178.

⁷⁶ Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia.

⁷⁷ David Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 253.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 253-256.

against private utility companies. In both cases the Court ruled that the TVA had authority to market electricity generated from its hydroelectric dams.⁷⁹

Mired in poverty, the people of the Tennessee Valley cared more for the TVA's potential to help their economic plight than the TVA's legal battles. In November 1933, the national unemployment rate stood at 23.2%. The average income of Tennessee Valley residents was less than half of the U.S. average.⁸⁰ With few economic opportunities, the largely agrarian population of the valley remained relegated to a life of simple survival. The residents' only way of obtaining economic or social mobility was to move out of the valley. Very few had the means to do so. Advisor to Roosevelt and agricultural economist Rexford Tugwell concluded that much of the farmland within the valley had been farmed too hard for too long. He claimed that the soil was "approaching the limits of arability."⁸¹ The valley held the highest concentration of farmers to acres of land in the entire country.

The first phase of the TVA, from 1933 to 1944, consisted of organizing the TVA, creating the policy for managing the generation and sale of hydroelectric power, fighting off legal challenges to its publically owned power program, developing flood control procedures, initiating the development of fertilizer and farm demonstration programs, and other assorted methods of developing natural resources and improving the economy of the Tennessee Valley.⁸² To accomplish these tasks Roosevelt appointed a board of three directors that answered directly to him. The first was Dr. Arthur E. Morgan.⁸³ A.E. Morgan was a former president of Antioch

⁷⁹ Dean Hill Rivkin, "TVA, the Courts, and the Public Interest," in *TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy*, ed. Erwin Hargrove (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 194-201.

⁸⁰ Shlaes, 178.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁸² Erwin C. Hargrove, *Prisoners of Myth: The Leadership of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933-1990* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2001), 4.

⁸³ A.E. Morgan, often referred to as FDR's utopian, was an idealist. As an engineer as well as an idealist, Morgan's life goal was to combine science with moral reform. Disdainful of politics, he believed that enlightened experts could lead individuals toward moral living. A.E. Morgan's life and work experiences not only qualified him for his work at the TVA but illuminated the direction he sought to take in the Tennessee Valley. First, in the 1920s, A.E. Morgan's engineering firm had constructed a successful and innovative series of dams on the Ohio River known as the Ohio Conservancy Project. On top of his experience on the Ohio Conservancy Project Morgan had experience with moral reform. In 1921, he became president of Antioch College in Yellow Springs, Ohio. To revive

College and had obtained experience building earthen dams while working as an engineer on an innovative series of dams on the Ohio River, part of a program known as the Miami Conservatory Project.⁸⁴ With A.E. Morgan's help, Roosevelt hired Dr. Harcourt A. Morgan⁸⁵ (no relation) as the second director of the TVA. Coming to the TVA straight from his position as the president of the University of Tennessee, H.A. Morgan lent credibility to the TVA. People of the Tennessee Valley respected H.A. Morgan for his honesty and sincerity. Many have speculated that without H.A. Morgan the project never would have gotten off the ground.⁸⁶

The final, and most important, director was David E. Lilienthal. Although Lilienthal was, as he liked to say, the only director not named Morgan, a doctor, or a college president, he stood out because of his endless energy, charisma, and drive. Lilienthal's tireless efforts to publicize the TVA and his contagious optimism were the major reasons for the allure of the TVA. The *Journal of the National Education Association* declared his *TVA: Democracy on the March*, which focused on the organization's virtues, the most important book of 1944. Lilienthal biographer Steven Neuse claimed that the book "is arguably the finest example of political rhetoric in the century."⁸⁷ Contemporaries and future readers alike took Lilienthal's quixotic image of the TVA as reality. Lilienthal himself believed that inspiration was a leader's most effective instrument. He understood that the TVA required a positive image to succeed as a motivational tool for both TVA workers and valley residents. Without Lilienthal's appeals to the

the struggling college and instill moral righteousness A.E. Morgan established a novel work/study program. For students to apply what they learned and gain valuable experience, students' time was divided equally between work and school. In addition A.E. Morgan established a moral code for students as well as faculty that forbade any non-productive activities such as drinking alcohol or staying out past 8 pm. A.E. Morgan attempted to transform his highly moralistic Antioch vision onto the TVA, most clearly in the utopian town of Norris. His vision clashed with both H.A. Morgan's and David Lilienthal's vision. The conflict ended only when FDR removed A.E. from the TVA board in 1937.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 24-26.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 32-35. H.A. Morgan developed the idea of the "common mooring" notably that humans and nature were interdependent. According to Erwin Hargrove, because of H.A. Morgan's inability to clearly articulate his vision, he never became a visionary for the TVA. Throughout his TVA career he simply remained in a position of dependable staff person.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 32-35.

⁸⁷ Steven M. Neuse, *David E. Lilienthal: The Journey of an American Liberal* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1996), xviii.

nation, it is unlikely that the TVA would have held such a resilient position in the mind of postwar liberals. Born in Morton, Illinois in 1899, Lilienthal attended DePauw University and then move on to Harvard Law School, studying under Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter later became a Supreme Court Justice and acquired fame for his approval of government controlled-utilities. Throughout their lifelong friendship—and especially during the TVA years—Lilienthal consulted Frankfurter on the legal issues of government ownership.⁸⁸ After his studies at Harvard, Lilienthal practiced law under labor lawyer Donald Richberg and became a member of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission under Wisconsin's innovative Governor Philip La Follette.

As director of the TVA Lilienthal held an overriding faith that the power of science and technology could modernize the Tennessee Valley. Historian Roland Stromberg has claimed that, unlike Europeans, Americans suffered little from the post-World War One disillusionment with science, technology, mechanization, progress, and Western civilization in general. Compared to the Europeans who experienced warfare such as the Battle of the Somme—where the Germans killed 60,000 British soldiers in one day—historian David Kennedy has explained that Americans experienced “the relatively open warfare that characterized action all along the front in the final weeks when the American army at last saw combat.”⁸⁹ Kennedy has also written that Europeans “were soon made to see the skull of death beneath the smiling skin of life.”⁹⁰ British writer H.G. Wells commented that “this civilization in which we are living is tumbling down, and I think tumbling down very fast.” Many Europeans lost faith in themselves and in the future of Western civilization.⁹¹ When Americans did experience disillusionment, historian Michael Adas has pointed out, “Hemingway and John Dos Passos notwithstanding, postwar American disillusionment was a product of the failure of the peace process more than a reaction against modern mechanized warfare.”⁹² Americans maintained their affinity for science

⁸⁸ Ibid., 322.

⁸⁹ Kennedy, 215.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 213.

⁹¹ Roland N. Stromberg, *European Intellectual History Since 1789*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990), 242. Stromberg fully describes the European pessimism after World War I on pages 239-249.

⁹² Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 409.

and technology and their belief in the benevolence of machines. Historian Leo Marx has asserted that, as America industrialized, newspapermen, writers, and politicians increasingly emphasized the “special affinity between the machine and the New Republic.”⁹³ Historian David Nye has claimed that by 1876 the engineer had found place at the “center of pantheon of American Heroes.”⁹⁴ In the decades following World War I, applied science and technology pervaded American society more than any other society in the world. American society became saturated by products such as Ford vehicles, radios, telephones, motion pictures, and labor-saving devices such as vacuums, washing machines, toasters, and electric stoves.⁹⁵

Not only did Lilienthal accept the prevailing American belief in the benefits of science and technology, he did his best to further it. Because all TVA activities required an abundance of and faith in technology—dam construction, fertilizer development, the generation of electricity, and flood control—Lilienthal understood that the best way to gain public support for the controversial organization was to convince the American public that the TVA reinforced rather than threatened America’s values, including its traditional emphasis on technology. In *Prisoners of Myth*, political scientist Erwin Hargrove has noted that “TVA leaders were captivated with the idea of an electric valley in which technology would produce a good life for all people.”⁹⁶ By 1945 the TVA operated 26 dams, produced more electricity than any other single integrated system in the country (12 billion kilowatts per hours), and provided ten percent of total electricity for the war effort.⁹⁷ Lilienthal explained to the American public in various speeches that there was “no turning back from the machine...to a simpler romantic time and handicraft economy.”⁹⁸ He promulgated that the TVA was the best way to apply science and technology to society’s problems.

⁹³ Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1964; USA: Oxford University Press, 2000), 203.

⁹⁴ David. E. Nye, *American Technological Sublime* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 122.

⁹⁵ Adas, 409.

⁹⁶ Hargrove, *Prisoners of Myth*, 8.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁹⁸ Michael J. McDonald and John Muldowny, *TVA and the Dispossessed: The Resettlement of Population in the Norris Dam Area* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981), 36.

Lilienthal conceived of a modern society as one that increasingly controlled nature. In Lilienthal's conception, science, technology, and organizational skills combined to harness nature for the material benefit of humans. The burdens of floods, poverty, physical exhaustion, and a laborious existence would be eliminated.⁹⁹ According to Lilienthal, the endpoint of development would be a scientific society with maximum predictability. In *TVA: Democracy on the March* Lilienthal painted a picture of the rational TVA conquering nature. The previously unpredictable Tennessee River that had so violently wreaked havoc on the valley residents through flash floods—destroying farms, crops, livestock, houses, towns, and communities—now bent to the will of the people. When faced with a potential flood, the TVA employees sprang into action:

Day by day until the crisis was over the men at their control instruments at each dam in the system received their orders. The rate of water release from every tributary river was precisely controlled. The Tennessee was kept in hand. There was no destruction, no panic, no interruption of work. Most of the water, instead of wrecking the valley, actually produced a benefit in power, when later it was released through the turbines.¹⁰⁰

Also experts made advancements in science and technology possible. They enjoyed Lilienthal's admiration and confidence. He boldly proclaimed that "there is almost nothing, however fantastic, that (given competent organization) a team of engineers, scientists, and administrators cannot do today (parentheses in original). Impossible things can be done, are being done in this mid-twentieth century."¹⁰¹ To function the TVA depended on experts in public health, wildlife and marine biologists, geologists, agronomists, architects, foresters, chemists, librarians, wood technicians, accountants and lawyers.¹⁰² Experts not only held a central role within the TVA scheme, "but in every facet of modern living...the people are now helpless without the experts."¹⁰³ Lilienthal argued that "experts as well as rivers have no politics"¹⁰⁴ and

⁹⁹ William C. Harvard Jr., "Images of TVA: The Clash Over Values," in *TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy*, ed. Erwin Hargrove (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 297-302.

¹⁰⁰ David Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1944; pocketbook ed., New York: Pocket Books, Inc, 1944), 16.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 194.

that they got “beneath prejudices, dogmas, and broad generalizations, down to the facts themselves, the working facts.”¹⁰⁵ He claimed that experts were apolitical.

Although Lilienthal repeatedly spoke about technology’s ability to help bring prosperity to less developed areas, his confidence had limits. He tempered his enthusiasm for technology by proclaiming that the physical benefits produced by science and technology may “bring no benefits, may indeed be evil.”¹⁰⁶ Since the very beginning of mechanization some individuals feared that machines could ruin their livelihood or even enslave humans. For example, early-nineteenth-century British artisans known as Luddites conducted a social movement protesting changes in textile making produced by mechanization in the Industrial Revolution. Lilienthal claimed to have the same fear that technology and machines could diminish human creativity and ruin their livelihood. The only way to avert such a quagmire, he argued, was to wed technology to democracy.

The goal of grass-roots democracy inspired more hope than any other issue pertaining to the TVA. As evident by the title of his book, *TVA: Democracy on the March*, Lilienthal placed the utmost significance on democracy. The TVA leaders thought that an imposed federal program would be alien and unwelcome and therefore accomplish little. Lilienthal enjoyed telling the story of his first meeting with community leaders in Decatur, Alabama. The skeptical leaders, reluctant to give up their power to an outsider, questioned Lilienthal on what he planned to do now that he was in charge of developing their area. Lilienthal recollected that he just sat back in his chair smiled, and said, “I’m not going to do anything. You’re going to do it.”¹⁰⁷ The story encapsulated Lilienthal’s conception of grass-roots democracy. The TVA would provide the tools and technical ability; the people would devise a plan and provide labor for projects. By local people Lilienthal meant organizations such as federal, state and local agencies, voluntary private organizations, local universities, community councils, and the local residents themselves. He claimed that the TVA’s technical intelligentsia, guided by local people, could transform the devastated valley into a prosperous region.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 133.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰⁷ Hargrove, *Prisoners of Myth*, 35-36.

¹⁰⁸ Richard Lowitt, “The TVA, 1933-45,” in *TVA: Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy*, ed. Erwin Hargrove (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 36-37.

An example of grass-roots democracy in action was the agricultural program. The TVA delegated administration of the agricultural program to seven land-grant colleges and the county agent system.¹⁰⁹ Both were already active in the Tennessee Valley and had credibility with many local farmers. To bridge the gap between the experts and the locals, the colleges and county agents used farms of willing participants as demonstration farms to showcase new agricultural products and techniques. Locals were exposed to ideas such as crop rotation. Locals also learned about phosphate fertilizers developed by the universities and produced at the Muscle Shoals Dam. The universities conducted soil surveys and performed scientific analysis to develop fertilizers that replaced nitrites specifically lacking in farms located in the Tennessee Valley. By 1944, 20,000 demonstration farms, located in seven states and covering nearly 3,000,000 acres, operated under the TVA name. Others in the community learned by observation and through advice given by those who operated the demonstration farms. When locals were ready to experiment with the new fertilizers, the TVA ensured that an ample supply was available. When new products failed to match the farmers' actual need, the farmers gave the technicians new criteria which their products must meet. The program was designed to have an open line of communication with information being exchanged back and forth between the technician and the farmer. Lilienthal claimed in *TVA: Democracy on the March* that: "Science, if brought thus close to him, would enable the average man (on a farm or in the town) to learn what it is that technology makes feasible, for him, what, in short, are *the people's alternatives*; without that knowledge what reality is there in the free man's democratic right to choose?"¹¹⁰ (Emphasis in the original)

Lilienthal also claimed that decentralization augmented the TVA's democratic structure. Decentralization simply meant that the overall power resided in Washington D.C., while all key decisions would be made by local organizations with the regional directors' approval. The TVA structure did not limit the authority of the government; rather it changed the way its powers were exercised.¹¹¹ To make his point, Lilienthal relied on one of the first persons to write about American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville. De Tocqueville differentiated between centralized

¹⁰⁹ The University of Tennessee, the University of Alabama, the University of Mississippi, the University of Kentucky, the University of Georgia, the University of North Carolina, and the University of Virginia.

¹¹⁰ Lilienthal, *Democracy on the March*, 94.

¹¹¹ Ekbladh, 341.

government and centralized administration.¹¹² Centralized government is located in one place and maintains interests relevant to all people within the nation, such as foreign policy. Centralized authority resided in many locations, such as state governments, and conducted affairs common to that region, such as the regulations of a state park.¹¹³ Lilienthal advertised the TVA structure as consisting of “centralized authority with locally decentralized administration.”¹¹⁴ Roosevelt described the TVA as “a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise.”¹¹⁵ Lilienthal declared that decentralization improved the effectiveness of development by connecting experts and decision-makers directly to the people and the problems of local communities. Founded upon the logic that no two problems were exactly alike, experience within the actual field or town to be improved was indispensable. In a speech to the Southern Political Science Association in 1939, Lilienthal declared that the U.S. was a vast and diverse country and therefore a “lack of knowledge of local conditions” by any centralized authority was inevitable.¹¹⁶ To avoid the handicaps of an overly centralized government, Lilienthal called for decentralization of administration. Unlike the centralized government in Washington D.C., local leaders in the field could make decisions quickly, adjusting TVA projects in order to be sensitive to each unique situation. Lilienthal directed agricultural and forestry experts to live as near as possible to their areas of responsibility so as to become familiar with them and their distinctive characteristics.

Lilienthal used the theme of grass-roots democracy to gain support from a wide range of people including international visitors, politicians, local organizations, and valley residents. Because TVA lawyers had to repeatedly defend the corporation’s legality and authority against attacks from private utilities and the Department of the Interior, Lilienthal sought to gain popularity as a means to secure the existence of the TVA. He believed that, if the TVA was popular, the president and valley residents would defend it against anyone who threatened its

¹¹² Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1994), 85-86.

¹¹³ Phillip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 25.

¹¹⁴ Neuse, 131.

¹¹⁵ Hargrove, *Prisoners of Myth*, 20.

¹¹⁶ Ekbladh, 341.

existence. So he included the theme of grass-roots democracy in nearly all his speeches from the theme's inception in 1939 to the end of his tenure at the TVA in 1947.

His outspoken optimism about the TVA's grass-roots democracy was also responsible for creating the "myth" of the TVA, about which Phillip Selznick first wrote in his 1949 book entitled *TVA and the Grass Roots*. Selznick explained that the "myth" lay in the discrepancy between grass-roots rhetoric and the actual amount of authority valley residents had in the operation of the organization.¹¹⁷ Selznick pointed out that the TVA needed to produce results in order to gain support in Washington and in the Tennessee Valley. Accordingly several programs marginalized local input. Rather than accept every farmer's offer to become a demonstration farm, the agricultural colleges often chose the farms most likely to be successful. Almost always the colleges chose larger farms occupied by farmers willing to let the college authorities manage their operations. In addition, the colleges used techniques and products too expensive or impractical for smaller farmers to implement. Within the power program, TVA distributors were governed by boards that consisted of non-elected members. States lacked the power to regulate TVA power policies and valley residents had no say in setting electricity rates.

Lilienthal also used decentralization to keep the TVA out of the Department of Interior and away from its director, Harold Ickes. From 1933 to 1948, Lilienthal's relationship with Ickes deteriorated. Originally Ickes had helped Lilienthal and the TVA secure authority over public distribution of electricity. Ickes's Department of Interior provided loans for individual towns and cooperatives to buy their own distribution systems in order to receive electricity directly from the TVA. In this way towns with distribution systems were able to circumvent private power companies, notably, the most powerful company in the region, Wendell Willkie's Commonwealth and Southern (C&S). C&S steadily lost ground and was forced to acquiesce, giving the TVA full jurisdiction to distribute power in the Tennessee Valley. Shortly after the TVA had emerged triumphant over C&S, Ickes began to push for full control of the entire TVA by calling for the enlargement of the Department of Interior. He did so through Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management, which sought to reorganize and consolidate executive functions.¹¹⁸ Ickes wanted the TVA to be under the jurisdiction of the Department of

¹¹⁷ Selznick, 47-82.

¹¹⁸ Neuse, 125.

the Interior. The Interior was already constructing smaller scale hydroelectric dams throughout the country and Ickes wanted all dam building operations within the United States under his control. Lilienthal and Senator George Norris confided to the president that giving control of the TVA to the Department of Interior would destroy the organization's flexibility and effectiveness.¹¹⁹ Roosevelt settled the dispute by awarding control over an authority creating and running a smaller dam in Washington (known as Northwest Power) to the Department of Interior while Lilienthal maintained full control of the TVA.¹²⁰

Few noticed the gap between Lilienthal's rhetoric and the reality on the ground. In his book *Prisoners of Myth*, political scientist Erwin Hargrove explained that, "in TVA's first decades, professional expertise and popular opinion were pretty much congruent."¹²¹ During Lilienthal's time at the TVA, the corporation was widely popular and few valley residents objected to its structure. Historians Michael J. McDonald and John Muldowny have explained that even the 70,000 citizens forced to relocate from areas submerged by the new dams originally thought that the TVA was a worthwhile project. They dreaded relocation but understood that they had to do it for their country.¹²² Only when the TVA lost popularity in the 1970s because of mismanagement of the TVA nuclear program, the energy crisis, and an increasingly powerful environmental movement, did objections become widespread.¹²³ The early lack of discord led Lilienthal to believe that the TVA was an effective means of development and he soon sought new areas to apply it.

In the early 1940s, while the world remained embroiled in World War II, Lilienthal became very aware of the possibility of applying TVA concepts to development throughout the world. By then Lilienthal had refined and perfected his skills of broadcasting the virtues and advantages of the TVA; but Lilienthal no longer did so solely to ensure the TVA's survival. Successful court rulings over the constitutionality of publically owned utilities and the need for more electricity for World War II ensured that the TVA would endure. Now he undertook a

¹¹⁹ David Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: Volume 1 The TVA Years* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), 138-142.

¹²⁰ Neuse, 130.

¹²¹ Hargrove, *Prisoners of Myth*, 58.

¹²² McDonald and Muldowny, 58.

¹²³ Neuse, 145.

public campaign to convince others of the TVA's global applicability; he spoke throughout the country, discussed the idea with Vice-President Henry Wallace, wrote to Roosevelt, did an interview with Lyman Bryson at CBS Radio, submitted writings to Bill Nichols of *This Week* magazine, and hired a promoter for his *TVA: Democracy on the March*. In 1942, he concluded that another war would inevitably follow World War II unless the United States "participate[d] in the problems of the world."¹²⁴ To spread the word and convince others, Lilienthal dedicated the final two chapters of *TVA: Democracy on the March* to the TVA's global applicability and visions of the future.

Within the final two chapters, Lilienthal argued that the TVA spoke "in a tongue that is universal."¹²⁵ By 1942, visitors from all over the world including Western Europe, Mexico, China, the Soviet Union, North Africa, and the Middle East had visited the TVA and spoken with Lilienthal. The various meetings with world visitors convinced him that "the changes that are taking place here are much the same as those which men all over the world are seeking."¹²⁶ Lilienthal's experience may have been within the Tennessee Valley, but he claimed that "all this could have happened in almost any of a thousand other valleys where rivers run from the hills to the sea."¹²⁷ In his book he discussed the possibilities held by rivers throughout the world including the Amazon, Nile, Ob, Yangtze, Ganges, and Paraná.¹²⁸ To augment global enthusiasm he had the book translated into Hebrew, Chinese, German, Norse, and French.

Furthermore, Lilienthal claimed that, because the United States had created the TVA and already perfected its method of development, American policymakers and experts could accelerate development in lesser developed nations. On June 24, 1942 Lilienthal confided in his journal that there

seems to be a definite sequence in history in the change from primitive or nonindustrial conditions to more highly developed modern industrial conditions. Whether all of those steps have to be taken and all the intervening mistakes made is open to question, but it makes me mad to think that there is a possibility that all those steps have to be gone through with. Don't we have enough control over our destinies to short-cut those wasted steps?¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Ibid., 133.

¹²⁵ Lilienthal, *Democracy on the March*, 219.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 221.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹²⁸ Neuse, 137.

¹²⁹ Lilienthal, *Journals*, 510.

Similarly, in *TVA: Democracy on the March* he claimed that “the United States can in some way speed the process and influence its course.”¹³⁰ Provided that they received proper training and guidance from Americans, all countries could obtain high standards of living by utilizing the TVA’s structure that harmonized private and public interest, grass-roots democracy, decentralization, and finally the democratic value from popular participation.

Lilienthal’s campaigning failed to result in the government immediately starting new river authorities throughout the country. Roosevelt discussed smaller operations similar to the TVA on the Arkansas, Missouri, and Columbia rivers but when he died, so too did the hopes of the new river authorities.

Nevertheless, Lilienthal’s promotion of the TVA did attract two groups of people: Third World leaders who sought a solution for their poor economies, and postwar American theorists on development, including many modernization theorists. Between 1950 and 1970, TVA-inspired river authorities were started throughout the world: the Akosombo Dam across the Volta in Ghana, the Pahlavi or Dez Dam in Iran, the Kariba Dam across the Zambezi, the Aswan Dam on the Nile, the Damodar Valley Corporation in India, the Cauca Valley Corporation of Colombia, the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority in Afghanistan, and the Puerto Rican Water Resources Authority. None matched the success of the TVA. Lilienthal himself worked on the Iranian project but could not replicate the success of the TVA. Disagreements with the World Bank over loans and conflict with the Shah of Iran on the desirability of the Dez Dam (the largest of the dams considered within the Dez Dam project) prompted Lilienthal to depart midway through the project.¹³¹

Certain TVA themes resounded with postwar theorists on development. In the 1950s modernization theorists including C.E. Black, Myron Weiner, Marion Levy Jr., Walt Rostow, Joseph Kahl, Clark Kerr, and Edward Shils attempted to identify ways to accelerate development in order to inoculate Third World countries against communism. Modernization theorists believed that non-industrialized nations were more susceptible to communism because their economic instability, combined with their desire for development, could lead to communist redistribution or development schemes. Historian Michael Hunt has explained that theorists

¹³⁰ Lilienthal, *Democracy on the March*, 229.

¹³¹ Neuse, 60-70.

thought that, if they could get Third World nations to begin democratic and capitalist development, at a certain point the Third World countries' economies would "take off" into self-sustained growth and become impervious to communism.¹³² The TVA was a suitable American model to use, but not all countries had suitable river systems. Hence theorists were unable to export TVA-style development wholesale. Instead they needed a development scheme that was universally applicable yet distinctly American. Theorists took a number of Lilienthal's themes to induce American development: technology and science, grass-roots democracy, and decentralization.

The idea of decentralized democratic development struck a chord with modernization theorists. The method of democratic development found in the TVA emerged as a key component of U.S. Cold War development programs. Most importantly the TVA's democratic method set American development schemes apart from those of the rival communists. It was true that the United States had emerged from World War II with an undamaged vibrant economy and augmented geopolitical power, but the corresponding rise in the Soviet Union's power garnered much attention from those that theorized on development.¹³³ Historian Nils Gilman has pointed out that the Soviets' newly acquired international clout "had more influence than any other single factor on the manner in which American development discourse would be articulated over the following decades."¹³⁴ The Soviet Union had clearly claimed that, while capitalist countries languished in the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets had the ability to rapidly industrialize and develop from a predominantly agrarian society to a world power. Furthermore, in contrast to America's experience in the Philippines and accession to allies' imperialist ventures, the Soviets appeared to have impeccable anti-imperialist credentials. With the belief that the ideological Cold War would be settled in the decolonizing regions of the

¹³² Michael Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 209.

¹³³ Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 18; Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 9-12, 182.

¹³⁴ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 42.

world and fearing that the Soviets had provided an unassailable model of development, modernization theorists set out to provide an alternative model that was distinctly American.

Modernization theorists also presented democracy as a modern form of government while depicting the Soviet Union as somewhat less modern. The seemingly high level of modernization in the U.S.S.R. troubled modernization theorists. Nils Gilman has noted that, “again and again, Russia appeared as the bogey of modernity, an example of a malignant version of modernization—but never as anything other than modern.”¹³⁵ In *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Rostow presented the best example of the Soviets’ lack of modernity. Rostow described communism as a “disease of transition.” Instead of modernization from an agrarian-based traditional society to a modern society liberated from political and economic oppression, communist development resulted in false liberation. Communists proclaimed themselves able to achieve a classless utopia but in reality communist schemes were controlled by a small cadre of party members enforcing and directing the modernization process. Rostow claimed that citizens excluded from the leadership cadre of the communist party had no say in the overall direction of development. Because the “disease” could only infect societies before they reached Rostow’s famous take-off stage, communism was never able to attain all characteristics incorporated in Rostow’s final stage known as the stage of high mass consumption: notably democratic participation and input from the masses.¹³⁶ Without democratic institutions, Rostow argued, the Soviet society remained a deviant form of modernism.¹³⁷

An emphasis on democracy set the American model of development apart from Soviet development. On the surface, multipurpose technical programs founded upon government planning appeared no different than Soviet industrialization. However only the United States could proclaim democratic development.¹³⁸ While communists might be able to provide material well-being only, American programs included citizens in the decision-making process. The democratic and decentralized emphasis was also meant to reassure decolonizing countries

¹³⁵ Ibid., 147.

¹³⁶ Walt Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 162-164.

¹³⁷ Rostow, 162-164.

¹³⁸ Ekbladh, 351.

skeptical of Western intrusion and control. Theorists speculated that a relationship between the West and the Third World founded upon participation would prevent cries of imperialism and colonialism because that type of relationship was “inconceivable in the colonial context.”¹³⁹ American efforts simply desired, as Kennedy pledged in his inaugural address, to “help people help themselves.”¹⁴⁰ In comparison to colonial arrangements where Western nations sought to subordinate colonial economies to the Western powers, American efforts of development founded upon modernization theory portrayed an ideal world populated by equally industrialized and competitive nations engaged in benign trading relationships.

The themes of grass-roots democracy and decentralized authority, developed by Lilienthal during his TVA years and embraced by modernization theorists, were incorporated into the operating structure of the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps was an agency started on March 1, 1961 as one of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s development initiatives. Historian Michael Latham argues that the Peace Corps was built on an intellectual foundation provided by modernization theorists.¹⁴¹ Kennedy enlisted a number of academics and institutions including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Center for International Studies (CIS) for multiple purposes—to define the agency’s mission, purpose, and goals, and to formulate the agency’s operating structure. Several prominent modernization theorists were members of the CIS faculty including Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, Daniel Lerner, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lucian Pye. All advised the Kennedy administration on the Peace Corps. Modernization theorists’ characterization of the United States as the epitome of modern society and the apex of development became the goals of the Peace Corps.¹⁴² Modernization theorists also provided Peace Corps workers with a conceptual framework with which to measure each society’s level of modernity and the suggestions on how they could be “agents of change” and accelerate modernization.¹⁴³ Volunteers were provided indices to assist them in ranking the

¹³⁹ Adas, 413.

¹⁴⁰ John Fitzgerald Kennedy, "Inaugural Address "; available from <http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2007.

¹⁴¹ Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 69-109.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 111.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 120-121.

modernity of the developing nation they were sent assist. The Peace Corps was an agency that conducted small-scale development with the overarching goal of starting the modernization of Third World countries with societies that, Gilman commented, were “inward looking, inert, passive towards nature, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically simple,” turning them into democratic, egalitarian, scientific, technologically advanced, secular, and economically advanced societies.¹⁴⁴

The Peace Corps, according to Michael Latham, was designed to “provide necessary labor and technical skills and build bridges of friendship between Americans and the people of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.”¹⁴⁵ The agency consisted mainly of young volunteers, often fresh out of college, who agreed to live in and develop Third World communities for at least two years. The volunteers were to be catalysts for development by working on projects such as eliminating illiteracy, building schools, teaching English, purifying water supplies, providing vocational engineering skills, and agricultural techniques and improving crop yields.¹⁴⁶ Volunteers were not simply to provide skilled labor but also to “stimulate dormant communities to undertake self-help programs.”¹⁴⁷

The clearest example of Peace Corps volunteers carrying out development founded on modernization theory through a TVA-styled structure were the Peace Corp Community Development projects (CD). Peace Corps officials were unable to recruit enough specialists and professionals, such as teachers, engineers, and farmers; therefore, Peace Corps officials could assign only a limited number of specialists to each region. To remedy the situation officials created the role of CD volunteer, making up 25 percent of all Peace Corps volunteers.¹⁴⁸ Volunteers served as the link in the chain between scientific experts and unskilled natives.¹⁴⁹ They had a two-fold job. First, they were to act as a filter. Not all projects required a trained professional. Volunteers were to identify tasks that required special expertise and contact the

¹⁴⁴ Gilman, 1-2, 5.

¹⁴⁵ Latham, 109.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 113.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 124.

¹⁴⁸ Gary May, “Passing the Torch and Lighting Fires: The Peace Corps,” in *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 288.

¹⁴⁹ Latham, 122-129.

relevant professionals. Second, the volunteers were to fill the mid-level gap in manpower.¹⁵⁰ They conducted development projects too complex for unskilled villagers but too simple to require a trained professional. For example, volunteers could help construct a small school building without engineers and architects.

Peace Corps officials also sent CD volunteers to alter social life by “teaching democracy” while conducting development on the community level.¹⁵¹ According to historian Gary May, Peace Corps literature claimed that the “protocol-minded, striped pants officials would supposedly be replaced by reform-minded missionaries of democracy.”¹⁵² The Peace Corps projects were less complex than TVA projects—Peace Corps volunteers never attempted anything as complex as a hydroelectric dam—but like the TVA, CDs were promoted as both democratic and decentralized. Volunteers did not enter a community and immediately start projects such as schools, roads, gardens, and septic tanks; as in the TVA, volunteers encouraged grass-roots democracy by promoting suggestions from villagers. Town meetings were setup and villagers were encouraged to discuss their needs and problems collectively.¹⁵³ The Kennedy administration wanted volunteers to “stimulate a new, participatory ethic, establish a sense of common needs, organize collective action, and assist the peasantry in carrying out a ‘self-help’ plan.”¹⁵⁴ Once inhabitants identified their most urgent needs and drew plans to accomplish a task, the volunteer would either contact the relevant specialists or simply start on the project with the villagers’ help only. As Lilienthal broadcasted that the TVA provided the tools while valley residents carried out the actual project, Third World villagers provided the labor and ideas while Peace Corps volunteers provided the expertise and direction. As had been the case with the TVA, CDs had decentralized administration. As TVA experts resided near their areas of responsibility to familiarize themselves with the local conditions, CD volunteers lived in the communities and among the villagers they were sent to assist. Collaborating with local inhabitants, they could carry out development as they saw fit. Ultimate authority resided in Washington D.C. but the majority of CD projects were decided on and carried out completely within the community itself.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 122.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 123.

¹⁵² May, 315.

¹⁵³ Latham, 127.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 123.

The program was designed to provide the flexibility needed to operate in any location throughout the world. Only larger projects that required specialists to be brought in required authorization outside the community. Peace Corps officials intended the decentralized democratic method to ease villagers' skepticism about foreign intrusion and also change their worldview. Once inhabitants accomplished their agreed upon tasks, they would realize their ability to change their station. They could draw themselves out of their traditional passivity and develop a modern can-do spirit. In South America some communities participating in CD projects joined together with up to a dozen other local communities in a more comprehensive plan. Organizing these various communities showed villagers how democracy from the grassroots up could accomplish great things. Peace Corps officials asserted that this kind of experience had positive implications for democracy because it helped villagers conceive of themselves as part of a larger association carrying out democratic development.¹⁵⁵ If Third World citizens were convinced that the democratic structure of the Peace Corps could effectively accomplish development, redistribution schemes would become less attractive and communists would have little chance of spreading their ideology into the Third World.

Like the TVA, the CDs were sometimes more democratic in theory than in fact. Some volunteers arrived in villages to discover that community organizations already existed which did not welcome volunteers' suggestions about democratic organization. Other volunteers became dismayed when their small development projects failed to instill a democratic spirit within the community as a whole. Still other volunteers found a community's culture more appealing than their own and refused to try to change it. Historian Fritz Fischer claims, "The real development in community development became the development of the volunteers, rather than that of the host country."¹⁵⁶

In addition to grass-roots democracy and decentralized administration, Lilienthal's emphasis on omnipresent technology as a major instigator and indication of modernity reappeared in modernization theory. First, as had been the case with democratic development, modernization theorists posited that the use of technology separated capitalist from communist development. Whereas the communist solution to scarcity had been to redistribute the wealth,

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 128.

¹⁵⁶ Fritz Fischer, *Making Them Like Us: Peace Corp Volunteers in the 1960s* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian, 1989), 144.

thus eliminating the conflict between the have and have-nots, by eliminating the material difference as a matter of fact, modernization theorists claimed that the capitalist answer was to use technology to expand the economy and eliminate conflict.¹⁵⁷ As the TVA had built hydroelectric dams, creating electricity where it had been non-existent and spread phosphate fertilizer usage, doubling and tripling crop yields, technology was intended to create new sources of wealth rather than redistribute existing resources. Writing in 1966, modernization theorist C.E. Black contended that “an important feature of the intellectual revolution [of becoming modern] was the application of science to the practical affairs of man in the form of technology.”¹⁵⁸ He also argued that modern societies used science to create new technology and apply that technology to improve areas such as agriculture, communications, transportation, mechanization, and medicine.¹⁵⁹ Also, modernization theorists repeatedly emphasized that, compared to communist revolutions, their approach was a peaceful way to modernity. Charles Merriam, the founder of the Social Science Research Council, for which many modernization theorists such as Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye worked, claimed: “Sound and reasonable planning [based on technology] is the very safeguard against what many people fear, violence, tyranny, and harsh repressions....sound planning is a way to prevent that.”¹⁶⁰ Modernization theorists, as part of the postwar milieu that emphasized consensus over discord, looked to provide a peaceful way for politicians to control development, emphasized technology rather than conflict as the means to modernity.

A second effect of the emphasis that modernization theorists put on technology was to support their argument that all societies converge on the same end state. Modernization theorist Clark Kerr argued that industrialization, specifically the application of the most advanced technology to production, was a convergent process. He claimed that modern nations were technocratic nations; experts created and citizens used technology in all facets of modern life, i.e., agriculture, communication, industry, and transportation. As societies modernized and began

¹⁵⁷ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 5-20.

¹⁵⁸ C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 11.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 9-11.

¹⁶⁰ Gilman, 37.

used the same modern technology, their social, cultural, economic, and political structures would adapt in the same way, forming a universal modern society. In *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (1960) Kerr asserted that nations converge on the same modern end state because there is only one technology and it is omnipresent in all modern societies. He claimed: “The same technology calls for the same occupational structure around the world....Social arrangement will be most uniform from one society to another when they are most closely tied to technology.”¹⁶¹ He argued that technology transcended ideology. He was like Lilienthal, who claimed that “experts have no politics”¹⁶² and that they got “beneath prejudices, dogmas, and broad generalizations, down to the facts themselves, the working facts.”¹⁶³ Kerr claimed that the scientists and administrators who created and maintained the technocratic state had no ideology; they created universally applicable technology and societies changed to fit the application of that technology. To Kerr, the United States, and not the Soviet Union, possessed and used the most advanced technology and therefore was the modern state that all other countries would converge on.

Lilienthal’s optimism and charisma extended the appeal of the TVA far beyond the TVA’s formative years from 1933 to 1944. His relentless advertising of TVA themes—grass-roots democracy, decentralization, and technology—and the TVA’s material successes—such as generation and distribution of electricity, and improvements in agricultural production—convinced postwar liberals that the TVA provided a valuable American plan of development. Lilienthal’s optimistic rhetoric made the TVA’s faults fade into the background while its successes stood out as American ingenuity. TVA-style technological prosperity became the primary means to start Third World countries down the path of development leading to a whole host of elements considered part of a modern society. It also provided an attractive alternate means to achieve the aspirations of Third World countries instead of communist redistribution schemes.¹⁶⁴ Modernization theorists took the TVA’s material achievements, such as the creation of electricity and increased crop yields, as proof that conflict between the haves and have-nots could be eliminated by creating new sources of wealth rather than by redistributing current resources. Also the themes of grass-roots democracy and decentralization, developed by

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 109.

¹⁶² Lilienthal, *Democracy on the March*, 194.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 133.

¹⁶⁴ Hogan, 23.

Lilienthal, resurfaced in development programs throughout the 1950s and 1960s such as the Peace Corps. The TVA's democratic method made the American development schemes distinct from those of the rival communists. Modernization theorists emphasized that to be effective all development programs had to be democratic or be seeking to establish a democratic society as the final result. Decentralization to ensure flexibility also remained vital.

Although Lilienthal's optimistic rhetoric made the TVA appear faultless, the authority certainly had shortcomings. Small farmers found the new agricultural products too expensive and new techniques too difficult to make effective on a smaller scale. Lilienthal's democratic mantra often fell well short of what was advertised. Blacks, small-scale farmers, and farmers in remote areas found themselves outside the area that received TVA help and were thus unable to have their voice heard on the creation and implementation of TVA programs.¹⁶⁵ Even when valley residents had a say in the TVA, it was only in the non-power programs including navigation and forestry. Engineering, power, and fertilizer divisions strictly held to professional standards, excluding all but the most highly educated and trained personnel.¹⁶⁶ As Lilienthal's biographer Steven Neuse points out, Lilienthal himself "never fully trusted democratic control of public institutions, science, and technology."¹⁶⁷ However to modernization theorists searching for an effective, distinctly American development scheme, the TVA's faults took a back seat to its triumphs. As projects that developed rivers lost favor with the American public in the 1970s because of the increasingly powerful environmental movement and the mismanagement of the nuclear program, so did the positive image of the TVA. Works highlighting the TVA's democratic myth and inadequacies became popular. But for thirty years from 1940 to 1970 the TVA's image remained untarnished as a successful development program to be emulated the world over.

Whereas the TVA served as a technology-driven, democratic decentralized model of development carried out in the United States, Harry Truman's Point Four Program, an international program of development, revealed a theory of political evolution and economic philosophy similar to those of modernization theorists.

¹⁶⁵ Hargrove, *TVA: Fifty Years*, 329.

¹⁶⁶ Hargrove, *Prisoners of Myth*, 7.

¹⁶⁷ Neuse, xviii.

CHAPTER 3 - The Community Development Program in India: Using Keynesian Economics to Stimulate Development

President Harry S. Truman in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949 announced “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”¹⁶⁸ Eventually known as the Point Four Program, it signaled the first time that U.S. policymakers championed the economic development of the Third World as a strategy within the Cold War. Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India from 1951 to 1953, created a unique derivative of the Point Four Program that contained much of the logic that eventually became modernization theory. Both Bowles and modernization theorists created a theory of political evolution derived from the American past that they believed to be the universal blueprint for development. In each, the American historical example was used as a guide to accelerate development within Third World countries toward an expected endpoint. Both assumed that prosperity brought democracy and conversely that economic stagnation threatened it. Both Bowles and modernization theorists founded their theory on the economic theory of John Maynard Keynes. Keynes argued that government spending in agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure would stimulate and improve the economy. Although all Point Four projects focused on improvement in each of these areas to lay the foundation for industrialization—which they considered to be the endpoint of development—Bowles created a unique integrated approach known as the Community Development Program. Eisenhower ended the Point Four Program three years after it began. However, Bowles’ efforts in India laid a solid foundation for what would become modernization theory.

Scholarship on the Point Four Program is very limited; hence, works connecting Point Four to modernization theory are nearly non-existent. Most early works on the Point Four

¹⁶⁸ Harry S. Truman, "Inaugural Address "; available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1030&st=inaugural&st1=>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2008.

Program were written by employees of the program and were intended to gain American support (and a larger budget) for the program. Jonathan Bingham's *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy* (1953) is an example. Truman, a proud supporter of the program, devoted twelve pages in his memoirs to the program's virtues, in hopes that future administrations would initiate similar programs.¹⁶⁹ Of the historical works that mention the program, most allocate only a paragraph or passing sentence.¹⁷⁰

Exceptions exist, scholars, focusing on the debate—which became particularly acute after World War II—about whether the world's resources could support the recent population flux and maintain global standards of living, have written a substantial amount about the Point Four Program. Two examples are Björn-Ola Linnér's *The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism and Post-War Population-Resource Crises* (2003) and Sarah Phillips' *This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal* (2007). Linnér argued that a number of U.S. and European policymakers developed an awareness of the "population-resource crisis" and its potential deleteriously impact on world peace.¹⁷¹ He claimed that: "Social unrest spurred by resource shortage was of great concern to American security interests. Economic and political stability was a crucial means to curb communist, as well as fascist, revolts."¹⁷² Truman, Linnér asserted, "saw the issue of natural resources as vitally important to his national security policy.

¹⁶⁹ Harry Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Volume 2 Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1956), 227-239.

¹⁷⁰ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006*, 10th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 89; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 424; Michael Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Welded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 211; Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 160, 166; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 732; Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 193, 197, 225; George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 557, 648; David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 7; Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 195.

¹⁷¹ Björn-Ola Linnér, *The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism and Post-War Population-Resource Crises* (Isle of Harris: The White Horse Press, 2003), 5.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 44.

This was perhaps expressed most clearly in the aid programme –Point Four–.”¹⁷³ Although Linnér focused on the debate after World War II, Phillips primarily concentrated on the New Deal. Phillips devoted a chapter of her epilogue, entitled “Exporting the New Deal,” to the Point Four Program. She argued that the Point Four Program was an example of Truman extending, on a worldwide scale, the “New Conservation” ideology that had begun in the 1920s and achieved full maturity during the Great Depression. She claimed that “a loosely connected coterie of engineers, politicians, intellectuals, and government officials...believed that regional planning of land and water resources would alleviate farm poverty, modernize farm areas, and restore the viability of rural living.”¹⁷⁴ “They believed that proper resource use and fair resource distribution could relieve rural poverty and raise rural incomes, and they called upon the government to execute this vision,” according to Phillips.¹⁷⁵

Although scholars have primarily focused on the Point Four Program as part of the issue of conservation, some scholars have interpreted Point Four within the framework of the Cold War, notably Dennis Merrill’s *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic Development, 1947-1963* (1990).¹⁷⁶ He gives the most in-depth examination of American policies of development in India to date. Merrill interprets them within a Cold War framework of government-to-government interactions. He adroitly examines each administration’s policy toward India, but his focus on Cold War imperatives marginalizes his study on the intellectual foundations that undergirded and connected each policy. Merrill states: “As Bowles pushed ahead with his plans for liberal development, however, senior officials in Washington implemented a global foreign aid strategy that derived from a much narrower conception of national security.”¹⁷⁷ Merrill mentions that, “in many respects, the policies of the development

¹⁷³ Ibid., 42.

¹⁷⁴ Sarah Phillips, *This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷⁶ Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic Development, 1947-1963* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 101. Other works include Robert McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Howard Schaffer, *Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

¹⁷⁷ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 101.

decade [the 1960s, when modernization theory flourished] resembled those of the past,” but, instead of identifying Chester Bowles and his work as the director of the Point Four Program as the major precedent, Merrill argued that “American development strategies during the Kennedy years largely grew out of the policies laid down by the Eisenhower administration.”¹⁷⁸

Although Merrill focused on political rather than intellectual connections, Nils Gilman and Michael Latham succinctly and explicitly cite Point Four as a predecessor to modernization theory. In *Modernization as Ideology*, Latham claims, “Kennedy also outlined a broader mission for American foreign aid than any presented before. . . . Where the Marshall Plan had successfully rebuilt Western European economies and Truman’s “Point Four” had offered technical assistance to poor countries, Kennedy and his advisors set out to build entirely new nations.”¹⁷⁹ In *Mandarins of the Future*, Gilman comments that:

The ideological core of modernization theory was already present in Truman’s [inaugural] address: the peculiarly American mix of lofty idealism and crude materialism; the emphasis on industrialization as the key to progress; the notion that there existed noneconomic conditions (and obstacles) to economic growth; the emphasis on technology as the key to economic growth; the anticolonialism; and above all, the boundless faith in the power of American scientific knowledge and goodwill to make the world a better place from a social point of view. Although Point Four itself, with its limited goals of promoting economic growth through technical assistance, did not emphasize the social scientific dimensions of development theory and policy, which would be the critical innovation of modernization theory, it indicated that henceforth the American government would consider development a topic of international concern.¹⁸⁰

Rather than argue against the prevailing historiography of scholars of modernization theory, this study elaborates on existing arguments. In line with current scholarship, the argument of this study is that Bowles was not a modernization theorist, rather an unknowing precursor. As with Point Four in general, Bowles’ theory primarily focused on the economic aspects of development and lacked the social and psychological dimensions that made modernization theory distinct. Although Bowles was not a modernization theorist, his thought was closer to modernization theory than was that of any other predecessor. Both Bowles and modernization theorists relied on a metanarrative derived from the Western historical experience to measure the modernity of developing countries and forecast their future trajectory. This study

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 170, 178.

¹⁷⁹ Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 57.

¹⁸⁰ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 71.

emphasizes the intellectual connections between Bowles and modernization theorists within the field of economics and also between their assumptions about normative development.

Truman intended the Point Four Program simultaneously to bring prosperity to the entire Free World while inoculating “unstable” countries against communist infiltration, manipulation, and subversion. Point Four policymakers assumed that political instability resulted from lack of industrialization and economic prosperity. They believed that communist infiltration and subversion fed on unindustrialized and economically stagnant societies. Truman boldly proclaimed that “economic stagnation is the advance guard of Soviet conquest”¹⁸¹ and that the seeds of totalitarian regimes “spread and grow in the soil of poverty and discontent.”¹⁸² Truman declared, in his 1951 State of the Union Address, that “[communists] deliberately try to prevent economic improvement,”¹⁸³ thereby ripening the ground for infiltration and subversion. Influenced by the experience with the Versailles Treaty and Germany’s interwar economic tribulations, both Truman and Acheson believed that economic stagnation was also the root of war. Secretary of State Dean Acheson articulated the program’s aim as the “use of material means to a non-material end.”¹⁸⁴ He thought that global peace and democracy could be achieved if the United States could successfully use the Point Four Program to spur economic improvement and raise the standards of living within Third World nations.

Point Four policymakers envisioned three types of objectives: foundational, economic, and strategic. Foundational efforts, in concert with Keynesian economics, included technical assistance to improve food, health, and education. American experts provided the training and education so workers could effectively build modern structures and manage modern techniques and operations. These efforts laid the foundation for industrialization, leading to the

¹⁸¹ Harry Truman, to Nelson D. Rockefeller (March 1951). Student Research File Folder 1 of 10: “The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.

¹⁸² Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, 229.

¹⁸³ Harry Truman, “1951 State of the Union Address,” in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 27, *The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1999), 455.

¹⁸⁴ Dean Acheson, “Transcription of Extemporaneous Remarks by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Concerning Point 4 of the President’s Inaugural Address, at His Press Conference, January 26, 1949,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, Vol. 1, *National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1976), 758.

policymakers' second objective, economic efforts. Economic efforts included augmenting industrial production and maintaining global free trade to economically benefit all participating countries. The improved economies and increased global cohesion through augmented trade strengthened the non-communist world and supported strategic efforts. Strategic efforts included securing democratic governments, especially those with strategic raw materials, and containing the spread of communism.¹⁸⁵ By 1953, the foundational efforts were well on their way. Agricultural yields were improving, literacy rates were on the rise, health and sanitation facilities were being built, and new infrastructure was being constructed. But Eisenhower's premature termination of the Point Four Program arrested the implementation of the succeeding steps. Although the Point Four Program never progressed past the foundational efforts, as a program of development, it did signal a change from policies of the past.

As Truman delivered the 1949 inaugural address his administration's policy toward India was ambivalent. Historian Robert McMahon pointed out that almost every strategic appraisal, intelligence report, and policy paper of the late 1940s judged India to be "a region of major, although not vital, significance."¹⁸⁶ The Truman administration based the significance of each country on the projected help it could be to the U.S. economically and militarily. The administration placed primary importance on countries that had already achieved full industrialization such as European countries and Japan while India—a primarily agricultural country—remained secondary. Because India was the largest democratic country in the world and was positioned so near the Soviet Union, its significance stood above other Third World nations in the minds of the administration. Accordingly, the Truman administration's policy toward India more closely resembled policies toward industrialized Europe rather than development policies toward Third World nations. From India's independence on August 15, 1947 until October 1951, the Truman's policy consisted of attempts to achieve major advancements through swift and substantial bilateral exchanges. Two of the major issues included a U.S. wheat bill to alleviate starvation in India and India's non-aligned diplomatic status.

¹⁸⁵ Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1954), 344.

¹⁸⁶ McMahon, 13.

The first issue, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's refusal to take sides in the Cold War, frustrated American policymakers. The Truman administration wanted India to align itself with the United States and other democratic nations. Nehru had multiple reasons for declining the proposals for an alliance. First, India had just emerged from 200 years of colonial rule by Britain and had little interest in aligning itself with a stronger Western nation in a binding alliance.¹⁸⁷ Second, Nehru used India's non-aligned status to attract aid from both communist and capitalist countries. When India gained its independence in 1947 most of its 350 million people remained mired in abject poverty. Historian Dennis Merrill has pointed out that in 1947 one-quarter to one-third of the world's poor lived within India's borders.¹⁸⁸ Nehru sought to secure aid enticements from both communist and democratic countries just to be able to feed India's starving population.

In 1950, as famine ravaged India, the Truman administration decided to try to lure India out of non-alignment by offering aid in the form of wheat. Although India had suffered from a lack of foodstuffs since its independence in 1947, Nehru had refused to ask for aid. Not until December 16, 1949—when a combination of floods and droughts over the course of the previous twelve months had occurred throughout India, drastically diminishing wheat harvests—did Madame Pandit, Nehru's sister and ambassador to the U.S., formally ask the U.S. State Department for two million tons of wheat aid.¹⁸⁹ Although Truman sent the newly convened Eighty-Second Congress a special message urging food relief on February 12, Congress balked at the bill. Disappointed of Nehru's policy of non-alignment and continuous refusal to reciprocate U.S. aid with strategic materials, Congress increasingly resisted the aid bill. An initial proposal of a \$190 million grant shifted to a \$95 million grant and a \$95 million loan, and then to a \$190 million loan payable through the exchange of specific strategic materials, and finally to a \$195 million loan payable through unspecified raw materials before both Congress and Nehru would approve it.¹⁹⁰ Truman finally signed the Emergency Indian Wheat Act on June 15, 1951.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 38.

¹⁸⁸ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 1.

¹⁸⁹ McMahon, 91.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 95-102.

¹⁹¹ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 72.

In 1951, U.S. policy toward India changed, primarily because of one man, Chester Bowles. Loy Henderson's tenure as ambassador to India ended in late 1951, and Truman moved him to be U.S. ambassador to Iran, a position requiring an experienced diplomat because of Mohammed Mossadegh's threat to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the detrimental effects that this would have on British oil revenues.¹⁹² Bowles replaced Henderson in India. Bowles enthusiastically championed economic development as the best method to solidify a democratic and friendly India instead of bilateral exchanges such as the Wheat Act. He distanced himself from the more military-oriented policy set forth by National Security Council in NSC-68, which had been approved in June 1950. Bowles declared that it was time "for Point Four, in Asia, Africa, and South America to become Point One, to rank equally with our program for military defense."¹⁹³ Bowles believed that only economic development could provide a solid foundation on which to build lasting amicable relations.

Bowles' interest in economic development derived from experiences both in and out of government. Born in Springfield, Massachusetts on April 5, 1901, he attended Yale University. He admitted that his ambition throughout college was to work for the U.S. State Department,¹⁹⁴ however, when his father's business fell into financial straits, he settled for a business degree, graduating in 1926. Upon graduation he started the very successful advertising company, Benton and Bowles, with William Benton. Although he enjoyed advertising, Bowles vowed to pursue his lifelong dream of government service when he turned 39. In 1940, the opportunity presented itself when he was offered the position of director of the Office of Price Administration (OPA). From the OPA Bowles went on to work as a delegate to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946 and as Special Assistant to the Secretary General of the United Nations from 1947 to 1948. He was the governor of Connecticut from 1948 to 1950, and finally he served as international chairman of the U.N. Children's Appeal from 1948 to 1951.¹⁹⁵ It was while touring war-torn Europe in January and February 1948 for the U.N.

¹⁹² LaFeber, 161-162.

¹⁹³ Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, 325.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁹⁵ Yale University Library and Social Science Statistical Laboratory, "Yale Manuscripts and Archives, Collections, Chester Bowles "; available from <http://www.library.yale.edu/un/papers/bowles.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2007.

Children's Appeal that Bowles realized his life's ambition.¹⁹⁶ The sight of malnourished children three years after the end of hostiles convinced Bowles that his mission in life had to be to "create international understanding and encourage greater cooperation among all people regardless of ideology."¹⁹⁷ Although his revelation came from his experience in Europe, Bowles directed his energy toward the Third World. He believed Europe was on its way to recovery while the real need resided in the periphery nations. When asked by Truman in which country he would prefer to serve as ambassador, Bowles immediately chose India. To this Truman abrasively responded, divulging his lack of hope for change in South Asia: "Why in the world would you want to go to India?"¹⁹⁸

After overcoming a formidable attempt to block his confirmation, led by Ohio Senator Robert Taft, Bowles zealously went to work. With a staff of only 148 people, half those of U.S. ambassadors to Mexico, Italy, and Greece, and a third of that to France, Bowles set out to ensure that he used each person as efficiently as possible. In comparison to Henderson, who primarily assigned office jobs, Bowles directed his staff to spend thirty percent of their time traveling throughout the country, even at the expense of assigned paperwork. Bowles himself crossed India fourteen times from east to west and six times north to south.¹⁹⁹ He visited remote villages and major construction sites and met with Indian people ranging from Nehru himself all the way down to farm laborers in isolated countrysides. All staff member and their families were enrolled in classes on Indian history, culture, and language.²⁰⁰ The Bowles children—Sam, Sally, and Cynthia—enrolled in Indian schools, and Chester endeared himself to the locals by riding his bicycle to work every day.

Bowles took over the Point Four Program in India and secured a link with Truman in order to maintain autonomy from other Point Four administrators throughout the world. At the time of Bowles' arrival in India, the Point Four Program in India, led by Clifford Wilson, Bernard Loshbough, and Horace Holmes, had 114 staff members. Although assigning only 114

¹⁹⁶ Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 245.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 245.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 247.

¹⁹⁹ Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, 23.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

people to develop a country of almost 350 million makes it seem that Point Four directors cared little for India, in proportion to the rest of Point Four Program, India's staff was quite large. By the middle of 1951, only 350 technicians worked for the Point Four Program throughout twenty-seven countries.²⁰¹ Although Truman had announced the program in January 1949, Point Four actually began operating on June 5, 1950 when Congress passed and Truman signed the Foreign Economic Assistance Bill, which became Title IX, the Act for International Development (AID).²⁰² Truman delegated the responsibility to implement the program to Acheson. On October 27, 1950 Acheson created the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) within the State Department to administer the program and appointed Dr. Henry Bennett as its director on November 14, 1950.²⁰³ However, technical assistance under Point Four suffered from amorphous authority and poorly defined jurisdiction. The TCA had to share authority with the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA). The TCA primarily operated in India, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The ECA, created as part of the Marshall Plan, operated under both Point Four and the Foreign Assistance Acts of 1948 and 1950. Its primary operations were in the Far Eastern countries of French Indo-China, Taiwan, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.²⁰⁴ The IIAA, because it had been conducting technical assistance similar to Point Four in Central and South America since 1940, was not replaced but acted as the operating arm of the TCA within its designated area. Although the TCA and ECA had primary areas of operation, both conducted assistance in nearly every country receiving Point Four aid, often simultaneously. Bowles seized on Point Four's amorphous authority and jurisdiction to secure a direct line to Truman and total authority over Point Four operations in India.

²⁰¹ *Point 4: What it is and How it Works...*, U.S. Department of State Publication 4868, Economic Cooperation Series 39 (February 1953), 11-12.

²⁰² Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, 234.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 235.

²⁰⁴ By 1953 The Point Four Program had projects in 35 countries: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Liberia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Burma, and Indonesia.

Bowles used his extensive advertising experience to bombard Congress and the President with pleas for an enlarged economic development program in India; however, his efforts produced very little. In 1950 and 1951, Senator McCarthy's domestic communist hunts and Chinese entry into the Korean conflict exacerbated the U.S. public's anxiety about the threat of communism. Rather than increased economic aid, the public insisted on increased military preparedness. The public's call for increased security measures spurred Congress to reorganize and restructure several foreign aid organizations from 1951 to 1952. The Point Four Program was included. Point Four became integrated into the new Mutual Security Program (MSP) directed by W. Averell Harriman; however, Bowles maintained his total authority over India. Although the budget of Point Four increased, the new program favored military spending. Of the MSP's \$6.5 billion budget for 1952 only \$140 million went to Point Four, \$45 million of which went to India.²⁰⁵

With less than fifty per cent of his desired budget, Bowles still managed to create a program in India unlike any other Point Four project. Bowles' approach differed from other Point Four projects because he combined agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure improvement into one integrated approach known as a Community Development project. Bowles derived the idea from Dr. James Y.C. Yen, a Chinese citizen and Yale graduate. Dr. Yen had discovered, as Bowles put it, "that far more could be accomplished in each of these fields if these three workers (food, health, and education) went as a team, entering the villages together and developing a broad, coordinated development program."²⁰⁶

Bowles said that he founded his development program on a theory of political evolution derived from his "reading of American History, firsthand observation of our two political parties in action, and thousands of talks with fellow citizens in all walks of life in most of our 48 states."²⁰⁷ Bowles made his theory public in the Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1955. Bowles surmised that all nations developed along the same three-stage path already travelled by the U.S.

²⁰⁵ Paper Prepared by the Representative of the DOD on the Executive Group on Foreign Aid (Lincoln) [Washington], "Essential Points of Mutual Security Program," (15 May 1951), in *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 1, *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, ed. Frederick Aandahl (United States: GPO, 1979), 316-317.

²⁰⁶ Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, 196.

²⁰⁷ Chester Bowles, *American Politics in a Revolutionary World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), ix.

The first stage began around 1800, while Thomas Jefferson occupied the oval office. It consisted of a combination of Jeffersonian republicanism and Hamiltonian federalism. Jefferson supported a nation founded on yeoman farmers exercising power through local governments while Hamilton desired a nation of commerce and manufacturing, administered by stronger federal government. This stage was represented by rugged individualism, poor systems of communications, but a general acceptance of effective federal government responsive to the will of the people.²⁰⁸ The second phase started while Abraham Lincoln was president. Spurred on by the Industrial Revolution, it consisted of an expansion of economic opportunities, broadening of civil rights, creative use of corporate institutions, and settlement of a supposedly untamed West. In this second phase, nationalism expanded and individualism weakened as Americans were brought together through new transportation and communication systems.²⁰⁹ In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt ushered in the third and final phase. *Laissez faire* economics gave way to what Bowles called a “general acceptance of governmental responsibility for minimum standards of living [and] opportunity”²¹⁰ and for intervention into the economy. Bowles claimed that the American historical experience was “similar in many ways to what we now see being undertaken in much of Asia, Africa, and South America, where the social structure is beginning to feel the full impact of the industrial revolution which we faced a century ago.”²¹¹ Bowles believed development occurred in stages and tacitly positioned India within the American historical experience. He predicted that the emphasis of Community Development projects would evolve from agriculture, education, and health and sanitation concerns to village level industrialization and production.²¹² He predicted that India would be self-sufficient in foodstuffs within five years and ready “for rapid economic growth.”²¹³ Bowles thought that it was possible to accelerate India through its predetermined path. The emphasis within Community Development projects on agriculture, health and sanitation, and education were merely the first steps in the modernization process toward that of industrialized contemporary America.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 12.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 26.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 12.

²¹¹ Ibid., 26.

²¹² Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, 207.

²¹³ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 85.

Bowles' opportunity to apply his theory came on January 5, 1952 when Nehru and Truman signed the Indo-American Technical Agreement, approving the Community Development Program (CDP).²¹⁴ In the Community Development Program, India was divided into development areas. Each area consisted of between 150,000 and 300,000 people and revolved around a central town of 5,000 to 10,000 people.²¹⁵ The central town housed an administrative headquarters, a hospital, and a center for health, educational, and agricultural improvement. Each center employed around 125 Indian workers and housed American experts in agriculture, health and sanitation, education, and administration, commissioned by the State Department. To replicate America's "second phase" of development, Bowles ordered the construction of roads, infrastructure, and communication systems linking the entire development area to the central town. Roads and communication systems were designed to break antiquated village allegiances and instill national perspectives by connecting previously isolated towns and villages into regional units. On October 2, 1952, what would have been Mahatma Gandhi's 84th birthday, fifty-five Community Development projects were launched covering 17,000 villages and nearly 11 million people.²¹⁶

The program's emphasis on state-directed improvement in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure revealed that Point Four policymakers accepted and used Keynesian economics. The number of American economists exploded in the decades following World War II. Whereas the American Economic Association (AEA) had 3,000 members on the eve of World War II, only 500 more than in 1912, membership doubled within a decade after World War II. By 1980 AEA membership increased six-fold.²¹⁷ The number of economists working as government advisors increased even faster. The dominant economic theory accepted among the new economists was Keynesianism. Historian Richard Parker noted that "Keynesian economics did 'triumph' after World War II and in a fashion that...did dramatically transform the profession (and) the function of government."²¹⁸ Keynesianism gained ascendancy within

²¹⁴ Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, 200.

²¹⁵ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 84.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

²¹⁷ Richard Parker, *John Kenneth Galbraith: His Life, His Politics, His Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 195.

²¹⁸ Parker, 192.

American economics in the latter years of the New Deal, notably after the recession of 1937. The recession of 1937 seemingly brought to light the inadequacies of the older form of policies that favored government trust-busting and the breakup of monopolies to ensure that corporate power remained in check and that competition was guaranteed.²¹⁹ Economists who favored these policies maintained that government-facilitated competition would bring prosperity to a wider swath of the population by eliminating concentrated power and profit. Once government successfully operated as the “broker” among economic interests, economists maintained, the private sector and market would be able to revitalize an economy stuck in a lull.

The recession of 1937 inspired New Deal liberals and economists to entertain new Keynesian ideas about the role of government in the economy. Historian Alan Brinkley states that, four years later, as United States became involved in World War II, the need to quickly and efficiently mobilize large amounts of material quieted “liberal hostility to capitalism and the corporate world” and ushered in a prevalent acceptance of Keynesian economics.²²⁰ Brinkley has pointed out that John Maynard Keynes argued that “the state could manage the economy without managing the institutions of the economy.”²²¹ No longer did the government rely solely on breaking up areas of economic concentration to ensure the ameliorative function of the market; Keynes argued that the government could spur the economy by supplementing market forces and leaving most corporations intact. Keynes disagreed with Say’s Law, after Jean-Baptiste Say, a nineteenth-century French economist, that both overproduction and high unemployment could not occur at the same time. Say argued that production created its own demand and demand then created employment because businesses needed to hire additional employees to increase production. Keynes argued that a portion of profits was saved, withdrawing it from reinvestment and increased production, thereby slowing demand. The entire process could slow down, and eventually stop, possibly trapping the economy in overproduction or high unemployment.²²² Keynes claimed that during the Depression the lack of effective demand trapped the economy in

²¹⁹ Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 9-10.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

²²² Peter Watson, *The Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the 20th Century* (New York: Perennial Press, 2001), 341.

an equilibrium consisting of a low-level of production and high unemployment, and “neither consumer spending nor business investment was capable of snapping the economy out of this funk.”²²³ Keynes’ theory afforded government an enlarged role. Keynes supported countercyclical policies—policies that acted against the business cycle. Rather than view deficit spending—government spending during recessions when money was tight— as bad, Keynes supported spending and unbalanced budgets. Government spending, such as for public works projects, was to be the catalyst that would spur consumption and therefore economic growth.²²⁴ The labor required for the projects would provide employment and income for thousands of unemployed citizens. The citizens would spend their salaries on various goods and services within the community, increasing consumption, thereby improving other sectors of the economy. Keynes’ “multiplier effect” stated that the effects would continue to radiate outwards, until the entire economy had been jumpstarted back into growth.²²⁵ Once the economy had recovered and progressed into a boom period, the government would raise taxes in order to curb too rapid growth and consequent inflation. Higher taxes would also correct the overspending that had occurred during the recession. Therefore Keynes tried to reduce the amplitude of swings between recessions and boom times and settle the economy on a path of steady-sustained growth.

Although Keynes wrote little on Third World nations themselves, development theorists and policymakers applied his theories to economic development in the periphery. Policymakers interpreted Third World economies as stuck in a long-term recession. To facilitate economic growth, policymakers working on the development of the Third World from the 1940s to the 1960s relied on Keynesian ideas.²²⁶ Historian Dennis Merrill claims that in addition to public works projects, Keynes identified specific key variables that “governments could manipulate in order to induce economic growth and plan economic performance.”²²⁷ Investment by government in areas including basic research, agriculture, education, health and sanitation,

²²³ David M. Hart, *Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 22.

²²⁴ John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1997), 116-117.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 122.

²²⁶ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 10-11.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

infrastructure—typically marginalized by profit-seeking private businesses—would facilitate growth in the private sector.

Growth was promoted in several ways. First, improvements in these specific areas would provide a work force that was well fed, healthy, and educated, essentially constituting an investment in “human capital.” Second, well built infrastructure would facilitate efficient importation of supplies and distribution of products. Third, the increased money supply from surplus agricultural yields would provide the population with the financial ability to consume more. Citizens would purchase new products and help sustain new businesses. Fourth, Keynes emphasized psychological aspects. Keynes devoted much attention to the argument that the perception of future profits—which Keynes termed the marginal efficiency of capital—matters as much as the current physical reality. Keynes argued that a “fundamental psychological factor” was “the psychological expectation of future yield from capital-assets.”²²⁸ Government investment in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure would provide confidence and convince investors to invest and consumers to consume, spurring economic growth. The combination of these four phenomena would propel the country down the road of development, eventually leading to self-sustained growth. However, until Third World countries could achieve self-sufficiency, foreign aid programs would provide the crucial money for the initial investments. Government relied on private business to carry on the economic growth begun by government investment. Historian David Hart explains that Western economists and experts would “calibrate the budget deficit or surplus to nudge aggregate economic indicators onto the right track.”²²⁹ Historian Nils Gilman has asserted that, convinced by the Marshall Plan and its successful rehabilitation of European economies after World War II, policymakers working on the development of the Third World believed that “a mixed private-public economy, orchestrated by professional economists trained in macroeconomic theory, represented the best way to relieve the transitory and chronic poverty of much of the world’s population.”²³⁰

Given sufficient time and money, Truman and Bowles believed that the Point Four Program could economically strengthen the Third World; however, Point Four’s initial objectives were limited because it was a small self-help program. Point Four policymakers

²²⁸ Keynes, 246-247.

²²⁹ Hart, 22.

²³⁰ Gilman, 40.

agreed that a substantial amount of investment in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure would accelerate Third World nations toward industrialization; but they were also aware that both the United States' financial resources and the unindustrialized nations' absorptive capacity, or ability to effectively use financial aid, were limited.²³¹ In contrast, America's technical skills and the Third World populations' ability to learn were limitless. Truman proclaimed, in his 1949 inaugural address, that "The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible."²³² American experts in each of the designated development areas (e.g., agriculture) could provide technical assistance—relatively cheap compared to military spending—to Third World nations. By providing training and education, American experts could increase the amount of capital investment that non-industrialized nations could effectively absorb. Title IX, the act that originally created the Point Four Program, stated that the program could help

the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity and expanding purchasing power.²³³

In addition, a 1950 State Department brochure explained that "the Point IV Program calls for an intensification of existing efforts (technical assistance) to foster the international flow of capital."²³⁴ Once the Third World population had acquired the requisite skills and knowledge in each area of development they would be able to effectively use financial aid. For example, a modern asphalt road would be nearly impossible for untrained people to construct. The uneducated laborers would be unable to use effectively funds designated for this particular

²³¹ Bowles, *Ambassador's Report*, 324-336.

²³² Truman, *Inaugural Address*.

²³³ Theodore Donald Freidell, "Truman's Point Four: Legislative Enactment and Development in Latin America" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Missouri at Kansas City, 1965), 69.

²³⁴ "Point Four: Cooperation Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas," (1950), 44, in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 27, *The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1999), 496; Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 286.

infrastructure improvement. American engineers could demonstrate which materials were needed and the most effective techniques in the process of road construction. Once educated and trained in modern road construction, the local population would be able to put financial aid to effective use throughout their region. They could effectively absorb more capital investment. In India, Community Development Centers served as hubs, housing American experts who demonstrated modern techniques and products to help local people use foreign aid.

Bowles viewed the improvements in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure—spurred by investment from the government and facilitated by technical assistance—as the first steps in the modernization process. Bowles believed that the second stage would consist of industrialization. The Indo-American agreement itself stated that Community Development was “to lay the proper foundation for the industrial and general economic development of the country.”²³⁵ As Dean Acheson pointed out in extemporaneous remarks delivered to the press shortly after Truman announced the Point Four concept, “In those areas where economic life is primitive and stagnant, a basic improvement in health and education may well be prerequisite to increased production and improved standards of living.”²³⁶ In Bowles’ mind, as improvement in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure occurred, industrialization would start at the local level. He pointed out that privately produced consumer goods, such as “textiles, clothes, shoes, small-unit agricultural by-products and many other products,”²³⁷ would appear. Rather than endear citizens to communist development, the appearance of consumer goods would inspire capitalist modernization. Citizens’ desire to acquire the new products would drive them to increase crop yields for the purpose of earning more disposable income. The drive to form a profitable consumer market and increase crops yields would form a symbiotic relationship, propelling each other down the road of development. Bowles explained that “such an undertaking could open immense possibilities for village industries, which in turn could provide the goods which would give the cultivators the incentives we are going to need three or four years from today if we are going to maintain the maximum

²³⁵ Bowles, *Ambassador’s Report*, 212.

²³⁶ Dean Acheson, “Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Truman,” in *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 1, *National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 14 March 1949), 774.

²³⁷ Bowles, *Ambassador’s Report*, 208.

production which our technical efforts make theoretically possible.”²³⁸ Not only did Bowles envision the possibilities that Keynesian economics could produce domestically, he also predicted what a domestically prosperous India could do on a global level.

Focusing on the agricultural aspect of domestic prosperity, Bowles sought to improve India’s balance of payments by lowering its need for imports of food. Bowles believed that he could strengthen the entire free world through developing Indian agriculture. India had few available non-strategic exports and, as the leader of a non-aligned country, Nehru refused to trade India’s profitable strategic materials, i.e., manganese, monazite, and beryl.²³⁹ Nehru had to purchase the immense quantity of wheat by liquidating sterling reserves. To compensate, Nehru was forced to take out hefty foreign loans and accrue substantial interest. India’s interest payments strained its economy and reduced standards of living—creating an environment that, in American policymakers’ minds, was ripe for communism.²⁴⁰ In a special message to Congress Truman declared: “The present food crisis, if permitted to continue, would magnify these difficulties and threaten the stability of India.”²⁴¹ Bowles sought to use improved crop yields to lower food import levels and free up precious currency for other imports from Europe or the United States.²⁴² Europe and the United States would prosper domestically as levels of industrial production rose to meet increased demand from India. Truman explained that “an improvement of only two per cent in the living standards of Asia and Africa would keep the industrial plants of the United States, Great Britain, and France going at full tilt for a century just to keep up with the increased demand for goods and services.”²⁴³

In Truman’s and Bowles’ logic, international trade was not a zero-sum game. The United States, Europe, and India would all prosper through mutually beneficial trade. This proposition

²³⁸ Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 85.

²³⁹ Rotter, 95-108.

²⁴⁰ George C. McGhee, “Indian Request for Food Grains,” to Dean Acheson (Washington D.C.: 30 January 1951), in *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 6, *Asia and the Pacific Part 2*, ed. Fredrick Aandahl (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977), 2100-2101.

²⁴¹ Harry Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on the Famine in India”; available from <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=241&st=Special+Message+to+the+Congress+on+the+Famine+in+India&st1=>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

²⁴² Bowles, *Ambassador’s Report*, 161.

²⁴³ Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, 238.

revealed that Point Four policymakers' economic logic may have been domestically Keynesian but, in the earlier stages of Point Four, internationally classical. A major contributor to classical international trade theory was David Ricardo. Ricardo advanced the theory of comparative advantage. He argued that an international division of labor would benefit all nations. In the words of Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, each nation would produce (and then trade) "those commodities that it was best fitted to produce by virtue of natural or historical circumstances."²⁴⁴ Third World countries would specialize in the production of raw materials while the U.S. and Europe produced finished products and all could equally profit in a trading relationship. As countries in the Third World developed past the early stages of development, they would begin to industrialize, becoming more like the West, and rely much less on the production of raw materials.

Although economic factors undoubtedly were major reasons for the direction and operations of the Point Four Program in India, policymakers emphasized alternative ways in which agriculture, education, and health and sanitation helped facilitate the transition into modernity.

The improvement of agriculture helped ease fluctuations of the population associated with development. In early 1951 Dr. Henry Bennett, the original director of the Technical Cooperation Administration (one of the three organizations that administered the program), pioneered a successful agricultural improvement program in Etawah, India under Point Four that became the prototype for later projects. He argued that the key to sound economic development was food production because improved health and sanitation exponentially enlarged the population by increasing life expectancies and lowering infant mortality rates.²⁴⁵ The enlarged population required more food. Second, Dr. Bennett accepted the proposition set forth around 1800 by British clergyman and scholar Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus that a rapid increase in

²⁴⁴ Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, *Theories of Development* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999), 29.

²⁴⁵ Technical Cooperation Administrator (Bennett), to the Director of the Management Staff (Heneman) (Washington: 20 April 1951), in *FRUS*, 1951, Vol. 1, *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1976), 1644-1645; Dean Acheson, "Progress Report on Point IV," to Harry Truman (College Park, MD: NARA, 14 March 1949), 6, in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 27, *The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1999), 59.

population would dissipate improvement in living conditions, returning living standards to their original low equilibrium.²⁴⁶ However, Bennett differed from Malthus in that he believed economic development and improved living standards could be made permanent. D.S. Brooks, the president of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, even coined the term “stomach communism” to explain the assumption among Point Four policymakers that starving people were most likely to choose radical amelioration schemes.²⁴⁷ Once again advocating economic over military aid Bowles declared, “A hungry and depressed India would be hard to defend with a million American troops and a hundred atom bombs.”²⁴⁸

Within his first month in India, Bowles visited the Etawah project and decided to adopt it as the model for his development program. The provincial government of Etawah, a province located in northern India in Uttar Pradesh on the Gangetic Plain, had requested help to raise agricultural yields. Albert Meyer, the Point Four advisor assigned to Etawah, recruited Horace Holmes, another Point Four agricultural technician and former Tennessee county agent, to help in Etawah. A veteran of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in China, Holmes, suggested using a new wheat seed known as Punjab 591. Because most Etawah farmers lived on the edge of starvation, they were hesitant to risk an entire year’s harvest. Holmes convinced a select number of farmers near the village of Mahewa to experiment with the new seed. When their yields rose twenty-six percent, others became convinced and planted Punjab 591. With a secure food supply, Point Four technician Jonathan Bingham claimed, the people “began to want to improve their living conditions and to secure an education.”²⁴⁹

The Indian Point Four Program under Bowles emphasized education because it provided the widespread technical ability required by an industrialized society. At the most basic level

²⁴⁶ W.T.S. Gould, “Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus,” in *Fifty Key Thinkers on Development*, ed. David Simon (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 155.

²⁴⁷ D.W. Brooks, to Harry Truman, *Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files—President’s Personal File* (27 December 1951), in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 27, *The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1999), 721.

²⁴⁸ Bowles, *Ambassador’s Report*, 325.

²⁴⁹ Jonathan B. Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action* (New York: The John Day Company, 1953), 46.

Bowles sought to eliminate illiteracy. Although Point Four had a student exchange program for more advanced subjects like engineering and medicine, the exchange program had trouble reaching average agricultural villagers who could not leave the land for an extended time.²⁵⁰ Bowles brought in Frank Laubach, an American literacy expert, to create a literacy program that gave “down-to-earth information” to reach even India’s poorest citizens. Bowles believed that the British had created the Indian university system to produce “little brown Englishmen.”²⁵¹ The Indian scholar was too disconnected from the day-to-day life of the people. Bowles explained that, because the university system often trapped these scholars between the future and the past, they often reacted with deleterious nostalgia or radical political philosophies. To remedy this situation, policymakers created village-based schools that reached the maximum number of people with practical information. Bowles expressed the view that “perhaps the best fruit of all is that the projects are bringing together educated India with village India.”²⁵² Education also assisted the process of democracy. Bowles explained: “There are hundreds of millions of very wise villagers who have never had a chance to read and write, but who know how to talk intelligently about their problems and to cast a thoughtful vote.”²⁵³ Bowles believed that illiteracy created a political system ripe for manipulation and tampering. If all persons could properly cast their own votes, the democratic process would improve and attract more adherents.

In addition to agriculture and education, Point Four policymakers emphasized improvement in health and sanitation. Point Four technicians focused on sanitation over health because they believed it created more advantageous long-term results while curing sickness produced only short-term relief. The elimination of diseases rampant in India such as malaria, yaws, and yellow fever increased the energy of citizens and increased the number of hours each could work in a day. The Point Four Program in India financed American doctors, nurses, and

²⁵⁰ *Partners in Progress: A Report to the President*, by Nelson Rockefeller, chairman (7 March 1951), 33, in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 27, *The Point Four Program: Reaching Out to Help the Less Developed Countries*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1999), 522.

38. Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 527.

²⁵¹ Bowles, *Ambassador’s Report*, 90.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 211.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, 155.

sanitary engineers to construct health facilities for the administration of vaccinations and sanitary structures, such as water purification systems.

Bowles believed that his Community Development concept provided a rock-solid method to develop India. Guided by his own theory of political evolution derived from America's historical experience, Bowles sought to create the necessary conditions to usher India down the road of development.²⁵⁴ Technical assistance would provide India with the necessary skills to be able to absorb and effectively use foreign aid.²⁵⁵ Improvements in agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure would provide the necessary foundation and environment to sustain industrialization and a new consumer market. Profit from higher crop yields, spent by farmers on the expanded consumer market, would increase the income of a large number of Indian entrepreneurs.²⁵⁶ Prosperous entrepreneurs would invest profits in new technology and spend money on additional consumer products, spreading prosperity to a wider swath of the population. An India self-sufficient in food would free up precious foreign exchange and increase the diversity of imports, improving the economy of all countries participating in trade.²⁵⁷ In addition, agriculture, education, and health and sanitation would feed the growing population, narrow the gulf between educated and uneducated India, and improve the physical well-being of the population. Everything would combine to jump-start the Indian economy down the path to self-sustained prosperity.

Although Bowles had unending confidence in his development scheme, Eisenhower did not. Bowles' Community Development projects in India had only been in operation for three months when Eisenhower took office in January 1953. The ascendancy of an administration more conservative than Truman's put Bowles on the defensive. In June 1953, Eisenhower terminated the Point Four Program. Eisenhower called for a balanced budget and a reduction in expensive open-ended foreign aid programs. Eisenhower claimed that "it is not easy to convince an overwhelming majority of free people, everywhere, that they should pull in their belts, endure marked recessions in living standards, in order that we may at one and the same time develop

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 324.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 326-330.

²⁵⁶ Chester Bowles, *A View From New Delhi: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1963-1969* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1969), 9.

²⁵⁷ Bowles, *Ambassador Reports*, 326, 331.

backward countries and relieve starvation, while bearing the expenses and costs of battle in the more fortunate countries.”²⁵⁸

Eisenhower, during his first term, rejected programs of development. He thought that the programs were too expensive. He claimed that they “could alter the very nature of American society, either through the debilitating effects of inflations or through regimentation in the form of economic controls.”²⁵⁹ Eisenhower distrusted Keynesian economists such as Leon Keyserling, Truman’s economic advisor, who argued that government spending could spur economic growth and create additional sources of profit, thereby offsetting in the future the deficit spending done during recessions. Eisenhower was unconvinced that the government needed to spend more to earn more. He saw overspending as a risky and unsound policy.²⁶⁰ Historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued that Eisenhower believed that a costly defense strategy ran the risk of ruining the sole thing it was meant to sustain, the American way of life.²⁶¹ Eisenhower thought the best strategy was a fiscally conservative one.

However, the absence of contact between the administration and advocates of foreign economic aid only lasted a short while. In 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed C.D. Jackson, his special assistant for international affairs, to set up an informal meeting on how the U.S. could promote free trade and maintain geopolitical security.²⁶² The meeting took place in Princeton and eventually became known as the Princeton Inn Conference. Jackson invited businessmen, labor leaders, government officials and academics, including future modernization theorists Max Millikan and Walt Rostow. Rostow later explained that “in the peaceful setting of Princeton Inn a rough-and-ready consensus did emerge that an enlarged global initiative by the United States in support of development was required.”²⁶³ Jackson enlisted Rostow and Millikan

²⁵⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; revised and expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 131.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁶² Gilman, 175.

²⁶³ W.W. Rostow, *Concept and Controversy: Sixty Years of Taking Ideas to Market* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 210.

to write a report stating the conclusions of the conference. Rostow and Millikan entitled their report *Objectives of the United States Economic Assistance Programs* (1954).

In *Objectives* Rostow and Millikan called for a shift in emphasis from military to economic aid. Economic aid entailed financial and technical aspects. Financially, the U.S. would provide grants to non-communist countries throughout the world to end economic stagnation and spur worldwide economic growth through industrialization. Technically, America would disseminate technical and scientific knowledge to help poverty-stricken areas effectively use economic aid and overcome roadblocks to the development process.

Eisenhower knew of Rostow and Millikan's report but remained unconvinced. Eisenhower maintained his belief that economic aid programs were too expensive. He remained in tune with fiscally conservative allies such as George M. Humphrey, Herbert Hoover, Jr., and Joseph Dodge.²⁶⁴

Undiscouraged by Eisenhower's decision, Rostow and Millikan spent the next three years expanding and sharpening their argument. The result was the 1957 publication of *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*. Rostow later enthusiastically described it as "a book that had some impact on policy"²⁶⁵ (italics mine). Rostow admitted that "the protracted debate on foreign aid for development purposes was, in a quiet way, one of the most dramatic strands in the Eisenhower administration."²⁶⁶ As the 1950s wore on economic development became somewhat of an intellectual fad. Russell Edgerton, a political scientist and Rostow's and Millikan's contemporary, explained that "nothing else on the scene in Washington rivaled the grand scale of the Millikan-Rostow proposal nor the sophistication of its presentation... as the different parts of the Executive and Congress launched reappraisals of aid in different directions with different motives, Millikan and Rostow supplied them all with a common theme."²⁶⁷ *A Proposal* did indeed have an impact on policymakers, including soon-to-be-President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, but the authors' conception of development, and the U.S. role in accelerating it, resembled that of Point Four policymakers' conception.

²⁶⁴ Rostow, *Concept and Controversy*, 211; Gaddis, 132-133, 146.

²⁶⁵ Rostow, *Concept and Controversy*, 188.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 207.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 198.

A Proposal was founded on many of the same assumptions about development and ways in which the U.S. could induce economic modernization such as the Point Four Program in India. Like Bowles with his theory of political evolution, Rostow and Millikan also relied on a metanarrative derived from the Western historical experience to measure the modernity of each developing country and forecast its future trajectory. Fellow modernization theorist Daniel Lerner explained that developing countries would follow “paths to the present already marked out by the historical experience of modernization of the West” and that “modernizers will do well to study the historical sequence of Western growth.”²⁶⁸ Mark Haefele has claimed that “Rostow provided a system that imposed order on this chaos because, in his model, all nations were merely at different points on the same development path.”²⁶⁹ Like Bowles, they figured that development occurred slightly differently everywhere but that each society did go through the same stages of development and end at a universal modern stage. Modernity was not a heterogeneous culmination of all the world’s cultural, political, and economic traditions in a higher order containing the best of each society. Rather it was a phenomenon outlined by the contemporary United States. As made clear by the United States, modern society, as Gilman pointed out, was “cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of change, and characterized by a complex division of labor.”²⁷⁰

In *A Proposal*, Rostow and Millikan placed all past events into three, later expanded by Rostow to five, stages of development. No longer were historical events isolated occasions that occurred because of unique circumstances; now events were evidence of a country’s current stage of development. Rostow and Millikan formulated three stages: preconditions, take-off, and self-sustained growth. The preconditions stage started with agriculturally based nations using low-productivity techniques. Each country then began to develop along the path of development: education broadened, both internal and external commerce widened, capital

²⁶⁸ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, with an introduction by David Riesman (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 10, 46.

²⁶⁹ Mark Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization Development, and the Global Cold War*, eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 86.

²⁷⁰ Gilman, 5.

expanded, and transportation, communication, and health care improved.²⁷¹ To Rostow and Millikan, the U.S. had gone through the preconditions stage from 1790 to 1840. Rostow and Millikan posited that a country reached take-off when the national rate of saving reached around 10 percent and the country pushed forth toward a phase of sustained and irreversible growth. The authors argued that “a new class of businessmen emerges and acquires control over the key decisions determining the use of savings.” Technology spread to nearly all facets of the economy, generating rapid increases in production. The United States’ take-off occurred between 1840 and 1860.²⁷² Finally, Rostow and Millikan asserted that the stage of self-sustained growth consisting of a “long period of regular if fluctuating progress” where “10 to 20 per cent of the national income is steadily plowed back into expanding productive capacity.”²⁷³ The economy constantly changes and adapts to new technology and techniques. Furthermore the domestic economy becomes interwoven with the international economy.

In the two years following the publication of *A Proposal* Rostow published *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*.²⁷⁴ Although both *A Proposal* and *Stages* were filled with economic terms, Rostow and Millikan recognized that development also had social and political dimensions. The dissatisfaction with modernization schemes that primarily focused on the economic aspects, to the detriment of cultural, social, and psychological aspects, set modernization theory apart from previous models of development. Rostow emphasized the impact of a given country’s propensities on the development process. He specified six propensities: “the propensity to develop fundamental science; to apply science to economic ends; to accept the possibilities of innovation; to seek material advance; to consume; and to have children.”²⁷⁵ Rostow emphasized propensities to create a more comprehensive and, in his mind, superior theory to his self-proclaimed rival Karl Marx. Rostow argued that Marx gave too much

²⁷¹ Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 43-46.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 46-47.

²⁷³ Rostow and Millikan, *A Proposal*, 47.

²⁷⁴ W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 1-4.

²⁷⁵ Kimber Charles Pearce, *Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 40.

attention to the economic structure and failed to recognize the impact of political, social, and cultural systems on economic modernization. The concept of propensities gave Rostow a way to include political, social, and cultural aspects. He argued that a change in propensities occurred concurrently with economic modernization. At times they helped, such as when the propensity to seek material advancement drove entrepreneurs to improve the economic state of the country; and, at times they hurt, when the propensity to have children drove individuals to withdrawal from material advancement to focus on spending more time with and raising their children. Because all six propensities could not be maximized at once, they created a never-ending tension, slowing or accelerating economic modernization.²⁷⁶

Although modernization theorists were dissatisfied with development theories based solely on economics, they accepted that economics was still a major component of modernization. Far from disappearing, the economic foundation of development theory remained more or less intact. Both Millikan and Rostow held Ph.Ds from Yale, Millikan in economics and Rostow in economic history. Not surprisingly economics was a major component of their development theories. Rostow and Millikan explained: “Not only is economic growth a prerequisite for political, cultural, and social improvement, it can also be an engine of such improvement.”²⁷⁷ They stressed the centrality of economic factors in development:

Most cultural, educational, and social issues are directly related to economic problems. Village education requires schools, equipment, and the support of teachers; public health requires medical services, better nutrition, and better housing; social justice frequently depends on land redistribution and community services; a wider communication of ideas demands roads, radio, films and, about all, literacy and the written word that then comes to life.²⁷⁸

As made apparent by their comment, they identified primary growth sectors that were very similar to those identified in Keynes’ economic theory and Bowles’ efforts in India. Millikan and Rostow admitted the continuity of their economic thought with that of the past: “The tasks of the preconditions period (e.g., in Black Africa) remain as they have long been: the buildup of infrastructure, the education of a generation of modern men, the creation of institutions which can absorb technology and mobilize capital; the expansion of agriculture to permit the growing

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 40-70.

²⁷⁷ Rostow and Millikan, *A Proposal*, 39.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 37-38.

cities to be fed; and the generation of increased export earning capacity.”²⁷⁹ Both realized that the private sector could do only so much. They viewed the lack of development that had existed in traditional countries for centuries as a failure of the private sector to jump-start modernization. To remedy the problem, both put forth proposals that—building on Keynesian economics—relied on government spending to set modernization in motion.²⁸⁰ Government spending in areas such as agriculture, education, infrastructure, and health and sanitation all propelled traditional countries toward modernity in important ways.

As had been the case in the Point Four Program in India, improvement of agriculture held primacy in Rostow’s *Stages*. Because the population of traditional societies predominantly relied on agriculture as their means for livelihood, Rostow understood that it must be the cornerstone of any modernization theory. In his 1955 essay, “Marx was a City Boy, or Why Communism May Fail,” Rostow argued that Karl Marx created a faulty theory because he failed to fully consider agriculture in development. Rostow noted that “agricultural development is vastly more important in modernizing a society than we used to think” and, like industry, modernizing agriculture required “that the skills of organization developed in the modern urban sectors of the society be brought systematically into play around the life of the farmer.”²⁸¹ Differing little from the logic of Bowles, Truman, Acheson, and Bennett, Rostow identified three major purposes agricultural improvement would serve: provision of food for the growing population, the accumulation of capital for development from increased productivity, and the freeing up of foreign exchange.

The belief that poverty and all its repercussions, such as malnutrition, created a setting ripe for communism remained an important component of Rostow’s logic. He stated: “Success in resisting the combination of subversion and guerilla operations depends directly on the political, economic, and social health of the area attacked. A substantial part of American and Free World policy must be devoted to eliminating or preventing those circumstances under which subversion can succeed.”²⁸² Because starvation held political as well as physical repercussions, the

²⁷⁹ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, 182.

²⁸⁰ Max Millikan, “Economic Thought and Its Application and Methodology in India,” *The American Economic Review* 46:2 (May 1956): 405.

²⁸¹ Walt Rostow, *View From the Seventh Floor* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 124-131.

²⁸² Gilman, 176-177.

modernizing country's growing population required a food supply to match. Self-sufficient farmers became inadequate in a developing country. During transition the urban population disproportionately grew in comparison to the rural populace. The burden of feeding the urban population fell directly on the farmers. Fewer farmers were expected to feed the rapidly increasing urban population. Better seeds and techniques became imperative.²⁸³ Better crop yields eased modernization.

As already mentioned, in addition to feeding the population, Rostow believed that agriculture played a key role in development as a source of capital. As had been made evident in the development of the West, predominantly agricultural societies were sure to make the transition into industrial societies dominated by industry, communications, trade, and services.²⁸⁴ The immense cost of launching the transition could not be met by profits from a nascent industrial sector; it could only be met by improvement in agriculture. Rostow argued that the most efficient way to acquire the capital needed was to apply quick-yielding changes in agricultural productivity. New seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation techniques could quickly increase crop yields. Although Rostow never mentioned the introduction of Punjab 591 in Etawah, India under Point Four, it was a striking example of how Rostow proposed to rapidly increase productivity. Also, in agreement with Keynes' multiplier effect, Rostow theorized that farmers would spend their newly-acquired profits on consumer goods, invest a portion in items of capital for agriculture such as chemical fertilizers, farm machinery, and diesel pumps, and increase their private savings rates.²⁸⁵ Each action would stimulate other sectors: the consumer market would become more lucrative and expand, the farming industries would grow, and private saving would provide capital for a whole host of development ventures. Previously idle laborers would find employment in the expanded areas. Rostow stated: "In short, an environment of rising real incomes in agriculture, rooted in increased productivity, may be an important stimulus to new modern industrial sectors essential to the take-off."²⁸⁶

In *Stages* increased productivity in agriculture could also bring international prosperity. In agreement with Truman's and Bowles' logic for the Point Four Program, Rostow viewed

²⁸³ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, 22, 142.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 23, 52.

²⁸⁶ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, 23.

agricultural exports as a catalyst for modernization. Not only would selling agricultural surpluses bring in money, it would also free up precious capital and improve the trade balances of developing countries. Without the need to import food, developing countries would be able to import the capital and supplies needed for development; Rostow stated that a “major new and rapidly enlarging export sector which, in turn, [will] serve to generate capital for internal development.”²⁸⁷ The developing country would prosper domestically while fellow capitalist countries would profit from selling their manufactured products abroad.

In both *A Proposal* and *Stages* Rostow and Millikan realized that, although new seeds and fertilizers could help bring increased prosperity, permanent material prosperity could not be exported whole; the technical skills needed to maintain self-sustained prosperity must also be acquired. As had been the case in the Point Four Program, they understood that “it does little good to supply money to build plants if there are no skilled workers to operate them, no competent administrators to manage them....take-off into continuing growth cannot occur until certain minimum preconditions of education, skills and attitudes....have been established.”²⁸⁸ In other words, the people of developing countries were unable to effectively use—or in Rostow and Millikan’s term “absorb”—foreign aid and resources without the necessary skills and techniques.²⁸⁹ They envisaged that the U.S. could supply the know-how through a world program of technical assistance, similar in many ways to the Point Four Program. The program would be carried out on a nation by nation basis and initially consist of basic education and demonstration, optimally progressing to advanced training in subject such as in engineering, medicine, administration, and economics.²⁹⁰ American experts would calculate the absorptive capacity of each country by evaluating “the technical and a managerial capacity available, the size, stability, and motivations of the nonagricultural labor force, the level of skills and education, the development of markets, the state of basic facilities for transport, communications, power, and community services.”²⁹¹ Countries considered to be in the traditional or pre-conditions stages required more technical assistance and less capital investment while countries

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 23, 55.

²⁸⁸ Rostow and Millikan, *A Proposal*, 45.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 59.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 50.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 51.

at the take-off stage and beyond required the opposite. Once modernizing countries acquired technical abilities, their capacity to effectively absorb capital investment would rise.

Development programs would shift from technical assistance to material aid.

In both their books and their comments throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Rostow and Millikan testified to the importance of keeping India non-communist. They invoked modernization theory as the best method to secure India for the Free World. Although their form of modernization theory rested on the same logic and assumptions held by Point Four policymakers such as Bowles, Truman, Acheson, and Bennett, Rostow and Millikan never mentioned Point Four as an influence as they formed and elucidated their theory. The absence of acknowledgment does not indicate an absence of connection. It more likely reveals a common thread in thinking about development running from the 1940s through the 1960s. Both Bowles and Rostow and Millikan defined development as a linear phenomenon exemplified by the United States' historical development. Both accepted that the process could be accelerated through American efforts abroad. Both relied on Keynesian economic theory and prescribed government intervention and assistance to jump-start development. Both ordered technical assistance to increase the capacity of developing countries to absorb government aid. Both identified agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and infrastructure as the best sectors through which to start the modernization process. Because both shared the same logic and assumptions when identifying a continuum from traditional and modernity and the engines to accelerate that progress, they both fell into the same pitfalls when applying their theories.

Although he worked tirelessly and cared deeply for India, Bowles fell into the same faulty assumptions as modernization theorists. Both assumed that American-style capitalism could be implanted into India. Both also failed to consider the friction to the modernization process created by India's entrenched abject poverty, caste system, socioeconomic hierarchy, immense population, and restrictive land policies.²⁹² Each placed too much confidence in the ability of experts and technology to transform a foreign society. Finally, each equally accepted the proposition elucidated by David Potter that prosperity inherently led to democracy. Historian Michael Hunt explained that they assumed that "sophisticated science and technology would push aside primitive agricultural and handicraft techniques and create new wealth and

²⁹² Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 87.

prosperity,”²⁹³ invariably leading to democracy. Historian Andrew Rotter claims that Bowles stood as “the most successful American diplomat in India during the Nehru period.”²⁹⁴ Bowles’s enthusiasm and devotion to India led him to champion economic development. Yet, as the first Cold Warrior to seriously theorize about development, he faced the arduous task of transforming theory into practice without lessons and guidance from other Cold War development experiments. Bowles was unable to carry his theory to fulfillment in action because Eisenhower prematurely ended both the Point Four Program and Bowles’ ambassadorship in 1953. However Bowles’ logic and efforts reappeared in economic development efforts a decade later. Given more time and money Bowles’ program and theory might have become more comprehensive, containing the social elements that made modernization theory unique; however, Congress’ marginalization of Point Four ensured that Bowles’ efforts only laid the foundation which upon modernization theorists built an all encompassing theory of development.

²⁹³ Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 160.

²⁹⁴ Rotter, 278.

CHAPTER 4 - Consistent Conceptions of Modern and Traditional: The Occupation of Japan as an Antecedent to Modernization Theory

On May 5, 1951, testifying before a Senate joint committee, General Douglas MacArthur declared: “If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture...they [Japanese] would be like a boy of twelve.”²⁹⁵ MacArthur had just completed five and a half years as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the occupation of Japan after World War II. Inherent in MacArthur’s comment was his belief that societies, like humans, develop from childhood to adulthood. MacArthur believed the United States had achieved maturity while the Japanese remained underdeveloped and immature. MacArthur’s comments also revealed an assumption underlying the U.S. occupation: that the Japanese had independently begun development and only needed guidance through the final stages. The occupation and its authorities held similarities to and served as an example for modernization theorists who formed their theory of development in the following decade. The occupation authorities identified the same traditional and modern characteristics as modernization theorists, they provided an example of a successful authoritarian/military modernization but differed from modernization theorists because they lacked a systematic theory of transition, the hallmark of modernization theory.

Authorities believed that feudalism was still present in Japan even at the end of World War II, and they aimed to eliminate its vestiges in Japanese traditions. Japan’s feudal society was stratified based on ascription, without widespread suffrage or political representation, and it was also controlled by religion. The characteristics identified by the authorities as feudal were the same as the characteristics within the “traditional” category formulated by modernization theorists. The occupation authorities’ ideal society—democratic, secular, stratified by merit, and

²⁹⁵ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: The New Press, 1999), 550.

rational—also was the same as the society envisioned as “modern” in modernization theory. Accordingly the General Headquarters (GHQ), SCAP focused on accelerating the Japanese move into full maturity through reform in areas such as democratization, meritocracy, secularization, and civil rights. Without the luxury of time, MacArthur attempted to impose rapid American-style modernization onto Japan. To accomplish this he ordered American authorities to rewrite the Japanese Constitution in one week without Japanese input. During the 1960s, modernization theorists faced with countries thought to be lethargic in the modernizing process, increasingly advocated modernization in the manner of MacArthur during the occupation. They believed that benign authoritarians could help traditional countries achieve modernity—as MacArthur had helped Japan—and prevent the spread of communism. As the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified in the late 1940s, GHQ undertook a “reverse course” and tried to fashion Japan into a stable Cold War ally through economic rehabilitation. The “reverse course” marginalized social, cultural, and political modernization but emphasized the economic preconditions modernization theorists considered vital to lasting democracy. Consequently, SCAP pushed for social, cultural, and political modernization through revision of the constitution from 1946 to 1947 and for a prosperous economy by resurrecting the prewar economic pillars from 1948 to 1952, but never at the same time. In contrast, modernization theorists saw the transition from “traditional” to “modern” as a systematic process requiring simultaneous change in the political, social, cultural, and economic structure of a given society.

There is little scholarship connecting the thoughts of the American policymakers in the occupation of Japan with those of modernization theorists. Historian Sheldon Garon has explained that “Modernization theory profoundly influenced Japanese studies in the United States during the late 1950s and 1960s.”²⁹⁶ However, scholars in the 1950s and 1960s who studied modernization theory in Japanese history were more like “fellow travelers” of modernization theory than critics forming an alternative theory about development. Rather than evaluate American efforts during the occupation in light of what would become modernization theory, these scholars, such as Edwin O. Reischauer, Marius Jansen, John W. Hall, and Ronald Dore, viewed Japanese history through the prism of modernization theory. They argued about

²⁹⁶ Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-Society Relations,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53:2 (1994): 347.

when Japan had attained the various stages of modernization, outlined by Rostow and Millikan, rather than examine the concept of modernization itself. They focused on Japan rather than on the intellectual and cultural foundation of the theory within American history. Their scholarship was also almost exclusively on pre-occupation Japan. When modernization theory came under attack in the late 1960s and 1970s, nearly all scholars dropped it as an analytical tool.

Of the scholars who focused on the occupation period, other than modernization theorists themselves, none that I know of used modernization theory as an interpretative lens. Instead they celebrated the occupation as a splendid chapter in American history, appraising it as an absolute success for the Americans and Japanese alike. This interpretation stood into the 1980s within works such as *Sentimental Imperialists* (1982) by James Thomson, Jr., Peter Stanley, and John Curtis Perry.²⁹⁷ Works in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, such as John Dower's *Embracing Defeat* (1999), have challenged the interpretation of the occupation as benevolent and altruistic. Dower identified American efforts as a "neocolonial revolution" and examined the censorship of the Japanese press, "showcase justice" for Japanese leaders in World War II, and compulsory revision of the Meiji Constitution. Dower's most important addition to the historiography of the occupation was his examination of the experience from the Japanese point of view. He examined how the Japanese reacted to and altered the American efforts of reform as they became codified into the Constitution and embedded in Japanese culture.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ The authors successfully identified both, occupiers' antipathy to the pervasiveness of feudalism in Japanese society, and their "ignorance of Japan" and belief in "the universal applicability of the American ideal." Nevertheless, they claimed that, "the paradox is that despite profound American ethnocentrism and despite profound American ignorance of Japan, the occupation went well."

²⁹⁸ The impact of Japanese people on the occupation—through contact, the Japanese government bureaucracy that the American officials of the occupation administered through, and through semantic altering of the Constitution when it was translated—has become a historiographical topic itself, prevalent in works such as, Chambers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Sheldon M. Garon, *The State and Labor in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1979); John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: The New Press, 1999); Andrew Gordon, *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853-1955* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

As modernization theory reemerged as a popular historical subject in the 1990s and 2000s, a few works connecting the theory to the occupation appeared. Some alluded to a connection without elaborating. For example, Odd Arne Westad claimed in *The Global Cold War* that “it was the restructuring of Japan that formed the main model for future American initiatives outside Europe.”²⁹⁹ Others, such as Olivier Zunz in *Why the American Century?*, devoted an entire chapter to the impact of ideas about modernization on the occupation. Although Zunz specifically discussed a few modernization theorists, such as Rostow, he used the term modernization largely to mean “Americanization.” His main focus was on how Americans—businessmen, scientists, engineers, professors, and government officials—tried to export their images of America and Americans. Those images were identified during the interwar years within an “institutional matrix,” concocted by corporations, research universities, government agencies, foundations, and the military. He claimed: “Japan became arguably almost a laboratory for duplication of America aboard.”³⁰⁰

Whereas Zunz identified how the ideas that Americans exported had been developed during the interwar years, this study examines the ideas about America society and culture in the 1940s continued and resurfaced in modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s. This study concentrates on the U.S. authorities’ original intentions rather than on how policies were altered and then embedded in Japanese culture. Hopefully by identifying connections between occupation authorities’ and modernization theorists’ conceptions of modernity and tradition, this study will provide a new way to interpret the occupation. Future scholars will hopefully interpret the occupation, not only as an unprecedented attempt at foreign reform, but also a predecessor to later models of development.

In August 1945, the Americans entered a debilitated Japan. Around 2.7 million Japanese citizens, or 3.75% of Japanese total population, had been killed. Japan’s cities and infrastructure had suffered from three years of conventional, incendiary, and atomic bombs. Forty percent of Japan’s sixty-six largest cities had been destroyed. The length and severity of the war had damaged Japan’s agriculture. Bombing had diminished domestic food production, while the U.S. Navy’s destruction of the Japanese merchant marine had made the importation of relief

²⁹⁹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24.

³⁰⁰ Oliver Zunz, *Why the American Century?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), xiii.

foodstuffs impossible. At the time of surrender most of the population was suffering from malnutrition. Fifteen million Japanese were homeless, inflation was rampant, prices were soaring, and prostitution and the black market were flourishing. The Japanese people were disillusioned from their long struggle and abysmal defeat. Americans, by contrast, entered Japan as exuberant victors, confident in themselves and their government.

The United States had full control over the occupation. Two international advisory committees had been set up to influence the occupation but, as historian John Dower observes, “The United States alone determined basic policy and exercised decisive command over all aspects of the occupation.”³⁰¹ Truman wanted to avoid dividing Japan as Germany had been after V-E Day.³⁰² Truman secured American control over Japan in exchange for Soviet control of the Kurile and Sakhalin Islands off the Japanese mainland. Because of the Truman administration’s Eurocentricism, Truman had “made up [his] mind that General MacArthur would be given complete command and control after victory in Japan.”³⁰³ The Japanese referred to MacArthur as the “blue-eyed shogun,” and his monopolistic title of Supreme Commander properly conveyed his stranglehold on power.

Three papers guided MacArthur’s initial actions during the occupation. First, the Potsdam Proclamation; second, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee’s (SWNCC) directive entitled “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan”; and, finally, JCS 1380/15, a comprehensive military directive outlining postwar policy from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP. The foremost goal articulated in the policy papers was the demolition of Japan’s war-making capacity through democratization and demilitarization. As expressed in the Potsdam Proclamation: “The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be

301 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 73.

302 Harry Truman, *Memoirs of Harry Truman, Vol. 1. 1945: Year of Decisions* (Old Saybrook: Konecky & Konecky, 1955), 432.

303 *Ibid.*, 412.

established.”³⁰⁴ U.S. policymakers believed that the *zaibatsu*, large Japanese business conglomerates that American policymakers believed served as belligerent collaborators with Japan’s military and government during World War II needed to be broken up. In JCS 1380/15 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed occupation forces to implement economic democratization and demilitarization through “policies which permit a wide distribution of income and of ownership of the means of production and trade.”³⁰⁵

MacArthur had little knowledge of the Japanese to guide reforms. While in Japan, he made no effort to gain any personal knowledge of the country. As fellow occupation official and historian Theodore Cohen explained: “He made himself virtually unapproachable...the only thing MacArthur saw of Japan physically was on the automobile route between the Daiichi Building and his quarters at the American Embassy, a distance of about a mile.”³⁰⁶ MacArthur never installed a phone in his sixth floor office and only the Emperor, prime minister, and the three divisional secretaries could speak with him. He mainly derived his understanding of Japanese society, culture, and politics from Ruth Benedict’s *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, a book heavily influential to American policymakers.

In 1944, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) turned to cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict to understand the causes of Japanese militarism. According to historian Olivier Zunz, “Benedict’s interpretation became, directly or indirectly, the accepted wisdom among those American policymakers and Army personnel whose charge it was to reform a part of the world that seemed so alien to their own habits.”³⁰⁷ As made evident in her first book, *Patterns of Culture* (1934), Benedict believed that each culture acquired a select few characteristics from the “great arc of human personalities” and those characteristics became dominant within the culture. Benedict subordinated personality to cultural and social systems. For example, the Pueblo

304 “Potsdam Proclamation July 26, 1945,” in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), 413.

305 “Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper, Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive, 1380/15, November 3, 1945,” in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), 435.

306 Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, ed. Herbert Passin (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 66.

³⁰⁷ Zunz, 164.

culture of the American Southwest was dominated by restraint. The individual agency of Pueblo citizens became lost in the cultural explanation of behavior or action. Because Japan and the United States were at war in 1944, when Benedict started writing and researching *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, she was unable to take a field trip to Japan.³⁰⁸ To uncover Japan's leading characteristics she relied on Japanese literature and Westerners' personal accounts and scholarship on Japan. Benedict's interpretation that feudalism permeated Japanese culture had a major impact on the occupation. A major goal of the occupation became the removal of feudalistic society and all its ramifications. In a public response to a 1949 *Fortune* article MacArthur stated: "In the very nature of the Occupation's task the reform of the prewar feudalistic structure of Japan merited and received primary attention."³⁰⁹ Benedict contended that the system of feudalism produced a rigidly hierarchical, nearly caste, structure on society.³¹⁰ The Japanese ordered everything by hierarchy "age, generation, sex, and class dictated proper behavior."³¹¹ The prescribed role of each citizen influenced that citizen's interactions with all others. Benedict stated that the "Japanese were said to behave in accordance with situational or particularistic ethics, as opposed to so-called universal values as in the Western tradition."³¹² Benedict acknowledged the Meiji Restoration—that from 1868 to 1912 brought Western technology and ideas to Japan—but denied that Western ideas about social structure impacted Japan;³¹³ suffrage and political representation remained limited, education remained strictly hierarchal, familial relationships remained patriarchal and hereditary, social stratification remained ascriptive, religious doctrine remained obligatory, and the scientific spirit remained constrained. She contended that a feudalist mentality remained: "the extreme explicitness of the Japanese hierarchal system in feudal times, from outcast to Emperor, has left its strong impress

³⁰⁸ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, with a forward by Ian Buruma (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 5-6.

³⁰⁹ Douglas MacArthur, "Japan—An Economy of Survival," (May 1949), in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 335.

³¹⁰ Benedict, 61.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

³¹² Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 219.

³¹³ Benedict, 79-80.

on modern Japan.”³¹⁴ Benedict argued that the only way to eliminate feudal society would be to replace the hierarchical social structure of Japan with a social structure based on equality, like that created by the U.S. Constitution.

Occupation authorities accepted Benedict’s interpretation that feudalism caused a lack of scientific spirit and a rigidity of religious doctrine. In 1946, the Ministry of Education released *New Educational Guidance* and explained that the Japanese had “learned how to use trains, ships, and electricity, but did not sufficiently develop the scientific spirit that produced them.”³¹⁵ The authors of the pamphlet argued that the Japanese lack of scientific spirit had resulted from their strict adherence to the religious doctrine of the state: Shinto. The Japanese lacked a scientific, rational, and critical spirit because established authority and Shinto went unquestioned in feudal society. Popularized in a report by the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Japanese people were often referred to as the “obedient herd” because of their perceived lack of individuality and self-direction.³¹⁶ Religious leaders were obeyed, not questioned. GHQ believed that the Japanese viewed the emperor as their divine leader.³¹⁷ Authorities pointed to the imperial rescript on education of 1890 that pronounced him “coeval with Heaven and Earth.”³¹⁸ All mandates handed down by the emperor had the aura of religious doctrine. Accordingly, the Japanese had been complacent before government-inspired ultra-nationalism and militarism. Even Japanese intellectuals were unable to fully develop the critical spirit because Shinto doctrine was unassailable. The emperor obligated intellectuals to confirm, not question, established doctrine.³¹⁹

³¹⁴ Ibid., 70.

³¹⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 248.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 218.

³¹⁷ Benedict, 58-59.

³¹⁸ Charles Kades, “Representative Government in Japan,” in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), xxiv.

³¹⁹ “SCAPIN 448: Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control and Dissemination of State Shinto,” (15 December 1945), in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), 467-470.

Occupation authorities also accepted that feudalism instilled a social hierarchy approaching a caste system. Each person in feudal Japan had an established position and role in society.³²⁰ Deputy Chief of the Government Section (GS) Charles Kades argued that the Meiji restoration had entrenched, not eliminated, feudal structure. A highly centralized government replaced the decentralized feudal lords. The new system had prefectural, municipal, and neighborhood branches, enforced by a strong police force.³²¹ Rigid social stratification prevented the emergence of a modern society predicated upon social and economic mobility. Citizens died in the position into which they were born. Stratification and hierarchy also impacted family arrangements. Age trumped merit, and patriarchal arrangements subjugated women to men.³²² Authorities of the occupation believed that the American family consisted of the nuclear family (father, mother, and children) while Japanese households, in addition to the nuclear family, consisted of the extended family network (grandparents, aunts, uncles, spouses of children and cousins).

Although cultural anthropology and psychology seemed to give credibility to these characterizations of the Japanese, they actually reaffirmed old theories based on biological determinism. The new theories differed in that they argued that “national character” was malleable. In their eyes, misguided cultures could be corrected. During the war, theories that there were superior and inferior examples of “national character” may have fostered killing, but they promoted paternalism in the postwar period.³²³ Benedict compared the Japanese with “American adolescent gangs.”³²⁴ John Dower has pointed out that “Western social scientists had used childishness in precise academic ways to diagnose the pathology of the Japanese: they were collectively blocked at the anal or phallic stage; their behavior as a people was equivalent to

³²⁰ Benedict, 61.

³²¹ Charles Kades, “Representative Government in Japan,” in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), xxviii.

³²² Kades, xxviii.

³²³ See: John Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), chapter 1, “Patterns of a Race War,” chapter 6, “Primitives, Children, Madmen,” and chapter 11, “From War to Peace.”

³²⁴ Benedict, 108.

adolescent behavior amount Westerners.”³²⁵ MacArthur’s comment that the Japanese were like a twelve-year old boy revealed his belief in Japan’s arrested development or evolutionary backwardness. Both displayed a belief that societies, like people, invariably developed from children to adults. Their belief in the malleability of national character gave credence to the viability of progress toward maturity, embodied by the United States.

To simultaneously bring the adolescent Japanese to modern “maturity” and achieve the objectives set by the three policy papers initially guiding the occupation, MacArthur relied on revision of Japan’s Meiji Constitution. While MacArthur had begun social, cultural, and political modernization through various SCAP directives in the fields of land reform, education, political freedom, religion, press, speech, and assembly,³²⁶ the Constitution codified the reforms into a document that would outlive the occupation. The initial policy—revision of the constitution—gave priority to changing Japan’s social, cultural, and political structure while downplaying economic revival and development. The three policy papers guiding the occupation forbade MacArthur from reviving the Japanese economy. The drafters of each policy paper believed that demilitarization and democratization could only be successful if Japan’s industrial power remained limited. A 1945 directive from Washington bluntly stated: “You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation or the strengthening of the Japanese economy.”³²⁷ The Supreme Commander did not believe the argument that social, cultural, and political change required economic change. Throughout the occupation MacArthur rejected that economic stagnation led to communism while economic prosperity invariably led to democracy.

Unconvinced that the Japanese could reform their own country, MacArthur saw no problem with grafting onto Japan a U.S.-styled constitution and democracy. In October 1945, MacArthur announced his intention to revise the existing Meiji Constitution and called for

³²⁵ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 302-303.

³²⁶ Land Reform in “SCAPIN 411,” (9 December 1945); Education in “Education Diet Resolution Rescinding Imperial Rescript on Education,” (19 June 1948); Political Freedom in “SCAPIN 93,” (4 October 1945); Speech in “SCAPIN 16,” (10 September 1945), MacArthur ordered an “absolute minimum of restrictions upon freedom of speech”; Religion in “SCAPIN 448: Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control and Dissemination of State Shinto,” (15 December 1945).

³²⁷ Douglas MacArthur, “Japan—An Economy of Survival,” May 1949, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 326.

recommendations from the Japanese. From then until March 1946, GHQ received proposals concerning the constitution from twelve groups including the Communists, Liberals, Progressives, Socialists, Conservatives, and Kempō Kondankai (Constitutional Discussion Group). MacArthur and aides from the Government Section (GS) of the occupation rejected all Japanese proposals. Many amounted to little more than slight amendments to the Meiji Constitution while others were radical proposals, out of line with U.S. goals. For example, the Matsumoto Committee submitted a new constitution that, like the current constitution, was steeped in German political theory and was authoritarian in nature. Comprised of men who held power and wealth within the existing system, the committee sought to uphold conservative rule, not overthrow it. In contrast, the communist party submitted a plea for the complete elimination of private property.

The Supreme Commander therefore took it upon himself and the occupation government to revise the constitution. Although Benedict, as a cultural anthropologist, believed that all cultures differed and that culture was nontransferable, MacArthur believed in universalism. He thought that one false dogma often expressed was “that the East and the West are separated by such impenetrable social, cultural and racial distinctions as to render impossible the absorption by one of the ideas and concepts of the other.”³²⁸ In a revealing speech about his certainty of the applicability of American democracy in Japan, MacArthur later claimed:

Our experience...reformation of Japanese life, where in reshaping the lives of others we have been guided by the same pattern from which is taken the design to our own lives, offers unmistakable proof, however, that while American in origin and American in concept, these tenets underlying a truly free society are no less designed to secure, preserve and advance the well-being of one race than they are of another—and given the opportunity to take root in one society they will flourish and grow as surely as they will in any other society. The lesson from the past and contemporary events is that they are no longer peculiarly American but now belong to the entire human race—and that their firm adaptability in the pattern of human life is by no means governed by ethnological considerations...many voices were raised against the planned implantation here of ideals and principles and standards underlying American democracy, for it was contended that Japanese tradition, Japanese culture, and Japanese experience would not permit their assimilation in Japan’s redesigned social system. Never was a statement more erroneous and unrealistic.³²⁹

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kades, the man who directed the revision of the constitution, explained that, left to the Japanese, political evolution would take decades. Because the

³²⁸ Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, vi.

³²⁹ Douglas MacArthur, “On Significance of 4th July,” (4 July 1947), 1, in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), 772.

occupation could not last that long, he suggested immediate revision of the constitution to accelerate development.³³⁰ Understanding that revision of the constitution would not immediately generate a modern society and eliminate feudalism, GHQ reasoned that the codification of so-called universal laws, upon which modern society was built, would accelerate development. The Japanese would avoid the arduous and time-consuming task of developing modern institutions and laws because the West had already done the legwork. The Japanese could avoid the pitfalls of development and needed only to live up to the standards already set.³³¹ In a letter to his friend Charles Englishby, MacArthur stated: “There is no need to experiment with new and yet untried, or already tried and discredited concepts, when success itself stands as the eloquent and convincing advocate of our own.”³³² Utah Democratic senator and member of the Committee on Foreign Relations Elbert D. Thomas urged Americans to “introduce in a few years the non-material aspects of hundreds of years of western culture—the fruits of the Renaissance, political liberalism, Christian humanism—in short, all those ideals and spiritual values which have tempered the material advance of the West.”³³³

MacArthur assigned the task of revising the constitution to the Government Section (GS) of the occupation. As Chief of the Government Section, Brigadier General Courtney Whitney assigned Kades to direct the revision. Including Kades, fifteen men and one woman comprised the drafting committee. According to John Dower, the membership was comprised of “New Dealers, leftists, and Asia specialists more associated with China than Japan.”³³⁴ The committee members held the same conviction as MacArthur that democratic ideals were universally applicable and desirable. None of the members had extensive knowledge of Japan; in fact, the top three American experts on Japan—Joseph Grew, Eugene Dooman, and Joseph Ballantine—

³³⁰Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, 90.

³³¹Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, 90.

³³² Douglas MacArthur, “Pattern For the Occupation of Japan,” (14 February 1948), in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), 785.

³³³ Elbert D. Thomas, Speech at the University of Michigan (5 August 1947), transcription in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 214.

³³⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 220.

had been ousted because they were unconvinced of the applicability of democracy in Japan.³³⁵ The experts on Japan preferred a constitutional monarchy to maintain a semblance of the past.

On February 3, 1946, MacArthur laid out three principles that he required be followed in drafting the new constitution. The Supreme Commander demanded completion in seven days because it was reported that a Far Eastern Commission (FEC) comprised of four nations—Britain, U.S., U.S.S.R., and China—would be formed in February. The FEC might challenge MacArthur’s authority in Japan.³³⁶ MacArthur resisted any outside influence and therefore ordered the completion of the constitution before the FEC could be organized and its policies enacted. SCAP emphasized as the three essential principles: the emperor shall remain the head of state but be responsible to the people; the abolition of war; and the abolition of the feudal system.

Within MacArthur’s seven-day deadline, the GS produced a new constitution based on the U.S. Constitution. The GS sought to use the document as a means to eliminate Japan’s feudal society and usher in modern society. The feudal society closely resembled what modernization theorists would later identify as a traditional society. Likewise, the society the GS sought to create was very similar to that of the “modern” category in modernization theory. Influence from the Declaration of Independence, Gettysburg Address, and Constitution were particularly acute in the preamble: “We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land...do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people.”³³⁷ John Dower has pointed out that the GS’s “constitutional convention” relied on three major tenets: popular sovereignty, pacifism, and the protection of individual rights.³³⁸ The constitution was comprised of one hundred and three

³³⁵ Ibid., 218.

³³⁶ Courtney Whitney, Memo to MacArthur (1 Feb 1946), in *Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to September 1948. Report of Government Section: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1949), 622-623.

³³⁷ Constitution of Japan, 1, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 170.

³³⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 360.

articles grouped into eleven chapters. Each of MacArthur's three mandatory principles received its own chapter in the new constitution.

Chapter One established that the emperor was “the symbol of the State and the unity of the people.”³³⁹ The GS retained the emperor because the bedrock of the occupation's policy was what historian John Dower called the “respectful appraisal of the emperor's benign potential and virtually totalitarian spiritual control over the Japanese psyche.”³⁴⁰ GHQ sought to retain the emperor but demystify his status and role. No longer did the emperor perform esoteric spiritual rituals in the Imperial Palace but ventured out before the public to interact and receive suggestions from the people. The retention of the emperor convoluted GHQ's emphasis on meritocracy and apprehension to hierarchy. However the occupation authorities believed that the Japanese people would only accept and abide by the constitution if it retained the emperor. The retention of the emperor depended on a successful effort by GHQ to drive a wedge between the emperor and responsibility for the war. Saved from culpability, the emperor remained atop the Japanese social structure. GHQ solidified his permanence by making his position hereditary.

Chapter Two, drafted by Kades with instruction from MacArthur, renounced “war as a sovereign right of the nation.”³⁴¹ Chapter Two consisted of only one article: Article IX. The GS insisted that the “no war clause” be given its own chapter for emphasis. The second paragraph of Article IX obligated Japan to renounce the maintenance of an army, navy, or air force. Kades left the possibility of rearmament for national defense especially vague by removing the clause “even for preserving its own security,” setting the stage for decades of controversy.

The “constitutional convention” codified thirty civil and human rights within chapter three. Historian John Dower points out that chapter three “was, and remains, one of the most liberal guarantees of human rights in the world.”³⁴² Using chapter three the GS took aim at all the feudal characteristics of Japan. In Articles XIV and XXII the GS sought to eliminate social and cultural hierarchy. To ensure modern mobility, Article XXII guarantees each person's right to choose his or her own occupation while Article XIV states: “All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of

³³⁹ Constitution of Japan, 2, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, 171.

³⁴⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 283.

³⁴¹ Constitution of Japan, 2, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, 171.

³⁴² Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 369.

race, creed, sex, social status., or family origin... peers and peerage shall not be recognized.”³⁴³ The GS secularized the Japanese government by separating “church” and state and guaranteeing freedom of religion in Article XX. Article XV ensured widespread political participation by securing universal adult suffrage and declaring that “the people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them.”³⁴⁴ Article XXIV established equality of the sexes in marriage and eliminated, as John Dower put it, the “legal underpinnings of the paternalistic family system.”³⁴⁵ The core family became a father, mother, and their children while the linkages to the extended family weakened.³⁴⁶ One of the more telling attacks on feudalism and support of democracy came in Articles XIX, XXIII, and XXVI, pertaining to the field of education.

The Civil Information & Education Section (CIE), in charge of the reorientation of Japanese education, explained: “In any long range policies and plans for the democratization of Japan, education necessarily plays a fundamental role.”³⁴⁷ The only direction given to MacArthur and the CIE within the field of education from the Potsdam Declaration, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan,” and JCS 1380/15, was the removal of militaristic nationalism and the “gradual introduction of new educational patterns to ensure the development of schools and the training of young people and teachers for a democratic Japan.”³⁴⁸ To accomplish these two goals MacArthur brought to Japan thirty prominent American educators to study the current state of Japanese education and suggest reforms. The

³⁴³ Constitution of Japan, 3, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, 172.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 172.

³⁴⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 244.

³⁴⁶ Richard Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 96.

³⁴⁷ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, “Education in the New Japan. Volume 1 text,” (May 1948), 7, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 254.

³⁴⁸ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, “Education in the New Japan. Volume 1 text,” (May 1948), 137, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 259.

educators focused on methods to re-educate the Japanese population, edit current textbooks, alter educational administration practices, and expand higher education.³⁴⁹

Guided by the suggestions of the thirty educators, Colonel Kermit R. Dyke, the original chief of CIE, released preliminary directives in late 1945 and early 1946 pertaining to military nationalism, educational structure, wartime texts, and gender education. The Japanese had traditionally attached great significance to education. They had nearly 100 percent literacy, and the first six years of education were compulsory and free.³⁵⁰ However less than one percent of elementary graduates attended university. Furthermore a select few universities including Tokyo Imperial University dominated the system. At the end of the war eighty-five percent of executive bureaucrats were graduates of Tokyo Imperial University.³⁵¹ The military had a grip on education; military generals often served as ministers of education. Textbooks reflected military priorities. Colonel Dyke ordered a purge of all militaristic teachers and officials from Japanese education. Upon learning of Dyke's directive, 115,778 educators resigned.³⁵² Dyke then moved on to the structure of the education system. CIE restructured the Japanese to conform to an American system. Japanese students now attended six years of elementary school, three years of junior high school, three years of high school, and then had the option to attend college.

Revision of textbooks followed the restructuring of the school system. Colonel Dyke and the CIE called for an elimination of all textbooks that inspired ultranationalism, perpetuated Shinto teachings of the past, or exalted the state over the individual.³⁵³ Dykes asked that textbooks "indicative of progressive ideas be issued."³⁵⁴ Until new textbooks could be

³⁴⁹ "Bid to U.S. Educators: MacArthur Wants Thirty to Help in Japan," in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 90.

³⁵⁰ Finn, 59.

³⁵¹ Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, xxxi.

³⁵² Finn, 60.

³⁵³ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, "Handbook on Christian Missions and Missionaries Vol. 1," (May 1950), 1, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 552.

³⁵⁴ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section, Religions and Cultural Resources Division, "Handbook on Christian Missions and Missionaries Volume 1," (April 1950), 1, in *The Documentary History of the*

introduced, CIE required students to carefully read each text, with the help and guidance of their teachers, and systematically blacken out all parts deemed militaristic, nationalistic, or undemocratic. Educators specifically focused on history, ethics, and geography: the three subjects most permeated by military nationalism. “Blackening out” left an indelible mark on the memory of a generation of Japanese students. The exercise not only eliminated military nationalist passages but also revealed the relativity of knowledge. Occupation authorities were convinced that Japanese educational methods used during the war consisted of rote learning. CIE emphasized modern reason over traditional rote. Students analyzed and criticized texts rather than memorize them. Teachers instructed students to challenge the status quo rather than confirm it. Unassailable truths were suddenly dethroned and new answers became not only possible but encouraged. CIE wanted to instill the critical spirit that had eluded Meiji Japan.³⁵⁵

By providing first-hand experience with the process of reinterpretation and assessment, Japanese students were to experience a crash course in modern liberal education. No longer were answers handed down from a hierarchical organization to be memorized and used to create servants of the state, education was to be democratic. CIE encouraged local school districts to take control of their own curricula.³⁵⁶ The old hierarchical organization took a further blow when the CIE installed measures to place educators and students on more of an equal basis. Knowledge was to be derived from a give and take between the instructor and student, not handed down to be memorized. CIE emphasized education through research and facilities to help individuals formulate new knowledge. Occupation authorities reorganized the entire educational process to promote individualism over regimentation and orthodoxy.

Democracy mandated equal opportunity. Traditionally Japanese boys and girls had been separated from fifth grade on. CIE promoted “coeducational egalitarianism”³⁵⁷ and abrogated

Truman Presidency, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 552.

³⁵⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 248.

³⁵⁶ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, “Education in the New Japan. Volume 1,” (May 1948), 142, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 5, *Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952*, ed. Dennis Merrill (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 1996), 264.

³⁵⁷ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 244.

gender segregation in all levels of education. For the first time in history Imperial universities admitted women. Women became principals and officials. Simplified textbooks previously used for girls were eliminated.³⁵⁸ To further facilitate equality CIE issued a directive calling for the simplification of language use in education. Japanese education had traditionally used *kanji*, *hiragana*, and *katakana* for its system of writing. *Kanji*, *hiragana*, and *katakana* were systems of writing consisting of borrowed symbols, Chinese in origin. The difficulty of learning these systems proved to be an obstacle to widespread education. CIE instigated a form of *romaji*, or Roman alphabet to expand educational opportunities and make language “a highway and not a barrier.”³⁵⁹ A new lexicon of borrowed American terms and neologisms quickly appeared. Words such as “*Karikyuramu*, *gaidansu*, *homūrūmu*, *hōmu purojekuto*, *cōsu obu sutadei*, *kurabu akutibiti*—that is, curriculum, guidance, home room, home project, course of study, and club activity”³⁶⁰—became common. CIE also brought expanded opportunities for university education to the public. Night classes, correspondence courses, an improved extension system, holiday courses, and an expansion of library and museums all took place within the first years of the occupation.

In addition to expanding educational opportunities, CIE secularized education to ensure a modern democratic Japan. Occupation authorities believed that state Shinto “had occupied an extremely important part of the national school program and formed the core of ultranationalism.”³⁶¹ In addition, Shinto handed down acceptable programs of study and material. To break free of religion, deemed traditional, and foster modern liberal education, CIE cut all ties between Shinto and education.

Education was an example of the logic, goals, and assumptions that MacArthur and his fellow policymakers shared during the first two years of the occupation. The general guidelines of demilitarization and democratization became more specific as the first two years progressed.

³⁵⁸ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, “Education in the New Japan. Volume 1,” 148, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, 270.

³⁵⁹ Finn, 62.

³⁶⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 251.

³⁶¹ GHQ, SCAP, Civil Information & Education Section, Education Division, “Education in the New Japan. Volume 1,” 138-139, in *The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, 260-261.

Knowing little about Japan, policymakers relied on the interpretation of Japan society and culture held by liberal scholars such as Ruth Benedict.

Between the time the new Japanese Constitution became law on May 3, 1947 and the end of 1948, the American policy shifted to the “reverse course,” a term created and popularized by the Japanese media.³⁶² The reverse course policies gave priority to economic revival and recovery over demilitarization and democratization. Although the initial policies pertaining to social, cultural, and political reform gave way to policies favoring economic resuscitation by 1948, similar logic, goals, and assumptions would resurface in modernization theory.

The near universal obsession with the Japanese feudal system and mentality revealed a trend that would become a key in the logic of major modernization theorists. In 1955, historian Louis Hartz published *The Liberal Tradition in America*, a book that reflected the prevailing interpretation of American history at the time. As a consensus historian Hartz stressed historical harmony over the discord emphasized by the progressive historians of the first half of the century. Hartz argued that America had been settled by Europeans fleeing feudal oppression. Settlers’ flight was “the American substitute for the European experience of social revolution.”³⁶³ In Hartz’s eyes, the absence of feudalism and lack of need to overthrow the *ancien régime* made America exceptional.³⁶⁴ Without a feudal past, Hartz contended, America never developed the dialectic of class and therefore remained impervious to socialism and communism. The Pilgrims merely established a liberal community under the influence of John Locke. All Americans had therefore been “born free,” and affluence prevented any political persuasion other than Lockean liberalism from developing.

Rather than being empowered by his interpretation of America’s past, Hartz believed that America’s lack of ideology had blinded Americans to what true revolutions entailed; however, modernization theorists accepted Hartz’s interpretation of American society and history as a constant account of conservative liberalism and used it as “the basic vision for...what a healthy

³⁶² Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 526.

³⁶³ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1955), 3, 65-66.

³⁶⁴ Richard Pells, *Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*, 2nd ed. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 157.

modern polity should look like.”³⁶⁵ In *The Stages of Economic Growth* Rostow stated: “The United States, again to use Hartz’s phrase, was ‘born free’—with vigorous, independent land-owning farmers, and an ample supply of enterprising men of commerce, as well as a social and political system that took easily to industrialization.”³⁶⁶ Consequently, the U.S. “never became so deeply caught up in the structures, politics, and values of the traditional society.”³⁶⁷ In contrast to Japan’s need to overcome feudalistic society, America’s transition to modernity was “mainly economic and technical.”³⁶⁸ Occupation authorities also took America’s absence of feudalism as proof that America operated under a modern ideology while Japan remained imprisoned by an archaic political philosophy. Lt. Colonel Kades, when referring to feudalism, claimed: “That way of life was the antithesis of the democratic way.”³⁶⁹ Occupation authorities saw their task to be the elimination of the traditional Japanese culture and the development of a modern representative government—embodied by the universal American example—and the “way of life attuned to its principles.”³⁷⁰

Modernization theorists had to deal with how Japan had maintained its feudalistic society despite modernizing their industrial and military sector. In *The Dynamics of Modernization* (1966), modernization theorist C.E. Black provided the answer. He argued that Japan had engaged in limited or defensive modernization.³⁷¹ The Japanese began modernizing on their own initiative—without any change in their territory or population—to prevent foreign intrusion and disruption of their traditional society. Japanese leaders reformed their bureaucracy and military using advice from foreign—mainly German—military and political leaders. The bureaucracy and military received modern equipment and training while Japanese society remained unchanged. Thus Black argued that “it was an essential feature of these reforms, however, that they were

³⁶⁵ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 65; W.W. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 17n; Pells, 161.

³⁶⁶ Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*, 98.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁶⁹ Kades, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, xxvi.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, xxvii.

³⁷¹ C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 121.

designed not to transform the traditional system but to strengthen it against foreign pressures.”³⁷² The military ensured that the elites maintained their positions of power and the way of life of the peasants—who constituted eighty percent of the population—remained unchanged.³⁷³

Black contended that the American occupation had shocked the Japanese into a revolution of modernity.³⁷⁴ The Americans’ defeat of the Japanese convinced the Japanese that their traditional society was no longer viable, that modernity was inevitable, and that they should embrace the American reforms. However, until the occupation, the Japanese had been able to withstand the powerful modernizing forces from abroad and preserve their integrity and traditional identity.

Black described a traditional society that shared many characteristics described by Benedict and accepted by occupation authorities as elements of Japan’s feudal society. In addition, Black depicted a process of modernization similar to what authorities of the occupation tried to institutionalize through the revision of the constitution. First, Black explained that modernization entailed the establishment of a critical spirit and dethronement of religious justification.³⁷⁵ He asserted that the Japanese must discard religious (Shinto) dogmas and establish a modern, scientific, universal, and secular spirit in society.³⁷⁶ Theological systems and religious beliefs were based on “earlier conceptions of the nature of the world” and were ill-fitted to modern thought because they subjugated man and his well-being to unworldly promises in an afterworld.³⁷⁷ In agreement with measures such as Article XX of the revised Japanese Constitution—which separated “church” and state, and therefore eliminated any obligation to carry Shinto beliefs into intellectual pursuits—Black contested that modernization mandated secularization. He believed that religion could not supply the government a paradigm or guide on how to conduct itself domestically and internationally.

In ways similar to those of authorities of the occupation, Black also theorized about modernization and its impact on family arrangements. He defined the modern family as a

³⁷² Ibid., 121.

³⁷³ Ibid., 119-123.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., 121.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 11-12.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 28.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 12.

household occupied by a nuclear family detached from the extended family. According to Black's argument, Japan's family arrangements were traditional. He contended that modernization included a "significant transformation of the family from the larger kinship units normally associated with agrarian life to the much smaller nuclear family consisting only of parents and younger children."³⁷⁸ Black, convinced that the typical American family consisted of a husband, wife, and their children, predicted that all non-modernized societies would eventually move in the same direction. Consequently, it remained only a matter of time before the bonds of family within traditional societies weakened and the nuclear family arrangement became prevalent.³⁷⁹

Social stratification and peerage, other feudal characteristics that Benedict had identified and that the occupation authorities had tried to eliminate, resurfaced as a focus of criticism in the works of modernization theorists. Both modernization theorists, such as Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, and occupation authorities believed that a modern society was based on achievement over ascription. According to Inkeles and Smith ascription was social status derived from birth while achievement signified status attained by technical and intellectual ability. Evident in occupation authorities' attempt to replace the Japanese feudal structure through Articles XIV, XXII, and educational reform, achievement and ascription reemerged in *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951), edited by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils. Shils and Parsons, both modernization theorists, were sociologists who dominated their field in the 1950s and 1960s. In *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Parsons and Shils created "pattern variables." Pattern variables were "dichotomous pairings of value orientations that collectively constituted a system that allowed actors to determine the meaning of a situation."³⁸⁰ The authors centered on five pattern variables: affectivity and affective neutrality, self-orientation and collectivity-orientation, particularism and universalism, diffuseness and specificity, and, most importantly, ascription and achievement.³⁸¹ To Parsons and Shils, the former variable of each pairing was essentially traditional while the latter of each pair was modern. Embedded in the authors' logic was the idea

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 21.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 21-26.

³⁸⁰ Gilman, 86.

³⁸¹ Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 53-110.

of universality; the population of all societies would at one time or another travel from the former of each pair to the latter. As arguably the most influential American social scientist of the Cold War era, Parsons exerted immense influence on other modernization theorists. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith identified ascription as a traditional characteristic and achievement as a modern characteristic in their book *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (1974). Inkeles and Smith contended: “Traditional societies are generally defined as having closed class systems, in extreme cases possessed of the rigidity of a caste structure.”³⁸² They continued that within traditional societies mobility is at a minimum—children are born into a profession and die in that same profession. Modern societies, by contrast, predicate movement into different social status by means of education and technical ability. Each person always holds the possibility to change station, for better or for worse.³⁸³

The occupation was an attempt to replace an ascription-based society with one based on achievement five years before Parsons and Shils made their theory explicit. Authorities of the occupation clearly held the same logic and assumptions that modernization theorists later developed about the nature of social relationships and about economic and social mobility. Modernization theorists never overtly admitted influence from occupation policies on ascription—Parsons even expressed his dismay over Ruth Benedict’s cultural relativism—but both modernization theorists and policymakers of the occupation operated under the same mentality.³⁸⁴

Valuing achievement over ascription was also connected to pluralist democracy and the elite theory of democracy. Modernization theorists took from the “end of ideology” debate in 1950s sociology the idea that the West had advanced past ideological disagreements and influence. Because only technical problems remained, objective experts could effectively lead society. Modernization theorists never denied that experts and educated elites should lead each country, but, to set themselves apart from communist ruling cliques, they emphasized pluralism. Pluralism meant that the educated elites, rather than a monolithic group, competed and shared power within government. The American effort to reform and expand the university system in

³⁸² Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 31.

³⁸³ Inkeles and Smith, 31-32.

³⁸⁴ Parsons and Shils, 418.

Japan provided an undeniable example of an attempt to create pluralism. The occupation authorities believed that the feudal nature of pre-occupation Japan had stifled the possibility that common citizens could advance to a leadership role based on their intellectual and technical ability. As stated before, eighty-five percent of Japanese governmental bureaucrats had graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and the military elite had a grip on the educational system. Col. Dyke and members of the Civil Information and Education System agreed that educated elites should run the country but sought to provide opportunity to lead groups outside the imperial university system. Occupation authorities attempted to expand non-imperial institutions of higher learning and encourage local and regional educational curricula. CIE authorities hoped to break Tokyo University's monopoly on education.

A curious aspect was that both MacArthur and modernization theorist supported imposing a democratic society by authoritarian means. Historian John Dower has explained: "While the victors preached democracy, they ruled by fiat; while they espoused equality, they themselves constituted an inviolate privileged caste."³⁸⁵ The American occupiers wrote the new Japanese Constitution without Japanese input. MacArthur rejected all Japanese suggestions and proposals. Under the assumption that "laws of political morality are universal," a phrase eventually incorporated into the preamble, MacArthur sought to impose an American-styled society on Japan. MacArthur and Lieutenant Colonel Kades understood that the occupation could not last for decades; they, therefore, introduced a constitution heavily influenced by the American Constitution and expected the Japanese to live up to its social and political arrangements. MacArthur's authoritarian modernization served as a shining example to modernization theorists desperate to rapidly modernize traditional societies. In the high-stakes Cold War of the 1960s, modernization theorists became dismayed by the lethargic pace of modernization in traditional societies. Believing that all traditional countries desired modernization in the American form and pushed by the perceived necessity to accelerate their move toward it, theorists advocated drastic measures. It became justifiable to defer democracy to achieve rapid modernization. Certainly democracy remained the goal, but transformation in the economic, social, and cultural arenas could be accelerated to provide a suitable setting in which democracy could flourish. Modernization theorist Lucian Pye explained that "The military may

³⁸⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 211.

provide an opportunity and a basis for cooperation, but the objective must remain the development of stable representative institutions and practices.”³⁸⁶ In August 1959, Pye elaborated on the potential of authoritarians and military dictatorships to modernize non-modern countries in a speech delivered in Santa Monica at RAND Corporation. First, Pye claimed that authoritarians could eliminate the disorienting elements of the modernization process by providing structure and direction. Instead of being held to the time-consuming majority rule and compromise that beset democratic rule, authoritarians would clearly promulgate a goal and ensure progress towards it. Second, the military could act as a modernizing organization by providing stability while society modernized. Political scientist Samuel Huntington pointed out that “violence and other destabilizing events were five times more frequent between 1955 and 1962 than they were between 1948 and 1954.”³⁸⁷ The threat of destabilization prompted modernization theorists to prescribe rule by the military as a remedy, to ensure a safe transition to democracy. Pye explained that “The experience of breaking from the known and relatively sheltered world of tradition and moving into the more unknown modern world is generally an extremely traumatic one. In contrast to the villager who is caught up in the process of being urbanized, the young army recruit from the village has the more sheltered, the more gradual introduction into the modern world.”³⁸⁸ Third, the military could also provide an example of a rational, orderly, merit-based, and technologically modern organization to be emulated by the society at large.³⁸⁹ He claimed: “a military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the type for an industrialized and secularized enterprise.”³⁹⁰ Mimicry could produce modernization. Pye and modernization theorists in general viewed the Japanese occupation as an encouraging example of controlled modernization, imposed by a military occupation, and led by MacArthur, a military autocrat. Without a doubt, modernization theorists thought, the success of the occupation was attributable to the Japanese population; however, they saw MacArthur’s controlling hand and guiding spirit as responsible for the achievements of the

³⁸⁶ Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), 187.

³⁸⁷ J. Timmons Roberts and Amy Hite, eds., *From Modernization to Globalization* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 148.

³⁸⁸ Pye, 180.

³⁸⁹ Gilman, 185-190.

³⁹⁰ Pye, 175.

occupation.³⁹¹ As such, the model embodied in the occupation solidified the belief of modernization theorists that a similar successful modernization could be carried out by American-backed autocrats throughout the world.

Modernization theorists also viewed the occupation as an example of how a foreign penetration could act as the catalyst for modernization. As Rostow stated in *Stages of Economic Growth*, “as a matter of historical fact a reactive nationalism—reacting against intrusion from more advanced nations—has been the most important and powerful motive force in the transition from traditional to modern society.”³⁹² Rostow argued that modern societies could accelerate the modernization of traditional societies by encroaching on their sovereignty. Inspired by a common enemy, locals would coalesce—augmenting nationalism—and become motivated to establish their own autonomy. Rostow asserted that the only way traditional societies could gain international credibility and authority would be by adopting modern ways and using modern tools. To Rostow this meant that traditional societies would undoubtedly develop themselves into modern societies—as outlined by the West—to expel the foreign power. In Japan, Rostow argued that “Commodore Perry’s seven black ships...cast the die for modernization,” but the occupation finally brought Japan into full maturity.³⁹³ Of all the nations Rostow claimed to have achieved maturity, Japan was the only non-white country. In the minds of modernization theorists, the occupation, and specifically the revision of the constitution, undoubtedly played a key in Japan’s attainment of modernity.

It is possible to identify programs created and administered by the U.S. in the 1960s—when modernization theory dominated—that were meant to instill similar cultural values by similar methods that were described above (democratic, secular, and rational society stratified by merit, created by authoritarians and their military while encroaching on a “traditional” society’s sovereignty). An identical program was never created. Within the programs that did exist, it is difficult to pinpoint actions that were specifically intended to instill these cultural values because most modernization programs started at the village level and never successfully progressed to the

³⁹¹ Lucian W. Pye with Mary W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1985), 176-177.

³⁹² Rostow, 26.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 27.

later stages of development, where large-scale transitions were mainly to factor in. The closest example, though arguably more draconic, was the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam.

Begun by the Kennedy administration and Diem regime in 1961, the program was an effort to defeat North Vietnam by separating the South Vietnamese rural population from the North Vietnamese and Vietcong guerrillas. Convinced that the guerillas relied on the South Vietnamese villagers' support, the Kennedy administration sought to eliminate contact between the two. The rural population, formerly scattered throughout the countryside, was relocated by the military into more densely populated villages. Each village was surrounded by various types of barriers (e.g., barbed wire or chain-link fences) that were guarded by armed soldiers. Roger Hilsman, the director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the most enthusiastic advocate of the program, claimed that strategic hamlets could achieve more than simply separating the guerrillas from the farmers. According to Latham, Hilsman asserted that "they could also ignite a powerful, nationalistic sense of affinity between a formerly apathetic rural population and the South Vietnamese government."³⁹⁴ To achieve this, policymakers attempted to provide the farmers with an opportunity to participate in the functioning of government by extending democracy and state power down to the local level.³⁹⁵ They did this, according to Latham, because Lucian Pye had influenced the Kennedy administration.³⁹⁶ Pye, in his most influential work entitled *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (1956), argued that developing nations lacked a national identity—much like a teenager facing an identity crisis—and by involving all citizens through democratic institutions policymakers could help create "an inner coherence of values, theories, and actions for the entire polity."³⁹⁷ With a national identity and influence in the decision-making process, the democratically empowered citizens would seek to uphold and strengthen the South Vietnamese government rather than side with the guerrillas and try to overthrow it. Eugene Staley, a theorist on development, charged with drafting a national financial plan for U.S. economic assistance to Vietnam, claimed, the new politically active citizens would be "shaken from their ancient, static

³⁹⁴ Latham, 180.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., 177.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., 177-178.

³⁹⁷ Quoted in Gilman, 170.

ways of life....[and] pull[ed] out of the mire of ancient customs.”³⁹⁸ The “traditional” peasants would abandon their “filial piety,” “religious justification,” and “political passivity,” and become “modern” citizens.³⁹⁹

In addition to the modernizing force of democracy, the Kennedy administration believed that the military presence in each hamlet would accelerate the development of modern values. “Contact with modern military forces, experts believed, would stimulate self-defense efforts as well as an identification with the larger national government structure beyond the boundaries of peasant lives,” according to Latham.⁴⁰⁰ Pye explained that: “In large part, this is a reflection of the basic fact that in much of Southeast Asia the bureaucracy and the army are positive actors in the political process and not neutral instruments of policy.”⁴⁰¹ Pye described how the military presence in Southeast Asia could accelerate modernization by providing stability during transition and an example of a rational, ordered, merit-based organization to be emulated by the peasants.

Similar to the American experience in the occupation of Japan, the Strategic Hamlet Program was in reality authoritarian modernization. American policymakers failed to recognize the arbitrariness of their actions. Referring to Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Latham asserted, “The United States, in his terms, was not cooperating with a repressive regime, forcibly moving peasants off their ancestral lands, demanding their labor, or controlling the intimate details of their lives. It was instead providing the guidance necessary for South Vietnam to become more like America and helping that country take an honored place among modern nations.”⁴⁰² Without popular support—as had been the case in Japan—the Strategic Hamlet Program failed. Nevertheless, examining the Strategic Hamlet Program and the occupation of Japan reveals within each program ideas about modernization and about what constituted “traditional” and “modern” society and how to transition from the former to the

³⁹⁸ Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Economic Development* (New York: Harper Publishing, 1954), 1.

³⁹⁹ Lucian Pye, “The Politics of Southeast Asia,” in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 139-149; Latham, 178-180.

⁴⁰⁰ Latham., 178.

⁴⁰¹ Pye, 145.

⁴⁰² Latham, 180.

latter. Although policymakers of the Strategic Hamlet Program held nearly identical ideas as modernization theorists, authorities of the occupation had at least one major difference.

The authorities of the occupation and modernization theorists were generally in harmony about the social, cultural, and political aspects of a traditional and modern society. They agreed that traditional societies were hierarchically based on ascription, were religious, had limited suffrage, had hierarchical education, had family relationships based on heredity and patriarchy, and lacked critical thinking and a scientific spirit. In contrast, modern societies were mobile, secular, democratic, rational, and egalitarian. Although they basically agreed on the characteristics of a traditional and modern society, they had one major area of contention when it came to the transition: economics. MacArthur and fellow authorities of the occupation believed that the strongest countries were economically vibrant ones; however, without the authority to resuscitate Japan's economy, they maintained that social, cultural, and political modernization could occur without economic change. In contrast modernization theorists argued that transition was a systemic process. Changes in one area were related to and affected changes in the other areas. Modernization theorist Daniel Lerner explained that all elements of modernization were highly associated "because, in some historic sense, they had to go together."⁴⁰³ Social and cultural change required economic change and vice versa. The "reverse course" represents the best example of MacArthur's view on economic development and how it differed from the modernization theorists' view.

From late 1948 through the end of the occupation in 1952, GHQ completely reoriented its policies and goals in Japan. Whereas the pre-1948 GHQ emphasized democratization and demilitarization, after 1948 it attempted to economically resuscitate the Japanese economy and prepare the country to become part of the U.S.'s effort to contain the Soviets. While social, cultural, and political modernization had taken precedence over economic development before 1948, economic modernization now became occupation authorities' foremost concern. Social and cultural factors—family structure, religion, social stratification, and suffrage—received little attention compared to economic resuscitation and the Cold War.

⁴⁰³ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, with an introduction by David Riesman (London: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1958; The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 438.

Cold War imperatives motivated authorities in Washington D.C. to change policy. Four hundred and forty-five days passed from the completion of the English version of the constitution on February 13, 1946 until it formally became law on May 3, 1947. Translators converted it to Japanese and Japanese cabinet members, Japanese parliament, and parliamentary committees had to debate and ratify it. Meanwhile Soviet-American antagonism intensified. In 1947, Truman issued the Truman doctrine sending \$400 million aid to Greece and Turkey to maintain antiauthoritarian governments. From June 1948 to May 1949, Stalin ordered troops to carry out the Berlin Blockade, effectively blocking the overland route connecting West Berlin to West Germany. The U.S.-supported Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek steadily lost ground throughout the late 1940s, eventually losing all control of mainland China in 1949. Washington needed a new Asian ally. Global circumstances prodded American policymakers to abandon their “soft policy,” defined negatively as denying Japan to the Soviets and, as historian John Dower has observed, enacted a “hard policy, which sought to transform Japan into an active integrated ally against communist forces.”⁴⁰⁴

The logic of the “reverse course” was founded on the belief that economic stagnation made Japan, as well as the other non-Communist Asian nations, susceptible to communist takeover. Postwar American policymakers generally believed that World War II had been started because of German’s economic plight imposed by the disadvantageous Versailles Treaty and its drafters’ demand for war reparations from Germany. Occupation authorities extended that logic to argue that the best way to make Japan a strong ally would be to revive its economy. An economically strong Japan could better defend itself from Chinese or Soviet aggression, provide the West with industrial and military resources, provide a potential base for Western military power in Asia, and encourage other non-Communist nations to fight the spread of Communism.⁴⁰⁵ To accomplish this goal, GHQ sought to augment production and trade by reinstating the *zaibatsu* conglomerates. MacArthur had originally viewed the *zaibatsu* as main pillars of feudalism and militarism. In December 1947 he had sent legislation to the Diet for the dissolution of the *zaibatsu*. The Supreme Commander designated 325 large firms to be evaluated and possibly dissolved. However the ascendancy of reverse course economics had

⁴⁰⁴ John Dower, *Japan in War & Peace: Selected Essays* (New York: New Press, 1995), 162.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 187-188.

already begun as debate took place in the Diet, impacting the dissolution law. In the end, only eleven companies were dissolved. In total, only 28 out of 1200 firms considered were actually dissolved. All major banking institutions avoided dissolution and they provided a framework for the recovery of the *zaibatsu*.

Using the *zaibatsu*, SCAP replaced the free economy with a directed one that championed “priority production.”⁴⁰⁶ Certain key industries with high-priority received scarce labor and resources, government subsidies, and Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) loans. Industries with high priority included basic energy producers (coal and electric power), heavy and chemical industry (iron, steel, and fertilizer), and shipbuilding companies.⁴⁰⁷ The RFB directed eighty percent of their loans to only ninety-seven companies, most within the high priority category. As promulgated in NSC 48/1, GHQ envisioned that Japan could strengthen other non-Communist Asian nations through a mutually beneficial triangular trading arrangement predicated on comparative advantage and neo-classical international trade theory. The triangular trading relationship operated this way: Third World Asia nations, such as India, would provide raw materials to Japan; Japan would produce second-rate products, including “Oriental” specialties, not manufactured in the U.S. or labor-intensive products to be sold in the U.S. and Asia; and finally the U.S. would specialize in manufactured goods to be sold throughout North America, Asia, and the rest of the third world. There existed an overriding belief among American policymakers that each side of the triangle would equally benefit. This belief eventually turned out to be faulty, and Japan’s economic recovery actually relied on the boom caused by the Korean War and on its production of highly specialized and scientific products.

The logic underlying the reverse course resembled modernization theory but did not yield a systemic theory. Both modernization theorists and authorities of the occupation predicted that democracy could best survive and prosper within countries enjoying a vibrant economy; however, occupation authorities failed to connect the social, cultural, and political considerations of development to the economic factors. Once “reverse course” logic became policy and practice occupation authorities viewed economic development as a suitable goal in and of itself to win the

⁴⁰⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 534-535.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 535.

Cold War. Unlike modernization theorists, they failed to view development as a systemic process. Modernization theorists considered the economic impact on social, cultural, and political factors, and vice versa. Walt Rostow elucidated the impact of economic prosperity on social, cultural, and political factors. Citing historian David Potter's *People of Plenty*, Rostow argued that a democratic society was untenable without economic prosperity.⁴⁰⁸ Theorizing about development in the opposite direction, modernization theorists including Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils focused on the social, cultural, and psychological aspects that hindered or helped economic development. Modernization theorists were motivated by the perceived inadequacies of neo-classical economic theory and its focus on rational individuals and absence of cultural factors in their mathematical formulas. Occupation authorities never made an explicit connection between social, cultural, and political factors and economic factors.

The occupation of Japan differed from the kind of action envisioned in modernization theory because policymakers started with democracy and ended with economic development while modernization theorists advocated the opposite: the initial policy of the occupation favored social, cultural, and political modernization and marginalized the economic aspects while the reverse course gave priority to economic modernization to the detriment of social, cultural, and political aspects. Although occupation authorities including MacArthur, Gen. Whitney, Lt. Col. Kades, Col. Dykes, and Col. Fellers never formulated a theory, they had a clear conception of how traditional and modern societies differed. Founded on their understanding of a modern United States and Benedict's interpretation of Japanese society, authorities delineated feudalism and its ramifications as the main factors constituting a traditional society. Feudalism created a rigidly stratified social structure relegating individuals to hereditary occupations. The social structure forbade upward mobility, and dependence on absolute power from the top down produced a passive polity. Government influenced by religion stunted the growth of a critical spirit. Initially lacking authority to resuscitate the Japanese economy, GHQ relied on revision of the Constitution to modernize Japan. Accordingly the Constitution was comprised of articles guaranteeing a representative democracy, pacifism, gender and racial equality, freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and the right

⁴⁰⁸ Gilman, 67. Nils Gilman pointed out that Rostow relied specifically on *People of Plenty* for his argument in a book-length unpublished essay entitled "The Making of Modern America,"

of citizen to have a free education predicted upon intellectual freedom. All resurfaced in the modern category of modernization theory. The occupation conducted by the military with MacArthur on top provided modernization theorists of the 1960s with a suitable example of how an autocrat could effectively accelerate modernization. As Cold War antagonisms intensified, in the late 1940s, policymakers enacted a reverse course. The logic underlying the reverse course proposed that increased economic prosperity would fashion Japan into a strong Cold War ally. Hence policymakers aimed at resuscitating the Japanese economy while giving lower priority to the social, cultural, and political ramifications entailed. However while modernization theorists elucidated an explicit theory connecting economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors, occupation authorities pursued the modernization of each aspect at different times, never creating a systemic justification for their actions.

CHAPTER 5 - Conclusion – Toward an Understanding of Historical Change

Historian Michael Latham has pointed out that modernization theory came to the forefront in “tandem with growing official interest in the nature of development and its strategic significance.”⁴⁰⁹ Decolonization after World War II had strategic implications; nearly 450 million people from 45 countries were becoming liberated from the imperial control of Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States. The combination of decolonization, Europe’s decline in power, the breaking up of European trading blocks, and the United States’ augmented geopolitical power led U.S. policymakers to reason that they were now responsible for the future and direction of the global capitalist system. Furthermore, the overriding concern with containment of the Soviet Union and Communism prompted U.S. policymakers to try to prevent decolonizing countries from seeking communist solutions to their widespread poverty.

U.S. policymakers’ attention to the Third World and its development became particularly acute during the Kennedy administration. In January 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared his support for “wars of national liberation,” leading policymakers to focus on the Third World as the new battleground of the Cold War. Kennedy himself played down Eisenhower’s strategy of nuclear deterrence and focused on development of the Third World as a means to win the Cold War. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1961 he pledged: “to those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny....we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required” and that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the

⁴⁰⁹Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 23.

survival and the success of liberty.”⁴¹⁰ In the same year Kennedy told Congress that “widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area.”⁴¹¹

The shift in focus predicated a need for a distinctly American theory of development, superior to that of the Soviets, to counter decolonization, the erosion of Western empire, and rising Third World nationalism.⁴¹² Historian Odd Arne Westad has argued that “the need was felt to be urgent: instead of the clear-cut Marxist theory of social change, the Western experience was a messy, drawn-out series of unheroic social processes, with few concrete points of reference that could enflame young Third World intellectuals.”⁴¹³ A new theory would need to be both liberal and capitalist and convince Third World countries that the American method could eliminate poverty and bring economic prosperity better than the Marxist alternative. The theory would help strategists take an active stance rather than simply reacting to changes on the periphery.

Modernization theory became the dominant theory used by policymakers working on the development of the Third World in the 1960s. The argument of this thesis has been that, although modernization theorists claimed that their theory was novel and grounded in rigorous, empirical analysis, there were antecedents to their theory. The scale of programs of development was grander and policymakers’ attention to development was greater, but the programs were not unprecedented. The existence of similar logic, assumptions, and methods suggests that receptivity to modernization theory was augmented because it fell within the cultural and intellectual milieu of mid-twentieth century America. Modernization theorists’ works gained widespread acceptance because theorists organized their thinking in a framework that reinforced Americans’ perceived ideals, history, and mission. Michael Latham has pointed out that, as an ideology about development, modernization theory made “sense out of apparent chaos and rapid change” and ordered “complex information and events into meaningful, intelligible

⁴¹⁰ John Fitzgerald Kennedy, "Inaugural Address "; available from <http://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2007.

⁴¹¹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 34.

⁴¹² Latham, 27.

⁴¹³ Westad, 32-33.

relationships” that resonated with mid-century Americans.⁴¹⁴ The rise of modernization theory can best be described as the culmination of ideas that had been in existence since at least the New Deal. Modernization theorists’ ideas confirmed rather than refuted the prevailing intellectual and cultural trends of the time. Because modernization theory was a manifestation of the American intellectual and cultural milieu—therefore larger than the policies of any single presidential administration—it must be understood in light of the changes in American culture.

The ostensible novelty of modernization theory or “change” from past policies sheds light on how change occurred in thinking about development from the New Deal of the 1930s through the full maturity of modernization theory in the 1960s. Modernization theory flourished in the 1960s because theorists incorporated assumptions and logic prevalent in American culture and because theorists expanded on ideas already developed in previous decades.

John Lewis Gaddis has claimed that “John F. Kennedy attached even greater importance than usual to the task of putting ‘distance’ between himself and his predecessor.”⁴¹⁵ Kennedy, during his 1960 presidential campaign, criticized the Eisenhower administration for falling behind the Soviets, both economically and militarily. As the Democratic candidate, he promised to “get America moving again.” As president, this took the form of more publicly proactive stance to foreign policy, launching the “development decade” and programs such as the Peace Corps and Alliance for Progress.

Whereas Kennedy’s new emphasis revealed the way in which change was prompted by political considerations, factors outside of the government shaped the final form of that change. In a deeper sense, Kennedy’s programs, founded on modernization theory, manifested the way they did because of the cultural and intellectual milieu of mid-twentieth century America. Assumptions, logic, and methods prevalent in American culture when Kennedy took office did not guarantee that U.S. policy would naturally move toward the development of the Third World; however, when global and political circumstances prompted the administration to think about development, certain themes within that culture emerged to determine the shape of policies of development. Many of the themes had existed throughout American history and had already

⁴¹⁴ Latham, 13.

⁴¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; revised and expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 197.

manifested in previous programs of development, including the TVA, Point Four Program, and the occupation of Japan after World War II.

The first theme was the technocratic faith that envisioned nature as a standing reserve of resources to be tamed and harnessed for human ends.⁴¹⁶ Technocratic projects such as the dams of the Tennessee Valley Authority represented the pinnacle of man's triumph over nature and served as a template for postwar development projects, such as the Alliance for Progress, which sought to use technology to transform nature for the benefit of humans. Evident in works such as Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962), but not gaining widespread national support until the late 1960s and 1970s, the environmentalist movement ushered in the emphasis on the need for harmonious coexistence between man and nature. The environmentalists offered an alternative conception of nature compared to the faith in a human-centered world and the technocratic faith. No longer was nature to be conquered and made to bend to the will of science. Now preservation and co-existence became imperatives. However, Kennedy's and modernization theorists' confidence in technology as a tool to accelerate modernization confirmed the prevailing view of their time.

A second theme shared by modernization theorists and the American culture at large was a belief in cultural assimilation. Rather than accept cultural pluralism, Americans expected immigrants and minority groups to assimilate into the "white" American culture.⁴¹⁷ As pointed out earlier in this thesis, both General Douglas MacArthur and modernization theorists believed that the elements of American culture were universally applicable to all societies of the world and the epitome of modernity. They argued that all cultures would eventually converge on the American model, steadily eliminating what came to be called multiculturalism. The rise of movements in the 1960s for Native American rights, La Raza, and Black Power signaled an end in the idea that assimilation was desirable or even feasible. In the 1980s and 1990s the American culture at large celebrated multiculturalism over assimilation and universalism. Nevertheless, modernization theorists confirmed the prevalent assumptions about cultural and racial assimilation.

⁴¹⁶ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 245.

⁴¹⁷ Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 167-225.

A third shared theme was deference to authority. In the mid-twentieth century—augmented by the U.S. government’s and military’s handling of World War II—Americans generally accepted that the government was competent and could effectively improve the lives of its citizens. This general support of government and support of the expert opinion of its advisors surfaced in Lilienthal’s reliance on experts, Bowles’ reliance on technicians, and the reliance on qualified volunteers within community development projects of the Peace Corps. Odd Arne Westad has added that “All postwar American administrations up to Ronald Reagan were much more willing to use state power for social development purposes than any of their predecessors had been.”⁴¹⁸ Third World development appeared like a new vexing issue in the 1960s but by that time the prescribed solution was familiar to and resounded with most Americans.

As the 1960s progressed, various events signaled and caused the waning of deference to authorities. In 1964, during the Free Speech Movement at the University of California, Berkeley, student leader Mario Savio challenged university officials who banned on-campus political activities. He claimed that students should have a voice in university policies and not simply be parts of “the machine.” Savio claimed:

If this is a firm [the university], and if the board of regents are the board of directors, and if President Kerr in fact is the manager, then I tell you something — the faculty are a bunch of employees! And we’re the raw material! But we’re a bunch of raw materials that don’t mean to have any process upon us, don’t mean to be made into any product.⁴¹⁹

In 1968, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam damaged the credibility of government and military authorities. During the Tet Offensive, North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops simultaneously invaded nearly every South Vietnamese village. Prior to the event, government and military officials had repeatedly made optimistic assessments about their conduct and the future trajectory of the war, specifically denying that the enemy was capable of major widespread operations in South Vietnam. Historian Robert Schulzinger has claimed that, as a

⁴¹⁸ Westad, 24.

⁴¹⁹ *Berkeley in the Sixties*, prod. and dir. Mark Kitchell, 117 min., First Run Features, 2002, DVD.

result of the offensive, “A ‘credibility gap’ opened between what government officials said and what the public believed about the war in Vietnam.”⁴²⁰

The rise and fall of modernization theory happened in tandem with the swing in the American intellectual and cultural milieu. When the Kennedy administration focused on development, modernization theory appeared credible because it coincided with the intellectual and cultural trends that had been developing and had become dominant within the American society at large. When an intellectual and cultural shift occurred in the 1960s and 1970s—environmentalism became increasingly powerful, assimilation gave way to celebrations of multiculturalism, and authorities’ credibility began being questioned—modernization theorists’ ideas lost favor within the government and with American society in general. For the remainder of the Cold War, presidents supported aid to the Third World in the form of food and medical supplies, but not larger programs of development founded on modernization theory.

The history of modernization theory helps shed light on a wider debate between historians over how change happens. Its history suggests that change in foreign policy is often shaped by changes in intellectual and cultural milieu of America. Foreign policy cannot be fully understood without examining the domestic culture. The strength and pervasiveness of the culture were evident in how it permeated domestic (the TVA) and international (the Point Four Program, the occupation of Japan, and the Peace Corps) projects of development, directed by both liberals (Lilienthal and Bowles) and a conservative (MacArthur). On the other hand, it is just as dangerous to rely solely on intellectual and cultural interpretations of history. Change does happen for political reasons. Kennedy purposely separated himself from Eisenhower’s policies to get elected. The limited number of new interventions into the Third World after the Vietnam War resulted from the lack of popular support and presidents’ unwillingness to risk their constituencies’ support. Government officials are influenced by both political considerations and non-governmental forces. When examining change over time, both aspects need to be considered or interpretive validity will be sacrificed.

⁴²⁰ Robert A. Schulzinger, *A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 217.

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