THE ELITES IN THE MAGHREB
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

by

FATIMA NASSIF

B.A., University of Mohammed V. Morocco, 1971
C.E.C., University of Mohammed V. Morocco, 1974

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1983

Approved by:

[Signature]
Major Professor
# Table of Contents

**List of Tables**  
---  
**List of Maps**  
---  

**Chapter**

I. **INTRODUCTION**  
---  
- The Problem  
---  
- The Study of Elites in Developing Countries  
---  
- Methodology

II. **THE MAGHREB UNDER COLONIAL RULE**  
---  
- Colonization  
---  
- Ethnic Composition  
---  
- Land Tenure  
---  
- Economy  
---  
- Agriculture  
---  
- Industrial Development  
---  
- Impact on socio-economic structures  
---  
- Education: a Ladder to elite status  
---  
- Conclusion

III. **NATIONALISM AND EMERGENCE OF ELITES**  
---  
- Traditionalist anti colonialism  
---  
- Modern Secular Nationalism  
---  
- **Algeria**  
---  
- **Tunisia**  
---  
- **Morocco**  
---  
- Active Violent Nationalism  
---  
- **Algeria**  
---  
- **Morocco and Tunisia**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF ELITES</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Origins</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Origins</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Occupational Training</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry into Politics</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. POLITICAL STRUCTURES</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria: The No-Party State and Army Rule</strong></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tripoli Program and Political Crisis</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution-making under Ben Bella</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military in Power</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco: Monarchy and Multi-Party System</strong></td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohammed V's Rule</strong></td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan II's Rule</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia: Bourguiba and One-Party Hegemony</strong></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. CONSOLIDATION AND MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL POWER</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion and Sanction</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage and Clientelism</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Rationalization</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Socialism</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Liberalism in Morocco</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian Socialism Revised</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>160-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tunisian Leadership: Place of Origin</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tunisian Leadership: Occupations</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tunisian Leadership: Type of Education</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Geographic Origins of Algerian Elites</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Geographic Origins of Moroccan Elites</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Geographic Origins of Tunisian Elites</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PICTURES THAT ARE ATTACHED TO DOCUMENTS CROOKED.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.
List of Maps

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH THE ORIGINAL PRINTING BEING SKEWED DIFFERENTLY FROM THE TOP OF THE PAGE TO THE BOTTOM.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM THE CUSTOMER.
Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

In 1956 Morocco and Tunisia gained their independence after 44 years of French Protectorate in the former and 75 years in the latter. In 1962 Algeria joined its neighbors in the state of independence after 132 years of subjection to French rule. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, constituting what is widely called the Maghreb, are three countries whose experience in colonization, nationalism and post independence politics provide compelling contexts for the study of socio-economic and political development. Colonization of the three countries represents the imposition and development of a new system within an old-traditional one. Nationalism represents the rising awareness of the conflict between the two systems and finally with independence comes the establishment of a new system from within. In 1983, two to three decades after independence, the political system in each of the three countries is a product of all three processes.

The Maghreb countries do not only belong to post-colonial regimes which struggle to establish a nation or consolidate a state; they also belong to the developing world where economic progress is yet to be achieved. The Maghreb countries, in this sense resemble many other African and Asian countries where nationalism is not only a struggle for political independence but also a struggle for economic development. Bottomore (1964:97) states that

"The nationalism of the developing countries is a consequence of the struggle for independence from alien rulers and also of nature of the problems which confront these countries after independence is gained; especially the need to create a nation out of related but still separate tribal or linguistic groups, and the economic need to plan on a national scale the industrial development of the country".
Given the magnitude of colonization in Algeria, the extent of transformation of society during the colonial period, and the violence with which independence was achieved, one would expect the reestablishment of independent Algeria to be difficult and revolutionary. One would expect Algeria to follow a path of development that is different from that of Morocco or Tunisia. One would also expect that the 8 years of armed struggle or what is commonly referred to as the Algerian revolution be reflected in the political behavior of Algeria's leadership.

Indeed it is argued that Algeria belongs to contemporary revolutionary regimes where social and economic inequalities are eroded and also where the power structure is established from the bottom-up. Fanon's argument that the launching of a new society is possible only within the framework of national independence and through a revolution by the masses (1967:179) considers Algeria as best illustration and as a proof. Fanon states "This community in action, renovated, and free of any psychological, emotional, or legal subjection, is prepared today to assume modern and democratic responsibilities of exceptional moment" (Fanon, 1967:179). Another scholar argues that in Algeria the confrontation against the colonial system involved all groups in society and because this confrontation was severely violent and extremely tense, Algeria has been predisposed to revolutionary orientations and radical change. Bourdieu (1962:191-192) states that,

"It is not only the interests of one social class but the whole economic and social situation that will make mandatory the adoption of a revolutionary policy. A society which has been so greatly revolutionized demands that revolutionary solutions be devised to meet its problems".

One of the assumptions many scholars hold when it comes to their study of Algerian nationalism is their consideration of the Algerian war of liberation or armed struggle for independence as a revolution. In a sense it was a revolution, since it destroyed the colonial system imposed from the
outside, but it remains to be seen how profound is the second revolution: The transformation of the basic structures of the indigenous society. These scholars also assume that once a revolution is launched, it continues until it fulfills its objectives. In their thinking Algeria has accomplished that.

As opposed to the conception of revolutionary Algeria, Morocco has been conceived of as politically and economically stagnant. Waterbury's work on Morocco, (1967, 1970, 1973) which has been adopted by many scholars after him, emphasizes that, "for centuries Moroccan society has been characterized by constant tension and varying degrees of violence, but at any given point in history, the most salient product of this tension has been stalemate." (1970:61) In his view, the subjection to 44 years of colonization did not in any significant way alter this pattern, nor will it be changed in the immediate future. (Ibid.) It is supported in part by the monarchy's control of the political system through manipulation of diverse political forces, planned corruption, distribution of spoils and patronage. (Ibid.)

Finally, Tunisia has been viewed as one of the most successful experiences in modernization, development and state building in the developing and newly independent world. Tunisia, in many scholars' views, offers the most promising prospect for a modern, stable, and democratic political evolution. It is often noted that the Neo-Destour party's effectiveness, combined with Bourguiba's flexibility, pragmatism and emphasis on national cohesiveness, has allowed Tunisia to achieve greater economic growth and higher political stability.

Moore (1962; 1970), Hermassi (1972); Entelis (1974), Stone (1982) and many others argue that the process of economic and political development in independent Tunisia has been more rapid, more effective and successful than in its neighbors. One scholar for example argues that Tunisia has long been regarded as a model of political development and stability in the third world.
There is no doubt that the charismatic Bourguiba has helped ensure Tunisia's development from the period of the preindependence struggle until today (Entelis, 1974:543). Another scholar refers to the consensus among a number of scholars in their assessment of the situation in Tunisia when he states "All agree that Tunisia's elite was more successful in the early years of nation-building and managing independence than most third world nations, and attribute it to the single party system for producing consensus under Bourguiba's charismatic leadership" (Stone, 1982:146).

The Problem

As suggested above, the predominant view in the literature on the Meghreb sees the three states as political units which have little in common. Moore, (1970:321), for example, concludes his study by stating that,

"Indeed, political differences have been far more striking than any underlying cultural or structural similarities in the post colonial Maghreb. Though the precollonial systems shared with slight variations a common pattern of political underdevelopment, post colonial Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have hardly a political culture in common..."

It may be, however, that these differences are partly the product of the research process itself. For obvious practical reasons, most studies on the Maghreb are case studies. This type of research, by definition, focuses on the specific features and idiosyncratic characteristics of the society or system under study. Although efforts are made to generate categorical concepts, models and typologies of broad relevance, these tend to be rooted in particular cases rather than applied comparatively. Waterbury (1970:2) raises this issue when he states that,

"It is perfectly legitimate, although not always very useful, to construct typologies of political regimes according to the nature of their governmental institutions, the kinds of policies they apply, and their formal arrangements for political participation. But often the categories so constructed either blur meaningful distinctions between regimes in an attempt to be all-inclusive, or are so narrow that each regime in effect becomes a
separate category. Moreover, single-minded concern with regime types leads to distortions in our appraisal of any given change in regime.

As an attempt to remedy this unintentional bias in the existing literature, I have decided to compare the three countries, bearing in mind that they might be different in some respects and similar in others.

As already noted, it is widely argued that Algeria has undergone two revolutions. One was the long and painful armed struggle against the colonial regime; the other a continuing struggle against privilege and wealth acquired during the colonial era as well as the structural change of the economy. In contrast to Algeria, both Morocco and Tunisia are said to have undergone only the struggle against French colonialism, and even that with considerably less violence. In this context, I will be concerned with the extent and manner in which Algeria is different from its neighbors, and the ways in which there are resemblances as well.

The Study of Elites in Developing Countries

In addressing the similarities and differences between the three countries, I will concentrate on their political elites, in part because "politics can best be understood through a study of those who exercise power..." (Zartman, 1982:1). In recent decades, studies of elites in Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries have become more and more frequent. Bottomore points to this fact in his statement that "there is no context in which the idea of elites is invoked more frequently at the present time than in discussions of the problems and prospects of the developing and post colonial countries" (Bottomore, 1964:86). Rustow suggests that one reason for this is that politics in this part of the world "is a rapid flux, hence, while constitutions and other formal arrangements would project a false image of stability, individuals and groups can be seen as a binding link from regime to regime"
(Rustow, 1966:695). Furthermore the study of elites in the new context is pertinent because the changes in social and political order are closely linked to what type of elites assume position of power. This will become a major focus of the present thesis.

Inspired by Lasswell and Lerner's work, Zartman suggests that the "whole system approach to the elites is a particularly crucial starting point, for anything less abstracts political elites from the context that gives meaning to their action" (Zartman, 1980:71). This will be the approach utilized here. Not only does it allow the investigation of elites' characteristics and behavior in their own social context but it simultaneously permits the analysis of the social context itself. In this perspective it is pointed out that various characteristics of the elites covering their socio-economic backgrounds, geographic origins, skills, generational cohorts and so forth, are sensitive information by which one can study the elites attitude toward change, value orientation, political preferences and policy-making capabilities.

In his review of studies concerned with the elites in seven developing countries, including Waterbury's study on Morocco and Quandt's on Algeria, Zartman raises the question of definition in elite studies and its significance for the advancement in theory building. Zartman argues, however, that there is some consensus among the authors of the various studies; "all start with positions of authority" (Zartman, 1974:467-468). But this scholar also argues that defining elites in terms of top positions avoids but does not solve the boundary problem which is significantly important to the separation of the elites as a distinct group from the masses or other groupings in society (Zartman, 1974:469). In other words we always face the question of the extent to which we are dealing with a functional elite, defined by position, or an upper class, defined by social and cultural traits as well.
Most studies of politics in the Maghreb utilized in this thesis have defined the political elites within an institutional framework. Quandt for example defines the Algerian political elites "as a set of incumbents of identifiable roles within the authoritative political bodies of the FLN (National Liberation Front) and the government" (Quandt, 1969:21). Recently another scholar, in a similar way, defines the elites in Algeria as the members of the Political Bureau of the FLN, the members of the council of ministers, the Army General Staff, the executive Council of the army and the commanders of the various military regions" (Entelis, 1982:101). In Tunisia, Camau, Dubray and Sraieb see the elites as members of national political organizations including the government, the central committee and political bureau of the Destourian party (1973:176).

For Morocco, in one study elites are defined as top officials in the government namely the ministers and secretaries of state, and different party leaders (Berrady, Santucci and Regnier, 1973:134). However, Waterbury's definition of the Moroccan elites extends beyond the institutional criteria to identify the elites on the basis of informal interlockings and moves in the direction of an upper class. This scholar (1970:82) suggests that the term 'political elite' in the Moroccan context.

"denotes a group of Moroccans who, for diverse reasons, have an actual or potential influence on decision-making and the distribution of spoils and patronage, and who articulate, occasionally or persistently, their demands. Their influence results from their clientele or 'alliance-mates', who may or may not be formally organized."

Keeping in mind that the approach adopted in this thesis dictates emphasis on the context in which the elites emerge, evolve and exercise power as much as it focuses on the elites themselves, the term "elites" used in this thesis will refer to a group of individuals who, by their position in the institutional system, control the decision-making process formally and
informally. Even if elites are defined by position, our studies find that they can be distinguished on the basis of some other criteria which only they are more likely to have developed, such as skills, higher education, and for those countries which have achieved their independence very recently, one can add the participation in the nationalist movement.

Generally, the elites in post colonial countries are to a great extent the product of the modern educational facilities, administrative structures and army opportunities introduced by the colonial regimes. Those who have benefited from the colonial opportunities generally represent only a tiny proportion of the population. Their entry into politics during the colonial period has enhanced further their distinction from the masses not only by their leadership but also by their acquisition of skills. In the Maghreb, men like Ben Bella, Boumediene, Bourguiba and many others who commanded the political institutions and ran things after independence owed their ascendance to the top to their education, nationalist participation and their skills in political organization or the military which had been acquired during the colonial period. All nationalist leaders became contenders for power after independence, some of them succeeded in gaining legitimacy and some of them had influence only as potential elements for political leadership.

In sum, the elites in the Maghreb have come to the top through political militancy and nationalism and to a lesser degree educational qualifications and technical competence. As time goes by the latter becomes more emphasized as a means of entry into the elites.

**Methodology**

Logically speaking, comparing involves the process of sorting out the similarities and differences among the cases or units under study. Practically there are two ways to proceed. One approach is to treat some phenomena or
issues in a number of cases where these phenomena are present in order to find out the resemblance and variation from one case to the other. The second approach is the treatment of the cases as such for the purpose of delineating their similarities and differences. It is, however, desirable to use a combination of the two approaches when having a number of cases that have in common the phenomena to be studied along with some other shared characteristics.

One of the difficulties usually faced by a comparative approach is that sufficiently similar cases are rarely found. But this is hardly valid in the present selection. Throughout most of their past, the Maghreb countries have shared similar ethnic composition, similar religious and cultural features and even further similar economies. All also had France as colonial ruler. Colonization transformed the Maghreb's economic structures along roughly parallel lines. As one scholar puts it "all have been distorted by the so-called 'dual economy' pattern, in which modern, European-type agriculture, industrial circuit, processing and shipping facilities, and export market economies were superimposed on and alongside local cultivation methods and traditional ways in commerce and artisanry" (Gallagher, 1973:13). Even geographically the three countries share major physical features that distinguish them from the rest of the African continent. Thus, as Gellner notes, "Nature appears to have designed this island so as to provide the sociologist with a controlled experiment, a contrast with Mediterranean Europe, in which many factors are held constant" (quoted in Gallagher, 1973:15).

Considering all the above, the approach of this thesis is to compare the three countries on a topical basis. The topics for comparison include the impact of colonization on each of the three states, nationalist movements, elite characteristics, political structures and other issues. Emphasis is put on the elites since, as noted earlier, they represent our key element to
the study of politics and political development in the Maghreb.

This thesis is based upon different categories of published sources in French and English. The major category consists of systematic studies dealing with the three countries comparatively or separately. Most of these studies have been published during the 1970's with one major study published last year. The CRESM (Center of Research and Studies of Mediterranean Societies) publications particularly "La Formation des Elites politiques Maghrebines", which provides background data on the three countries' elites over the first 17 years of independence for Morocco and Tunisia and almost a decade profile on Algeria, make a significant contribution to this category.

The second major category comprises articles of different journals. Middle East Journal, World Politics, Comparative politics and African studies are the most used. Some local official documents such as speeches of presidents, national publications and newspapers are also employed. Most of the material upon which this thesis is based comes from major work done by foreign scholars who not only did research in the area, but who also lived for extended periods and even were at some point either students or professors in one or more of the three countries. Some of these scholars have had contacts with the Maghreb politicians and social scientists. Among national scholars two major studies are extensively used, the comparative study by Hermassi (1972) and the study on emergence of classes in Algeria by Lazreg (1976). Even though I have relied heavily on the work of others for my data, I have tried throughout the thesis to establish new relationships between previously researched aspects and develop new interpretations in the light of recent developments in the area.

The thesis provides a socio-economic background on the traditional Maghreb societies before their subjection to colonial rule and the transformations brought in by the colonial regime (Chapter Two). As colonization proceeded in
the area, it produced new elites in society whose formation depended largely on their access to modern education and their political militance (Chapter Three). Added to their nationalist experience and educational achievement, the newly developed elites shared some other common attributes that put them in a position to lead the political and economic development of their respective countries (Chapter Four). Once the colonial regime was overthrown these elites established political institutions for self-government (Chapter Five) as well as the mechanisms for the consolidation and maintenance of their own control (Chapter Six). Finally the elites had to face the challenge of economic development which we use as a major case study of their processes of political policy formation (Chapter Seven).
Chapter Two

THE MAGHREB UNDER COLONIAL RULE

Culturally and ethnically, the precolonial Maghreb formed a homogeneous unity. Social and economic structures of the three politically distinct states of the Maghreb were also similar. However the extent of similarity of precolonial socio-economic and ethnic characteristics was significantly affected as European colonization proceeded in the area. Although European settlement was shared by all three countries, the timing of colonization, the duration of European presence and colonial policy set into motion a process of differentiation among the Maghreb states.

This chapter attempts to examine some of the shared precolonial socio-economic features and the transformations brought about during the colonial period.

Colonization of the Maghreb

The establishment of French rule in the Maghreb was made over an 83 year period. Algeria was the first of the three countries to be subject to colonial rule which started by the French attack on Algiers in 1830. Amin points out that at the time, France was not at all sure what to do with her new possession (Amin, 1970:96). Considering that France at the turn of the 19th century was still an agrarian country at the early stage of her industrial development, the appropriation of Algerian land was a promising economic venture. France then resorted to the policy of colonization by settlement. The emigration of European settlers to Algeria was encouraged through guaranteeing easier access to land. By 1955, the European population numbered 13% of the total Algerian population (Entelis, 1980:17).

Once the first settlements were established in the area and the national resistance led by Amir Abdelkader totally crushed (1847), France
moved towards a policy of "assimilation". The French attempted to make
Algeria the base of their control and rule in North Africa by creating what
was called French Algeria. In Amin's view, "such assimilation was intended
to be gradual, and to proceed only so far as the native inhabitants became
'true Frenchmen' in the cultural sense" (Amin, 1970:97). From its inception,
the assimilation project had many weaknesses. One of these was the assumption
of a possible de-Islamization of the Algerian Muslims. Another weakness was
the conflicting attitude of the Europeans themselves toward the assimilation
scheme.

France certainly had already learned from her experience in Algeria when
she decided to establish her protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in
1912. Theoretically, the terms of the Protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco
differed from the direct colonization of Algeria. These were initially meant
to preserve the national government's sovereignty. However, one should not
be misled by the concept of protectorate, for in both Morocco and Tunisia,
French authority became in control of the two states in almost the same way
as in Algeria. Furthermore, "settler colonization of the land was retained
as an aim for the two protectorates" (Amin, 1970:98). But there were no such
aspirations as the cultural assimilation or de-Islamization attempted in
Algeria. In Morocco and Tunisia, the French were powerful, privileged and in
control of the decision-making process and yet they were foreigners. Also,
the European settlement itself was not as intensive as in Algeria. By 1955,
the European population in Morocco and Tunisia represented between 6 and 8%
of the total population as opposed to 13% in Algeria (Entelis, 1980:17).

**Ethnic Composition**

The two major ethnic groups that populate the Maghreb are the Arabs and
Berbers. The latter are the original inhabitants of the area. The origins
of the Berbers are historically unknown. The Berbers were able to resist successive conquerors until the late 7th century and subsequent centuries when the Arabs in the name of Islam succeeded in installing and reinforcing the language of the Koran and integrating the Berbers into the Islamic civilization and culture.

The process of assimilation of Berbers into the Arab culture was facilitated by the use of Arabic as the dominant language of commerce, politics and administration. Those Berbers who were interested in becoming participants in these activities learned the language whereas those who remained in the mountainous and remote areas and had no contact with the Arabs remain until today Berber speaking.

In Algeria, for instance, the language of the majority is Arabic, though nearly 30% of the population speak Berber as their mother tongue, particularly in the Kabyle region and the Aurès (Barbour, 1962:203). In Morocco, people of Berber origin numbered 4 million in 1965 (Area Hand Book, 1965:76). For the whole Maghreb, it is stated in the Encyclopaedia Britannica that between 1/5 and 1/4 of the population (about 6,000,000) still speak Berber, the population rises as one moves westward, reaching 2/3 in Morocco (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1980:11:294).

Colonial France tried to exploit these ethnic divisions in the Maghreb particularly in Morocco. The colonial policy of 'divide and rule' was expressed in more than one instance. On one hand the French established a college to which only students of Berber origin had access, and where Arabic was not taught. On the other, the French made an attempt in 1930 to separate the Berbers and Arabs for legal purposes (Herriotts, 1977:249). They promulgated the 'Berber Dahir', a decree that allowed the Berbers to use customary law and not Muslim law. However, these colonial policies ended in
failure. The distinctions between Arabs and Berbers were obscure and actually lost significance during the colonial period. Moreover, the reaction to such policies contributed heavily to the rise of nationalist movements in the Maghreb (Chapter Three).

Land Tenure

The precolonial land tenure system in the Maghreb took three forms (Barbour, 1962:327; Area Handbook for Morocco, 1965:303; Lazreg, 1976:27). These were the Melk, Habous and Tribal common land. The melk or freehold is the equivalent of privately owned land. Lazreg observes that under the melk system, "plots of land are often fenced and their owners have written titles to them" (Lazreg, 1976:28). Lazreg also suggests that although the melk expresses the right to the individual to property, it is set in a communal framework because of the traditional and customary restrictions imposed on the sale of melk land (Lazreg, 1976:28).

The habous land is usually donated by private and public organizations for religious and charitable purposes. Habous property cannot be sold. Then, there was the tribal common land. Plots of land under this type were acquired through invested labor. "The right to usufruct", wrote Lazreg, "is obtained through work, so that if a tribesman started cultivating a plot that was previously fallow, it became his and was passed on to his heirs" (Lazreg, 1976:38). But families and individuals who worked on the land did not have legal titles to their plots.

With the establishment of colonial rule in the Maghreb, a variety of land policies were introduced. Most of these land policies were primarily directed to attract more settlers to the area and only secondarily to modernize the existing property structures. In describing them, Barbour wrote, "they tended in the first place to favor the settlement of European
colonists by giving a secure title to acquisitions" (Barbour, 1962:327). Because of the lack of legal titles to land especially under the tribal common type, it was easier for the French to ignore and misinterpret the prevailing property system. In Algeria for instance, as early as 1841 General Bugeaud (General Resident of France in Algeria) declared "Wherever the water supply is good and the land fertile, there we must place colonists without worrying about the previous owners. We must distribute the land in full title to the colonists" (Quoted in Brace, 1965:48). Brace also cites Lyautey's (General Resident of France in Morocco) description of land policy in Morocco which resembled Bugeaud's declaration in Algeria "The French legation was induced to encourage a horde of Frenchmen to stake out land and take possession, creating titles to this land without inquiring too closely into legal rights to it" (Quoted in Brace 1965:52).

However, the content of the different measures adopted by the French regarding land varied from one country to the other. By and large Algeria was the most affected in this respect. Lazreg cites the major legislative measures made the French in Algeria when stating that "Three major decisions put an end to the Algerian form of property. These were the 1844-46 ordinances, the 1863 senatus consultum and the 1873 law, amended in 1887 (Lazreg, 1976:41). Along with the abolition of habous property, the 1844-46 ordinances stated that all uncultivated lands were to be considered vacant if nobody could prove right to ownership, and titles after July 1830 (the date of the French attack on Algiers) were not accepted (Lazreg, 1976:41). Based on these ordinances almost all uncultivated land became incorporated as French public domain. Consequently, the Muslim Algerians living on this land were pushed to the mountains and poorer areas.
The 1863 Senatus consultum was initially directed to surveying different types of property and establishing an inventory. But because of the misunderstanding of the prevailing property system and inaccuracy of the inventory, the consultum resulted in similar abuses. According to Hermassi, the consultum was first applied to "the 372 tribes that were the most powerful and which occupied the best land of the Tell." (Hermassi, 1972:77). The tribes thus became fragmented and could keep only smaller portions of the large holdings they once controlled. The 1870 law represented an amendment to the consultum, "prohibiting indigenous co-proprietors from opposing the individual sale of a plot" (Lazreg, 1976:44). In sum the application of western concepts of private property was an extremely effective mechanism for transforming the landscape, and in turn resulted in new socio-economic structures in Algeria. Not only did the land become a marketable commodity but the introduction of usurious money lending to the rise of a group of land speculators and usurers. Peasants who were once owners of small plots became sharecroppers or wage laborers on European farms. By the displacement of tribes from their land, tribal solidarity was undermined and traditional families lost status and social position. The number of landless and rural poor increased drastically. At the turn of the 20th century, the number was estimated to be 1,386,510 (Lazreg, 1976:52). Finally as a result of the application of the various measures of land appropriation in Algeria, land under colonial ownership amounted to 40% of the arable land in Algeria in 1955. (Amin, 1970:65).

According to the 1881 Bardo Treaty between France and Tunisia, the latter was not meant to become a settlement colony as was the case of Algeria. Indeed during the early period of the protectorate in Tunisia, the thirst for land was not as strong as that motivating European settlers who moved to Algeria a half century earlier. Nonetheless, French authorities in Tunisia were led to allow greater French settlement to take place in part because of
the Italian competition. Hermassi argues that the new policy soon led to "the liquidation of the land of the Domaine and to a spoliation which, although it had less tragic results than did the policy followed in Algeria, was nevertheless substantial" (Hermassi, 1972:80). In the same vein it is stated in the Encyclopedia Britannica that "although there was none of the wholesale confiscation of land and displacement of population that had occurred in Algeria, the most fertile portions of Northern Tunisia passed largely into the hand of Europeans" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1980:13:167). A significant portion of the habous land was also taken by the French, and had it not been for opposition by local notables, all of it would have been expropriated. According to one source, European colonists and enterprises held 1,825,000 acres, equal to one tenth of the total productive area of Tunisia (Barbour, 1962:327). Another source estimated the amount of land under colonial ownership to 18% of the cultivated land in Tunisia (Amin, 1970:65). However, a third source indicated that Europeans held approximately 26% of the land under cultivation when the protectorate ended in 1956 (Brace, 1965:55). Despite the disagreement in the literature on how much land exactly was owned and controlled by Europeans in Tunisia, at least most sources agreed on the fact that almost all colonial holdings were in the most fertile arable areas.

As in Tunisia, during the early period of protectorate in Morocco, "large-scale settler colonization was discouraged" (Area Handbook, 1965:304). Hermassi even suggests that "Only in Morocco did the colonial project have the dual purpose of instituting controlled colonization while maintaining traditional society in its integrity" (Hermassi, 1972:81).

This change in the colonial policy was in part due to the fact that Morocco had the advantage of being subject to colonial rule over 80 years after the colonization of Algeria and over 30 years after that of Tunisia.
On the other hand, France herself found out from experience in the two other Maghreb countries that the attempt to totally disintegrate the colonized society was not beneficial to her own interests. Consequently, France under the first General Resident in Morocco, Lyautey (1912-1925), developed a policy that was aimed at the preservation of traditional society and existing structures. Thus in Morocco "there was no repetition of the shocking excesses of the first Algerian colonization, nor the deplorable results of the law of 1873; nor even of the ravages inflicted by the Tunisian law of 1898 on the habous" (Berque, 1967:46). Instead, the 1919 Dahir in Morocco stated that "collective lands are imprescriptible, inalienable and unseizable" (Quoted in Hermassi, 1972:81).

Yet, Europeans were able to acquire significant portions of the arable land in Morocco through varying means which were not all legal. In the Area Handbook for Morocco (1965:304) it is stated that

"By independence in 1956, nearly, 6,000 Europeans were in possession of some 2.5 million acres of land, most of it in the fertile coastal areas. Only a little over a fourth of these lands were acquired under official colonization schemes and were provided by the government primarily from state lands....The remainder of settler land was acquired by private purchase, sometime under circumstances that approached fraud."

Since in Morocco traditional 'great' families, notables and other privileged groups were spared the effects of displacement, they were able to help Europeans acquire parts of the land, especially collective land, and at the same time extract some for themselves. In 1955, land under colonial ownership in Morocco amounted to only 12% of the cultivated land as contrasted to 40% in Algeria and 18% in Tunisia (Amin, 1970:65).

The importance of the land for the Maghreb people was not merely economic. Berque (1967:36-37) described this importance when he stated that
"The land clings round the nucleus of power, wealth or saintliness.... Where land is concerned, several orders of things are always involved: man's material enterprise and nature's resistance, the economic system and the moral code, a kind of alternation between the individual breaking free from the group and the group holding back the individual."

Through the appropriation of the best and most exploitable land of the Maghreb, Europeans not only affected the rural society by displacing the centers of power and wealth traditionally enjoyed by tribal leaders and rural notables, but they developed economic structures especially in agriculture that certainly reshaped the Maghreb society in almost all respects.

**Economy under Colonial rule**

Before the French conquest of the Maghreb and settlement of Europeans in the area, the Maghreb economy was centered around agriculture. Subsistence farming was the basic activity of the Maghreb population. Agriculture then represented the main source of the Maghreb income. Besides agriculture, some commercial activities, trade and artisanry were of significant importance. Apart from a little manufacturing, industries of any kind were entirely lacking.

Agriculture during the precolonial period was essentially directed to the production of cereals. Hard wheat, barley and corn were the main crops grown by the subsistence farmers of the Maghreb. The cultivation of these crops was done with very rudimentary techniques. Based on the prevailing land tenure system, "Every family head who owned a plow and a couple of animals had the right to work the common land. In areas where the melk system prevailed, there were small farmers (Fellahin) and also men (Khammasin) who were employed by others in return for one fifth of the harvest" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1980:11:296). Not only was the farming technology very primitive but the agricultural endeavor depended completely on natural conditions. Consequently, harvests were extremely uneven, "and may drop by a half of even two thirds
from one year to the next" (Amin, 1970:36).

As European colonization proceeded in the Maghreb, a profound transformation of the economy took place. Mechanization of agriculture was the most important feature of the transformation brought in by the Colonists. "The colon," wrote Berque, "was to seek his security against the uncertainty of the climate, and his unquestionable advantage over the traditional farmer, in what was then a new form of energy: mechanized ploughing and harvesting" (Berque, 1967: 39). The application of modern technology in the Maghreb enabled farmers to reach levels of productivity never experienced before thus contributing to the economic growth of the Maghreb.

However, the resultant economic growth was very uneven. In describing it, Amin states "The economic growth of the Maghreb under colonial rule can in no sense be described as balanced or orderly" (Amin 1970:25). The main cause of this unevenness lay in the fact that modernization of the economic structures as introduced by Europeans was to a great extent restricted to those areas of the economy that served the interests of the colonizer. In the area of agriculture for instance, as pointed out by Amin, "colonization certainly revolutionized agricultural methods, but this agricultural revolution was confined to the lands taken over by the settlers" (Amin, 1970:25). In the area of industry, Europeans were more interested in extracting minerals and building transportation networks that facilitated their export to Europe. Once again Amin noted that "Colonization turned the Maghreb into a world supplier of phosphates, iron ore, and certain non-ferrous metals" (Amin, 1970: 26).

Colonial Agriculture

As previously noted, the amount of land appropriated by Europeans represented significant portions of the Maghreb arable land particularly in
Algeria in which it amounted to 40%. As also noted, in each of the three Maghreb states colonized land was the best, most fertile and easily accessible land. On this land, Europeans developed a mechanized agriculture that was based on diversification of crops, use of fertilizers and, most important of all, was directed to export. Little colonial land was devoted to cereals; most of it was devoted to the production of cash crops that were in some cases introduced by Europeans such as vineyards.

In Algeria for example "Vine growing on a large scale began around 1880. The area under cultivation, then some 40,000 hectares, had increased to about 400,000 hectares by 1940" (Amin, 1970:36). Vineyard cultivation along with wine production became the major component of the colonial economy and at the same time of the overall Algerian economy. "Wine exports from Algeria came to form 50% of all Algerian exports" (Wolf, 1969:223).

The growth and commercialization of vineyard and other export oriented agricultural commodities especially citrus fruit and vegetables made Algerian agriculture dependent on cash crops which were almost entirely controlled by Europeans. Wolf states "that 9/10 of all Algerian vineyards, and thus most of the main cash crop, were in the hands of Europeans" (Wolf, 1969:224). moreover the colonial orientation was made at the expense of production of cereals and food crops and thus very damaging not only to the Algerian economy but also to the Algerian people. In describing the effects of vine growing in Algeria Launay wrote "The result is that the vine had displaced and polluted all else: it has chased away the wheat, it has chased away the sheep, it has chased away the forest and the dwarf palm. It has polluted the river where the skins and pips, lees, and refuse are thrown" (Quoted in Wolf, 1969:223).

In Tunisia the first vineyards were introduced around 1890 and, as in Algeria, they increased significantly until they reached 51,000 hectares in
1933 (Amin, 1970:37). However, colonial rule in Tunisia developed another cash crop. Olive production became an important feature of the Tunisian economy. According to Amin, the number of olive trees rose from 8 million in 1880 to 27 million in 1955 (Amin, 1970:37).

Similarly in Morocco, the 10,000 hectares of vineyards in 1930 increased to 55,000 hectares in 1955 while the annual growth rate of wine production rose from 1% between 1930 and 1948 to 10% over the period 1948-1955. The citrus fruit plantations introduced in 1935 increased from 5,000 to 52,000 hectares in 1958 (Amin, 1970:39). It is very clear that the emphasis Europeans put on the plantation of vineyards was because of their interest in wine production for export. The same motivation stimulated their concern with growing citrus fruits. But within the colonial interests of commercialized agriculture and profit-making export agriculture, the production of cereals for national consumption suffered great declines.

Moreover, whereas the figures noted above indicated the creation and increased growth of an export oriented agriculture, the overall agriculture of the Maghreb did not experience similar patterns of growth. Instead, traditional agriculture practiced over a bit less than 9/10 of the cultivated land in Morocco, 8/10 in Tunisia and 6/10 in Algeria, was stagnant. In other words the overall annual growth was slow varying from 1% to 2.5% over the years (Amin 1970:25). Algeria experienced the lowest agricultural growth rates. Tunisia revealed steadier agricultural rates partly because of the time lag between the colonization of Algeria (1830) and her own subjection to French Protectorate in 1881. Morocco had the advantage of being the last country to come under colonial rule, thus, revealing higher growth rates than those of both Algeria and Tunisia.
Industrial Development under Colonial Rule

In the sector of industry, traditional crafts production declined sharply as the needed goods were increasingly imported from abroad mainly from France. Europeans in the Maghreb were not interested in establishing industries of any sort. Until the post war period, the share of industry in the national income was still very small. According to Amin, "in 1955 large-scale industry still supplied less than 8% of the gross domestic product" (Amin, 1970:26). The existence of rich and abundant mines in the Maghreb particularly phosphates and iron ore represented favorable assets for potential development of industries. But the lack of industrial infra-structures, the insufficiency of natural sources of energy, combined with the colonial economic philosophy at the time resulted in a more or less show industrial development. Mining and construction were the sectors that developed most during the colonial period because of the continuing expansion of European settlement and increased urbanization in the area.

In both Morocco and Tunisia, the two major categories of industry created during the colonial period were: processing industries of local raw materials and processing industries using imported materials. The first category included treatment of minerals, chemicals, preparation of building materials, milling, canning and the like. The second category was oriented to the production of goods for local consumption from imported materials mainly sugar and tobacco.

In Algeria, except for some mining activities, it was not until 1946 that certain industries became noticeable. In 1949 there were reckoned to be 800 factories or workshops (Barbour 1962:246). The industrial development in Algeria was handicapped by a variety of factors. First, the industrial circles in Paris were not in favor of competitive industry in Algeria. Neither were the settlers inside Algeria, but for a different reason. They were reluctant
about the expansion of industry because it could lead to the transfer of labor from agriculture. Barbour (1962:247) noted that in 1957,

"a technical, semi-official memorandum stressed three major obstacles to the establishment of industry in Algeria. First, the peculiar shape of the country which involves difficult transport problems. Second, the limited internal market, so long as the income of the vast majority of the population remains low. Third, the customs union with France, which prompts French competitors to resist any change."

However, the sudden discovery of oil and natural gas in the Algerian Sahara led to a significant transformation of the colonial Algerian economy. Yet the full effects were not to become apparent until after independence (Amin 1970:123).

**Impact of Colonization on Socio-economic Structures**

As a result of the establishment of large-scale commercialized agriculture, the economic structures became broken into two separate worlds, thus creating a situation of unbalanced growth. While the modern type, mainly European with a few large land owners among the nationals, produced greater income; the traditional type, focused on cereals and other food crops, produced almost no income, and at times of bad weather or poor crops the production was not even enough to meet the population needs. The unbalance between the two types became deeper because of the rapidly growing population of the three countries. Subsequently the Maghreb resorted to imports of cereals and other agricultural products to meet local needs. Continuing deficits in the balance of the trade became a permanent feature of Maghreb economy. Along with these, deficits in the budget of the Maghreb due to increased expenditures and low productivity were also experienced. European assistance and Foreign capital provided temporary solutions to the crises at that time but they created conditions of dependence of the Maghreb upon other countries especially upon France.
The pauperization of the Maghreb, masked by foreign aid, was not the only by product of colonial domination. At the societal level, "the worsening relations with respect to land ownership, the disparity of techniques and yields, financial difficulties of commercialization concurred to widen the gap between colons and fellahin on the one hand, large and small landowners on the other" (Berque, 1967:236). The usury previously noted altered the lives of the Maghreb peasantry. Berque wrote that "usury in North Africa has been defined as 'a leech turned vampire', creeping in insidiously and then devouring the hapless peasant" (Berque, 1967:235). The traditional farmer in the Maghreb, unable to compete with the European farmer and uncertain of his environment, was forced to borrow money in order to survive. To illustrate the extent to which usury affected the Fellah in the Maghreb, Berque cited that the "total amount of debts owed to usurers within a single commune, that of Fort-National in Kabylia (Algeria), in 1936, came to twenty-five million, and affected practically the whole of the population (70,000): three-fifths to Europeans; the rest to lending societies" (Berque 1967:234:235). Under the burden of debts and high interest rates, many small peasants had to give up whatever plot of land they had and started working on European farms. In describing the situation of the Fellah and the options he was left with, Berque wrote, "The small-scale fellah farmer realized that, with less than 10 hectares, he was working at a loss. As soon as he had broken free of group control, he found that it was to his material advantage to go elsewhere; either as farm labourer or, better, as factory worker, as casual labourer, or even as unemployed worker on the outskirts of the city. From 1935 onwards particularly, these uprooted peasants flocked into the urban areas" (Berque, 1967:56).

The shift from production of cereals to production of vineyards and other cash agricultural products was accompanied by a decline in sharecropping and
increase in wage labor. But the supply of labor by far exceeded the demand for labor in the vineyards particularly outside the harvest season. This shift from sharecropping to wage labor increased the insecurity of larger portions of the working age population in the Maghreb especially in Algeria where the effects of colonial transformation was sharply marked. In Wolf's words "one effect of growing wage labor was the creation of a large floating semi-proletariat, which was to bear all the stigma of a growing economic insecurity" (Wolf, 1969:23).

As previously noted, European settlers took over the best land and pushed the Muslims to the poorest and mountainous areas which could not provide subsistence for their enlarged populations. This again was more so in Algeria than in the other two countries. As observed by Wolf (1969:282),

"many Kabyles were forced to seek alternative sources of livelihood outside their mountains and move into towns as traders, storekeepers, transportation workers, police, government agents, porters and miners. Their readiness to occupy positions opened up by the French gave them an advantage over other Algerians less drive by necessity to serve the conquerors".

Wolf goes further as to suggest that Kabylia benefited more than any other region in the country from French educational facilities.

Furthermore, Algerian workers, once the labor market became exhausted inside Algeria, turned to colonial France herself for economic opportunities. Over the war period (1915-1918) some 76,000 Algerians left Algeria to work in French factories, by 1950 the number reached 600,000 (Wolf, 1969:233).

Colonization has been given credit for modernizing the Maghreb which in fact, at least in some respects, it did, but in the process it created significant social and economic problems which the independent Maghreb states had to face.
Education: A Ladder to Elite Status

The other feature upon which European influence was of great significance was the area of education. Before the establishment of colonization in the Maghreb, the kind of education available to the people of the Maghreb was of the traditional religious type. On the other hand, this education was of limited capacity since only small portions of the population could achieve secondary or higher levels.

At the primary level, traditional education focused on the memorization and recitation of the Koran. Each town and village had one or more msids (Koranic schools). In larger cities there were several of these schools. For example in 1837 in Constantine (Algeria) there were 90 Muslim primary (presumably Koranic) schools, attended by 1,300 to 1,400 pupils (Barbour, 1962: 239).

At the secondary level, a few madrassas were scattered, especially in large cities, providing once again religious instruction with some courses in Arab history and Arab literature. The only institutions for higher education in the Maghreb were the Qarawiyin Mosque University in Fez (Morocco) and Zitouna Mosque University in Tunis. Both universities provided programs in Koranic Law (Shariâ) and Arab linguistics. Eventually these universities' brightest graduates become "Ulama" (Scholars of traditional learning).

Tunisia was more fortunate than its neighboring countries since there was a college providing modern education before the advent of French protectorate over the country. The college As-sadikia known today as Sadiki, was founded in 1875 by the Turkish authorities in their attempt to modernize the country. The college was designed to provide the state with trained civil servants (Hermassi, 1972:53). After the establishment of colonization in each of the three Maghreb states, modern education systems were created almost from scratch except in Tunisia. The creation of schools in the Maghreb was
hindered by a variety of factors such as the lack of previous facilities, lack of trained teaching staff, and financial difficulties. More importantly there was a large number of school age children. In 1955 in Morocco it was estimated to be about 1.5 million (Barbour, 1962:114). In Algeria the number was even larger, the potential Muslim population of school age was estimated to be 1.5 million (Barbour, 1962:238). On the other hand, the application of the same standards adopted in Metropolitan France in terms of the quality of education, the length of schooling and other features made it difficult and very costly for these countries to expand and extend modern education to significant numbers of Muslim school aged populations. In Algeria for example only 317,000 Muslim children were being educated in government schools in 1957 while in Morocco the number reached 247,000 in 1955 (Barbour, 1962:238,114). In Tunisia, colonial France did better in the area of education than in the other two. Considering the size of the population it appeared there were more schools in Tunisia under the protectorate than in either Morocco or Algeria. As a result the school population in Tunisia increased from a few hundred in 1881 to 260,000 by the end of 1955 (Barbour, 1962:320).

As the secondary level, in both Tunisia and Algeria, particularly in Tunisia, educational facilities, although insufficient, were substantial compared with what was made available to Muslim Moroccans. In Algeria "there were 30 secondary schools for boys and 18 for girls in 1957" (Barbour, 1962:240). By the end of the protectorate in Morocco, "less than 10 secondary schools of the modern type were open to Moroccans, and no modern university was available within the country" (Area Handbook for Morocco, 1965:133). This resulted in a difference of the number of graduates each country could produce. Tunisia had by far the largest number. In the calendar year 1931-32, among the 151 north African students in French universities, 119 were Tunisians, 21 Algerians, and 11 Moroccans, (Hermassi, 1972:121).
The educational facilities established under the colonial regime were not evenly distributed within each of the Maghreb states. The towns and cities had greater shares in these facilities than did the countryside. In Algeria, in 1954 for instance, 13 out of 18 Muslim boys went to schools in Algiers city whereas in most rural places the ratio was very low; in some cases it came to be 1 in 70 or more (Barbour, 1962:238). In Morocco the pattern just described was even more marked. Most of the schools were established in larger cities especially Fez, Rabat, Marrakech, Casablanca.

As noted earlier, the French attempted to turn existing ethnic divisions to their own political advantage by creating schools for Berbers where Arabic was not at all taught or at least was not made compulsory, as was the case in schools for Arabic-speaking children. In Algeria, "Schools were established in the Berber-speaking zones earlier than elsewhere in the country, and during the period of French occupation nearly all teacher-training institutes were manned by Kabyles (cited in Wolf, 1969:233). In Morocco, the college of Azrou was founded in the Atlas mountains with the objective of providing modern education for students of Berber origin.

The creation of modern educational networks in the Maghreb meant not only that the French language became the main language of teaching but also that the content of instruction was set up in the framework of French culture. "The French", states Halstead, "have insisted on the use of their mother tongue as the language of instruction, whatever the racial origin of the students" (Halstead, 1967:100). The aims of French education in the Maghreb were to assimilate the younger generation into the colonial culture, develop greater affection for the colonial value systems and ways of life, and create intermediary groups between Europeans and the indigenous society. However, cultural assimilation was what concerned nationalists most.
The dominance of the French language in the established educational system was felt as a threat to the national Arab culture of the Maghreb. In order to counterbalance the Gallicization of the Maghreb by the French and also in order to provide more schooling opportunities for Muslims, nationalists established a system of private schools throughout the Maghreb. These schools provided modern education and similar diplomas to those of French school but instruction was given in Arabic.

Modern education played a significant role in the rise of nationalism in the Maghreb. Of equal importance, education was a means for social mobility and a ladder to elite status. In the Maghreb, nationalist activity and anti-colonial forces germinated not among those who lost their prestige, status or their land. Rather it was the small nucleus created by the French themselves, a nucleus made up of those who discovered that the European presence was an obstacle to their emancipation and their aspiration to assume responsibility in their own society.

Parents realized that education was the road for the future in the Maghreb and thus were anxious to get education for their children. In Morocco modern education was available mainly to the sons of urban and well-to-do families. Nonetheless the rural notables had some chance to get access to the French educational system. "The French," wrote Waterbury, "sought to educate a group of Moroccans completely loyal to France, who would act as intermediaries between the protectorate administration and the rural populations, and who would serve in subordinate posts in the protectorate bureaucracy" (Waterbury, 1970:112). As opposed to Morocco where colonial educational policy tended to be deliberately elitist, French schools in Tunisia were spread all over the country, thus, creating conditions for a wider range for elite recruitment. In Algeria, in addition to the opportunities provided in the 48 secondary
schools and the university of Algiers inside the country, more opportunities were given to Algerian workers in France.

"Twenty-five years later, one meets certain doctors, certain lawyers, certain professors, certain mathematicians or chemists whose brilliant studies have been paid for during these already distant years by a father or an elder brother out of his laborer's salary. To achieve this result, the illiterate 'émigré' must have had to deprive himself daily of what in France we call the 'vital minimum'" (Quoted in Wolf, 1969:233-234).

Conclusion

Based on the previous description of source of the socio-economic features of the traditional Maghreb society and the changes imposed upon them during the colonial period, three major conclusions can be drawn.

First the transformation of economic structures through land expropriation and commercialization of agriculture resulted in creating a vulnerable economy in the Maghreb, displacing various traditional groups and creating new ones especially in Algeria. Yet these changes were not as effective as was modern education in terms of creating new leading groups in society.

Second, modern education stimulated nationalist movements in the Maghreb. The acquisition of this type of education along with the participation in the struggle for independence produced leading groups that later on were to become rulers of the Maghreb. Those who benefited from French education became the spokesmen for independence and the leaders of nationalism as will be shown in the next chapter.

Third, colonial France attempted to win the Maghreb through a number of mechanisms varying from cultural assimilation, exploitation of existing ethnic divisions to tribal fragmentation. Colonial schemes, however, underestimated the significance of such cultural and religious symbols for the
Maghreb people. As we will see, the French failed to stamp out the Muslim character of the people. Instead they made it possible for the Muslims in the Maghreb to rise above their ethnic differences and become a unified community whose main objective was to preserve the national culture and identity against the alien culture.
Chapter Three

NATIONALISM AND EMERGENCE OF ELITES IN THE MAGHREB

As the economic and political control of colonial France was felt through her various policies and reforms, certain groups took upon themselves the responsibility to lead the confrontation against colonial rule. The present chapter aims to examine the emergence and evolution of elites within the context of nationalism in the Maghreb. In order to provide a framework for investigating this issue it is convenient to distinguish three major forms of nationalism. Inspired by Moore’s concept of ‘modes of consciousness’ (Moore, 1970:35-36) and Hermassi’s concept of ‘elites orientations’ (1972:92-98), these forms are:

1 — Traditionalist anti-colonialism
2 — Modern secular nationalism
3 — Active violent nationalism

These forms do not constitute historical sequences, for in one case or the other they developed simultaneously or they overlapped. They are only analytical tools to help us construct fragments of the socio-historical conditions under which nationalism of one form or the other evolved.

Traditionalist Anti-colonialism

The advent of colonization in the Maghreb, as elsewhere in the world, was strongly resisted. If it were not for the well-trained and highly equipped French military forces, France would not have been able to stay in the Maghreb as long as it did. Considering the stage of development of the Maghreb and the predominant type of social organization at the time of colonization, tribal resistance was the only form of confrontation against France the indigenous society could generate. This form of resistance was rather strong among the mountainous and Berber population which, during most of their history, lived independently and free from any governmental authority,
be it the Turkish authority in Algeria and Tunisia or the Sultanate of Morocco. The 17 years of tribal resistance in Algeria was only one instance of the continuous tribal efforts to resist the French.

However, the intervention of French military troops along with the dispossessio
n of land, which socially and economically supported tribal solidarity, destroyed the active resistance of the tribes. This state was to last for decades, particularly in Algeria, where the colonial regime stayed longer. In describing this period Wolf says "This was a period not so much of incubation of the revolution-to-be, but rather of muted changes and adjustments, experiments in social and cultural relations, with attendant advances and retreats" (Wolf, 1969:225).

In Algeria and Tunisia the confrontation with France was renewed during the period of World War I. In Morocco, put under French protectorate in 1912, the confrontation did not take shape until the early 1930's. This time the political efforts to challenge colonial France were stimulated in the urban areas especially old Islamic cities of the Maghreb such as Constantine, Tlemcen, Tunis and Fez. With respect to the content of these early manifestations of nationalism, it was molded in the realm of defining and defending the national identity. Since religion has been the strongest and most shared symbol of this identity, French reforms that touched upon religious features triggered unanticipated reactions from the indigenous society. Berque suggests that "just as tribal resistance gave place to political opposition of the modern type, so Islam, from the ultimate moral sanctuary, became enterprising and aggressive" (Berque, 1967:75).

What were the French policies and reforms that led to the rise of the first form of nationalism and, at least in part, cost France the giving up of her control in the Maghreb? In their desire to establish a so-called French Algeria, the French presented Algerian Muslims with an ultimatum. The latter
were required to relinquish their religion if they wished to become French citizens. Muslims responded in a rather unexpected way. Instead of welcoming the French Proposal, they turned inward to this religion they were asked to give up. Subsequently there developed a reformist movement directed to purifying Islam from mysticism, superstition and other distortions especially maboultism. Implied in this orientation was the return to the early orthodox Islam. The spokesman of this reformist Islam was Ben Badis from Constantine. Ben Badis graduated from Zitouna Mosque University at Tunis where he received orthodox religious instruction. In 1931, Ben Badis founded the Algerian Association of Ulama which formally spoke for religious reforms.

The goal of the Badissia movement was twofold. On one hand it attempted to affirm "the authority of the reformist schoolmen, the ulama, and furthered the creation of numerous orthodox schools (madrassas) in the hinterland" (Wolf, 1969:228). As previously noted, these schools were meant to counter the effects of French schools. Consistently the slogan of the Badissia was the often quoted statement "Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country, Islam is my religion". As observed by Wolf "the Badissia also demanded the restoration of the properties of religious foundations seized by the French" (Wolf, 1969:228).

On the other hand, the Badissia movement along with its reformist drive, had a nationalist drive to affirm the existence of an Algerian national culture and identity. In fact the two aspects were part of the same thing for Ben Badis and his group. This explains why Ben Badis strongly stood against the assimilation position held by Ferhat Abbas. Not only did Abbas call for assimilation of Algeria to France but he denied the existence of the Algerian nation when he publicly stated in 1936 "If I had discovered the Algerian

"If I had discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would not blush for my crime. Men who die for the patriot ideal are daily honored and respected. My life is not worth any more than theirs.
However, I will not die for the Algerian fatherland because this fatherland does not exist. I have not found it" (Quoted in Brace, 1965:100).

Soon after this statement was issued, Ben Badis replied by the statement that appeared in the paper of the Algerian Association of Ulama:

"We have searched in history and in the present and we have undeniably established that the Algerian Muslim nation is formed and exists, as all the other nations of the world. This nation has its history demonstrated by facts; it has religious and linguistic unity; it has its culture, traditions, and characteristics, good or bad, as is the case for any nation on earth. Further, we say that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France, and does not wish to be France" (Quoted in Brace, 1965:100-101).

As noted earlier Ben Badis' ideas were generated in the cities. From there they were carried into the hinterland where they were resisted by the poor peasants and landless who would rather enjoy the security of the shrines and lodges but were strongly supported by the middle peasants (Wolf, 1969:229). On the other hand the assimilation tendency "was most congruent with the interests of middle-class professionals of whom there were about 450 in the higher ranks, whose social standing depended on their French education, and who saw in their French degrees a passport to mobility" (Wolf, 1969:225).

In Tunisia there were several incidents that touched upon the religious attachments of Muslims. In 1911 the French tried to transform a Muslim cemetery to a European orbit. In Brace's words, "Such an incident led to fighting and exile of Tunisian Leaders" (Brace, 1965:61). In 1919, the French took over parts of Habous lands. The Tunisian notability was upset not because of the amount of land but the kind of land that was taken. "This attempt, says Brace, offended the 'old Turbans' who had no objection to the French presence as long as Muslim institutions, particularly religious, were
respected" (Brace, 1965:62). Added to this above, there occurred another cemetery incident but this time concerning the burial of Tunisian Muslims who had accepted French citizenship. Brown points out that "in Bizerte it was ruled that these people did not have the right to be buried in a Muslim cemetery" (Brown, 1966:105). To such incidents, Muslim Tunisians responded by boycotts, demonstrations and continuing revolts. Over this period, the confrontation against colonial France was led by Cheikh Taalibi who, like Ben Badis, graduated from Zitouna Mosque University. Taalibi founded Tunisia's first political party under the name of Destour (Constitution). Destour leaders reflected the Tunisian national consciousness in cultural and religious terms. Like the Badissia movement in Algeria, there developed in Tunisia a reformist movement whose main concern was the purification of Islam and return to Orthodox Islam. In a similar way to their neighbor nationalists in Algeria, Destour leaders strongly opposed French reforms that represented threats to Islamic national culture.

In Morocco the Dahir Berber was the most significant impulse behind the first expression of Moroccan nationalism. As already noted, the Dahir meant the separation of Berbers and Arabs, each having distinct law. In his memoirs, King Hassan of Morocco wrote in this respect "In 1930, French democracy claimed to have discovered a new state in Morocco: The Berber State. The claim was based on dubious ethnic and linguistic grounds,..... Archaic customs were resurrected, often to assume the force of law" (King Hassan, 1978:19). Whereas the French intended the Dahir to facilitate their own control over Morocco, it resulted in establishing stronger solidarity between Berbers and Arabs. The Dahir was felt as an attack not only on the unity of the country but also as a threat to Islam. Brown suggests that "in a very real sense the two were seen as one and the same thing" (Brown, 1966:104).
In their response to the Dahir, Arabs and Berbers united to confront the French violation of their shared sacred symbols. The majority of Muslims resorted to incessant prayers in the mosques. The reformist movement already in motion since Allal Al Fassi founded the first club in 1926 at Fez, was reinforced. Allal Al Fassi received similar education to that of both Ben Badis and Taalibi, at the Qarawyin Mosque University in Fez. Further, the promulgation of the Dahir also contributed to the diffusion of reformist ideas first generated at Fez and Rabat, to other major cities and parts of the country-side. Like in Algeria and Tunisia, the reformist movement in Morocco aimed at purifying the faith from superstition and return to orthodox Islamic principles. In the process, mysticism and other practices which lacked grounds in the Koran or the prophetic tradition, were condemned.

In all three countries, early nationalism or what we called traditionalist anti-colonialism was significantly linked with religious issues. French rule in the Maghreb was attacked on cultural and religious grounds before it was attacked on political grounds. Moreover the French desire to introduce their culture and way of life in the Maghreb resulted in developing the susceptibilities of the Muslims. One on hand they became more concerned with their traditional way of life and identity, both of which they identified with Islam. On the other hand, in the eyes of the Maghreb populations, the French culture was conceived of from the standpoint of Christianity not in terms of secular European development. As it turned out the three countries of the Maghreb responded in a similar way to what they considered as threats to their religion, leading to the rise of nationalist consciousness that was framed within a reformist Islamic movement. Brown cites the major elements of the reformist program as follows:

1 — return to early Islam

2 — rejection of institutionalized mysticism, superstition and other practices
3 — A stand against Christianity
4 — dissemination of Arabic and Islamic teachings in order to counter the French Influence (Brown, 1966:103).

As already noted, the reformist movement in all three countries was an urban feature. It evolved within the urban, traditionally literate segments of the population. Ben Badis, Taalibi and Allal Al Fassi who led the traditionalist anti-colonialist campaign graduated from one or the other Mosque University of the Maghreb. Because of their education and their social standing, these men were in a better position to comprehend the significance of the cultural challenge embodied in colonization. These men were also able to voice the national demands which as we saw, became crystallized around religious issues while political independence was not yet a demand. This explains why this form of nationalism is described as traditional anti-colonialism. Nationalist leaders were more concerned with the affirmation of national culture and identity that were distinct and different from those of the colonizer, and less with the economic and political independence of the Maghreb.

Modern Secular Nationalism

Broadly speaking, the shift from traditionalist-anti-colonialism to modern nationalism was the most pronounced in Tunisia. In Algeria it evolved simultaneously with the traditionalist-anti-colonialism. In Morocco traditional elements merged with modern ones. This form of nationalism manifested itself roughly between the mid-1930's and late 1940's; in Algeria it was expressed almost a decade earlier. One of the most significant features characterizing this period was the take over of nationalist leadership by younger and modern educated elements. In the previous chapter it became clear that modern education was a colonial creation except in Tunisia. French education was the key to the shift in the national
consciousness from religious issues to more politically focused claims. By the late 1920's the first generation of beneficiaries from French educational facilities entered the national scene. In French schools young students of the Maghreb were taught the meaning of democracy and the importance of laws, rights and public liberties, especially since most of these students majored in law and political science. As they returned to their respective countries from abroad, they discovered that there was a real contradiction between what they learned in French universities and what was going on in the Maghreb under colonial rule. They became aware of the reality of colonization and the obstacles it presented to their own emancipation. Their activism involved publication of local newspapers, consciousness raising in the countryside and efforts to establish channels of communication between the Maghreb and France.

In Algeria the situation was rather complex. As previously noted, early nationalism evolved around religious issues on which two positions were taken: those who attempted to define the Algerian nationality as distinct from that of France and those who called for increased contact and assimilation to France. The difference between the two positions was linked to the type of education received by their advocates. However, while these two positions were simultaneously developing inside Algeria, there was a third tendency growing among the Algerian workers in France. This was the North African Star group led by Messali Hadj.

In Wolf's view "the working class milieu had two immediate effects. On one hand it produced among the Algerian workers in France the realization that an adequate French education constituted a passport to entry into the modern technical civilization. On the other hand, it incubated the first modern nationalist movement, in the formation of the 'Etoile Nord Africaine' in Paris in 1925, in which Messali Hadj became the dominant personality" (Wolf, 1969:233). In fact Messali Hadj was the first nationalist to call for
independence. His North African Star soon developed into the Party of the Algerian People (PPA).

The Vichy government in Metropolitan France (194-1943) was most repressive for the Algerian Muslims. Most political leaders including Messali Hadj were put in jail. Ferhat Abbas was also put under forced residence. Against the Vichy administration De Gaulle promised certain reforms to the Muslims upon his visit to Algeria in December, 1943. But these were strongly resisted by the colons inside Algeria and those who supported them in France. The French unwillingness to make concessions resulted in the abandonment of the idea of assimilation. Abbas, who was the spokesman of the assimilation project, gave up this goal and joined Messali Hadj in claiming political autonomy of the Algerian nation. In 1943, Abbas even helped other Algerian leaders issuing 'the Manifesto of the Algerian People' which called for equal rights for the Arab-Berber Muslims and the recognition of Arabic along with French as an official language (Brace, 1965:103).

The tension between France and Algeria reached its climax at the end of World War II. On May 1945 in Sétif, thousands of Muslim Algerians carrying the Algerian flag were gathered to celebrate the Allied victories in Europe, and had inscriptions such as "long live independent Algeria", "Down with colonialism", "Free Messali Hadj". Someone opened fire, which ended with hundreds killed among both Europeans and Muslims. Wolf observes that the riot was fiercely repressed by French air and ground forces. Estimates of Muslims killed vary between 8,000 and 45,000 with 15,000 a not unkilely number (Wolf, 1969:236). Following the Setif insurrection, the Algerian question was debated in two French constituent Assemblies where Muslim representatives were present. Although no concrete solutions were provided, most political prisoners were released.
Upon his release from prison, Messali Hadj renewed his party (PPA) under the name MTLD (Movement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Democratiques) while Abbas pulled his followers together under the UDMA (Union Democratique du Manifest Algerian). Both groupings called for an independent Algerian State. The 1947 French National Assembly came up with a statute whereby Algeria was defined as a group of overseas departments (Brace, 1965:107). But the statute failed in two ways: on one hand it was not endorsed by the colons and colonial administration inside Algeria; on the other it was not enough for the Algerian nationalists whose demands were no less than independence. Meanwhile the socioeconomic conditions of Muslim Algerians continued to deteriorate; harvests were poor, wine production was decreasing, wages were also decreasing while the number of day workers increased significantly.

The unchecked repression against the Algerians forced nationalists to operate clandestinely. Within the MTLD, there developed a secret society under the name the Organization Speciale (O.S.). The formation of this paramilitary organization was made with the clandestine approach in mind. The founders of the organization were in favor of direct action and organized rebellion. The importance of the O.S. was not in what it accomplished but from what it led to; the O.S. provided the first organizational networks that in 1954 culminated into the Algerian revolt. The MTLD (Messali Hadj) and the UDMA (Abbas) were the major nationalist parties that made up modern secular nationalism in Algeria. The approach adopted by these two parties was certainly different from that of the Ulama and traditional nationalists. MTLD and UDMA, each in its own way, worked within the framework of colonial political and legal system. Both attempted to reach agreements with France on the basis of dialogue and legal arrangements. But their efforts proved unsuccessful.
The MTLD and UDMA leaders had different education from that of the Ulama and traditional nationalists. While the latter received their education in the Mosque universities, MTLD and UDMA leaders graduated from French high schools and colleges and many were drawn from the liberal professions. Quandt compares the two groups in terms of their educational and professional status and concludes that the similarity is more striking than the differences. Quant's comparison covered the candidates to the 1948 Algerian Assembly from both the MTLD and UDMA. Quandt found that over 50% of those presented from each group were educated and trained in liberal professions particularly medicine, law and education (Quandt, 1969:57).

As noted earlier in Tunisia the rise of modern secular nationalism was to a great extent made at the expense of the previous form of nationalism. The return of younger and highly educated Tunisians from abroad, especially France, marked the turning point in Tunisian nationalism. Bourguiba and others like him with degrees in law and political science brought about a new perspective to Tunisian nationalism. These men, instead of making issues of religious matters, attempted to open communication between French and Tunisian minds (Brace, 1965:63). Meanwhile efforts were made to gain recruits among the masses. Brace observes that Bourguiba pushed for greater activity, for more than anti-colonial utterance (Brace, 1965:63). In 1934, Bourguiba and his group founded the Neo-Destour. From its inception, the Neo-Destour's basic objective was independence. Despite France's repressive policy and ups and downs in the relation between France and Tunisia, the Neo-Destour continued its work toward independence following an "evolutionary nationalist approach—first a voice in the protectorate then autonomy, finally independence" (Brace, 1965:63-64).

The shift from traditional-anti-colonialism to modern secular nationalism was associated with changes in the educational and professional background of
the leaders of each of the two forms of nationalism. Moreover leaders of the Neo-Destour tended to be drawn from all over the country with a relative dominance of the city of Tunis as opposed to the old Destour of which the leadership appeared to originate almost exclusively from the capital city. Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize the composition of both old and Neo-Destour with respect to place of origin, occupation and type of education.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tunisian Leadership: Place of Origin</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Rest of the Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destour Party</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Destour Party</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tunisian Leadership: Occupations</th>
<th>Liberal Professions</th>
<th>Traders and Farmers</th>
<th>Administrative Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destour Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Destour Party</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tunisian Leadership: Type of Education</th>
<th>College Es-Sadiki (Modern)</th>
<th>Zitouna (Traditional)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destour Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Destour Party</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tunisian leaders like their counterparts in Algeria were not spared either French repression or jail particularly during the second war period. However,
the presence of Germans in eastern Tunisia was significantly beneficial to
Tunisians, for the Germans forced the French to release prisoners and allow
meetings. Tunisian nationalists hoped that the end of the war would ease the
pressure upon France and thus facilitate their dialogue with the French regard-
ing independence. But no such development took place. Consequently Tunisian
leaders tried to seek support abroad. From Cairo Bourguiba appealed to the
world criticizing France's repression and unwillingness to consider Tunisia's
claim to independence as well as that of Algeria and Morocco. Meanwhile the
Neo Destour continued working towards independence reaching every national
force in the country from trade unions to farmers organization. Brace estimates
that "By 1949 the Neo-Destour claimed a half million Tunisians for its ranks"
( Brace, 1965:69 ). France then understood that repression and violence against
nationalists could only result in revolt and rebellion; she decided to open the
dialogue with Tunisia leaders.

In Morocco, the traditionalist approach established by Allal Al Fassi was
not totally abandoned as men with modern education joined the nationalist
movement. Modern political activity in Morocco emerged from within the
reformist movement seeking purification of Islam. For it was the national
consciousness of the religious unity of Berbers and Arabs attacked by the
Dahir, that developed into organized and independence oriented nationalism.
Brace observes that the Dahir "was France's most telling contribution to
Moroccan nationalism" ( Brace, 1965:77 ). Soon the early responses expressed in
religious terms were to become organized political efforts towards the
achievement of the country's independence. Nationalist leaders in Morocco,
like their counterparts in both Algeria and Tunisia, started by publishing
newspapers in which they expressed their protest against French rule and
policy in the country. In 1934 Allal Al Fassi and other nationalist leaders
formed the CAM (Comite' d' Action Marocaine). Soon they issued a reform
proposal in which they called for basic rights for Moroccans especially freedom of expression, equality, protection from arbitrary arrest and unification of educational facilities (Brace, 1965:78).

Mohammed V, then the Sultan of Morocco, became aware of the gradual shift in French policy from protectorate to colonization. The Sultan sympathized with the nationalist movement in progress and nationalist leaders to whom he opened the place for support and dialogue. In 1937 the CAM was dissolved resulting in two nationalist groupings, one led by Allal Al Fassi who formed the Moroccan Movement for the Plan of Reforms, the other led by Hassan Al-Ouazzani who established the Popular Movement. When the two leaders denounced French repressive policy against a group of protestors, they were jailed. Al-Fassi was sent to jail in Gabon where he remained for 9 years while Al-Ouazzani was held under forced residence in Morocco. The most significant developments in the nationalist movement in Morocco, like in the neighboring countries, came about during the second war period. On one hand French repression and control of the economic and political spheres increased rather significantly as the Vichy administration supported the North African Lobby in Paris. On the other hand the nationalist movement in Morocco gained strength and mass-support.

In 1943 Balafrej, a graduate of the Faculty of letters and law at Paris, was able to found the Istiqlal party (Independence). Al Fassi, still in Gabon, was given the highest position in the party while Balafrej served as secretary general. Soon after the formation of the Istiqlal, a manifesto calling for independence was presented to the Resident General in Morocco. The French responded to the nationalist proposal in the same way they did to the Tunisian demand for independence. Not only was the Moroccan demand rejected but nationalist leaders were arrested and jailed. Balafrej was sent
to Corsica while other leaders were held locally. At the end of the war, Moroccan nationalists joined Tunisians and Algerians in their efforts to gain world support. Cairo, where the Maghreb office was established in 1947, provided a platform from which the Maghreb nationalists could share views and speak for the nationalist cause. In Morocco nationalist leaders attempted to strengthen the party organization. Brace describes these efforts when he states "At home, party organization was strengthened, the executive committee was enlarged from twelve to twenty-five, study groups took form, and new branches were founded throughout the country. Istiqlal locals sprang up even in the Berber mountain communities" (Brace, 1965:82).

In 1947 upon his visit to Tangier, the Sultan voiced his concern with the Moroccan people. This appeal from the Sultan intensified the crisis between France and Morocco especially with Resident General Juin serving in Morocco. The Sultan refused to sign a number of decrees which he felt disadvantageous to his government. When the Sultan visited France in 1950, he provided President Auriol with a memorandum calling for change in the relationship between France and Morocco and abolition of the protectorate. The Sultan's quest remained unanswered. At the same time Resident General Juin tried to turn the Berber population against the palace. Under Juin's suggestion, Thami Al Giawi, whtn Pasha of Marrackech, accused the Sultan of being supportive of the Istiqlal. Further, Al Giawi called Berber leaders and their tribes using a variety of pretexts and asked them to march into Fez and Rabat. Using the Berber presence in the two cities, Resident General Juin presented the Sultan with an ultimatum: either he signed all decrees and denounced the Istiqlal or renounced his throne. The Sultan consulted with the government and the ulama who, in Brace's words, unanimously agreed that there was no legal basis in Islamic law or the protectorate treaty for outlawing the Istiqlal (Brace, 1965:86). Consequently the Sultan went on refusing to sign
French drawn decrees and requested that the Istiqlal misdeeds, if there were any, should be handled in courts.

As previously noted the rise of traditionalist anto-colonialism was associated with traditional religious education while the growth of independence directed nationalism was associated with modern education. However, Morocco differed from Algeria and Tunisia where the two tendencies were sharply marked. In Morocco both French educated and traditionally educated worked together and contributed almost equally to modern nationalism. Halstead (1967) provides data on the function, rank and education of leading nationalists in Morocco. This scholar distinguishes between directors, theoreticians, organizers and propagandists in Morocco, in France and in the Middle East. One of the major findings of Halstead's data is that most of the directors and theoreticians were French educated, while most of the organizers had a traditional education. The propagandists in France were French educated as opposed to those assuming the propaganda task inside the country or in the Middle East who were traditionally educated. With respect to ranking, Allal Al Fassi is at the top of most of these functions. Halstead observes that "the propaganda function in Morocco and the Middle East was assumed by the Muslim-educated because the French-educated tended to lose rapport with the people" (Halstead, 1967:196-197). Halstead goes further as to suggest that the lack of rapport between the nationalist leaders and the masses did not become critical until the decision was made to rally the masses to a national party. What is more important, however, is that nationalist leaders in Morocco were highly educated, a feature they shared with their counterparts in Algeria and Tunisia. The other significant point is Al Fassi's unquestionable leadership of the nationalist movement in Morocco which indicates the working relationship between Muslim educated and French educated at least within the nationalist movement. As nationalism progressed in the country the number of those with modern education
increased significantly.

With respect to the place of origins of the nationalist leaders, Morocco revealed a relatively different pattern from that found in either Algeria or Tunisia. As noted earlier, Algerian leadership did not exclusively emerge from major cities, it also developed from within the Kabylia region and a number of small towns and cities. Further it even developed within Algerian migrants in France as reflected in the nationalist contribution of Messali Hadj and the North African Star.

In the case of Tunisia, French education again allowed a wider range for recruitment to the ranks of nationalist leadership, for it was spread almost all over the country. The Neo Destour leaders were not exclusively from the capital city as was the case with the old Destour. Rather both Tunis and the rest of the country contributed to the makeup of nationalist leaders. In Morocco most nationalist leaders were drawn from major cities particularly Fez. This was so because both traditional educational facilities especially at the highest level and the schools established by the French were built in the major cities. Fez had the advantage of having both educational facilities while some other cities did not have any at all.

**Active Violent Nationalism**

This form of nationalism started approximately in the early fifties and continued until independence was attained in each of the three countries. Nationalism in the Maghreb shifted to violence and organized rebellion when peaceful means proved ineffective and unsuccessful. By the early 1950's nationalist leaders in the Maghreb realized that France would not agree to the independence of their respective countries unless she is forced to do so. This realization was stronger among Algerian nationalists who for several decades tried various approaches to their relationship with France. Over the
years, proposed reforms and accommodations for Muslim Algerians were strongly rejected by Metropolitan France and continuously resisted by the French colonial administration in Algeria. The resort to violence was thus justified by the failure of negotiations and other peaceful means. In Tunisia and Morocco rebellion and violent confrontation with the French were to a great extent circumstantial, less painful and discontinuous.

As noted earlier, the late forties and early fifties in Algeria witnessed the development of the Organization Speciale (O.S.). The importance of this organization stemmed from its clandestine character and its contribution to the 1954 outbreak. Over this period (1950-1954) O.S. leaders planned and organized the rebellion against Colonial France. This planning was in great part made outside Algeria. Cairo, Geneva and even Paris were places where frequent meetings between leaders were held. Brace cites the prominent leaders of the organization and the responsibilities assumed when he states,

"Four men dominated these clandestine planning sessions: Ben Bella, Belkacem Krim, the Kabylia leader whose job was to organize the inhabitants of these mountains, Mostafa Bena Boulaid who did the same work in the Aurès, and Mohammed Boudiaf, a thirty four year old intellectual and militant from the plateau area of South Constantine who had helped organize Algerians in France (1950-1953)" (Brace, 1965:111).

These O.S. leaders with a few others were to form the Comite' Revolutionnaire d' Unite' et d' Action (CRUA) which unleashed the armed struggle of 1954. These men were hardly associated with the existing nationalist parties, which still believed in negotiations with France (MTLD and UDMA). Action not politics was the stand of the CRUA leaders. On the first November 1954, French police stations, military headquarters and properties were attacked in different areas at once. In the Aurès mountains there were more incidents than in the other areas of the Algerian territory. From the mountains rebellious attacks spread to the urban areas. Wolf observes that in 1956 in Algiers 120 occurrences took place in December alone. (Wolf, 1969:239). In October 1956, Ben Bella,
Bitat, Khider and Ait Ahmed were arrested as they were flying from Morocco to Tunisia. These leaders remained in jail for almost six years.

The rebellious Algerian forces developed into the National Liberation Front (FLN) which represented a coalition of differing political forces. The military organization was led by the National Liberation Army (ALN). As the number of incidents increased, the number of French military forces increased. In 1954, there were 50,000 French soldiers in Algeria. Within a 2-year period they increased five times and by 1960 the number reached a half million (Brace, 1965:125). Algerian freedom fighters were fewer in number and had fewer arms. In early 1957 French troops succeeded in checking the ALN which thus was forced to seek outside support in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. The growth of Algerian forces outside Algeria resulted in the formation of what was to be known as the external army. As the latter was gaining strength and training in the borders, the French countered this development by constructing electrified barriers along the Algerian Frontiers on both the Moroccan and Tunisian sides. Inside Algeria, the French exhausted all war tactics in order to put the rebellion down. They relocated large segments of civilian population in order to cut the rebels sources of support, they isolated the military districts and finally their "counterthrust was capped by the employment of psychological warfare, ranging from mass persuasion and the provision of social services by army personnel to forcible indoctrination and torture" (Wolf, 1969:240).

On the Algerian side, the FLN held its first congress during the summer of 1956. At this congress the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) whose task was to secure the organization of the ALN and legislation for the revolution, was established. The 17 full members of the CNRA included the 9 leaders who constituted the CRUA, plus a number of Wilaya leaders. Abbas joined the CNRA, and when the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) was formed and recognized by several Asian and African states in 1958,
Ferhat Abbas was named prime minister while Ben Bella, then in jail, was named first deputy prime minister.

The advent of De Gaulle to power in 1958 affected the course of events in Algeria. Soon, De Gaulle visited Algiers and called for a return to peaceful negotiations. But his offer was rejected by Algerians who considered it a surrender and by the French Army in Algeria. De Gaulle then proposed what was known as the Constantine program. This plan provided for an amelioration of the conditions of Algerian Muslims. Wages were to be raised, land redistributed, industry established, housing, employment and education were also considered in the plan. In 1959 De Gaulle spoke for the Algerians' right to self determination. Once again De Gaulle's proposition was resisted and this time more so from the French, especially high ranking officers. It was seen as a betrayal of the French Army and French people in Algeria, particularly those who were born and brought up in Algeria. A secret Army organization took shape out of this refusal. Not only did this organization destroy all it could in Algeria but also attempted to assassinate De Gaulle. It was not until 1961 that De Gaulle could obtain a 75% majority in France and 69% in Algeria on his self-determination policy. Negotiations between France and FLN were held at Evian, France. The most debatable feature was the Algerian Sahara where oil and natural gas were abundant. The French wanted this part of the Algerian territory to remain with France while the FLN insisted that no part of Algeria would be sacrificed for peace. De Gaulle finally agreed that the Sahara belonged to Algeria. On July 1, 1962 Algeria was declared an independent state after almost 8 years of armed struggle. As the struggle came to an end, the ALN inside Algeria was rather exhausted, particularly in Kabylia where the rebels were the most active and most violent. At the same time the branch of the army which remained outside Algeria gained in recruits, equipment, support and strength.
As noted earlier, planning and organization of the Algerian armed struggle were carried out by a group of leaders who did not depend in any significant way on the existing political parties that dominated Algerian nationalism between the thirties and late forties. Neither Messali Hadj nor Abbas were for violence and revolt. Both leaders and their followers favored political and legal means. When these failed a new group favoring the use of violence emerged particularly from within the MTLD and then became active in the Organization Speciale of which the members became CRUA and CNRA leaders. The background of these leaders was somewhat different from that of the politicians. By and large, they came from more modest origins than the politicians, with a few notable exceptions of advantage origins, but even more common were reports of Revolutionaries whose families had once been prosperous but who had lost wealth and prestige (Quandt, 1969:69). They were, of course better off than the illiterate peasant masses (Quandt, 1969:69), but tended to be less well educated than the politicians, who were almost all highly educated and practitioners of liberal professions. Few among the revolutionaries achieved higher education but most of them received secondary or only primary education. Because of their lower educational achievement, most revolutionaries had careers in the French Army. Ben Bella, Krim Belkacem, Boudiaf and Khider, who came to be known among the nine historic chiefs, served in the French Army. Through military life they became aware of the injustices of colonialism. These were the men, who if not dead or killed during the armed struggle, took over the control of Algeria once the French departed.

The early fifties in both Morocco and Tunisia witnessed greater internationalization of the nationalist cause. Moroccan and Tunisian leaders traveled to several world capitals for support and offices were established in Washington, New York, Bagdad and many other cities. As these nationalist activities progressed, France's repression became more pronounced. In 1952 the Bey of
Tunisia under the nationalists' suggestion appealed to the Security Council in Paris. The Resident General in Tunisia asked for a withdrawal of the appeal and when the Bey refused, a wave of arrests and exiles wiped out the Neo-Destour leaders (Brace, 1965:89). French military forces continually intervened in order to reduce nationalist activism. Tunisians responded by counter-terror and resistance which went on for almost two months.

In Morocco, as previously noted, the relationship between the Sultan and France reached the stage of crisis as the Sultan refused to sign decrees and outlaw the Istiqlal. When in December 1952 the Tunisian and Moroccan questions were heard in the United Nations, France claimed that they were "domestic" questions. During the same month Ferhat Hached, who then was the Tunisian labor Union leader, was murdered. Riots and demonstrations of protest arose not only in Tunisia but reached Morocco especially Casablanca. These events led to more arrests and more repression on the part of the French. In Morocco the climax of the crisis came in August 1953 when the French, playing with the Berber-Arab distinction, forced the Sultan to relinquish his throne. The royal family was sent to Madagascar and a puppet Sultan was put in the palace. The dethronment of the Sultan resulted in a widespread protest, first expressed in the religious and spiritual terms and then as an organized resistance and violent confrontation against the French. Brace reports that "early in 1954 French goods came under boycott. The tobacco monopoly always produced an important revenue, so the Moroccans stopped smoking, reducing tobacco sales by nearly 80%" (Brace, 1965:94). These boycotts were supplemented by a number of violent acts. French cars, stores and other properties were either attacked or burned. Similarly in Tunisia, violence became the order of the day. Guerrilla warfare was launched from the mountains of Southern Tunisia. Brace observes that although the Neo-Destour denied any association with this violence, the guerrilla fighters were recruited in party headquarters in
various cities (Brace, 1965:95).

The resort to violence in Morocco and Tunisia simultaneously was even more complicated when some 75 rebellious attacks broke out at once in Algeria on November 1, 1954. France, unable to use her forces on the three fronts at the same time, decided to change her tactics and approach in both Morocco and Tunisia in order to preserve the country where she invested too much to give up easily. Negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco were renewed, and many nationalist leaders in both camps were released. Bourguiba returned from exile, and an agreement on the autonomy of Tunisia was reached in June 1955 followed by the declaration of independence in March 1956. As Tunisia achieved autonomy, "Morocco entered the throes of its most violent chapter since the advent of the protectorate" (Brace, 1969:116). The reason for this violence in Morocco was the exile of the Sultan, and as long as the Sultan was retained in Madagascar, both Berber tribesmen and Arabs continued their violent action. On the second anniversary of the dethronement of the Sultan, August 20, 1955, general revolt in Morocco was coordinated with the FLN operations on the same day in Algeria (Brace, 1965:117). In one small town, it appeared that all French people including women and children were killed. Soon the Puppet Sultan was asked to retire and the Sultan Mohammed V flew from Madagascar to France. In November 1955 the Sultan returned to his throne in Morocco. The ultimate goal then became independence. The Sultan formed a government where the Istiqlal members had 7 out of 15 cabinet positions, while the rest of nationalist parties shared the remaining positions. This selection by the Sultan was very significant for it revealed the Sultan's desire to show his support of this Istiqlal and yet his dislike of the dominance of this party which could favor a one party system in Morocco. Negotiations between the Sultan and France culminated in the recognition of the independence of Morocco in March 1956.

In both Tunisia and Morocco the same nationalist leaders who dominated
the national scene during the 1930's and 1940's continued to provide leadership
during the years preceding independence except for the fact that the Sultan of
Morocco was also to become a nationalist leader. There also were some younger
nationalists who joined the nationalist movements once they finished their
education. In this respect, Tunisia and Morocco differed from Algeria where a
third group, emerged as organizers and leaders of the Algerian revolution.

Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, three features seem of most significance. The
first of these is the structural change brought in the Maghreb countries and
the implications of these changes for the viability of colonization itself.
Nationalism in the Maghreb was to a great extent the product of French efforts
to facilitate and insure their stay and their control in the three countries
as if it was France herself that created the conditions of her withdrawal.
When the French established educational facilities that previously did not
exist, they assumed that those who benefited from these facilities would be
won to their side. But it turned out that the products of the French schools
adopted approaches and developed views that went against the French expectations
except in Algeria where Abbas's early approach tended to be more consistent
with what the French anticipated.

Moreover the French attempted to exploit the existing ethnic cleavages
to their advantage by playing Berbers against Arabs particularly in Morocco,
but this policy again cost France the rise of solidarity and unity of the two
ethnic groups at least for the time they were confronting the French. Wolf
(1969:234-235) says,

"wholly against the expectations of the French who had
always pursued a policy of keeping the Berbers culturally
and politically separate from the Arab population, in order
to better divide and rule, the forces generated by a common
involvement in processes set up by the French impact itself
would bring these disperate groups into fusion".
In sum the French in the Maghreb developed the conditions of their own undoing. On one hand whenever the French authorities in France proposed constructive reforms and programs that could contribute to the well-being of the people in the Maghreb, these were resisted by the Colons and French power in the three Maghreb countries. On the other hand when the nationalists tried to appeal to the French democracy they were faced by all kinds of repression.

The second feature that became important in the achievement of independence was the use of violence. The importance of violence in the Maghreb nationalism stemmed from three elements: it speeded up the process of decolonization, brought about unity and allowed the contribution of the masses to the attainment of independence. Brace argues that there was no doubt that once the nationalists in the three Maghreb states shifted from publication of local newspapers, speech-making and political appeals to organized action, violence and rebellion, the days of the colonial system were numbered (Brace, 1965:122). Further violence in the Maghreb led to the unification of the people. Berbers and Arabs, men and women, old and young, all used one or another form of violence against the French, strongly so in Algeria where it became not only a shared action but a symbolic one. Fanon who had first hand knowledge of the Algerian armed struggle says that

"The practice of violence binds the people together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning.... The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to say, it throws them in one way and in one direction" (Fanon, 1963:73).

Finally violence allowed the masses to become active and provide their share, perhaps the most important, in the work for a common goal. Indeed the people of the Maghreb, mostly peasants in the plains and the mountains as well, paid their dues in the achievement of independence. Fanon (1963:73) states
that

"even if the armed struggle has been symbolic and the nation is demobilized through a rapid movement of decolonization, the people have the time to see that the liberation has been the business of each and all and that the leader has no special merit."

Violence especially when it was carried out on a full scale, was an act of the common man while the organizer and leader was most probably in exile in jail.

The third feature was the creation of nationalist elites in the Maghreb. The processes of colonization and decolonization produced new leading groups in the Maghreb. Under the colonial regime they had the chance to benefit from educational facilities that were of limited capacity and newly installed in their society. This resulted in their being ahead and in better position to participate and lead nationalist movements. When the colonial era reached its term, they harvested the rewards of their efforts and became the governing elites of the independent Maghreb.
Chapter Four

CHARACTERISTICS OF ELITES

Assessing the relationship between background variables and behavioral patterns, who the elites are and what they do, is a difficult task, but nonetheless pertinent to better understanding of the elites, their role in the society they lead and why they do the things they do. Zartman argues that "the value of developing detailed, conceptual description of those in power is to be able to grasp better the problem of explaining what they do. What is the relationship between age, origins, education, and insertion on one hand and attitudes and policies on the other?" (Zartman, 1975:498).

In fact the background approach is more fruitful when one goes beyond the mere facts about who the elites are to explain why they make certain decisions, favor certain social and political orientations and practices and resist others. Social science, as widely argued, seeks explanation because it is this explanation which in addition to its own scientific value, prepares for prediction of future occurrences which is an ultimate goal of any scientific endeavor.

One scholar goes further as to suggest that inquiring into who elites are and their characteristics is mandatory. "Research on power elites must raise the questions common to the study of any participant in the political process. Who are they? What are their perspectives? In what arenas do they function? What strategies do they use? How successful are they in influencing outcomes and effects" (Lasswell and Lerner, 1965:12). In order to study the establishment of political structures and political dynamics of the post colonial Maghreb states, the knowledge of their elites' characteristics is undoubtedly relevant. Our interest is less in the elites themselves than in what their traits and their history can tell us about the political development of the Maghreb countries after independence. The size of each country's political
elite, its age distribution, geographic origins, social origins, education and occupational training, and entry into politics are being investigated in this chapter in order to help us understand better why certain choices and policies are adopted in one or the other country.

**Size of Elites**

Estimates of the size of elites in each country vary from study to study depending on each study's definition of elites. But since most studies appear to define the elites on the basis of position of authority within the institutional system, there is strong agreement on the smallness of the elites. The comparative work on the Maghreb elites sponsored by the CRESM uses 91 individuals in Algeria, 140 in Morocco and 97 in Tunisia (Duchac, 1973:25-26). Other studies give different estimates for each of the three countries. To mention only a few, Quandt estimates 360 individuals in Algeria holding 87 top positions and 273 secondary ones (Quandt, 1969:21); while Hermassi estimates 200 individuals to constitute the inner circle of the elites in Morocco (Hermassi, 1972:102). In spite of the discrepancies among scholars with respect to the size of elites because, as noted earlier, different definitions have been employed, the smallness of the elites is found to be a shared feature in all three countries. What does this fact tell us about the distribution of power and political style of the three countries?; or as pointed out by Zartman, what do we know when we know that the elites in the Maghreb states are of a certain size? (Zartman, 1975:497). First, the smallness of the elites indicates the high degree of power concentration in the three countries which is expressed either by the creation of fewer positions of control in the government, the party, and other political institutions, or by the overlap that exists within these positions. One individual usually holds two or more of these positions. Algeria is no exception, although it is officially claimed that the political
system is populist—socialist and based on a participatory government. To give an illustration of how a number of key positions can be held even over a long period by one person, one cannot find a better example than Boumedienne. At the time of his death in late 1978, Boumedienne was President of the Republic, Head of the Council of the Revolution since 1965, head of the government, Commander in Chief of the army since 1967, Minister of Defense since 1963 and head of the FLN since 1965. There was no Prime Minister under Boumedienne.

While it is often argued that the monarchy in Morocco has extraordinary powers and overwhelming weight in determining the political process in Morocco, Bourguiba, who has been president of Tunisia since independence, has perhaps as much power and control as the King of Morocco. In any event, in each of the three countries, the top man, whether monarch or elected president, surrounds himself with a small group of individuals whose loyalty is as much required as their technical competence. As will be shown, Algeria is no different from its neighbors in this regard. The Boumedienne period (1965-1978) is described as "dominated by a relatively small civil-military oligarchy with remarkably little participation on the part of the masses" (Entelis, 1982:95).

Second, another implication of the size of elites is the establishment of personal linkages which may affect the political behavior of the elites. This proposition is based on the assumption that the smaller the elites the greater their chance of having known each other on a personal basis especially if one takes into account that they were almost all educated before independence, very likely in the same schools and universities and were activists in the nationalist movements. As pointed out by one scholar "in countries where the political community is much broader, politicians may have no personal relations with one another to trouble the purity of their political positions" (Waterbury, 1970:86). In fact the political development in each of the three countries has been characterized more by personal rivalries and personalization
of conflict than by divergence on policies, programs or issues.

**Age of Elites**

Age can be an important element in determining elites characteristics especially if it is considered in conjunction with socialization experiences. It also helps to identify cohorts and generational shifts in elites structure and composition and with these the change in outlook and character. Generally, elites of all three countries reveal similar age patterns with most members in their late forties and early fifties. In his study of the Algerian elites, Hubert found that in 1969 the average birth year was 1923 (Hubert, 1973:94). Hubert studied 91 Algerians who were ministers in the G.P.R.A., ministers under Ben Bella and those under Boumedienne, members of the Political Bureau since independence and members of the National Council of the Revolution (C.N.R.) established by Boumedienne in 1965. (Hubert, 1973:89-90). These men were in their early thirties when the war for liberation started. The armed struggle then represented the occasion for their most important public action. These were also the men who assumed the responsibility of nation-building and establishing political structures once independence was attained.

For Morocco, Berrady, Santucci and Regnier studied 140 Moroccans including all ministers of the governments between 1955 and 1969 and all the political parties' leaders. They found that the average year of birth was 1920. (1973:136). As in Algeria, the Moroccan elite was in its mid-thirties when independence was attained. For the Tunisian elite the estimation of age is given rather in generational terms. The generation between 1920-1934 supplies 62% of the elites over the first 14 years of independence, while less than 30% are born between 1905 and 1919. (Camau, Dubray and Sraieb, 1973:177). The study of the Tunisian elite covered 97 Tunisians who were either members of the Central Committee established in 1964 or the Political Bureau of the Neo-Destour since 1934, and all ministers over the period between 1955 to 1969. (Camau,

Hermassi's point that Tunisia has been the sole society in North Africa in which the generation that achieved independence continued to assume the tasks of nation-building is not true. A similar pattern is found in Morocco and to a lesser degree in Algeria. The active nationalists have been the ones who assumed high positions in government, administration, party and union leadership. It is only in Algeria that relatively significant shifts took place prior to independence. As shown in the previous chapter the men who organized and led the armed struggle (1954-1962) were not the same men who dominated the political scene during the previous decades especially the UDMA and MTLD leaders, but in a similar pattern to both Tunisia and Morocco, those who survived the war actually assumed the nation-building of the new independent state. The case of Ben Bella is the best illustration of both the discontinuity before independence and the continuity after independence.

Again age of elites is crucial because it allows individuals of the same cohort to grow up under overall similar socio-economic and historical conditions and develop a common outlook. Moreover, the age structure of the nationalist leaders actually facilitates the continuity or even perpetuation of the same elites in each of the three countries. Not only were the nationalist leaders better educated than anyone else in society, skilled in political organization but they also were young which could only make it easier for them to maintain their position for a longer period.

Geographic Origins of Elites

In countries where regional differences are clearly set up, and where regionalism is still predominant, the geographic origin variable becomes significant and essential to understanding the relationship between political power and regional support. Equally important in the Maghreb is the fact that
geographic regions are to a great extent made up along ethnic lines. The Berbers have most often been the settlers of the mountains while the Arabs have often settled in the plains and coastal areas. The urban-rural differences are also very pronounced. The Maghreb states are agrarian with over two thirds of their population still living in the countryside and dependent on agriculture. All three countries have a well-established pattern of urban dominance. Education, health, and other basic services have been made available only in larger cities, and it is only recently that rural areas are beginning to obtain some of these facilities. Amin (1970:77) has written that

"The urban community of the Maghreb inherited from the ancient Arab era a profound contempt for the countryside. Whereas the cities were, above all, centers for the courts and for the civil and military authorities, points of learning and religion, they were also centers of craftsmanship, manufacture and commerce".

Given the considerations above, geographic origins can be very meaningful in bringing more insight upon the characteristics of elites. Generally the three countries elites vary in this respect. The Algerian elites tend to come from villages and small towns of the northeastern part of the country; the Moroccan elites in contrast originate in larger cities and finally the Tunisian elites come from Tunis (the capital) and other towns of the Sahel, thus, representing a mixture that is closer to Morocco than to Algeria (Zartman, 1975:497).

Table 4 indicates the places of origin of Algerian elites in regional terms and size of the place as well.

The table shows that almost one third of the elites comes from the region of Constantine primarily from villages, town and small cities. The same pattern applies to other regions. The predominance of villages and small towns in supplying the elites can in part be accounted for by the fact that the colonial regime created a number of new towns in the vicinity of old Muslim cities. These new towns still are influenced by the major city. On the other
THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH DIAGRAMS THAT ARE CROOKED COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE INFORMATION ON THE PAGE. THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.
TABLE 4. Geographic Origins of Algerian Elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Small City</th>
<th>Medium Size City</th>
<th>Large City</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algiers (minus the great Kabylia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine and Aures (minus the little Kabylia)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranie</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabylie (of Algiers and Constantine)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M'ZAB</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Morocco)</td>
<td>(Morocco)</td>
<td>(Tunisia)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Village: less than 3,000 people  
Town: between 3,000 and 15,000  
Small City: between 15,000 and 50,000  
Medium-size City: between 50,000 and 100,000  
Large City: more than 100,000  

Source: Michel Hubert, CRESM, 1973, p. 97.

hand, the establishment of educational facilities in these places along with their proximity to the large city where more educational facilities are available facilitate the upward mobility of Algerians of modest origins. As already noted in the previous chapter the colonial regime attempted to use the ethnic differences to its own advantage. One of the colonial schemes to achieve this goal was to establish educational facilities in the Berber speaking areas earlier than in other areas. This contributed significantly to the rise
of some Kabyle people to elite status. On the other hand the preponderance of Constantine both as a city and as a region throughout most of the history of Algerian nationalism and national politics after independence is because of its old, Islamic character and its strong anti-colonial attitude towards the French. Overall the contribution of villages and small towns in supplying elite elements is rather overwhelming in Algeria.

Morocco, however, reveals the reverse of the pattern found in Algeria. The study of the Moroccan elites by Berrady, Santucci and Regnier (1973) concludes that most elite members originated in larger cities. Before going into the place of origin of Moroccan elites it is important to note that a part of the discrepancy in the assessment of the origin of the elites in one or the other country is a result of the difference in classification of large, middle size, small cities or towns. While for example the study of Algerian elites noted above considers places between 50,000 and 100,000 as medium size cities, the study of Moroccan elites classifies these places as large cities and those with populations between 5,000 and 50,000 as medium cities which are in the former study categorized as small cities.

The predominance of the large city as a supplier of elites in Morocco can be assessed in two other ways. On one hand as noted earlier the few colonial educational facilities were almost exclusively established in old traditional cities of the country which were at the same time the largest in the country such as Fez, Rabat, and Marrakech. On the other hand Fez had the advantage over other cities of having the oldest, traditional, and most prestigious Mosque University in the Maghreb. The new modern educational institutions created by the French only enforced that advantage. Thus it is not surprising that Fez alone supplies 34.5% of the Moroccan elites (Berrady, Santucci and Regnier, 1973:146). Another major feature of the geographic distribution of elites in Morocco is the dominance of elites of urban origins. While the urban
populations represents less than one third of the total population, over 90% of the Moroccan elites originate in urban areas. According to Berrady, Santucci
and Regnier, 93.8% of party leaders and 90.4% of ministers are of urban origins
(1973:147).

Table 5 shows the distribution of elites in terms of size of cities they come from and contribution of both rural and urban areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large Cities*</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium cities</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country side</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Members of governments, (2) Political party leaders,
(3) Total of the Sample.
* 50,000 people and over; medium cities: 5,000 to 50,000.


As previously noted the geographic origins of elites in Tunisia reflects a mixture of both Algerian and Moroccan patterns. Table 6 shows the geographic origins of elites in Tunisia. The table indicates that Tunis and Sousse are overrepresented compared with the rest of the country. Historically, Tunis has always been the political, administrative and cultural center of Tunisia. Therefore it is not surprising that it provides a significant proportion of the elites in government and the party. In this regard it resembles both Constantine in Algeria and Fez in Morocco. The overrepresentation of Sousse is to be understood in the context of the dominance of the Sahel region. Sousse is the most important district in the area. Monastir which is
Table 6. Geographic origins of elites in Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth and family residence</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sousse</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medenine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kairouan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizerte</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabeul</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from M. Camau, G. Dubray, and M. Sraieb, CRESM, 1973, p. 182.

Bourguiba's home town is also located in the area. The contribution of the Sahel to the nationalist movement and to post-independence elites has been reflected in economic planning as well as in generation of political support for the incumbent elite. The conflict between Bourguiba (Sahel) and Ben Youssef (the South) on the eve of independence is one instance where regional differences were raised to the political sphere. Whereas the regional pattern in Tunisia tends to be sharper than in either Morocco or Algeria, the urban-rural pattern clearly manifested in Morocco and almost totally blurred in Algeria loses significance in Tunisia because of the dominance and leading position of both the capital and the Sahel. In general while the three countries' elites reveal great similarities with respect to age and size, they significantly differ from each other in terms of geographic origins of their respective elites particularly Algeria.
Social Class Origins of Elites

It is difficult to determine the social origins of the elites for all three countries on a comparative basis, either because of the lack of information in one of the cases or because of the variability of criteria used in identifying the social rankings of the elites’ origins. In one case only occupational categories are used, in another case a combination of fathers’ occupation, wealth and prestige is employed. The levels of ranking also vary from one case to the other depending on the studies’ conception of the stratification systems.

It is in the case of Algeria that data on social origins is lacking most. This country was the most intensively colonized of the three. The best land was taken from its traditional owners. Wealth, along with most prestigious and rewarding occupations, were mainly controlled by the French. The whole society and within it the traditional stratification system was upset and restructured by colonization. For these reasons it is difficult to conceptualize and thus to operationalize social origins. The available information on social origins of Algerian elites is rather fragmented, imprecise and incomplete. The only indications repeatedly noted in various studies point to the fact that most Algerian elite members come from modest origins with a few among them belonging to privileged well-to-do families. Although from modest origins, Algerians have made their way to the top through educational attainment and nationalist militance.

The mobility through education was made possible in part by the existing system of scholarships for most qualified students on one hand and the parents’ realization of how valuable education was for their children’s future on the other hand. As noted in an earlier chapter, the Algerian workers in France were committed to achieve education for their sons. One scholar further observes that the traditional family solidarity contributed a great deal to the
achievement of this goal because it made possible the gathering of all family members' efforts and support for the benefit of one son whose educational achievement would be beneficial to all (Hubert, 1973:101).

Unlike Algeria, Moroccan traditional structures were kept almost intact. French policy especially during Lyautey's period (1912-1925) was deliberately set up to preserve the existing social structures. The colonization was not as effective in Morocco as it was in Algeria in terms of creating new conditions allowing people from lower origins to achieve higher status. To the extent that it created modern educational facilities it did, but again this was limited by the very nature of the colonial educational policy adopted in Morocco. Access to French schools was not open to everybody. Largely only sons of notables, big merchant families sons and those of Makhzen families (families who have been working in and with the government) had access to the limited educational facilities available. In one study it is noted that "between 1912 and 1954, only 530 Moroccan Muslims passed both sections of the baccalauréat examination, the final hurdle to entry into a French University." (Waterbury, 1970:84). Thus it is no surprise that the sons of these families particularly the commercial families of Fez were the founders and the leaders of the nationalist movement, and once independence was attained they contributed significantly to the elites.

In their attempt to define the social rankings of the elite members families, Berrady, Santucci and Regnier use father's occupation, prestige, reputation, wealth and education. They come up with four levels as follows: upper class, upper-middle-class, middle class and lower class. Based on this classification their major finding is that over half of the elite between 1955 and 1969 came from the upper class, about 16% from the upper-middle-class, 20% from the middle class and only 12% from the lower class of manual workers, fellahin (small peasants) and unskilled employees in the administration
(Serrady, Santucci, and Regnier, 1973:154). In a further combination of both social and geographic origins it is found that 72% of individuals belonging to the upper class and upper-middle-class were born in Fez and Rabat (1973:229). This again confirms the urban dominance and the leading position of the city of Fez noted earlier in this chapter.

In Tunisia the same difficulties of defining the most appropriate ranking system arise. Camau, Dubray and Sraieb have identified 17 occupational categories in order to determine the class level of the elites. It is argued that to the extent that the three categories selected (upper classes, middle classes, and lower classes) regroup occupations whose members have approximately the same educational level and similar level of living, they are legitimate. The major findings of the study indicate that 51% of the elites originate from the upper classes of whom 47% are the product of commercial and landed families, 27% come from middle classes and 21% from the lower classes (Camau, Dubray and Sraieb, 1973:19).

In a similar fashion to the study on Moroccan elites, the study on the Tunisian elites also used a cross-classification of social and geographic origins. Based on this combination it is found that 19% of the elites of upper classes origins came from Tunis, 10.6% from Djerba while the rest 21.5% are from the towns of Sahel especially from Sousse (Camau, Dubray and Sraieb, 1973:19).

**Education and Occupational Training of Elites**

Education is most important of all variables, because it has played a significant role in the rise of elites. Not only was education of most importance in raising the national consciousness and confrontation against the colonial regime but it also reinforced the already distinct status of a small group in society. The importance of education is to be understood
within the context of mostly illiterate populations. In 1960 the level of literacy was 10% in Algeria, 14% in Morocco and 16% in Tunisia (World Development Report, 1980:154-155). It is also important to note that the role of education is relatively more important in Algeria than in the other two countries because of the disparity between the educational achievements and social origins of the elites. As previously noted education has allowed individuals of modest origins to reach higher positions in Algeria. Even in Morocco where there has been a small minority of prestigious and wealthy families, education allowed their sons to become prominent leaders in the country. "An advanced education, while not a requisite to elite membership, is almost a guarantee of access to elite status." (Waterbury, 1970:317).

Once again, the data on the educational background and training of the Algerian elites are less complete than those on the Moroccan and Tunisian elites. In general, according to Hubert's data 39 out of 91 individuals have done higher studies, these were not always completed because a number of students at the time had to give up their studies and join the armed struggle which started in 1954. Fourteen out of the 39 who had done university studies majored in law and political economy. Another 14 studied medicine and pharmacy while the rest were in engineering and sciences. One third of this group did their studies in France. Eighteen persons had received secondary education, 12 achieved elementary education and for the rest of the level of education or the kind of training received are unknown (Hubert, 1974:100-101).

Based on their study of the Moroccan elites, Berrady, Santucci and Regnier conclude that the major feature found in Morocco is that 90% of the elites received higher education whereas the large majority of the population was illiterate. Furthermore it is also found that 15% of this proportion had two or even three degrees. The other major finding of the study is the predominance of modern French education. This type prevailed in 69 out of 74 cases
at the secondary level and 78 out of 90 at the higher level. (Berrady, Santucci and Regnier, 1973:163). In terms of fields of study the highest proportion graduated in law, that is 35 out of 80 individuals, 16 in arts, 11 in medicine and 5 in basic sciences. Most of these degrees were obtained in France (Berrady, Santucci and Regnier, 1973:164). In Tunisia it is found that 77 out of 97 individuals achieved higher education, of which 50 got their degrees in France. Ninety-two out of 97 had secondary education of which about 60% received their education in College Sadiki (Camau, Dubray and Regnier, 1973:174). Like their counterparts in Morocco most Tunisian degree holders were trained to be lawyers and teachers. Generally, studies of law, education and administration trained people for the work of politics and government and nationalism provided an excellent opportunity for application.

Entry into Politics of Elites

In all three countries to varying degrees, most of the men who undertook the tasks of creating political structures and state building after independence entered political life as young men during the pre-independence period. As already noted, nationalist activism of one form or another has been fundamental to elite status. In Algeria there have been four political arenas in which the leaders of the independent state gained experience and skill, one of these was the continuum of working class organizations led by Messali Hadj (ENA, PPA, MTLD, and OS). The second, although it produced only a few individuals who continued after independence, was the AML-UDMA organizations led by Ferhat Abbas. The third most important context that actually ensured continuity after independence was the FLN. FLN leaders and members were indeed the political force that led Algeria through the first years of independence. Equally important was the armed struggle itself which allowed the rise of a group of people whose first entry into politics was through their direct
engagement in the war of liberation.

Similarly, nationalist militance has been the predominant way of entry into politics in Morocco. But in the absence of a long armed struggle, the insertion into politics was essentially made in the form of partisanship and affiliation to various representative institutions. Even after independence these forms remained important ways to higher positions. In Tunisia, the affiliation and militance within the Neo Destour before independence guaranteed access to authority, for the work within the party was equated with nationalism. Since independence the authority of the party has been unrivaled. Nationalist militance was associated with high educational levels during the colonial period. During the early years of independence nationalist leaders assumed positions of leadership primarily because of their past contribution to independence. Later on emphasis was put on technical competence. As observed by Zartman ---"in all three countries the decline of the political function and of the party and the rise of technicians appear in the entry of a growing percentage of the elites directly into politics through a ministerial portfolio" (Zartman, 1975:497).

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted, considering the data available, to sort out the various characteristics of the three countries' elites for the purpose of bringing more insight into the investigation of political development of the post colonial states. Comparatively the three countries' elites tend to be similar with respect to age and size. But they vary significantly in terms of dominant patterns of geographic distribution and social origins, particularly Algeria from the other two. In fact Morocco and Algeria represent two extremes of the spectrum. Whereas the upper and upper middle classes of the urban community provide most of the elites in Morocco, in Algeria the large supply comes from middle and lower classes of villages and small towns.
Tunisia stands in a middle position between Algeria and Morocco in that one half of the elite was supplied by well-to-do families of Tunis and the Sahel towns, the other half by middle and lower classes of the same region plus other areas in the country. These differences, as noted earlier, can be accounted for by the extent and duration of colonization in each of the three states.

Finally education also reveals a certain degree of disparity once again between Algeria on one hand and Morocco and Tunisia on the other. Whereas in both Tunisia and Morocco about five-sixths of the elite appear to have achieved higher levels of education, in Algeria those with higher education make about 50% of the elite. However, while this disparity exists, it appears that there is a great similarity in the distribution of those who have higher education along social origins lines. In all three countries those with higher education are generally from privileged backgrounds. In Tunisia for example only 11 out of the 77 who have university education are from modest origins. In Algeria only 4 out of 33 who have similar education are from modest origins. (Berrady et al., 1973:234). This association between the level of achieved education and socio-economic background affirms the elitist function of education in the Maghreb countries while the disparity in educational levels reflects the various educational policies adopted by the French in each of the three countries.

To conclude the elites in all three countries are to a great extent the product of privileged socio-economic backgrounds (although less so in the case of Algeria), modern educational facilities and nationalist movements. The elites are indirectly the product of underdeveloped agrarian societies affected by the introduction of a modern colonial economy that is based on large-scale commercialization and export within a small agricultural sector. Since independence the elites have had to face the problem of development in all its rigor
and all its aspects. Political institutions had to be created, the state had to be built, the economy had to be rebuilt and to a large extent corrected, and finally the whole society in the Maghreb had to be renewed so it could be more viable for all of its members.
Chapter Five

POLITICAL STRUCTURES

The most striking feature of political structures in the post-colonial African states is the general tendency toward the establishment and consolidation of single-party or one-party dominant political systems (Coleman and Rosberg (1964), LaPalombara and Weiner (1966), Wallerstein (1966) and Zartman 1973). Coleman and Rosberg state that "all but few of Tropical Africa's new states have single-party political systems, or systems where one party is dominant, and everywhere the trend is toward the establishment of one or the other of these two types." (1964:4). It is argued that the most important causes of this trend are: (1) The situation party leaders confronted at independence; (2) supportive or predisposing elements in traditional African Society; (3) various aspects of the colonial legacy; and (4) the political culture of the new African elites" (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:655).

The theorists of the one party syndrome suggest that the political culture of the elites is probably the determinant element in this trend although the contributions of other factors are essential preconditions (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:661-662). The three common, interrelated and mutually reinforcing elements constituting this culture are elitism, statism and nationalism. Elitism is expressed in the leaders' self-image and perception of their roles in the political system, their claim to leadership because of their educational achievement in mostly illiterate populations and their ability to face the challenges of nation-building. Elitism in Coleman and Rosberg's words "has furthered the one party tendency, because it carries the implicit presumption that the governing group possesses a monopoly of wisdom and legitimacy." (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:662).

Statism reflects the socialization of the leaders within societal frameworks in which the state is the predominant element. Although inherited from
the colonial regime it is preserved because it could be used as an instrument for modernization. Furthermore statism has resulted from the Marxist influences on the African elites. Finally, nationalism of the elites indicates the leaders' commitment to "national unity as the Supreme value and goal" (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:663).

It is also argued in this theory that the one party syndrome experienced in most African new states is not the final stage in the political development of these countries. In fact it is explicitly stated that "the triumph of one party rule, the emergence of the dominant party as the political center of gravity immediately after independence may prove to be no more than a transitional phenomenon" (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:672). The leading factors for the transitional character of the single party or one party dominant political system are

"(1) the ideological and structural vulnerability of the single-party under the radically altered circumstances created by independence; (2) the strain toward primacy and autonomy of the formal institutions of government; and (3) changes in the social structure brought about by the modernization processes launched or accelerated by independence statehood" (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:672).

Borrowing from Coleman and Rosberg's work, Zartman develops his thesis of the single-party system as a natural but temporary stage in political development (Zartman, 1973:247). This scholar uses his model in his argument that Moroccan multi-party system is typical only in the sense that pluralism has occurred more rapidly than in other new states.

Using the one-party syndrome model of political development as guideline, the main concern of this chapter is to examine to what extent the three Maghreb countries treated as empirical-historical cases fit the model. This requires following in some detail the establishment of the political structures in each of the three countries with emphasis on the position political parties hold in
the system and also the contribution of the elites in this establishment.

Algeria: The No-party State and Army Rule

When Algeria obtained its independence on July 1962, it was in a chaotic state. The 8 years of armed struggle finished what colonial rule had started some 130 years earlier. Brace states that "by the time the cease-fire was called in March, 1962, the Algerians counted one million dead, two million in regroupment camps inside the country and 300,000 refugees in neighboring countries". (Brace, 1965:124). The landless, homeless and unemployed were countless. At the time of independence, roughly half the Algerian population was unemployed.

The literature is full of descriptions of the effects both the colonization and the war had on the Algerian people. Fanon (1966), Bourdieu (1962), Berque (1967) among others provide profound anthropological analyses of the Algerians' painful experience during the colonization and war periods. Added to the human and social costs to Algerian society, the economic cost was also severe. The Algerian economy was extremely damaged by the war and also by the departure of hundreds of thousands of Europeans whose knowledge and skills in business and agriculture Algeria was dependent on. Had it not been for the international assistance and foreign aid during this period, the restoration of the Algerian economy would have been much more difficult to achieve.

However, more important than the socio-economic problems of the newly independent state, was the political crisis that arose at the time of independence. We have already seen that the FLN was made up of various political factions that were held together only by the shared drive for independence and the confrontation against a common enemy. The fulfillment of this drive and absence of a common enemy resulted in the resurgence of previous divisions and conflicts. Zartman states that "colonial opposition welded the nationalist
movement into a united or unified organization, for if it were not the colonial government could keep it weak by playing on its internal divisions" (Zartman, 1973:246). The release of the four leaders after 6 years in jail aggravated the tension between the ALN (Army) and the GPRA (Provisional Government).

The Tripoli program and the political crisis

In early June 1962 the FLN called a meeting in Tripoli-Libya in order to draw up a program for the future independent state and to form a Political Bureau whose job would be the preparation of the elections for the future Assembly. Indeed a program was presented and adopted. The men who drafted the program seemed to receive Ben Bella's assistance and support. Lazreg observes that it is claimed that the program was drafted under Ben Bella's direction (Lazreg, 1976:73).

The program defined the economic orientation of the country within a socialist framework. Quandt says that "the authors of the Tripoli Program foresaw a state subscribing to socialist principles, in which the large means of production would be collectivised and rational planning would be introduced" (Quandt, 1969:166). Agrarian reform and nationalization of major components of the economy such as credit, mineral and energy resources, foreign trade were considered in the program (Lewis, 1966:166). The program was also concerned with improvements in the fields of education, health and all kinds of services that would improve the living conditions of the Algerian people. The Algerian elites as previously noted grew up under colonial conditions that not only were resented but were violently rejected. Originating themselves from relatively modest strata, the elites identified themselves with the peasants and workers. As a result the elites expressed concern with the renewal of society by establishing economic structures that break away from the colonial model. Simultaneously the program explicitly assigned the leadership to the FLN.
The latter was defined as the sponsor of policy and guidance for the state (Lewis, 1966:166).

Apart from the unanimous consensus on the economic and political orientations of the future state put rather in general terms, no agreement could be reached upon the crucial issue of forming the Political Bureau. The lack of consensus on this particular issue can be accounted for by three elements. One was the fact that all members of the elite considered themselves as legitimate contenders for power and that each deserved to be in position of authority since all contributed in one way or another to independence. The second element was the manifested intra-elite conflict resulting from the heterogeneous character and personal rivalries within the elite structure. The third element was that institutions and organizations available at the time of independence were created under most repressive colonial conditions or under severe war circumstances, thus, their viability after independence was called into question. The ALN (Army) viewed the GPRA (Provisional Government) as a temporary organization whose function after independence was obsolete. Further "the ALN refused to accept the GPRA as more than an agent of the CNRA (National Council of the Algerian Revolution)" (Brace, 1965:155). On the other hand the GPRA declared publicly the counter-revolutionary character of the ALN General staff then headed by Boumedienne and even dismissed him. Although the struggle for power crystallized on the conflict between the ALN and GPRA, actually there were other political forces which rallied to either one or remained neutral.

Ben Bella's unparalleled contribution to the armed struggle especially during the early stages of organization and planning, gained him some popularity and support but not enough to neutralize or absorb all other groups. On the other hand the army was strong and well-organized, but lacke both the popularity and the support, especially because it contribution to the war had
been rather limited, thanks to the French military control of the borders.

Therefore, the Tripoli meeting, although it was able to provide general guidelines for the future, failed to resolve the issue of the Political Bureau. Many CNRA members walked out from the meeting. All this was taking place while independence was not yet formally declared. It was July 1, 1962 that the referendum for independence was held.

"Independence simply unleashed all of the intrinsically fissiparous forces which had been accommodated within the FLN. There rapidly emerged divisions between existing leaders such as Ben Khedda (the president of the GPRA) and founding fathers (Ben Bella, Khider, Bitat and Ahmed whose contribution to independence was their planning and organization of the revolution plus their 6 years confinement in French prisons), the wilaya commanders and the external army" (Lewis, 1966:155).

Quandt goes further as to suggest that by 1962 the FLN contained within its loose structure at least ten relatively independent centers of authority (Quandt, 1969:167).

The GPRA's decision to dissolve the General Staff resulted in developing an anti-GPRA coalition which brought Ben Bella closer to Boumedienne. One could argue that the GPRA's opposition to the formation of the Political Bureau was stimulated by its leader's drive to perpetuate the institution as a national political organization after independence. The formation of a political Bureau meant the GPRA's undoing. Lazreg argues that the tension between the social categories to which the two groups belonged. While the GPRA represented the well off, educated social category intent on using independence to establish and consolidate its power the Ben Bella group stood for the less educated and the peasants (Lazreg, 1976:76-77).

The conflict over the Political Bureau almost developed into a civil war in which Algerians fired on Algerians. As previously noted in an earlier chapter, the external army was spared the loss of its equipment and the
exhaustion of its men since it was cut off from the battle fields inside Algeria by the French electrified barriers on the borders. Thus with the support of this same army, "Ben Bella marched on Algiers after defeating two wilayas and convincing the other two to join him" (Lazreg, 1976:73). Finally Ben Bella succeeded in establishing his authority by neutralizing the opposing forces. Ben Bella then announced the Political Bureau whose members shared Ben Bella's vision of the Algerian State. According to Quandt, all the members were all long-time nationalists, some of them were involved in the Organization speciale, and some of them were either CRUA members of wilaya leaders during the war (Quandt, 1969:209). Ben Bella also provided the electoral list for the National Assembly of which the elections were held on September, 1962. The National Assembly also was formed of exclusively FLN candidates. Ben Bella as premier was authorized by the assembly to form the first government of independent Algeria.

It appeared that while the Political Bureau members were primarily chosen because of their contribution to the Algerian war of liberation, the members of cabinet were to a great extent recruited because of their education and their technical competence. Lazreg notes that 11 out of 19 members of the first cabinet had college education (Lazreg, 1976:79). Even Quandt who argues that the composition of the cabinet reflected the diversity of support Ben Bella received from major political groups, recognizes that the ministers were generally better educated and more likely to have practiced liberal professions. The ministers, more than the members of the Political Bureau tended to be selected according to criteria of technical competence. (Quandt, 1969:209-210). As the summer crisis was resolved, it became clear that the one party-system was the political alternative adopted in independent Algeria. Later on the constitution legitimized the one-party system in Algeria.
Between the Summer of 1962, and that of 1963 when the constitution was approved, three men, or what Lewis called the "ruling Troika" (Lewis, 1966:167), dominated the political scene in Algeria. These were Boumedienne as head of the Army General staff and minister of defense, Khider as the party secretary general and Ben Bella as Premier. These three men disagreed on crucial issues, namely the form of the party and the role of the army in politics. While Khider called for the enlargement of the party's authority and withdrawal of the army from politics (Quandt, 1969:211) Boumedienne insisted on the army's involvement in the country's politics. Ben Bella called for the reinforcement of the State's authority. The divergence in the three men's views resulted in the resignation of Khider from the party. Ben Bella himself assumed the party position after Khider's resignation. In addition there were more political casualties. A number of prominent revolutionaries and politicians began to express strong criticism of Ben Bella's style and government. Some of them resigned their seats in the Assembly, Political Bureau and government to join the opposition. Others simply left politics. At the end of the summer Abbas also resigned as head of the Assembly. One scholar observes that "one by one each of Ben Bella erstwhile backers were pushed from the center of the political stage" (Lewis, 1966:167). As this occurred, only two major figures remained, Ben Bella and Boumedienne. The latter's influence was rapidly increased and consolidated especially that he reorganized, unified and trained an army that was loyal to him. After independence the army assumed the name of ANP (Armée Nationale Populaire).

Constitution making under Ben Bella

Meanwhile the constitution still was in the making. Later in the Summer a draft of the constitution was made by the Political Bureau and presented to the Assembly on August 28, 1963. On September 8, 1963 a nationwide referendum
approved the constitution by 97% of the votes. However, despite this wide approval, the constitution was questioned and opposed at the top of the power structure. Three major features led to the rise of this opposition. One was the fact that the Assembly was not consulted when the draft of the constitution was made. A second one related to the provisions the constitution granted to the FLN. The third feature was the powers granted to the president.

The critics of the constitution argued that the FLN was not yet a viable political party, it emerged as a front for nationalist purposes, thus it needed organizational restructuring before it could assume control of Algerian politics. Moreover the Political Bureau which was the party's high command consisted of three men after Khider's resignation (Quandt, 1969:193). Many of these opponents further brought up the legal aspect of the party. In their view, the party had no legal existence prior to the constitution, thus, "When voting on the constitution no one knew what the Party would in fact be like" (quoted in Quandt, 1969:218).

Nevertheless the constitution legitimized the one party-system in Algeria. The FLN was enforced as the principal source of authority. The FLN would define the nation's policy, control and Assembly and the government, elect the president and inspire the action of the state (Brace, 1965:160; Quandt, 1969:218; Lewis, 1966:166-167). The constitution also institionalized the concentrated power Ben Bella had already established during his first year of rule. Soon after the approval of the constitution Ben Bella was designated as the party's presidential candidate. This nomination was endorsed in a nationwide referendum on September 19, 1963.

Thus within one year period following the declaration of independence, Algeria established political structures of her own. The newly independent state constituted an Assembly, a government, a party, a constitution and a
president. Ben Bella seemed to be the most active element in this governing establishment. One scholar observes that "during his three years in power, from independence until he was toppled by Boumedienne's military coup in June 1965, President Ben Bella succeeded in creating the institutions for governing the country, and restored some measure of internal order" (Younger, 1977:113). In the process, however, Ben Bella alienated many members of the elites who previously worked very closely with him. Ben Bella tried to reduce the intra-elite conflict and divisiveness among actual and potential centers of power in Algeria. In so doing he directly and indirectly excluded most prominent elite elements and opened the party to opportunism and greater disorganization.

As Ben Bella's assumption of power became formalized, a new cabinet was formed. The new cabinet, more than the first one, reflected Ben Bella's alliance with the Army. Four men known to be Boumedienne's friends and protégés were given ministerial posts in the cabinet. Two significant consequences emerged. On one hand the opposition already in existence became more and more pronounced. Earlier it was expressed in the formation of an oppositional party named the FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes) particularly among the Kabyle leaders. Then the opposition tended to be expressed in occasional violent uprisings against the established regime. On the other hand Ben Bella under the circumstances was forced to rely more on the military.

The 1964 party congress revealed the symbiosis of the Ben Bella—Boumedienne alliance. Ben Bella directed his efforts to free himself from the dependence on the army. He attempted to introduce changes in the staff, regain some of the opposition to his side and further the idea of forming popular militias which might offset Boumedienne's monopoly over the army, was suggested. On the other side Boumedienne declared his opposition to such maneuvers by Ben Bella. Following the Congress, new Political Bureau and
Central Committee of the FLN were formed. The compromises reached at the Congress were drafted in the Charte d' Alger. Most important of all, the Charte "contained the most complete doctrinal statement of Algerian Socialism to date, falling short of a clear-cut affirmation of scientific socialism by stressing Algeria's Arabic-Islamic past." (Quandt, 1969:225). The definition of Algerian socialism was debated at the congress, and like many other issues it was at the origin of a dispute between Ben Bella and Boumedienne. While Ben Bella tended to define socialism within a Marxist framework, Boumedienne supported by the Ulama argued for an Algerian socialism within which the Arab-Islamic roots of Algerian society could be preserved. It turned out that the Charte was more in favor in Boumedienne's model than that of Ben Bella. With respect to the position of both the party and army it appeared that "the role of FLN as supreme authority in Algeria was strongly asserted in the Charte, and the army was formally subordinated to the FLN. Popular militias were to be formed but the army would be able to control them in time of war" (Quandt, 1969: 225).

The military in power

During the early years of independence, each summer seemed to witness a political crisis in Algeria. The summer of 1965 above them all marked a turning point in the center of power in the country. On June 19, 1965, Boumedienne surprisingly overthrew Ben Bella's regime. The military coup by Boumedienne was explained and justified by a variety of reasons. Among these were Ben Bella's "cult of personality", his interest in Algeria's position in the world and foreign policy and neglect of the country's growing economic problems. As Boumedienne took over the country's command, he declared that his interest was not to radically change goals and policies but rather transform the political practices and political structures. Immediately after
the coup, the Assembly and constitution established under Ben Bella were suspended. The Political Bureau of the FLN was also disbanded. Instead a Council of the Revolution was formed as the major institution of authority in the country. The Council of Revolution was predominantly composed of military leaders during the Algerian war. Quandt suggests that the Council included among others, a group of five or six members known as the Oujda group who were Boumedienne's closest friends (Quandt, 1969:242).

Added to the Council of Revolution, a Council of ministers was formed. This Council was composed of new recruits as well as some of the ministers who served in Ben Bella's various cabinets. The new recruits, however, tended to be younger and better educated.

Furthermore the party was restructured. Its role was also redefined. As previously noted the role of the party was ambiguously stated. When the party was headed by Khider, Ben Bella called for subordination of the party to the state, but when Ben Bella became secretary general of the party after Khider's resignation, the party was to direct and control the state. For Boumedienne, "the FLN will be a dynamic, avantgarde revolutionary party, functioning according to the rules of democratic centralism, and consisting of tested militants. Its task will be that of orienting, animating and supervising but not that of administering or substituting itself for the state" (Quoted in Quant, 1969:249).

In fact the party structure was changed, the Political Bureau was replaced by an Executive Committee whose task was "to formulate plans for the reorganization of the party, pave the way for elections for a new party leadership and plan a second party congress" (Lewis, 1966:172). But what actually happened was that the military seizure of power resulted in speeding the political decline and institutional weakness of the party itself. Huntington argues that although the military officers are usually modernizers par excellence, they
frequently are indifferent or hostile to the needs of political institution-building (Huntington, 1965:423).

Thus apart from the Executive Committee of the FLN, the Council of ministers and the council of revolution, all other political institutions were held in abeyance for over a decade. And while it is officially claimed that the FLN is the Avant-garde party in the Country, the party was actually a facade for military rule. As one scholar puts it, "The FLN and other national institutions were allowed to atrophy in order that Boumedienne's vision of a strong, secure, centralized government could evolve free of the challenge that such organizations could present" (Entelis, 1980:107). Indeed, the only elections that took place during the first decade of Boumedienne's rule were communal and provincial elections. The mid-1970's, however, marked the return to institutional politics when Boumedienne on his tenth anniversary of accession to power (June 1965) announced that election for the presidency, national Assembly and constitution would be held the following year (Younger, 1977:118). Indeed, 1976 witnessed nationwide referendums for the constitution, the Algerian National Charter, and later on that year Boumedienne was overwhelmingly elected president after 11 years of governing the Algeria.

Morocco: The monarchy and the multi-party system

The Protectorate in Morocco had relatively significant effects on the social and economic structures of the traditional society. On the political structures the effects were rather minimal, meaning that the protectorate has been ineffective and unable to undermine the traditional authority of the Sultan as a spiritual-religious leader in a predominantly Muslim community although it succeeded in restricting his secular power. Moreover it appears that colonization had rather consolidated the traditional authority and popularity of the Sultan.
Contrary to what happened in Tunisia and other countries such as Egypt "where traditional authority lost influence and legitimacy during the colonial period and eclipsed after independence, the monarchy was enforced and thus remained the only legitimate institution capable of uniting city and countryside, Arab and Berber after independence" (Tessler, 1981:4). One hand the forced exile by the French in 1953 made the Sultan the symbol of Moroccan nationalism. The exile of the Sultan resulted in rallying both the masses and nationalist leaders to him. The Sultan became "a martyr and a saint" (Brace, 1965:94) in the eyes of many Moroccans who strongly believed in seeing his image in the moon. In his absence, prayers in the mosques were made in his name and when the French attempted to stop them, the Muslims abandoned going to the mosques and continued praying at home. In 1954, the French writer Francois Mauriac noted that

"Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef (full name of the Sultan) was never stronger than he is today. We are more dependent on him than he is on us. We only hold his body captive; but he holds the spirit and heart of the millions of Moroccans who, a fact without a precedence, go so far as to refuse to pray, since they are forbidden to pray in his name" (Quoted in Brace, 1965:94).

Mohammed V's Rule

When in 1955 Mohammed V returned from exile, his popularity and prestige were immense and his sovereignty unquestioned. Nationlist leaders announced their allegiance to the Sultan and publicly acknowledge his leadership and authority as the legitimate spokesman for the nation. As previously noted within one year after the return from exile, Morocco was formally declared an independent state.

In contrast to Algeria at the time of independence when all tensions and intra-elite conflicts returned to the surface, and where an institutional vacuum prevailed, Morocco enjoyed a relatively high degree of national unity
and greater homogeneity within the elites. The Istiqlal, then the most organized nationalist party and whose contribution to independence was recognized by all political forces, attempted to gain recruits all over the country and within most organizations. The Istiqlal aimed at installing a single party system in Morocco. But the Istiqlal scheme of single party of the Tunisian type was countered by the Monarchy's desire to retain control of the political System. Mohammed V himself assumed the task of establishing the first council of ministers and Consultative Assembly. The appeal to one single party system in Morocco was restrained because it could endanger the monarch's power and legitimacy, as it did in Tunisia, where the Neo-Destour and Bourguiba were able to overthrow the monarchy. Pluralism in Morocco was the best and perhaps the only way to prevent the development of any strong political force that might rival the monarchy. The latter further encouraged the continued existence of other political parties although not as well organized as the Istiqlal and ensured their presence in the first cabinet and Assembly. In 1958 the Istiqlal was able to control the government through assuming almost all key positions. But this hegemony was shortlived because at the end of the same year the Istiqlal split. The left wing of the party was instituted under the name of UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces). Not only did the split undermine the unity and strength of the Istiqlal but it aggravated the conflict between the two wings to the point of handicapping the functioning of the cabinet. Meanwhile the rural-based Popular Movement (MP) established after independence revealed greater support and loyalty to the King and opposition to the Istiqlal whose basis of support was the urban well-to-do elements especially the merchant class from Fez. The rise of the Popular Movement provided an opportunity for rural and Berber leaders to become participants in the national political system. Their loyalty to the palace ensured
their protection against the better-educated, urban nationalist leaders whose claim to authority was based on their significant contribution to the achievement of independence. By rallying to the palace the rural notables also ensured the protection of their interests and their pre-eminent position in their respective home areas (Tessler, 1981:5).

The split in the Istiqlal, the rise of UNFP and MP nourished tensions and conflicts, consolidated a situation of fragmented politics from which the monarchy was the only beneficiary. In 1960 Mohammed V in response to the existing political situation, dismissed the government that was dominated by UNFP elements who had rather radical views particularly on economic issues. They called for agrarian reform, nationalization and improvement of the living conditions of the working class. The King himself assumed direct control of the government as premier, with his son Crown Prince Moulay Hassan as Vice premier.

Four years passed since independence and a constitution was not yet adopted. At the suggestion of the UNFP of a nationally elected constitutional assembly that would draft the constitution, Mohammed V instead appointed a constitutional council composed of predominantly Istiqlal members. The UNFP openly attacked the council and criticized its composition on the basis that it was not representative of the nation. Mohammed V died unexpectedly in 1961.

Hassan II's Rule

Upon this succession to power King Hassan, to the extent that he desired to establish the constitutional monarchy his father was preparing for, followed his father's steps. But to the extent that he was young and educated in the French schools at home and abroad, he differed from his father in his drive "to assume an activist political posture and involve himself directly in the
running of the country" (Tessler, 1981:5). Since the constitutional council which was supposed to draw up the constitution was the focus of conflict and tension between the UNFP and the monarchy, King Hassan resorted to a small group of foreign legal advisers and himself to do the job (Area Handbook for Morocco, 1965:187). Despite the UNFP opposition to the way the constitution was drafted, the constitution was ratified in a nationwide referendum on December 1962. The results were overwhelming: 95% of over 4 million and half voters were in favor of the constitution.

The constitution defines the Moroccan country as a Muslim state whose form of government is a social and democratic constitutional monarchy. The constitution forbids the single party system and calls for a representative government. What is important is that all provisions are open to revision except those institutionalizing Islam as the religion of the state and the monarchy. The following year parliamentary elections were held. Various parties provided candidates for the elections. Moreover, parties were created for the sake of participation and most probably the weakening of the opposition. The FDIC (Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions) for example came into being in the spring 1963 a few months before the elections.

The first year of the parliamentary experiment was successful in terms of open political dialogue between parties, and between the house of representatives and government. However, the second year witnessed increased tensions between different elements and contestation from the opposition. Two major elements contributed to the explosion of these tensions. First, in March 1965 Casablanca broke out in riots initiated by hundreds of secondary school students protesting against certain government educational policies, then joined by young unemployed in the streets leading to the intervention not only of the police but that of the army. Second, the parliament showed a
great lack of efficiency and goal-orientation. During the two and half years it existed, it could pass only a few bills. In June 1965, the King declared a state of emergency, suspended the parliament and constitution as well. The declaration of the state of emergency meant the effective-personal control of politics and government by the King.

The five years between 1965 and 1970 were marked by political immobility similar to that experienced in Algeria after Boumedienne's military coup in 1965. Both Boumedienne and King Hassan ruled their respective countries while no constitution was in effect. During this period criticism of the government practices and policies had grown immensely. The number of strikes among students and workers, and demonstrations in opposition to the political stagnation increased.

In 1970 political life was resuscitated by the introduction of a new constitution. Once again, the new constitution was opposed. This time the Istiqlal and UNFP joined together to form a common front. By boycotting the elections for the House of Representatives they allowed a landslide election of Independents. The formed Assembly although elected, "could not persuasively present itself as representative national institution." (Tessler, 1981:7).

Both the constitution and Assembly collapsed when a military coup was attempted against the King on July 10, 1971. A third constitution was introduced in March 1972. This constitution is still in effect although a second military coup was directed at the King on 16 August, 1972 and despite the UNFP and Istiqlal refusal to participate in a government of which the constitution only institutionalizes the King's power. Because of the continued political unrest and the rise of the Sahara question the parliamentary elections were postponed for five years. Local and provincial elections were held on November 1976 and the national elections were held the following year. These elections marked the return to the constitutional monarchy and
parliamentary rule. One scholar observes that these elections were "an impressive achievement in view of the situation a few years earlier and that most observers were impressed by the comparative honesty of the balloting." (Tessler, 1981:8).

**Tunisia: Bourguiba and one party hegemony**

Tunisia's political life at the time of independence was dominated by the Neo-Destour. Like the Moroccan Istiqlal, the Neo-Destour's leadership of the nationalist movement is undeniable, but unlike the Istiqlal the Tunisian party, although elite-led-party, was effective in mass mobilization. According to one scholar's assessment "The Neo-Destour is the only mass party of its kind in the Arab world." (Moore, 1962:461). In fact by 1954 the membership of the party was estimated at 106,000, it increased to 325,000 in November, 1955, and by 1957 it numbered 600,000 members (Moore, 1962:467). The significance of these figures should be understood in the context of the number of adult male population in Tunisia at that time, (women membership was hardly significant) which was estimated to be less than on million.

Over the two decades of confrontation and negotiation with France (1934- 1956) the Neo-Destour was able to sharpen its organizational structure. The party was also able to capture most if not all national organizations. According to Moore "The Neo-Destour created or infiltrated a number of organizations that today group workers (UGTT), artisans and shop keepers (UTIC), farmers (UNAT), students (UGET) youth (Neo-Destour Youth), and scouts" (Moore, 1962:462). In the absence of any other representative institution that could compete with the Neo-Destour or overrule its hegemony, this party guaranteed its monopoly of power and eventually prepared for the institutionalization of its dominance once independence was achieved.

Behind the Neo-Destour there was the person of Bourguiba, founder, organizer and leader of the party. Too many Tunisians, Bourguiba had become
the 'everlasting soul of the party" (Ghiles, 1977:343). Bourguiba's powerful position in the party was reflected in the way disagreements with him were resolved. Often those who contradicted Bourguiba's views or decision upon political and economic issues were easily expelled from the party. Two major cases strongly pointed to the unparalleled position Bourguiba held in the party. When in 1955 Ben Youssef attacked Bourguiba's agreement with France on self-autonomy, he was expelled from the party. Again when in 1956 Ben Salah attempted to use the labor union as a national instrument for social and economic development within a socialist framework, he was removed. Thus the two major elements that dominated the political process in Tunisia were the Neo-Destour and Bourguiba. They still dominate Tunisian politics in 1983. 

The hegemony of both Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour was reflected in the composition of the Constituent Assembly elected a few days after the declaration of independence, and where all seats were taken by National Front candidates, all of whom acknowledged allegiance to the Neo-Destour (Entelis, 1980: 132). Bourguiba as premier formed the first government of independent Tunisia in which 16 out of the 17 members were affiliated to the Neo-Destour.

In one of his early speeches as premier, Bourguiba said that "our people have elected their representatives in order to define the form of the state, its prerogatives and its institutions .... The harmony (between men and institutions) can be established only by the abolition of the monarchy and the proclamation of the republic" (Bourguiba, 1957:163-175). Indeed the first public act of the elected assembly was the abolition of the monarchy and election of Bourguiba as a chief of state of the newly established republic. Since the constitution was not yet drafted and national elections have not yet taken place, all public policies and decisions enacted between 1956 and 1959 when the constitution was ratified, were presidential decrees and without legislative review (Entelis, 1980:132).
In 1959 the constitution was drafted and approved by the assembly then ratified by Bourguiba. The first national elections under the constitution were held on November, 1959. The Neo-Destour once again won all seats in the new Assembly and "This it has done at every election since" (Ghiles, 1977:343). Bourguiba was elected president unopposed, winning 99% of the votes. He was reelected in 1964, 1969, and 1974. In his fourth election, Bourguiba was constitutionally made president for life as well as chairman of the party for life. The elections for the national assembly were also held on a five-year interval. In each of these elections, all seats were won by the party, whose name became the Destourian Socialist Party in 1964. Although in the elections held in November 1981 Bourguiba at last allowed other political formations to participate, the results were a total victory for the National Front which represented the party and labor union coalition.

The salient characteristic of the Tunisian political system is the overlap among all major political institutions. As one scholar puts it, "The party and state hierarchies run parallel, with much interchange of personnel between them, and much mutual interplay. One exists in symbiosis with the other: both bureaucracies have overlapping staffs, vaguely differentiated functions, and parallel structures" (Entelis, 1980:164). The extent of this overlap is indicated in Camau, Dubray and Sraieb's study when they state that in 1964 for example about 60 out of 81 individuals who were in office has assumed positions of responsibility within both the state and the party. This feature is the result of the role Bourguiba plays in each of these political institutions, head of the state, commander in chief of the army, head of the dominant party and the political bureau and head of all executive agencies. As pointed out by Entelis "the currently institutional structures in place including the Assembly, the PSD and its Political Bureau and National congress, and the
cabinet are all mere appendages to Bourguiba's system of personal rule with little capacity for independent action or influence." Entelis, 1980:167).

**Conclusion**

In all three states the favorable conditions and causes for the establishment of a one party system as outlined by Coleman and Rosberg were present at independence. In Morocco, however, the monarchy, its traditional authority consolidated by its contribution to the nationalist movement, favored weaker, plural parties. More importantly is the fact that in all three countries, the prevailing conditions at the time of independence were closely linked to the kind of nationalist activity and degrees of colonial tolerance of repression of the nationalist movement in general and party organization in particular.

The nationalist movement in Algeria had to assume a military character in order to pressure the colonial regime to grant the country its independence because other means had proven ineffective (La Palombara and Weiner, 1966:13). The FLN itself had, on one hand, to assume a clandestine and conspirational character, and to accommodate diverging views and groups on the other. All this has affected the attempt to institutionalize and legitimate the position of the FLN in Algerian politics after independence. The legitimacy crisis during the summer of 1962 was tense and difficult to resolve, and the institutional weakness of the party resulted in the Army's seizure of power.

In Tunisia, the nationalist movement was also developed under colonial conditions but these were less repressive and more tolerant in Tunisia than in Algeria. Furthermore, the homogeneity of the Tunisian nationalist elites in terms of shared educational experiences, social and geographic origins plus its grass-roots organizing ability made the Neo-Destour's legitimation at independence easier. All contributed to the established and continued hegemony of the Neo-Destour in Tunisia. Coleman and Rosberg argue that "to the
extent that it preserves a measure of its aura of legitimacy, the party can continue to facilitate the legitimation of the formal institutions and processes of government." (1964:680).

In Morocco, the Istiqlal would have established itself as the dominant party, had it not been for the consolidated traditional authority of the monarchy. In addition the social structures of the Moroccan society are more complex and diverse than those of Tunisia. The dominance of urban-well-to-do-elements in the Istiqlal restricted the party's ability to generate mass-support or mobilize the various social forces in Morocco.

This chapter has also attempted to bring into light that the establishment of political institutions and formalization of political processes does not necessarily mean that the policy of the country is activated and led according to the rules of these political institutions. From the formal institutional point of view the three countries tend to be different. The political role of the army in Algeria, the party-government fusion in Tunisia and the monarchy-multiparty combination in Morocco, all appear to confirm the political differences between the three countries. But despite these differences and beneath them, the three countries display remarkable similarities. Constitutions tend primarily to legitimate the leaders' personal power and only secondarily to regulate the power distribution in the political system.
Chapter Six

CONSOLIDATION AND MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL POWER

Post-colonial politics in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia has involved not only the establishment of new political structures but the consolidation and maintenance of systems of personal power. As seen in the previous chapter, all three countries have established political systems in which the leader, surrounded by a small group of loyal and politically reliable individuals, dominate the political activity. Ben Bella, then Boumedienne and Bendjedid in Algeria, Mohammed V and then Hassan II in Morocco, and Bourguiba in Tunisia have markedly shaped the political development of their respective countries. They have developed political systems in which actual and potential opposition is treated as a threat to the system itself. Consequently the political arena is highly controlled from the top.

The processes of consolidation and maintenance of these personalized systems in the three countries have entailed a variety of mechanisms. These can be classified in three types: (1), overt mechanisms of control leading to elimination of serious opposition and deterrence of potential opponents; (2), patronage and clientelist networks aiming at cooptation and absorption of dissident elements; (3), diffusion of certain themes and ideas justifying and rationalizing the system. The analysis of these three types of activity and, then, the investigation of how successful they are in ensuring political stability and inhibiting dissent constitute the main concern of this chapter.

Coercion and Sanction

This set of measures encompasses direct actions against the opposition. These vary from extreme use of coercion to other forms of punishments and sanctions such as expulsion from office, harassment by the police and imprisonment. The latter are often used in order to prevent emerging oppositional
forces from crystallization or further materialization in the political system. The political history of King Hassan, Boumedienne and Bourguiba indicate the three men's ability to resort to extreme coercion against political rivals or alternate leaders when other means prove ineffective especially during the period of power consolidation. Although there is no clear-cut evidence that the three leaders are personally and directly involved in the elimination of their rivals, there have been cases of ambiguous assassination which cannot be interpreted or made sense of otherwise.

In Algeria the use of coercion and military intervention have been more frequent. Ben Bella came to power through military support and action, Boumedienne took office in 1965 through a military coup, and consolidated his power by eliminating all his rivals. As one scholar indicates, the early years of Boumedienne's rule were "maintained by the use of coercive force or the threat of it" (Entelis, 1982:109). During this period two of the most prominent FLN leaders were assassinated while in exile. Khider was killed in Spain in 1967 and Belkacem Krim was assassinated in Germany in 1971. One scholar goes further as to suggest that "even so called 'natural' and accidental deaths of those fallen from favor are rarely accepted at face value, especially in an environment where even a mild deviation from the narrowly defined norms is reprimanded" (Entelis, 1982:124).

Furthermore, opposition parties were banned and opponents are usually controlled or exiled (Zartman, 1982:10). Neither Ben Bella nor Boumedienne hesitated in punishing and neutralizing their opponents. The suppression of opponents and critics of the regime was greater under Boumedienne. Under the latter's rule, Ben Bella was kept under house arrest until the advent of Bendjdid to power. Abbas, Ben Khedda and a few others were put also under house surveillance in 1976 because of their critique of Boumedienne's national
and foreign policies. Meanwhile most of the men who joined the opposition after the 1965 coup left Algeria and today live in exile. As a result of the suppression and continuing supervision of people and ideas within and outside Algeria, opposition lost significance and effectiveness.

As a response to the way the Algerian press covered Boumedienne's death, a group of Algerians living in France wrote,

"The nature of the regime since 1962 is put under silence, the fact that Ben Bella together with Boumedienne came to power through crushing all resistance, and that Boumedienne's assumption to power was through a military coup are forgotten. Reglements de comptes and eliminations are common practices: Mahroug is secluded in 1976, Cherif Belkacem in 1975, Medeghri assassinated in 1974, Kaid Ahmed in 1972 ... Paradoxically the same press that supports the partisans of democracy in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe denies this same democracy to Algerians who have been struggling for the establishment of democratic liberties in Algeria" (Jeune Afrique #942, January 24, 1979, p. 13).

In Morocco, Mehdi Ben Barka was one of the few men of modest origins who were able to achieve higher education during the colonial era. Ben Barka was a member of the Istiqlal until the 1959 split and the formation of the UNFP of which he became one of the most prominent leaders. In 1963 he was condemned to death twice because of his involvement in the 1963 plot against the King and because of his statements during the border war with Algeria. At the time Ben Barka was living in exile between Geneva, Algiers and the Middle East. In November 1965 Ben Barka was kidnapped in Paris and most probably assassinated by the Moroccan minister of the interior (Zartman, 1973:251).

In Tunisia Salah Ben Youssef was the Neo Destour's number two leader. As much as Bourguiba, Ben Youssef enjoyed enormous popularity and support particularly among the religious conservative groups as well as the urban elements that sympathized with his brand of radical Arab nationalism (Entellis 1980:129-130). Regionally, Ben Youssef's support was crystallized in the south where the resistance was active and where tribesmen and peasants have felt neglected
by the concentration of Neo-Destour policies in the coastal and northern regions (Ashford, 1964:217).

In 1955 Ben Youssef overtly criticized Bourguiba's agreement with France on the autonomy of Tunisia, considering the convention as a backward step that might delay the country's independence. At first Ben Youssef was expelled as general secretary of the party by the political bureau, and then a party congress was called in order to justify the dismissal (Moore, 1970:98). When Ben Youssef and his supporters organized an uprising against the agreement made by Bourguiba, the latter called upon French forces to repress the movement. In January 1956 Ben Youssef, politically and militarily defeated, fled to Libya. In spite of Ben Youssef's defeat and absence, the movement grew as to become a serious threat to Bourguiba's dominance. In 1961, Ben Youssef was assassinated in Germany. When in 1956 Ahmed Ben Salah as secretary general of the labor union (UGTT) attempted to expand the union and called for the decolonization of the Tunisian economy, he was removed from the UGTT. As one scholar observes "This one-man dominance of the elite structure and one-party dominance in politics accurately characterizes the nature of the Tunisian political system. The elites actively cooperate, or risk expulsion, removal from public life, and even imprisonment." (Stone, 1982:153).

As previously noted, the three Maghreb leaders are in the center of politics in their respective countries. As leading elite elements they have been able to achieve a remarkable control of political processes and political actors. It is precisely this control that allows the leaders to set up the political game and the rules according to which it should be played by other members of the elites, those who agree with and support the leaders are highly rewarded and those who do not play by the rules are eliminated or controlled. The cases described above reveal a pattern of political behavior that is similar in all three countries. The hallmarks of the three systems have been
the leader's great control over the political process and subordination of all political actors and even institutions to their will.

However, circulation patterns vary. In Algeria under Boumedienne, there was elite circulation up and circulation out but not circulation back in (cited in Entelis, 1982:125) whereas in both Tunisia and Morocco those who fell out of favor could be reintegrated to position. The present president of Algeria seems to employ patterns similar to those attributed to both Bourguiba and King Hassan. While Bendjdid purged the Political Bureau and Central committee of the FLN of men loyal to Boumedienne and members of the 1965 council of revolution, he released most of those jailed under Boumedienne. He declared amnesty to some of the members of opposition in exile, freed Ben Bella, Abbas and Ben Khedda.

In general arbitrary politics and a drive for personal power characterize all three political systems. As one scholar puts it

"the leaders exercise broadly comparable comprehensive powers in the absence of any effective political opposition. Each leader has to date successfully consolidated power by playing-off competing groups and rival factions, and, if need be eliminating them altogether as threats to his personal power as the cases of Ben Barka of Morocco, Ben Youssef of Tunisia, and Krim Belkacem of Algeria so well demonstrated (all of whom were mysteriously assassinated in Europe)" (Entelis, 1980:64).

Patronage and Clientelism

Coleman and Rosberg argue that "the selective use of patronage to assimilate or control political opposition, or to enlist the support of potentially dissident elements, has been an extremely powerful weapon" (1964: 665). In fact the political systems of the Maghreb are to a great extent maintained by the use of patronage and clientelist networks at the top. There are three interrelated elements for the rise and diffusion of this type of relations in the Maghreb states. One is the static tendency of these societies
which facilitates the growth of patronage within the bureaucracy and administration. Another element involves the unlimited powers of the leaders which help create conditions of subordination of other members of the elites and their dependence on the leaders' favor. A third element is the intimate character of the elites which makes formal rules, procedures and institutions less important.

In all three countries the government is involved in all economic and social programs of national scope. The state sponsors the economic plans, major public works, education, employment and major national resources. But the governmental structures have many deficiencies. The government is highly centralized, bureaucratic operations are unintelligible to the larger segment of society and finally criteria for recruiting high officials and bureaucrats are not always universalistic.

Keeping in mind that over two thirds of the Maghreb states' population still lives in rural areas and is mostly illiterate, the centralization compels the rural people to depend on urban brokers to obtain access to services. It leads also to the emergence of local patrons whose function is to make linkages between rural consumers and urban suppliers. "When government structures", state Lemarchand and Legg, "fail to extend beyond the confines of a relatively narrow perimeter, usually the capital city, and when the scope of governmental activity is equally restricted, no amount of structural differentiation at the center can prevent the development of clientelism on the periphery" (1971-1972: 162).

Furthermore, the majority of people do not know how to get access to available services or do not understand the administrative procedures to obtain services because of illiteracy and because the bureaucratic processes are conducted in French, a language they do not understand. As observed by
one scholar "One form of patronage arises when a modern or semi-modern state operates in an idiom as yet unintelligible to a large part of its population, who then need brokers to obtain benefits or to avoid persecution" (Gellner, 1977:5).

Finally, all three countries faced similar situations at the time of independence. The urgent need to fill the high governmental and bureaucratic positions vacated by the French made formal criteria such as educational qualifications, required training and the like less important than having participated in the struggle for independence. Gellner argues that

"In as far as bureaucrats are selected for their posts by fair and public criteria, are constrained to observe impartial rules, are accountable for what they do, and can be removed from their positions, they are not really patrons, even if they do exercise much power. It is only to the extent to which some or all of these features are lacking, that bureaucracies also become, as indeed they often do, a form of a patronage network" (Gellner, 1977:1).

Clientelism that is embedded in the bureaucracy constitutes a major feature of the Algerian system. One scholar points out that one of the features that characterizes Algeria today is the various manifestations of clientelism (Bruno Etienne, 1977:291). This scholar gives concrete examples of situations where the transactions and inter-relations are based on clientelist networks rather than institutional channels. And since the Algerian elites, for the most part, are founded on their position within the party, the administration and the military, their way of protecting their own positions "is to create links of dependency with aspirant groups through the assertion of blood and clientelist ties. Favors that move both horizontally and vertically in these linkages include state-owned cars, villas, trips abroad, scholarships, administrative short-cuts, etc" (Bruno Etienne, 1977:303-304).
In the same vein another scholar argues that patron-client networks are the basis of politics in Algeria. Junior members seek to attach themselves to a member of the core elite in a relationship that is durable but not permanent and that can be rearranged by shifts in political fortunes or new experiences. The basis of the relationship is found in some element of commonality—region, wartime experience, political experience, common education and, rarely, ideological compatibility (Zartman, 1982:8). Thus contrary to socialist ideology, traditional ways in Algeria have not been eroded, nor have informal networks been replaced by legal-formal procedures. Instead they may have been strengthened by the periods of colonization and armed struggle. That the officially claimed revolution has not prevented the growth of patronage within the Algerian bureaucracy brings Algeria closer to its neighboring countries, particularly Morocco, where the clientelist system is said to be endemic (Waterburg 1966:94-111; 1970; 1973:533-555; Tessler, 1981: 1982:35-91). Tessler argues that personal, family and regional networks in Morocco are primary sources of power and influence while the recourse to formal organizations and institutionalized power occupy a secondary position (Tessler, 1982:63). More importantly is that patronage built in the top of the political system is enjoyed by the surrounding elites. Clientelist groups are developed at the national level with leading members often occupying high governmental positions. As previously seen in the case of Algeria, the government and governmental agencies in Morocco, are themselves sources of private benefits and wealth. Etienne's argument that the Algerian bureaucrat is not rich because he earns a lot, but because he pays nothing: a home, a servant, an automobile, travel, and so forth, are parts of the perquisites of his job (1977:304), applies to the Moroccan bureaucrat.
Finally, "The Tunisian state", in Gellner's terms, "is a machine for the making and unmaking of patrons" (Gellner, 1977:5). Like their counterparts in Algeria and Morocco the elites in Tunisia have learned to be part of Bourguiba's personal entourage (Moore, 1970:105). Clientelist ties with top officials precede institutional rules. On the other hand Bourguiba as much as the King of Morocco, uses his powers of appointment and dismissal to keep opponents off balance and prevent them from becoming autonomous political forces (Moore, 1970:105; Waterbury, 1970:152).

Whereas the distribution of economic rewards and consolidation of clientelist networks are used as means for absorption and cooptation, the continuous rejuvenation of the elite structure by the introduction of new recruits and cabinet shifts perform the same function. As argued by one scholar "A continual rejuvenation of intermediate cadres further prevents crystallization of cliques into factions or interest groups that might present organized alternatives to existing policies or leaders" (Moore, 1970:105).

In brief, to the extent that the leaders of the Maghreb states maintain a central position in the political system along with their unlimited powers, opponents are easily discredited or coopted while the formation of strong challenges becomes extremely difficult. Patrimonial leadership in the Maghreb has been so far successful in stabilizing the political system but at the same time it undermines the institutional character of politics in these countries.

**Ideological rationalization**

In order to consolidate and maintain the established political order the leaders put forward a set of ideas and a rationale for policies and political actions. Although the themes vary from one country to the other the purpose and the function of these remain the same. Boumedienne's neglect of political
institutions is justified by the protection of the revolution and its continuation. In Morocco King Hassan uses the continuing need for territorial integrity and unity to resolve conflict and increase the incorporation of the opposition into the existing regime. Finally Bourguiba puts emphasis on the national cohesiveness and appeals to the Tunisian national unity. The appeals to these themes in the leaders' speeches and writings can be interpreted as the leaders' ideological defense of their policies and behavior. "Like most political ideologies, they serve primarily to rationalize and legitimate a particular state of affairs" (Coleman and Rosberg, 1964:668).

In Algeria the key element of the ideological rationalization of the country's politics is the revolution before and after independence. Every action and every policy is justified by the revolution. Boumedienne's takeover in 1965, the role of the army in politics, the depoliticization of the country and the emphasis on industrialization, all are defended on the basis of revolutionary legitimacy. Boumedienne once said

"The confusion and concentration of power and the liquidation of the revolutionary cadres have turned a policy of docility to a system of government .... But one cannot try with impunity to subjugate an entire nation that has fought and suffered for the triumph of revolutionary principles. That is why the revolutionary outbreak of June 1965 was written in the historical logic of our revolution. In bringing an end to personal power, the Revolutionary Council has reestablished legitimacy" (Boumedienne, 1966 in Zartman, 1973:127-128).

Moreover it is officially claimed that because of the army's identification with the people it has to assume responsibility in the country. Boumedienne's coup, thus, "cannot be called a military coup d' état. All they did was to assume their revolutionary responsibility toward the people" (Boumedienne in Zartman, 1973:217). Politics in the Algerian leadership's
view generates conflict, factionalism, division and distrust and these are counterrevolutionary. Thus the emphasis on establishing a strong state structure, economic development, although at the expense of democratic participation in government, are legitimized by the need for unity and efficiency. The army leadership combined with the state are the only legitimate institutions that can effectively protect the revolution and fulfill its goals. Consequently instead of institutionalizing national organizations, the party and encouraging greater participation, the Algerian leadership institutionalized the revolution and with it the army power. In the process, opponents and politicians are not only viewed with suspicion but are consistently kept away from the political system. However, between the official justification of military control and the reality of spoils and privileges enjoyed by the army, there is a contradiction. The army in Algeria has almost developed into a caste. As one scholar observes, "their expanding elite status, good pay, extensive fringe benefits, and other tangible and nontangible signs of privilege are creating an officer 'caste', with the military in general developing into a preferred and almost separate segment of society" (Entelis, 1982:120).

In Morocco, the justifying themes and ideas vary significantly depending on the political situations and the kind of demands presented by different political parties and social forces in the country. Nevertheless, the idea of territorial integrity and unity has been rather emphasized over the years. Often the idea of reintegrating parts of the country that are still under Spanish occupation, is evoked in times of political turmoil. For example, during the early 1970's, two military coups (1971, 1972) against the King resulted in shaking his reliance upon the army's loyalty and support. Social unrest particularly among students reached the apex during the calendar year 1971-1972. Strikes of high school students went on for over five months. In
1973 the King started the campaign of integration of Moroccan territory under Spanish occupation. The following years were marked by negotiations, requests, and UN hearings on the issue until the idea of the Green March was materialized in the march of 350,000 unarmed volunteers in November 1975.

The Green March reunited all political forces including the opposition parties. In fact various party leaders campaigned for the reintegration of the Sahara both inside and outside the country. One scholar points out that one of the consequences of the Green March was the defusion of the opposition and its cooptation to the service of the regime. (Weiner, 1971:31).

In Tunisia, Bourguiba's ideological rationalization of the party dominance and his personal power include a variety of themes that are emphasized by the leader and to which many scholars refer to as Bourguibism. Bourguiba stresses the absence of class-differences and class-struggle and the unitary nature of Tunisian Society. This emphasis renders competitive politics and parties unnecessary as it serves to justify unipartism in Tunisia.

Bourguiba explicitly expresses his dislike of the term 'class' and criticism of Marxism and his belief in the "collective march of all the social categories of the nation toward common objectives" (Bourguiba, 1966; in Zartman 1973:147). The major elements of Bourguibism are reason, human dignity and human solidarity" (Vandewalle 1980:150). One scholar cites bourguiba's statement that "for us the dignity of man is at stake, we think man is perfectible, and we refuse to believe that there are men who are irremediably bad." (in Entelis, 1980:146).

The diffusion of these ideas and their use for political mobilization are parts of Bourguiba's concern with national unity and his systematic attempt to create grounds for consensus among the governing elites. Yet the resolution of conflict in Tunisia has not always relied on the integrative
function of rhetoric and ideas. The removal of opponents and elimination of rivals are also parts of Bourguiba's political style. In brief, in spite of differences in official claim and legitimacy of the political process, all three states are ruled by small and highly intimate groups where family, regional, and personal ties still play an important role in their incumbency and their status maintenance.

The consolidation and maintenance processes described above have, up to the present, proved effective in suppressing, absorbing dissent and creating relatively stable political systems, albeit few serious attempts to overthrow the existing regimes. One of the reasons of this stability is the intimate character and political experience of the governing elites. As often noted the elites of the Maghreb states have shared origins, educational and political experience in the nationalist movements. The result of this convergence in the elites characteristics is the development of small privileged and homogenous elites that provide leadership in the three countries of the Maghreb. The leaders of the Maghreb are parts of these ingrown and intimate groups. Furthermore the interaction among the elites in all three countries has been based on more than participation in formal politics (Tessler, 1982:64). Intermarriage, personal ties and clientelist networks further enhance the ingrown nature of the elites.

One consequence of the elite structure is its divorce from the rest of society. Even in Algeria where the claim of the revolution in the name of the people is widely disseminated, the elites are as much divorced from the masses as those in the neighboring countries. However, the incumbent elites cannot remain in power forever. New generations of aspirant-elites or would be elites are increasingly taking shape. The increased opportunities for modern education through the national educational facilities established after independence are producing a growing number of highly educated individuals.
Most of these aspire to high positions and elite status. Waterbury states that "The development of significant would-be-elites is a serious threat to the incumbent elites" (Waterbury, 1970:319).

While the incumbent elites have grown up under colonial conditions, knew each other in school or in the party, originated from mostly well-to-do origins, the aspirant elites are larger in number, originate from diverse backgrounds and receive their education in national universities. In their quest of status and power the aspirant elites namely university graduates are faced with an almost closed system. The incumbent elites tend to deny the access of younger elements to their ingrown circles, because if they do, "They would destroy their intimacy and introversion upon which their politics is predicated" (Waterbury, 1970:319). But if they go on restricting the ascendance of new elements they could be thrust aside.

In order to avoid the emergence of counter-elites and resolve the conflict of incumbent versus aspirant elites, the patterns of recruitment must be sufficiently exclusive to maintain the cohesiveness of the elites and coherence of governing institutions, yet sufficiently inclusive in order to neutralize and absorb challengers (Moore, 1970:289).

As previously noted there has been some rejuvenation among the incumbent elites but not enough to offset the growing number of aspirants. As a result complaints against the three systems are increasingly manifested particularly among students. The number of strikes each year, the students attitudes toward the regime and their demands are very significant. In all three countries students are emerging as sources of challenge and opposition.

Entelis, for example, did a study (1974) on ideological change and emerging counter-culture in Tunisian politics in which he characterizes the students as the emerging counter-culture. He studied two samples of Tunisian
students studying at the university of Tunis and the university of Paris. The
first sample consisted of 212 students (147 studying in Paris and 65 in Tunis)
selected because of their academic specialization. The second sample of 96
university students in Paris (n = 46) and Tunis (n = 50), was stratified
according to ideological orientation. (1974:546-547). In reply to the question
of whether or not there has been change in the distribution of power and
influence among the various social groups in Tunisia, 84% of the general sample
and 99% of the ideological sample, felt that there has been either little
change or no change at all. When the students were asked whether or not each
person could express his opinions freely in Tunisia, 78% of the general sample
and 63% of the ideological sample replied that such freedom does not exist.
Finally, when the students were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the
statement that "Tunisia's current political leadership inspires respect, con-
fidence among the masses," 87% of the general sample and 77% of the ideologi-
cal sample answered in the negative. As many as "83% of the sample indicated
that Tunisia's political leaders were either indifferent to the numerous
socio-economic and political problems besetting the state or simply corrupt
and therefore the cause and beneficiaries of the resulting dysfunctionalism"
(Entelis, 1974:551-552).

Tunisia is not the only country of the Maghreb where the students are
unsatisfied and tend to express their dissatisfaction as often as they can.
Both Algeria and Morocco continually experience the same phenomenon.

Conclusion

In the three countries, despite their formal political differences, the
political style of their leaders and their elites are quite similar. Person-
alistic politics takes precedence over formal politics in all three countries.
Opposition is extremely controlled, opponents are either coopted or eliminated, and the patronage system operates in Algeria as much as it does in Morocco. "At all levels of bureaucracy and administration the patronage system still prevails in Algeria" (Entelis, 1982:124). All three systems appear to have built their survival and stability on the basis of a personal system of power rather than institutionalization.

Nevertheless, in recent years the three countries have revealed some signs of political revitalization after decades of personalized power and single-man rule. The return to institutional politics in 1976 and the orderly transfer of power in early 1979 in Algeria are probably indications of a trend toward less personalized power. The 1977 parliamentary experience in Morocco and the last national elections (1981) in Tunisia can be interpreted as manifestations of more mature political patterns. These trends towards institutional politics came about as a response to the interplay between the increasingly manifested political discontent particularly among students and workers and the pressure of the economic situation of the three countries. The stability of the independent Maghreb states depends upon both their political and economic development.
Chapter Seven

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

When the Maghreb states gained their independence, they were not only faced with creating political institutions of their own, but were also faced with a variety of social and economic problems inherited from their subjection to colonial rule. The sudden departure of Europeans deprived the three countries from managerial and technical skills that were most needed. The unstable political conditions cost these countries the outflow of foreign capital upon which their economies were dependent. Agriculture which was and still is at the center of the Maghreb economy was torn between a modern sector suddenly abandoned by those who controlled it and subsistence-traditional sector at the mercy of natural conditions. In their attempt to meet these difficulties, the Maghreb states tried various strategies and methods before the economic deterioration could be stopped and new economic structures established.

In each of the three countries the nature of the elites in power at the time of independence determined the direction of economic development and major economic policy as well. Changes in elites structures resulted in changes in economic strategy. Thus our study of political elites in the Maghreb would be incomplete without an analysis of their role in the politics of economic development. There is little doubt that economic policy and reform are in the last analysis political decisions.

Algerian Socialism

The Algerian nationalist elites, as already shown, grew out of relatively modest origins when compared to their counterparts in both Morocco and Tunisia. The history and make up of the Algerian nationalist movement reflected the significance of this fact. The Messali Hadji's North African
Star which was to become the PPA and later on the MTLD were established and supported by the Algerian working class. Even more, the FLN strength during the war owed a great deal to mass peasant support and collective action. The relationship between the nationalist leadership and the Algerian peasants and workers was thus forged and enforced during the colonial period particularly during the war. Consequently as early as the 1956 FLN Congress the Socialist orientation for the future state was strongly expressed. The Tripoli program, a few weeks before independence, reaffirmed the socialist path of the future. More significant was the consensus of both politician and military segments of the elites upon the socialist line. Even if the elites at the top had envisaged another course, it is probable that some form of socialism would have been imposed upon them from the bottom. When the French abandoned their estates and enterprises the Algerian peasants and workers simply moved into these abandoned lands and enterprises. As one scholar puts it "Algeria's experiment with Socialism began in the agricultural sector when landless laborers spontaneously occupied and started managing the estates abandoned by the departing French colons" (Griffin, 1973:395).

On these abandoned lands and industrial establishments was born the self management sector, which was to become Algeria's dominant form of economic organization. Within months, two decrees were issued as to provide some organizational framework for the functioning of the self-managed farms and entreprizes. On March 1963, Ben Bella's government officially endorsed the new sector as an integral part of the Algerian economy.

Following the endorsement of this spontaneously created sector, another 600,000 hectares of the largest French estates were expropriated by the state and added to the self-managed sector. Later on the same year (1963) the remaining 1 million hectares under French ownership was nationalized. Thus
over 2.6 million hectares of the best-farmed and most fertile land became under state control. From the production stand point "The land was converted almost overnight from a system of colonial production based on private property to socialist production based on worker management" (Griffin, 1973: 398).

The drastic nationalization measures taken by Ben Bella were to a great extent based on political reasoning rather than economic planning. Ben Bella was aware of the departing French and impossibility of replacing them considering the lack of Algerians with managerial and technical skills, thus, providing efficient management of 2.6 million hectares under the circumstances was economically impossible. "Among the 800,000 French who left within a period of six months were most of Algeria's entrepreneurs and technicians" (Hermassi, 1972:196).

But Ben Bella was also aware of the importance of the peasant society in Algeria and the political significance of its contribution to the armed struggle: to disappoint it could cost him his position and power. Therefore, the endorsement of the peasants' take over of the land was hasty and motivated by the search for political support. A number of scholars point to the link between Ben Bella's decision and his political motives (Quandt, 1969:213; Griffin, 1973:398; Lazreg, 1976:92-93).

Once the self managed sector was institutionalized as the socialist sector, it became organized into units. One source gives the figure of 2,151 units (Hermassi, 1972:197) while another source estimates about 3,000 self managed units whose average size approached 1,000 hectares (Griffin, 1973:398). The permanent workers of these units formed assemblies that elected workers' councils which were responsible for the election of management committees. At the national level a number of institutions were created for the purpose
of regulating the operations of the sector. The import and export operations of the sector were handled by the Office National de Commercialization (ONACO). The Office National de la Reforme Agraire (ONRA) was designed to supervise the management committees in the agricultural sector while the Bureau National d'Animation du Sector Socialist supervised self-managed industries. These institutions set production goals, price levels as well as loans and credits, and evaluated the management committees. Moreover these institutions' personnel were state bureaucrats who not only assumed total control of all operations within the sector but who also developed into an administrative elite far removed from the peasants and workers. One scholar suggests that "whatever the rights and responsibilities of the workers' assemblies, councils and committees on paper, in fact the two major movers of the self-management farm appear to be its president and its director." (Smith, 1975:265). The increased control of the state administration over the socialist sector resulted in restricting the workers' participation and raising their resentment against the state intervention which in turn led to the intensification of the difficulties experienced in the sector.

Added to the containment of the socialist sector by the same institutions that were supposed to organize and ensure its efficient functioning, the sector had its own limitations. As noted above, the socialist sector was transplanted on the sector that was previously owned and controlled by the French. In agriculture this meant that the self-managed farms were for the production of wine and citrus fruits. The lack of planning, coordination, managerial skill, increased administrative control over the farmers, plus the lack of incentives among the peasants resulted in the decline of production. It even appeared that the sector became more of a burden on the state than a viable form of economic organization. The salaries received by the sector permanent workers, seasonal workers and particularly the directors and
presidents of the farms absorbed almost all the income they produced, and at times the state had to subsidize them when production could not generate enough income.

More importantly the socialist sector coexisted with a traditional sector which not only represented a greater share in the national economy and supported more people but which was negatively affected by the state concentrated efforts on developing the socialist sector. As Hermassi points out

"Algeria deserves to be blamed less for its state capitalist orientation than for its exclusive preoccupation with the modern farms and its total disregard for traditional agriculture. Though socialized, the modern sector is providing only a minority - one tenth of the estimated employable adult rural population - of workers with high incomes and permanent employment, while the fundamental bifurcation of the economy abandons the rest of the rural society - one half million people to unemployment."

(Hermassi, 1972:199).

In earlier chapter it was pointed out that the French in Algeria took over the best lands. This meant that the bulk of fellahin in the traditional sector lived on less fertile lands. Griffin estimates that over the period 1962-1964 the traditional sector was composed of 630,000 fellahin who eked out a living on some 7,349,000 hectares of infertile and rather badly eroded land. Most of them, approximately 438,000 - had holdings of less than ten hectares. In any given year, however, half of the land will be in fallow. (Griffin, 1973:399).

Thus the socialist sector resolved neither the problems of the Algerian peasantry nor those of the workers. Actually it absorbed only a minor proportion of both rural and urban unemployed especially when considering the 3% annual population growth and the rapidly increasing urban population. The latter increased from 1.6 million in 1955 to 3.4 million in 1963 (Amin, 1970: 139). The emigration of Algerians to France remained as high as it was during the colonial period. Between October 1962 and March 1964 an estimated 135,000 adult Algerians left for France (Who's Who in the Arab World, 1978-1979:271).
Over the years the Algerians represented the largest foreign population in France and this has become a source of tension between the countries.

While Ben Bella succeeded in establishing political structure that was lacking, his major economic policy was rather weak and ineffective. One of the weaknesses of the self management policy was its unplanned character which entailed problems of organization, goal determination, lack of trained personnel, and misconception of the appropriate ways to administer the socialist sector. The logical consequence of the promptness with which the sector was started out and the haste with which it was institutionalized was the sector's failure not only to generate capital but also to consolidate the peasants and workers participation in management. However, the sector created a group of administrators who do not own the means of production but who control strategic knowledge and the decision-making system.

When Boumediene came to power in 1965, he criticized Ben Bella's drive for personal power, his 'propagandist' socialism and blamed him for the failure of the socialist sector and deterioration of the economy. Boumediene's assumption to power was associated with a change in the composition of the ruling group in Algeria. More war veterans and military men joined the new ruling team. Surrounded by military professionals and technicians, Boumediene, although himself a son of a peasant, was not concerned with popularity or mass-support. Rather he was inclined toward efficiency and state control over the economy. As observed by one scholar "The commitment to what has come to be called state capitalism evolved out of the radical nationalism of the Boumediene group" (Entelis, 1980:117). Accordingly the economic strategy shifted from the emphasis on agriculture to industrialization. In the meantime the self-managed sector was abandoned. The ONRA was dissolved in 1967 and its responsibilities were centralized under the ministry of Agriculture.
Self-managed enterprises were converted to national corporations.

Boumedienne's emphasis on industrialization was justified by two elements. One was the need to establish economic independence and the other was the use of the country's abundant resources in oil and natural gas to promote economic development. Boumedienne and his team of planners and experts assumed that once an industrial infrastructure is set up, agriculture becomes easier to deal with. Based on these assumptions the 1967-69 plan poured the vast majority of the available resources into heavy industries. In numerical terms 45% of the national investment was allotted to industry while only 15% was devoted to agriculture (Smith, 1975:269; Younger, 1977:115) Entelis gives the same figures for the 1970-1973 plan.

While Ben Bella's government at least in principle showed some concern with the peasant conditions and standards of living, Boumedienne's concern with economic independence based on industrialization resulted in the deterioration of the peasant society. As previously noted, apart from the self-managed farms the Algerian peasantry in the traditional sector did not experience any sign of amelioration. During the war, over two million peasants were relocated in the so-called regroupment centers. Driven off from their land the peasants' link to their environment was extremely disrupted. After independence most of these peasants stood between the permanent workers of the self managed sector who at least secured some income and the state administrators who benefited most from independence. The peasants were forced to survive on small plots of land that were the least productive.

Although the Algerian elites themselves originating from predominantly rural areas have theoretically recognized that the country's economic and political destiny is closely linked to the peasantry (Smith, 1975:268-269),
and despite the official claim of the continuing revolution to serve the people, almost a decade went by before any reform was taken except the nationalization of French owned land.

The capital intensive industries under way could not offset the rural unemployment and underemployment which was estimated as high as 60% (Entelis, 1980:118). As already noted the improved techniques applied in the socialist sector, where production of wine and citrus fruits took place, were not attempted in the traditional sector where the cereals upon which the population depends for consumption are cultivated. Added to these elements, the population growth rate of over 3% worsened the conditions of the peasantry. Consequently the import of food products have become a major item in the Algerian trade and food subsidies have taken up a large proportion of the national budget (Younger, 1977:17).

Under these conditions an agrarian reform became an imperative. The agrarian reform or what the government called the "agrarian revolution", was announced by Boumedienne in 1971. The reform was intended to rationalize both economically and politically Algeria's agriculture sector (Younger, 1977:117). On one hand the agrarian reform aimed at redistributing the privately owned land which amounted to 4, 147,000 hectares (Lazreg; 1976:103) or two thirds of the nation's total of cultivable land (Who's Who in the Arab World, 1978-1979:274).

Although Boumedienne did not depend on the peasantry for political support as much as did Ben Bella during the first years of independence, it turned out that the stability of his regime was linked to the peasantry by the very nature of the Algerian society in which over two thirds of the population is rural. As argued by one scholar "The incorporation of the peasantry into the country's political life will be essential to Algeria's economic growth as
this economic growth will in turn be basic to the success of political institutionalization" (Smith, 1975:259-260).

In fact the land reform was implemented over several stages. First land was surveyed and the first distribution of land covered some 600,000 hectares of government land that was distributed among 44,000 beneficiaries grouped into pilot villages. The second stage initiated in 1973 covered the redistribution of some 650,000 hectares of privately owned land among 60,000 families of landless peasants. The third stage involved the development of the lands bordering on the Sahara.

Since the redistributed land was not sufficient to meet the needs of all landless peasants, a variety of agricultural cooperatives were established. Some of these were based on common ownership of the land, others were based on shared activity while a third category was based on shared labor. The political and administrative organization of the cooperatives tended to be made along lines similar to those of the self-managed farms (Smith, 1975:275).

Assuming that the figures on the land given in the available literature are relatively accurate and considering that the private land makes two thirds of the nation's total cultivable land or amounts to over 4 million hectares of which only 650,000 has actually been redistributed, one must wonder whether or not the Algerian land reform will be effective in improving the lives of the peasants, the poorest parts of the countryside and agricultural productivity. What is needed is a more ambitious and revolutionary agrarian reform albeit the official propaganda of the agrarian revolution. As one scholar states

"Ironically, what was initially a peasant revolution has culminated in a form of vigorous state capitalism, utilizing both modern large-scale techniques and small-scale local plants. In addition, industrialization has tended to bifurcate society
growth and stagnation which will take more than money or good will to overcome" (Entelis, 1980: 122).

The political consequences of the economic strategies adopted in Algeria are very significant. To the extent that emphasis on industrialization is made at the expense of agriculture, the peasant society does not appear to have benefited from independence as expected and as officially claimed. To the extent that economic development or more exactly economic independence takes precedence over political institutionalization the leadership alienates all political forces in the country particularly those who do not share the leadership's point of view. Further, Algerian state capitalism has created and sustained its own group of beneficiaries. This group includes the state officials who make the decisions and run the national economy. The different components of this group are the "military, party and administrative technocrats, who all share a common socializing background in the ALN (later on the ANP) and its experience in the revolutionary war, monopolize the state's critical military, mobilization and managerial affairs. For the most part of Boumediene's rule, the three elements were unevenly aligned, with the FLN reduced to a minor functionary role while the military and the administrative elite were elevated to predominant positions" (Entelis, 1982:95-96).

Economic Liberalism in Morocco

At the time of independence, the economic conditions in Morocco resembled those of Algeria and Tunisia. But Morocco differed from its neighboring countries in that its economic difficulties developed into a prolonged stagnant economy. In their assessment of the first 14 years of economic development in independent Morocco, Amin (1970), Waterbury (1970) and Hermassi (1972), all have characterized this period by economic stagnation, agricultural depression, lack of structural reform and failure of development
First we will describe the economic growth of this period with emphasis on agriculture since it has profound ramifications in the rest of the economy, then we will attempt to provide some explanation. Amin claims that what happened in Tunisia from 1956 to 1958 and in Algeria in 1962-1963 has in Morocco been prolonged from 1955 until the time of his study (1970) without any sign of recovery appearing on the horizon (Amin, 1970:169). In fact during the first years of independence agriculture was stagnant, level of investment in productive public expenditure was increasing and capital was flowing out of the country. But while in Algeria drastic nationalization measures were undertaken immediately after independence, in Morocco the private sector and French owned land were left untouched. King Hassan of Morocco claims that in order to prevent speculation, the resale of European owned lands to Moroccans was undertaken by the state and that about 300,000 hectares had already changed hands in 1956 (King Hassan II, 1978:91). What actually happened was the opposite of the King's claim. The transfer of European owned land was the most speculative transaction Moroccan landowners ever had. Some of it was indeed bought by Moroccans and some of it was given to government officials or passed into members of the Royal family. Amin estimates that between 1956 and 1965 some 500,000 hectares were sold privately to Moroccans (Amin, 1970:177).

While the private transactions were taking place, the government launched an extensive program of major public works with the assumption that it would prepare favorable environment and provide an impetus for private investment to take place in productive sectors. Private investment, however, declined. Local investors were oriented to speculative activities in the real estate and commerce with low risk, while foreign investors started transferring large proportions of their capital outside the country. In the meantime the
government sought outside capital from various countries and international organizations in order to finance major projects. The flight of capital out of the country increased inspite of the state's word that nationalization would not take place (Brace, 1965:153).

In 1959-60 the UNFP government expressed some socialist tendencies similar to those expressed by Ben Salah in Tunisia in 1956. These tendencies emphasized the necessity of land reform and nationalization of French owned land. The government then issued a five year development plan (1960-1964) whose main objectives were "The intensification of the extractive industries, import substitution and the improvement of agricultural production by land reform" (Hermassi, 1972:180). The dismissal of this government by King Mohammed V, his death in 1961 and the succession to the throne of King Hassan II hindered the completion of the plan. Nevertheless, in order to hamper the rural exodus to towns and cities and absorb the unemployed rural workers, a National Promotion program was set up in 1961. As described by the King, it was a vast cooperative enterprise for mobilizing the mass of unemployed and putting them to work on the big projects envisaged by the plan. The promotion workers, paid in kind and in cash, put in 207,172,504 working days over a ten year period (King Hassan, 1978:94).

Another three year plan (1965-1967) followed the previous one. Over this period an agrarian reform was announced by the King on July 1966. The agrarian reform in the Moroccan context meant the distribution of some 250,000 hectares of colonial land. This was the land that had been expropriated by the colonial administration for the purpose of public utility. The land was to be parcelled into small lots and distributed to the peasants. By the end of 1972 only 181,000 hectares had been distributed (King Hassan, 1978:92). In order to orient and finance the reform, a number of national offices were instituted.
These included the Office National de la Modernization Rurale, the Office National d'Irrigation, the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique and the National Agricultural Credit Fund.

In spite of these efforts many scholars as noted above made negative assessments of the development of the first decade and were pessimistic about future change. Waterbury for example states that "The production of cereals, while sometimes, varying spectacularly from one year to another due to lack of rainfall, has not progressed significantly beyond the maximal levels of the 1930's" (Waterbury, 1970:305). What Waterbury called the agricultural depression was reflected in the increase of rural under-employment, decline in per capita production, shortage in food products from local production and imports of food commodities.

I propose an explanation of the Moroccan situation that is based on two interrelated elements. These are the direction of the nationalist movement and the power structure established after independence.

In earlier chapter is was noted that the Moroccan traditional social structures were not altered by the colonial regime in any significant way. By this it was meant that while in the urban sector the modern educated elites were developed from within the urban, well-to-do traditional literate families of larger cities, in the rural sector the distinction between landed proprietors - rural notables - and peasants was preserved. The distinction was even consolidated and enforced through colonial educational and administrative policies. Contrary to what happened in Algeria, the amount of land expropriated by the French, estimated at 12% of the country's cultivable land, was not significantly harmful to the strength and power of the landed proprietors in Morocco. This group, composed of Berber and Arab tribal chieftains and big land owners, owned about 4,000,000 hectares. Among the group there was some 7,500 land owners who had some 1,800,000 hectares farmed by traditional

Although the nationalist movement was not significantly affected by the Arab-Berber distinction which it rather solved, it was influenced by the rural-urban and peasant-big landowner distinctions. One one hand the rural notables were not active participants in the movement because of acquired privileges under the colonial regime and because of their resentment of the urban dominated nationalist leadership. As Waterbury puts it "Most were reluctant to alienate their benefactors by taking up with nationalists whom they regarded as outsiders anyway" (Waterbury, 1970:115). The Glaoui scheme with the French Resident General illustrates this attitude.

On the other hand, the peasant society was neither proletarianized, nor was it involved in the nationalist movement the way the Algerian peasantry was. The peasant society in Morocco has always had a weak link if at all with the central administration. Thus, it remained marginal in politics both under the colonial and national regime. In the early 1950's however, when the tension between the monarchy and the colonial regime reached crisis proportions, both elements of the rural forces rallied to the monarchy. Thus if independence in Algeria meant the restructuring of society and power, in Morocco there was little call for structural change at any level.

It is within this context that one should understand why no nationalization measures such as the ones undertaken in Algeria, were attempted in Morocco, and why the agrarian reform adopted in Morocco was very limited.

With independence, the monarchy enforced its traditional religious legitimacy by its symbolic function and contribution to the nationalist movement. Through their loyalty and support to the monarchy, the rural forces were able to protect their property and privileges. Finally, the nationalist leaders who sponsored the establishment of political institutions favored the
status quo in order to prevent a socio-economic and political order in which they may have to give up their privileges or share their position with other segments of the population. Given that most of them originated from well-to-do backgrounds, it was not surprising that they opted for a more or less 'liberal' policy. More importantly the Moroccan elites as opposed to their counterparts had no particular doctrine and no fundamental criticism of the colonial system which they appeared to perpetuate (Amin, 1970:174). Even if some socialist program entailing structural land reform was presented, the complexity of the land tenure system in Morocco would make its implementation very difficult. Yet the modernization of agriculture in Morocco could not be promoted effectively and efficiently without land reform. Of a total of 70,000 square kilometres of cultivated area, only one seventh is large-scale farming. The predominance of small holdings accentuates the use of traditional farming methods.

The decade of the 1970's was marked by continuous efforts to moroccanize business enterprises and small industries owned by Europeans. But the Moroccanization did not mean nationalization. Rather it meant that enterprises under European control and ownership were to be completely transferred to private Moroccans with adequate indemnities paid, or at least greater shares in their control have to be in Moroccan hands.

In contrast to Algeria where apparently some fundamental structural change is taking place, in Morocco despite the attempted government programs for land reform, and the continuing call for more equity in the distribution of wealth, the gap between the wealthy few and the many poor is widening. Yet like Algeria the economic growth of Morocco provides more opportunities for the technically skilled and educated with the right family, regional and personal ties and less if anything for the poor, unemployed and landless.
Also like Algeria, the population growth rate of over 3% hampers whatever improvements that are taking place in agriculture or any other sector of the economy.

Tunisian Socialism Revised

Tunisia is the third country of the Maghreb which had to face the economic problems of the newly independent state. Over the first 7 years of independence the number of colons fell by half (Amin, 1970:146-147). The level of investment in 1957 dropped sharply below the level of the previous years. In the same year France, for political reasons, curtailed its aid to Tunisia. In order to meet these economic difficulties, Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour at first opted for a 'liberal' policy. They shared the attitude taken by the Moroccan government towards foreign and local private sector. No drastic nationalizations of the Algerian type were undertaken. Bourguiba's intent was to spare the private sector in order to stimulate investment which in turn would generate economic growth. As one scholar observes "during this period, economic policy was concerned with maintaining the status quo in order to avoid the gradual alienation of the local investor and foreign creditor which overt socialism might engender" (Simmons, 1970:456).

At the political level, the liberal orientation may be interpreted as stemming from Bourguiba's concern with national unity and his attempt to prevent conflict among the elites over economic policy. In fact in a similar argument to that of King Hassan, Bourguiba (1973:147) once said

"You would not wish me, now that we are independent, to seek out the "wicked bourgeoisie" and give them a bad time! Of course not. We are all of us her united fraternally and I shall never consent to destroy our national unanimity and exclude certain elements of the nation in order to deserve the title of Marxist socialist."
But the conflict was already apparent when Ben Salah in 1956, then secretary general of Tunisian Trade Union (UGTT), expressed criticism of continued French land ownership and Europeans' control over the means of production in Tunisia. Ben Salah, at the time, had a labor-oriented program which entailed socialist measures and decolonization of the Tunisian economy.

As Bourguiba sensed the far-reaching implications of Ben Salah's view, he encouraged a split in the Trade Union and the formation of a rival union. Ben Salah was further removed from the UGTT and in 1958 he was appointed Secretary of State for Public Health. Bourguiba was not only concerned with national unity but also with the protection of big land owners who were his supporters and some of whom were even his friends. As a result the first years of independence went by without any sign of amelioration in the economy. The expected increase in the level of private investment did not take place. Investors, uncertain of the government's intention, were reluctant to risk their capital as was the case in Morocco. Investors seemed to be awaiting further signs from the government before risking additional capital in the new state (Simmons, 1970:457). Thus if Bourguiba's economic liberalism was politically effective, economically it failed to generate the expected effects.

Amin points to the most critical aspects of the Tunisian economy over this period when he states that "for three or four years production stagnated, and it seems likely that it actually fell; investments dropped sharply and the flight of capital was uncontrolled and uncontrollable until a national currency was created and exchange control imposed in October 1958" (Amin, 1970:145).

The economic situation described above was aggravated by the Franco-Tunisian conflict over Bizerte in 1961. Bourguiba and the Neo Destour were, thus, forced to rethink their economic policy and seek new alternatives. In
the early 1960's Ben Salah was brought back in the center of Tunisian politics. He was appointed minister of planning and finance, one of the most powerful positions in the government especially in a state that was still searching for directions. As Ben Salah assumed position, a ten year development plan (1962-1971) was drafted and endorsed by the government. By all definitions the plan was set up within a socialist framework. As a sign of support and acceptance of the plan the New Destour changed its name to the Destourian Socialist Party in 1964.

The plan had economic and political dimensions. First it aimed at improving the Tunisian economy, improving living conditions of all segments of the population and decolonizing agriculture. Second, its endorsement meant the integration of oppositional political forces that revolved around Ben Salah and stimulation of the peasants' support to the regime through involving them in the cooperative program set up by the plan. To achieve these goals, two major elements were considered: the nationalization of European owned land and the establishment of a cooperative system in Agriculture.

The cooperative system was not new in Tunisia. During the colonial period, there developed cooperatives as spontaneous voluntary groupings of private farmers. Simmons observes that in early 1930's fruit growers on Cap Bon had grouped together to purchase local supplies and to negotiate sales with European buyers (Simmons, 1970:455). The post independent cooperative system was different. It was based on the gradual intervention of the state in management and commercialization. Between 1960 and 1963, some 600,000 hectares of the colonial lands were gradually transferred to Tunisian private ownership or to the state. But the most significant transfer was made in 1964 when the state expropriated the remaining unsold colonial land which represented about one half of the total held in 1956 (Simmons, 1970:458).
On this land which was taken over by the state, the initial nucleus of state farms was established. The state plan to improve agricultural production emphasized mechanization. With the assumption that mechanization is more economically viable in large holdings, all cultivable land of less than 500 hectares including privately owned land was regrouped into unités ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 hectares (Simmons, 1970:461;1971:46). Titles to the land were maintained while the management and commercialization were assumed by state administration and boards of directors. Simmons notes that although the farmers elected the boards of directors and participated on the crop committees, the cooperatives were actually run by a state hierarchy of technicians, administrators, and politicians (Simmons, 1970:462).

By 1968 the cooperative program was extended to about 38% of the country's cultivable land where over 900,000 of Tunisians lived which represented 30% of the Tunisian rural population. The following year the cooperative system was expanded to all cultivable land in Tunisia. But the expansion did not last long. By the end of 1969 the Prime Minister announced that private holdings could be withdrawn from the cooperatives. Within a few weeks a 13% decline occurred and more importantly Ben Salah and his team were arrested under the charge of high treason. All land was returned to its former owners except the land that was under state control. The cooperative program was discredited and officially abandoned.

To inquire into the causes of the failure of the program, the effects of the cooperative experience on the peasantry, on the economy and the implications of Ben Salah's arrest and trial, requires a separate analysis. But keeping in mind the purpose of this chapter two aspects seem of most significance: the effects of the cooperatives on the Tunisian economy and the political significance of their official abandonment for both the peasants and governing elites in Tunisia.
Under the cooperative system, both the area devoted to cereals which were the main crops, and the production of cereals declined by 36% and 34% respectively. The share of agriculture in GDP declined from 20% to 14.5%. And since 50% of the financing of the program was from external resources, the fact that production was not as expected, led to the aggravation of Tunisian foreign debts. While the objectives of the plan stressed economic independence it turned out that it increased Tunisia's vulnerability to foreign capital.

The political significance of the abandonment of the cooperative plan is very complex. Over the years the cooperative system was in effect, Bourguiba's authoritarian yet paternalistic style irritated different groups in Tunisia and the opposition was diffused among students and workers. In 1968 for example, the student unrest reached a stage of crisis which ended by hundreds of them tried under the charge of attempt to overthrow the regime. In order to ease the tension, and at the same time to establish a scapegoat, Ben Salah, still holding two portfolios, was appointed Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education. In the same year the Minister of State to the Presidency resigned from position because of disagreement with Bourguiba. In 1969 severe floods resulted in hundreds of deaths, damaged communication networks, roads and above all affected agriculture. Thus the cooperatives by their failure to bring about short term and concrete results were good targets to divert the attention from the political arena to the economic one.

In 1970 Ben Salah was tried and sentenced to 10 years hard labor. In his study of the agricultural cooperatives and Tunisian development, Simmons questions whether Ben Salah was guilty of the charges against him which included mismanagement, corruption and high treason. After examining the weaknesses and insufficiencies of the cooperative model at its inception, and Ben Salah's compliance and determination to carry out the program despite its
pitfalls, this scholar concluded that Ben Salah could not have been guilty of either mismanagement or corruption. Was Ben Salah guilty of attempt to abolish private property? Again the answer is no; otherwise why would Ben Salah conceive of a program of collectivization where private titles are kept and respected?

Ben Salah fell out of Bourguiba's favor because he became too powerful. When Bourguiba returned from France, where he spent several months for health reasons, he declared that he had no intention of becoming a figurehead in the country or of delegating any of his power (Who's Who in the Arab World, 1978-1979:1107). Furthermore the conservative elements and big landowners were not in favor of the program. The abandonment of the program indicates their ability and effectiveness in influencing Bourguiba and his decision to dismiss Ben Salah. In fact most of the ministers and officials who resigned during the 1960's were re-integrated.

What effects did the program have on the peasants? Although the cooperatives were initially meant to improve the living conditions of the peasants, it appeared that they were hurt instead. First the peasants did not have a clear understanding of the program. They thought that they were going to be dispossessed of their land. As a result some of them sold their land and their animals to large owners before the program started. This led to the increase to the number of landless and thus intensified the problem of unemployment.

On the other hand the gap between the peasants and management became wider as the program proceeded because of their position in the cooperative hierarchy. The cooperatives' managers and directors were state administrators and technicians receiving high salaries regardless of the production output while the peasants depended on production for returns. As observed by Simmons,
not only were the small farmers and rural laborers as poor in 1970 as they had been 15 years earlier, but their real income level had declined and the gap with urban populations had widened even more rapidly since independence. (Simmons, 1971:45).

Therefore the abandonment of the cooperative system was a relief for all, but it was enjoyed more by the big land owners who from the very beginning were opposed to Ben Salah. "These five thousand families have shown their power in being able to convince Bourguiba that it was to the nation's advantage to end the program and let them retain their status and property." (Simmons, 1971:51).

The end of the cooperative marked the end of socialism and return to liberal economic policy although it is officially claimed particularly by Bourguiba that Tunisia is still socialist. A similar claim is made in Morocco where the kind of socialism adopted means improvement of the conditions of the poor without sacrifices from the rich. The compromising economic policy in both Morocco and Tunisia reflects the ambiguous political ideology held in these countries as well as their governing elites reluctance to support structural change and desire to maintain the status quo which serves their best interests.

While the decade of the 1960's proved to be economically unsuccessful because of lack of planning and hesitation, it was also a period of trial and error in both Algeria and Tunisia. Although the three countries followed different paths by the end of that decade they had similar social structures and were still facing similar problems.

The early 1970's in Tunisia revealed a significant increase in agriculture. In 1971 agricultural output rose by 25% and 35% in 1972. This increase contributed about one third of the rise of the Gross Domestic Products in 1971. The positive response to the abandonment of the cooperative system was further
reflected in the increase in the level of private investment in various industries while the state continued investments in major public works in order to provide favorable environment for private initiative.

The 1973-76 development plan stabilized and reinforced the economic growth initiated with the previous plan. Over this period domestic private increased significantly, agriculture revealed an average 3% growth and some 164,000 new jobs were created. However, they did not absorb all the unemployed labor because of a rapid increase associated with a decrease in emigration to Europe, particularly France, and also because of the increase in the number of women entering the labor market. The unemployment question became one of the targets that the 1977-81 plan attempted to deal with. But the liberalization of economic structures was associated with increased political restrictions. The last decade was characterized by an intensification of student and labor unrest. Over the calendar year 1975-1976 students' demonstration and riots were frequent and ended by hundreds in jail. The labor union also experienced frequent upheavals which culminated in the labor union crisis in January 1978. A 24 hour general strike developed into riots and violent incidents resulting in 40 people killed according to official sources, while the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions estimated the number to be 100, plus a greater number of injured.

The centralization of all powers in the hands of Bourguiba and the single party system have become more and more open to criticism and opposition. As the social malaise was growing Bourguiba finally ceded to the pressures by allowing various political formations to participate in the 1981 elections.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced major economic trends in the three Maghreb states. The argument was that the countries economic choices were directly determined
by their political situations and the constraints of the economic difficulties they had to face. In Algeria, the spontaneous peasant movement into abandoned land coincided with Ben Bella's rejection of the colonial style of development as well as his desire to secure his own power. Thus the endorsement of the self managed sector was rapid. Boumedienne while sharing Ben Bella's socialist view and eagerness to decolonize the economy, was more careful in putting them into practice. Despite revolutionary rhetoric in Algeria, "Ben Bella's socialist option had more disastrous economic and political consequences than the indecision and hesitation of the monarchy" (Moore, 1970:258). Boumedienne's industrialization and concern with efficiency only created a technocratic centralized system without improving the status of the peasants and workers with whom the revolution and the military identify themselves. Peasants and workers in independent Algeria are mere hired labor instead of being political participants in the system.

Both Morocco and Tunisia, because of their elite structures and the marginal position of their peasantry in the nationalist movement, developed more liberal economic strategies. But Tunisia was forced to adopt a socialist oriented approach when faced by economic difficulties due in large part to its lack of resources. As one scholar observes

"the reversal of economic strategy in Tunisia reflects the inherent difficulties of a government torn between the affirmation of economic independence and the need to compensate for its lack of resources through foreign aid, and between the desire to win over the rural masses and its fear of alienating the landowners" (Entelis, 1980:176).

In summary, what Algeria had conceived of from the very start, Tunisia had to accept under necessity while Morocco continued its liberal policy. Tunisia learned the hard way that in a country where the landed proprietors are powerful land reform is doomed to failure. Although the self managed sector has
survived longer in Algeria, "in practice the self-managed farms are as authoritarian as the Tunisian cooperatives, for the workers still consider themselves hired hands" (Moore, 1970:258). Thus Socialist Algeria and capitalist Morocco and Tunisia are not as different as these categories might suggest.
CONCLUSION

As noted in the previous chapters, colonization, nationalism and post-independence politics have shaped the Maghreb states. In this concluding chapter, it is convenient to summarize these processes and then review the similarities and differences among the three countries.

French colonial rule in the three Maghreb countries was of varying lengths and forms. In Algeria French rule was direct while in both Tunisia and Morocco the French ruled in the name of the sovereigns of these countries. Economically Algeria was totally under French control while in both Morocco and Tunisia French economic dominance was of less magnitude. Finally the community of French settlers in Algeria was larger than that of either Tunisia or Morocco. Consequently the transformation of the socio-political and economic structures of the Maghreb societies varied in degree. Independent Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia bore the mark of this difference.

In the process of colonization, France brought various parts of the colonized country under a centralized authority. France also weakened the organization and solidarity of the tribes. Various ethnic groups were unified as Arabs and Berbers realized their position vis-à-vis the colonizer. Furthermore Arabs and Berbers were brought together by Islamic sentiments. Not only did Islam hold people together but the reformist movement contributed significantly in crystallizing the rejection of colonial rule. The unexpected response to the Berber dahir in Morocco, the unwillingness of Algerians to give up their Muslim status and the Tunisians’ great agitation against the French take over of habous property exemplify the religious basis of nationalism in the Maghreb. We treated Islamic reforms as part of the first of three phases of nationalism though there is again an Islamic revival occurring in all three countries.
In Algeria French rule was overthrown through a painful and costly war under the leadership of the FLN. In Morocco, independence was attained to a certain extent under the leadership of the Sultan which explains the political continuity of the monarchy after independence. Tunisia's independence was achieved under the leadership of the Neo-Destour whose mass-support and organization helped dismantle Tunisia's monarchy which was of alien origin.

Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia entered the state of independence with economies that were significantly affected by decades of colonization. One of the effects of the latter was the juxtaposition of an European sector which was fully commercialized and developed for export markets, and a traditional one producing food for subsistence. The European sector controlled the best land. The traditional sector contained the great majority of the people. Their needs presented an urgent agenda for all three countries. Whether by radical or moderate policies, they had to respond. Algeria chose the radical route, the other two initially chose moderate policies.

Throughout the thesis, I have tried to investigate the extent to which Algeria is different from its neighbors with emphasis on the interplay between the elites' attributes and their role in political and economic development. In the following pages I will review and assess the differences and similarities that have emerged in this study.

First we begin with the differences. From a formal - static point of view, this suggests the accuracy of the assessment of the differences among the three countries in terms of their formal political structures. Moore (1970:X) best summarizes these differences when he states

"There are striking political differences between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In Algeria power lies with the military, and all attempts to shape the official party into an effective revolutionary instrument have failed. Tunisia, by contrast, retains a strong single-party system that is radically reshaping
society. Morocco is officially a multi-party system, but the monarchy has concentrated power at the expense of the parties.

Indeed the three countries have different political systems. These differences are argued to be the result of a number of factors, most of which have to do with the colonization of the three countries. The disparities between what France did in each of the three countries, the length of its presence, the intensiveness of the colonial conflict have contributed to different political systems after independence. It is further argued that the crucial colonial legacy that looms large in explaining the differences in political development between independent Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was the nationalist elites and organizations created by the struggle for independence (Moore, 1970:90).

The importance of political organizations and cohesiveness of the nationalist elites at independence is also relevant to the different directions of political development the three countries have followed. In Algeria the factionalism and intro-elite conflict which characterized the nationalist elites before independence influenced the political outcome at independence. The coalition Ben Bella - Boumedienne and later on the take over by the military are due to the lack of consensus among the Algerian elites upon a single national leader who could unite the elites or generate enough followers and popularity. In addition once independence was attained apart from the army, most organizations including the FLN and GPRA lacked a strong organizational structure or the ability to mobilize the masses. Consequently the army first broke with the GPRA, then helped Ben Bella neutralize the wilayas (administrative districts) and when it discovered that Ben Bella was attempting to reduce its power it simply took over.
In Morocco colonization enhanced the popularity and legitimacy of the monarchy. The latter was effective in providing unifying symbols for the divergent political forces of the country. In addition, to the extent that the elites' privileges and dominance were protected by the monarchy, they contributed to the consolidation of the monarchical system in Morocco. In Tunisia, the Neo-Destour and Bourguiba's leadership were strengthened by the homogeneity characterizing the elites. At independence the Neo-Destour enjoyed greater popularity, a well-articulated structure, skills and relatively cohesive leadership.

But the differences in the formal political systems are only one side of the political development of these countries. The other side is to be understood within the context of historical processes and underlying social realities. From a dynamic stand, the comparison of the three countries suggests that there are rather striking similarities which include the following: the colonial experience itself as a source of similarity, the elites' attributes, the mass-elite gap, mechanism of consolidation and maintenance of power and outcome of economic strategies.

Colonial policies in the Maghreb, though they varied from one country to the other because of the time lag, had a similar overall impact. The educational systems established by the French and the French influence upon the economic structures were similar in kind though varying in degree. In all three countries colonization ended up creating similar social and economic structures. The economy became characterized by the coexistence of a modern sector owned and controlled by Europeans and a traditional sector under national control. More importantly the colonial regime had, in all three countries, introduced educational systems that played the utmost significant role in the formation of new leading groups in the Maghreb. Education along
with the nationalist experience not only made possible the rise of new elites but significantly determined their characteristics.

With respect to the elites' characteristics the three countries display more similarities than differences. Apart from the relatively modest origins of Algerian elites and proportion of those with higher education, the composition, the size, the age, the mode of entry into politics, the kind of education received and the occupation of elites are similar. Furthermore the elites in all three countries have developed into an ingrown-intimate small group that is set apart and divorced from society. In terms of their background, Algerian elites are more similar to one another than to the general population (Harik, 198:56-57). Consequently the elite - mass gap is as pronounced in Algeria as in its neighboring countries. One scholar points to the 'super-elitist' character of the military academies in Algeria in terms of the quality of education, the available facilities and the physical environment of these institutions.

"While civilians of all classes experience chronic food and water shortages, confront the daily problems of housing and transportation, and battle the powers of bureaucracy at almost every turn, academies like the one at Cherchell are veritable enclaves of material prosperity and comfort" (Entelis, 1982:120).

The Algerian elites, despite their success in overthrowing the colonial regime and also despite their claim to have radically restructured society towards equalization, elimination of privilege and former wealth through nationalization, have perpetuated patterns of inequality and discrimination that are similar to their counterparts in both Morocco and Tunisia.

Further the comparison of the three countries in terms of the ways political institutions were put in place at independence and the mechanisms developed to consolidate and maintain power suggests that politics in all three countries is predicated upon personal power rather than on institutions.
The subordination of institutions to individuals is a common characteristic to all three policies. Similarly the three countries' regimes are characterized by the dominance of a single man whose real power is not exclusively based on the position in the formal structure of power. Rather, personal linkages, clientelist networks, elimination of rivals and cooptation of opponents play a pivotal role in the consolidation and maintenance of the political system. In all three countries, the building of political institutions has been hindered by the leaders' drive to concentrate and enlarge their own personal power and the elites' desire to appropriate the rewards of independence for themselves. In Algeria, the peasants and workers in whose name the revolution is claimed participate little if at all in decisions and benefits.

The day the leaders of the Maghreb act less within systems of personal power and more within systems of organizations and formal procedures, the stability of the political systems they lead will be put on more solid grounds. At the present the monarchy and multiparty system of Morocco, the no-party system in Algeria, and the one party dominant in Tunisia, formally different, resemble each other in their institutional weakness and arbitrariness of personal power.

The political stalemate which in Waterbury, Entelis, and Tessler's view, characterizes Moroccan politics applies to Algeria and Tunisia as well. As we have seen, the capacity of survival and stability of these regimes is also derived from the leaders' control of means of coercion and their ability to use them when necessary. On the other hand the political order is similarly sustained by the elites' reliance on patronage and clientelism as means of cooptation and absorption of conflict. In order to bring the gap between systems of personal power and mobilization of the masses and stimulation of their support, the leadership stresses such themes as national unity and
economic independence. Combined with the formal and informal domestication of opposition, this ideological rationalization has enabled the leadership to stabilize the prevailing political order.

The similarities among the three countries also involve their economic strategies and programs for development. Because of the centrality of agriculture to the Maghreb society and economy, it is crucial to both political and economic development. The need to contain the peasant spontaneous take over of the colonial land compelled Ben Bella to endorse the self-managed sector. In Morocco and Tunisia, the marginal role of the peasants in the nationalist movements resulted in their marginalization in politics after independence. In both countries, the colonial estates were usually allowed, with part of the land sold to private hands and another part taken over by the state.

In all three countries, however, because of the existing land tenure systems, the prevalence of small holdings, the proportion of landless in each, and finally the dualist character of agriculture inherited from the colonial era. land reform appears to be a precondition to the improvement and development of agriculture. Yet in all three countries, apart from the drastic nationalizations undertaken in Algeria, land reform in the sense of redistribution and reorganization of the land tenure system was postponed and when attempted it was of limited scope.

In Algeria the absence of large landowners provided no obstacle to land reform and structural reform in agriculture whereas their presence did so in both Tunisia and Morocco. But the emphasis on industrialization facilitated by the existence of petroleum and gas restrained the improvement of the agricultural sector. In Morocco the importance of the rural notables as the monarchy's source of support supplemented by the growth of a group of large
landowners as a result of the transfer of parts of colonial land to private hands, inhibited the conception or implementation of an ambitious land reform.

In Tunisia the cooperative system planned and implemented by Ben Salah was sooner and more ambitious than attempted reforms in Morocco and Algeria because it meant the redistribution and reorganization of all land both privately and state owned. But it failed under the pressure of the landed proprietors among other factors. In the early seventies two French scholars raised the question of whether or not Algeria is socialist? Their final conclusion and firm answer was in the negative (Ottaway, 1973:397). In their view the Algerian revolution has failed in "undertaking a policy of real development, having neither mobilized the unemployed productive forces of the country nor substantially increased the rate of national accumulation" (Ottaway, 1973:398). As argued in this thesis Algeria although proclaims a different stature in the area, it is actually closer to its neighboring countries than to revolutionary regimes of the west.

Another emerging similarity between the three Maghreb states involves the revival of Islam and the rise of groups of Islamic fundamentalists among the younger segments of the population. During the last six or seven years, outstanding journalists have been following the nascence of religious revivalist movements in the Maghreb states (Souheir Belhassen, Jean-Louis Buchet, Hamza Kaidi and others). These journalists suggest the link between the rise of the Islamist movement in the Maghreb and social unrest, economic discontent and political tensions in the area. Young workers and college students who had hoped for democratization of political processes, freedom of expression and association, less repression and censorship, are giving up these hopes and falling into the idealistic security of religious principles
and practices.

The Islamists attack the incumbent elites' life styles, their culture and their identification with French language and modes of behavior. Thus while the early nationalists of the Maghreb fought to purify Islam from distorting practices and superstition, today's younger generations propose the purification of national culture from western influences. They also attack the inefficient, discriminatory and corruptive characters of the existing regimes. As the Islamist movements gain more recruits each day especially among students, the three regimes become more repressive and yet more concerned with what these movements might lead to in countries where Islam is the predominant religion. The Islamic revival is increasingly becoming a potential political force in all three countries, as it expresses the emerging counterculture against the elites in power as well as it points to the insufficiencies, weaknesses and failures of the existing political systems.

In summary the three countries are still undergoing processes of political and economic development. At the political level a greater institutionalization requires the dispersion of power, the restriction of personal power and respect of political institutions and procedures that may secure the stability and continuity of political structures beyond the men who established them. At the economic level economic planning and economic programs are to be taken seriously and not only improvised to satisfy the whim of an individual or to protect a particular group in society at the expense of the rest.

To conclude, the similarities among the three countries cannot be comprehended in the framework of structural approaches and typologies that posit a priori the difference among the three systems, but must be understood from a dynamic historical perspective that allows for the discovery of the ongoing resemblance and underlying patterns of convergence among the Maghreb
states. In each of the three states the product of decades of colonization has been an ingrown - intimate small group whose education and political skill predisposed it to lead national development. The outcome of this group's efforts is so far centralized, relatively coercive systems of personal power.
Bibliography


Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.


GLOSSARY

ALN: Armée de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Army), the Algerian army that fought the French during the war between 1954-1962.

ALIM (pl. Ulama): Traditional scholar.

AML: Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty), a political association led by Ferhat Abbas in 1944.

ANP: Armée Nationale Populaire (National Popular Army), the Algerian army formed after independence.

CCE: Comité de Coordination et d'Execution (Committee of Coordination and Execution), an executive of five men formed at the first FLN congress in 1956.

CNRA: Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (National Council of the Algerian Revolution), the Front's highest authority. It was formed in 1956 and passed on most major decisions.

CRUA: Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action), a group of nine men who led the launching of the armed insurrection on the first November 1954.

Dahir: Royal decree.

Destour (Arabic): Constitution

Destour Party: Tunisia's first nationalist party, it was formed under the leadership of Cheikh Taalibi in 1920.

FDIC: Front pour la Défense des Institutions Constitutionnelles (Front for the Defense of Constitutional Institutions), a political party formed in 1963.

ENA: Étoile Nord-Africaine (North-African Star), a political organization that was founded in Paris, 1925 and led by Messali Hadj. It recruited its members among Algerian workers.

Fellah (pl. Fellahin): Peasant.

FLN: Front de liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front), the Algerian party that led the armed struggle against France.

GPRA: Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (Provisional Government of the Algérían Republic), it was in 1958 with headquarters in Tunis.
Habous: Religious foundation, donated property for charitable and cultural purposes.

Istiqlal: (Independence), a political party that was created by Ahmed Balafrej in December 1943 (Morocco).

Khammas (Pl. Khammassin): Farm tenants who receive one fifth of the harvest in return for their labor.

Melk: Private property.

MP: Movement Populaire (Popular Movement), a rural-berber based political party that was formed after independence in Morocco.

MTLD: Movement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), a nationalist organization that was founded by Messali Hadj after World War II (Algeria).

Neo-Destour: A political party that was founded by Bourguiba in 1934.

ONACO: Office National de la Commercialisation (National Office of Commercialization), the institution that was in charge of export and import of agricultural products of the self-managed farms in Algeria.

ONRA: Office Nationale de la Réforme Agraire (National Office of Agrarian Reform-Algeria).

OS: Organisation Spéciale (Special Organization), an underground paramilitary organization that was formed in order to prepare for organized armed rebellion against the French in Algeria.


PSD: Parti Socialiste Destourien (Destour Socialist Party), the name that was given to the Neo-Destour in 1964.

UDMA: Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto), a nationalist party that was formed and led by Ferhat Abbas after World War II.

UGTA: Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (General Union of Algerian Workers).

UGTT: Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (General Union of Tunisian Workers).

UNFP: Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces), a left-wing political formed as a result of the split in the Istiqlal in 1959.

WILAYA: Military region during the Algerian war; also an administrative region.
THE ELITES IN THE MAGHREB:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

by

FATIMA NASSIF

B. A., University of Mohammed V, Morocco, 1971
C.E.C., University of Mohammed V. Morocco, 1974

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1983
This study is a historical comparative analysis of the three countries of the Maghreb in order to determine their differences and their similarities. It is widely argued that Algeria, because of its double revolution, is politically and economically different from both Morocco and Tunisia. Socio-political change in Algeria is claimed to be structural, revolutionary and participatory. National development is said to be leading to the improvement of the lives of those in whose name the revolution is proclaimed.

The thesis involves the comparison of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in terms of their political development after independence. The thesis concentrates upon the elites of the three countries, their formation, their characteristics and their leadership of political and economic processes. The approach to political development involves both the establishment of political institutions and the mechanisms of their consolidation and maintenance. Economic development is discussed as a major context of political policy formation and implementation.

The comparison of the three countries reveals the following differences and similarities. From the point of view of formal political systems, the three countries are indeed different. Algeria is a single-party system with power vested in the military. Morocco combines the monarchy and a multi-party structure. Tunisia is one party dominant system. These differences are accounted for by the interplay of colonization and the nature of traditional society.

But beyond these differences, the three countries' elites display similar characteristics. Colonial education contributed heavily to the resemblance of the three states' elites and their divorce from the rest of society. Elite politics in all three states is primarily based on personal systems of power which are consolidated and maintained by similar mechanisms of coercion, clientelism and ideological rationalization.