THE NATURE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN AFRICA

by

JOHNATHAN BASCOM
B.S., Kansas State University, 1981

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Geography
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1983

Approved by:

[Signature]
Major Professor
With appreciation to those who have kindly traveled alongside during my graduate work, and to Dr. Bill Siddall whose cross-grained criticism has strengthened this thesis.

______________

Dedicated to African refugees.

______________

With thankfulness to the very real God in this universe...a personal Lord who has not only brought creativity and compassion to my education, but affected my whole way of seeing — life, and African refugees.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I Introduction ........................................... 1
II Some Fundamental Generalizations ...................... 22
III Spontaneous Self-Settlement .......................... 43
IV Refugee Holding Camps .................................. 59
V Designated Agricultural Schemes ....................... 77
VI A Synopsis ............................................. 101
LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Major Refugee Flows and Repatriations in Africa ............... 5
1.2 The Rising Number of Refugees in Africa ...................... 6
1.3 Origin and Destination of Africa's Refugees: 1979 ............. 7
2.1 Severity Scale Continuum ...................................... 23
2.2 Spatial Model of Refugee Resettlement ......................... 29
2.3 Self-Settlement in Zaire ....................................... 30
2.4 Refugee Camps in Somalia ..................................... 31
2.5 Designated Agricultural Schemes in Tanzania ................. 32
2.6 All Three Resettlement Patterns in Sudan ...................... 33
2.7 Spatial Analysis of Rural Resettlement Patterns ............. 37
3.1 Principal Areas of Refugee Concentration .................... 44
4.1 Somali Refugee Centres ....................................... 65
4.2 Eritrean/Ethiopian Refugees in Northeast Sudan (1980) ...... 69
5.1 The Qala en Nahal Scheme .................................... 87

LIST OF TABLES

4.1 The Daily Rationed Food Basket .............................. 67
4.2 Places of Previous Work ..................................... 72
4.3 Type of Employment .......................................... 72
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION

Refugees constitute one of the greatest, but least appreciated, documented, or understood tragic realities in present-day Africa. By 1982 the refugee population around the globe had risen to over twelve million people. One half of those refugees are in Africa. In fact, one out of every seventy Africans is now a refugee in one place or another (Gould 1982, p. 494). In many respects, African refugees have been seen and treated as a short-term, very-far-removed crisis. However, contemporary refugee problems in Africa are of accelerating magnitude, confusion, and complexity. Thus, African refugees are a poignant reality today and will be a daunting problem in the decade ahead.
Undoubtedly, refugee displacement and related problems will continue to mount rather than abate, globally as well as in Africa. Particularly in developing nations refugee resettlement can represent the most acute essence of population overload and human ecological stress both now and, more importantly, in the future. Despite mounting streams of refugee displacement and the complex challenges of resettlement, only a nominal amount of academic attention and research has been devoted to African refugees until very recently.

As a geographer I intend to specifically investigate the nature of refugee resettlement patterns in sub-Saharan Africa. The only geographer consistently publishing in this field, J. R. Rogge, suggests that refugee flows are "... a mobility which is variable in terms of scale, direction, and ramifications in both the areas of dispersion and destination" (Rogge 1977, p. 192). Although dispersion or flight patterns are of interest as related to resettlement, this paper hinges on four destination patterns—self-settlement, refugee holding camps, designated agricultural schemes, and urban enclaves. This study explores, in particular, the nature of the three rural patterns of African refugee resettlement and the wider implications of refugee resettlement in general.

The inherent fundamental problem of refugee research, particularly in Africa, is the nonexistence or nonavailability of data. What data is available tends to filter very slowly into a well-collected form within periodicals, journals, and books. Consequently, most research to date has been typified as scattered primary research with a descriptive orientation and a narrow focus on specific case studies.

A great deal of this descriptive narrowness reflects a subtle, but prevailing attitude towards refugee problems as short-term, temporary, and
unique events. E. F. Kunz, a sociologist, has noted that too often refugee problems are viewed as, "...individual, historical occurrences, each distinctly different and circumscribed in its locus and time..." (Kunz 1973, p. 129). In a 1981 paper entitled, "The Refugee Experience: Defining the Parameters of Study," Barry Stein pinpointed not only this inaccurate perspective, but its solution. He declared that if we are to move toward a comprehensive professional system for refugee assistance then research must be encouraged and supported that not only focuses on the most recent arrivals or on specific policy questions, but is general as well. It should also study refugees everywhere from a broad historical perspective that views them as recurring phenomena with identifiable and often identical patterns of flight and resettlement (Stein 1981, p. 321). His generalized, comprehensive approach is particularly needful for Africa and unusually apropos for geographers with a broad approach.

Hence, this piece is envisioned, designed, and intended to serve as a stepping stone from scattered descriptive studies towards the consolidation of recurring events and resettlement phenomena into certain consistencies and patterns. As stated, my specific theme is the nature of refugee resettlement patterns in Africa. However, that theme is also meant to serve as a helpful touchstone with which to push to the edges of the present research by reviewing the literature in a comprehensive manner and therein to examine ideas, raise significant questions, and illustrate some of the wide-range implications of refugee resettlement, for example, the role of relief agencies in refugee relief and the role of refugee resettlement in regional development.

This study will be highly qualitative in nature and purpose. This study intends, further, to develop a conceptual framework from which others can more effectively re-enter specific refugee resettlement problems and projects with a new breadth of understanding and perspective.
This thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter will
develop a broad overview composed of three key elements: the historical
and geographical background of refugee displacement in Africa and an in-
vestigation of the inherent ambiguities and alternative frameworks for a
useful refugee definition for Africa. Chapter two will postulate some
general principles about refugee flight and settlement patterns, propose
a spatial model of rural refugee resettlement patterns, and briefly discuss
urban refugees as a context and contrast to rural ones. The next three
chapters each focus on one of the three primary patterns of rural refugee
resettlement - self-settlement, refugee holding camps, and designated
agricultural schemes. Chapter six, the concluding chapter, is a brief
comparative analysis, aimed primarily at suggesting the potential for
assisting self-settlement, and then investigates some of the wider impli-
cations of relief agencies' participation as well as the role of refugees
in development.

The Geographical and Historical Background of African Refugees

The vast number of African refugees is a relatively recent phenomenon.
In the early 1950's any map of the global distribution of refugees illustrated
a sprinkling across North America, Europe, and Asia. As a continent, Africa
was conspicuously blank - and for good reasons. While the world's attention
was riveted on post-war Europe and the rise of Communism in Asia, the
African continent still lay predominantly under the grip of foreign colo-
nialism. In the last thirty years, however, almost every African nation
has become independent, while many have succumbed to a rising flood tide
of refugees (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1

The middle of the 20th century was a particularly difficult period for any newly independent state. For most African nations independence meant unraveling the legacy of colonial domination, establishing legitimate political systems, and developing viable economies. But African nations also did so in the midst of growing ideological pressures from the two superpowers and a world-wide demand for better living conditions after World War II. Independence brought pressures, both external and internal, that unleashed coups, countercoups, revolutions, liberations, nationalistic movements, ethnic conflicts, economic disparities, ideological clashes, fragile economies...and many **refugees**. In 1960 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) sanctioned the first African relief operation in Congo (now Zaire). In 1961, the UNHCR was called into Algeria and the tide of refugees had begun. The rapid expansion of African refugee numbers can be graphically shown as follows:

**The Rising Numbers of Refugees in Africa**

![Graph showing the rising numbers of refugees in Africa]

*Figure 1.2 Source: U.N. Data and the 1980 World Refugee Report*
A geographer, John Rogge, at the University of Manitoba, has extensively explored the location and direction of refugee flows in Africa. Political upheavals have created growing streams of refugees in one fledgling nation state after another across a great part of the continent. Figure 1.3, compiled from 1979 UNHCR data, illustrates not only the specific origin and destination of Africa's refugees, but the general fact that African refugees have been and are basically a phenomenon located south of the Sahara.

**Origin and Destination of Africa's Refugees: 1979**

*Figure 1.3*

If Africa were divided into five basic regions - north, west, central, east, and south - Northern Africa and Western Africa have had a conspicuous absence of refugees. John Rogge asserts that West Africa has had a passive role as compared to most of Central, Southern, and Eastern Africa in creating and receiving refugees (Rogge 1981, p. 195). Two small exceptions have occurred in the last five years. First, a tiny pocket of West Saharan refugees exists near Tiendouf, a remote town in extreme western Algeria. These "refugees" in actuality represent the Polisario of the Population Front for the Liberation of Saquía al Hamia and Rio de Oro, which is a group of freedom fighters trying to overthrow Moroccan control of West Sahara. Second, since 1977 several thousand Equatorial Guineans have fled from an extremely repressive regime across a nearby border into Senegal. In contrast to its national peers on the continent, Ghana has maintained a stringent policy of barring refugees. Triggered by new economic pressures related to lower OPEC prices, Nigeria reciprocated by expelling tens of thousands of Ghanaians in late January, 1983.

Despite their own serious internal problems and development responsibilities in the past quarter of a decade, four countries - Sudan, Zaire, Tanzania, and Somalia - have been obliged to shoulder the brunt of the growing influxes of refugees. Thus far Tanzania has most successfully dealt with refugees, but it has fewer total refugees to contend with than the other three. At the other extreme, Somalia's refugees now number close to one million, or an incredible one-third of the country's entire population (UNHCR 1981, p. III). Needless to say, this devastating refugee load has seriously retarded Somalia's effort to develop economically.

In dealing with refugees, African nations have been left more to their own resourcefulness and initiative as compared to other parts of the world.
J. R. Rogge substantiated this when he stressed that, "Africa has had to take responsibility for its own refugees to a much greater degree than any other world region" (Rogge 1981, p. 211). In May of 1979, President Nyerere presided as head of a major conference on African refugees held in Arusha, Tanzania. During the conference he emphasized that refugees in Africa are primarily an African problem and an African responsibility, and the dominant theme of the conference was a plea for an equal sharing between countries of the cost of aiding refugees (Nobel 1982, p. 17). Over ninety percent of African refugees are in just eighteen of the fifty member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (UNHCR n.d., p. 4). Nyerere also suggested, "Our resources are very limited, demands made upon us are very large. But I do not believe that dealing with the problems of 3.5 million people, and giving them a chance to rebuild their dignity and their lives is an impossible task for 46 nations and their 350 million inhabitants" (UNHCR 1979, p. 10). Statistically speaking, to even begin to monitor the financial support for refugees by African countries is impossible. However, in juxtaposition to the African experience are vivid recollections of Southeastern Asian countries refusing to accept refugees, sending them back out to sea or back across the border at gunpoint. In general, African political boundaries have been more permeable to the displaced refugee and most African societies have generously absorbed new refugees.

The countries of Sudan and Somalia exemplify Africa's amazing ability to adjust socially. As Peter Nobel, a lawyer for the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, writes, "Few countries could have better reasons than Sudan and Somalia to be restrictive in their refugee policies considering the poverty and the sufferings of their own people and plead instead to international solidarity" (Nobel 1982, p. 3). Both countries share a Koranic
injunction to protect those who seek protection. Somalia only grants asylum while Sudan grants asylum and provides opportunities for self-supporting activities. Moreover, in precedent-setting fashion, Sudan also made 1980 a Refugee Year in Sudan and resourcefully hosted its own conference in 1982 on refugees and development, an innovative idea in light of the fact that refugee problems and economic development are generally viewed as incompatible concepts.

The proportion of financial aid that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees devotes to African refugees has grown significantly since 1963—from two million U.S. dollars to over seventy million dollars (Rogge 1981, p. 201). Most financial aid is funneled through the U.N.'s bilateral mechanisms and directed into four kinds of relief—emergency assistance to refugees, direct assistance to refugees, direct assistance to returnees, and infrastructure support projects. In 1981, the UNHCR and the OAU hosted together an International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa with the explicit intent to raise public consciousness and mobilize new financial support. Quite naturally however, developed nations have feared that emergency projects will pull them into long-term financial commitment to refugee relief. Such fears are justified by examples such as Ethiopia and Somalia where after eight years no immediate political solution is yet in sight, and expensive emergency relief must continue in order to avoid massive starvation.

The dilemma of African refugees has been overlooked by Western researchers for a number of other significant reasons. In the past most Western people have naturally tended to transfer their perceptions, thoughts, concepts, and models of European refugees to Africa. In her monumental descriptive study, *Refugees: A Problem of Our Time*, (1975) Louise Holborn was the
first to suggest explicitly that, "African refugee groups have proved to be very different from those in Europe in size, character, and needs; and African refugee movements have occurred in an entirely different political, economic, social, and cultural context" (Holborn 1975, p. 825). This fact is indeed true. Within the United States most of our "refugees" historically have been essentially economic emigrants quietly coming into the country as families or ethnic pockets rather than hard-core refugee masses desperately fleeing physical violence and war. A wide ocean (its distance) and the high cost of traversing it have in themselves not only padded and protected us from refugee shocks, but have generally precipitated migrants who have some choice and economic resources rather than those who act in desperation and poverty. Today the unprecedented flow of migrants from Mexico comes closer to the nature of African refugees than Americans have experienced before.

At least in the last quarter century the perception of "refugees" has been largely associated with the post-war era in the European context. Even so, the post-war European refugee - crossing very distinct, international borders usually as explicit ethnic aliens and then quickly and efficiently repatriated or resettled - is quite unlike the African experience of refugees moving spontaneously across loosely controlled international borders; African refugees often have little hope or interest in repatriation, and lack the necessary education, skills, and personal mobility to quickly resettle and reestablish their own self-sufficiency. A final contrast is accentuated by an old Russian proverb which declares that a man consists of a body, a soul, and a passport. By comparison, the African refugee usually has little use or understanding of a passport. Rather, he consists more of a body, soul, and land. Thus, we ought to recognize African refugees as "new refugees"
and therein clarify the real differences between our refugees in the developed world and those in the developing world like Africa.

The dilemmas of African refugees have also been consistently overlooked because Asian countries rather than African ones have received most of our media exposure, popular interest, and financial support for refugees. In recent years for instance, media coverage on the plight of the southeast Asian boat people was greater than that for Somalian refugees despite the fact the Somalian situation was acknowledged as the worst refugee problem in the world in 1981 (The Washington Star 1981, p. 1). Somalia was overshadowed in the press by the exodus of the Cambodian boat people. The sensation-seeking elements of the mass media did portray Southeast Asia as a more dramatic place to die in a boat in a storm rather than on foot in the deserts of Africa. However, the boat people were also more closely tied to our own national interests by the mere fact Asians were and have migrated in large numbers to the United States. The 1980 numbers for foreign immigrants who were permitted to immigrate into the country were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asians (Primarily Indo-Chinese)</td>
<td>169,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Americans (Primarily Cubans)</td>
<td>20,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Europeans</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Easterners</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U.S. Dept. of State 1980, p. 2)

At least until now, although many Asians have sought and gained asylum in the U.S., the African refugee has been bureaucratically told to find his future in Africa.

Aid has also been more generous for Asians as compared to Africans for refugees being resettled abroad. Göran Melander reported in his article, Refugees and International Cooperation, that Malaysian refugees received $2,072 per capita in 1979 from the combined international community, while
refugees in Somalia, Sudan, and Tanzania received $161, $113, and $255, respectively by comparison (Melander 1981, p. 39). As Appollo Kironde of the African section of the U.N. insists, "The big world powers have displayed little interest in the overall refugee problem in Africa when compared to the role that they played and are still playing in assisting refugees in Europe, the Middle East, and in the Far East" (Brooks 1970, p. 107). Eighteen of the world's least developed countries are in Africa and most of these carry the heaviest refugee burden (de Sherbinin 1980, p. 41). Nevertheless, the United States government largely supports Asian refugees due to our political interests and the media's orientation. Moreover, Göran Melander, with the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, believes that, "Interest is easily generated when the reasons for the refugee's flight can be attributed to the activities of the Soviet Union. In Africa the etiology of the refugee situation is not so clearly related to the activities of the Soviet Union although this country is somewhat seen in the background" (Melander 1981, p. 40). The Caucun Conference in Mexico during October of 1981 at least symbolized the rising consciousness of the emerging north-south conflict. Soviet activity does seem on the rise in Eastern and Southern Africa. Hence, although the motivation may be partly political in nature, perhaps the day will soon come when Africa will be explored further by the world press and cared for by the international community.

Finally, not surprisingly, if international financial support and media attention have been diverted away from Africa, so has published academic research. Much material has been rapidly published by many volunteer agencies. Most of it is sketchy, descriptive case studies; dramatic appeals for finances; hasty project proposals virtually without any comprehensive, united evaluation of any sort. Thus, volunteer agencies do publish, but they tend to publish material that is inherently dramatic and descriptive.
Academic research has also been carried on in many disciplines and descriptive in nature. H. P. David noted this trend when he wrote that, "The literature is widely scattered. Specialists seem too preoccupied with immediate service demands to take the time needed for reflection" (Kunz 1973, p. 127). Consequently, very few significant articles concerning refugees in Africa can be cited. Although at least three excellent studies exist concerning refugee flight patterns (Patterson's typology, 1958; Kunz's kinetic models, 1973; and Keller's extensive field study, 1975), no integrative theoretical material of any magnitude exists to date concerning refugee resettlement. Sven Hamrell and Hugh Brooks edited papers from two symposiums, Refugee Problems in Africa (1967) and Refugees South of the Sahara (1970) in two books; and Louise Holborn wrote Refugees: A Problem of Our Time (1975), a monumental treatise on the work of the UNHCR, one volume of which covers the African setting. However, even these major works hinge on a historical perspective summarizing refugee numbers and location and therein are a superficial descriptive level of inquiry.

The major preoccupation of geographers with respect to African migration has been rural–urban migration studies primarily from West Africa. In 1977, J. R. Rogge, the only publishing geographer in the mainstream of African refugee issues, published an article devoted to African refugees in The Professional Geographer. He declared, "A considerable volume of literature on human mobility has been produced by geographers. One form of mobility, however, namely the forced or impelled migration of refugees, has received only peripheral attention by the discipline. In the case of contemporary Africa, not only is there an apparent apathy among geographers towards an understanding of the nature, directions, and implications of refugee migrations, but indeed, there has been an almost equal degree of disinterest
among other social sciences" (Rogge 1977, p. 186). As noted already, with half the world's refugees located in that continent, Africa has the most acute refugee crisis in the world. Realistically, the continent can only expect to face the harsh realities of refugee problems more and more in the future. Thus, African refugee problems, including resettlement, represent the kind of real-world problem oriented towards the future that geographers ought not to ignore.

The Development of a Useful Refugee Definition for Africa

The expression "refugee" certainly has a broad gradation of meanings. On one hand, refugees are defined in cold, calculating ways within legal documents or committee reports. On the other hand, reports from volunteer agencies and the popular media describe refugees in passionate and sometimes indiscriminate ways. Consequently, within the regional context of Africa, at times the more one reads, the more one becomes confused. What about the angry South African student leaving his homeland, the ambivalent Somali herdsman, or the Ethiopian school teacher who ekes out an existence in Khartoum, Sudan? Who is a legitimate refugee? What makes him one? And how long does he remain one? Certainly these questions and perceptions are related. A fundamental problem of this study is to clarify and refine our concept of a refugee, particularly within the historical context of Africa.

In 1958, W. Petersen published his classical piece, "A General Typology of Migration" in the American Sociological Review based on the fundamental distinction between forced expulsion (no choice) and impelled migration (some choice). He carried this distinction over from World War II during which two explicit German words, "Vertriehene" (forced) and "Fluchtlenege" (impelled) made that very specific distinction. Today sociologists and
geographers typically use the expression "voluntary emigrants" as compared to "involuntary refugees." In Africa repressive regimes and international conflicts have forced "definite refugees" to involuntarily flee. At the same time, however, the concept of an African refugee is often blurred between being obviously voluntary or blatantly involuntary for at least three significant reasons.

Involuntary migrations are often caused by natural disasters or ecological deterioration, accompanied by political strife. As distinct from our European experience, in Africa politics and nature are often intrinsically intertwined. For example, many of the first Somali refugees in the mid-1970's were fleeing drought and famine as much as the Ethiopian conflict with Somalia. Likewise, in 1976, Michael Glantz explicitly unveiled this truism when he published his book, *The Politics of Natural Disasters: The Case of the Sahel*.

The politicized nature of refugee movements is also blurred by confusing tribal hostilities, racial conflicts, and avid guerrilla warfare. Unlike refugees fleeing clearly defined nation-states, in Africa fairly new national identities and old arbitrary and inappropriate colonial boundaries radically affect the quest for clear-cut definitions. Over 600 ethnic groups comprise 40 nations (de Sherbinin 1980, p. 38). Five different, but classical, examples illustrate some of these kinds of confusing and complicated refugee settings.

1. In South Africa thousands of urban blacks have fled not because of open war or expulsion, but subtle, poignant racial pressures and quiet, unpublicized conflicts.

2. Thousands of Tutsi's from Rwanda have left the country for Burundi to join fellow Tutsi's who are in a majority there as compared to living in Hutu-dominated Rwanda. Thus, here tribal affinities outweigh national identities.
Neither of these instances reflect open blatant warfare, but they do reflect powerful economic and political disparities, persistent physical abuse, or repressive social tactics.

3. The liberation struggle in Angola represents clashing ideologies. Certainly most would agree the "freedom fighters" in Zaire are not refugees, but what about the wives and children with them?

4. Economic motives are often mixed with political ones, particularly when persecution is of an economic form. In 1974 in Uganda, for instance, although 72,000 Rwandan refugees existed in the country another 80,000 Rwandans were in Uganda as labor migrants. As in this case, often times there is a very unclear economic division between bona fide refugees and economic migrants both living in the same area of the country.

5. Despite massive flows of Ugandans into nearby Kenya in the last five years, the Kenyan government refused to acknowledge them as having "refugee status" for political reasons—that is, because Kenya fears antagonizing Uganda. These internationally displaced people are obviously refugees, but continue to go unnoticed in terms of media or relief.

Besides the impinging political and natural forces, the status of some refugees is complicated as well by internal flows. Refugees are usually thought by definition to cross international borders. However, often internally-displaced people face the identical plight as internationally-displaced refugees. Often we take for granted that if a person is forced to leave his home, he can and will be able to cross the next international border. In the late 1960's, for instance, well over 170,000 southern Sudanese did flee out to Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zaire. Another 1,000,000 southern Sudanese, however, left home but never left the country (Rogge 1982, p. 39). Hence, we often fail to realize that in developing nations like Africa such "refugees" may leave home but lack the financial resources, a transportation infrastructure, or merely the basic physical strength to bodily move themselves to and across an international border. In the last five years the UNHCR has in certain instances, such as Zaire,
begun categorizing internally displaced people as "displaced persons" therefore to qualify and receive refugee relief (de Sherbinin 1980, p. 32).

At the same time ironic paradoxes also occur in terms of refugees who cross international borders but in confusing, sometimes opposite directions. Often an African nation is both a sender and a receiver of refugees. Countries such as Zaire and Sudan, for example, will create conditions to cause citizens to flee and then simultaneously become recipients of their next door neighbor's refugees. Not only do these paradoxical swinging doors bring havoc on statistical analysis, but this kind of refugee swapping creates some refugee groups who move back and forth alternately across the border as political pressures rise and fall. Moreover, occasionally refugees become not only twice displaced, but hidden in a confusing manner. For instance, in the early 1970's Idi Amin expelled Rwandan refugees from Uganda, thereby recreating a new exodus of double refugees. Many Rwandans were (involuntarily) forced back into Rwanda to which one conceivably should ask whether they were still refugees.

In 1973, Patricia Kolenic, a geographer, dealt with the confusing nature of African refugees - although obviously imperfectly - by categorizing African refugees into six general types.

"POLITICAL - a result of limited political and personal freedom imposed by the controlling government. Limitations are a combination of personal persecution because of a particular political affiliation, discriminatory economic and education opportunities, and restricted geographic mobility within the country.

"OPEN WARFARE - a result of fighting which has erupted between two or more groups of people within a country.

"RELIGIOUS - a result of restrictions (e.g., on education, residence, job market, etc.) or personal persecutions of a particular group of people (usually a minority) because of their religious beliefs.
"ETHNIC - a result of restrictions (e.g., on education, residence, job market, etc.) or personal persecutions of a particular group of people because of their ethnic background. Refugees in this category are usually a minority group in their country.

"NATURAL CATASTROPHE - a result of a sudden or gradual deterioration of physical conditions to the point where it is no longer possible to live in a particular area.

"ECONOMIC - a result of discriminatory policies prohibiting a group or groups of people from having a particular job or any job at all. This group also tends to be a minority group in their country" (Kolenic 1974).

Obviously these types are a simplified view of the movements as they occur in reality and there are strong combinations of types within movements. Nevertheless, these categories are a useful, intermediate step for grasping definitive distinctions in a general framework for African refugees.

The traditional, legal definition of a refugee was developed three decades ago by the United Nations for the masses of Europeans after World War II. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) still applies the following definition, originally chosen by the Geneva Convention, for (the status of) refugees. Refugees are people who,

"... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; to whom, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (de Sherbinin 1980, p. 39).

The two key elements of this definition are that this person is outside his or her country of origin and has a "well-founded" fear of "persecution" if he or she returns. Hence, this concept of refugees hinges on their motivation for flight and their physical change in location.

In contrast, many volunteer agencies and the media emphasize refugees' desperate condition rather than their motivation and changed location, and
thereby radically broaden both the scope of meaning and response to refugees. Candace Weeks, writing for the Church World Service, notes that, "... the churches, unlike national and international political bodies, base their actions on the broadest possible interpretation of the term refugee..." (Weeks 1978, p. 2). Her booklet appropriately carries the following compassionate title, *Africa's Refugees: The Uprooted and Homeless*. From this vantage point a refugee is commonly perceived as a homeless, uprooted, helpless casualty and an innocent victim of circumstances and events for which he cannot be held responsible. Moreover, this more encompassing concept of a refugee is reflected not only in heightened compassion and emotion, but lengthened or expanded relief efforts as well. In the late 1960's a representative for the League of the Red Cross spoke for many when he insisted that, "It goes without saying that when it is a question of resettling refugees the emergency continues up to the moment when these refugees become self-supporting" (Holborn 1975, p. 863). Thus, this broad spectrum of refugee definitions is differentiated in a general way by narrow legal definitions maintained by those who receive refugees - that is, host governments - as compared to volunteer agencies or those who relieve refugees galvanized by a broader, popular perception.

Although perhaps oversimplistic, the response of African governments in particular tends to be mid-way between these two extremes. Compared to other nations in the world, African governments, in general, lean more and more towards a broader perception of refugees, and thus to a corresponding sense of expanded responsibility. To many African leaders the Geneva Convention's definition fails to match entirely the specific realities of the refugee-burdened areas in Africa. Consequently, in 1969 at the Refugee Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), member states signed
an obligation to, "use their best endeavors consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality" (Melander 1981, p. 35). Not only did this contract and succeeding OAU action strengthen an individual's right to asylum, but several African states have taken specific care to expand their own legislative framework concerning the status of refugees.

Sudan, in particular, has actively sought to implement on the national level this agreement with the OAU Convention. In 1974, the Sudanese legislature enacted the Regulation of Asylum Act. This Act incorporates the twofold OAU legal definition of refugees. The first section simply reiterates the Geneva Convention's definition, but the second section of the OAU definition explicitly expands the basis for permitting refugee status. It reads as follows:

"The term 'refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality" (Nobel 1982, p. 10).

This definition clearly establishes a broadened view of refugees. Today Sudan, like many other African nations, grants asylum to all refugees, does not distinguish between political, economic, or other reasons for leaving their original homeland, and grants the same rights and obligations to all refugees.
Chapter Two

SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

Our focus now turns toward refugee resettlement in Africa. The beginning of this chapter develops some meaningful generalizations about refugee flight and resettlement and then proposes a model of "resettlement types." The latter part of the chapter briefly explores urban refugee settings in order to establish a broader context for studying rural refugees in later chapters. In essence, this chapter serves as the stepping stone from a general survey of African refugees to separate, chapter-long, discussions of each one of the predominant resettlement patterns for rural refugees.
In 1974 Patricia Kolenic completed an analytical contribution on African refugees at the geography department at Ohio University. Her study, entitled *African Refugees: Characteristics and Patterns of Movement*, attempted to develop a comprehensive framework for recurrent refugee flight patterns in Africa. An adaption of her continuum of severity summarizes a number of major refugee conditions and characteristics generally associated with urban resettlement as contrasted with rural resettlement of refugees. (Figure 2.1)

**Severity Scale Continuum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Conditions of Country</th>
<th>Less severe</th>
<th>More severe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Small numbers - - - - - Large numbers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gradual movement-- - - - - Sudden movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Long distance - - - - - Short distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Many intervening - - - Fewer obstacles obstacles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General Characteristics of Refugee Movements**

| | 5. Even flow through time -- Initially large flow, decreases through time |
| 6. Individuals - - - - - Family groups (primarily young male adults) (mixed age distribution) |
| 7. Permanent - - - - - Temporary |
| 8. Scattered distribution -- Concentrated distribution |

**Flight Destination and Settlement Location**

Urban | Rural

*Source: Kolenic, 1974, p. 84.*
The interpretation of this continuum is rather straightforward. A number of generalizations can be noted despite the fact that a paucity of refugee research makes testing them a difficult and incomplete task.

1. **There is a direct relationship between the size of refugee groups and the severity of internal conditions of a country.**

   Seen along a spectrum of refugee types, open warfare obviously produces refugees en masse as compared to political or economic pressures that create small numbers of refugees, including trickles of individual refugees. This contrast is exemplified by the massive exodus of nomads into Somali as compared to a trickling of migrants (who may or may not deserve a refugee status) out of South Africa. The higher the severity of internal conditions, the larger the size of refugee groups. In turn, the larger the group, the less distance it can travel. Consequently, this relationship between size and severity is the fundamental dynamic which acts upon refugees.

2. **The speed of the movement is also directly related to the severity of the internal conditions of a country.**

   Open warfare creates sudden flights while quiet economic or political pressures reflect a slower, less conspicuous flow. In 1979, for instance, fleeing Ugandans created within two weeks a tent city in southern Sudan. On the other hand, disenchanted South African students trickle slowly out of that country ensnared in apartheid pressures.

3. **The length of distance travelled by a refugee is inversely related to the speed of his movement and therefore the severity of internal conditions as well.**

   During blatant open warfare a refugee's objective is often merely to get beyond the range of hostilities, and not necessarily any further, in which case the shorter the distance, the easier. "Economic refugees" or political exiles, however, often have more time to leave, and therefore are concerned not only with borders and survival, but usually select a further
location as their destination. Usually when they move their objective lies beyond the first "safe" rural areas. Instead, they travel to urban centers where they believe they can better thrive - physically, politically, and economically - not just survive.

4. The distance traveled by a refugee is also related to intervening obstacles like physical barriers, transportation facilities, and transportation costs.

Compared to other continents, Africa has a preponderance of rural refugees lying in close proximity to borders. Rwandan refugees are just inside Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire; some Zairians were just inside Central African Empire, Sudan, Uganda, Botswana, and Tanzania; pockets of Sudanese were located just over their border with Uganda, Zaire, Central African Republic, and Ethiopia; and many Ethiopians are now living just inside Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Djbouti. These short hops are often due as much to intervening obstacles such as the absence of transportation, the cost of transport, and physical barriers, as to the severity of internal conditions in the homeland. On the other hand, wealthy "refugees" such as the Asian traders ousted from Uganda by Idi Amin made the longest jump in distance, historically, by any group of African refugees when they moved off the continent into European cities.

5. The changing size of flows is related to the actual severity of internal conditions in the home area of the refugee and to the refugee's perception of the severity (real or imaginary).

The changing size of refugee flows through time could easily be thought of as only related to the severity of internal conditions of a country. To a large degree, this relationship does hold true. The work of E. F. Kunz, however, substantiates the fact that refugee flows over time change not only due to the actual severity of conditions external to refugee, but with a refugee's own changing perception of changing severities (Kunz 1974).
Consequently, a refugee's motivation to move is usually dependent upon the combined interlocking of the actual severity of conditions in his local area with his personal perception of their acuteness.

In his article, "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement," E. F. Kunz captured in theory some of the dynamism inherent to changing refugee flows as a result of the growing perception of an individual who views his position vis-a-vis the historical forces around him and his own ideological stance. On one hand, open warfare instantly creates "acute displacements." Often, however, in less blatantly violent situations, the changing flows of refugees is dependent upon "anticipatory displacement." Kunz also coins the expression "vintages" to denote different corporate waves of refugees produced by significantly changed physical severities, ideological sentiments, or perceived dangers in a simple chronological analysis.

The waves of Mennonites to Kansas in the late 1800's from Russia is one familiar American example. The sporadic flows of refugees out of the Ogaden and into western Somalia during the last eight years is a more recent African example of such vintage waves. In general, "acute pressures" are more likely to produce larger but fewer vintages of fleeing rural refugees, while "anticipatory pressures" generate smaller but more frequent vintages of refugees who are more likely to flee in a slower, migratory fashion to urban centers.

6. The composition of the refugee group is directly related to the size of the movement and therefore often to the severity of internal conditions.

Larger flows or waves of refugees generate a broader age distribution and more balanced ratios of males to females. These two factors combined mean a greater likelihood of family groups. On the other hand, not
surprisingly, the smaller the flow and the slower the movement, the more selective the refugee group. In short, the longer the time for refugees to leave, the more likely that only the most highly motivated will go. Consequently, smaller refugee groups such as students leaving South Africa or political exiles from other countries tend to be young, intellectual, male adults who travel long distances to urban areas.

7. The degree of permanence of a move is related to distance traveled.

Simply stated, this postulate implies that for whatever reason(s) the further a refugee travels the more permanent the move. Obviously, the longer the move the more intervening obstacles a refugee puts between himself and his original home – namely, sheer distances themselves. Economic and political refugees are the most likely to migrate long distances after having understood better the nature and consequences of such a move plus having had more freedom to choose when to make the move and where to make the move, which is usually to urban centers.

On the other hand, the refugees who best reflect temporary movements are those who settle closest to border lines. Many rural refugees flee violent warfare or natural disasters by at least leaving the immediate area. Their intention upon arrival in a new country is usually to stay only until "the storm blows over." The majority return home sooner or later.

However, the longer the period between arrival and return, the less likely refugees will ever return to their homeland. Time itself produces inertia in several ways that eventually reinforce the relationship between distance and permanence. Refugees are more likely to make what they regard as a temporary move but then stay at their destination when over time they obtain arable land, discover acceptance by the indigenous population into which they move (e.g., ethnic affinity), and are able to maintain their
former life styles and livelihoods. The Somalian government, for example, has understandably had a very difficult time trying to convert nomads into resettled fishermen on the coast due to the complete reversal of the refugees' original life style and livelihood in the Ogaden desert. On the other hand, resettled Sudanese in the extreme western province of Gambela, Ethiopia, have now been totally integrated into Ethiopian society after a short move (Ellman 1972). In contrast to the Somalian nomads' experience, however, they settled into an area with available land, similar agricultural methods, and local people with the same ethnic background.

8. The distribution pattern of refugee settlements is directly related to the size of the refugee groups, and indirectly related to the distance traveled.

We have already illustrated that these first seven generalizations are dynamic factors which create a significant differentiation between urban refugees and rural ones. Rural areas obviously do shoulder the burden of refugee settlement in Africa in general. However, these same dynamic factors—primarily size, distance, and degree of spatial concentration—create the fundamental distinction between three distinct patterns of rural settlement of refugees: self-settlement, refugee camps, and designated agricultural schemes. The following model (Figure 2.2) shows the inter-dependent relationships between distance traveled, size of refugee group, and the degree of spatial concentration of refugees.

As refugees move further and further from their point of origin the zone of settlement broadens, their real numbers decrease, and their spatial concentration takes on a distinctive nature in such a way as to differentiate four basic patterns of refugee settlement. Empirically, this hypothetical model is borne out across Africa in one country after another. The further into the country the more dispersed refugees become, filling larger areas,
and creating broader zones of settlement. More specifically, the following sequence of maps are illustrative, historical examples of zones of settlement and the internal spatial concentration within them.

Figure 2.3

Extending for hundreds of miles inside and along the southern border of Zaire is a clearly distinct but narrow band of spontaneous self-settlement by Angolans. This zone follows the contours of the border line because Angolan refugees are occupying the emptiest land available in the country and because they moved across the border with the intention of only making a temporary squatter stay and then returning to Angola when civil strife
SELF-SETTLEMENT IN ZAIRE

Figure 2.3

Figure 2.4

Source: UNHCR, 1981.
DESIGNATED AGRICULTURAL SCHEMES IN TANZANIA

Figure 2.5

ALL THREE RESettlement PATTERNS IN SUDAN

Figure 2.6 Source: Holborn, 1975.
subsided. Moreover in the mind of host governments like Zaire's, the further away spontaneous settlers are from existing populations, the better. The pattern is extended in an elongated fashion due to the unusually large numbers of refugees (approximately 170,000) needing intensive land area and the loosely knit spatial concentration characteristic of spontaneous self-settlement. With self-settling refugees the zone of settlement lies just inside and along the border and their spatial concentration fills out the area, but follows the contours of the border. Consequently, the larger the influx of refugees, the longer and more elongated the band of refugee settlement.

Figure 2.4

On the other hand, Somalia illustrates the typical zone created for refugee holding camps. Thirty-five refugee camps now exist in western Somalia. This broader band begins and ends where it does, in a given country, for three basic reasons. The zone usually begins about 50 kilometers from the border due to the mere fact that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by policy will not provide relief to refugee settlements that are not at least that far from the border line. (Self-settling refugees do, however, often parasitically attach themselves to a refugee camp and thereby give the appearance of settlement extending back toward the border.) Second, refugee camps are produced by acute crises wherein refugees are fleeing with physical safety as their prime goal, and they want to get well beyond the border line where the threat of marauding raiding parties is greatest. Third, African governments like Somalia's want to keep the blighted conditions and economic problems of refugee camps as far away from major urban centers as possible. In essence,
a locational balance point is struck between refugees pushing into the country and the host government's pushing them back away from major urban centers. These factors create a broader zone available for settlement than is the case for spontaneous self-settlers. Usually this line for settlement extends from 50 kilometers inside the country up to 125 kilometers. By virtue of the very nature of refugee "camps," however, the actual spatial concentration of refugees consists of very tight-knit clumps within this broader zone available for settlement.

Figure 2.5

The best efforts to devise self-sufficient agricultural schemes for refugees to resettle in have been made in Tanzania. Spearheaded by President Nyerere, Tanzania designated at least nine rural settlements for refugees, primarily from Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zaire. Although Tanzania established two small schemes near the extreme western border (8,000 and 4,000 ethnic Tutsis), the majority of settlement schemes were larger (approximately 10,000 refugees apiece) and further from surrounding borders. In actuality, these remaining refugee resettlement schemes lie within a zone stretching from approximately 150 to 350 kilometers inside the border. President Nyerere envisioned these agricultural schemes as a significant component of the Ujamaa plan for agricultural development and therein quite successfully integrated refugee settlement programs into national social and economic policies. Consequently, the informal zone for such resettlement schemes not only has to be wider (agricultural refugees need more land per person on which to become self-sufficient), but these kinds of resettlement schemes need to be knit into the national economy in order to be productive. Hence, although no government wants a large refugee population on its urban doorstep,
such schemes at least must be located at the ends of the transportation system. Finally, the spatial concentration of refugees in designated schemes lies somewhere between the random sprawl of spontaneous self-settlers and the honeycombed, stringently-packed pattern within refugee holding camps. In general, this means a loosely-knit but organized pattern usually ordered on the basis of standard, equitable units (such as, ten acres per family).

**Figure 2.6**

As seen in this map, Sudan holds these four patterns of refugee settlement simultaneously. Having suggested a trend of broadening zones - a narrow band of self-settlers, a wider band for refugee camps, and a broad belt available for self-sufficient agricultural schemes - Sudan does epitomize well this hypothetical model in a comprehensive way, including Khartoum at the center of the country catching the influx of urban refugees. Dominant cities in Africa, however, obviously do not lie usually as squarely in the center of a country as Khartoum does in Sudan. Nevertheless, at least the dominant urban hubs often lie at one protected end of a country or another (e.g., Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, and Kinshasa, Zaire).

This researcher has not discovered any study that explicitly documents the spatial concentration of an urban refugee population in Africa. Not surprisingly, writers usually refer loosely to urban refugees as living in ethnic pockets or enclaves. My own experience in Khartoum, Sudan, does confirm empirically that kind of distribution. Within the three towns - Khartoum North, Khartoum South, and Omdurman - educated Eritreans live in several pockets within Khartoum South. This is confirmed by clandestine Ethiopian restaurant/homes in several different locations throughout the southern portion of the capital city. Certainly more research and field
study need to be done concerning the spatial concentration and configuration of urban refugees, going beyond purely empirical observation like my own in Khartoum.

The following figure summarizes the preceding maps and discussion.

**Spatial Analysis of Rural Resettlement Patterns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone Size and Pattern</th>
<th>Spontaneous Self-Settlers</th>
<th>Refugee Camps</th>
<th>Agricultural Schemes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone Location</td>
<td>Narrow Band</td>
<td>Wider Band</td>
<td>Broad Belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 100 km.</td>
<td>Approx. 150 km.</td>
<td>Approx. 250 km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to Border</td>
<td>0 - 100 km.</td>
<td>50 - 200 km.</td>
<td>100 - 350 km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>into country</td>
<td>into country</td>
<td>into country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Concentration of Population</td>
<td>Random Sprawling</td>
<td>Tightly-Packed</td>
<td>Loosely-Knit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Configuration of Individuals</td>
<td>Sprinkled and Scattered</td>
<td>Tight Honey-Combed Pattern</td>
<td>Organized (e.g., 10 acre units)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.7

Obviously, the hypothetical model described above and encapsulated in this figure does not always match nicely and neatly, much less perfectly, with real-world phenomena for refugees. Distance and therefore space tends to separate and sort phenomena. Consequently, the smaller the country the more difficult it is to meaningfully superimpose these analytical models onto the real world. Nevertheless, though condensed, the same basic
relationships between settlement types expressed in zone size, location, and shape, as well as the same basic spatial concentrations and configurations of refugee settlers within each zone do exist in recurring fashion from one country to another, regardless of how large or small that nation's area may be.

**Urban Enclaves**

The primary emphasis of this study is rural refugee patterns of settlement. However, before proceeding into a separate discussion of each pattern of rural settlement, a brief exploration of the background and problems of urban refugees, as well as relief responses to them, is an appropriate step. In doing so, this brief overview is meant to broaden the contextual understanding of refugee problems in general, rather than to serve as an intensive analysis of urban refugees.

Refugees create definite migratory flows to urban areas in Africa; however, estimates of their numbers conflict. In September of 1982 the UNHCR office in Geneva, Switzerland, reported that over one-third of all refugees were in urban areas (Billard 1982, p. 34). In 1979, Robert Chambers estimated that only four percent were urban refugees (Chambers 1979, p. 382). These estimates vary considerably for several reasons. The lengthy issue of whether many "urban refugees" are economic migrants or bona fide refugees is one reason. Although the Kenyan government has actively sought to curb large refugee flows into Nairobi and Port Mombasa, but fails to acknowledge these people (who are primarily Ugandans) as "refugees" for political reasons. Similar action such as this one certainly disguises and confuses the number of actual urban refugees in a country. African cities experience dramatic fluctuations in refugee populations which also clouds the issue. Nevertheless,
John Rogge maintains that it is more and more clear that refugees are becoming less willing to be institutionalized in settlement schemes and frequently prefer now to take their chances in cities and go to great lengths to get to urban centers (Rogge 1981, p. 212).

Thus, not only are the numbers, but the ratios of refugees in urban areas to those in rural areas unquestionably growing. Often urban refugees get superficial treatment and analysis because they become a source of quick interviews, quick insights, and quick stories for researchers and journalists. After realizing the dearth of fundamental background data on urban refugees in Africa, UNHCR recently conducted inquiries, surveys, and censuses in the main urban areas. In that, their goal was to clarify who the urban refugees are in Africa. In September of 1982, UNHCR published the results of a study carried out in Kenya that inquired into the background of urban refugees both in Nairobi and in other African cities. A surprisingly high 95 percent correlation existed between refugees with an original urban background and their subsequent settlement in urban areas as refugees (Billard 1982, p. 35). Among many reasons, refugees with rural backgrounds can not effectively compete for employment with their new counterparts who have lived and were trained in urban centers. Space and distance tend to separate, sort, and correlate other characteristics. Hence, as distance increases, urban refugees increasingly become a distinct group from rural refugees in terms of their political convictions, education, sexual composition, age categories, and employment opportunities.

Although housing and food are certainly problems for urban refugees, the strategic factor on which their successful integration into society depends is employment. Rampant shantytown areas in one city after another are only one stark testimony to the difficulty of employment of any newly-
arrived migrant, refugee or not. W. T. Gould estimates that only five to ten percent of the refugees in Khartoum, Sudan, are employed (Gould 1982, p. 497). This employment rate may be comparable with other African cities. My own observation from Khartoum, Sudan, suggests at least four useful forms of employment commonly held by refugees. Some highly-trained Eritreans out-compete Sudanese nationals and secure positions with foreign companies working in Sudan (i.e., Chevron Oil Company). Other foreign companies, such as shipping lines, hire Eritrean refugees as cheap, yet highly-trained and English-speaking labor. The Sudanese government does occasionally deregulate employment restrictions for refugees in order to compensate for an important gap national Sudanese cannot fill in the employment market, such as nursing. Hence, English, education, skills, and luck are typically the four most important ingredients enabling a refugee to land a job. Without these extra assets, urban refugees usually resort to menial labor (e.g., shoe-shining and handicrafts) or illegal alternatives such as clandestine restaurants (largely to serve fellow refugees), entrepreneurship in the country's black market, theft rings, or prostitution.

Relief for urban refugees has been slow in coming for a number of fundamental reasons. Needless to say, often urban refugees' expectations exceed the host country's capacity to fulfill them (Weeks 1978, p. 5). Saddled with these expectations, responsibilities, and the prolonged and complicated nature of urban relief, refugees in urban areas are often "conveniently" ignored by relief agencies and host governments. Often, a tendency to overlook them stems from a predominant but incorrect presupposition that if a refugee reaches a city, he is able to take care of himself and eventually establish his own self-sufficiency. Linked to this incorrect presupposition is the fact that host governments often regard
urban refugees as being a transient, temporary problem who will resettle in a third country or repatriate. This "move on" syndrome means that host governments often passively hope refugees will eventually leave rather than actively coming to grips with urban refugees' problems and seeking to solve them.

In 1979 the Tanzanian government hosted the Arusha Conference which is the most recent large-scale conference on African refugees.* Among many findings, the conference concluded that, "It must be accepted that urban refugees are not in transit, and that special efforts to create opportunities for their employment and retraining and for the reevaluation of their qualifications must be made" (Erikson 1981, p. 37). BPEAR, the Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees, has worked particularly hard since the early 1970's to promote the individual resettlement of African refugees with professional qualifications or a university education (Gould 1974, p. 426). Also, some host governments have begun actively relocating less trained and poorly-educated refugees to wage-earning settlements on the suburban outskirts of urban areas to generate income with small-scale enterprises and industries.

Nevertheless, certainly a great deal of research on urban refugees needs to be done in the future in order to recommend appropriate, innovative kinds of relief. Who are African urban refugees and what obstacles and problems do they feel most keenly? How could trained urban refugees be more effectively used to counterbalance the exodus of educated nationals to other countries? What kinds of employment could best offset the tendency

*This conference included 38 African countries, 5 African Liberation Movements, 20 non-African countries, 16 intergovernmental and regional organizations, and 37 non-governmental refugee servicing agencies.
for urban refugees to drain services without any production? What means can be used to slow rural exodus? How can refugee guidance be matched by local awareness and acceptance? And then of course, what new facilities, programs, and institutions are needed for urban refugees? These issues and questions are particularly apropos in light of the fact that over the next decade refugee problems in Africa are likely to shift more and more to the cities.
Chapter Three

SPONTANEOUS SELF-SETTLEMENT

Either by choice or necessity, most African refugees are self-settlers. To begin with, over 90 percent of Africa's refugees originate in rural regions and flee to rural areas (Weeks 1978, p. 3). Their pattern of flight is typically a short hop, en masse, across the closest territorial boundary away from the conflict source. While some African refugees enter formal refugee camps or resettlement schemes, the majority of rural refugees begin squatter settlements of their own, join an established one, or in some instances mesh into a similar ethnic community just inside the country adjoining their homeland. In 1976 the UNHCR estimated that 75 percent of Africa's refugees were self-settlers, 20 percent were in organized settlements, and five percent lived in urban centers (Hansen 1981, p. 177). In 1979 experts who convened at the Pan African Conference held at Arusha, Tanzania, concurred with the UNHCR's estimate when they calculated that at least 60 percent of the continent's refugees were self-settlers (Rogge 1981, p. 199). The darkly marked bands of settlement areas along border regions on Figure 3.1 - in Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia - illustrate well the predominant zones of self-settlers in the past.
Figure 3.1

African refugees who are self-settlers in rural areas have been overlooked for at least four reasons, which together account for a general ignorance about them. First, attention to rural refugees is distracted by urban refugees who—although they are few—are an extremely visible minority. Researchers and journalists can garner quick interviews, insights, and stories in the more convenient, safe confines of a city. Moreover, urban refugees are not only more articulate, but able to be more persistent. They
literally do not go away, often queuing up day after day at the entrances of embassies, government offices, and UNHCR stations. Consequently, in light of the ever-present urgencies of urban refugees, the importance of rural refugees can easily be forgotten or ignored as a less-pressing, residual problem. In short, with urban refugees literally on your doorstep, the temptation has been to "let sleeping dogs lie" - even if they are dying - and conveniently assume all is well.

Second, government officials and relief agencies also have a bias toward formally organized projects which receive the most attention and funding. In 1976 the average allocation of UNHCR funds were forty times higher ($20.00 per person) for refugees in organized settlements (camps and agricultural schemes) than for self-settlers (Chambers 1979, p. 383). In turn, where money is spent in rural areas, visiting officials also go. Too often, physical structures such as airstrips, clinics, dispensaries, or schools become an overused point of contact with the refugees, particularly for foreign visitors who may be large donors, yet unfamiliar with rural Africa. As Robert Chambers relates, "In the words of some refugees, describing rare visitors, 'They only talk to the buildings.' and 'They come and they sign the book and they go'"(Chambers 1979, p. 383). Too often, Western donors begin to see institutions, not people, and therein develop a project mentality.

Third, a related bias toward dry season observation also contributes to overlooking self-settlers. Most refugee populations, as well as the surrounding indigenous population they may live within, share seasonal deprivations of food year after year. A relief worker at a remote Baptist mission gave the following personal account of the Angolan refugees in Zaire during the late 1960's:
"For three years, during ... December and January, there would be many deaths, especially amongst the children. The reason was that the normal diet during these months just before harvest was on a starvation level; these were the months when food was the shortest, especially nutritionally valuable foods, such as peanuts" (Holborn 1975, pp. 1068-1069).

Hence, towards the end of the rainy season conditions for self-settled refugees are typically at their worst (little food, extensive malnutrition, and much disease such as diarrheas and malaria), while visits from external aid agencies and government officials are least frequent because transportation systems are usually at their worst.

Finally, self-settling refugees are generally overlooked because they may be geographically remote or maintain a very low profile. The recent exodus from Uganda into extreme southern Sudan is a classic example of self-settling refugees who are virtually inaccessible from the capital city and cut off from the outside world. In addition, self-settling refugees tend more often to blend into similar cultural groups and sprinkle themselves randomly across a great deal of territory. Consequently, they become "hidden" people to the public and political eye. For example, in 1970 Art Hansen, a professor of behavioral studies and anthropology at the University of Florida, arrived in northwest Zambia to do some fieldwork unrelated to refugees. After stumbling onto Angolans interspersed throughout the area, however, Hansen not only turned his attention to them, but he wrote thereafter the most extensive series of articles on self-settling refugees in Africa to date. Eventually he concluded that 25 to 35 percent of the area's people were "hidden" but bona fide Angolan refugees (UNHCR 1981, p. 384). Apparently Angolan refugees rather silently drifted into Zambia from 1966 to 1976. Comparable instances of low-profile self-settlements continue to occur in other African nations. Often such refugees are out of
sight and hearing and therein out of political and public consciousness. Nevertheless, several recent articles on self-settlement (Nansen's, 1982; Chambers', 1979; Hansen's, 1979; and Bett's, 1981) attest to a newly growing interest in self-settlers.

_The Myth of Spontaneous Integration_

Not surprisingly, a general ignorance concerning self-settling refugees has led, in turn, to a number of key misunderstandings. The largest misunderstanding could be called "the myth of spontaneous integration." Spontaneous integration is commonly capsulized as a natural process. When violence occurs, rural refugees simply slide across the border and join their kin. Their kin not only gladly welcome them, but give them food, generous hospitality, and eventually land. With land in hand, these refugees quickly settle, reestablish a livelihood, and are fully integrated into their host society. Such a scenario unrealistically implies a degree of inherent ease, natural adaptability, and complete success that is rarely true of rural self-settlers.

Undoubtedly some actual cases of complete spontaneous integration have occurred in the past. William Zartman documented a Senegalese welcome of neighboring Guinea-Bissceans. He wrote that they:

"...speak the same language, lead a communal life, and sometimes even have shared the same fields which lay across the border. The affinity between the inhabitants and the refugees has proved so strong that, in many cases, the local population has shared everything with the refugees including lodging, tools, seeds, and food stocks" (Zartman 1970, p. 151).

This example does epitomize the ideal of the unassisted and full integration of refugees in a spontaneous manner, but one may question how common such instances are, and how long it takes for integration into the host society to occur. Both W. T. Gould and Rachel Yeld have documented
instances where some family groups have become self-sufficient within one harvest season (Gould 1974, p. 423). But in no way does the physical "self-sufficiency" of a few guarantee full social integration by an entire refugee population flowing into an area. Refugee populations are not homogenous. A visible minority with strong family ties may be helped to establish themselves in a new setting. The majority, however, may not be helped.

In this regard, Art Hansen has suggested that refugees who cannot find kinsmen or enough social and political support to establish themselves emerge in refugee camps (Hansen 1979, p. 370). And this is true not only for the weak and the poor. Whole refugee populations refute this myth of spontaneous integration. Three examples may be cited: the Burundi refugees who crossed into South Kivu, Tanzania, in 1972; Bakongo refugees who crossed from Angola to Bas Zaire from 1961 onwards; and Ugandans who have fled into southern Sudan since 1972. Each represent entire population groups who have sought to self-settle, but have suffered extensive deprivation, discouragement, and disease.

In essence, "spontaneous integration" has seemingly become a benign label to support the idea that it is better not to interfere with the natural course of events, and to dismiss the problem. As Robert Chambers notes, "Refugees about whom little is known and for whom little is done, have been allowed to act from natural impulse without external stimulus or constraint,..." (Chambers 1979, p. 385). This is not to deny that unassisted, spontaneous integration can happen (it does), but generally spontaneous integration is more of a reassuring, convenient myth than an actuality.

The Reality of Self-Settlement

As seen already, the experience of whole populations refutes the myth of spontaneous integration. Moreover, neither moving short distances nor
settling with kin can assure even an individual or small family of self-sufficiency once they arrive across the border. Instead, evidence, though scattered, suggests some serious problems with self-settlement. To begin with, self-settling refugees usually face instant impoverishment. Most refugees of this type evacuate quickly in response to sudden warfare in their homeland. Consequently, refugees who may have to self-settle, generally arrive after experiencing a traumatic flight, perhaps the loss of their family, and physical exhaustion. Moreover, they often have left behind food, land, livestock, possessions, and even cash. Although cash can be a mobile asset in most instances, what cash refugees have is usually radically devalued immediately upon arrival. In 1975, for example, Ethiopian refugees arriving in Sudan quickly discovered that they could only get ten piastres for an Ethiopian dollar as against the official rate of 25 piastres per dollar, therein losing 60 percent of their saving’s value (Chambers 1979, p. 386). Art Hansen summarizes the real-world saga of Angolan self-settler refugees as follows:

"Refugees are poorer than normal immigrants for several reasons. Angolan money is worthless outside the colony, so any monetary savings became worthless. Earlier immigrants from Angola would exchange their money at the border with people who traded in Angola, but the war stopped trade. The other mode of storing large amounts of capital is cattle. Earlier immigrants either sold their cattle before leaving or drove them to Zambia. Refugees either lost their cattle to various soldiers before leaving or abandoned the cattle. No one was left to buy them, and it was dangerous to drive cattle because the Portuguese were bombing anyone they saw in the free-fire zones. Only the refugees who fled in the first days of fighting were able to save some of their invested capital. Later refugees could only carry smaller less valuable items (clothes, blankets, tobacco, axes, etc.). By the time refugees reached their Zambian relatives their food supplies were usually exhausted, as were the refugees themselves" (Hansen 1979, pp. 371-372).

Hence, this kind of devastating impoverishment often aggravates the self-settlement process.
After the traumatic experiences of flight and the loss of possessions, self-settling refugees also do not have a guarantee of ethnic affinity and generous hospitality. Case studies are beginning to illustrate that many refugees receive mixed receptions and some even hostile ones. Quite opposite Zartman's example of unusual generosity on the part of Senegalese, another anthropologist, Colin Turnbull, recorded the superficial welcome, but devious theft by the Ik tribe in Northern Uganda during the Sudanese civil war at a village named Kauai.

"...we had a steady trickle of refugees coming through Kidepo, mostly Didingo herders...those who had wealth of any kind were ushered with great protestations of friendship into a kind of refugee camp that the Ik thought up themselves. It was at the lower end of Kauai's long, narrow village, just across from me. The village even constructed a 'boma' [cattle corral] to contain the Didinga cattle and goats, but it was placed at the other end, away from the Didinga and convenient to the hungry Ik. Didinga who were thus welcomed never lasted long before they too joined the stream of refugees flowing on down to Kaabong..." (Turnbull 1973, p. 122).

This example of tactful theft reflects the fact that ethnic hostility or indifference may be just as likely, if not more so, than ethnic affinity.

Self-settlers are also confronted by a combination of cheap labor being combined with poor access to land and costly food. Land may not be available for self-settling refugees to utilize. If land is available, it is likely to be too little, too far away from the settlement, too poor in quality, or some combination of all three. Even in the case of the Angolans in Zambia, self-settlers typically traveled six or seven miles from the villages to reach their fields (Chambers 1979, p. 387). Secure access to land for refugees on traditional terms is declining, especially where population pressures are exceeding the norm (Chambers 1979, p. 387). In any case, research in the past has probably overexaggerated the physical availability and social access to viable land for self-settling refugees.
Particularly if arable land is unavailable, the terms of trade for labor and food become overwhelming. With a sudden influx of refugees the wage rate drops immediately and food prices begin to climb rapidly. When refugees arrived in northwestern Zambia in the early 1970's agricultural labor rates dropped to ten nqwee (14c) a morning - strictly enough to purchase daily minimum requirements of food (Hansen 1981, p. 187). Consequently, refugees attempting to self-settle often resorted to gathering honey caterpillars, beer brewing, and menial food processing (e.g., preparing cassava or pounding corn). Moreover, any Arab trader in southern Sudan knows how to increase the cost of dura (grain) and maximize his profits during an influx of refugees. Thus, self-settlement without viable land or extremely generous hosts generally leaves refugees trapped in precarious balance between low wages against the rising demand and price of food.

Self-settling refugees are often extremely vulnerable, politically, legally, and economically. Obviously, rural refugees do not carry any major political power at all. They are simply too poor, too uneducated, and too far away to take any kind of a strong position vis-a-vis the national government bureaucracy. Locally, refugees are prime targets for blackmail, exploitation, and expropriation, particularly under the threat of forceable repatriation. Robert Chambers spells out the implication of this disadvantageous position.

"If they (refugees) begin to achieve modest economic success, they may become hypervulnerable to harassment or expropriation. They may be kept poor not just by their initial poverty, low wages, lack of work and lack of food, but also by petty persecution and lack of security. They then often keep a low profile and avoid investment" (Chambers 1979, p. 388).

Hence, self-settling refugees can be kept indefinitely in a state of extreme impoverishment.
Finally, perhaps the saddest commentary on self-settlement is when the costs of hosting refugees begin to impoverish even the indigenous, local population. Ethiopian refugees, for example, are often recruited as cheap labor to weed and harvest on Sudanese agricultural schemes. This practice displaces poor Sudanese nationals from employment and drives the wage rate down. It also increases the disparity between the local "have's" and "have not's." Moreover, self-settling refugees can easily overload the area's carrying capacity in other ways - land, food, water, or financial resources - and thereby depress the entire region physically. Often, when repeated influxes of self-settling refugees flood an area with a limited carrying capacity a famine situation occurs. As time mounts and numbers of refugees grow, the physical environment and actual carrying capacity deteriorates so rapidly that both the local indigenous people and the refugee population can reach the brink of mass starvation.

Due to the seasonality of crops in tropical Africa, the most dangerous period occurs at the end of the rainy season when food stocks are lowest. Aside from refugee influxes, for instance, the Mabaan people in southern Sudan are always "hungry" at the end of the rainy season. One year may mean famine, the next merely temporary malnutrition, but in every year the degree of hunger is in question. In societies such as this one, the rapid influx of refugees en masse can create famine conditions for the whole region.

One of the worst conclusions to a self-settling situation was documented in the Bas Zaire region of Zaire in the late 1960's. Over 400,000 alien Angolans crossed the border in the mid-1960's. This overload eventually overtaxed the land and created a rapid decline in per capita food production along this border region. The Zairois National Nutritional Planning Centre finally concluded in the mid-70's that, "There are no major differences in
the nutritional standards of the refugee population and their Zairean neighbors" (Betts 1981, p. 217). Moreover, the Centre concluded that in terms of the total number of malnourished people there were probably more acute cases of malnutrition in the Bas Zaire region than in four out of five countries surveyed at the same time in the Sahel (Betts 1981, p. 217).

One result of famine situations like this one is (the unsurprising fact) that local indigenous people often begin to show up as "refugees" for emergency food. Ironically enough, in some instances, when food relief arrives, the bona fide refugees can begin to cultivate the land and self-settle because they have free food while their indigenous hosts remain hungry, without food, and without the energy to begin recultivating for next year.

The preceding discussion has utilized and referred to the two prime examples of African self-settlement contained in recent refugee literature - Angolans in northwestern Zambia and Angolan refugees in the Bas Zaire region of Zaire. Hansen's extended study in Zambia typifies successful, "spontaneous" self-settlement, while the Bas Zaire region represents a disastrous instance of self-settlement. The next objective is to isolate and explore several strategic elements that produced successful, unassisted self-settlement of Angolans in Zambia. In doing so, I hope to identify several strategic hinges on which self-settlement swings to either relative success or failure.*

1. Not surprisingly, the first clear reason for successful self-settlement in Zambia is merely the fact that the influx of Angolans into Zambia was 20 to 25 times smaller than the number of Angolans who flooded

*"Success" in this instance is predicated primarily on establishing individual self-sufficiency and secondarily based upon thorough integration into the society.
the Bas Zaire region. The Bas Zaire region received from 400,000 to 500,000 refugees while northwestern Zambia simultaneously had only 20,000 Luvuli-speaking refugees entering the area (Hansen 1981, p. 186). Due to the lower ratio of refugees to the indigenous population in Zambia, Hansen frequently refers to the fact that Angolan self-settlers remained extremely low profile, blended into the indigenous population, and were a rather well-hidden people. On the other hand, although they remained geographically "hidden" by being in remote areas, in Zaire Angolan self-settlers could not as easily blend into the indigenous society simply due to their massive numbers. Hence, more successful (or integrated) self-settlement can be correlated in a general way, with smaller sizes of the preceding refugee influxes.

2. The spatial configuration of villages in the receiving region of Zambia was also a significant factor for success. Art Hansen estimated that 81 percent of the border villages in northwestern Zambia had twenty people or fewer largely due to their matrilineal social customs (Hansen 1981, p. 185). Consequently, villages were not only small and spread out, but their loose configuration left easily-accessible and physically viable land between villages for incoming refugees to utilize for planting crops. This pattern also served as a natural sorting and spreading mechanism built into the local society. Incoming refugees were routed to and self-settled in small pockets that imaged or mirrored the helpful spatial pattern of the local society itself. Hence, host societies made up of loosely-knit, small villages are more likely to precipitate more successful self-settlement.

3. Self-settlement was also aided by an ethnic affinity that had been developed and expanded over time through mobility. Society in the northwestern region of Zambia was already a mobile, transient one to begin with. The indigenous population had a mobile lifestyle itself - frequently visiting
relatives, shifting fields, moving village sites, traveling to fish or trade, and migrating to European mines and farms. Between 1971 and 1972 Art Hansen conducted a census of 117 matrilineal villages. Although the total population remained at 1,223, he discovered that 217 people (18 percent) had left the area and were replaced by another 217 newcomers (Hansen 1981, p. 187). Births and deaths did account for 70 of the 434 persons who either left or entered society, but the majority (364) were travelers of one kind or another (Hansen 1981, p. 187). Hence, this highly mobile society was already particularly well suited for refugee influxes.

However, an historic pattern of migratory drift between countries also set the background for the present refugee movement. In fact, refugee influxes may be seen as only the latest phase in the continuing migration of these people along the same routes throughout this century (Hansen 1979, p. 371). Originally the Zambian/Angolan border bisected a common ethnic territory leaving in its wake a rudimentary relationship between the two societies on either side of the border line. This rudimentary relationship, however, has been supplemented by an historical pattern of constant migration and interdependence. During and after the colonial era apparently a number of labor migration routes emerged between Angola and the rest of southern Africa, many of which ran through the border region of northwestern Zambia. Consequently, many Angolans, even before "acute displacement," had developed a network of dependent relationships with relatives and kin in Zambia. As Hansen notes, "This constant mobility and resettlement has been institutionalized socially and politically. There are established ways by which visiting kin are to be received and sheltered, obligations that hosts have to their relatives who come to visit or stay..." (Hansen 1979, p. 370). Hence, by the mid-1960's this ethnic affinity ran far beyond mere compatibility and into thorough-going, generous hospitality.
This generous, institutionalized hospitality for Angolan refugees is illustrated well with regard to food, the most important variable for refugees' recovery. When Angolan refugees first arrived they were given generous gifts of cassava, the local staple in the diet, either in a prepared form, ready to be processed, or standing in the fields. Next, growing exchanges of cassava for labor signaled the onset of active assimilation into society. Eventually, many refugees were given land or at least the right to use it. This land was not only the fundamental unit needed to realize their goal of self-sufficiency, but it was the basic element for integration into the society. Thus, this particular setting offered a degree of "ethnic affinity" that was translated over time from what could have been just passive coexistence into a dynamic institution ready-made for successful self-settlement.

In summary, many writers refer to "ethnic affinity" and "available land" as the two primary prerequisites for self-settlement, but treat these two keys in a superficial manner. On the other hand, Art Hansen's extensive study illustrates in a more complete way that smaller influxes of refugees into areas of loosely-knit settlement free up more land, and thereby assure greater success for refugees who are self-settling. Hansen's work in Zambia also illustrates the fact that "ethnic affinity" at its best can involve an entire social structure already historically developed to bear the brunt of refugee influxes. In an area of transborder mobility Angolans have established routes and relationships on the Zambian side of the border. Consequently, when fighting erupted in 1966, these Angolans did not indiscriminately flee across the border. Instead, they relied on familiar routes and relationships to enter Zambia, activate kinship relationships for food and shelter, eventually secure land, and begin the assimilation process into a
new, but similar society and physical setting. Thus, other rural Africans who successfully self-settle are likely to also use well-worn paths and processes in order to shed poverty and dependency and become economically self-sufficient.

Having started with the discouraging situation in Zaire and traced through the positive experience of self-settlers in Zambia, it is now crucial to note the fact that Hansen's field work has, for all intents and purposes, dominated the literature on self-settlement. He concluded that understanding the processes by which these Angolans resettled themselves provides an insight into the settlement of more than a million Africans who became refugees between 1960 and 1972 (Hansen 1979, p. 369). It would be unwise, however, to simply superimpose Hansen's insights indiscriminately upon every other instance of "spontaneous self-settlement" in Africa. Logically enough, as borne out by the Bas Zairian experience, oftentimes self-settlers do not enjoy the distinct set of positive advantages reflected in Hansen's case study of successful self-settlement.

However, success or failure, Hansen's field study is not sufficient for the rest of the continent. Recurring phenomena certainly do exist across Africa with regard to self-settlement. However, documented field experience is extremely limited at best. For that reason, settlers in Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Somalia need to be studied more closely. How, when, and why is self-settlement truly "integrative" or naturally successful without assistance? Research of particular populations may unearth other instances of successful self-settlement. On the other hand, renewed research in another place may reveal that, "the condition of the refugees...is much less satisfactory than had been believed," as was the case after an extensive mission undertaken by the UNHCR representative in
1967 along the Congo border (Chambers 1979, p. 286). Thus, in actuality very little is really known about the majority of self-settlers in Africa. In the absence of information and more thorough case studies, conflicting assumptions will continue about conventional African hospitality, spontaneous integration, and self-settlement in general.
Chapter Four

REFUGEE HOLDING CAMPS

The second basic pattern of settlement for rural refugees in Africa is holding camps. Historically, most sub-Saharan nations have employed this solution at one time or another, particularly in instances of acute violence and consequent refugee overloads arriving en masse very suddenly. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, for example, Uganda established the Nakaspiripiri Camp, Zambia sought to enforce a stringent camp policy for incoming Angolans, and Tanzania as well as Zambia founded holding camps for Mozambiquans. Robert Chambers combines two categories - organized agricultural schemes and refugee camps - and calculates that 24 percent of African refugees are in one or the other (Chambers 1979, p. 382). In 1983, the major African countries which maintain holding camps are Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Zambia, and Mozambique. Among these five nations, it is Somalia which faces a massive overload of refugees. Thousands of ethnic Somalis have fled from the disputed Ogaden region. In June of 1982, the American Embassy estimated that the number of refugees given temporary asylum in holding camps was 1,000,000 (Department of State 1982c, p. 2). Without repatriation, Somalia continues to deteriorate economically amidst an overbearing flood of more dependent refugees in holding camps than any other African nation.
As in the case of other types of refugee settlement very little research has been done on holding camps. Barry Stein, a well-known member of the U.S. Refugee Policy Group, suggests that, "The experience in refugee camps, ... is perhaps the most poorly analyzed part of the refugee experience. A fair amount of descriptive material exists, and a few scholars have examined the impact of the camp experience on behavior, but there is no system of classification of camps nor models of the crucial elements of the camp experience" (Betts 1981, pp. 321-322). Hanne Christensen, a sociologist for the U.N.'s Research Institute for Social Development, recognized this gap, especially with regard to Africa. After her six weeks exploratory field study in Somalia she wrote, "In particular, research into the conduct of refugee camps is practically nonexistent" (Christensen 1982, p. 1). Investigating social, spatial, and economic patterns in refugee camps is dirty, difficult work to begin with in any situation. Often, however, researchers are only allowed limited information or restricted access to refugee camps given the political vulnerability of holding camps. Thus, African refugee camps need more academically-sound field studies done in a thorough fashion and followed by some comparative analysis and theoretical model-building.

Refugees bound for holding camps are usually typified by a very large, sudden flight which diminishes to a smaller, steady flow after the first acute displacement. Within the receiving country the zone for holding camps is usually clarified, defined, and informally demarcated by two opposing pressures. On one hand, the greater the intensity and the closer the proximity of physical violence, the deeper refugees are pushed into the country of refuge. To avoid border skirmishes this tendency has been formalized by the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which
commonly requires settlements to be at least 50 kilometers from the international boundary in order to qualify for financial aid. On the other hand, the host governments are usually eager to keep refugee holding camps as far away from urban centers as possible. Isolating holding camps and their blighted conditions is not only politically less embarrassing, but distance decreases the likelihood of urban-rural migration and the subsequent weight of an added refugee population in cities.

Despite U.N. protocol that calls for the right of a refugee's freedom of movement in an asylum country, camp confinement in a tight spatial configuration is logically the most economic and efficient pattern to distribute and dispense food or medical aid. Most holding camps are generally laid out and administrated in sections or blocks, each containing a standard number of households (e.g., 80 households in a small camp or up to 450 households in a large camp). The spatial configuration of a typical holding camp is organized so rigorously that out-migration can sometimes be spotted from an airplane overhead as gaps or holes where dwellings once stood in the spatial pattern. Moreover, holding camps are usually soon surrounded by a broad, but barren circular area fourteen or fifteen miles across in which people and animals have stripped away all the vegetation for firewood or fodder.

In broad terms there are two kinds of holding camps for refugees - a temporary, emergency holding center, and a holding camp that becomes a long-term, permanent form of refugee settlement. Pierre Simonitsch, a journalist, documented the rapid emergence of Kaya, a short-term emergency center in southern Sudan. Kaya was one of many set up after some 140,000 Ugandans fled recently into Sudan. He writes as follows:
"Look though you may, you will never find the city of Kaya on a map. Just a few years ago, all that could be seen on the Sudanese side of the border with Uganda were isolated straw huts. Today, Kaya has more than 10,000 inhabitants. On the main street, automobiles with Ugandan licence plates are parked. For them it is the last stop, since there is no way of moving forward or backwards. Three-quarters of Kaya's population are refugees from Uganda.

"The refugees from Uganda form a long line in front of the police station and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. Lorries arrive several times per week in order to take some of the refugees to a more secure area...

"Before each refugee is taken away from Kaya he receives a food ration which is supposed to last for one month, consisting of cassava beans and dried fish. Some refugees possess one goat, which also takes its place on the lorry" (Simonitsch 1982, p. 8).

Like some other instances in Africa, even though the city of Kaya is not formally sanctioned by the government, it functions as a transit stopping point between initial flights and permanent resettlement. Our concern here, however, is not to discuss holding camps which function as merely a temporary receiving station, but to explore refugee camps that take on the longer function of a permanent settlement for refugees.

At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the fact that these two kinds of refugee camps are often related closely together in reality. Many permanent holding camps are originally conceived and created for transitory purposes, but over time become a permanent or "semi-permanent" settlement. When the interim between flight and repatriation or further resettlement becomes longer and longer, holding camps inevitably become permanent features long enough to be thought of as an independent, significant pattern of settlement. In this sense "holding" camps which first function as a means ("holding") eventually become or progress into an end (permanent settlements). Hanne Christensen identified these kinds of "semi-permanent" camps when she described refugee camps in Somalia as holding camps that are
neither emergency centers nor full-fledged settlements (Christensen 1982, p. 41). In essence, such holding camps are self-perpetrated by a paradoxical state of semi-emergency. As the time between initial flight and eventual repatriation grows, holding camps lose their dramatic aura of emergency, but still maintain an emergency identity because they are usually virtually completely dependent on external sources of food to survive even a few days. Thus, simply defined, holding camp settlements for refugees not only have a tightly-packed spatial configuration of dwellings, but they are places where refugees come to a stop and settle, but remain dependent upon outside food sources.

This statement situation between time and dependency that creates a settlement can also be seen in the context of the other two forms of rural refugee resettlement. In short, permanent holding camps are inevitable if: 1. refugees lack the ethnic linkages and/or the land with agricultural potential (climate, soils, water, etc.) necessary to settle independently and establish their own self-sufficiency, and 2. the host government has not planned and/or does not have the necessary physical and financial resources to resettle refugees on organized schemes, particularly after an unusually large, sudden influx of refugees. In this situation holding camps may continue and become, by sheer default if nothing else, a form of refugee settlement.

A Somalian Case Study

The nature of permanent refugee camps can now be explored further by two examples which exhibit different degrees of dependency on relief and economic success. We can rely upon two independent case studies from the
field - Hanne Christensen's sociological study of Somali camps for the U.N. and Trish Johnson's investigation of Eritrean camps in eastern Sudan for the Catholic World Relief - as a basis for comparative analysis and clarification of each settlement's nature and degree of economic or geographic isolation. In each instance the level and kind of trade between the settlement and the surrounding country serves as a measure of economic self-reliance.

In the first case the historical background for the Ogaden conflict between present-day Ethiopia and Somalia is linked to colonial negotiations in the late 1800's and early 1900's between Ethiopia, Great Britain, and Italy. For nearly one hundred years ethnic Somali nomads have straddled the controversial international boundary line running through the Ogaden territory. In early 1977, Somalia's rising quest for a "Greater Somalia" and Ethiopia's avid territorial claims under a new Marxist government collided and exploded into the Ogaden War. By the early 1980's food aid was geared to a refugee population estimated at nearly 1,000,000 in as many as forty-four different refugee camps (Christensen 1982, p. 4). As early as 1980, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that more than one out of every three Somali residents were refugees, most of which were in three major areas containing camps - Gedeo, Hiran, and the Northwest Region (See Figure 4.1) (UNHCR 1981c, p. 3). In these three regions eleven camps were designed and designated as temporary camps, while the remaining thirty-three were systematically being closed to newcomers, and therein becoming permanent settlements by intention (Christensen 1982, p. 7).

Refugees were still trickling out of the Ogaden in 1983. The sheer number of refugees and the magnitude of their poverty has been increased by both countries. The Ethiopian government has reportedly pursued a
Figure 4.1

Source: UNHCR 1981c, p. 3.
military policy likened to General Sherman's devastating "march to the sea" during the American Civil War. Their reported goal is to make the Ogaden virtually uninhabitable and they have done so by indiscriminate bombing, poisoned water holes, slaughtered cattle, rape, and murder (Meland 1980, p. 21). On the other hand, the Somalian government has chosen for political reasons to leave most refugees in concentrated camps. As J. R. Rogge explains, "...the permanent resettlement of ethnic Somali refugees within Somalia would clearly weaken Somalia's territorial claims to the Ogaden and hence no immediate resettlement plans are being formulated" (Rogge 1982, p. 43). Recently the Somalian government has been confronted by its unrealistic pretense of "imminent repatriation" and has begun developing a few small-scale resettlement schemes for refugees.

Hanne Christensen visited one settlement in each of the three major regions containing refugee camps. She summarized their general spatial layout and physical conditions in the following way:

"The camps each occupy from four to seven square kilometers. Each is divided into a number of dwelling sections. The camp areas are totally cleared of trees and small vegetation, as is up to five to eight kilometers of the adjacent land. The refugees have cleared the areas in the process of getting fuel for cooking. This is still going on and the areas are slowly being transformed into stony, arid desert. The camps give the impression of being densely populated. The inhabited areas appear to be occupied totally by refugee huts (the 'guries')" (Christensen 1982, p. 11).

Without reliable motivation or means of self-sufficient indigenous food production, most Somalian refugees in holding camps have been fed by agency food programs for the last several years. Food rations coordinated by the World Food Programme are generally distributed to refugees every ten days as long as the transportation system continues to function. Only 70 to 90 percent of the allotted food actually reaches the refugees due to undependable transport, petty theft, and spoilage (Christensen 1982, p. 21).
The rationed food basket is composed of ten basic items which, in principle, should depend on the following daily quantities:

**THE DAILY RATIONED FOOD BASKET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Type</th>
<th>Ration</th>
<th>Actually Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>food in grain form, i.e., maize, sorghum, rice</td>
<td>300 g.</td>
<td>300 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wheat flour, corn soya milk</td>
<td>100 g.</td>
<td>50 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vegetable oil</td>
<td>40 g.</td>
<td>40 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milk powder, i.e., dried skimmed milk, dried whole milk</td>
<td>50 g.</td>
<td>25 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beans</td>
<td>40 g.</td>
<td>40 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>40 g.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dates/dried fruit</td>
<td>10 g.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meat</td>
<td>10 g.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tea</td>
<td>3 g.</td>
<td>3 g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salt</td>
<td>2 g.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**                                      | 595 g. | 458 g.            |

Table 4.1 Source: Christensen 1982, p. 24

Not surprisingly, within each camp an extensive system of social stratification is molded around the central dynamic of food in general and in grain specifically. Over time this self-perpetuating stratification tends to reinforce a growing disparity between the camp's own set of "haves" and marginal "have-nots." When food supplies are received irregularly the marginal minority (10-15 percent) suffer malnutrition and need supplemental feeding centers.

On the other hand most refugees manage to accumulate food surpluses and engage in trade with non-refugees living in the camp's vicinity. Refugees develop food surpluses in four basic ways: during occasional overstocks of food; acquiring extra food when ration quotas are identical for adults and children; cutting back on their daily diet fifty to one hundred calories; and pilfering grain as it moves through the distribution
network. The overwhelming majority of refugees apparently have enough food and regularly stockpile extra grain inside their huts. Hanne Christensen discovered three categories of stratification based on grain stockpiling: a. a group of 10 to 15 percent had five to ten bags piled up in the gury (hut); b. some 70 percent had one to three bags stockpiled; c. only 10 to 15 percent had no extra food available at all (Christensen 1982, p. 22). Group (a) is composed of section leaders and deputies who are in charge of some aspect of food distribution, while category (c) are the disadvantaged refugees who are ill, incapacitated, parentless, etc. Regardless of the amount of stockpiled grain, anyone who manages to acquire extra (categories a and b) begins to regularly exchange grain with local traders or at local markets in adjacent areas. In return, refugees regularly obtain fresh foods such as goat meat, milk, or cheese in a series of regular exchanges. Enterprising refugees have regular contact with two or three local livestock-raising families and food is exchanged approximately twice a month (Christensen 1982, p. 23). Consequently, not only do refugees obtain food items that they previously relied on in their diet within the Ogaden, but these limited in-kind food exchanges provide a constructive contact between refugees and the indigenous inhabitants. This social linkage that hinges on food exchange prevents segregation, encourages cooperation, and lowers hostilities or antagonism between refugees and non-refugees in the area. Thus, extra access to food becomes a strategic basis for trade, supplemented nutrition, and inter-community cooperation.

The Wad el Hilawy Case Study

The story of Wad el Hilawy, a refugee holding settlement in eastern Sudan, however, is a very different one than the experience of refugee
camps in Somalia. Wad el Hilawy was originally a town and then the site for a transit center for refugees before it became a permanent camp from 1975 until 1979 for Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees who were both fleeing westward. Like many Somali camps, Wad el Hilawy is located close to the border.

**ERITREAN/ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES IN NORTHEAST SUDAN (1980)**

![Map of Eritrea and Ethiopia with major cities and towns labeled.](image)

**Figure 4.2**

*Source: Wright 1980, p. 159*
The fact that its nature was quite unlike Sonalian camps, however, was illustrated in a concrete way by a central market area away from which the mud huts of its 30,000 inhabitants radiated outward. This central market place betrayed the fact that although Wad el Hilawy was a bona fide refugee settlement camp, it had a full-fledged internal economy of its own, both for cash and for in-kind goods.

In 1975, the World Food Programme, in conjunction with the Catholic World Relief Service, began a twelve month program for emergency food relief. This program continued until Wad el Hilawy was forceably closed down in 1979 due to frequent outbreaks of violence and a general hesitancy to permanent settlements. Throughout the 1970's, however, Sudan had very active resettlement policies and plans. Consequently, refugees in Wad el Hilawy were originally asked to either join an organized settlement scheme (10 acre plots, transportation to the location, huts, water, and medical care included) or to become laborers on nearby mechanized agricultural schemes. But as Trish Johnson, a nurse for Catholic World Relief, relates, "While to an outsider these options might look attractive and certainly more so than continuing economic dependency, the refugees steadfastly refused to cooperate with the government's plan to resettle them" (Johnson 1979, p. 41). Why was this so?

On the surface, their public reasons for refusing to move were malaria infestation and poor land for farming at the proposed scheme site. That site, however, was formerly run very profitably, though illegally, by a wealthy Sudanese, and the threat of malaria was virtually the same throughout the entire area. Moreover, the refugees contended they should not work as cheap labor on mechanized schemes and therein compromise themselves as low-waged proletariats for Sudan in the quest to become the "bread basket"
of the Middle East. Nevertheless, a good number of Eritreans and Ethiopians already worked on the mechanized schemes.

Underneath these superficial statements were two fundamental reasons for not moving and instead settling indefinitely in a holding camp. The first reason was their adamant desire to maintain their identity as Eritrean and keep their opportunity for repatriation. As Johnson relates, "Privately, while refugees reiterated the public reasons for obstructing resettlement plans, they added that while they would have liked in principle to be self-sufficient, they did not want to achieve this at the expense of moving deeper into Sudan and thus cutting themselves off to a greater extent from their homeland" (Johnson 1979, p. 141). Closer to the border they had news nearly every day from the battlefront and from relatives and easy access into Eritrea for short reentries and visits. Hence, they actively sought to stay quite literally midway between Sudan and Eritrea — close enough to Eritrea for easy access or repatriation and far enough away from the domination of Sudanese culture in order to maintain their own identity.

The second reason refugees settled indefinitely in Wad el Hilawya until they were forced to leave was their relatively high degree of economic success based on both markets and trading both internally as well as externally. Unlike Somalian camps where trading a few in-kind goods occurred now and then, Wad el Hilawya was bolstered by a much more active economy. Among African ethnic groups, Eritreans and Ethiopians are unusually educated, skilled, enterprising, and proud. Consequently, they are particularly well-suited for trading economies based on rigorous entrepreneurship. Within the camp a number of small-scale projects occurred: basket weaving, textile weaving, embroidery, and a donkey project to haul firewood and water for sale (Wright 1980). These formal projects as well
as other kinds of informal employment (e.g., cigarette selling) generated
income and economic activity within the camp settlement.

A second related key to Wad el Hilawy’s economic livelihood was its
close proximity to the Sudanese transportation network and several urban
centers. Figure 4.2 of eastern Sudan as well as the accompanying inset map
illustrate Wad el Hilawy’s close relationship to the cities of Kassala,
Gedaref, Wad Medani, and Khartoum; to the rail line and road network; and to
several development schemes. Two hundred Eritreans interviewed near Gedaref
illustrated their mobility by identifying the following places of previous
work.

Plac es of P revious W ork

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas around Gedaref</th>
<th>52%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gedaref (excluding Rabab)</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabaa</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (border towns Umgulja, Port-Sudan)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Source: Wright 1980, p. 91

Many refugees also found some kind of employment in the area.

Ty pe of E mployment

| Tea and food sellers | 30.5% |
| Shopkeepers and traders | 19.5% |
| Farm workers | 12.5% |
| Cigarette sellers | 12.5% |
| Daily labourers | 9.7% |
| Others, including launderers, tailors, butchers, barbers, weavers | 15.3% |

Table 4.3 Source: Wright 1980, p. 91

Hence by periodically leaving the camp, shifting from place to place, and
finding temporary employment before returning to Wad el Hilawy, refugees
brought back income and economic rejuvenation to the holding camp's own internal economy.

By way of a comparative summary, both Somalian refugee camps and Wad el Hilawya are examples of holding camps which became settlements, although indefinitely. These two examples represent contrasting ends of a spectrum representing different forms of settlement within the general category of holding camp settlements. In its physical layout Wad el Hilawya revolved around a central market place while Somalian camps center around feeding centers and administrative offices. Wad el Hilawya had the distinct economic advantage of close geographic proximity and easy access to other urban areas. Consequently, Wad el Hilawya clung somewhat parasitically to its urban counterparts, whereas Somalian camps continue to languish in economic isolation. On one hand Somalian refugees exchange a few food items in a limited way with the local population. On the other hand, Ethiopians and Eritreans capitalized on their ability to migrate in and out of the camp, to secure employment, and purchase or trade for in-kind goods or cash. For Somalis the major question was food, but for Ethiopians and Eritreans it was two-fold - food and employment. In the final analysis, both instances represent holding camps, but of different natures. In Somalian holding camps extreme confinement is dictated by sheer necessity; Wad el Hilawya reflects greater choice and mobility.

The Dependency Issue

Finally, one more major issue needs to be considered - dependency. Time and time again the question of dependency lies at the heart of discussions concerning holding camp settlement. Often refugees are stereotyped as passive, unproductive individuals with a perpetual "give us this day our
daily bread" mentality. In many instances this kind of "refugee camp mentality" predominates and is true. At the same time, however, a good deal of evidence not only counters this frequent image of spoon-fed, dependent individuals, but suggests that relief agencies may subtly (and/or unconsciously) impose this mentality upon refugees and create a self-fulfilling prophecy of dependency.

After observing Somalian refugee camps which are generally thought to epitomize overt dependency, Hanne Christensen wrote:

"The refugees generally appeared to be highly active. They are neither spoon-fed nor passive spectators of camp life. Often they turned out to be individuals who little by little pick up with the previous life-styles after having to start from scratch. Often they appeared willing to improve life in the camps and were receptive to initiative and ideas about how to use available resources and opportunities such as relief aid as a means to improve camp life.

"Consequently the image on the part of refugee agency officials of refugees as spoon-fed, passive dependents was not affirmed by the findings. Such an image based on a myth may sustain the need for the refugee aid agencies as such and justify their role as good samaritans. The assumptions may also reflect value judgments disguised and presented as quasi facts. Thus camp residents may be termed spoon-fed, passive dependents as a substitute for the real conceptualization of refugees, whatever it may be" (Christensen 1982, pp. 42-43).

Quite remarkably, refugees in this kind of setting often manage to develop industrious trade like food exchange, and forge a surprisingly innovative existence.

The frequent perception of refugees as absolutely dependent and spoon-fed individuals is also countered by two other trends. Refugees in holding camps often want to leave camps - often they try to - and refugees outside holding camps often avoid them. Hanne Christensen sampled 150 households in Somalia during her field study. One household wished to stay, but 149 wanted to return to their former residential areas in the Ogaden (Christensen 1982, p. 19). In June of 1982, the American Embassy in Mogadishu reported
to the State Department that, "There have, however, been rumors of refugees, apparently attempting to return to the Ogaden, being sent back to the camps" (Department of State 1982, p. 1). In another part of Africa, Art Hansen discovered a whole pocket of self-settlers in Zambia who intentionally sought to avoid refugee camps by keeping a low profile and remaining hidden within the indigenous population. Having interviewed a number of such refugees, he wrote, "Normal existence meant living in a village or town, not in a camp under government supervision. None of the refugees I interviewed wanted to live in a camp" (Hansen 1979, p. 318). Moreover, in other instances throughout Africa, refugees have not only been suspicious, but openly antagonistic towards government attempts to install them in refugee camps.

The other side of the dependency issue, however, lies in the hands of relief agencies and host governments. As W. T. Gould notes, "...in resettlement centres or camps at first refugees are dependent on the generosity of host nations and the international community for their immediate survival and longer term economic viability" (Gould 1982, p. 494). At first holding camps do arise out of a real need for food and medicine, but relief agencies in particular need to guard against unconsciously encouraging refugees to become too dependent upon them. Moreover, relief agencies must guard, as much if not more so, against unconsciously allowing themselves to become too dependent upon refugees being dependent on them. Certainly refugee's conscious gravitation towards dependency upon external aid cannot be denied, but relief agencies and host governments alike need to think carefully about who makes refugees become dependent. Without that kind of constant awareness, relief agencies may help create an attitude of incessant dependency and unconsciously force themselves and refugees more and more into a
position of long-term dependency upon each other. Holding camps that are labeled as "temporary-permanent" express in part the tendency for both refugees and relief agencies to become trapped indefinitely in a stalemate of mutual dependency.

In terms of future research a number of key questions are certainly related to this overarching issue of dependency. First, researchers need to explore further the basic nature of holding camp settlements. What are the physical requirements for a site with an adequate carrying capacity? What kinds of spatial layouts naturally emerge or are bureaucratically planned for refugee camps? What do spatial patterns indicate about camp life within them?

Researchers need to explore some of the more hidden dynamics as well. What are the key sociological dynamics and institutions at work within holding camps? How does time itself affect attitudes and dynamics within holding camps? How crucial is the time factor?

Several more questions are directly linked to the dependency issue. How can relief agencies help refugees to achieve self-sufficiency? What are some effective means, methods, and motivations to instigate successful self-help programs in holding camps? And what are the sufficient preconditions for cutting back aid or pulling out completely? These kinds of questions are important to answer with thorough academic research. At the same time, however, relief agencies and host governments need to repeatedly ask themselves these questions—answers or not—in order to maintain a clearer understanding of their role and insure helpful responses to people in refugee camps.
Chapter Five

DESIGNATED AGRICULTURAL SCHEMES

Many African specialists view designated agricultural schemes as the most desirable solution for African refugee problems, apart from repatriation. In many instances spontaneous self-settlement is impractical and permanent refugee camps are only a "temporary" partial answer, not a long-term solution. Designated settlement schemes based on agriculture, however, represent an optimal response for several reasons. Settlement schemes for refugees are explicitly designed to replace long-term dependency with agricultural productivity by giving refugees both a place and the resources to bring into play their cultivation skills. In so doing, such schemes not only reduce the burden of refugees upon their host countries, but in time they may actively contribute to the local, regional, and national economy.
Settlement schemes are designated areas with a designated activity - agriculture. Whether a scheme is strictly for refugees or not, designated schemes are more than a circumscribed place and activity. In his sociological appraisal of settlement schemes in Africa, John Morris has noted seven characteristics of such schemes. Most uses of the term imply one or more of the following:

1. The scheme is basically agricultural in its form of land-use, including one or more crops and sometimes animal husbandry.

2. Scheme members share a common residence with definite physical boundaries, i.e., a designated territory.

3. The scheme has a clear social boundary and a definite group membership which farmers join and leave.

4. Scheme farmers are mutually interdependent for certain types of assistance. The farming activities are often done with cooperatives rather than by completely autonomous households.

To these basic characteristics one may add others which usually (but not always) apply:

5. Scheme members accept some form of organized, managerial structure with distinct roles and offices.

6. The scheme makes a common claim upon many outside services, such as technical advice, education, health facilities, markets, etc.

7. The scheme may be supported by an external agency (e.g., United States Agency for International Development) and be an answer to that agency for meeting specified objectives (Morris 1982, p. 82).

Certainly rural settlement schemes vary in size, location, organizational method, degree of external support, and degree of self-support. However, an organized settlement can generally be defined as a "...deliberate and coherent process of administrative and technical measures whereby a group of refugees are enabled to settle on land, usually in an uninhabited or sparsely populated area (made available by the government), with a view to creating new self-supporting rural communities which will ultimately form part of the area's economic and social system" (UNHCR 1981, p. 3).
In the early 1960's many African governments adopted settlement schemes as a common strategy to rejuvenate agricultural production after the colonial era. In the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's, as refugee numbers began to mount, African governments began to realize the applicability of the settlement scheme approach to refugee relief as well. In 1965 Zaire initiated twelve self-help settlements in the Kivu region for Botswanan refugees (UNHCR 1981a, p. 3). Uganda, Sudan, Botswana, and Tanzania developed extensive settlement schemes for refugees soon after. Of these, Tanzania has been considered the most successful country with regard to the settlement schemes approach for refugees. The Tanzanian government integrated refugee settlement schemes into their national Ujamaa plan (African socialism with an agricultural emphasis). All together, by 1981, 66 settlement schemes existed in 14 different African countries for over one million people (UNHCR 1981a, p. 3). A great deal more has been written about settlement schemes for refugees than about spontaneous settlement or holding camps. Consequently, today agricultural settlement schemes are now widely recognized and advocated as a viable resettlement alternative.

The broad objectives of designated settlement schemes are threefold: to establish agricultural self-sufficiency; integrate the refugee population into the socio-economic framework; and eventually become an active contributor to the local, regional, and national economy. Organized rural schemes are the plan; self-sufficiency, socio-economic integration and economic contribution are the goals, and agriculture is the means to those goals. This chapter will explore some of the major elements of a successful resettlement scheme for refugees via four sections - the preconditions for launching a settlement scheme, establishing a viable agricultural basis for the settlement, activating social dynamics within the settlement scheme to increase
agricultural production as well as community well-being, and developing an economic framework on the local, regional, and national level.

The Preconditions for a Settlement Scheme

1. Site selection: As soon as a host government chooses to resettle refugees in an organized scheme the first prerequisite is to select a site with adequate natural resources. Ideally, sites should be chosen after an extensive survey including aerial photographs, hydrology studies, soil fertility tests, crop patterns, transportation outlets, market accessibility, and a thorough sociological study of the local population. In the last five years Clark University has begun conducting environmental surveys of East African countries for future development, but most African nations lack any kind of national assessment of their physical or social environment. Too often, particularly under the pressure of sudden refugee influxes, governments are often forced to make haphazard site selections without careful thought, planning, or comparative surveys.

Obviously the first prerequisite for an agricultural scheme is arable land. Land is needed not only to permit intensive cultivation of specific plots but also a shifting pattern of agriculture. Adequate amounts of land are necessary to allow for a fuel supply, an adequate reserve for population growth, and to minimize the impact on the area's ecological system (Neldner 1979, p. 400). Unlike Asia - although it is less and less true each day - the African continent is still more labor-limited than land-limited with regard to agriculture. As John Rogge suggests, "Though the land is often marginal, the question of its availability is not generally critical in Africa, and programmes intent on resettling refugees have been able to obtain land for this purpose from most governments" (Rogge 1975, p. 145).
At present, only a few small African countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho, and Swaziland have serious deficiencies of land on a national scale.

2. Physical layout: The physical size and spatial layout of a scheme varies greatly in one instance as compared to another. Refugee settlement schemes generally range in size from a couple of thousand residents up to the enormous Katumba Scheme in Tanzania with over 66,000 inhabitants (UNHCR 1981a, p. 3). Experienced planners usually agree that 10,000 people represents a moderate size - an optimizing level between maximum benefits and minimum costs (financially, socially, and agriculturally) (D'Souza 1980, p. 210). As a general rule smaller settlements can be managed more efficiently and successfully than larger ones.

The spatial pattern of a designated scheme rests on several factors: the physical setting; communal land cultivation versus private family holdings; central villages versus scattered dwellings; plot sizes based on soil types, crop types, and degree of mechanization; and the layout of administrative posts throughout the settlement. The most typical pattern is a radial one where a central administrative headquarters is surrounded by a number of villages often containing different ethnic groups. For example, the Nputa settlement for Mozambiquans in Tanzania has thirty villages within a seven mile radius of the administrative headquarters (Stoltzfus 1971, p. 52). Usually the administrative headquarters becomes a central hub for the settlement's health centers, schools, cooperatives, markets, stores, and a community development center. Most designated schemes allot ten acre plots to each household instead of establishing a communal farming system (UNHCR 1982b, p. 1). In this way, scheme administrators try to encourage some individual enterprise, initiative, and self-sufficiency.
3. Emergency aid: Brian Meldner, the secretary of service programs for the Lutheran World Federation, has emphasized that three specific stages can be recognized in any relief process for rural refugees — an emergency phase, a self-support phase, and an integrated settlement phase. Often the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, or an independent volunteer agency will conduct an immediate survey for a settlement site, choose a site, and establish an emergency relief program. Particularly in instances where refugees have been rapidly moved onto settlement schemes, relief agencies usually provide food, clothing, blankets, shelter, and health care. During this six to nine month period food is usually the primary need. Consequently, relief agencies often temporarily borrow food stocks from development projects in the country or resort to purchasing bulk supplies of grain off the commercial market. The World Food Programme suggests that refugees need at least 2,200 calories per day made up of 400 grams of cereal wheat, 30 grams of oil, 15 grams of milk, and 40 grams of beans or fish (Neldner 1979, p. 397). This ideal quota, however, presupposes not only that such stocks of food are available, but that the foodstocks can be effectively transported, stored, and distributed to refugees. Transporting ten tons of food for 20,000 refugees per day in Tanzania logistically would mean that one ten-ton truck would have to arrive each day (Neldner 1979, p. 397). Should the average round trip for a truck take four days from Dar es Salaam to the settlement, and allowing for maintenance, at least five ten-ton trucks would be needed to keep 20,000 refugees supplied with food. Food storage and the distribution process are complicated problems as well.

Food donations are obviously needed for the first planting season. Often some food rations are also needed for the next year or two thereafter.
Food, however, is not the only required aid in the first couple of years. During the late 1960's in Tanzania, individual refugees were given seeds, a bucket, hoe, panga, bowl, blanket, and some clothing for $1.20 per person (UNHCR 1973, p. 52). This kind of aid—oriented more toward establishing self-sufficiency and less toward food dependency—can also serve as a strategic way for relief agencies to signal the fact that they are phasing out their emergency relief role.

4. Capital and Administration: John Rogge, the leading geographer in refugee research, contends that the key issue for many refugee resettlement schemes is not whether land is available or not, but whether adequate capital and the necessary administrative skills are available (Rogge 1982, p. 43). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees makes an explicit distinction between emergency assistance, direct assistance, and infrastructure support assistance by categorizing each of its donations as one or the other (UNHCR n.d., p. 6). In many instances, settlement schemes need both emergency relief assistance (as referred to already) as well as long-term direct assistance for upkeep, maintenance, and continuing development. Occasionally the UNHCR assists a designated area for just six months of intense emergency relief, but the average assistance for UNHCR projects is four years (UNHCR 1981a, p. 3). In general, the per capita cost of aiding rural refugees in Africa is quite low. In the late 1960's the average annual assistance for each African refugee was only $100 (Hamrell 1967, p. 50). It is not excessively costly to aid rural refugees in duplicating their rural life style of the past. In essence, some relief will bring a settlement into being, but usually only long-term funding can assure its success.
Administrative personnel also play a crucial part in the birth of a refugee settlement scheme. A rising curve of adversity faces every scheme during the first couple years. The plans and attitudes of the supervisory staff, however, largely determine the scheme's motivation and ability to offset counter-productive trends. For instance, while writing about the Nakspiripirit refugee scheme in Uganda, Trappe surmized that, "The development prospects in Nakspiripirit are far better than the staff and officials assume them to be. As a result of their attitudes, hardly anybody has any confidence in the future" (Trappe 1971, p. 49). With the inherent inertia any resettlement scheme faces - much less one for refugees which heightens the complexities and difficulties - any negative speculation about economic progress or scheme success on the part of administrators can easily filter down to the refugee community.

Likewise, settlement schemes also need competent, but flexible planning. Too often social and economic development bogs down under a centralized supervisory staff who doggedly pursue a rigid, inflexible plan of attack for a scheme. Administrative personnel must serve multi-faceted roles and actively participate with the refugees; they need to ask themselves periodically how to decrease their supervisory roles while increasing the refugees' ideas, initiative, and leadership roles. Heavy-handed administrators not only alienate themselves from refugees and every-day realities of the scheme but they often squelch fledging initiative and refugee leadership. Administrators, especially foreign administrators, also must be aware of the importance of gradually phasing out their own supervisory roles as residents of a scheme become capable of assuming responsibility for its operation.
Establishing a Viable Agricultural Base

In post-war Europe, refugees were easily absorbed into expanding urban-industrial economies. Although Africa has the same kind of available refugee manpower, the continent does not have the same industrial framework. As Rogge stresses, "No parallel economic opportunities exist in Africa. Non-agricultural employment is very scarce and in most instances refugees are unqualified for anything other than work on the land" (Rogge 1975, p. 133). He continues, "If...therefore the African refugee is to be made self-supporting, he must be absorbed into the rural economy" (Rogge 1975, p. 133). Most refugees come from rural agricultural areas. Not surprisingly they can be assimilated more easily and more productively into the same kind of agricultural setting.

Relief agencies usually supply settlement schemes with land, water, seeds, tools, and perhaps fertilizer and agricultural extension education. However, three other key issues - the need for mechanization, the utilization of animal husbandry, and the development of cash crops - need to be addressed briefly. In order to raise agricultural yields and develop commercial crops, at least some mechanization does seem appropriate for refugee settlement schemes. And while tractors and trucks may help refugees plant and harvest crops, they can also be used to clear, grade, and expand agricultural areas.

Animal husbandry is another issue that requires careful consideration. Most rural Africans are semi-sedentary cultivators who traditionally rely upon both crops and livestock. Often people have been carried through dry years by utilizing livestock for food when their harvests are low. Livestock, especially cattle, demand a great deal of grazing area. Consequently, given limited land (and the premise that you get more for your land in crops
than with animals) most schemes have banned cattle and asked refugees to rely solely on crop production. However, cattle and goats are a central theme within the social fabric of many traditional cultures. The entire Dinka culture – the largest Nilotic tribe in Sudan – hinges on cattle. In most African cultures social values and norms like bride prices are directly related to goats and cattle. Thus, scheme administrators need to weigh very carefully the whole value of livestock against their apparent physical demands.

Cash crops are a third issue linked to establishing an agricultural basis for settlement schemes. The initial goal of a settlement scheme is self-sufficiency, and schemes rely heavily upon a primary grain crop to produce food. However, in the long term, one major goal of designated agricultural schemes is participation in the local, regional, and national economies. In order to accomplish this goal, agricultural schemes need to diversify their agriculture and develop marketable cash crops.

The Qala en Nahal settlement scheme for Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan illustrates well the benefit of a marketable cash crop. Qala en Nahal is a 100,000 acre scheme originally designated to resettle 23,000 Eritreans held temporarily at the Wad Sharifay refugee camp (Rogge 1975, p. 136). (See Figure 5.1) Only a few small Sudanese villages had sprung up in the area so Sudanese officials envisioned the scheme as an opportunity to resettle refugees and bring a large tract of unused, but potentially productive land into the Sudanese rural economy. A 21 mile pipe – "the water road" – brought the water necessary for irrigation from the Rahad River (Rogge 1975, p. 136). After the refugees were transported by truck to the scheme, they settled in six major villages. All the ethnic groups except the Barea were semi-nomadic or nomadic. Not surprisingly, the experienced
The Qala en Nahal Scheme

Figure 5.1
Source: Rogge 1975, p. 137

cultivators - the Barea - have had the most agricultural success on the scheme.

Unlike communal schemes in Tanzania, Qala en Nahal is organized and based upon individual land ownership. Ten acre plots were given to each family. Over 5,000 tenancies were established by the mid-1970's (Rogge 1975, p. 139). After refugees cleared their land they adopted a simple, but effective pattern of crop diversity. Refugees generally plant five acres of dura (sorghum vulgare) and five acres of sim-sim (sesamum indicum).
Rogge 1975, p. 139). Dura is the basic staple in their diet, and sesame seed is a commercial crop which ranks as the third most important Sudanese export behind cotton and gum arabic (Rogge 1975, p. 141). A strong, consistent demand for sesame seed generally exists, and furthermore is not as vulnerable to large over-stocks or radical price drops as cotton. In short, this simple approach utilizes dura grain for food and sim-sim for cash. Moreover, when local stocks of dura accumulate, the refugee farmers can easily plant an extra acre or two in sim-sim and make additional income.

As yet these Eritrean refugees have not given up their livestock completely, but the incentive and motivation to shift exclusively to cultivation is rapidly growing. Many settlers are already producing twelve sacks of dura per acre and can get as much as seven dollars per sack if they sell it, while sim-sim currently commands as much as twenty-four dollars per sack and the better farmers are selling over six sacks of sesame seed from their five acres planted with sim-sim (Rogge 1975, p. 143). These yields generate net incomes of over two hundred dollars a year which is well above average for rural Sudan and even better than what these refugees could have expected in Eritrea. Profits and production are up enough that supervising agriculturalists are now suggesting farmers plant one-third of their plot in dura, one-third in sesame seed and leave one-third fallow each year (Rogge 1975, p. 144). Moreover, on the national scale, Qala en Nahal has helped diversify the Sudanese economy by reducing slightly its dependence upon cotton exports.

Qala en Nahal is now very close to becoming a, "wholly self-sufficient rural development enterprise" (Rogge 1975, p. 145). This settlement scheme has generated enough income to produce a quality of life that is actually superior to most of rural Sudan. Consequently, as early as 1975, authorities
introduced a number of tax schedules (hut, crop, and stock) for scheme residents to placate the rising animosity of neighboring Sudanese residents (Rogge 1975, p. 145). As a whole, refugees in Qala en Nahal have stepped beyond the short-range goal of self-sufficiency and begun actualizing greater economic goals for themselves and, to a small degree, for Sudan as well.

Activating Social Dynamics Within the Scheme

In the 1960's, certainly much of the impetus behind the successful settlement schemes for African refugees was provided by the enormous financial and administrative commitments of Western nations. The success of the Etsha scheme in northwestern Botswana, for instance, was largely due to extensive foreign donations for transportation of refugees to the scheme, food, blankets, tools, donkeys, ploughs, seeds, as well as a cooperative retail store, handicraft industry, free schooling, free health care, more dispensaries, and further investment in the area's transportation system (Potten 1976). In essence, this scheme and many others were financially boosted into self-sufficiency largely by external aid. The era of Western prosperity and generosity, however, faded in the 1970's with rising oil prices. With more refugees and proportionately less aid researchers and camp administrators alike began recognizing in the early 1970's the ability and importance of the internal social dynamics of settlement schemes to help generate their own success and increased agricultural production.

Particularly in sociological studies, refugee "initiative" and "participation" became key themes in most discussions about settlement schemes. Based on the premise that many schemes had a top-heavy administrative structure, sociologists and anthropologists noted the desirability of fully
integrating refugees into the development process. Soon scheme adminis-
trators began to identify emerging leaders and seek their input. Ideally,
scheme plans were built around an understanding of refugees' needs, fears,
aspirations, and desires. Scheme "success" was correlated, at least in
theory, with refugee input, participation, and initiative. Because re-
searchers began to discover parallel sets of leadership (foreign adminis-
trators and indigenous refugee leadership) - but an alarming communication
gap between them - many designated schemes were decentralized organizationally
and refugee input was incorporated, sometimes even indiscriminately, into
the plans for settlement schemes. Finally, at least in the minds of soci-
ologists, a great deal of scheme success, in theory, was correlated
with refugee input and participation.

Two other key concepts were heavily applied in designated schemes -
self-help programs and cooperatives. Typically "self-help" programs are
designed to utilize surplus manpower for building health dispensaries,
schools, roads, irrigation systems, etc. Specific, short-term projects
such as these are justified for several reasons. Self-help programs are
envisioned as a strategic way to raise the overall quality of life in the
scheme and lower the financial costs to relief agencies. Ideally, self-
help programs are also thought of as an effective method to sort out priori-
ties for distributing financial aid, and at the same time, to encourage
refugees to put down permanent roots in the area.

The concept of cooperatives has been utilized in all kinds of African
resettlement schemes, including ones for refugees. Many African societies
are already collectivist in nature, and therein are well-equipped for coop-
eratives in many settlement scheme frameworks currently underway in Africa.
The cooperative concept, however, is especially appropriate for refugee
resettlement schemes for several reasons. Refugees are inherently people whose socio-economic fabric has been torn apart by whatever pressure caused them to flee. Consequently, cooperatives can provide a substitute for the missing socio-economic relationships refugees had in their former indigenous settings. In his paper, "Social Change and Development Institutions in a Refugee Population," Paul Trappe suggests that cooperatives can accomplish a number of strategic things. At first they can resolve some of the initial social complexity and confusion in a new refugee settlement scheme and help reconstruct social community and continuity. However, Trappe also believes that cooperatives can serve as the necessary basis for "development from below" brought about by the people themselves (Trappe 1971). In other words, he believes that institutionalizing cooperatives in the formative stage of settlement schemes can provide an endogenous, collectivist incentive to pursue development.

As Trappe stresses, cooperatives are not unfamiliar to the African setting. Cooperative efforts by families, tribes, and clans have always existed in African society for hunting, fishing, fighting, planting, and many other rural activities. Consequently, cooperative systems are already well suited for refugee groups. Working groups can clear brush, build irrigation systems, invest in machinery together, plant crops, and harvest them together to raise their total agricultural productivity. Marketing cooperatives can supply combined storage facilities, transportation vehicles, a credit union, legal aid, and access to faraway markets to sell cash crops. Small industrial cooperatives can establish low-capital ventures such as a brick kiln, a rudimentary carpentry shop, or a handicraft enterprise. Hence, the cooperative form can be adapted to many situations and is flexible enough to become a means to achieve many kinds of socio-economic goals.
Moreover, a number of different cooperatives can draw a settlement scheme dynamically together to help it achieve self-sufficiency, increased agricultural productivity, and a greater degree of social cohesion.

During the 1960's the Nakspiriririt settlement scheme in Uganda reflected one real-world refugee situation where cooperatives could have been extremely helpful. Writing for the U.N. Office for Refugees, Paul Trappe observed, "Nakspiriririt is - from the sociological viewpoint - a dynamic, but frustrated scheme, above all because the traditional social norms are cut or neglected by the responsible people" (Trappe 1971, p. 47). In general the Nakspiriririt scheme had a favorable geographic, climatic, and agricultural setting, but it had a number of socio-economic shortcomings. Meetings of family heads were not allowed despite the fact that such informal meetings were a fundamental basis for integration and cooperation in their traditional society. Moreover, in spite of the fact that each tribal group had functional working groups and their own names for them ("kida" by the Didinga tribe; "waho" by the Acholi tribe, and "ahidai" by the Lotiko tribe) these working groups were limited to projects that individuals or families by themselves could not do (Trappe 1971, p. 41). Thus, the scheme's administration (consciously or unconsciously) curtailed the emergence of indigenous cooperatives and failed to institute useful socio-economic cooperatives of its own.

In summary, Africa's traditional attitude towards cooperative work seems conducive to extensive cooperative systems on settlement schemes for refugees. Cooperatives represent more than simply a means to rekindle community spirit in a new settlement scheme, for they come to grips with many of the sociological factors at work in a refugee situation. In addition to providing a significant place for refugee initiative and popular
participation, they can also serve as a necessary mechanism for increased organizational unity, agricultural production, and the marketing of agricultural goods. Western countries are sometimes leary of donating money to cooperative projects that have the ring of socialism. Nevertheless, in the African setting, cooperatives may be far more of a socio-economic necessity for refugees than part of a political ideology.

An Economic Framework

Within a refugee settlement scheme, once agriculture intensifies beyond a production level for self-sufficiency (via cooperatives or not), an economic opportunity for increased production needs to be opened on at least three levels – local, regional, and national. This is particularly true when designated agricultural schemes begin producing cash crops like groundnuts, coffee, or tea. At the local scale a settlement suffers a keen economic disadvantage if the scheme is either too isolated to have access to outside markets or if refugees are banned from trading with non-refugees. In some instances limited food exchanges may occur between refugees and the local population (e.g., cassava for milk), but for a settlement scheme to "take-off" economically, it needs full access to external markets in the area and the subsequent stimulation of a money economy within the scheme itself. In short, economic vitality is intrinsically linked to active exchanges with an external economy (outside the settlement itself). A nearby town often provides this kind of socio-economic impetus a refugee settlement scheme needs where refugees can take goods to sell on a weekly, daily, or permanent market. The Itshu scheme, for instance, has enough trade relationships locally so that a portion of the profits accumulating in the community are reinvested for further development of agriculture, tea plantations, and
small livestock (Zarjevski n.d., p. 7). In contrast, without local markets, refugees cannot sell what extra crops they produce and what subsequently follows is at least economic stagnation, if not total strangulation of a settlement scheme.

Like other kinds of agricultural development plans, refugee settlement schemes are now being studied in the context of regional development. As Brian Neldner notes, "International aid to refugee projects really ends where normally a development project begins. As refugees have been motivated to achieve local community standards of living in relatively few years - does this not provide a suitable launching point for a development project with international support for the community as a whole" (Neldner 1979, p. 401). Too often a "project mentality" causes planners and administrators to view a refugee settlement scheme as a project in isolation. Refugee schemes, however, can and need to interact with their region.

With regard to a Rwandese settlement scheme in the Kivu province of Zaire, Yefime Zarjevski contends that, "Their resettlement could not be successfully achieved without a programme of economic development encompassing the indigenous population of the region as well as the refugees" (Zarjevski n.d., p. 4). In other words, refugee settlement schemes and rural development plans can and should be dovetailed together on a regional basis to insure benefit for the entire region.

At this point it is important to note the fact that too many planners and government officials tend to view refugee settlement schemes as if they were simply another kind of development project and thereby overlook some very basic differences in their nature. Development projects are carefully planned in advance, while refugee schemes are not. Within development projects, each setting has some distinctly different socio-economic dynamics
at work as well. As Brian Neldner emphasizes, "...the international community must increase its understanding of the true nature of the refugee situation and not apply development project norms to it by demanding a degree of planning, of sophistication, of advance target setting in a situation that does not lend itself to such requirements and where one of the most important commodities, namely time, to prepare for a refugee situation and project is simply not available" (Neldner 1979, p. 401).

With a proper perspective and wise planning, however, refugee settlement schemes can serve as a constructive, effective stepping stone into further regional development. This viewpoint was widely advocated throughout the 1970's as "zonal development." Zonal development can be defined as utilizing organized rural settlements (e.g., designated refugee schemes) to create new self-supporting rural communities which ultimately form part of the area's economic and social system. In instances of planned zonal development the settlement scheme receives additional governmental assistance along with the local population for the entire region. This occurs even after refugees have established their self-sufficiency via relief aid explicitly designated for them as "refugees." Refugee agricultural schemes can, therefore, be a focal point for cross-cultural and socio-economic integration, an active contributor to the regional economy, and a significant part of developing a comprehensive infrastructure in the area.

Finally, as time goes on, refugee settlement schemes must eventually be integrated into the national economy. Undoubtedly Tanzania has had the most successful national program for development that includes refugees. In the late 1960's Tanzania had land, but needed agricultural manpower. Therefore, government officials led by President Nyerere not only hoped refugees would eventually contribute to the national economy; they planned
for that to happen. The Ujamaa plan effectively incorporated refugee settlement schemes into the national drive for agricultural resurgence. Over 50,000 refugees in settlement schemes were incorporated into the Ujamaa Plan (Stoltzfus 1971, p. 59). In so doing, Tanzania has set an extremely healthy precedent for its national peers throughout the rest of Africa.

**Conclusion**

Certainly the success of refugee resettlement schemes can be measured in a number of conventional ways - agricultural productivity per individual member, total agricultural output, rise in the general standard of living, or increased income per capita. Relief organizations generally utilize such indicators to interpret success. These criteria, however, reflect the perception of Western developed countries who largely finance designated settlement schemes for refugees. In an African context, significant social dynamics are at work in a scheme as well as these more concrete, economic results. Hence, the following sociological indicators, although less concrete, may be more appropriate for appraising the "success" and monitoring the performance of designated agricultural settlement schemes for refugees:

1. Do settlers identify with the scheme and are they then proud to be members of it?

2. Do settlers identify with scheme decisions? Are they willing to accept responsibility for scheme decisions?

3. Do settlers invest in permanent household improvements? Is their commitment to the scheme secure?

4. Does the scheme generate its own services through settler activity and investments?

5. Is there spontaneous diversification of occupations and crops through settler initiative in taking advantage of new opportunities?

6. Is there participation in work distribution, and do settlers regard the system with satisfaction?
7. Are there recognized channels for getting feedback to scheme management, and are there public opportunities for resolving disputes?

8. Is there a growing degree of stability and continuity among the supervising staff? (Morris 1968, p. 95)

Moreover, it is the African refugee himself who may unconsciously use many of these sociological indicators to evaluate most of his settlement scheme's success and performance.

This chapter has explored at length the physical, social, economic, and administrative aspects of successful resettlement schemes for African refugees. The following conditions constitute the major elements of a successful resettlement scheme:

1. The choice of congruent objectives and appropriate administrative organization.
2. Proper site selection and choice of crops.
3. Highly motivated refugees, especially those desiring long-term residency.
4. Suitable physical preparation of the site.
5. Appropriate acreage allotments and land tenure conditions.
6. Adequate capital input for the scheme.
7. Organization of group activities, especially cooperatives.
8. Sufficient management, skill, and flexibility together with a positive attitude.
9. Socio-economic integration with the local, indigenous population.

In addition to establishing these conditions, relief agencies, government officials, and the administrative staff should be cognizant of the following points given briefly in their sequential order:
1. While refugee influxes are never planned, relief agencies and African governments can prepare ahead for them in a number of ways: socio-economic surveys, tentative site selection, operational responses, consulting with other governments, etc. A little alert preparation may save valuable time and money for initiating resettlement schemes under enormous time and financial pressures.

2. From the start of a new refugee settlement scheme a tentative timetable with planned goals and projected phase-out dates needs to be established. Too many relief agencies and scheme administrators are too optimistic. Provisions for breakdowns in the system, flexibility, and decentralization of power must be planned in advance as well. Many times scheme administrators also expect too much too soon. Many refugees are learning a new culture, new agricultural methods, new crop types, new social relationships, new economic relationships, new marketing techniques, and relating to a new authority structure, namely, the supervisory staff themselves. Particularly in refugee settings good things will take time!

3. Refugee settlement schemes must have a goal of socio-economic integration as well as agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency. These three goals are more related than realized. On one hand, refugees need freedom to associate within the scheme (e.g., social groups and cooperatives) as well as freedom to associate outside the scheme economically and socially with the indigenous population, thereby bringing together the two communities. On the other hand, refugee populations are often
given so much financial aid, technical support, and services that inside a well-demarcated socio-economic boundary they begin overshadowing the local people of an area, therein often creating animosity and open antagonism. Activating an increasing tax structure may help rectify this tendency along with incorporating refugee schemes into the economic context of regional development.

4. The initial stage (first couple of years) of a refugee settlement scheme are crucial ones for setting the tone of the experience for incoming refugees and setting into action their socio-economic growth. Too many settlers are reluctant ones who perceive themselves as temporary residents until repatriation or further resettlement. Consequently, scheme administrators need to help plant a general attitude of resourcefulness, progressiveness, and permanence in every way they can to keep the scheme from undue frustration and eventual failure. Given adequate resources (land, tools, working capital, food, etc.) refugees have often become self-sufficient within a year or two if they entered the scheme with the attitude that they were coming to stay. Secure land tenure, freedom of movement, and granting citizenship are three methods to directly encourage perseverant attitudes and the motivation to stay.

5. The transition phase for a settlement scheme from dependency as a special-need group to a self-supporting group integrated into regional development plans is a difficult one. Supervisory staffs should carefully phase out the exogenous organization structure and help phase in an endogenous one. In the first couple of years of a new scheme administrators and staff may need to be
high-profile initiators, but later they must shift into low-profile roles and actively seek, in most instances, to replace themselves.

In conclusion, a country of asylum which is faced with refugees who are unlikely to be repatriated must meet its responsibility for the well-being of the refugees. Designated settlement schemes are a very desirable solution. They prevent an attitude of overt dependency, reduce the economic burden for host countries, recreate the opportunity for self-sufficiency, and meet the qualifications necessary for international aid. Host nations must clearly recognize the fact that when, and if, repatriation rights are granted, refugees may abandon their designated settlement scheme and leave for the original homeland. However, refugees who are settled in permanent schemes often choose to stay even after repatriation rights are officially granted. In other instances, although refugees have evacuated schemes and returned home, the local indigenous population has come in and gladly taken them over. Therefore, as long as adequate land is available — and it ought to be available at least during the 1980's throughout most of Africa — relocating refugees onto self-supporting agricultural settlement schemes represents an effective long-term solution.
Chapter Six
A SYNOPSIS

Ironically enough, despite the acute nature of refugee problems, host
governments and refugees are usually hesitant to tackle a solution. On one
hand, refugees typically adopt a wait-and-see attitude, particularly when
they first arrive in a country of asylum; relocated people initially settle
with hopes of returning home to do exactly what they did before. On the
other hand, although host governments could help refugees break through
this unrealistic and unproductive wait-and-see attitude by officially
responding and resettling them, most African nations respond at first with
a wait-and-see mentality of their own. Host governments could, of course,
choose to get rid of refugees by forced repatriation. Although millions of
Ghanaians were forcibly repatriated by Nigeria in February of 1983, that
may have been the first instance of forced repatriation on a large scale.
Usually the common response of many governments to a new refugee influx is to ignore them for as long as possible rather than quickly seeking solutions. Hosts generally hope—though unrealistically—that refugees will move on or return home of their own accord, and/or they conveniently assume that local African hospitality will adequately take care of refugees. In Africa this kind of indifferent response to suffering strangers is sometimes borne out of a fatalistic resignation to the inevitability of hardship and refugee displacement (Cowell 1983). Repatriation may occur, but even if it does (and it may not) it is generally very slow in coming. Meanwhile, the refugee has arrived at a spiritual, spatial, temporal, and emotional impasse, a no man's land of midway-to-nowhere, and the longer he remains there, the longer he is subject to its demoralizing effects (Kunz 1973, p. 133).

**An Effective Resettlement Approach**

Sooner or later (and the sooner the better), host governments usually begin to sense more realistically the remoteness of repatriation and realize that temporary asylum without assistance will not be a sufficient answer. Often, it takes reports of massive refugee starvation or media attention to bring about this realization and force officials into more decisive action. If, in fact, widespread starvation has begun, government officials are forced by the acute nature of famine to immediately establish refugee holding camps for emergency food distribution, shelter, and health care. However, as noted already, although emergency refugee camps may become long-term settlements, they are not an ideal solution. Refugees in camps usually become dependent people—socially, politically, and economically. The government or an international agency typically becomes the keeper and
the provider (Hansen 1979, p. 399). Meanwhile, refugees in holding camps are less and less likely to regain their own self-reliance.

Unassisted self-settlement may serve as a solution for some refugees. However, as J. R. Rogge maintains, in Africa, "Spontaneous settlement has become more a product of government inactivity or ineffectiveness rather than an instrument of official policy in the asylum country" (Rogge 1981, p. 199). Unassisted self-settlement may "spontaneously" occur given low indigenous population densities, a strong measure of ethnic affinity, the availability of agriculturally productive land, and small refugee loads. Hansen's documentation of Angolan refugees in northwestern Zambia portrayed one such case. Despite the Mehaba settlement scheme in the area, over 65 percent of the Angolan refugees self-settled without significant cost to the Zambian government (Hansen 1981, p. 185). Unassisted self-settlement, however, is far from being an ideal solution for the majority of refugees in Africa. Passively allowing "spontaneous settlement" may, in fact, mean extreme poverty, a precarious food supply, and a marginal existence for refugees in a virtually unknown setting.

When a host government does come to fully grasp the reality of their refugee problem, organized settlement schemes are usually advocated as the most favored solution. There are many instances of successful settlement schemes where refugees have been regarded by their country of asylum as potential settlers for the development of hitherto unused land (UNHCR 1981a, p. 134). Tanzanian authorities certainly envisioned Rwandan refugees as fulfilling this purpose. Patrick Ohadike described the Mkushi Agricultural Project for Botswanan refugees in Zambia as one example where, "Developments such as these are of considerable value to a country such as Zambia where there are very low densities of population and much unused land"
(Ohadike 1974, p. 407). Among African countries today settlement schemes would seem particularly appropriate for Sudan, the "potential bread basket of the Middle East," because of its 200 million acres of arable land.

In practice, however, many settlement schemes have failed. Large tracts of arable land are not universally available in Africa, nor are African people sufficiently acquainted with crop agriculture as the single source of food sufficiency. Consequently, policy-makers cannot always advocate highly-structured settlement schemes as the resettlement solution in every situation.

Instead of automatically adopting a designated scheme approach, concerned policy-makers should consider a wider range of options before selecting a plan of action (Scudder 1982, p. 286). Even an approach with four alternatives - self-settlement, refugee holding camps, urban enclaves, and settlement schemes - is too narrow. In order to create the most dynamic solution for a refugee influx, government officials and planners need to maintain a broad approach utilizing several alternatives (varying in kind and degree) at the same time.

The following table contains a breakdown of the 1980 refugee population in Sudan. It suggests that a number of refugee settlements fall in "grey" areas between the four major settlement types (See Table 6.1). On the suburban fringes of towns, refugee concentrations like those categorized as Kassala Rural (Wad Sharifai, Awarad, Laffa, Gulsa Marbe, Abu Ganul) are one example of an "in-between category." The three refugee settlements of the Es Suki Scheme provide another significant instance where 10,000 refugees have been relocated within a Sudanese development scheme which fails to fit neatly into one of the four categories. In light of examples like these, W. T. Gould summarizes that, "What is needed is broad-based projects closely
1 Urban:
   Eritreans and Ethiopians
   Port Sudan town 40,000
   Suakin and Tokar towns 5,000
   Kassala Town 40,000
   Gadaref town 30,000
   Khartoum 40,000
   Other towns 40,000

2 Spontaneous Self-Settlement
   Anwak and Nuer (Upper Nile Province) 6,000
   Ugandans (East and West Equatoria Province) 30,000
   Chadians (Northern Darfur Province) 7,000
   Zaireans (Equatoria Province) 5,000

3 Refugee Camps:
   Eritreans and Ethiopians (Red Sea Province) 10,000
   Eritreans and Ethiopians (Kassala Province) 20,000
   Um Guija 10,000
   Ugandans (East and West Equatoria Province) 10,000

4 Agricultural Schemes for Refugees:
   Qala en Nahal 30,000
   Esh Showak and Atbara River 25,000
   Rejaf 4,000

5 (?) Kassala Rural:
   Abu and Fao (Sudanese Rahad Scheme) 20,000
   Three Settlements in Es Suki Scheme 10,000
   Halfa Area 60,000
   TOTAL 457,000

Table 6.1  
Source: Wright 1980, p. 158

connected with local development and yet established in such a way that refugees may fit in" (Gould 1974, p. 13).

Gould's synoptic statement can be further distilled into two key elements of a dynamic, effective resettlement approach - optimizing refugees' control of their own destiny, and understanding refugee resettlement as a process occurring within the larger context of development. The strategic importance of the refugee having some sense of power and control is illustrated by the fact that many refugees opt for self-settlement rather than
settlement schemes, when given the choice. For example, despite the fact that the Mkushi settlement scheme afforded a considerably higher standard of living (food, land, clothing, homes, schools, and health centers) Angolan refugees quietly settled among Zambian kinsmen to deliberately avoid joining the scheme (Hansen, 1981). From the standpoint of our western "economic-man mentality" this choice may appear foolish. However, the majority of Angolan refugees apparently believed the social and psychological advantages of self-settlement outweighed the material benefits of a formal scheme. The fear of forced repatriation, restricted social mobility, and governmental supervision threatened refugees' sense of control — already radically deteriorated after their flight — enough to convince them to self-settle. To Art Hansen, self-settlement is a conservative tactic by which refugees minimize their loss of control, and therein lies one explanation of self-settlement's popularity among refugees in Africa (Hansen 1981, p. 193). Particularly among social anthropologists, there is now a growing body of opinion that social advantages of self-settlement far outweigh the material advantages of formal settlements (Betts 1981, p. 213).

The intent of this discussion is not to suggest that self-settlement is always a better resettlement alternative than organized settlement schemes, but to stress the oft-forgotten fact that the ebb and flow of refugees' power and control are always key factors that underline the dynamics of flight and settlement for refugees. Lenin aptly said that, "A refugee is a man who votes with his feet" (Keller 1975, p. 1).

Having stressed the importance of refugees being able to control at least some of their destiny, relief agencies and government officials are well-advised to choose a refugee settlement strategy — whatever one that may be — that represents an optimal balance point between physical well-
being and personal power, and control. The application of this principle to settlement schemes, for instance, could mean a less structured plan for the scheme, decentralized control and supervision, and instigating official cooperatives or encouraging indigenous emerging ones. One advantage of the enormous Katumba and Ulyankulu settlement schemes in Tanzania (over 60,000) is the fact that they were simply too large for highly centralized control. An operating principle of less control and more security may also mean giving refugees a higher degree of autonomy on securely tenured land within the scheme, and police protection from roving bandits and guerilla forces outside of a scheme. If, in time, refugees believe they have reestablished some of their own control and security, many ethnologists suggest that they will express this belief by such practices as reinstating former bride prices or planting banana trees which take a long time to produce fruit.

The other key to a dynamic, effective resettlement approach is to understand refugee resettlement as a process growing into the larger context of regional development. Thayer Scudder and Elizabeth Colson suggest four basic stages in the process of refugee relocation: a recruitment stage, a transition stage, a potential development stage, and an incorporation stage (Scudder 1982, pp. 274-275). These four stages appear to match the changing nature of a group of refugees from Zaire who have been living in southern Sudan. In the late 1960's, during the Congo civil war, approximately 4,000 refugees filtered into southern Sudan and self-settled along the border. For a period of five years spontaneous self-settlement constituted an informal recruitment period until the number of refugees accumulated into a distinct concentration. In 1972 the Sudanese government created a refugee camp for them. The transition stage was marked by a two-year period during
which the nature of their refugee camp (a tightly-knit, closed system) forced the refugees to turn inward and reconstitute their social structure. In 1974, this community was resettled at Rejaf in the Juba Province as a self-sustaining settlement scheme, overseen by a European staff. This potential development stage was signified by the reemergence of an open-ended society, increases in economic risk-taking, widening wealth differentials, and social stratification. This stage is now being completed largely because of its high agricultural yields. The Rejaf scheme may never reach the incorporation stage, but if it does, it will be realized only after a number of events occur. As defined by Scudder and Colson,

"A resettlement community is a long-term success as an entity when management of local production systems and the running of the local community are handed over to a second generation that identifies with the community. Where relocation and development are carried out by special agencies with exceptional funds, staff, and other resources, incorporation also involves the phasing out of such agencies of local government. Incorporation completes the process whereby the community is able to take its place within a larger territorial frame that includes host communities, neighboring towns and urban centers, and regional marketing and commercial networks. Its people are again operating within a familiar environment where they feel at home. Very little research has been done on the process included within this stage" (Scudder 1982, p. 275).

Obviously this final incorporation stage is an ideal goal, wherein the former refugee community is actively integrated with the indigenous population and the local economic structure. Nevertheless, the transformational nature of these four stages as seen in Sudan contain some significant insights and lessons that deserve careful attention by future researchers.

Although refugee settlement is certainly a process (often differentiated by distinct stages as Scudder and Colson suggest), refugee settlement should be a process with an end — development of the area and its community. In the late 1960's and the 1970's, most government officials and planners
generally considered development potentials and refugee problems as at least unrelated forces, if not opposing ones. The exceptions were a few highly-organized settlement schemes that were envisioned as potential contributors to "zonal development." Today many kinds of refugee settings and settlements are starting to be considered in the context of, and in relationship to, regional development. In short, zones for refugee settlement are being viewed increasingly as designated areas for future development. The basic premise is that refugee settlements - albeit a scheme, self-settled village, or otherwise - can provide an innovative point of departure for further development of the area because refugees are more likely to be successful innovators than the established population, and therein positively affect the traditional rural economy (Gould 1974, p. 421). In his book Uprooting and Social Change: The Role of Refugees in Development, Steven Keller confirmed that in India refugees have significantly higher innovation rates (Keller 1975, p. 247).

Now refugee settlements are occasionally described in the literature, although perhaps ideally as, a "suitable launching point" or "a catalyst" for development. Although regional development of any monumental magnitude may never be accomplished in a refugee setting, nevertheless choosing area development as a subsequent goal for refugee relief and resettlement can generate a more positive, constructive tone for even the initial relief and resettlement efforts themselves. The Arusha conference (1979) on African refugees, "...emphasized that progressive official assistance to rural refugees should be planned and implemented within the context of national, subregional, and regional development plans, that the approach should be one of integrated development and that the aim should be refugee self-reliance" (Eriksson, Melander, and Nobel 1981, pp. 29-30). To encourage
this trend, the UNHCR and other relief agencies ought to begin funding infra-
structure projects a little more, because:

"Where rural development is intended, a well-designed and well-
maintained physical infrastructure is essential. This often
involves the establishment of research stations and pilot proj-
ects; carefully thought-out systems of land tenure and of land
and water usage with appropriate conflict regulation mechanisms;
the organization of extension, marketing, and other economic
services; the provision of social services, and the encouragement
of institutional mechanisms for encouraging local leadership"
(Scudder 1982, p. 286).

In so doing, relief organizations can consciously integrate refugee settings
into the life and economy of the host country.

Assisted Self-Settlement

The single most important gap in the current understanding of refugee
settlement patterns is the concept of assisted, self-settlement both in
research and finance. As of 1976, most African refugees who were self-
settlers received absolutely no aid and the remaining ones were generally
given only indirect aid (Hansen 1981, p. 177). As noted in chapter three,
most researchers would have to question the validity of purely "spontaneous"
self-settlement. That issue needs to be reiterated here insofar as directed
and assisted self-settlement (as compared to unassisted self-settlement,
which is generally the rule) needs a great deal of careful research, attention,
and financial aid in the future.

Major studies on the problems of "spontaneously" settled refugees,
with a view to formulating specific programmes of assistance, have already
been suggested for a number of reasons. As of 1979 only two major studies
on self-settlement areas existed in African refugee literature, despite
the overwhelming majority of self-settling refugees in Africa (Chambers
1979, p. 383). Studies dealing with the basic social, educational, and
economic situation of rural refugees living outside an organized scheme is unavailable. Second, unassisted self-settlement has worked successfully on occasion. In Zambia, self-settled Angolan refugees were self-sufficient within five years at virtually no financial cost to the government (Hansen 1979, p. 379). Third, and most important, assisted self-settlement has shown a good deal of promise already. In the early 1970's, Tanzanian officials successfully distributed five to ten families at a time into rich agricultural areas as a permanent solution for a few refugees, and a temporary one for others before relocating them on organized resettlement schemes (Yeld 1968, p. 35). Functionally, assisted self-settlement has worked, and financially it can too. Brian Neldner contends that in most situations the cost in purely financial terms to bring a refugee to self-support over three to five years is no greater than supporting them in a full dependency situation for a relatively longer period of time (Neldner 1979, p. 401).

In many instances assisted self-settlement could cost a lot less than a settlement scheme, yet still produce self-reliance. Moreover, refugees could be directed, but still allowed to resettle themselves in existing villages and towns. This kind of directed resettlement should be supported in turn by the special support facilities (e.g., job counseling services, transportation services, or employment cooperatives) without the kind of enormous capital investments of large-scale settlement schemes.

Self-settling refugees are often wiser and more innovative than donors in the West think. Too often relief organizations and their donors allocate their resources in terms of overwhelming support of a few, highly-intensive projects rather than broadly supporting a larger number of less-intensive projects. Consequently, refugee camps and settlement schemes get full-scale aid, while self-settlers receive no aid. Part of the tragedy of
being a rural African refugee is that help is not usually provided unless the refugee is a member of a formal closed camp or scheme. The argument here is that assisted and directed self-settlement is particularly appropriate for carefully planned, selective aid. Thus, the pertinent issue in many refugee settings is not more aid, but better and more discriminating aid, particularly for assisting self-settlers.

In summary, refugee settlement projects need to be evaluated in terms of what is desirable as opposed to what is feasible. As long as large tracts of arable land are available, organized agricultural schemes will be an effective approach for African refugees. On the other hand, in many instances a considerable exodus of indigenous rural people from border regions to urban areas is freeing up more land for self-settling refugees. The indigenous population in many countries is slowly shifting towards urban centers, leaving the furthest rural areas for incoming self-settlers. Thus some new pockets of marginal land are appearing, but the large tracts of highly productive land have already been garnered for commercial use, apart from a few exceptions like Sudan.

Larger refugee populations can be more effectively absorbed into some areas (physically, socially, and economically) than into others. However, in general, large refugee concentrations need to be subdivided into smaller, more productive and manageable units because of the marginally scattered nature of available land. Further study of the success of refugees within assisted self-settlement areas as compared to those in designated settlement schemes is certainly needed. Nevertheless, whether by choice or by necessity, the majority of African refugees are already self-settlers and most experts agree that a significant rise in the number of African refugees will continue for at least another decade (Rogge 1982, p. 43). Consequently,
although many refugee camps are still inevitable and some settlement schemes are feasible, most of Africa's refugees in the future will be self-settlers who will need increasing amounts of directed assistance.

The Role of Volunteer Agencies

Unlike our own United States government, many African governments lack a tradition of public welfare service. Often they fail to interact well with voluntary relief agencies, question their motives, and place extravagant expectations on them. Repeatedly, complicated bureaucratic relationships slow efforts to solve refugee problems. In the late 1960's, however, the tripartite partnership of the Lutheran World Federation, the UNHCR, and the Tanzanian government gave a precedent-setting example of successful cooperation in an African refugee setting. In this instance, as in others, the host government supplied the initiative, land, and policy. Brian Neldner, an administrative head for the LWF, contributed a good deal of the successful cooperation and assistance to the Tanzanian government's "...very clear framework for refugee policy" (Neldner 1979, p. 396). The UNHCR's role was to supply most of the needed finances for food, housing, health services, education, and the initial agricultural efforts. As in this case, generally the UNHCR cannot serve in a supervisory role on the resettlement location, but does serve as a financier and mediator between governments and volunteer agencies; and the LWF provided the administrative supervision to implement scheme plans at refugee resettlement locations. Although volunteer agencies are often reluctant to relinquish their independent status, the LWF's very successful role in Tanzania illustrated the fact that volunteer agencies can usually maximize their effectiveness in a strongly cooperative interrelationship with host governments and the UNHCR.
In 1982, the UNHCR's office in Washington, D.C., noted that there has been a significant increase in the numbers of nongovernmental and voluntary organizations providing vital assistance to refugees in Africa. The UNHCR further acknowledged, "These organizations play an indispensable role implementing projects aimed at promoting durable solutions and in providing emergency relief" (UNHCR n.d., p. 2). Volunteer agencies are good implementers for these basic reasons: they are in the field, are flexible, and have important people-to-people linkages. Because they are often working in the area already, volunteer agencies may be helping refugees before host countries have officially admitted the existence of a refugee problem or provided assistance. In politically sensitive situations volunteer agencies have the distinct advantage of being low-profile.

Volunteer agencies are also quite flexible. Free of extensive red tape and usually a political orientation, volunteer agencies can move quickly into refugee settings. Agencies such as World Vision and World Relief are specifically designed to respond rapidly to emergency needs. Where there are emergency refugee needs, volunteer agencies are usually the first ones on the scene.

Volunteer agencies also demonstrate another kind of flexibility by meeting changing needs from a local standpoint rather than catering to external interests. For instance, in southern Sudan ACROSS (Agency for Relief and Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan) shifted from an emergency relief role for Sudanese refugees returning after the civil war to a long-term rehabilitation role with a development orientation. Moreover, volunteer agencies can more easily phase out projects when appropriate, and train nationals to replace their own personnel, than can government-directed programs. Volunteer agencies also contribute an important personal dimension
to refugee relief. Their people-to-people approach in the field means that a voluntary agency often takes up where government financial aid leaves off by providing significant intangibles like moral support, personalized training, practical counsel, and simple friendship. By living alongside refugees, many volunteers communicate in a concrete way to refugees that an outside world cares. Although host governments and U.N. agencies are usually bound by the strict legal definition of a "refugee," voluntary agencies interpret the term in the broadest possible way and therein help some refugees who would otherwise go without relief aid (Weeks 1978, p. 25). Moreover, voluntary agencies such as CARE or Catholic World Relief are not only effective fund raisers, but in so doing they also educate the public on refugee issues and problems, many of which would not have reached the public through the media or the government. Thus, voluntary agencies and organizations play a significant role in implementing and personalizing refugee resettlement.

Conclusion

Western Europeans have developed elaborate systems for handling foreign refugees over the course of Judeo-Christian history as compared to Africa. Michael Teitelbaum recently wrote, "The United States is a nation of immigrants, and most of us look with pride upon the invigoration and pluralism that immigration continues to provide. We have not fully lived up to the poem inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, but the concept of a melting pot, however lumpy we know it to be in practice, is still an American ideal" (Teitelbaum 1980, p. 421). However, as African countries established their national identities in the last 25 years, their attitude towards refugees has been markedly different from this American ideal. Immigrant refugees
were often considered an unfortunate hindrance to national development - and they often were.

In the fall of 1982, however, Sudan hosted a Refugees and Development seminar for its African counterparts. This conference may symbolize a philosophical shift to a more positive attitude toward new influxes of refugees. As has been aptly suggested, "Refugees can make a more direct and more immediate contribution to economic development in African countries than is usually the case in developed countries" (Gould 1974, p. 421). In these terms African refugees ought to be seen as an asset rather than a handicap to future development plans.

One of the strong motivations behind this research effort was to help assimilate and construct an integrated, holistic understanding of the resettlement patterns for African refugees in their continental context. Often, all refugee settings and settlements worldwide are lumped together and viewed alike. Neither specialized researchers nor the general public, however, can afford to transfer their perceptions, thoughts, and models of European refugees directly to Africa. Although African refugee resettlement is understood at present in only a superficial way, its distinctive nature in contrast to other continents is apparent.

On the other hand, within the African context, refugee problems are often viewed as temporary and unique events. Results of this prevalent perspective include incomplete and narrow research, insufficient evaluation of programs, lack of preparation for the next wave of refugees, inadequate experimentation with alternative strategies, and a failure to develop coordinated relief efforts or learn from the past (Stein 1981, pp. 320-321). Barry Stein believes that, "All refugee agencies at all levels, as well as the refugees, are victims of this perspective" (Stein 1981, p. 321). Hence,
this study was specifically envisioned, designed, and completed to serve as a needed stepping stone from scattered descriptive case studies to assimilating and consolidating recurring refugee resettlement phenomena in Africa. As stated, my specific theme was the nature of refugee resettlement patterns in Africa. In 1983, Richard Morrill reiterated that, "A major role of geography is to study how physical and human processes are conditioned by, and in turn, structure territory" (Morrill 1983, p. 7). As a geographer, I have sought to study the African territory, refugee processes, and the four basic resettlement patterns they produce. Richard Morrill further stated that, "One key concept (of geography) is that territory (space) becomes efficiently divided into similar areas ('cells') as a resolution of opposing forces" (Morrill 1983, p. 6). The hypothetical model of settlement zones for African refugees suggested in chapter two, I believe, epitomizes the recurring resolution of many opposing forces surrounding different kinds of refugee resettlement.

Although I have already referred to the need for further analysis of assistance for self-settlers, some other fundamental issues need to be researched. What is the nature of urban refugee settlement? What are their different spatial layouts? What kinds of relief are the most effective for the urban refugee? Can settlements which originate as refugee camps shift into self-sufficiency? How much does the spatial layout of refugee camps affect their success? What is the impact of development agencies upon refugee camps? What types of environmental surveys and socio-economic studies are most needed to establish successful agricultural schemes? These questions regarding refugees are all fertile research areas for geographers.
Nevertheless, the generalized, comprehensive approach of this study was intended to build a context for future research, increase general public understanding, and to promote appropriate refugee relief. As E. F. Kunz concluded, "It is only through such conceptual clarification of the refugee phenomena, and the identification of recurrent patterns, that fieldworkers in countries of asylum and in countries of settlement can be provided with advice" (Kunz 1973, p. 127). With a stronger conceptual understanding of African refugee resettlement others should be able to cope more successfully and efficiently with specific resettlement problems and projects, and do so with a new breadth of understanding and perspective.
BI-LIOGRAPHY


THE NATURE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN AFRICA

by

JOHNATHAN BASCOM

B.S., Kansas State University, 1981

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Geography

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1983
ABSTRACT

Refugees constitute one of the greatest, but most poorly understood realities in present-day Africa. Over one half of the world's refugees are in Africa alone. Particularly in Central and East Africa, refugees can be expected to increase in the future due to the encroaching Sahara desert moving southward and rising political pressure in southern Africa. Thus, African refugees are already a harsh reality and will continue to be a difficult problem in the decade ahead.

Too often all refugee problems everywhere have been lumped together, studied, and relieved as alike. However, the distinctive nature of African refugees demands careful analysis of that continent's specific refugee problems. Moreover, although most research has been highly descriptive case studies, a broad generalized investigation of refugee settings in this region is sorely needed in order to provide a context to reenter refugee situations for further study or relief.

This thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter develops a broad overview comprised of three elements: the historical and geographical background of refugee displacement in Africa, an investigation of their inherent ambiguities, and alternative frameworks for a useful refugee definition for Africa. Chapter two postulates some general principles about refugee flight and settlement patterns, proposes a spatial model of rural refugee resettlement patterns, and briefly discusses urban refugees as a context and contrast to rural ones. The next three chapters each focus on one of the three primary patterns of rural refugee resettlement – self-settlement, refugee holding camps, and designated agricultural schemes. Chapter six, the concluding chapter, is a brief comparative analysis, aimed primarily at suggesting the potential for assisting self-settlement, and then investigates some of the wider implications of relief agencies' participation as well as the role of refugees in development.

Instead of viewing African refugee problems as individual, temporary events, this study was specifically envisioned, designed, and completed to serve as a needed stepping stone from scattered descriptive case studies to assimilating and consolidating recurring refugee resettlement phenomena in Africa. The particular theme of rural refugee resettlement is also meant to serve as a helpful touchstone with which to push to the edge of the current literature and therein to examine ideas, to raise questions, and to illustrate some of the wide-range implications of refugee resettlement such as the role of relief
agencies' in relief and refugee resettlement in regional development. The theoretical model of settlement zones suggested in chapter two illustrates the recurring resolution of many opposing forces into different kinds of refugee resettlements. Therefore, the generalized, comprehensive approach of this thesis is intended to build a stronger context for future research, to increase public understanding, and to promote appropriate refugee relief.