THIS BOOK IS OF POOR LEGIBILITY DUE TO LIGHT PRINTING THROUGHOUT IT'S ENTIRETY.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM THE CUSTOMER.
TREATING THE ALLIES PROPERLY

by

KEITH WARREN BAUM
B. S., Kansas State University, 1977

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1981

Approved by:

[Signature]

Major Professor
# Table of Contents

Preface .................................................. iii

Introduction .............................................. 1

ONE Conflict Over Control ............................. 4

TWO Two's Company, Three's a Crowd ............... 28

THREE NATO as a Nuclear Power .................... 51

Conclusions .............................................. 70

Notes ..................................................... 76

Bibliography ............................................ 100
This study concerns the nuclear diplomacy of the Eisenhower administration, particularly the questions raised by American nuclear weapons in Europe, the assistance the United States gave to its allies, and the attempts by the President and his chief advisers to establish a political base and military rationale for its security policies. It is not to "sanitize" the use of nuclear weapons nor to offer a panegyric of the Eisenhower presidency, but rather to delineate the crux of the strategic crisis which afflicted the Atlantic alliance and to show that in their efforts to bolster what many considered a deteriorating NATO that Eisenhower and associates deserve higher marks than has been generally accorded. With this purpose in mind, this paper is part of the scholarly reconsideration of the Eisenhower years.

Some of the ideas in this thesis were sharpened in correspondence and conversation with Professors Burton I. Kaufman, Donald J. Mrozek, and Donald G. Nieman, whom I wish to thank for their valuable suggestions and interest in my work. I am also grateful to the staff of the Eisenhower Library in Abilene and archivist David J. Haight for the fine assistance they provided. I would also like to thank Cindy Wiser for her skillful typing. Finally, I would underscore a special indebtedness to my parents for their generous support, encouragement, and patience.
INTRODUCTION

During the 1950s, the growth of Soviet strategic power, especially in its ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the United States, caused the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reassess the merits of relying on American nuclear arms as the primary deterrent to Russian aggression. Ever anxious about American intentions and actions, the NATO allies feared being drawn into a world war by American imprudence, or worse yet of being "defended" in a conflict that would destroy Europe while sparing the United States and Soviet Union. Dependence on the American nuclear guarantee generated as many doubts and apprehensions as it gave assurances.

Coinciding with this crisis of confidence was the gradual economic recovery and social resurgence of Western Europe which allowed these countries to give priority to matters of national integrity that had been temporarily suspended in the years immediately following World War Two. The control of nuclear armaments, as each American military service had already assumed, was symbolic of primacy, or, to a nation, of sovereignty. As Charles DeGaulle argued in defending France's force de frappe, no country could conceive of a national role without disposing independently of modern military power. Thus, the allies, notably Great Britain and France, desired their own nuclear forces as these weapons
promised to augment their bargaining position within the alliance and to counter the Soviet threat.

New and challenging questions appeared in light of these changing relationships of Western Europe vis-à-vis both the United States and Soviet Union. Would the United States use its nuclear weapons to respond to Soviet nuclear attacks on Western Europe and risk escalation to a complete strategic exchange if the Soviet Union retaliated with strikes against the American homeland? Was it necessary to provide these armaments to NATO in order to prevent the development of national nuclear arsenals and a disruption of alliance unity? Could an arrangement be contrived to satisfy the European requirements for security without alienating American control of the warheads? Toward each of these issues the member states of NATO adopted views that differed materially from each other. This multiplicity of national interests and the various perception of nuclear arms within the alliance that accompanied those interests threatened to throw NATO into acute disarray.²

In dealing with these disruptive issues, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower retained the decisive initiative by virtue of the United States’ superior nuclear arsenal and technology compared to its allies. Yet the President and his chief advisers could not reverse the growth of Soviet strategic power nor could they prevent France and the United Kingdom from constructing their own
nuclear forces. ^3 Basically, the United States had only a limited capacity to influence the positions of its allies regarding the control of nuclear arms. Nevertheless, this capacity could be decisive due to the United States' preponderant role in forming the strategy of the alliance. ^4

Eisenhower claimed that this initiative was curtailed by congressional restrictions, primarily the Atomic Energy Act (commonly referred to as the McMahon Act, after its sponsor, Senator Brian McMahon of Nevada) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. As the President asserted in 1960, the McMahon Act was a "very defective and terrible law," which severely damaged relations with the NATO partners, even though certain features of the act and its amendments in 1954 and 1958 provided unexpected advantages. ^5 The legal requirement that the warheads remain in American custody presented a formidable obstacle for the administration's nuclear diplomacy as the vital issue was clearly the control and custody of the warheads. How successfully, then, did Eisenhower and his chief advisers respond to this situation marked by its complexity, congressional restraints, and anxiety on the part of the allies?
CHAPTER I
CONFLICT OVER CONTROL

When Eisenhower entered office, the defense budget was bloated by expenditures for the Korean War. Convinced of the need to lower substantially the level of defense spending, Eisenhower considered a balanced federal budget as vital to a vibrant American economy, which in turn was essential to the nation's security. He further realized that in the nuclear age omnipotence was an extravagant and hazardous illusion. The principal lesson for Eisenhower of the Korean War was that limited wars, fought with conventional weapons on the periphery of the communist world, would deplete the resolve of the United States' allies and the nation's resources. At the same time, administration officials perceived a clear and present menace evident in mainland China as well as the Soviet Union. The problem, therefore, was how to attain security with solvency—to protect the United States, contain communism, and guard American interests overseas, while reducing defense expenditures.¹

The synthesis of the apparently conflicting goals of global defense and military economy was the doctrine of strategic deterrence which formed the basis for what Admiral and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Arthur Radford termed the "New Look" in a speech late in 1953.² With its increased reliance on nuclear power, the New Look promised a dramatic yet logical solution to the "Great Equation" and an alternative
to the previous administration's practice of scattering funds among the three military services in an effort to surpass or at least match the Soviets in every weapons category. "With the shift in emphasis to the full exploitation of air power and modern weapons," Eisenhower explained, "we are in a position to support strong national security programs over an indefinite period with less of a drain on our manpower, material, and financial resources."³

A National Security Council paper (NSC 162/2) delineated the essentials of the New Look. American strategic forces, especially the Strategic Air Command's hundreds of nuclear-armed bombers, provided a long-range deterrent and formed the foundation of the nation's entire defense posture. To counter localized communist aggression, the United States would rely on a first line of defense of American-equipped and trained indigenous soldiers rather than react with its own conventional forces. Tactical nuclear weapons would theoretically buttress these troops. In fact, NSC 162/2 enunciated for the initial time in a formal policy statement the concept that the development of the hydrogen bomb had made 1945-style atomic armaments part of the tactical equipment of nuclear warfare.⁴

Administration officials believed that the New Look would bolster a sagging Atlantic alliance.⁵ In part this optimism derived from a substantial trend in military thought which stressed nuclear weapons as the means for closing the gap
between NATO's objectives and its actual capabilities. The military's perception of the problem made it increasingly difficult to dampen hopes of substituting technology for manpower and money. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Alfred Gruenther, who prepared the administration's planning paper on NATO's nuclear strategy, indicated the pivotal assumption:

We have determined that our strategy in the center requires the use of atomic weapons, whether the enemy uses them or not, and we must use atomic weapons to redress the imbalance between their forces and ours to achieve a victory.6

Endorsing Gruenther's study in November 1954, both Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson thought it necessary and desirable to base NATO's plans and preparations on "an effective atomic capability."7 The two Cabinet members also expected a vigorous congressional questioning of the administration's proposed action, specifically the possible demand that the United States seek the authority to conduct atomic operations from bases in the European countries. Displaying a sense of restraint, they advised Eisenhower not to press for formal commitments the United States itself would not be prepared to give. Instead, they recommended (with the support of their respective departments and General Gruenther) that the President lead the Europeans as well as Congress into the nuclear age tacitly and gradually.8

Holding the line against an irresponsible dispersion of
nuclear armaments represented an important guideline for the administration. This policy preference grew in part out of the administration's intention to avoid the onus of encouraging the spread of the world's most dangerous and lethal weapons; but it also reflected the anxiety that the allies would use American assistance to develop their own nuclear arms at the expense of their NATO contributions, especially manpower. The spread of nuclear arsenals could also mean independent foreign policies and more discord within the alliance. In the first years of the Eisenhower presidency, the insistence on the United States' centralized control was in the administration's view the best way to attain what Dulles called "a harmonious nucleus of integrated defense" in Europe.9

The first stage of implementing NATO's nuclear strategy was to secure member approval of "the concept of the capability to use atomic weapons as a major element of military operations in the event of hostilities."10 This was not a difficult assignment given the United States' virtual monopoly of strategic weapons delivery systems at that time. Presupposing the invulnerability of the United States, the North Atlantic Council at its December 1954 meeting officially adopted MC-48 which authorized allied commanders to base their strategic plans on the assumption that NATO forces would use atomic arms to defend themselves, whether an aggressor used them or not. By encouraging its allies to rely upon a tactical nuclear response to conventional attacks, the United
States hoped to fulfill its professed goal of protecting Western Europe against invasion. Secretary Dulles acclaimed MC-48 as providing the means for developing a forward strategy that would repel the aggressor at the threshold. ¹¹

Dulles' anticipations notwithstanding, NATO's New Look raised a host of problems, particularly the control and custody of nuclear arms. ¹² At the Council assembly, representatives of Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands argued against leaving the authority of when and how to employ these weapons with military commanders. Earlier statements by Lord Bernard Montgomery had created a furor over the possibility of the Atlantic command generals precipitating a nuclear war, and had prompted the British government to seek civilian and political control. ¹³ The British also believed that in the event of war there would be no distinction between tactical and strategic weapons. In their view, the use of tactical armaments would provoke a strategic retaliation against British cities and harbors, and therefore controls on the tactical use of nuclear weapons should be established to match those that the United States and Britain already had on their strategic arsenals. ¹⁴

The administration yielded to these concerns and withdrew its request that General Gruenther in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander be given the power to employ nuclear weapons. Charging Gruenther with this responsibility appealed to Eisenhower, who as the Supreme Allied Commander from 1950 to
1951, had worked closely with Gruenther and was confident of his associate's abilities. Moreover, the Supreme Allied Commander, although theoretically an international post, was more like an American proconsul in Europe. This was significant for if there was a surprise attack on NATO forces like that on Pearl Harbor, Eisenhower wanted the decision to retaliate to be made by the commanders, preferably American, on location. Politically, SACEUR was also important for it allowed the administration to work within the formal lines of authority by meeting the McMahon Act's stipulation that the warheads remain in American custody. As Dulles later asserted, this requirement was "quite compatible" with the functions of the Supreme Allied Commander. Despite Britain's opposition in December 1954, SACEUR continued to be a crucial element in the administration's nuclear diplomacy as it represented the link between a common strategy for both the United States and NATO.

Rather than confront the British at this time, Dulles attempted to deflate the issue by contending that the time and manner of authorizing the use of nuclear armaments by NATO forces should not be defined at the Council meeting. The Secretary maintained that if too many restrictions were instituted, war would become more likely. A degree of intentional ambiguity also served to keep an aggressor off balance, thereby enhancing the deterrent effect of NATO's nuclear arms. Eventually, the North Atlantic Council deter-
minded that the decision to use these weapons should be made by civilian authorities, although there remained disparate views on whether the fourteen Council members or the three nations (France, Great Britain, and the United States) composing the Standing Committee should decide. This procedural matter was further complicated by the fact that the United States owned the weapons which by law could be used only on direct order from Eisenhower.

Within a few years after NATO had adopted MC-48, it was clear that this strategic expedient had generated more problems for allied cooperation and defense than it had solved. Besides stimulating the allies' appetite for a greater share in the control of nuclear arms, the greater reliance upon these weapons which had been originally viewed as a substitute for conventional weaponry in deterring a Soviet invasion discouraged the European members from increasing their conventional contributions to a military establishment in which the United States primarily produced and controlled nuclear arms. Indeed, the only evident merit of NATO's tactical nuclear strategy was that it facilitated the training of the allies in this type of warfare.

Soviet missile developments compounded the problem of calculating and meeting the requirements of allied security and cohesion. As early as 1955, the Soviets openly boasted of a medium-range missile capacity, and during the Suez crisis brandished this force at Britain and France. Although
these oblique threats had little effect on American strategic policy, the advances made by the Soviet Union in equipping its forces with nuclear arms lessened the confidence of NATO officials that the alliance would have the advantage in a nuclear conflict.

This skepticism coincided with German apprehensions about a strategy that would defend them by the means that could also destroy them.22 "Carte Blanche," an elaborate exercise carried out by NATO in June 1955, intensified their preoccupation with the possibility that Central Europe would become a nuclear battlefield. At the conclusion of the simulated maneuvers, in which 355 atomic bombs were "dropped" in 48 hours, observers calculated that, apart from the damage to military installations, 1,700,000 West Germans had been "killed," 3,500,000 "wounded," and an indeterminate number affected by radiation. The publication of these startling figures precipitated a public controversy which forced the government of Konrad Adenauer into awkward policy statements regarding its rearmament program.23

By the beginning of Eisenhower's second term, resolving NATO's nuclear problem had become a task of punishing difficulty for the United States and the allies. MC-48 had not fulfilled its original promise of providing more security at less cost in men and money. To its military leaders, the alliance was quickly losing its ability to fight a conventional war before it had acquired the capacity to "win" a
nuclear conflict. These shortcomings underscored the increasing divergence of American and European conceptions of NATO. To the United States, the alliance was the instrument for integrating the developing American nuclear arsenal with a sizable standing army to forge a forward strategy against the Soviet threat. The responsibility for the ground forces in the administration's judgment should devolve upon the European members, who on the other hand, saw NATO's principal purpose as ensuring the commitment of the United States to come to their defense, when they so desired. As a result, the allies often expressed more concern about "who would pull the nuclear trigger" than NATO's military efficiency.  

Thus the allies came to consider NATO's conventional forces as a "trip-wire," and nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, as a deterrent to invasion rather than as a defense against aggression should the deterrent fail. At the December 1956 North Atlantic Council meeting, the defense ministers of the Netherlands, France, Turkey, and Britain requested that tactical nuclear warheads be made available to European forces (other than West Germany) to increase their significance as a deterrent. While pledging to accelerate the development of warhead stockpiles, Dulles firmly declared that the United States would continue its custody of the warheads.  

The administration's position regarding the warheads confronted the allies with the choice of either becoming more
dependent upon the United States' arsenal or building their own nuclear weapons. For Great Britain and France, the latter option promised to reduce their reliance on another nation's nuclear arms and, perhaps more important, restore a waning grandeur. However, the acquisition of an independent capability required not only substantial financial and scientific resources but, as the British and French experiences demonstrated, American assistance. Accordingly, the British, who would explode a hydrogen bomb in May 1957, capitalized on their weapons development to obtain information and material from the Eisenhower administration. In a speech to the House of Commons on May 21, 1957, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan explained that the primary purpose of the Christmas Island hydrogen test was to make possible "a real partnership" with the United States: "In no circumstances must we ever allow ourselves to slip into the position of satellite status or permanent dependence upon America. That...is one reason why our decision to become a nuclear power in our own right is so important and so vital to us all."²⁷ In fact, "a real partnership" had already been achieved two months earlier by Eisenhower and Macmillan in Bermuda, where they agreed on the basing of American missiles in England under joint control.²⁸

On the other hand, France, which would not successfully test an atomic weapon until February 1960, received little assistance from the United States. As a counterweight to the Anglo-American association, France and the other members of
the "Little Six" signed the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) agreements on February 20, 1957. Although EURATOM was ostensibly formed to develop peaceful uses of the atom, administration officials recognized its military potential not only for France but for the Federal Republic as well. In March a Bonn news release disclosed that West Germany, like the other EURATOM members, would have access to the nuclear secrets of its partners under the terms of the agreement. 29 Although Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss quickly denied that the Adenauer government wanted to rescind the restrictions placed on West Germany's military establishment in order to obtain nuclear arms, the possibility of the Federal Republic becoming a nuclear power was certainly viewed with alarm in Moscow. Moreover, British leaders, such as Hugh Gaitskell of the Labour Party, regarded a German nuclear force as an anathema to their disengagement proposals, while others feared a Continental bloc of nuclear powers. 30

To offset these separatist trends, the administration decided to reiterate Dulles' suggestion of a NATO warhead stockpile which had generated little enthusiasm the previous December. Realizing that a major problem would be that of ownership, Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to give General Lauris Norstad, who had replaced Gruenther at SACEUR in November 1956, the authority to use nuclear weapons. They again viewed this as the most appropriate technique to signify the administration's willingness to accommodate the Europeans and still
satisfy the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. As for the December 1954 decision which affirmed civilian and political control, Dulles believed that the United States was not obligated to the Council's resolution. In addition, Defense Secretary Wilson indicated in February that the "modernization" of NATO forces--equipping them with the latest in nuclear arms--was based on the premise that "some way would be found" to make the warheads available to the allies "in the event of an emergency, at least." Both Eisenhower and Dulles hoped that these modest gestures would be favorably interpreted by the Europeans and would result in future agreements.

The United States refrained from immediately submitting its refurbished stockpile proposal for formal allied consent. Besides the congressional objections it might provoke, the administration's scheme would have made constructive arms control negotiations difficult at best. Indeed, an opportunity for serious discussions seemed quite possible when in the spring of 1957, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament in London, Valerain Zorin, placed his country on record for the first time as supporting mutual aerial surveillance and the installation of ground inspection stations before the process of disarmament had actually commenced. Zorin also stated the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate an agreement, separate from the broader question of disarmament, to ban all nuclear testing.
However, the initial American reply to these historic concessions consisted of little more than doubts about the sincerity of Zorin's offer. With an impasse threatening Harold Stassen, the American representative in London and Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Disarmament Studies, disregarded the formal conference sessions and talked directly with Zorin and his staff. Their suggestion that the nuclear powers discontinue the stockpiling of atomic and nuclear arms infuriated the British, who wanted more time to enlarge their arsenal following the recent Christmas Island test. Complaining that the Soviets were exploiting Stassen to divide the United States and its allies, Dulles convinced Eisenhower to recall Stassen for consultation. The Secretary of State then flew to London to assume the leadership of the American delegation and put the negotiations back on a formal basis.

Eisenhower blamed Stassen's lack of tact for the outcry of the British and, to a lesser extent, the French. Yet the problem was more fundamental than simply securing the prior approval of the allies. In the first place, the New Look was inherently incompatible with arms control, due to its stress on nuclear weapons and the perjorative phrases, such as "massive retaliation" and "more bang for the buck," associated with the administration's defense policy. Second, France and Britain probably would not have endorsed a measure which would bar them from acquiring the armaments representing the decisive gauge of military and political power. In
essence, the United States encountered difficulties in reconciling its nuclear commitment to NATO with its participation in serious negotiations which might have culminated in an acceptable agreement to slow the arms race. 36

For instance, the United States had been contemplating in July the prospect of enlarging the amount of American nuclear assistance to the British if they agreed to cease their independent production of nuclear weapons. Such a maneuver would allow the British full access to American nuclear technology and weapons, and hopefully consolidate their respective positions in dealing with the Russians. Perhaps then, the three members of the "nuclear club," faced with the specter of mutual destruction, could work together to prevent the rise of new nuclear powers—the so-called N+1 problem. 37 Undoubtedly Eisenhower and Dulles feared that a proliferation of nuclear arms would eventually bring them into irresponsible hands and therefore make the world a much more dangerous place to live in. This was evident in March 1956 when the President proposed in a letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin, that the production of weapons-grade fuel for these armaments be terminated and that all future production be for peaceful purposes. 38

Yet if one of the aims in the disarmament talks was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to a fourth power, or to other powers, what, as Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News inquired, was the logic of establishing a stockpile of
weapons and other fissionable materials for the fifteen NATO nations? On this point Eisenhower was intentionally vague at his July 31 press conference:

Well, I think that is exactly logical, because if you are going to defend yourselves against nuclear attack, then all of those people attacked ought to have the right, the opportunity, and the capability of responding in kind. . . . What we have just been doing is studying means and methods of making NATO effective as a defensive organization. This means they must be armed properly. Now that is all there is to that. There is no specific program laid down at this minute by which are taking place all these things that you (Lisagor) mentioned. 39

The President's deliberate ambiguity reflected his annoyance with Dulles' "wandering" into a discussion at the Secretary's July 16 news conference of a national security matter that Eisenhower felt should not have been commented upon at all, namely the disposition of American missiles in Europe. He had wanted Dulles to say no more than that the tactical distribution and deployment of such weapons remained a military secret. 40 After checking by telephone with Dulles about what exactly had been said, the President told his staff that if he were questioned on this matter, he would be evasive, as was the case. Not wanting to become a prisoner of publicity, Eisenhower informed Dulles that he "was not extremely happy" with what he considered the Secretary's poor judgment. 41

Dulles replied that he had only mentioned that the United States was "studying" a NATO stockpile. Furthermore, he had intended to downplay a July 15 article in the Washington Post
which revealed the administration's "special deal" with the British which gave them nuclear weapons and fissionable materials in exchange for a cut-off date. As the Secretary explained to the President, if the story was confirmed and he could not deny it, the United States "would be in hot water" with the other NATO nations. Consequently, Dulles "put a red herring on the matter" by declaring that the administration was "considering something for all." Realizing that there had been a misunderstanding, Eisenhower apologized by saying that maybe he should read the Washington Post more often.

Dulles' comments at his July 16 news conference illustrated the perplexities involved in developing an arrangement which could meet European security requirements without alienating American control of the warheads. His announcement that the administration was reviewing a NATO stockpile was clearly an effort to give some indication to the allies that in the event of hostilities, they would not be in the position of suppliants, as far as the United States was concerned, for the use of nuclear arms. Their dependence was, in Dulles' words, "not a healthy relationship."

Yet even if the stockpiles were assigned to NATO as a corporate entity, he explained that Norstad could conceivably have these armaments under his control as an American general. This remark was to assure not only the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that the administration would not bypass the
McMahon Act, but also American military leaders, who had voiced their opposition to supplying the allies with warheads.\textsuperscript{45} Given this predicament, Eisenhower and Dulles proceeded gingerly, cautiously optimistic that an agreement could be reached at the upcoming North Atlantic Council meeting in December.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in August and the spectacular orbiting of Sputnik in October greatly reduced the chances for a resolution of NATO's nuclear problem.\textsuperscript{46} Although Eisenhower took a more balanced view than most of the so-called "missile gap" and "space lag," the Russian achievements tended to confirm their claims that the American strategic advantage had been, or was being, nullified.\textsuperscript{47} Because of the potential vulnerability of the United States to enemy missiles, the allies understandably expressed their dismay with this situation in which their defense was fundamentally dependent upon a nation which was now itself susceptible to nuclear attack. General Antoine Bethouart of France succinctly stated this position:

\begin{quote}
However solid may be the ties that unite the signatory states of the North Atlantic Treaty, the risk created by the appearance of the absolute weapon (long range ballistic missiles) is now too grave to permit the member states to entrust to a single one of the allies the monopoly of retaliation which in the hour of danger could be neutralized by the enemy or by the opposition of its own press or public opinion.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}
Soviet satellites and ICBMs increased the allies' anxiety over the location of American missile bases on their territory. By mid-1957, the United States was engaged in a substantial effort to develop a variety of strategic missile systems, and administration officials estimated that by 1959 the United States would have enough intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to begin deployment in Western Europe. At the November 1957 meeting of NATO Parliamentarians, the new Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, announced that the United States would seek launching sites for the IRBMs. In urging the other NATO countries to follow Britain's lead and agree to the stationing of these missiles on their soil, the Eisenhower administration wanted to place the weapons close enough to Soviet Russia to make possible a second-strike capability. In addition to their strategic importance, the initial deployments could have a valuable "psychological impact," especially in the aftermath of Sputnik. By installing the missiles as soon as possible in those countries which desired them, the allies would have a measure of security against the possibility of nuclear "blackmail."

The psychological effects also extended to the allies having what Dulles termed "a very considerable measure of allied participation in the handling of these missiles." In other words, the administration was prepared to allow national custody of the means of delivery while the warheads would be stockpiled nearby under American supervision. Thus,
the United States and the recipient country would theoretically have a veto over the use of the weapons. However, the fact that the United States retained custody of the warheads and could still employ its strategic weapons without prior consultation of the allies obviously compromised their sense of control. For many Europeans, if the administration wanted the launching sites, it would have to truly relinquish a significant part of its power of decision. As the New York Times noted, "for the first time in years, it appears as though the United States will have to negotiate with her allies." 53

At the annual Council meeting in December, Dulles, with Eisenhower in attendance, presented the American plan to establish warhead stockpiles and IRBM bases in Western Europe. The stockpiles, including the warheads for the missiles, would be under the custody of the United States, represented by General Lauris Norstad, who as Supreme Allied Commander would release the warheads for use by appropriate forces in time of war. He would also direct the geographical distribution of the missile bases after securing an agreement with the nation directly concerned. Dulles emphasized that no nation would be compelled to accept either the stockpile or the IRBMs against its will. 54

The response to the administration's proposals was tepid. The Continental allies, in addition to their misgivings about the attendant risks of missile bases or warhead stockpiles
on their soil, questioned whether the separation of the weapons from the warheads would vitiate the military value of the armaments. Others, such as Norway's Premier Einar Gerhardsen, mindful of strong Soviet warnings, suggested that the decision on the missiles be postponed in lieu of re-examining the possibilities for renewed negotiations on disarmament. In short, the prevailing impression at the Council meeting was that the American proposals would be endorsed only after prolonged discussion, examination, and some modification.\(^55\)

Great Britain and Turkey expressed their readiness to accept the missile and stockpile arrangement. France, Belgium, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands all refused to commit themselves, although France and Greece hinted at their willingness to have the missiles under certain conditions.\(^56\) The West Germans maintained an official and tactful silence during the assembly, while the Danish and Norwegian delegations stated their reluctance about even being asked to accept the missiles. Finally, in exchange for a hesitant American pledge to support a new foreign ministers conference with the Soviets, to work diligently for a disarmament treaty, and to share more technical and scientific information with Europe, the NATO partners agreed to consider individually whether to accept the IREMs.\(^57\)

Despite this seeming inconclusiveness, Dulles was quite positive in his appraisal of the week's proceedings upon his
return to the United States. In a conversation with Texas Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson at the end of December, he indicated his satisfaction with the strengthening of NATO by confidently predicting that "we will get the missiles where we need them." The same day, Dulles told California Senator William Knowland that "things went very well" at the NATO sessions. According to the Secretary, several countries had expressed a desire to have the missiles, although the precise location had yet to be discussed. West German Chancellor Adenauer also had privately offered his support and had briefly touched on the possibility of placing some of the IRBMs on the west bank of the Rhine River. Even Norway and Denmark, initially opposed to discussing the administration's proposals, "came around to join in the unanimous decision." Of course, there were "technicalities" to be worked out but Dulles had "no doubt" that the American plan would proceed accordingly.

Yet, the outcome of the December 1957 Council meeting was at best a limited success for the Eisenhower administration. Dulles had forcefully argued the case that missiles in Europe were necessary to its defense and Eisenhower's attendance had somewhat revived the morale of the NATO partners. Furthermore, the Council meeting narrowed the breach between the United States and Europe over policy toward the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the vagueness of the final comminique offset these gains and demonstrated that the control of nuclear weapons remained as perplexing as ever.
The plan which the Council approved "in principle" involved the negotiation of bilateral agreements for the placement of IREMs on allied territory in accordance with NATO's defense posture.61 The understanding was that the United States would still have custody of the warheads, but the recipient country would operate the missile. The decision to use or not to use nuclear armaments, therefore, would theoretically be a joint one with both nations retaining a veto. The comminique also called for the establishing of stockpiles of tactical and strategic warheads, "readily available" in time of war but under the supervision of Norstad, acting in his capacity as an American general in charge of American forces in Europe.62

The agreement in principle demonstrated that the "technicities" and "precise location" that Dulles underestimated in his talks with Senators Johnson and Knowland represented crucial questions defiant of solution. Administration officials could claim that their primary objective at the Council meeting was not a definite decision, but rather an effective preparatory action, especially since the missiles would not be ready for another eighteen months. Perhaps a firm agreement was not urgent at that very moment, but the fact remained that little had been accomplished in alleviating the allies' dissatisfaction with the United States' control of nuclear weapons.

American strategic planning was not at fault for this
lack of resolve. Between 1954 and 1957, the administration's approach to NATO's nuclear problem centered on the Supreme Allied Commander, who, as Dulles aptly put it, "wore two hats." Eisenhower and the Secretary of State hoped that both the Europeans and Congress would have (for their respective reasons) enough confidence in Gruenther and later Norstad so that a compromise of sorts could be reached. Measures of flexibility and restraint accompanied this sense of direction. Essentially, then, the Eisenhower administration attempted to enhance allied collaboration with limited nuclear sharing, while at the same time trying to avoid the injurious effects of independent nuclear efforts and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous armaments.

The combination of Soviet strategic advances and the various definitions of security by the Europeans thwarted these endeavors. Sputnik and Russian ICBMs undermined what willingness there was among the allies to depend upon an American decision whether or not to use these arms. By the time the United States was ready to discuss giving the allies a greater part in the operation of tactical weapons, Great Britain and France were primarily concerned with gaining independent control of strategic nuclear weapons. To make matters worse, speculations about their use tended to assume a life of their own, especially as it became more than a military question. The result was that in December 1957 most of the NATO partners expressed their distinct hesitancy to accept ICBMs and stockpiles on their soil.
The French in particular objected to the continued possession of the warheads by the United States, which in their view was being too stubborn in sharing a decisive measure of authority. Unless France had control of the warheads along with the means of delivery, and had a legitimate voice in the use of strategic weapons outside the Atlantic command, it would not allow missiles or stockpiles on its territory. With DeGaulle coming to power in 1958, the national aspirations of France to develop its own independent capability quickly came to constitute the primary problem for the administration's nuclear diplomacy.
CHAPTER II
TWO'S COMPANY, THREE'S A CROWD

France's February 1960 explosion of its first fission bomb in the Sahara desert represented a significant stride toward the development of its own nuclear arsenal. This new status as the world's fourth nuclear power promised to bestow several advantages, such as enhanced prestige, strengthened position in alliance negotiations, and an independence of action, to French military policy and diplomacy. For many leaders of the Fifth Republic, an independent capability was synonymous with being a great power. President Charles DeGaulle exemplified these views at the abortive summit conference in May 1960:

Our alliance appeared a living reality. In order that it become even more so, France must have her own role in it, and her own personality. This implies that she too must acquire a nuclear armament, since others have one; that she must be sole mistress of her resources and her territory; in short, that her destiny, although associated with that of her allies, must remain in her own hands.¹

However, many scientific and military experts questioned whether the Sahara explosion could be classified as that of a nuclear warhead. These skeptics also pointed out that many more tests would be necessary before the operative ability of the Mirage IV bomber--France's primary means of delivery--to carry an effective payload for long distances could be established.² Even if this particular problem was
solved, the increasing level of strategic sophistication was making it more unlikely that manned aircraft could penetrate enemy air defenses. In sum, the physical accumulation of atomic explosives was relatively easy, but the associated warning, command, and especially the delivery systems were much more difficult to achieve.  

Moreover, the acquisition of nuclear armaments by the NATO allies depended in large measure upon grants of technology and materials from the United States. In this regard, the United Kingdom's privileged position in receiving assistance from the Eisenhower administration especially annoyed France. Their failure to gain an effective access to American assistance served as a prominent grievance against what many French officials perceived as a duopoly within the alliance.  

Certainly, Great Britain was the chief beneficiary of the administration's nuclear diplomacy. Eisenhower himself in a conversation with Secretary Dulles in January 1956 sanctioned this preferential treatment, asserting that "the more we can give, the better." Two months later, the President reiterated the merits of putting the British in "a position to make a full contribution both as a deterrent and in actual operations."  

Prompted in part by British pressure, amendments to the McMahon Act in 1954 and 1958 not only liberalized restrictions on sharing information but also augmented the policy making role of Congress, specifically the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy (JCAE). With extensive review powers over executive agreements disseminating information on nuclear arms, the Committee made technical criterion an important key to cooperation. Unfortunately for the French, the British by achieving what the JCAE termed "a capability of its own for fabricating a variety of atomic weapons" provided a standard which France never quite seemed to meet. Still, these technical requirements for American assistance continued to persuade French leaders that only by accelerating their own nuclear arms program could they obtain parity with Britain.

Eisenhower contended that the JCAE interfered with the administration's attempts to cooperate with the NATO allies, particularly France. In his last year as President, he emphatically registered his disgust with the extent of cooperation and blamed congressional encroachments for much of the problem. Eisenhower even expressed "considerable sympathy" for the perspective of DeGaulle, who was trying to strengthen his country, while "we persist in treating them as second-rate."  

Yet even if France had attained substantial progress in the manufacture of nuclear arms, the Eisenhower administration probably would have refrained from furnishing them the materials and technology it gave to Britain. Besides their genuine concern about the dangers of proliferation, Eisenhower and Dulles strongly suspected France's political stability before 1958. Because of the fluctuating political situation,
France might be somewhat less "responsible" with these weapons than Britain and American "secrets" might fall into the wrong hands. With the rise of DeGaulle to power, these apprehensions became secondary to the administration's uneasiness about the French leader's ambitious program to restore his country to great power status. Eisenhower and his associates considered DeGaulle's demand for tripartite global planning and his pursuit of the force de frappe, or national strike force, as detrimental to the strategic cohesion of the Atlantic pact. Even though he might empathize with DeGaulle's point of view, Eisenhower was not about to contribute to NATO's disruption by fostering the development of France's nuclear arsenal.

Indeed, France was not crucial to the American security design for Europe. This was initially revealed by Dulles' insistence on West Germany's membership in NATO. Significantly, their European policies rested upon the imperative of a resurgent West Germany, whose military potential, industrial capacities, and location provided a bulwark against Soviet expansion. The emphasis that Eisenhower and Dulles placed on West Germany's military collaboration was evident by their attempts to generate the European Defense Community (EDC), which foundered in September 1954 partly due to French fears of German dominance. With the President dismissing such misgivings as senseless, Dulles threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" if France failed to ratify the EDC. Although
the French Assembly defeated the proposal, the administration's
determination to secure a German contribution compelled France
to reluctantly accept the entrance of the Bundeswahr into
NATO in 1955.

France's miscalculation in the EDC debate compounded
the frustrations of the military and political defeats it
experienced in the 1950s. Struggling to maintain the French
colonial empire in Southeast Asia and North Africa, the
leaders of the Fourth Republic, such as Pierre Mendes-France,
had to make enormous military efforts at a time when the
nation could ill afford to do so. In Algeria and Vietnam
the original forces dispatched to quell the insurgencies
suffered steady losses with no decisive triumphs, and had to
be substantially enlarged. In the midst of these crises,
the French detected that they had become the pawns in the
power politics of the cold war. Consequently, the leaders
of the Fourth Republic began to reorient their foreign poli-
cies to make them less amenable to external pressure. By no
means coincidentally, Mendes-France in 1955 initiated an ex-
pensive program designed to enable France to join the nuclear
weapons fraternity and hopefully to restore la gloire.

Dulles was skeptical that France could ever again be-
come a great power, particularly because of the strength of
the communist party there. On October 7 the Secretary cautioned
Eisenhower that "things in the foreign field...may not go
through the French Parliament--half of Mendes-France's
entourage are commies or fellow-travellers..." In a sub-
sequent discussion, Eisenhower echoed Dulles' sentiments, saying that it was prudent not to complain about communist activities "but the fact that the French government allows at this time such things makes the world doubtful of her." He concluded by noting that he had "a burn on their whole capacity."\(^{15}\)

The President voiced his displeasure on other occasions. Writing in late 1953 to longtime friend, Swede Hazlett, Eisenhower complained about the problems caused by the brief duration of most of the French governments. He admonished the French for their almost futile effort to elect a president and their inability to agree on firm policies regarding Indochina and the EDC.\(^{16}\) In a November 1954 letter to Supreme Allied Commander, General Gruenther, Eisenhower also pointed to the dire effects that another sudden change in the French political situation would have on the Western alliance.\(^{17}\) Given these views of the Fourth Republic's political instability, it was hardly surprising that Eisenhower and Dulles were hesitant about assisting France in its nuclear weapons program, even though relations between the two nations deteriorated as a result.

Meanwhile, the United States and Britain consolidated their research efforts under an agreement reached in June 1955. In addition to this scientific cooperation, operational associations stemming from the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II enhanced the collaboration between the two.
nations during Eisenhower's first term. The United States received valuable base rights for the Strategic Air Command while the target lists of SAC's "Kissing Cousins" (the British fleet of V-bombers--Vulcan, Victor, and Valiant) were closely coordinated with that of the United States.18

In November 1955 the lure of submerged and mobile missiles led the British to petition for information from the American government in order to accelerate their own atomic submarine program. Although unsure whether the revised McMahon Act would offer sufficient margin for cooperation, Eisenhower informed Prime Minister Anthony Eden in January 1956 that the United States would supply data on Nautilus submarine propulsion reactors to the British.19 Much to the chagrin of the President, congressional concern resulted in a lengthy delay. To a large degree, the alleged laxity of British security contributed to this reluctance to broaden previous agreements to include submarine information.20

Not to be denied, Eisenhower sought an opinion from Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., who concluded that "restricted data" pertaining to submarine propulsion did not constitute "weapons information" and could therefore be released to the British legally. Armed with this verdict, the administration moved to fulfill its commitment by scheduling meetings between officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and British representatives in March 1957. In a revealing letter to
AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss prior to these discussions, Under-
secretary of State Christian A. Herter emphasized the urgency of finalizing the agreements:

This matter has taken on some political significance in view of the unfortunate impediments to implementation, and any indication that the United States is not yet prepared to get on with this agreement would be unfortunate, especially just before the meeting of Prime Minister Macmillan with President Eisenhower. I would very much appreciate your personal intervention to assure that the United Kingdom obtains the promised information as soon as possible.21

However, JCAE members, such as Senator Albert Gore (Democrat-Tennessee) and Senator Clinton Anderson (Democrat-New Mexico) continued to express their concern over the adequacy of the agreement's security safeguards, and the Committee requested a postponement of implementation until the next session of Congress.22 Eisenhower decided otherwise and the United States began transmitting military propulsion reactor information to the British in April 1957. The administration's maneuver generated considerable resentment in the JCAE, especially as all the details emerged.23

Besides illustrating the ongoing tensions between the JCAE and the administration, the so-called Nautilus incident impaired negotiations with France, whose efforts in building their own atomic submarine were being hampered by design problems associated with the reactor size. In March 1958 French representatives asked for American assistance in
submarine construction. Yet it was Britain which received submarine components and materials according to a new agreement signed in July 1958.24

Endeavoring to mollify French dissatisfaction with their secondary status, Dulles travelled to Paris that month to confer with DeGaulle, who, despite reports of a large identity of views on most issues, reaffirmed "bluntly and unequivocally" his determination to arm France with or without aid from the United States.25 The Secretary of State informed the French leader that, under American law, the administration could not provide direct support for DeGaulle's goal. Instead, the United States would accommodate the French in developing atomic submarines by furnishing superior grades of uranium and technical assistance for a propulsion reactor.

Dulles' proposal immediately encountered opposition from the JCAE, still irritated by what Committee members considered the haughty behavior of the administration. Senator Anderson objected on the grounds that the stability of the French government was dubious and that they might be inclined to use the submarine for military purposes in Algeria or elsewhere. Several of Anderson's colleagues on the JCAE, relying primarily on the testimony of Admiral Hyman Rickover, also stated their lack of enthusiasm for Dulles' offer.26

Eventually, Eisenhower decided to supply France with uranium fuel only and not any data on propulsion reactors. However, this decision was not based solely on the security
reasons that perturbed the Joint Committee. In the first place, the uncertainties of relations between France and the United States precluded any viable agreement on nuclear sharing and strategy. Perhaps Undersecretary of Defense Donald Quarles best appraised the dilemmas in dealing with France. After a discussion with Herve Alphand, France’s ambassador to the United States, he stated to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs C. Burke Elbrick that if the United States makes it evident to the French that nuclear weapons would be available to them through the stockpile and if the United States did not object to the development of an independent French capability, France would probably not attempt to construct their own nuclear force. Quarles noted, however, that if the administration demanded that the French not build their own strategic arsenal, they would proceed with it anyway.27

Secondly, administration officials had concluded that reactor information would help France become the fourth nuclear power. As Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Disarmament, explained to the Joint Committee: ”The bar to our cooperation with France... has not been security in the French defense establishment, but has been our own national policy of not assisting fourth countries to become nuclear powers.”28 Farley’s opinion was endorsed by his colleague in the State Department, I. B. White, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
who asserted that "France--the DeGaulle administration and General DeGaulle specifically--would not be satisfied with anything short of an agreement which would enable France to become a nuclear power." 29

Finally, France had recently refused the stationing of stockpiles of intermediate range missiles on its soil and had also elected to withdraw its ships from the NATO fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Both of these actions signalled DeGaulle's discontent regarding the progress of global tripartite planning. 30 In justifying the burdensome effort to develop France's independent capability, DeGaulle argued that France must become a nuclear power in order to possess the military strength that was the prerequisite of political autonomy and an equal say with the "Anglo-Saxon" nations in diplomacy and discussions of disarmament. 31

The French leader coupled his demand for equal nuclear status with equal political status in a September 1958 memorandum to Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in which he proposed a triumvirate to formulate policy on world political problems and the use of nuclear weapons. 32 Quite possibly, DeGaulle intended to use France's nuclear arms as a negotiable asset. Given this scenario, DeGaulle would have discontinued the pursuit of the force de frappe in return for a clearly defined role in a NATO nuclear force and regular tripartite political and strategic consultations. 33

Whatever DeGaulle's motives, the Eisenhower administration
was not about to revise the framework of interallied politics. In fact, Dulles had opposed the concept of tripartite planning as early as August 1956. At that time, he had advised General Gruenther to postpone a visit to London because he believed that the Supreme Allied Commander's presence there would be portrayed as the beginning of regular military planning between the United States, France, and Great Britain.34

Even when support for tripartite planning revived in the aftermath of the Suez canal crisis, Dulles maintained that the American delegation to the December 1956 North Atlantic Council meeting should use the occasion to terminate the movement for tripartite consultations.35 Besides being resented by West Germany, these meetings, if agreed to by the United States, would generally be interpreted as a reversal of decision by Eisenhower and would lessen his future influence. The President agreed with Dulles thoroughly, adding only that perhaps Dulles "should not completely close the door--someday he himself might want to arrange a tripartite meeting."36

On October 16, 1958, Dulles, after conferring with Gruenther, met with Eisenhower and again voiced his doubts about the practicality of tripartite discussions.37 In another conversation with Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy on November 8, Dulles contended that DeGaulle's motion was not a concrete proposal at all, but simply a device for DeGaulle to dramatize before the world France's re-emergence as a great power. According to Dulles, "all DeGaulle
wanted was to crystallize the tripartite relationship... Anything which will bring about this result, he will accept. If we ask him just what his program is, he will be hard put to come up with something." 38

These rebuffs of tripartite planning aggravated the frustrations France encountered in seeking nuclear information and material from the United States. Much of this discontent was directed at what DeGaulle considered the administration's failure to remove the legal obstructions to cooperation. In his view, if Eisenhower and Dulles had been serious about assisting France become the fourth nuclear power for the sake of allied cohesion, the 1958 amendments which were enacted in June would have significantly broadened the scope of sharing with France. As it turned out, the 1958 act confirmed DeGaulle's belief that France could gain equal status with Britain only if it made substantial progress in the development of its own nuclear armaments. To other French leaders as well, the amendments seemingly permitted the United States to extend its discriminatory treatment in favor of Britain. 39

Like the 1954 amendments, the primary reason for the latest revision of the McMahon Act was to elevate the level of cooperation between Britain and the United States. On October 23, 1957, Dulles candidly stated these intentions to Lyndon Johnson. The Secretary informed the Senator that the purpose of the upcoming November meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan would be to discuss the consolidation of
assets in the nuclear and missile fields, the use of present laws to a better advantage in this connection, and the possibility of liberalizing the McMahon Act, although this would not include any suggestion of releasing nuclear arms to other countries. Responding to an inquiry by Johnson, Dulles maintained that liberalization would mitigate the wasteful duplication of research efforts. Furthermore, the Secretary felt that cooperation with the British would discourage other nations from attempting to produce nuclear technology and materials on their own for military purposes. His views found support among other members of the administration, such as C. D. Jackson. The presidential speechwriter and consultant indicated to Dulles his hope that some progress could be made toward scientific coordination with great Britain. Otherwise, "every country, including Ghana, is going to have the hydrogen bomb—and the way to avoid that is to get cracking with the only people we really trust and with whom we have and can work." 

In contrast to 1954, however, Dulles perceived that the amendments could allow Congress to apply the legal criterion with a discrimination among the allies that the administration might have found embarrassing. He recommended to Lewis Strauss in May 1958 that the new law stipulate that only those countries which had demonstrated "a capacity in the weapons field" be eligible for American assistance and any future arrangements should be subject to Congressional approval. He believed
that this provision "would take care of the British and would not obviously discriminate against the French." 42

Indeed, AEC Commissioner John Vance had advocated a "measured approach" to nuclear cooperation in March testimony before the JCAE. Vance attested that any provision which did not identify restrictions would mislead the allies into thinking that a much greater dissemination of technology would be forthcoming, if requested, than the administration was contemplating. He implied that administrative restrictions would probably be more difficult for the NATO partners to accept than legislative limitations and conceded that the administration had on several occasions utilized these restrictions as a legitimate reason why it did not give out information it did not want to. 43 For the most part, Committee members concurred, although California Congressman Chet Holifield suggested that the new legislation remove all the restrictions rather than write in provisions which would make it obvious to the other NATO countries that Britain was the only country with which the United States had any intention of supplying data and materials. 44

Still, the Eisenhower administration was not actively involved in a cabal with the JCAE or Congress to deny France nuclear assistance. More accurately, Dulles, with support from Strauss, thought it advantageous to have the "substantial progress" clause as a check against the wanton spread of nuclear arms whether to France or Ghana. France's political
stability also continued to be very questionable, especially in light of its misfortune in North Africa. Such suspicions were confirmed in the spring of 1958 when the government of Felix Gaillard tumbled from power.45

Moreover, the arms race had come to overshadow all other events and issues at home and abroad. What journalist Chalmers M. Roberts described as the "mad momentum" in weapons buildup had reached such a point in 1958 that mounting protests by the so-called "non-aligned" nations and several relatively small but highly vocal organizations, such as the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, worked to move Soviet and American leadership in the direction of halting the costly and ecologically damaging nuclear tests they had conducted the past ten years.46

After a rapid sequence of tests (eleven in three weeks), the Soviet Union declared that it was unilaterally suspending these tests on March 31, 1958. Besides the symbolic advantages that this announcement might hold for the Russians, their proposal, which Eisenhower and his national security advisers had anticipated a week beforehand, raised the familiar problem of loyal partnership with the NATO allies and negotiating with the Soviet Union. At a March 24 planning session, Admiral Strauss' suggestion that the United States seize the initiative by ceasing production of all fissionable materials was turned down largely because it would have required the allies' agreement in advance, and even then they might not have endorsed such a proposal. As the President noted, "it
is one problem to work something out between the United States and the Soviet Union, and entirely another one when allies have to be consulted."  

France and Great Britain's unwillingness to go along with a test suspension thwarted American chances to circumvent the Soviet proclamation. Their demurrer, Eisenhower believed, indicated their dissatisfaction with the extent of American assistance. He contended that the two European allies would "never agree to elimination of tests until they know how to do what we can tell them to do...and so far we have been unable to get Congress to pass the bill that would authorize them to have our information."  

By not sharing what he considered the necessary information with the two nations respectively, the United States had forced them to conduct tests to evaluate the progress of their own nuclear programs. Besides the duplication and costs, additional tests would undercut the harmony of their position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union regarding disarmament and the test ban. Eisenhower in fact maintained that the United States could have reached a test suspension agreement with the Soviets in 1957 except that there was no provision which would permit enough assistance to the British in order to avoid the necessity for their future tests.

What especially irritated him was the distinct possibility that a test suspension and American law would work
hand in hand to frustrate the nuclear weapons development of Britain. On August 20, the President emphasized that Britain's future arsenal was vital to Western security. When Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles reported that their request for information had not been completely met, Eisenhower responded vigorously, arguing that the United States could not afford to conduct operations on such a basis. He specifically instructed Quarles to give the British the assurances they were seeking. Likewise, a day later, Eisenhower reaffirmed that an exchange of information should be complete and generous as any attempt otherwise would annoy the British.

Why was assistance to France not as accommodating and forthcoming? In addition to the administration's political and strategic evaluation of its NATO partner, the Geneva test ban talks, which began in October, further complicated difficulties between the two nations. The protracted discussions strengthened the opposition not only to testing of any kind but also to any action or policy that appeared to encourage the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons. Anyone relaxing the restraints upon transferring nuclear material and information in "Nth Countries" would have to bear the onus of promoting proliferation. DeGaulle guaranteed this by repeatedly stating that France would join the exclusive fraternity and would not be restricted by a test ban. Thus, in a worst case analysis, the United States could share its
technology with France and end up with an adverse world reaction, DeGaulle continuing his pursuit of a nuclear strike force or his demands for global tripartite planning, and even the use of these armaments in North Africa or elsewhere.\footnote{53}

With the risks outweighing the possible gains, the Eisenhower administration held back from furnishing France the assistance it gave to the British nuclear weapons program in 1957 and 1958.

For the final two years of the Eisenhower presidency American nuclear policy toward France continued in somewhat of a quandary. The prospect of a NATO without France undoubtedly alarmed the President, who hoped that the impasse could be broken.\footnote{54} At the same time he felt that the United States needed to remain firm in its dealings with DeGaulle. Following Secretary of State Herter's talks with the French leader in late April 1959, a "particularly disturbed" Eisenhower asked whether France's opposition to an integrated European air defense signalled the "beginning of the breakup of NATO." Unsure of their intentions, Herter replied that State Department had drafted a stern letter to DeGaulle. Eisenhower strongly supported State's action and stated that if there was not a confrontation now, the United States would likely find the French recalcitrant on other important defense matters much to the detriment of the American position in Europe.\footnote{55}

Almost a year before its first atomic explosion, France was a troubled ally in the eyes of American officials. Some
even feared a possible accommodation with the Soviet Union in exchange for a guarantee of France's neutrality, or that the threat of such an agreement would be exploited by the French to augment their bargaining position within NATO. Whether these worries were accurate or not, the developing situation was forcing the administration's preoccupation with the question of the control of nuclear weapons and France.

Attempting to placate DeGaulle, whose disgust for administration policies seemed to have no bounds, Secretary Herter offered the use of stockpiles stationed in West Germany. Although this was the first time such an offer had been extended, the specifics of the July 1959 proposal revealed that the basic American strategic position toward France had remained essentially unchanged since December 1957, when Eisenhower informed Premier Gaillard that the NATO stockpiles and deployment of missiles in accordance with those stockpiles would suffice for France's security requirements. Still, administration officials hoped that acceptance of this latest offer, which momentarily avoided the delicate problem of missile bases and territorial sovereignty, would expand France's commitment to the alliance and might eventually result in the establishment of a stockpile there.

DeGaulle, however, would not be swayed from his conviction that France must acquire its own nuclear force. Without the ability to threaten nuclear war, he contended, it would be virtually impossible for France to have a credible military
defense independent of NATO or secure equal partnership within NATO. Emphasizing the importance of the force de frappe to the nation's historic destiny in an address to the French War College on November 3, DeGaulle also stressed that France would not integrate its forces under the NATO command nor accept a secondary role in the control of those forces, especially nuclear armaments. 58

This series of events apparently was decisive in persuading Eisenhower that the United States should actually transfer the custody of nuclear armaments to France as well as Britain. 59 At his February 3, 1960, news conference, the President stated that he favored another amendment to the McMahon Act because the United States could not continue to "treat trusted allies as junior members" by denying them weapons already possessed by the potential enemy. The fundamental point for Eisenhower was that if France and Britain would stand by the United States in time of war, then it was in the American national interest to give them possession of the complete weapon. 60

Foreign reaction to the President's assertions was generally receptive. The London Times commented that the press conference statements represented an important signal that the administration wanted to share its nuclear arms more fully with its allies. Other commentators surmised that Eisenhower aimed to convince DeGaulle to accept the results of a test-ban agreement by assuring him that the United States would end its discrimination against France. 61
In contrast, Eisenhower's declarations confused the plans of the State and Defense Departments, which had been studying proposals to give these arms to Britain only, and, more important, angered the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Its chairman, Senator Anderson, warned the administration not to transfer any weapons unless authorized by Congress. Increasing the JCAE's irate grumblings was the recent disclosure of the so-called "two-key system" in Britain, where the warhead was already installed on the missile, contrary to assurances given by administration officials during the 1958 amendment hearings. Disturbed by these revelations, JCAE members questioned whether the United States actually had custody of the warhead and whether the same system would be put into effect in other NATO countries which allowed the installation of American missile bases. The Congressional committee also challenged the argument that the weapons could be transferred to the British under the "inherent powers" of the President. On March 9, 1960, Representative Chet Holifield delivered a lengthy lecture on the nature of the executive's constitutional powers, implicitly warning Eisenhower not to proceed under this clause. Ever suspicious, the Joint Committee might endorse a limited transfer of nuclear arms to Britain, but certainly not to France. 62

The President's comments within a month had raised a controversy not easily allayed. Indeed, the commotion caused
by the debate over the "two-key system" and the overall rivalry between the JCAE and the administration was a major consideration for Eisenhower, when on March 21, he relegated the issue of NATO and nuclear weapons to "the back burner for a while." Another concern was Nikita Khrushchev's blunt remark on March 8 that the implementation of any scheme for arming NATO allies with nuclear weapons would cast a pale on the summit meeting scheduled for that May. Eleven days later, Eisenhower assured the Soviet Premier that American law prohibited any such plans and that the administration had no designs to the contrary. Finally, Eisenhower believed that if an arms reduction agreement was "reasonably in prospect," the United States should not directly transfer these arms to its allies.

Nonetheless, policy planners, in this instance those of the National Security Council, remained actively engaged in examining possible initiatives. In particular, the idea of a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF)—initially advanced by General Norstad and Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon in August 1959—gained support following the Sahara tests. This alternative promised to reach a compromise of sorts with France and alleviate the increasing discontent of West Germany, along with Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, with American control and custody. In December 1960, the proposal to make the alliance itself a nuclear power became the administration's final attempt to solve the problems of nuclear weapons and NATO.
CHAPTER III
NATO AS A NUCLEAR POWER

At the December 1960 North Atlantic Council assembly, the United States called for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force controlled and financed by alliance members. Unfortunately, the outcome of this proposal demonstrated that NATO's nuclear problems remained ever baffling. West Germany's enthusiasm for the plan aroused fears of a German nuclear capability. French opposition reflected DeGaulle's belief that this proposal was just another example of "Anglo-Saxon" hegemony in Europe. The other NATO partners were apprehensive of the Soviet reaction to their participation and all discerned the illusion of "sharing" nuclear weapons.¹

Furthermore, the offer made by Secretary of State Christian Herter was essentially quite conditional. Not only would an agreement for a multinational system of control involve a lengthy and tedious process of negotiations, but it would also depend on congressional approval, which would probably require as a minimum requirement that the warheads remain in American custody. Finally, the outgoing Eisenhower administration could not commit the incoming administration of John F. Kennedy to any plan, and the President-elect declined to state his opinion in advance.²

Why did the United States advance a proposal which many regarded as impractical and too costly? One primary explanation
was that American strategic missile systems had developed to the point that a second-strike capability was conceivable. With the prospect of Soviet ICBMs raising the possibility that American strategic forces might be destroyed by a surprise first-strike, a retaliatory response became especially important in maintaining the credibility of the administration's defense postures and security commitments. Even before the launching of Sputnik in October 1957 dramatized Russian missile efforts and highlighted the risk of American force vulnerability, the issue had been identified and certain programs set in motion to minimize the hazard. Among them, the Navy Polaris project was pursued with the specific purpose of providing what Eisenhower termed an "invulnerable retaliatory capability." Since it could be launched from various locations underwater, this submarine ballistic missile system promised to relieve the concerns about the "survivability" of the United States' strategic forces. Moreover, by assigning five of these Polaris submarines to NATO (while continuing with the separate development of the American program) as its own strike force, American military planners clearly expected an expanded deterrent by the end of 1963.

In addition to these strategic motivations, Eisenhower believed that the multilateral force "would help pull NATO together and raise the morale of the NATO members." What he favored was a "Foreign Legion" strike force under exclusive NATO control. Only in this form, he contended, could the
dangers of nationalism and withdrawal by any nation of its own units be prevented. The President also foresaw that there would be considerable difficulties involving such questions as financing, manning of the submarines, and the authority to decide on the weapons' use. Indeed, the objective was not so much to solve these familiar problems, but rather to build a political base for a militarily awkward proposal which nevertheless had potential. Reflecting Eisenhower's desire "to leave a legacy to his successor," the President and his chief advisers submitted the proposal as an exploratory proposition, seeking to establish a foundation on which the difficulties could be worked out by President-elect Kennedy should he decide that the MLF was feasible.

Multinational control of nuclear weapons in Europe came under serious consideration during the summer of 1959. The problem of developing any scheme into a viable policy alternative assumed a sense of urgency, especially following Herter's talks with DeGaulle in April and the French leader's rejection of the July offer of Honest John and Nike missiles. Calling for an intensive effort in an August 19 telegram to the American embassy in Paris, Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon indicated that the custody of nuclear weapons and, possibly design information might be transferred to all or some of the NATO countries. The rather ambitious objective would be to meet the desires of European countries (particularly France) to achieve custody of weapons and to be able to count
on using these weapons without being de-
pendent on U.S. political decision, while
containing the European trend toward
creation of independent national nuclear
capabilities.⁸

Along with Dillon, Eisenhower and other Cabinet members
recognized the potential drawbacks to a multinational system
of control. A limited transfer or sharing of nuclear weapons
with the NATO partners would probably require another amend-
ment to the Atomic Energy Act. Perhaps more important,
"fifteen fingers on the trigger" could easily complicate the
decision-making process of when to use these armaments, there-
by reducing the credibility of strategic retaliation.⁹ Still,
administration officials remained guardedly optimistic that a
nuclear sharing scheme could improve the cohesion and defense
posture of the alliance and direct the European countries to
strengthen their conventional forces rather than pursue inde-
pendent nuclear capabilities.

Further impetus for a NATO nuclear force came from various
sources. In a December 6 speech, Supreme Allied Commander
Lauris Norstad not so subtly hinted that control should be
transferred directly to the alliance itself. Cautioning that
even with "NATO as the fourth nuclear power" some nations
would contain their quest for their nuclear arms, General
Norstad still expected that it would "remove a good part of
the motivation of others to do so." He concluded his address
to the Institute of World Affairs by emphasizing that "action
to pass to the alliance greater control over atomic weapons
and subjecting their use more directly to the collective will, if politically feasible, could be a great new step. ¹⁰

The same month, Frederick Mulley, a member of the British Parliament and a close associate of the Western European Union (WEU), proposed making the WEU into a nuclear power. His recommendation won the endorsement of the WEU assembly delegates, but not the governments they represented. Nor did Mulley's suggestion that Britain sponsor his plan by placing its warheads and "V-bombers" (or some of them) under the joint decision of the seven WEU countries obtain the approval of either political party in Britain, primarily because many considered this idea as foolhardy while others feared the Federal Republic's participation in such a force.¹¹ To make matters worse, West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss later ruled out any contribution apparently due to his belief that a multinational force would obscure the British and French refusal to accept an integrated European force.¹²

Thus, British and West German recalcitrance, when combined with the adverse reaction by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Soviet Union to the President's February 3 press conference remarks, caused the multilateral force proposals to emerge more slowly than might have been expected. Even the French Sahara explosions did not immediately result in any new initiatives, such as that advanced by Norstad, who on March 2 reiterated his idea of a strike force, specifically a highly mobile multinational unit armed with both conventional
and nuclear weapons, comprised of a battalion each from the United States, Britain, and France under a single commander, whom Norstad preferred not be an American. Several days later, however, Norstad recanted his statements, declaring in testimony to the JCAE that there were no plans to turn over warheads to this three-nation brigade and that his proposals were offered for "discussion purposes" only.

Nevertheless, the United States did not abandon its plan to deploy missiles in the European theater, which meant that the Eisenhower administration would have to continue its efforts to find a formula for nuclear cooperation acceptable to the Joint Committee, the NATO allies, and those who feared the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In April 1960, the impending operational stage of the Polaris missile ushered in a new version of the 1957 plan for deploying IRBMs in Europe, which had been suspended due to the allies' hesitancy and the eventual availability of mobile, solid-fueled missiles, such as the Polaris. At the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., announced that the United States was prepared to disperse hundreds of these weapons onto railroad cars or naval vessels by the end of 1961. The Supreme Allied Commander would have the power to join the missile with the activated warhead and launch it.

The British, who would complete work on their first nuclear submarine in October, welcomed the approaching avail-
ability of the Polaris, which they anticipated receiving on a special basis. Indeed, they used the expected opportunity as the occasion to discard their own Blue Streak missile program. France and the other Continental allies, however, would have none of this revised 1957 plan. DeGaulle was reported to have told Norstad that France might accept the Polaris installations if one-third of these armaments were granted to France for its own use with its own warheads.

The next month, the Nautilus incident assumed another dimension as French lenders denounced what they considered one more discrimination, this time in favor of the Netherlands. Even though France expressed the strongest interest in developing with American assistance submarines capable of carrying ballistic missiles, the administration seriously contemplated providing the pertinent information to the Dutch, whom the President "had always favored, as being, along with the British, our staunchest allies." On May 20, French Ambassador Alphand warned Secretary Herter about the "extremely bad reaction" which would occur in his country if it was announced that Congress had been petitioned for the necessary authority to make this information available to the Netherlands without doing the same for France. The French envoy stated that he could not overemphasize how great this reaction would be. Any chance that either nation had, however, was terminated on June 9, when the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy declared its opposition to nuclear submarine cooperation with the Dutch and French.
Angered by this latest disappointment, which in his estimation at least partly resulted from Congressional interference, Eisenhower stressed in an August 6 discussion with General Norstad that the United States must not treat the NATO partners as though they had inferior status. The President further asserted that the Polaris missile should be "utilized in 'overall' or strategic purposes" and that "we should be as generous with our allies in this matter as we think they should be in other questions involving the alliance."\(^22\) He agreed with Norstad that problems could be solved on an alliance basis and that bilateral, or selective arrangements were to be avoided. An active proponent of NATO as a nuclear power, Norstad indicated his strong support for turning these weapons over to NATO. The United States could maintain custody, or joint custody, but the alliance would have basic control, specifically the authority to decide their use. Eisenhower questioned whether DeGaulle would accept this plan. The Allied Commander replied that he might not, but this proposal would remove "every legitimate complaint that DeGaulle now has."\(^23\)

The next month, Norstad met with Chancellor Adenauer and NATO Secretary-General Spaak to confer on the administration's nuclear and missile policies. Noting DeGaulle's dissatisfaction, Adenauer vigorously stated that "Europe must have something" in the control of NATO's nuclear armaments.\(^24\)
Norstad responded by endorsing the sentiment among the American people and government that the United States should not release these arms to any country for independent uses regardless of the need for national prestige. The Chancellor then asked how Europe could organize its defense around nuclear weapons when the United States had a near monopoly on them and could remove them if it so desired.²⁵

At this point the American general alluded to his speech of last December at the Institute of World Affairs, where he had suggested the idea of NATO as the fourth nuclear power. Adenauer said that Europe would applaud a move in this direction. In fact, he became rather impatient with Spaak, when the Secretary-General raised the question of "who in NATO" would control these transferred weapons. In reply, Norstad contended that the alliance had made substantial progress "without answering unanswerable questions" of precisely how and why NATO would go to war and that further gains could be achieved without doing so. With Adenauer's "great enthusiasm for the scheme," the United States became more firmly committed than ever to a multilateral nuclear force.²⁶

On October 3, Eisenhower conferred with officials from the Defense and State Departments, who had jointly assembled a paper on the NATO medium range ballistic missile force. Defense Secretary Gates pointed out that this was essentially a "weapons modernization proposal" which did not entail a revision of current NATO strategic doctrine, although that
was under consideration. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant outlined the two phases of the plan, the initial consignment of five Polaris submarines by the United States, followed by the "NATO contribution," presumably by the procurement of American Polaris missiles. Merchant also explained that, besides the importance militarily of mobile missile bases, the other objectives of the proposal would be to alleviate the nagging doubts of the allies about the dependability of a deterrent basically controlled by the United States, to prevent the development of independent national nuclear capabilities, and to furnish a suitable framework for the future discussion of nuclear sharing.

After reading the paper and commenting on its targeting aspects, Eisenhower turned his attention to the apprehensions and attitudes of the Europeans. Believing that there should be no question that the United States would act under the provision that an attack on one was an attack on all, the President nevertheless realized that there could be a "psychological benefit" to "more specifically reassuring arrangements." Although he had some reservations regarding the ownership and financing of the submarines, and congressional approval, he felt that the plan was a sound one, which "might help to bridge the differences with DeGaulle if properly handled."

Merchant then addressed the disagreements between the
two departments over the proposed requirement of mixed manning, explaining that State envisioned a selected mixing of crews rather than having each NATO country represented on each submarine. The President quickly noted that this posed problems in leadership and discipline, which might necessitate a treaty between member governments to ensure that at sea the captain would have the complete loyalty of the crew. Setting forth Defense's views, Gates argued that the Supreme Allied Commander could establish the multinational features of the operation by placing separate national crews under a common command unit. Clarifying this earlier statement, Merchant said that the State Department did not envision each submarine having "complete cross section of NATO" but rather the careful mixing of "relatively compatible nationalities" in each crew. Ending this part of the conference on a positive note, Merchant acknowledged that SACEUR was capable of adequately selecting a crew, although mixed manning should not be ruled out.29

Eisenhower repeated that he was in favor of the plan and that Congress must understand that the United States had to have the faith and confidence of the NATO partners if it wanted the alliance to work. As for financing, the administration should inform Congress completely of the costs involved. In his own words, "it was not sufficient to talk only in terms of the initial American contribution but we must disclose the eventual program including the NATO multilateral concept. We
must be completely honest on the subject." Concluding the session, the President directed that planning and preparation proceed on an urgent basis.30

On October 4, Eisenhower expressed his fear to Spaak that the withdrawal by any nation of its own units from the NATO force would be a constant risk. Also concerned that crew members would emphasize national pride rather than exclusive loyalty to NATO, he favored a code of allegiance, similar to the strict military discipline of the Foreign Legion.31 Endorsing this idea that a safe transfer of deterrent responsibility could be accomplished with a foreign legion type force, Spaak urged that a procedure be found to persuade DeGaulle, whom Spaak expected to disapprove the proposal, of the importance of an integrated NATO strategic force. Eisenhower concurred, saying that proceeding without the French might result in their gradual withdrawal from the alliance.32 The chances of convincing France, in the Secretar General's opinion, appeared more than likely, particularly since France would isolate itself by not participating. Moreover, DeGaulle's plan to create an independent nuclear force was encountering opposition in the French parliament. By countering the force de frappe with the multilateral force, Spaak argued, the opposition in France against the force de frappe would be enhanced.33

The Secretary-General then promptly asked who would have the power to decide on the use of nuclear weapons if the
United States turned them over to NATO? Eisenhower declared that such authority should be vested in the alliance and especially the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He also explained that a nuclear aggression would be met with an automatic counter-attack and that the significant advantage of the Polaris system over land-based means of delivery was the fact that submarines were relatively invulnerable to surprise attack, which allowed a certain amount of time for "consultation and reflection" since it was not necessary to launch the retaliatory missiles immediately.\(^{34}\)

Spaak agreed that in a nuclear assault on NATO a response would be automatic and the question of authority to launch would hardly arise. However, he continued, under different circumstances, such as a non-nuclear attack by conventional forces, who would decide whether or not these weapons would be used in this case? Not evading the question, the President said that the wide variety of nuclear armaments being developed by the United States and the Soviet Union virtually ensured their use in any conflict in Europe, especially in those geographically small European countries where any penetration into their territory would warrant "an all-out war." In his analysis, the possibility of a non-nuclear conflict in Europe was remote and that this probability made the question "somewhat academic."\(^{35}\)

As for the Europeans' concern that American law would obstruct a non-American Supreme Allied Commander from making
the decision, the United States' ambassador to NATO from 1957 to 1961, W. Randolph Burgess, commented that even now SACEUR's organization resembled something of a foreign legion due to the presence of officers of many nationalities on the staff. Without elaborating, Burgess pointed out that it was "entirely possible that the need for a decision might arise at a time when the Supreme Commander would be unable to act, in which event the responsibility would fall on his deputy, a non-American." Reinforcing Burgess' statements, Eisenhower stressed that the administration would not consider the stipulation that the post of Supreme Allied Commander be reserved to an American should Congress insist on it as a condition for providing nuclear arms to NATO.

Summarizing the discussion, Spaak reiterated the two fundamental problems of security for the Europeans, which required guarantees that: 1) If their vital interests were threatened they would be able to respond with these armaments, if necessary without the prior approval of the United States; and 2) That in the case of American withdrawal from European territory, they would still have available the means for this response. He attached great "political and psychological importance" to the proposal and hoped that its endorsement at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December would "signify closer and more binding ties between the United States and Europe than ever before." The Secretary-General's meeting with Eisenhower heightened
the expectations of an already much-heralded proposal. On
November 21, General Norstad publicly urged the annual con-
ference of NATO Parliamentarians to take "a great and dramatic
new step" by approving the NATO-controlled nuclear force."38
The next day, Secretary of State Herter confidently predicted
in a letter to Ambassador Burgess that the American plan would
"live up to the commitments we have already made to NATO, at
least to the maximum extent feasible at this time..."39 The
New York Times reported that although a few details had not
been finished, the basic provision that the allies would share
the responsibility for a NATO nuclear force had been adopted
by the United States "as a matter of policy."40

However, one of the unsettled and potentially disruptive
details was how the proposal would be presented to the North
Atlantic Council in December. Prior to the meeting with Spaak,
State and Defense Department officials had requested the
October 3rd conference with Eisenhower to resolve this dif-
fERENCE. Arguing that the offer was fundamentally an explora-
tory proposition, the State Department with the backing of
AEC Chairman John McConel preferred to have it presented orally
as a "concept." Defense contended that the strategic impor-
tance of a sea-borne missile force warranted the submitting
of a "concrete proposal."41 On December 7, Gordon Gray
"regretfully" informed the President that "there were still
serious differences of opinion" which meant that the National
Security Council would have to establish the manner of
presentation at its meeting the following day. A week before Herter formally made the offer, Eisenhower decided in favor of the conceptual approach. The primary consideration for the President was McCone's advice that members of the Joint Committee, some of whom had been tentatively persuaded to support the multilateral proposal, would strongly oppose the Defense recommendation. He also believed that the NATO partners would not commit themselves to a "concrete proposal" when a new administration was set to assume office in six weeks.

Still, Eisenhower had been impressed with the potential of a multilateral force and was convinced that it could add significantly to the variety and dispersal of NATO's striking power. Even if the multilateral force was not adopted, it was a step in the direction of allowing greater European participation in the management of the American deterrent so as to give these forces more of an Atlantic character. Although less than optimistic, Eisenhower was not resigned to the ultimate failure of the proposal. Indeed, a fresh set of initiatives by the new president, founded upon the modest gains of his predecessor, could conceivably result in a satisfactory arrangement for all. Consequently, the President and his chief advisers felt that their best contribution would be as a catalyst for a thorough discussion of the complexities in managing NATO's nuclear weapons. Hopefully, this "clearing of the air" would assist the Kennedy adminis-
tration in defining its strategic policy toward NATO and nuclear sharing.

On December 16, Herter announced what he termed a new concept in NATO's operations. The offer as stated to the Council called for the commitment before the end of 1963 of five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles, if the allies could agree on a "multilateral system" of political control. The United States would then expect the other member nations to contribute approximately 100 medium-range ballistic missiles purchased in the United States and to be deployed at sea. Herter advised his ministerial colleagues to commence at once their scrutiny of the military and economic problems involved. In the interim, he emphasized that the United States would continue to "make nuclear weapons available for the use of the other allied powers."^45

Allied interest in the "concept," such as that of West Germany's, quickly diminished as a result of numerous problems, in particular whether or not the requirement of deterrence could be reconciled with that of consultation. Would an arrangement that placed "fifteen fingers on the trigger" and on the "safety catch" reduce the threat of nuclear retaliation to a scale inadequate to deter a potential Soviet attack? Could a quick and concerted decision, when under the pressure of Soviet nuclear reprisal threats or perhaps an offer of settlement, be made, especially in a situation in which NATO as the defender would choose to initiate the
use of nuclear arms? For the detractors of multinational control, a paralysis of power was all to easy to conceive, and even for proponents, it was difficult to imagine fifteen nations confidently reaching a unanimous verdict.\textsuperscript{47} Likewise, a sea-borne Polaris missile system might, as Eisenhower claimed, permit some time for fateful deliberations, but this very process of consultation should it prove lengthy and divisive would diminish the certainty of retaliation and might unwittingly provide the Russians with exploitative opportunities.

Representing this plan as something other than a step toward proliferation posed another problem, even though ironically an important appeal of the plan was its promise to remove some of the incentives for an independent nuclear capability by giving nations like West Germany a greater degree of participation in a joint deterrent. Also the Soviet Union could complicate NATO's undertaking by charging that this was a subterfuge for developing the necessary forces for a "pre-emptive first strike." That a multilateral force could be dangerously provocative was a suspicion shared by several influential leaders in Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{48}

Finally, there was confusion over what was meant by the "concept" as presented by the Eisenhower administration. The British considered it to be an "offer," while the West Germans thought it was a "proposal." A few disenchanted NATO military planners even described it as a "snow job." These comments pointed to the plan's lack of definition,
intentional so as not to confront the new president with a detailed commitment but generally interpreted by the allies as another project not fulfilling its advance billing. 49

The Eisenhower administration succeeded in furthering the strategic dialogue regarding the multilateral force, but its fondest ambition that it be adopted into NATO’s arsenal was not realized. Indeed, that the questions of deployment, control, and financing remained unanswered two years later when President Kennedy resurrected Herter’s proposal demonstrated that these questions were of a greater, perhaps insoluble, magnitude than the multilateral force. Its objectives were understandable and praiseworthy, but it was a rather odd attempt to solve NATO’s nuclear problem.
CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental point of NATO's strategy during the Eisenhower presidency was the "umbrella" provided by the United States as it maintained essential control of the alliance's nuclear firepower. Although this allowed a centralized command system, especially since the Supreme Allied Commander was an American in these years, a major shortcoming, which prompted NATO leaders and the American government to propose such alternatives as the multilateral force, was the failure to persuade France from an independent nuclear effort. In fact, the legal guardian of American control and custody, the McMahon Act, even furnished an incentive for France to achieve "substantial progress" in developing nuclear armaments and therefore receive the assistance that Britain did. The strategic arms policy of the United States in this sense was a political liability as France pursued an independent program as a means of acquiring the latest technology as well as re-establishing itself as a major power.¹

Practical problems constituted another drawback. The physical separation of the American-controlled warhead from the weapon encouraged many questions regarding their combat readiness, while the placing of the warheads on missiles under the two-key system in Britain engendered doubts about American custody, namely the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In short, neither measure was applicable to the problem of
control for the alliance as a whole.

The most serious disadvantage was the allies' dependence on the American decision of when and how to use (or not to use) nuclear weapons. Besides blunting endeavors of collaboration, this preponderance of power irritated the NATO partners, who were expected to strengthen their conventional forces, when their security in large part rested on strategic arms they did not control. Further tension resulted as the European community, no longer the weak and devastated states of the Marshall Plan era, experienced a political and economic resurgence during the 1950s. Consequently, the allies tended to view the critical strategic and political questions primarily through the perspective of their reliance and not enough through the perspective of shared responsibility. All too often the European members attempted to manipulate American policy rather than concentrating on the common problems of the alliance, while the United States was assigned the blame for dilemmas and frustrations it alone could not resolve.²

Similarly, some scholars have cited as the reason for the dwindling cohesion of the alliance and the discord over nuclear armaments the contradictory and vacillating policies of the Eisenhower administration. For example, Timothy Stanley has asserted that the various schemes advanced by the United States were inundated by ''a bureaucratic Sargasso Sea. Since the maximum nuclear sharing that one group of American leaders was prepared to accept fell short of the minimum
which another group felt was required, little progress was possible." 3 Harold Nieburg has contended that "confusion over American strategy, never clearly resolved by the Eisenhower administration, intensified the political problems of NATO...After 1958 continued strategic irresolution, especially on the part of the most influential member of the alliance, the United States, was the key contributing factor to the disruption of NATO unity." 4

Eisenhower and associates certainly can be faulted if only because of the ease in which critics labelled their policies as erratic and inept. North Atlantic Council meetings usually ended inconclusively and were typified by the final comminque of the 1960 assembly which expressed the Council's interest in a multilateral force but suspended any concerted approach to the complex issues raised by the American offer. Nor was controversy confined to these annual week-long Council sessions. Administration maneuvers frequently aroused the suspicions of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and internal division, such as those between the State and Defense Departments over the multilateral force proposal, hampered decision-making. These adverse situations when combined with a sort of indifference among the allies confronted the administration with a most laborious task. Indeed, Eisenhower never resolved the dilemma of dependence and even today the widely perceived weakness of American leadership and the continuing development of the Soviet arsenal has given a new
urgency to the unsettling question in Europe: Would the United States risk New York or Washington for London or Paris?5

Yet, the keen perception and sense of direction which underpinned the administration's policy choices also deserves serious attention. As a professional military man, Eisenhower recognized that the emergence of sizable nuclear arsenals and long-range delivery systems would have a profound impact on NATO's defense posture, and by 1961 strategic doctrines reflected this growing awareness of the implications of new weapons and technologies for American and NATO security. At the same time, the United States wanted to prevent the reckless spread of nuclear arms not only due to the awesome destructive capability involved but also because of the anxiety that the allies would interpret a widespread dispersion as leadership through generosity and would clamor for more weapons and assistance for purposes which administration officials did not have in mind. In light of these tangled, perhaps conflicting, objectives, the President and his advisers endeavored to reach a "strategic consensus" with each of the allies, hoping that such a consensus would instill a much needed sense of participation and possible provide the foundation for some type of political control over NATO's nuclear forces.

With the exception of France, these efforts were moderately successful. The Anglo-American partnership benefited both countries as the United States received valuable base
rights for its bombers, British target lists were coordinated with those of the Strategic Air Command, and each nation profited from the research of the other. This close cooperation facilitated the implementation of the two-key system which partly compensated for the failure of the Blue Streak program. Stockpiling arrangements with West Germany were also completed, and a comparable agreement with Italy was awaiting congressional ratification in January 1961. The reason for the favorable outcome of these negotiations was that the leaders of these nations were fairly sure of when and how these weapons would be employed.

In the case of France, the disappointments resulted from a combination of their obstinacy, the ambivalence of American policy, the increasing level of sophistication in strategic weapons, and, the chief culprit in Eisenhower's view, legislative restraints. But for all his anger, which was not pronounced until his final year as President, that Congress was encroaching on executive authority and disrupting relations with France, Eisenhower did not escalate the executive-legislative rivalry in an attempt to secure American nuclear assistance for a nation marked by the political turbulence of the Fourth Republic and DeGaulle's zealous pursuit of the force de frappe. Whatever his identification with DeGaulle's ambitions, Eisenhower was not about to change the framework of NATO strategy and politics for the sake of the French leader. In managing the nuclear strategy of the alliance,
THE FOLLOWING BOOK IS BADLY SPECKLED THROUGHOUT IT'S ENTIRETY DUE TO BEING POOR QUALITY PHOTOCOPIES.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.
as well as in other challenges he faced as President, Eisenhower knew what he was doing after all, even though he left office still struggling with the desire of the European allies to have some nuclear weapons under their own control.
INTRODUCTION


3. Osgood, NATO, 236-237. For a discussion of Eisenhower's "chief advisers," see Charles Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975), 30-35; and Kinnard, Strategy Management, 17-23. In the main, however, Eisenhower and Dulles were the principal architects of foreign policy. Although they differed from time to time on matters of tactics, the two men concurred in their basic policy objectives as well as their assess-
ments of the political realities of the era and the strategies appropriate to deal with them. Perceptive analyses include Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" Political Psychology, Volume 1 (Fall 1979); Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence" Political Science Quarterly, Volume 84, Number 4 (Winter 1979-1980); Kinnard, Strategy Management, 18, 128-129; and Herbert Parmet, "Power and Reality: John Foster Dulles and Political Diplomacy" in Frank J. Merli and Theodore Wilson (eds.), Makers of American Diplomacy: From Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Kissinger (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974). Dulles' abrasive style frequently embroiled him in controversy. A Life article by James Shepley in early 1956 charged that Dulles was more a warmonger than a secretary of state. Discussing the article with Carl McCord (Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs), Dulles said that the article did not strike him as being very good as "it gave the idea that he was a tough guy, tearing around the world, threatening people and drinking J.W. Harper whiskey."


4. The structural context is important for NATO is an alliance between one preponderant state and a number of middle and small powers, several of which became involved in experiments in nuclear power development (as well as economic integration and political cooperation) of their own. For a contemporary assessment, see Stanley Hoffman, "The Crisis in the West," The New York Review of Books, Volume 27, Number 12 (July 17, 1980), 47-49.

5. Memorandum of a Conference with the President (hereafter cited as MCP), Lauris Norstad, Andrew Goodpaster, and Dwight Eisenhower, August 8, 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings Series, Box 5, NATO 1959-1960 (4) Folder. The "unexpected advantages" are developed at length in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER ONE

2. As Eisenhower recalled, the term "New Look" probably suggested to many a picture of a far more radical change in the composition of American armed forces than was actually the case. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), 449. Useful examinations of the New Look include Donald J. Mrozek, "A New Look at 'Balanced Forces': Defense Continuities from Truman to Eisenhower," Military Affairs, Volume 38, Number 4, 145-151; Kinnard, Strategy Management, 1-65; and Alexander, Holding the Line, 63-707. For purposes of definition, strategy involves designs for using force with the intent to prevail against an adversary in the eventuality of a conflict. Deterrence involves so impressing an adversary with the efficiency of one's strategy that the necessity of ever bringing it to bear is obviated. Carl H. Amne, Jr., NATO Without France (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967), vi (Foreword by Charles B. Marshall).


4. Alexander, Holding the Line, 68. For the differences between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, consult Jeffrey Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 3-7; and Stanley, NATO in Transition, 158-159. Two other points to bear in mind are (1) the primary features of the US-USSR strategic relationship--substantial nuclear arsenals and long-range delivery systems--originated during the Eisenhower presidency, and (2) Soviet advances stalemated the one-time US superiority in nuclear forces. In particular, see Kahan, Security, 26-28.

5. MTC, John Foster Dulles and George Humphrey, August 25, 1953, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 1, July-October 31, 1953 (3) Folder. In another discussion with Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, Dulles reported that he had found "great eagerness" in Europe to have some explanation made as to what the New Look entailed. MTC, Dulles and Wilson, April 19, 1954, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 1, March-April 30, 1954 (1) Folder.
6. Gruenther's statement cited in Osgood, NATO, 104. Some military leaders, while hopeful of eventually defending Western Europe with fewer troops by incorporating tactical nuclear weapons into NATO's strategy, were wary of claiming too much for these weapons, lest it further encourage the allies to slacken their defense efforts. For example, General Omar Bradley issues a warning that these weapons were not adequately advanced to justify any relaxation in the effort to build up NATO's ground forces (New York Times, September 17, 1952, 7). Likewise, General Matthew Ridgeway argued that the new weapons would not only require more manpower but would also increase the cost of defense to the taxpayer (New York Times, February 14, 1953, 5). Even Gruenther had cautioned that nuclear weapons might have the effect of adding new problems and new tasks without eliminating those that previously confronted the alliance.

7. Memorandum for the President from General Andrew Goodpaster, November 16, 1954, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings Series, Box 3, NATO November 1954 - April 1956 (4) Folder.

8. Ibid.


11. New York Times, December 22, 1954, 1. Dulles underscored the administration's commitment to a forward strategy in his "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs, XXXII, 4 (September 1950), 353-364: "Some areas are so vital that a special guard should and can be put around them. Western Europe is such an area. Its industrial plant represents so nearly the balance of industrial power in the world than an aggressor might feel that it was a good gamble to seize it--even at the risk of considerable hurt to himself."

12. Control is defined as the power to govern the use of nuclear weapons, of which physical possession or custody is one means.

13. In a widely-publicized lecture at the Royal United Service Institute, Montgomery bluntly stated: "I want to make it
absolutely clear that we at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Personnel in Europe) are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used.' It is very definitely: 'They will be used, if we are attacked.' In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of atomic weapons in a hot war." New York Times, November 30, 1954, 13.


15. For an example of the fraternity between the two men, see Eisenhower's letter to Gruenther, November 30, 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary series, Box 8, November 1954 (1) Folder.

16. Although this particular assertion is not directly substantiated by available information, the tone of recently declassified documents strongly suggests that from the onset of his presidency, Eisenhower wanted a quick military response if an attack were made on NATO forces like that on Pearl Harbor. In this respect, the United States and NATO were committed to a first-strike strategy in order to deter "major" aggressions in Europe. Repeated official disavowals of an American first-strike strategy referred to the initiation of a nuclear attack "out of the blue," not to the retaliatory use in response to an invasion. On this point, see Osgood, NATO, 172-211; and Kahan, Security, 245-248. For a contrasting view of the United States' "first-strike strategy," see Robert C. Aldridge, The Counterforce Syndrome: A Guide to U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Policy Studies, 1978).

17. New York Times, November 20, 1957, 10. Indeed, Dulles often spoke of constructing the strategic arrangement with NATO-SACEUR.

forces and policies, see Kahan, Security, 47-54; and Cyril E. Black and Frederick J. Yeager, "The USSR and NATO" in Knorr, NATO and American Security, 37-65.


24. New York Times, December 10, 1957, 1. By the December 1957 meeting, it seemed to the United States, who had entered the alliance to assist Western Europe in its defense, that the allies were hardly interested in assuming the responsibility for their security; while to the Europeans the Eisenhower administration was too engrossed with military considerations at the expense of alleviating cold war tensions.


26. According to Dulles: "The United States is prepared, if this Council so wishes, to participate in a NATO atomic stockpile. Within this stockpile system, nuclear warheads would be deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by nuclear-capable NATO forces." Library of Congress, U.S. Policy on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1975 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1978), 51.


28. It should be pointed out that these intermediate range missiles were not operational at the time of the conference. The matter of control also was not resolved until February 1958 when the two nations agreed to a "double-veto" arrangement, which was later revealed to include the installation of the warhead in the missile
under a "two-key system"—one key to activate the warhead and the other key to launch the missile. During 1959 and 1960 four ICBM squadrons were emplaced, containing a total of about sixty above-ground, liquid-fuel "Thor" missiles. However, these missiles suffered the political and military liability of being so slow-firing and vulnerable as to be virtually useless except for a first strike out of the blue. Partly for this reason, the United States announced in October 1959 that it would not establish any more liquid-fuel missile bases in Europe. Rather, it anticipated the distribution of mobile and solid-fuel missiles in 1960 and 1961. Britain would also receive the air-borne "Skybolt" missile, even though it was not expected to be ready until 1964 or 1965. Osgood, NATO, 222-223.

29. New York Times, May 12, 1957, 14. Shortly after the EURATOM agreements, both AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss and Dulles publicly noted that military and civilian applications of nuclear technology went hand in hand. Their apprehensions were justified for the industrial program that the EURATOM members envisaged was to be based on dual-purpose reactors, capable of large-scale plutonium production, and on gaseous diffusion plants for the separation of weapons-grade material. Osgood, NATO, 218.


31. In Dulles' words, there was "a lot of stuff that we have implied—that the authority will remain as a political decision...but we are not stuck with that." MTC, Dulles and Robert Cutler, April 27, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 12, March-August 30, 1957 (4) Folder.


33. Alexander, Holding the Line, 205.

34. As Lincoln Bloomfield and associates point out, Russian economic and military planners misjudged the Soviet Union's rate of economic growth and hence its ability to afford escalating military costs. This misguided optimism soon began to falter before the realities of decreasing growth rates, an inadequate industrial base, and massive failures in agricultural productivity. After 1956, the burdensome costs of developing strategic weapons systems
represented a strong reason for the Kremlin to want formal agreements enabling the USSR to reduce its military costs. Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966).

35. Kahan, Security, 73.


40. The following excerpt is illuminating on both the vagueness of some of Eisenhower's press conference statements and the relationship between the President and Secretary of State: "The President was concerned about what had and what had not been made public. Yesterday, at his press conference, the Secretary of State 'wandered' around the point (stockpile of atomic weapons at NATO). What the President would like to say is that the 'tactical distribution and deployment of such weapons is a military secret.' The President at this point called the Secretary and asked for a further explanation of what he had said at the press conference yesterday. At the conclusion of the conversation, the President said simply, 'I will be evasive.' Pre-press Conference Briefing, July 17, 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 25, July 1957 Miscellaneous Folder.

41. MTG, Dulles and Eisenhower, July 17, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 12, March-August 30, 1957 (1) Folder.

42. Ibid.

44. "The Secretary of State's News Conference of July 16, 1957," Department of State Bulletin, Volume 37, Number 945, August 5, 1957, 233. It was also not a "healthy relationship" for the United States as indicated by Dulles in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor the week of his press conference: "Britain has them, France is working on them, Italy, West Germany, the Low Countries, cannot forever be kept from nuclear weapons production if many other nations do it." The prospect of the other NATO nations producing weapons themselves probably hastened consideration of the stockpile.

45. New York Times, December 15, 1956, 5. The newspaper article listed three principal reasons why American military leaders (no specific names were given) opposed the supplying of the NATO partners with warheads. First, one or more of the Atlantic pact members, possibly "under supreme provocation," might use the nuclear weapons on military projects not connected with the alliance. Second, once these armaments were transferred to another nation, the United States could lose many of its present prerogatives in modifying the delivery program—in other words, a possible loss in flexibility for the United States. Third, a general belief that some foreign capitals in Western Europe are not adequate security risks and that classified information invariably "leaks" from their government channels.

46. Despite the adverse effect on the alliance, the Soviet successes also provided an opportunity to build support, especially from Congress, for the administration's plans. Discussing the situation with Vice-President Richard Nixon on October 15, Dulles stressed that "We have to break down the insolidarity which is imposed upon us so we can have a larger measure of cooperation on nuclear weapons among our allies....we have to go after Congress." MTC, Dulles and Nixon, October 15, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7, September 2 - October 31, 1957 (2) Folder.

47. Following the Russian ICBM test, Dulles called General Ernest Cabell for "a quick evaluation." Cabell said that the Soviet Union should have the ICBM but "it is not foolproof or airtight," and that "this is about the
time they might do something like this." The Secretary commented that he would avoid any questions on the matter at his upcoming press conference. MTO, Dulles and Cabell, August 27, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7, 7 - August 31, 1957 (1) Folder. Other useful documents in examining the administration's response to Sputnik and the "missile gap" are Eisenhower's letters to Neil McElroy, October 14 and October 17, 1957, Papers of Neil McElroy, Box 2, White House 1957-1960 Folder; and the Cabinet Minutes of October 18, 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 27, October 1957 Staff Notes (1) Folder. Also see Roy Licklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy," Political Science Quarterly, Volume 65, Number 3 (December 1970), 600-615; Alexander, Holding the Line, 210-216; and Kahan, Security, 36-39. On a final note of sarcasm, Herbert York, author of Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race, characterized the missile gap as "a couple of millionaires arguing about who has got the most change in his pocket." Cited in Lloyd Gardner (et al), Creation of the American Empire: United States Diplomatic History (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 481.

48. New York Times, November 14, 1957, 4. In an attempt to allay these concerns as well as enhance bipartisan support for the administration's efforts, Dulles asked Adlai Stevenson, the Democrat presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956, to head a task force which would try to establish "new organisms" between the allies on the subject of the uses of nuclear arms. MTO, Dulles and Stevenson, October 28, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7, September 2 - October 31, 1957 (1) Folder.


50. Kinnard, Strategy Management, 70; and Osgood, NATO, 221.

51. At a November 23 conference with Eisenhower, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles and Staff Secretary Andrew Goodpaster, Defense Secretary McElroy stated that
it would cost more money to move toward the accelerated deployments of the IRBMs would cost more money at an earlier date. He emphasized, however, the psychological impact of the first units for initial deployments. McElroy further argued that this would spare the United States from a race to conclude additional agreements. Quarles added that missile deployments represented the crux of the upcoming NATO meeting and that the ability to carry these out was most important for the security of the alliance. MCP, Eisenhower, Quarles, McElroy, and Goodpaster, November 23, 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 28, November 1957 Staff Notes Folder.


53. Ibid., November 19, 1957, 4.

54. Ibid., December 17, 1957, 13.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., December 19, 1957, 1 and 12. As it turned out, only Britain, Turkey, and Italy were willing to accept the Thors and Jupiters when they became operational in late 1958. Moreover, the IRBM program for Turkey was delayed due to the excessive costs involved. See the recently declassified document, IRBMs for Greece and Turkey, Memorandum for Christian A. Herter (Acting Secretary of State at the time) from C. Douglas Dillon (Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs), April 3, 1959, Christian A. Herter Papers (hereafter cited as CAH Papers), 1957-1961, Chronological File, Box 10, Miscellaneous Memoranda 1960/1961 (2) Folder.

57. Alexander, Holding the Line, 217.

58. MTC, Dulles and Johnson, December 23, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7, November 1 - December 27, 1957 (1) Folder.

59. MTC, Dulles and Knowland, December 23, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7, November 1 - December 27, 1957 (1) Folder.


61. Osgood, NATO, 221-222. At the Council assembly British and French representatives opposed the equipping of the West German army with IRBMs. However, by summer 1958, the Federal Republic was receiving a variety of tactical
surface-to-surface and antiaircraft missiles, as well as atomic artillery and bombers capable of delivering nuclear warheads. On this point, see the New York Times, December 19, 1957, 1 and 12; and Osgood, NATO, 253-254.

62. Osgood, NATO, 222.


64. Osgood, NATO, 225.

CHAPTER TWO


5. MCP, Eisenhower, Strauss, and Goodpaster, March 8, 1956, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 13, March 1956 Goodpaster Folder. Relations with the British on nuclear sharing were not always smooth. At the Bermuda conference Prime Minister Macmillan strongly suggested that if the United States continued to resist British requests for closer collaboration, the British government might be forced to consider joining EURATOM, even though this expedient hardly appealed to them. Indeed, administration officials had been somewhat reluctant to discuss strategic concepts with the British. For example, on January 25, 1957, Admiral Radford called Dulles regarding a proposal by Defense Minister Duncan Sandys that he and Radford meet privately to talk about the Admiral's opinions concerning what strategic forces Britain should
have. Radford's first impulse was to say no, but Defense Secretary Wilson advised that the meeting be held and for Radford to be as discreet as possible. What disturbed Wilson and Dulles was that Radford might be misquoted by Sandy's. The Joint Chief's Chairman agreed, saying that he would tell Sandy's not to publicly use any of Radford's comments. MTC, Dulles and Radford, January 25, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 6, January 1, 1957 - February 28, 1957 (3) Folder.

6. Osgood, NATO, 401-402.

7. For an examination of the JCAE as a political institution, its relations with the executive, and its legislative techniques and decision-making, see especially Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); and Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 17-18, 83-84.

8. Osgood, NATO, 403.


10. MCP, Eisenhower, Norstad, and Goodpaster, August 8, 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings series, Box 5, NATO 1959-1960 (4) Folder.

11. The intriguing question that unfolds from such a statement is whether the administration deliberately used these legislative restrictions to discriminate against France. Harold Nieburg in Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy contends that this was the case. According to Nieburg, Dulles' method of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to "fourth countries" was based on the formulation of legislative checks upon the administration. These restraints had the additional advantage of regulating those parts of the administration that might desire for military or scientific reasons to jeopardize this goal of exclusion. American domination of bilateral agreements, the Atoms-for-Peace plan, and the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency would also serve as obstructions to nations attempting to take the step from power reactors to weapons production.

13. LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 172.


15. MTC, Dulles and Eisenhower, December 30, 1954, JPD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 10, November 1 - February 18, 1955 (2) Folder.


19. MCP, Eisenhower, Strauss, and General Herbert Loper, August 6, 1956, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 17, August 1956 Staff Memos Folder.

20. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 169.


22. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 169-170.

23. One consequence of the Nautilus incident was the rejection by the Congress of Strauss' nomination as Secretary of Commerce. The Nautilus incident was but one episode in a series of bitter clashes between Strauss and the Democratic JCAE majority in 1956 and 1957. As Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Strauss considered the Committee an aggressive claimant to policy making and attempted to prevent congressional domination of the AEC. A very troublesome dual role for the AEC Chairman, who was also appointed special assistant for atomic energy matters by Eisenhower in late 1952, added to the friction. As a presidential adviser, Strauss frequently attended National Security Council meetings and international conferences, much to the dismay of Committee members. They argued that, as defined by statute, the JCAE was to be kept fully and currently informed of the administration's activities in all aspects of nuclear policy. See Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 33-54; and Green and Rosenthal, Government of the Atom, 12-20.


27. MTC, Eelbrick and Herter, October 30, 1958, CAH Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 11, October 1 - December 31, 1958 (2) Folder.


30. The close connection between French recalcitrance and DeGaulle's dissatisfaction with progress toward global tripartite planning was noted by NATO Secretary General Paul Henri Spaak in talks held with then Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter in April 1959. See the Memorandum for the President, April 23, 1959, CAH Papers, Chronological File, Box 7, April 1959 (1) Folder.


32. Memorandum for the President, Translation of DeGaulle's Telegram, September 17, 1958, JFD Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Box 6, White House General Correspondence 1958 (2) Folder.

33. In particular, see the *New York Times*, November 11, 1959, 10; and Ciro Zoppo, "France as a Nuclear Power," in Rosencrance, *Dispersion*, 114-115.

34. MTC, Dulles and Gruenther, August 1, 1956, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 5, July 12 - September 29, 1956 (4) Folder. Dulles told Gruenther that there was quite a difference between the United States which did not want joint military planning, and France and Britain which did. In Dulles' words, "we are not altogether in accord with our friends' policies..."


36. MTC, Eisenhower and Herbert Hoover, Jr., December 10, 1956, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 20, December 1956 Phone Calls Folder.

37. MTC, Eisenhower and Dulles, October 16, 1958, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 13, August 1 - December 5, 1958 (2) Folder.

38. MTC, Dulles and Murphy, November 8, 1958, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 9, November 2 - December 27, 1958 (2) Folder.
39. Osgood, NATO, 225-226. Also see Zoppo, "France as a Nuclear Power," 121.

40. MTC, Dulles and Johnson, October 23, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7, September 2 - October 31, 1957 (1) Folder.


42. MTC, Dulles and Strauss, May 21, 1958, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 8, April 1 - May 29, 1958 (1) Folder.

43. Vance concluded by suggesting that Congress write in additional restrictive provisions: "We admit, to ourselves, that we want to discriminate among our allies, but we cannot admit it to them. Now the way to handle this situation is for you gentlemen to write some criteria into this law that we can use as a basis for our refusal to treat all our allies alike.... It seems to me that if... Congress did express its feeling that every possible safeguard should be put around sensitive information and elaborated on that to the greatest possible extent, it would be very helpful to us in doing what we want to do." Vance's testimony cited by Harold Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 83 and 240.

44. See the Memorandum for Bryce Harlow, February 6, 1958, Bryce Harlow Papers, Box 5, Atomic Energy Commission Folder.

45. For Eisenhower's view of the French problems in North Africa, see the Supplementary Notes to the Legislative Leadership Meeting, February 25, 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 30, Staff Notes February 1958 Folder. Commenting on the fall of the Gaillard government, Eisenhower, who had received optimistic reports from Dulles regarding a settlement between France and Algeria, compared it to being told by doctors on the morning of his heart attack that he was in the best condition in a decade and then having a heart attack that evening. Pre-Pres Briefing, April 16, 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 32, Staff Notes April 1958 (2) Folder.

Another suspicion shared by several influential American military and civilian leaders was that if the United States furnished its allies with nuclear arms on a large scale that this in turn would compel the Soviet Union to give its Eastern European satellites and possibly even China nuclear weapons. Osgood, NATO, 228.

Eisenhower became more optimistic that differences could be reconciled with France when DeGaulle came to power in May 1958. He anticipated that DeGaulle as a military officer would perceive the advantages in flexibility, in depth of defense, and in the safety of strategic units with the wider dispersal of NATO stockpiles. Indeed, Ann Whitman, the President's personal secretary, in a letter to C. D. Jackson recalled the President's comment that there was no one that he had had more satisfying and revealing conversations with than DeGaulle. Letter, Ann Whitman to C. D. Jackson, June 5, 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 34, June 1958-DDE Dictation Folder. Also see the Supplementary Notes to Legislative Leadership Meeting, May 19, 1958, Ann Whitman File, Legislative Meetings Series, Box 2, Minutes 1958 (3) Folder.

MCP, Eisenhower and Herter, May 2, 1959, CAH Papers, Chronological File, Box 7, May 1959 (2) Folder. Herter on April 22, 1959, succeeded Dulles, who had been immobilized by terminal cancer.

The May 2 memorandum noted that the President "wished to send a very strong letter to DeGaulle on this subject since he felt that, if we did not have a showdown now, we
were likely to find the French holding out on necessary parts of our infrastructure which might well make our position untenable in Europe." Some progress was forthcoming on the Air Defense question in January 1960, primarily due to discussions between General Norstad and DeGaulle. See Letters, Norstad to Eisenhow, January 19 and 27, 1960, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 31, Administration Folder.

56. To receive the currently offered Nike and Honest John battalions, France would have to agree to their use only by "NATO-committed" forces, the stationing of the warhead in West Germany, and the application of this criterion to Nike and Honest John missiles already accepted by the French and scheduled for delivery later in the year (the delivery was not consummated). Memorandum for the President from Herter, July 1, 1959, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 11, France 1959-1960 Folder. Also see the Memorandum for the President, December 15, 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 30, Administration Folder.


58. Translation of DeGaulle's Speech, December 1, 1959, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10, CAH December 1959 (3) Folder. The General's speech drew sharp criticism from Herter, who charged that DeGaulle had failed to comprehend the nature of weaponry and warfare as it had developed since 1945. Memorandum for the President from Herter, December 1, 1959, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10, CAH December 1959 (3) Folder.


60. Ibid., February 4, 1960, 1 and 12. The basic purpose of the President's statements can be described as "a trial balloon," an attempt to ascertain whether another amendment was possible.

61. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 194.

62. Osgood, NATO, 231; and Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 193.

63. MCP, Eisenhower and Gordon Gray, March 21, 1960, Project Clean Up, Box 8, 1960 Meetings with the President (Volume I-3) Folder.

64. Ibid.
65. See the Memorandum for Major General (Air Force) Daniel S. Campbell from Gordon Gray, March 22, 1960, Project Clean Up, Box 14, Nuclear Sharing with the Allies Folder.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Kaplan, Recent American Foreign Policy, 266-267.

2. Osgood, NATO, 233-234.


7. MCP, Eisenhower and Gray, March 21, 1960, Project Clean Up, Box 8, 1960 Meetings with the President (Volume I-3) Folder.


10. Norstad's statements cited in Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 192. For a transcript of the speech, see the January 1960 NATO Letter.

11. On the fears of German rearmament and British politics, see the New York Times, February 8, 1960, 3. According to Secretary of State Hertler, the British did not want the Federal Republic to have any nuclear capability of their own and that, in their opinion, the only way the Germans could do so was through a waiver of the Brussels Treaty Organization agreement. As the Secretary noted, the 1954 pact forbade the manufacture of nuclear weapons
on German territory, but the possession by West Germany of warheads manufactured elsewhere was not prohibited. MTN, Herter and John McConne, June 9, 1960, CAF Papers, CAF Telephone Calls Series, Box 12, March 28 – June 30, 1960 (1) Folder.


13. Ibid., March 3, 1960, 1 and 4. Also see Kinnard, Strategy Management, 58.


15. The Eisenhower administration's concern about being blamed for aggravating what Herter sometimes called the "Frankenstein peril" extended to the phrasing of the Polaris proposal at the NATO Defense Ministers April assembly. Prior to the meeting, Secretary of Defense Gates was anxious about his upcoming assignment. He found himself "in an extremely difficult position" and "did not quite know how he could get out of the box" he was in. Besides feeling that certain parts of the proposal were "retro-active," the working of the proposal posed another problem, specifically the correct wording on the question of launch facilities. Gates wanted to say that "these facilities would be devoted to meeting fully and first SACEUR's present and future requirements." However, Herter said to eliminate the word "first," even though Gates thought "first" was important in establishing NATO's priorities. Herter prevailed on this count, contending that "first" implied that the Europeans could proceed with the construction of their own facilities. Herter instructed Gates to "fuss that one" because it would appear as though the United States was assisting in the proliferation of weapons in Europe. MTN, Herter and Gates, March 30, 1960, CAF Papers, CAF Telephone Calls Series, Box 12, March 28 – June 30, 1960 (3) Folder.


17. The cancellation of the Blue Streak program, due to excessive costs and the distinct possibility that the missile might be obsolete before it became operational, signified Britain's difficulties in competing in the missile age.


21. Perturbed by what they saw as another attempt by the administration to bypass the prescribed legal avenues, JCAE members publicly defended the committee's review powers and requested that no commitments be given until the matter had been fully discussed by the JCAE. Although on the day after this unfavorable reaction Eisenhower and Herter talked about "the necessity of reviewing the entire United States nuclear policy with respect to our allies," relations between the executive and legislative branches were not as acrimonious as in past years, partly due to the lack of antagonism between the JCAE and the chairman of the AEC, John McConk. Also noteworthy is that several Congressmen, among them Chet Holifield, who chaired the JCAE subcommittee on legislation, were especially anxious about a nuclear weapons transfer to one of the allies because it might give Khrushchev a psychological weapon before the scheduled summit conference in May 1960. Following the summit's cancellation and the U-2 incident, the JCAE was less opposed to joint possession of nuclear arms with NATO countries, particularly as formal disarmament negotiations came to a dismal end that summer. See the Memorandum for the Record by Max V. Krebs, June 10, 1960, CAN Papers, Chronological File, Box 8, June 1960 (2) Folder; New York Times, June 10, 1960, 3; Holifield's speech in The Congressional Record, March 9, 1960, 86th Congress, Second Session, 5067; and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Interoffice Memorandum, James T. Ramsey to Clinton Anderson and Chet Holifield, June 15, 1960, Project Clean Up, Box 14, Nuclear Sharing with the Allies Folder. On the U-2 affair, consult Alexander, Holding the Line, 264-267.

22. MCP, Eisenhower, Norstad, and Goodpaster, August 8, 1960, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings Series, Box 5, NATO 1956-1960 (4) Folder.

23. Ibid.


25. Adenauer's question indicated his concern about the withdrawal by the United States of nine North Atlantic command airplane strike squadrons. Norstad explained that DeGaulle
opposition to integrated air defense and his views on the Mediterranean operations of NATO (interestingly, DeGaulle suggested to Adenauer that the northern shore of the Mediterranean be NATO's responsibility, while the southern littoral be France's) had complicated an already perplexing question of nuclear control and that the administration felt that it had to make a strong response to DeGaulle's actions. On the removal of the strike squadrons, see MCP, Eisenhower and Herter, May 2, 1959, CAH Papers, Chronological File, Box 7, May 1959 (2) Folder.

26. Telegram, Houghton to Herter, September 10, 1960, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 31, Administration Folder. Norstad's general assessment of his meeting with Adenauer was that the Chancellor's views on NATO and European problems continued to be "essentially sound" and that in his dealings with DeGaulle his tactics were "carefully designed to preserve the overall benefits of the postwar Franco-German rapprochement without selling the alliance or the United States down the river."


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Eisenhower's final instructions stressed the importance of preparing the proposal for Congressional presentation and possible amendment hearings.


32. While he agreed that France might not accept the proposal, at least initially, Merchant doubted that DeGaulle would actually withdraw from NATO. He cited in this respect the modest progress made recently regarding French cooperation in the fields of air defense and stockpile arrangements in Germany, and the awkwardness of the French position if they isolated themselves completely from their Western European neighbors.

33. The President strongly supported Spaak's argument, asserting that it was "ridiculous" for France to undertake tremendous expenditures solely for purposes of national prestige when there was a "super-abundance of nuclear material" available. He also agreed with Spaak's sug-
sion that Macmillan, Adenauer, and himself 'should use their influence to convince DeGaulle that a NATO nuclear force could meet France's strategic requirements.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid. Eisenhower acknowledged that the potential for a "limited war" in the Middle East, possibly in Turkey or Iran, was more of a possibility.

36. Ibid. During the summer of 1963, a Belgian general was appointed as Deputy to SACEUR for nuclear planning.

37. Ibid.


41. Memorandum for the Record by Max Krebs, December 7, 1960, CAD Papers, Chronological File, Box 9, December 1960 (2) Folder. McConne outlined the JCAE's attitude towards the proposal as (1) seeing no need for treating it as a "crash program," and (2) interpreting any attempt by the administration to advance a concrete proposal at this time as motivated by domestic political considerations. Also see the New York Times, Herter and Goodpastor, September 30, 1960, CAD Papers, CAD Telephone Calls Series, Box 13, September 1 - January 20, 1961 (2) Folder.

42. ECP, Eisenhower and Gray, December 7, 1960, Project Clean Up, Box 7, 1960 Meetings with the President (Volume II-2) Folder.

43. Memorandum for the Record by Max Krebs, December 7, 1960, CAD Papers, Chronological File, Box 9, December 1960 (2) Folder. Also see the New York Times, November 24, 1960, 10.

44. Stanley, NATO in Transition, 239.


49. On this point see Strachey's speech cited above and Osgood, NATO, 296.

49. Osgood, NATO, 228.


CONCLUSIONS

1. Osgood, NATO, 276-277.

2. Ibid., 278.


4. Kleeh, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy, 199.


6. Eisenhower believed that the Joint Committee had reserved for itself, as far back as 1947, certain prerogatives which should have belonged in the executive branch. The final week of his presidency saw again this complaint of congressional influence, this time with the bilateral agreement with Italy. See the FTC, Sam Rayburn and Neter, January 16, 1961, CAH Papers, CAH Telephone Calls Series, Box 15, September 1, 1960 - January 20, 1961 (1) Folder.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS


ARTICLES


NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Foreign Affairs

New York Times

New York Review of Books

MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS


Harlow, Bryce N. Records as Special Assistant to the President, 1953-1961.


TREATING THE ALLIES PROPERLY

by

KEITH WARREN BAUM

B. S., Kansas State University, 1977

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1981
This thesis examines the nuclear diplomacy of the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, specifically the question of "sharing" American nuclear weapons and technology with the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It analyzes the successes and failures of the administration in dealing with the multiple national interests involved, the domestic context in which these policies occurred, and Eisenhower's performance as chief executive.

During the 1950s, the growth of Soviet nuclear power combined with the gradual recovery of post-war Europe to create doubts and apprehensions among the European members of NATO about the reliability of American nuclear arms as the principal deterrent to Soviet invasion. The control of nuclear arms soon symbolized actual sovereignty as these weapons promised to enhance a nation's prestige, its bargaining position, and its defense against the possibility of Soviet aggression.

Formerly the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Eisenhower was keenly aware of the realities of nuclear arsenals in the 1950s and desired to increase Europe's and NATO's strategic readiness accordingly. At the same time, he wanted to prevent a reckless spread of nuclear weapons not only due to their destructive capability but also because of his fear that the allies would interpret a widespread dispersion as leadership through generosity and would then clamor for more weapons and assistance for purposes which the administration did not have in mind. Even though he left office still struggling
with the desire of the European countries to have some nuclear weapons under their own control, Eisenhower's management of the alliance's nuclear strategy was underpinned by a sense of direction and astute perception of the implications of nuclear weaponry for American and NATO security.

This was especially true in the case of France which did not receive the same assistance that the United States furnished to Great Britain, the chief beneficiary of the administration's nuclear diplomacy. Legal complications and restraints presented a significant barrier to cooperation with the French, but the underlying reasons for the administration's refusal to actively assist France's nuclear program was that before 1958 Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suspected France's political stability. However, with the ascension of DeGaulle to power, these apprehensions became secondary to their uneasiness about the French leader's ambitious program to restore his country to great power status. Eisenhower and his associates believed that DeGaulle's demands for tripartite global planning and his pursuit of the force de frappe were harmful to NATO's strategic cohesion.

The culmination of the administration's efforts to alleviate NATO's nuclear problems was the multilateral force proposal advanced at the December 1960 North Atlantic Council meeting. From a military point of view, such a nuclear force had several liabilities, among them the problems of financing, control, and manning. Despite these drawbacks, Eisenhower believed in the potential of a multilateral force, especially
if his administration could build a solid political base. Reflecting Eisenhower's desire to "leave a legacy to his successor," the President and his chief advisers submitted the proposal as an exploratory proposition, seeking to establish a foundation on which any difficulties could be worked out by President-elect Kennedy should he decide that the multilateral force was feasible.

Historical materials and manuscripts located at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, provided invaluable information for this study. In particular the papers of Eisenhower classified under the Ann Whitman File and the papers of John Foster Dulles were extremely useful. Important secondary sources were Douglas Kinnard's President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, Robert Osgood's NATO: The Entangling Alliance, and Jerome Kahan's Security in the Nuclear Age.