BEYOND THE GHETTO:
METHAMPHETAMINE AND THE PUNISHMENT OF RURAL AMERICA

by

TRAVIS LINNEMANN

B.S., Emporia State University, 1997
M.A., Kansas State University, 2006

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work
College of Arts and Sciences

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

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Abstract

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Approved by:

Major Professor
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CHAPTER 1 - Getting to know Methamphetamine

Yet the demons are not the strangers that have come among us, but the people who have become strangers.--Jock Young, *The Exclusive Society* (1999)

This line from Jock Young – questioning social fissures that separate the familiar and the foreign – hints at the questions that underpin the following pages. As this research will show, punishment and criminal justice fuel increasingly exclusive social relations.

For the last 40 years, the criminal justice system has become increasingly present in the everyday lives of Americans, making Young’s observation even more salient. Precisely when some began to foresee a future without prisons, America embarked on a massive project of criminal justice expansion. Ushered in by the conservative backlash to civil rights victories, the “tough on crime” mantle now holds near ideological supremacy in public discussions of crime and crime control. As a result, courts, prisons, and jails now hold the same symbolic space as churches and schools. As one demonstration, California, measured as the world’s eighth largest economy, now spends a greater portion of its budget administering prisons than its colleges and universities (Wingert, 2010). Undoubtedly, for some imprisonment is more likely than college graduation.

Around 1980, the era now labeled *mass imprisonment* by activists and academics began. Marking a massive increase in criminal punishments, mass imprisonment represents a growing population of over 2.3 million prisoners, the largest proportion of imprisoned citizens since the Soviet gulags (Christie, 2000). The form of mass imprisonment is apparent both quantitatively and qualitatively. In terms of sheer size, the criminal justice system reaches even beyond burgeoning prisons and jails, including vast
correctional fields that range from programs for very young and minor delinquents to indefinite “civil” commitments for violent adults. American criminal justice is so vast, in fact, that nearly one in 33 Americans are now under some form of correctional control (The Pew Center on the States, 2009).

However startling the rise and scale of mass imprisonment, it does not simply reflect correctional populations or agencies and institutions. As David Garland points out, mass imprisonment is a racially and economically concentrated project, subsuming entire segments of the population (Garland, 2001, p. 6). In the United States (US), for instance, without proportional changes in crime, the racial composition of American prisons reversed from nearly 70% white in the 1950s to over 70% Black and Latino today (Wacquant, 2001, p. 1). For some, this is disquieting evidence that American criminal justice carries forward legacies of slavery and Jim Crow oppression into the 21st century (Wacquant, 2001; Alexander, 2010).

Qualitatively, mass imprisonment has brought changes in punishment as well, often described as a climate of punitiveness. As evidence, the US is the last advanced Western democracy to retain capital punishment. Other practices – such as increasingly harsher sentences for minor crimes, removal of voting rights for those convicted of felonies (and sometimes misdemeanors), and the proliferation of supermax penitentiaries that completely isolate prisoners for the balance of their sentences – all stand as examples of a uniquely American punitivity.

Even though the American public does not vigorously discuss mass imprisonment as a social problem, it remains an important point of scholarly inquiry. Popular explanations propose a new system of racialized control, unequal labor market
conditions, and the centrality of crime in public life. Despite this massive body of theoretical and empirical literature, contextually speaking, nearly all studies reside in the well-trodden terrain of high crime inner-city ghettos. By implication, the dearth of research considering structural contributors to crime and the effects of mass imprisonment outside urban areas suggests a relative indifference to certain spaces, populations, and lives.

In 2008, this observation took on new personal meaning. That summer I attended a research institute designed to provide graduate students with mentoring from established researchers. The institute focused on the broad topic of “youth violence and culture” from a multidisciplinary approach. As such, a very prominent criminologist drew assignment to the sociology students. We sat at a table, taking turns sharing ideas, eagerly awaiting kernels of wisdom from this very accomplished man. When it came my turn, I described my interest in the constitution and consequences of punitive criminal justice policies for spaces beyond the boundaries of major cities. After some pause, the mentor made an important comment followed by an equally striking question.

First, he remarked, “Oh, well you will have to get to know meth then.” I nodded awkwardly, with the understanding that the “meth problem” appeared in California before the Midwest. Then, he immediately leaned back in his chair and asked with some guile, “Do you like the Midwest?” Of course I did, though by default, having never lived outside Kansas. He then fired off something to the effect of, “Well, that’s good, because no one outside the Midwest is going to care about your research,” and promptly moved on to the next student. To be fair, I believe he was suggesting that a research agenda focused on “rural crime” would not land me a job on either coast or earn research grants
and attention from the academic community. In retrospect, his response was not so surprising, given the time-honored indifference to such issues.

Odd, however, was his quick recall of the cultural tangle of rurality, criminality, and methamphetamine. I was familiar with the literature critical of this simplification, and I expected him, as a giant of the field, to be as well. What’s more, his comments align well with a theoretical tunnel vision that marks much of criminology. Thinking in binaries for a moment, criminological research tends to concentrate on the young rather than the old, men rather than women, crimes of the poor rather than the wealthy, and, of course, city over everywhere else. Combined, these interests produce a multiplicative term of sorts, focusing on a huge array of social problems associated with young minority men, living in the hollowed out cores of major cities. Simultaneously, these myopic tracts render whiteness and other privileged identities nearly invisible. Though seemingly inconsequential at the time, this brief conversation charted the course of this research.

To make this realization more clear, let us first ponder the rural/crime/meth equation. Though meth use and production varies by region (with perhaps a handful of areas experiencing elevated use rates), to be certain, meth has never been the most commonly used illegal drug in the US, even in most rural parts of the country. In fact, recent data show that overall illicit drug use in rural counties is about half that of drug use in urban counties (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2010). Furthermore, regularized meth use is quite uncommon. Recent estimates suggest that about .2% of the population used meth in the past month, compared to 6.6% using marijuana and .7% using cocaine (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration, 2010). In terms of health risks, emergency room visits implicating methamphetamine dropped rates from 45.2 per 100,000 in 2004 to 20.9 in 2009; these incidents pale in comparison to rates of 158.4 for cocaine and 438.7 for alcohol (SAMHSA, 2011). Likewise, drug treatment data show methamphetamine to rank a distant fifth for those seeking treatment. In fact, meth accounts for only about 4% of the nearly 30 million admissions to drug treatment nationally since 1992. This is not to imply that meth cases are not troubling individually, though they do appear somewhat trivial compared to alcohol, which accounts for nearly 47% of all drug treatment admissions nationally.

Even the contested crime-drug nexus finds meth among the least implicated in crime. The Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program screens arrestees for drugs of abuse in ten major US cities. The most recent ADAM report finds arrestees positive for methamphetamine 5.5% of the time, compared to 25.1% and 43.25% for cocaine and marijuana, respectively (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2010).

One reason that this study centers on Kansas is because of the popular notion that the state, sandwiched in the heartland of America, is a meth crime hotbed. Easily obtained data quickly disprove this assertion. Figure 1 below shows meth lab seizures in Kansas to be quite average nationally, and, in fact dwarfed by neighboring states like Missouri. Drug treatment data for Kansas follow national trends as well, with alcohol outpacing methamphetamine 52.8% to 6.4% respectively since 1992. Though always relatively low among youth, meth use among young people also declined over the last

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decade, with recent use dropping from 2.41% in 1997 to .9% in 2011 (Communities that Care, 2011). Even drug testing results of “high risk” probationers shows meth use to be relatively low. Testing indicates meth use among intensive probationers is in on par with cocaine (2.7%) and about half as frequent as marijuana (5.9%)\(^2\).

Ultimately, what I took from the earlier workshop conversation was my own realization that even a widely published and cited professional criminologist is not immune to the power of certain cultural constructions, which all too often distort the actualities of crime and punishment. Even in his role as mentor, he quickly reproduced two broad and familiar tropes, evidence of widespread “common sense” beliefs about crimes outside the city. First, meth signifies rurality, and rurality is mundane to the balance of the academic community. As Donnermeyer and DeKeseredy (2008) show, this sort of so-called common sense not only reflects unconscious beliefs about the way things work in rural and urban areas, but also obscures the force and effect of mass imprisonment. It advances the false notion that the largest increase in imprisonment in modern history does not affect large swaths of the country. Finally, dismissing meth as a “rural problem” animates it as the face of rural crime, and all but ignores problems of violence, abuse, and poverty faced by all Americans, not just those in major cities.

\(^2\) Data provided by the Kansas Department of Corrections TOADS database (2/15/2011). Data reflect all drug tests recorded in the TOADS system from 2004-2010.
Despite its relatively low prevalence, methamphetamine, as with other drugs, has irrefutable and often devastating effects. In Kansas and elsewhere, a wide array of individual and community problems most certainly involve meth, from personal health to child abuse and domestic violence, to a range of other property and violent crimes. This research does not contest these facts, nor does it seek to belittle or write off the stories and lives wrecked by the drug. The harmfulness of methamphetamine is without argument, but does not constitute the focus of this research. That said, for the many reasons outlined above, methamphetamine provides an interesting case study. Produced

Figure 1: Methamphetamine Lab Seizures 2004-2009

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3 Data retrieved from: [http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/map_lab_seizures.html](http://www.justice.gov/dea/concern/map_lab_seizures.html) map produced by Travis Linnemann
essentially anywhere, with common materials and by individuals with little specialized training, meth is distinguished from cocaine and heroin that have more elaborate distillation processes reliant on global markets. More important, the cultural constructions at which the mentor hinted defines meth as one of the only drugs of note primarily associated with [unsophisticated] white, rural users. These assumptions provide a unique opportunity to interrogate the evolving politics of punishment and inequality in contexts and landscapes largely dismissed by policy makers and the public.

Thus, the study pursues several broad questions raised by this discussion.

- The study first considers the objective realities of meth problems in relation to harm caused by other abused drugs.

- Secondly, the study provides an explanatory account of the political, cultural, and social conditions that encourage states like Kansas to pursue meth as a major public concern, and to a greater degree than other states with relatively higher meth rates.

- Most importantly, the study makes a theoretical contribution by demonstrating how anti-meth efforts, analogous to previous drug control campaigns, extends punitive drug control rationalities to new cultural contexts and social terrains, thereby reinforcing and extending the logics of mass imprisonment.

I approach these general questions from a broad theoretical perspective that combines elements of symbolic interaction and conflict theory, described generally as critical constructionism. This approach emphasizes the role of social power in the production of shared beliefs and values, and recognizes that ways in which social problems like methamphetamine are constructed, conceived, and presented to the public often reflect the interests of the socially powerful (Heiner, 2010). This is important, as the analysis will affirm, because crimes of all types, especially drug crimes, empower politicians, media, and other interest groups to move misdirected policy along, garner
massive funding, and reinforce dominant ideologies (Lusane, 1991; Reinarman & Levine, 1997; Muhammad, 2010; Robinson & Scherlen, 2007; Scheingold, 1991).

Following Mugford (1993) and others, this research views the rise of methamphetamine as part of broad drug control and carceral strategies brought about by changes in the state and modes of governance. As a product of media and political framing, meth is a powerful “political cocktail,” representative of a number of fears unique to the cultural conditions of rural parts of the Midwest. Therefore, by focusing on the production of meaning and ideology, the symbolic force of a “rural meth epidemic” comes into view. Rather than rehashing tired causal tautologies of drugs and crime, we focus on the representation of meth within the politics of risk and security (Seddon, Ralphs, & Williams, 2008).

Whether the rational “realist” or culturally constructed variant, the focus on risk and security signals the transition to the era of late modernity that emerged in America, Britain, and elsewhere in the developed world in the last third of the twentieth century. Late modernity is marked by a distinctive pattern of social, economic, and cultural relations, bringing a cluster of risks, insecurities, and control problems that have played a crucial role in shaping our changing response to crime (Garland, 2001, p. viii). In late modernity, wealth no longer shields the privileged from the risks and threats of everyday life (Beck, 2010). Today, risks and fear are fluid, as disease, disaster, terrorism, and crime can wait around every corner – reaching across generation and class to threaten all, even the unborn (Beck, 1996, p. 22).

David Garland’s highly influential The Culture of Control (2001) lays out several key developments of the period. According to Garland, the demise of the rehabilitative
ideal and the rise of punitive and emotive forms of justice encapsulate the entire project of mass imprisonment. Some suggest political maneuvering ushered in a “pound of flesh” approach to justice or “penal populism” (Pratt, 2006). Others connect the diffuse social insecurities of neoliberalism and vindictive social relations to the rise in punitive penalty (Young J., 2007), while still others point to the rise of a “new penology” concerned less with rehabilitation or punishment and more with diagnosis and the management of risk (Feeley & Simon, 1996). Marking the rise of mass imprisonment, other explanations document advancing insecurities – the politicization of crime, criminalization of public space, focus on the transition from liberalism to neo-liberalism (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006), change from a Keynesian state to a regulatory state (Braithwaite, 2000), and shift from modernity to late modernity (Young J., 1999).

Despite a diversity of perspectives, all agree that institutional forms shifted noticeably away from care and welfare to punishment and incarceration in the era of mass imprisonment (Wacquant, 2009).

Ironically, the shifts just described, rather than reducing concerns about public safety, marked an increased prominence in crime discourse. Simon’s (2007) Governing Through Crime sees crime as a driving force of governance. As fear, uncertainty, and insecurity persist, institutions and actors once disconnected from criminal justice come to view life through the prism of punishment and control. In this way, institutions and the behavior of government come to resemble criminal justice and the methods used to address problems of crime. Shaping structure and agency, crime concerns refashion institutional form and practice, remakes public space, and drives everyday decisions from where to live to what car to drive.
Keeping with the themes of criminal justice concerned with risk and security rather than welfare and rehabilitation, consider the following statement from Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius’ State of the State Address in 2005 (discussed in detail later). Outlining her public safety priorities for the coming year, the Governor makes very clear to the people of Kansas, that three actionable problems warrant her attention and their concern:

Kansas cannot be a truly healthy state unless it is both safe and secure. All our citizens must feel safe from crime and secure from the threat of terrorism, and feel protected from the natural disasters…Effective protection from terrorism and natural disasters requires the best possible communication among a wide range of government agencies…As for crimes that affect all Kansans, nothing is more important than stopping the illicit methamphetamine industry in its tracks (Sebelius, 2005).

Warning of natural disaster, terrorism, and crime, the Governor reminds the public of the inescapable uncertainty of late modernity. With growing frequency, hurricanes, tsunamis, and tornados invade public consciousness on nightly news broadcasts and documentary film, reminding of risk and the impotence of government response. Terrorism evolves as security mounts in airports, subways, and battlefields, while the risks of street crimes, though ever-present, are random and unpredictable (Best, 1999).

In late modernity, representation matters more than material realities. Risks of natural disaster flow seamlessly into racialized debates over the morality of “looting” for survival and the worthiness of victims. At the same time, color-coded threat warnings and full body scanners attach global jihad to the lives of average citizens. On the street, young Black men wear the certainties of crime as they would baggy jeans, while across town sex crimes lurk insidiously in Boy Scout leaders and daycare providers.
It is precisely through this lens that the risks of methamphetamine focus and sharpen. Cooked up with household supplies by anyone and anywhere, the “illicit meth industry” is shapeless. Whether in backwoods labs, trunks of cars, or imported from Mexico, meth risks are at once boundless and invisible. New crime victims are born as drug-endangered children and murdered deputies, proving that none are safe from a drug that ensnares rural farmers and suburban soccer moms alike (Linnemann, 2010). Most crucially, unlike crack before it, meth escapes the racialized ghetto and invades spaces once spared the blight of gangs, drugs, and violence (Macek, 2006).

**Plan of the Study**

To explore the lines of inquiry just detailed, this study makes use of a number of different data sources and methodologies. Because methamphetamine is relatively new on the national stage, very little consistent, uniform data exist. Furthermore, the study’s focus on the political, cultural, and ideological meanings attached to meth necessitates a variety of data sources. Therefore, in addition to official data, the study makes use of media reports, public opinion data, and semi-structured interviews, all to examine the social reality of meth from a number of angles.

The study focuses primarily on developments surrounding methamphetamine control in the Midwest and specifically in Kansas. Kansas is a useful focus because though it has relatively minor meth problems, the state’s leaders have proactively sought to address meth related issues with a number of community based programs, law enforcement initiatives, and legislation. The apparent disjuncture between the realities of relatively low meth usage and production (as indicated by available data) and heightened
public interest makes Kansas fertile ground to evaluate the social and political construction of the “meth problem.”

Culturally, Kansas is also uniquely important. As famously argued by Thomas Frank, Kansas demonstrates a unique brand of identity politics (Frank T., 2005). Though some of the most economically desolate places in the country are in Kansas and elsewhere in the Great Plains, the region remains among the most stridently conservative, generally opposed to social welfare programs, labor unions, and federal entitlements. Recognizing this, Frank shows that morally charged issues such as abortion, welfare, and gun control encourage working class people to repeatedly vote against their own economic interests. Within such a climate, the politics of backlash trump personal interest, maintain political stasis, and thwart progressive social policy. This is an important consideration for the study of meth and criminal justice more generally because issues of crime and drugs are among the most potent signifiers of latent race and class prejudices.

Therefore, to illustrate how meth is central to discussions of crime and criminality in Kansas, a key focus of this study lies in the development of crime policy and, ultimately, the broadening of the logic of punitive attitudes that drive mass incarceration and governmental rhetoric regarding drug use such as the “war” on drugs. Focusing on techniques of governmentality, realized as governing through crime, this study pays close attention to discourse whose “rationalization lies in the concern with narcotics” (Garriott, 2011, p. 5).

This dissertation does not follow the conventional format of literature review, methodology, and results. Rather, the introductory chapter is followed by five chapters,
each uniquely casting a somewhat different light on the central theme of governing through crime in rural areas. While Chapter 2 generally frames theoretical concepts and organizes the empirical inquiries, subsequent chapters represent various investigations into meth problem construction in Kansas. The following descriptions briefly preview these chapters. While each chapter refers to specific methods used in its development, Appendix A provides further details of the methodology, including author’s narrative and reflections on the research process. A concluding chapter reflects and contemplates the full study.

Chapter 2: *Drugs, Punishment, and the Politics of War*. For a background of events leading up to mass imprisonment, the chapter sketches a genealogy of the war on drugs and the punitive turn. Outlining a history of the present, the chapter touches upon key developments in crime policy analogous to the anti-meth program documented by subsequent chapters. A fusion of several concepts, the chapter also provides an analytical frame to consider how the actions of politicians and the media coalesce with public opinion to maintain social relations focused on security and management of risk. To organize points for empirical investigation, the chapters make use of Beckett and Sasson’s (2004) model of criminal justice expansion (Figure 2).

Chapter 3: *Governing Through Meth* traces the public narrative of methamphetamine related social problems as presented by key state level authorities and the media. Focusing on a few key events, the chapter shows the construction of meth as a powerful signifier of risk and rural crime. Following Simon’s (2007) *Governing Through Crime*, the chapter illustrates how drug war rationalities support the anti-meth program,
harnesses fear of crime, and secures tacit support for mounting legislation, budgetary allocations, and “tough on crime” political candidacy.

Chapter 4: *Crime, Difference, and Rural Life* considers the unique political and cultural context of crime control in Kansas. The chapter shows how punitiveness, support for repressive legislation, and broadening of the carceral state emerge in response to insecurity, anxiety, and fear. Building on whiteness studies, the chapter considers how the starkly racialized narratives underpinning mass imprisonment operate in areas of the country considered white. In doing so, the chapter proposes a theory of rural punitivity compelled by the precariousness of late modernity and a crisis of white hegemony.

Chapter 5: *Gendering the Crisis of the Present* examines starkly gendered constructions of meth crimes reported by newspapers in the American Midwest. The chapter illustrates how the media advance disparate explanations of why women use meth, built around conventional notions of motherhood, sexuality, and subordination. Men, alternately, are motivated to use meth because of their innate criminal virility, or the rational viability of the drug trade.

Chapter 6: *Policing the Drug War Beyond the Ghetto* illustrates cultural beliefs and punitive rationalities at work in the daily activities of police. Focusing on differences between urban and rural contexts, the chapter illustrates how meth reinforces actions of police serving communities not traditionally considered a high priority for law enforcement. The chapter also demonstrates how broad punitive drug control rationalities depict drug use and drug users as cause rather than a correlate of crime.
Figure 2: Beckett and Sasson's Model of Criminal Justice Expansion

With that said, this is not so much a study of rural crime or even a study of methamphetamine. Rather, the study seeks to build a broader understanding of the cultural politics of American criminal justice by viewing our social responses to crime and criminals through the lens of “rural crime” and its most recognizable signifier, methamphetamine. Even though the study employs the nearly unavoidable rural/urban dichotomy, the aim here is not to reify it. Rather, the study rests on the principal understanding that the deleterious effects of so many social problems, including mass imprisonment, significantly and disproportionately affect those marginalized places and people without political voice. From this starting point, then, the study seeks to illuminate the contours of a so-called “rural meth epidemic,” but especially the resultant
systems of control, as part of a broader carceral project, extending beyond the city and its
ghetto to the rural countryside.
CHAPTER 2 - Drugs, Punishment and the Politics of War

And even if the wars didn't keep coming like glaciers, there would still be plain old death. - Kurt Vonnegut, The Slaughterhouse Five (1969)

War is elemental. In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers Will and Ariel Durrant famously noted: “Of the last 3,421 years of recorded history, only 268 have seen no war” (Durrant & Durrant, 1968, p. 81). Of course, this record does not omit the US, a warlike nation without rival. As such, the national romance with war does not conform to the traditional battlefield. America wages wars across all theaters of social life and against all manner of enemy. From the Cold War reminder to “duck and cover” to commemorative ribbons of every color, war and enemy are always present. Reflecting on the emotional allure of war, veteran war correspondent Chris Hedges insists, “Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. Trivia dominates our conversations and increasingly our airwaves. And war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble” (Hedges, 2002, p. 2).

Since the early 1970s, America has fought the war on drugs, shaping a host of criminal justice and social welfare domains, making it the longest war and one of the most influential social policies of the last 40 years. Even though the US used similar strategies to control illicit drugs and punish drug users throughout the 20th century, the modern day war on drugs, marked by intense political attention, is an entirely new paradigm. Though most consider the early 1980s and the Reagan administration as the point when the drug war reached full speed, it began years earlier, at least symbolically.

The war on drugs is an ideological construct varying over time, based upon the attention granted it by government (Whitford & Yates, 2009, p. 34). Demonstrating this
construction, the now famous quote from Richard Nixon, launched perhaps the first volley in the drug war persisting today:

When we look at the vicious, destructive effects that drugs have on individual lives, on society as a whole, there is no question but that drug abuse is public enemy number one in the United States today. What we must do is to wage an all-out offensive against that deadly enemy. That offensive is underway right now. Government is playing a large part, educators are, scientists and doctors are...[by] mobilizing thousands, and even millions, of individual Americans on the basis of their absolute refusal to tolerate the drug menace as a part of our national life any longer—Richard M. Nixon: Telephone Remarks to Students and Educators Attending a Drug Education Seminar in Monroe, Louisiana. October 4, 1971 (Woolley & Peters, Public Enemy Number One)

Nixon’s speech came during massive social change marked by an unpopular war, civil unrest, riots, and a recession. Despite these things, Nixon names drugs as “public enemy number one,” effectively casting the blame for all the nation’s troubles on the problems of drug use. As this logic goes then, rather than occurring alongside poverty, homelessness, joblessness, broken families, and delinquency, drugs cause these ills. It follows then that the key to solving these problems rests in the eradication of drugs and the control of those who use them. This fact sets the “modern” drug war apart from previous strategies to control illicit narcotics and represents a massive policy initiative spanning law enforcement, social services, education, and even military actions.

This fixation on drugs and drug control has contributed to radical changes in American criminal justice over the last half century. To put this in perspective, consider that in 1958 there were “26,938 full-time [employees] in state and federal prisons and reformatories” managing a correctional population of just over 160,000 inmates (Schnur, 1958, p. 331). Less than a half century later, nearly a half million workers staff American prisons and jails and supervise a growing prisoner population topping well over two
million. Even though the US population doubled since Schnur’s time, prison guards and prisoners increased 15- and 13-fold respectively. For further evidence we need look no further than money allocated to the drug war. At the time of Nixon’s address, he pledged $350 million in new funding to support drug control efforts. In 2010, the Department of Justice set aside at least $15.1 billion dollars in funding further illustrating the ongoing expansion of the drug control and punishment business in recent decades (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2009).

**Governing through the war on drugs**

The war on drugs proved a potent strategy for governance. Once identified, “public enemy number one” provides clear opportunity for leading by fear, a strategy that continues to produce results. Though concern about the war on drugs spiked in 1990 at about 37%, the proportion of the public naming drugs as the nation’s biggest problem has hovered around 6% for the better part of the last two decades (Pew Resarch Center for People and the Press, 2001). Consistent as well are beliefs that the government is failing to address drug problems. Public opinion polls show that in the early 1970s, about 41% of the public felt that the country was “losing ground” in its battle against illegal drugs. Nearly 30 years and billions of dollars later, 32% of those polled believed the US was losing the war on drugs (The Gallup Organization, Inc, 2009). The notion of a “losing battle” sustained the drug control project at ascending levels of funding for the last four decades.

Though governing through war metaphors is powerful, a clearly defined enemy does not fully explain the longevity of the war on drugs (Simon J., 2002). At its core, the logic of the war on drugs links with broader changes in American society. Moving
from 1960s social upheaval into 1970s uncertainty, some argue that the American state was significantly transformed during this period. With the rejection of Keynesian economics, neoliberal social policy gradually replaced the American welfare state. The post-Keynesian strategy – supposedly built on fiscal conservatism, low corporate taxes to stimulate trade, deregulation of the marketplace, and privatization of public services and assets – worked to make market function the “... overwhelming priority for social organization” as well as the new economic policy regime in the US and UK (Couldry, 2010, p. 4).

Along with neoliberalism, several factors shaping crime control emerged in late modernity. For example, Garland (2001) notes post war wealth brought increased opportunities for crime as abundant consumer goods became targets for theft, and enhanced trade in illicit markets. Likewise, the evolving face of the city, marked by well-stocked suburban homes left unattended during a lengthening workday gave new opportunity for crime. Finally, the baby boom increased the at-risk population as a large group of teenage boys matured in an environment of advancing wealth and personal freedoms (Young J., 2002, p. 229). These conditions set the stage for increasing crime rates and encouraged the burgeoning social and political interest in crime of the early 1970s.

Simon (2007) argues that these shifts and manifold politicizations of crime have transformed late-modern democracy. He argues that the modern focus on crime makes it a prominent feature in a subject’s relationship to power (Fluery-Steiner, Dunn, & Fluery-Steiner, 2009). *Governing through Crime*, or governmentality concerned with crime, is different than simple state responses to crime or attempts by government to solve crime
problems. Governing through crime exists when attempts to manage and influence behavior through crime comes to invade other social spheres once not considered the domain of criminal justice institutions. Simon’s conceptions fit perfectly with the tacit militarism of late modern criminal justice supplanting penal welfarism with a wholesale “war” infused with neoliberal and authoritarian obsession with risk and fear. As Simon explains:

The attraction of crime control as a basis for executive power begins with its immunity from the political collapse of support for both the liberal social welfare state and the conservative message of global military dominance… In associating their executive authority with the role of the prosecutor, presidents and governors are able to tap into a logic of sovereign representation largely independent of, and unimpaired by, the discrediting of the general welfare state instructed by the new deal (Simon J., 2007, p. 72).

Consequently, as the welfare state gave way to neoliberalism, many traditional, long-standing social problems related to poverty were re-problematized as criminal and governed by police, courts, and correctional institutions (Wacquant, 2009).

The next section, a combination of diverse writings that focus on a few select social and political developments, provides background leading up to the present state of crime control in the US. Though presented in a linear fashion, this does not necessarily imply distinct breaks between events or developments; indeed, no history is that simple. Rather, what follows are examples to aid in theorizing methamphetamine criminalization and control as a strategy of governance and marker of punitive difference. While not an exhaustive account, the following section sketches a general framework that leads up to the present political environment, paying close attention to the “intellectual, linguistic, and technical ways in which phenomena are constituted by government as governable problems” (McLaughlin & Muncie, 2003, p. 192).

Criminology of the Self and Criminology of the Other
Foreshadowing the individualistic politics of mass imprisonment, David Matza fittingly observed that positivist criminology accomplished the remarkable feat of dislodging the study of crime from contemplation of the state (Cohen, 2009; Matza, 1969). As such, much of the theorizing and policy work on the causes of crime of the last forty years focus on the individual. Recognizing this, Garland (2001) outlines two tracts of late-modern thinking about crime that reflect broader social and economic changes of the day. Mapping his culture of control, Garland asserts most thinking about crime follows the contradictory criminologies of the self and the other. In a positivist sense, the criminology of the self sees crime as normal and rational and offenders as diagnosable and predictable subjects. This tract gives rise to routine activities, rational choice, and situational crime prevention strategies, stressing the instrumental character of crimes and criminals.

The criminology of the other promotes the fearsomeness of crime and supports vindictive state action against those “criminal types” who are held responsible. In an anti-modern sense, the criminology of the other is not concerned with the particulars of crime, only the emotive desire to punish and separate the good of society from the other (Garland, 2001, p. 137). As mass imprisonment advances, these tracts stand relatively unchallenged by a middle-ground stance, or by welfarist criminology that would emphasize rehabilitation and progressive social policy. Further complicating matters, the incompatibility of these two criminologies produce an incoherent and ineffectual public narrative as to the problem of crime. As Garland argues, “If one considers the whole range of governmental discourse on crime – not just statements of elected officials but also those of the administrative agencies – it becomes apparent that official discourse is
structured by a barely suppressed set of conflicts and tensions” (Garland, 2001, p. 137). The conflict and tensions result in a confused state response where local and state agencies act out individual policy initiatives in an unsystematic fashion. However, if we are to consider the rise of punitive criminal justice rhetorical detailed above and the corresponding growth of all correctional populations in the US, we must conclude, at least to some degree, that today criminology of the other speaks loudest and longest.

Commenting on the demise of the rehabilitative ideal and progressive views on crime, Young accordingly notes, “whatever it was, the opportunities for the new criminologies evaporated and neo-liberal and conservative ideas held an unchallenged ascendancy” (Young J., 2002, p. 231).

Following the Civil Rights Act and the dissolution of codified racial oppression, conservative politicians pushed back, devising a plan to stir white working class animus and sway new voters to their cause (Tonry, 2011). This so-called “southern strategy” placed race and crime at the center of cultural politics, capitalizing on fears born of burgeoning social change. Arguably, no public figure stood more prominently for this movement in the late 1960s than Barry Goldwater. As his acceptance of the 1964 Republican presidential nomination shows, Goldwater provides a roadmap to rallying the support of disaffected southerners around the conservative crime story (Macek, 2006).

Tonight there is violence in our streets, corruption in our highest offices, aimlessness among our youth, anxiety among our elderly; and there’s a virtual despair among the many who look beyond material success toward the inner meaning of their lives. And where examples of morality should be set, the opposite is seen…The growing menace in our country tonight, to personal safety, to life, to limb and property, in homes, in churches, on the playgrounds and places of business, particularly in our great cities, is the mounting concern – or should be -- of every thoughtful citizen in the United States. Security from domestic violence, no less than from foreign aggression, is the most elementary and
fundamental purpose of any government, and a government that cannot fulfill this purpose is one that cannot long command the loyalty of its citizens. History shows us, demonstrates, that nothing, nothing prepares the way for tyranny more than the failure of public officials to keep the streets from bullies and marauders… (The National Center, 1964).

The now famous risk-heavy Goldwater speech contains many of the hallmarks of contemporary conservatism, charting the course for the neoliberal and neoconservative crime agendas. Focusing the public on the tyranny of individuals, rather than the tyranny of the state, Goldwater brings the risks of the “growing menace” of urban crime to the forefront of American consciousness. Here he places crime on the same plane as the threat of cold war “foreign aggression,” while concurrently blaming the permissiveness of liberal elites for failing to keep the “bullies and marauders” off the streets. He continued to rally “good citizens,” through moral calling, to take up the fight against crime:

Those who seek to live your lives for you, to take your liberty in return for relieving you of yours, those who elevate the state and downgrade the citizen, must see ultimately a world in which earthly power can be substituted for divine will…It is the cause of Republicanism to ensure that power remains in the hands of the people -- and, so help us God, that is exactly what a Republican president will do with the help of a Republican Congress. It is further the cause of Republicanism to restore a clear understanding of the tyranny of man over man in the world at large. it is our cause to dispel the foggy thinking which avoids hard decisions in the delusion that a world of conflict will somehow resolve itself into a world of harmony, if we just don't rock the boat or irritate the forces of aggression -- and this is hogwash…It is further the cause of Republicanism to remind ourselves, and the world, that only the strong can remain free: that only the strong can keep the peace (The National Center, 1964).

As a remarkable example of the emerging governmentalities of crime, Goldwater insists that the “fundamental purpose of any government” is to ensure the safety of its citizens. Clearly then, welfare state methods failed to protect honest middle-class citizens from growing “violence in the streets.” Goldwater’s solution is not rehabilitative nor
founded upon social supports championed by “permissive liberals.” Rather, the new strategy and structure of governance rests on “Republican strength” and coercion, governed through crime.

Epitomizing the no-nonsense “tough on crime” approach, Goldwater reminds that only the strong can remain free or keep the peace, eschewing the “harmonious” politics of the welfare state. The address also introduces the racialized fusion of urbanism, crime, and immorality as the life blood of conservative crime policy. As Nixon shows a short time later, the fusion of drugs and crime were convenient scapegoats for emerging social change in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the US; glossed over or ignored were the broad-based social inequalities, growing racial unrest, dynamic protests of the Viet Nam war, and riots in major urban areas (Mauer, 1999). Although Nixon lost in convincing fashion, the outlines of the twin politics of race and crime caught on magnificently and continue in earnest today.

Addressing the utility of this sort of leadership, noted linguist George Lakoff shows that the political leanings of individuals, and therefore how we choose to solve social problems like drug use, resonate with idealized notions of family. Lakoff argues that discussions of crime and dependency center on competing concepts of the nation as family. On the one hand, conservatives prefer the Strict Father Model, positing a traditional nuclear family, headed by a stern disciplinarian who is charged with setting policy, writing rules of behavior for children, and enforcing with violence when necessary. The “tough love” metaphor characterizes the Strict Father Model and the “get tough” approach to crime, weighing on the notion that personal responsibility and prosperity flourish under strict parental authority (Lakoff, 2002, p. 33). Reflecting
rehabilitative orientations, the liberal worldview emanates from the ideal of *Nuturant Parents*. From this perspective children become responsible citizens through parenting that emphasizes love and empathy and the importance of community while expressing respect for others and encouraging individuality and creativity. Lakoff argues that each of these models induce and reinforce a set of moral priorities that translate easily into preference for governing styles. Simply then, we can also posit that the Strict Father Model of political morality gained ascendancy with the “strict father” presidencies, ushering in the era of mass imprisonment (Simon J. , 2002).

Marking the strong ascendency of governing through crime, Democrats and liberals joined the new “tough on crime” coalition, employing both criminologies of the self and the other on several notable instances. For example, Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (1965) further situated the character of inner city minorities within the notorious culture of poverty. Citing an explanation for the deterioration of the central city, and more important a suitable explanation for increasing civil unrest in poor minority communities, the Moynihan Report (as it was later called) proved tremendously influential on the shape and direction of a host of crime and social service policies in coming decades. Reverberating with “violence in the streets” discourse, teen pregnancy, crime, drug use, and welfare dependency can to signify inner city families. Rather than evaluating these and other social problems as indicators of urban inequality, Moynihan’s “tangle of pathology” located the cause of America’s most pressing social issues in the ghetto and placed the crosshairs of future criminal justice action squarely on the Black family (Macek, 2006, pp. 59-60).
While Goldwater, Nixon, and Moynihan represented major actors in setting the stage for mass imprisonment, some argue that Ronald Reagan, first though his Governorship and later in the Presidency, was instrumental in fully realizing the politics of mass imprisonment. John Hagan’s most recent work describes the “unchallenged ascendancy” of neoliberal and neoconservative crime control and heart of era mass imprisonment from 1974-2008 as the “Age of Reagan” (Hagan, 2010). By 1976, Governor Reagan had helped dismantle the Berkeley School of Criminology at the University of California an important center of “radical” or critical thinking about crime (Hagan, 2010, p. 101). As President, Reagan’s national policies were dominated by individualistic developmental theories focused on “career criminals” and “chronic offenders.” Now looking through the lens of Garland’s (2001) criminologies of the self and other, the attendant crime policies of Reagan’s “career criminals” could be built on nothing but actuarial and incapacitative rationalities.

As Ortiz and Briggs (2003) thoughtfully argue the Moynihan report, linked up with the residual culture of poverty, signaling the end for social supports for the urban poor. However, when Ronald Reagan began marshaling white conservative anger around his constructions of “welfare queens” a policy regime was born that would reverberate through the next three presidencies. During the 1976 Presidential campaign, candidate Reagan, spun the yarn of a woman on the south side of Chicago with “80 names, 30 addresses, 12 social security cards, and is collecting veterans benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands” (The Washington Star, 1976). Effectively employing racializations such as “Cadillac driving welfare-queen” and the “south side of Chicago” a historically Black neighborhood, Reagan struck a chord with the festering backlash
against “Big Government” entitlements and liberal social programs. Though a gross fabrication, the welfare queen construction of Black womanhood as immoral and undeserving served as a policy emblem culminating with Bill Clinton’s controversial welfare reform act, twenty years later (Boris, 2007). For Hagan and many others, the failed policies of the age of Reagan in response to exaggerated and racialized fears of ghetto unrest, ushered in a carceral state now eclipsing two million US citizens (Simon, 2007; Wacquant 2009; Western 2007).

In a parallel argument, O’Malley (2010) asserts that the publication of Robert Martinson’s (1974) What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform notably marks the rise of risk-focused governmentality, get-tough policies, and the criminology of the other. While no single piece of research can map the course of decades of crime policy, Martinson cast serious doubts on penal modernist efforts to reform offenders, linking it with the ascending neoliberal market based politics which shifted away from welfare state orientations. Despite arguing against prison expansion, Martinson’s now famous conclusion that “with few isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism” was picked up by conservative and liberal politicians alike, eager to cash in on the growing swell of “get tough” sentiment (Martinson, 1974, p. 25). Martinson’s conclusion, though scrutinized by the academic community, gained credence in the middle of a perfect storm that included rising crime rates, public apprehension, and opportunistic political competitiveness; as a result, “nothing works” became the clarion call of all manner of leaders. Moreover, as some argue, “radical” criminologists also latched on to “nothing works” as ammunition for destructive critiques of correctional treatments that they
viewed as criminogenic statecraft (Cullen & Gendreau, 2001). As Zimring notes, the “nothing works” mantle captured the appetite of many to “recognize in the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s as evidence of governmental incapacity.” This trend further strengthened deterrent and incapacitative approaches to justice (Zimring 2007, 30). Indeed, whether adopted by the left or right, notions of what works or, more appropriately, what does not work, has not faded from the lexicon of corrections professionals (The Pew Center on the States, 2007).

Other developments in academia also figured into the dismantling of rehabilitative philosophies and wholesale investment in law and order approaches. Similar to “what works,” the Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment again shed pessimistic light on progressive crime reduction practices. The experiment sought to measure the effects of “preventative patrol” techniques common to many cities that were reliant on patrol car based rather than foot patrol based activities. Findings of the study concluded little difference in crime reduction between the presumed deterrent qualities of preventative patrol techniques and no patrol at all. For some, these findings were further support for a nothing-works mentality, eventually reducing police visibility and interaction in some communities (Zimring, 2007).

Michael Tonry insists that the best explanations for the punitive turn and mass incarceration remain “parochially national and cultural” (Tonry, 2001, p. 518). Thus, it is important to consider how symbolic politics of crime control marshaled by political maneuvers tap into latent yet powerful cultural beliefs of the public. One of the most infamous of these constructions continues to be the “Willie Horton” and the “Revolving Door” ads of the 1988 presidential election (Newburn & Jones, 2005). Though trailing
early in the election season, the now famous attack ads helped deliver George H.W. Bush the Presidency. Briefly, the ad features “Willie Horton,” a repeat offender imprisoned in Massachusetts (governed by then Governor and presidential hopeful Michael Dukakis), who “murdered a boy in a robbery stabbing him nineteen times.” The ad emphasized that “despite a life sentence, Horton received ten weekend passes from prison.” On one such pass, “Horton fled, kidnapped a young couple, stabbing the man, and repeated raping his girlfriend.” Featuring a grainy mug shot of Horton throughout, the ad opens with Bush’s support for capital punishment and closes with “weekend prison passes, Dukakis on crime” (Newburn & Jones, 2005). Dukakis was never able to recover from the political attack.

Following the success of the Willie Horton piece, Bush’s team launched a similar ad focusing on the “revolving [prison] door” supposedly produced by Dukakis’ criminal justice policies. Again, symbolic language was central, citing over 200 escapees, “many [of whom] were first degree murderers.” While the exact effect on the election is impossible to measure, (a number of strategists insist other factors were central), the fact persists that Willie Horton remains a powerful figure in the political sphere; the image cemented the importance of being tough on crime for political hopefuls of both parties (Newburn & Jones, 2005).

The Horton case powerfully demonstrates the political utility of race and crime, a fusion of continued potency. For example, measuring the impact of “racial code words” research demonstrates that white respondents are more likely to support punitive criminal justice policies when questions are racialized by terms such as “violent inner city crime” as opposed to simply “violent crime” (Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005).
In the mid-1990s, a group of prominent policy advisors, including two former drug czars, produced a body of research heralding the rise of crime from the urban ghetto. They argued that inner city poverty and the continued degradation of the urban family would collide with the scourge of crack cocaine and ideal demographic conditions, working to produce hordes of “morally poor” children or “super-predators.” Drawing on Moynihan and an extreme culture of poverty, the authors argued:

In the extreme, moral poverty is the poverty of growing up surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in abuse, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings. In sum, whatever their material circumstances, kids of whatever race, creed, or color are most likely to become criminally depraved when they are morally deprived (DiIulio, 1995, p. 25).

From moral poverty, the authors warned of unparalleled violence rising from urban ghettos to spill over onto white America (Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996, p. 13). Though they offered disclaimers of “material circumstances,” the focus on minority communities as experiencing the highest levels of violence implicitly racialized the super-predator thesis. In doing so, the authors tapped into white America’s racial fears, exploited the caricature of the young Black criminal, and further solidified projects of spatial and social exclusion.

In terms of scholars, few figured more prominently in the shape and direction of American crime policy during the era of mass imprisonment than James Q. Wilson. Advisor to Reagan and Bush, Wilson was reviled by some and championed by others. As Matt DeLisi asserts, Wilson “…is not a sociologist; he does not skirt using the individual unit of analysis…and he does not shy away from the uglier realities about human nature, morality and immorality, vice, crime, and violence” (DeLisi, 2010, p. 192). This is certainly true, as Wilson gained notoriety largely because of his public refusal to consider
many sociological explanations of crime. His most influential works, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (1968), *Thinking About Crime* (1975), *Broken Windows* with George Kelling (1982), and *Crime and Human Nature* with Richard Herrnstein (1985), continue to influence the academic study of crime. Throughout his career, Wilson has famously insisted on a binary view of social life built on the assumptions of differences between “decent people” and “bums” (DeLisi, 2010). In *Thinking About Crime* (1975), a direct affront to sociological criminology, Wilson describes sociology as replete with ideology and devoid of fact, and urges policy makers to recognize that the causes of crime rest with the individual not society. As perhaps inspiration for Garland’s criminology of the other, Wilson famously argued, “Wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent people” (Wilson, 1975, p. 209). Further, Wilson with George Kelling proffered a theory of policing that still stands as an emblem of risk-focused and punitive criminal justice practices. The *Broken Windows* approach to crime reduction suggests that the roots of serious crime begin with minor disorder. Also described as “zero-tolerance policing,” agencies purportedly show citizens that neighborhoods are cared for by targeting all forms of visible disorder, however minor, along with more serious crimes (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

By the time Rudolph Giuliani became Mayor of New York City, the shift from welfare to zero tolerance appeared complete. However, Giuliani’s agenda played out in the nation’s largest and most visible city, ushered in punitiveness as a social policy in earnest (Vitale, 2008). Giuliani accomplished this shift by adopting the criminology of the other and broken windows policing philosophies en masse—in the process, he reframed homelessness as a so-called “quality of life issue” by first targeting poor and
homeless “squeegee men”. This strategy allowed poverty and homelessness, as well as other visible nuisances such as panhandling – previously the domain of social services to become the terrain of the police and criminal justice. Rather than continuing on with the concurrent tracks of enforcement and rehabilitation, the new strategy of zero tolerance (ZTP) and order maintenance policing sought to eliminate all visible signs of disorder as the first step toward crime reduction. By focusing on behaviors such as street peddling, panhandling, and squeegee cleaning under the auspice of improving “quality of life” issues, Giuliani effectively criminalized poverty and homelessness. Such reframing of everyday issues as crimes captures the public’s attention and allows governmental authorities the power to secure citizens’ safety and enhance their “quality of life,” even if at the expense of already marginalized people. Malanga reports on Giuliana’s mindset:

So we started paying attention to the things that were being ignored. Aggressive panhandling, the squeegee operators that would come up to your car and wash the window of your car whether you wanted it or not -- and sometimes smashed people's cars or tires or windows -- the street-level drug-dealing; the prostitution; the graffiti, all these things that were deteriorating the city. So we said, "We're going to pay attention to that," and it worked. It worked because we not only got a big reduction in that, and an improvement in the quality of life, but massive reductions in homicide, and New York City turned from the crime capital of America to the safest large city in the country for five, six years in a row. –Rudi Giuliani (Malanga, 2007)

However, as Harcourt and Ludwig (2007) demonstrate, the zero tolerance approaches now epitomizes tough on crime ideology, have far-reaching consequences continuing to reverberate years after Giuliani left office. For example, one of the numerous quality of life issues ZTP focused was smoking marijuana in public view (MPV). In 1994, the first year of broken windows policing the NYPD made 1,851 arrests for MPV, just six short years later in 2000, the NYPD made 51,267 arrests, an increase of 2,670% (Harcourt &
Ludwig, 2007, p. 165). More importantly, the focus of BWP disproportionately fell on people of color, with Blacks and Hispanics representing 52% and 32% of arrests made for MPV, even though they represent about 25% of the population of New York City.

As Golub and colleagues show (2007), during this time Black and Hispanic MPV arrestees were more than twice as likely as their white counterparts to be jailed prior to arraignment, twice as likely to be convicted, and received more than three times much jail time as similarly situated white arrestees (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2007, p. 165). Thus, in New York City, ZTP and BWP strategies serve as the initial stages of increasing hostile criminal justice practices, disproportionately punishing powerless minorities, and street level youth. Ironically the disparate outcomes of ZTP policies, serve as evidence for some, that young minority youth should be policed and criminalized at higher rates, further fueling the logic of mass imprisonment (Young J., 2007).

While Giuliani claimed political capital for the success of BWP in New York City, the Clinton administration accomplished a massive overhaul of welfare through broad bi-partisan support (Boris, 2007). Invoking culture of poverty politics established years before from Moynihan through Reagan, Clinton sought public support by promising to replace welfare with workfare. Just as Clinton’s criminal justice policy had set the stage for BWP by adding thousands of police officers nationally, Clinton’s neoliberal social policy effectively took a zero tolerance approach to social welfare by moving thousands from welfare rolls, mandating menial employment, and imposing criminal justice tactics in the assistential sphere (Wacquant, 2009). However with the transition from welfare to workfare came a number of unintended consequences, aggravating the circumstances of the socially vulnerable. For instance as Allard (2000)
shows, the punitive residue of the war on drugs, the culture of poverty fused to produce a seemingly innocuous section of Clinton’s welfare reform. Section 115 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) bans those convicted of a drug crime from receiving cash assistance and food stamps for life, though the same stipulations did not include violent crimes such as murder and rape. Effectively criminalizing and punishing the children of minor drug offenders, the hardly talked about provision ejected hundreds of thousands of children from public assistance in the first few years after PRWORA (Allard, 2002). As another example of free market economic ideologies applied to the social sphere, countless children and families were set adrift without government assistance, under the guise of a distorted meritocratic ethos.

Eventually what emerged from the cumulative effects of political expediency, professional pessimism, racism and the punitive “tough” social policy is a set of code words equating “crime” to “urban” and “urban” to Black. Gradually for large portion of the American population urban and ghetto became synonymous with dangerous places inhabited not by fellow citizens but violent predators (Parenti, 2000). In this way, the public policy drift toward control and away from social welfare amplified the conservative mantra of personal responsibility transformed socially marginal people into “squeegee men” and “welfare queens” and the fodder of a relentless carceral project.

As evidenced by the past 40 years, the legacy of the southern strategy, punitive rhetoric, and neoliberal social policies manifest as governing through crime. In relation to crime and criminals, politicians of all stripes recognize successful candidacy rests not on the presentation of a tough on crime platform, but who is able to appear toughest on crime. As Simon argues, “the commitment to secure communities from the threat of
violence by building and filling large carceral institutions has become a social compact cutting across the political order, binding Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives” (Simon J., 2009, p. 18).

Though five presidential administrations have passed through Washington since Nixon’s declaration, despite time, the tough on crime politics ushered with the conservative backlash remain if not flourish. Budget allocations for the Department of Justice FY2010 proposed by the Obama administration carry forward the tough on crime and expansionist mantle. Though once characterized as the “most liberal” Senator in terms of voting record, Obama’s proposed budget eclipses his predecessor’s on several “tough on crime” programs. Despite a floundering economy and rising unemployment Obama’s first DOJ funding plan of $29.2 billion represents a 25% increase over his predecessor’s 2008 DOJ budget. Specifically Obama seeks to enhance funding for the Byrne Justice Assistance Grants program and Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, both shown to contribute to prison populations at the State and Federal level4 in addition to increased funding directly to prisons and detention (Justice Policy Institute, 2010).

While the current Presidential administration appears to have adopted a more centrist criminal justice policy agenda, Obama’s work on death penalty abolition and racial justice as Senator as well as the following except from The Audacity of Hope, hint more progressive personal beliefs.

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We need to tackle the nexus of unemployment and crime in the inner city. The conventional wisdom is that most unemployed inner-city men could find jobs if they really wanted to work; that they inevitably prefer drug dealing, with its attendant risks but potential profits, to the low-paying jobs that their lack of skill warrants. In fact, economists who've studied the issue – and the young men whose fates are at stake – will tell you that the costs and benefits of the street life don't match the popular mythology: At the bottom or even the middle ranks of the industry, drug dealing is a minimum-wage affair. For many inner-city men, what prevents gainful employment is not simply the absence of motivation to get off the streets but the absence of a job history or any marketable skills – and, increasingly, the stigma of a prison record. We can assume that with lawful work available for young men now in the drug trade, crime in any community would drop (Obama, 2006, p. 257)

Though President Obama may hold beliefs that are more progressive, we need look no farther than his changing policy positions during the 2008 presidential election to gather another hint about the saliency of the tough on crime stance for public officials. As the commentary below shows, while working in Illinois communities and during his time as a state representative Obama was a tireless advocate against capital punishment.

Obama's most significant contribution has been his legislative battles against the death penalty, and against the criminal justice system. In Illinois, it's been a series of shocking exonerations of innocent people who are on death row. He was involved very intimately in drafting and passing legislation that requires the video taping of police interrogations and confessions in all capital cases. And he also was one of the co-sponsors of this very comprehensive reform of the death penalty system in Illinois, which many people say may trigger the retreat on the death penalty in many other states (The Sentencing Project, 2008, p. 5)

As the 2008 election drew to a close Obama shifted his hard-line stance and accepted capital punishment for “heinous crimes” such as child rape. Undoubtedly, the monumental issues of war, recession, and terrorism obscured criminal justice as a policy issue for the 2008 election. However, the disjuncture between policy suggestions and personal beliefs may indicate how difficult meaningful criminal justice policy reform is to accomplish, if not the importance of remaining the appearance of being tough on
crime. In this way, as Elliot Currie remarks, crime as a public issue has indeed been “taken off of the table” in many respects:

That success in taking the crime issue off the table, indeed, has been considered by many people in the Democratic Party as a political triumph. It means that the issue of ‘crime in the streets’ – as it was called back in the late 1960s when we elected a Republican president, Richard Nixon, in part because of public fears of crime – is no longer the property of the Republican Party and doesn’t gain them any particular electoral advantage anymore. But it also means that any systematic alternative to the failed policies of the past generation has disappeared from the political process, because it has also lost any effective political home (Currie, 2009, p. 22).

Currie does not allege that crime no longer matters for everyday Americans, or that mass incarceration has solved the crime problem, rather that the pressing problems of crime are no longer a point of considerable public debate among our political leadership, because of the utter triumph of tough on crime rhetoric.

The history of the present loosely sketched above details some examples of political and academic developments leading to the age of mass imprisonment, it is certainly not exhaustive, nor does it detail other events that oppose these structural changes. It does however, provide a genealogy leading up to the politics of the day. Echoing tensions between positivist and punitive criminologies, incoherent crime control narratives, and the power of governing through crime, Feely and Simon describe the state of late-modern crime control. As others have warned, the present circumstances no longer comport to episodic bouts with moral panics or crime epidemics as conceived at the onset of the era of mass imprisonment. Today, the politics of crime sustain a deep crisis, institutionalizing fear, uncertainty, and risk.
In the USA, with its weak and fragmented political parties and its tradition of populism, the manufacture of moral panics to affect political objectives has been developed into high art. Moral Panic has been institutionalized (Feeley & Simon, 2007, p. 45).

Inverting the notion of moral panics, Feeley and Simon offer that rather than a background of safety and security interrupted by episodic moral panics, fear and uncertainty are the norm. As such, the efforts of law enforcement and politicians advancing increasingly punitive practices are not intermittent responses to social ills, but “heroic efforts to stem the tide in what seems to be a losing battle” (Feeley & Simon, 2007, p. 50). It follows then, in a state of fear and insecurity characterized by a “culture of control” where the state increasingly governs through crime moral panics are “the manufactured background, a feature of the larger order of knowledge and power, that never goes away or recedes, and that must be guarded against” (Feeley & Simon, 2007, p. 51).

Drugs and the Punitive Turn

While the previous section describes governance marshaled through crime, the following section more deeply considers the quality of these changes. The section also specifically focuses on how drug criminalization supports the punitive characteristics of American criminal justice. Skillfully illustrating punitiveness and processes of social differentiation, Young (1999) shows how social attitudes about difference justify the marginalization of drug users and the poor. He begins by noting the temptations of modern life. Though all can choose the hedonism of drug use and a carefree life without work, only some succumb to such temptation. Therefore, poverty and drug use, clearly demonstrate some sort of individual failing and deficiency of character. From the single mother tempted by the “easy life” on public assistance to the drug user surrendering to
the lurid pleasure of the high, these outcasts succumb to the temptations faced by all. Once marked by temptation, drug users and the poor, are petrified. Unable to support her children, the single mother is perpetually dependent on the state. Likewise, drug users are presumably and forever addicts, despite the particulars of use. From the poor choices made by the weak and dependent, society as a whole suffers as disturbance spreads throughout. Children born to impoverished broken families become petty criminals or menacing “super predators” responsible for inner city disorder and the bloody spectacle of the nightly news. Degraded, the addict sleeps on the street, steals, and begs for change from honest hardworking citizens on the way to work. From this point poverty and drug use are clear markers of the enemy-nemesis. No longer fellow citizens, they are the other, a threatening annoyance to exclude both spatially and socially. Even though they may occasionally engender sympathy and kindness, the social indifference, scorn, and wrath they endure is ultimately self-inflicted (Young J., 1999, p. 113). Young shows how social beliefs about poverty and drug use link up to broader beliefs about social acceptability. Tautologically, then if the poor do not abide mainstream values, they must be undeserving, and if deserving they would not be poor (Gans, 1995). In this way, the appearance of drug use, single parenthood and the like swirl together, serving as indicators and the reasons for persistent inequality. The joblessness of some men directly identifies failures in character, as do the children of unwed mothers, for certainly opportunities exist to both have a job and a husband if the derelict poor and immoral mothers wanted either (Boyd, 2004). Persistent inequalities are justified and perpetuated in this way.
For an example of how contrived notions of worthiness and acceptability intersect with drugs and crime more generally, consider the following excerpts from an interview with a “drug” prosecutor in Kansas. Here the prosecutor demonstrates how particular criteria of deserving and undeserving figure into his decision-making and everyday criminal justice transactions.

**Interviewer:** I am unclear about a second offense for possession of marijuana, is it a mandatory felony or do you have discretion to still charge it as a misdemeanor?

**District Attorney:** Technically a prosecutor should charge it that way. There has been an occasional case where I have charged it as a first offense, the statute does allow a prosecutor some discretion, for a person when he’s cooperated for example, and who is really phobic of that felony they are going to have to report. Or some college kids that don’t want to lose their career or their financial aid.

The prosecutor describes the criteria he uses in deciding to charge a marijuana crime as a misdemeanor or felony, illustrating the array of characteristics coalescing as binaries determining the course of prosecution. As the discussion shows, the prosecutor clearly believes that some deserve mercy. This is not a revelation, as the research literature documents the tremendous discretion afforded to criminal justice actors. However, it is important to consider that the prosecutor makes clear the specific type of person deserving of his mercy, “someone who has cooperated” or served as a confidential informant or a college kid with a “career”. Therefore, those assisting in prosecution of others, or exhibiting the traits of a future middle class citizen meet the criteria of a deserving citizen, while others clearly do not. Later, while discussing the impact of criminal history on employment, the same prosecutor returns to the subject, further illustrating his disparate attitude about drug prosecution.
Interviewer: What impact does a criminal record have on employment locally?

District Attorney: We are very mindful with stuff like marijuana, we have had you know a diversion program for students, because of financial aid concerns and making certain they don’t lose their financial aid we’ve tried to address it that way. I don’t know if there is that much stigma per se with a simple possession of THC for an employer, really, I haven’t sensed that. Uh it’s kind of like an alcohol offense, kids will be kids.

Again he restates his opinion of college students who use marijuana, further stating that while it is a consideration in his daily work as a prosecutor; he doesn’t think that a drug offense carries “that much stigma” in the community. Certainly if this were the case his decision to prosecute some as misdemeanants and others as felons would be altered. A final comment from this discussion punctuates the politics of war.

Interviewer: What is your personal philosophy about your role as a prosecutor?

District Attorney: I think the most classic statement I’ve made in a while, you know [Judge _] stopped me a while back and he goes, kind of cross. “So Mr. [DA], are you still trying to win the war on drugs?” and I said, no your Honor, I am far more modest than that, I am only trying to win the war on drugs in [county]. And if I can press them out of here, they will go to Wichita, or they will go to Lawrence, or they will go to Kansas City”

In this conversation, just as Gans (1996) and Young (1999) warn, drugs intersect with notions of class and morality. “College kids” seem to warrant lenience, presumably because of their middle class backgrounds and potentially middle class lives. However, for those not so fortunate, the difference between a drug felony and a misdemeanor hold ominous potentials, perhaps representing Young’s trajectory of dehumanization. As the growing body of research on the consequences of a criminal record vividly documents, these seemingly inconsequential notions of acceptability reverberate far beyond the criminal sentence (Western, 2006). The conversation also reveals the symbolic nature of the battle with drugs. Here, in these three questions, the politics of war is palpable. As if
protecting an imagined border, the prosecutor names the enemy and even the battlefield. He does not consider the complexities leading some to drug use, or caring for the vulnerable, he is fighting a war he intends to win. Though merely anecdotal, the conversation illustrates the deleterious and divisive beliefs supporting the war on drugs.

As Young (1999) argues, punishment is at the core a project of social differentiation, setting the socially undesirable aside from the mainstream. Understanding this, Matthews describes how late-modern governance, the war on drugs, and mass imprisonment reflect not just the need to respond to crime, but the emotive desire to punish:

The processes that have been identified as playing a key role in the rise in punitiveness are: the decline of welfarism with its emphasis on needs and social inclusion; the demise of the rehabilitative ideal as the leading rationale for punishment and imprisonment; the ‘disembedding’ of social relations; the growth of ‘ontological insecurity’; the fragmenting of communities; growing individualism; the emergence of new styles of managerialism as well as the advent of the ‘risk society’. Each are seen individually or in combination to produce a (late modern) world characterized by a growing sense of insecurity and anxiety among different sections of the population. In this uncertain world, populist sentiments are seen to veer towards the more punitive end of the spectrum, resulting in a public and political shift to the right. In addition, the growth of the mass media is seen as critical in fuelling public sentiments and creating the conditions in which retribution and vengeance can more readily be expressed (Matthews, 2005, p. 182).

Scholars often describe the qualitative dimension of punishment as punitiveness. Some argue punitiveness extends from a sort of populist anger marshaled by moral and political motivations often not directly connected to crime at all. Coinciding with mass imprisonment, the punitive turn marks a point in recent decades when politicians began “tapping into and using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the public’s general punitive stance” (Bottoms, 1995, p. 40). Later coined penal populism, this view
shows how politicians use criminal justice policy to curry public favor rather than to reduce crime or deliver justice (Pratt, Brown, Brown, Hallsworth, & Morrison, 2005). While discussed widely, scholars are at odds regarding the origins of the punitive turn. Some argue it swells from “below” fueled by an increasingly fearful and angry public fed up with the seeming inability of government to protect the average citizen. Yet others reject the effect of rising crime rates, public attitudes, and populist punitiveness, as well as the conditions of late-modernity as sufficient explanations for the punitive turn. These writers instead suggest that the unique brand of punitiveness that emerged in the US results from the convergence of a “perfect storm” of political paranoia, moralism, racism and departure from its Constitutional foundation (Tonry, 2009). While both are individually plausible, it is not clear how to separate these factors from others, such as the limited effectiveness of government, increasing insecurity, risk aversion, and globalization characterized by late-modernity. Another interesting critique notes the historical function of criminal justice is to dole out a certain measure of pain. Then, if indeed the case, the question that follows is how “new” the “new punitiveness” or punitive turn associated with mass incarceration is. Moreover, some are convinced that hostility towards criminals and other unwanted groups is inherent to humanity itself, arguing that only fear of crime and faith in government vary (Zimring & Johnson, 2006).

For the purposes here, the “tough on crime” approach and punitiveness are synonymous. For some like Stan Cohen state coercion, formalism, moral entrepreneurship, and a rationality detached from the population at large imbue punitiveness (Cohen, 1991). Recognizing fissures in the state, Cohen foresaw dystopian systems of punishment diffused from the prison extending to community supervision
programs inherent to a new “punitive city” even before the rise of mass imprisonment (Cohen, 1979). Considering a community based correctional population of over seven million it appears Cohen’s predictions were spot on. Though remarkably accurate, arguably, even Cohen couldn’t have foretold the proliferation of DNA and public internet registries for non-violent offenders, life sentences for petty theft, and the Orwellian fusion of homeland security and street level crime control, in his visions of social control.

In the simplest term “punitiveness” implies disproportionality or excess beyond the traditional “just deserts” conception of criminal punishments, an ‘intensification of pain delivery, either by extending the duration or the severity of punishments above the norm” (Matthews, 2005, p. 179). Adding another dimension to the concept, Michelle Brown describes the modern spectacle of punishment as penal spectatorship. Penal spectatorship is the phenomenon of punishment as an entertainment commodity. Here from afar, society views the pain of victimization and the punishments of criminal justice. Seeking to explain the popularity of crime based reality programming, prison tours, and the spectacle of capital punishment, Brown posits the average citizen satisfies the desire to punish, as spectator (Brown, 2009).

It is quite easy to find examples of punitiveness played out on the nightly news and the pages of newsprint. In the era of mass imprisonment, most states adopted policies that seem to serve interests of neither the victim nor community, but do make good fodder for television interviews, campaign talking points, or to satisfy some Manichean need for revenge. For instance, a Kansas man recently convicted of involuntary manslaughter for killing a mother and one of her three children in a head on collision. Though eligible for a longer sentence and confinement in a state prison, he
received two years confinement in a county jail. In addition, the presiding judge ordered pictures of the victims displayed on his cell wall for the duration of his confinement. Though some may understand the Judge’s order as an attempt to connect the punishment to his victims, the emotive demand does not seem equivalent to the actual sentence imposed. Arguably, if the crime warranted such emotive punishment it should have also required a longer sentence, and confinement in state prison rather than the local county jail. Neither of these things happened, perhaps illustrating the defining criteria of punitiveness. In this case, the additional condition is not based on sound research or practices shown to decrease the likelihood of recidivism. The order appears to originate only from emotion and the desire to satisfy the community’s interest in revenge.

For a broader illustration of the punitive turn, consider the following numbers (Figure 3 below). In 1972, there were approximately 278 inmates in United States prisons for every 1,000 arrests made for violent and property crimes\(^5\). By 1980, the proportion dropped to about 209 inmates per 1,000 arrests for violent and property crimes. In 1990, the relationship nearly doubled, increasing to 377 inmates per 1,000 arrests. Then in 1999, following five years of steady reductions in crime, the number of prisoners per 1,000 violent and property crime arrests ballooned to 915. Today, the ratio of crime to prisoners continues to mount, with 1,200 people imprisoned for every 1,000 violent and property crimes. Prisoners now outpace serious crime each year by about twenty percent, clearly illustrating the effects of the commitment to longer and longer prison sentences for all types of crime. Simply put, these data suggest the American

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\(^5\) Rates for 1972 based on prison population data only. Data retrieved from www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t612009.pdf
criminal justice system now more than four times more punitive than at the onset of mass imprisonment.

\[ \text{Figure 3: Prisoners per 1,000 violent and property crimes 1972-2009} \]

The Social Sources of Punitiveness

Unnever and Cullen (2010) recently attempted to clarify the “social sources of punitiveness” offered by the research in this area. In the effort to specify the cultural roots of punitiveness and the “sensibilities or cognitive landscapes that emerge and are differentially endorsed by the American public” the pair organizes theoretical explanations of punitiveness around three broad categories they deem the escalating crime and distrust model, the moral decline model, and the racial animus model. (Unnever & Cullen, 2010, p. 100). Notwithstanding critique, their basic taxonomy is useful for thinking about punitiveness moving forward.

The escalating crime-distrust model presupposes the popular belief in perpetually rising crime rates along with a lack of faith in the government’s ability to address crime problems. Simply put, the public is more likely to support draconian anti-crime measures because of their perpetual belief in high rates of crime, rising from governmental impotence. As evidence, polling data collected since 1972 shows a majority of the public
continue to believe that “crime in the U.S. is higher than a year ago” (Gallup 2009b). These powerful beliefs persist despite steady decreases in violent crime since 1993 (Zimring, 2007). As Governing Through Crime (2007) shows, the concern for rising crime and governmental impotence strengthens the political power of crime victims, victims’ rights groups and advocates. Then, cases such as the horrible abduction and murder of Polly Klaas by “ideal” offenders like Richard Allen Davis, come to illustrate the increasing danger of everyday life and the relative inability of government to protect the innocent (Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001). Again, polling data support these assertions, showing that on average only 23% of public have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the criminal justice system compared to 41% of the public who trusted the institution of banking “a great deal” (Gallup 2010). While trust in banking has since diminished, only the news, labor unions, Congress, big business and HMO’s were trusted less by the American public. As Simon insists, this “ethos of fear” combined with distrust in government support the punitive logics of mass imprisonment (Simon 2007, p. 155).

The moral decline model is a more traditional functionalist conception of punitiveness (Mead, 1918). Implicit here is that criminal definitions rise from agreed upon norms of acceptability, and punishments therefore reinforce transgressed social boundaries and encourage social cohesion. As Durkheim famously explained, “that punishment is above all intended to have its effect upon honest people. Since it serves to heal the wounds inflicted upon the collective sentiments, it can only fulfill this role where

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6 Criminal Justice (N=17, Range 15%-34%, Mean 23.29, S.D. 4.95) Banking (N=18, Range 22-53, Mean 41.05, S.D. 8.6).
7 Organized Religion, Medical System, Military, The Police, The Presidency, Public Schools, and The Supreme Court are trusted more than the criminal justice system.
such sentiments exist, and in so far they are active” (Durkheim, 1997, pp. 62-63). It follows then that punitiveness results from the widespread beliefs about unraveling morality and the demise of traditional institutions and values. As such, the homeless, single parents, and drug users, seen to shirk traditional morality and social consensus, suffer the harshest punishments. Further, draconian policies such as “three strikes” are more likely supported by those who are uncertain about the direction of society and their place in it (Tyler & Boeckman, 1997).

Finally, the racial animus model shows how support for punitive criminal justice policies originates with widespread feelings of racial animus. As such, harsh punishments for crack cocaine, or the disparate use of capital punishment are attempts to control and punish people of color. Of course, the disproportionate growth in imprisonment of people of color in the age of mass imprisonment stands as the definitive example of racially motivated punitiveness. While the author’s find support for all of the models and racial animus in particular, it is very difficult consider the effects of “racial animus” apart from ideas of rising crime, governmental impotence, or failing morality. As discussed above, the conservative “tough on crime” approach built firmly on a strong current of racist backlash, marshals concurrent fears of declining morality and rising crime rates caused by certain people in certain places. It is then quite problematic to theorize the effects of “racial animus”, without simultaneously thinking about dominant moralities, and fear of crime within specific contexts. Nevertheless, Unnever and Cullen’s conception of the social origins of punitiveness provides a good outline for thinking about punitiveness.
The Crack Panic and America’s Most Dangerous Drug

This leads to discussion of drugs in general and methamphetamine specifically. Placed in the frame of risk, insecurity, and fear of crime, bouts of concern for one drug or another are not a rash of epidemics, but rather broad locations of concern and projects of anxiety. Concerns about drugs vary over time and space with new threats emerging to capture the public’s attention perennially. In one such case, Kansas was first to enact legislation criminalizing the synthetic cannabinoid “K2” sold as incense. Representative Rob Olson, who introduced the law, asserted, “there is so much that is unknown about these and other unregulated synthetic drugs. To hear that K2 is becoming popular among high school students – that concerns me. So many times a kid will start out with minor drug usage that leads to a lifetime of addiction. My goal with this legislation is to prevent that from happening” (Olson, 2009). While admittedly not much was “known” about K2 and citing the challenged gateway hypothesis Olson’s legislation was quickly enacted. With the legislation, searches of stores and arrests of local merchants ensued almost immediately. The legislation, however, like many supply-side interventions failed to influence supply or demand, and may in fact have made illegal trafficking profitable.

Arguably, no drug shaped the course of American criminal justice over the last thirty years more than crack cocaine. Because of escalating inner-city violence and a few high profile cases, crack came to demand considerable attention from the public and policy makers alike. Serving as a blueprint emblematic of the war on drugs, the federal government enacted some of the most punitive criminal punishments in the nation’s history. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, instituted among other practices, the now notorious 100:1 sentencing policy. The law provided that 500 grams of powder cocaine
and 5 grams of crack cocaine were necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years, under the federal guidelines. Ostensibly then, a large-scale cocaine trafficker could be subject to the same punishments under federal law, as a more typical street level crack dealer.

The “crack epidemic” amplified by politicians and the media was built on a number of now discredited myths. Producers make crack by boiling down a combination of cocaine, baking soda, and water, to a hard, solid form. The product is then broken into smaller “rocks” and sold inexpensively. Moving forward it is important to be clear about two facts regarding crack cocaine. First is the fact that the active ingredient in crack is powder cocaine, making the 100:1 guideline provisions even more perplexing. Secondly, though the popular assumption held that crack was an innovation, smoking cocaine or “freebasing” is a practice dating to the 1970’s.

Arguably, the so-called “crack epidemic” reflected the introduction of a relatively affluent drug to a new demographic—the inner city poor. With unemployment at high levels, especially among young minorities, drug markets represented viable employment opportunities. Additionally, despite per dose costs, the smaller amount of cocaine in each rock combined with the ingestion method characterized by a short lived high, kept users coming back for more, conditions that helped crack markets emerge nationally.

Common to drug panics is the notion that a particular drug is “instantly addictive”. Just as fears of the addictiveness of alcohol fueled Temperance and prohibition, the addictiveness of crack motivated many to act (Gusfield, 1996). Furthered by mediated descriptions thick with the language of epidemic and plague, narratives suggested that crack was spreading from “Black” neighborhoods of the inner city to
affluent “white” communities in outer ring suburbs (Reinarman & Levine, 1997).

The problems associated with inner city poverty fused with the racialized campaign against crack cocaine. As with many other instances described here, crack masked inner city poverty and was blamed for an increasing number of children born to drug addicted mothers or “crack babies”. Even though many of the symptoms such as low birth weight and childhood illness were more likely correlates of deep poverty, exaggerated notions of “crack babies” further underscored the racialized depravity of drug using mothers, supporting widespread indifference to the plight of the urban poor (Flavin, 2009, p. 103).

Finally, the crack panic supported the tenuous causal relationship between drugs and violent crime. Though research findings show the vast majority of violence associated with drug markets results from the dangers of doing business in an underground market, the popular assumption continues to be that the volatility of drug use causes crime (Reinarman & Levine, 2004). Toward the end of the panic, the overstated connection between crack and violence linked to the crack baby myth contributed to Bennett, DiIulio, and Walter’s “super predator” predictions. The crack panic shows how in the era of mass imprisonment cultural constructions of drugs, crime, race and dependency—from welfare queens, to super predators and squeegee men, have stirred resentment and forge public policy.

Following this well-worn script, methamphetamine is central to issues of crime and punishment in parts of the country once excluded from these discussions. Though history now documents the consequences of the overblown crack panic, the rhetorical marriage of crack to meth carries disquieting implications. For example, Senator Chuck
Schumer once claimed the problems posed by meth threatened to make it “1984 all over again”.

Twenty years ago, crack was headed east across the United States like a Mack Truck out of control, and it slammed New York hard because we just didn't see the warning signs. Well, the headlights are glaring bright off in the distance again, this time with meth. We are still paying the price of missing the warning signs back then, and if we don't remember our history we will be doomed to repeat it, because crystal meth could become the new crack (Schumer, 2004).

As if it is 1984 again, the public is told meth, like crack before, is primed to unleash unpredictable harm. Relatively inexpensive and made from common items, essentially anywhere, meth it threatens the heart of America, both geographically and metaphorically. Keeping with this logic, major publications like Newsweek continue to report on meth, going so far to name it America’s Most Dangerous Drug.

Once derided as "poor man's cocaine," popular mainly in rural areas and on the West Coast, meth has seeped into the mainstream in its steady march across the United States. Relatively cheap compared with other hard drugs, the highly addictive stimulant is hooking more and more people across the socioeconomic spectrum: soccer moms in Illinois, computer geeks in Silicon Valley, factory workers in Georgia, gay professionals in New York. The drug is making its way into suburbs from San Francisco to Chicago to Philadelphia (Jefferson D. J., 2005).

As Craig Reinarman notes, setting meth apart from crack is the construction of the meth user "drawn from the good old boy segment of our society, the us rather than the them“ (Stern, 2006). Of course, the us he refers to are whites typically not associated with crack cocaine. While meth production and use should not be declared “white” or “rural” drug, claims like Newsweek’s (2007) and the use of terms like “suburbs”, “mainstream”, “soccer mom” and “professional” all convey whiteness. As Bonilla-Silva (2003) has shown these rhetorical tools reinforce and maintain racial hierarchies even while explicit references to race have diminished or disappeared altogether, replacing
now unmentionable terms with a language of conceptual slipperiness and equates questions of moral character to social difference (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, p. 6).

These two excerpts from 2004 and 2007 respectively illustrate, among other things, the cyclical nature of concern for drugs like meth. In 1989, even before the concern about crack had waned, the New York Times crowned meth the “next drug menace” by making comparisons to crack. Citing a leading mental health official who warned that meth users “...go absolutely crazy…they're much more belligerent than those on crack” and a spokesperson for Drug Czar William Bennett predicted “methamphetamine will be the drug plague of the 1990’s” the article introduced meth to the public (Bishop, 1989). Similar to crack cocaine the article described meth as cheap, widely available, and more potent than other drugs. In addition, meth like crack instantly bore the weight of race and class stereotypes. Making these connections, one doctor asserted, “It seems clean because you don’t have to use a needle or go to a crack house and its available…It has the panache of cocaine when it first came out – something nice for the middle class” (Bishop 1989). Articles such as this, with subtext of “clean” and “middle class” effectively bridge the gap between Black and white, and urban and rural dimensions. Though meth would command varying attention over the coming years, here in the late 1980’s though its marriage to crack, its unique shape begins to form.

Rhetorical analogies equating the “next drug menace” to previous ones shape the politics of drug control in the United States. Weisheit and White (2009) show how one drug panic links to the next through early reports employing rhetoric such as “don’t even try it” or “not even once” that are particularly threatening to the wholesomeness of children and the sexual purity of heterosexual women that capture public imagination and
are quite often exaggerated and notoriously unreliable. These assertions rest on a fuzzy relationship between drugs and crime that often predict a crime wave that fails to materialize. Out of these erroneous forecasts, new cultural constructions like super predators also appear.

Arising alongside new statutes and punishments, like those for drug using mothers, distinct categories of criminals are born (Reinarman & Levine, 1997). Perhaps most consistently, the language of contagion describes the “new drug” in terms of a scourge, plague, or epidemic symbolically punctuating its social diffusion and omnipresence (Weisheit & White, 2009). Most importantly, these comparisons symbolically link the new threat to the marginalized and criminalized groups associated with the old one. It is here, in the distinction between the depravity of a ghetto drug like crack, and the creeping of meth into the “mainstream” that processes of differentiation, social boundaries and the meaningful contours of the so-called meth epidemic becomes most visible. For example, in 1999 when Governor Frank Keating drew the following analogies on the floor of the Oklahoma house, not only did he constitute the social reality of meth, he also symbolically mapped the course for public policies.

It's a white trash drug-methamphetamines largely are consumed by the lower socio-economic element of white people and I think we need to shame it. Just like crack cocaine was a black-trash drug and is a black trash drug (Senate Communications Division, 1999).

Following established binaries of good and bad and the familiar concoction of drugs, class, race and crime, Keating plants the flag of the drug war, firmly in the soil of his state. With a short statement, those he deems Black trash already socially cordoned and excluded are cast in with marginalized white trash through the equivalence of crack to
meth. Never mind that both substances and groups bear the weight of race, class, and gender based inequalities, here they are rhetorically equal and intertwined.

While the comparisons of meth to crack follow an established trajectory, some differences are apparent. For instance, Cobbina (2008) shows the media most often associates crack cocaine with Blacks and violent crime, while whites are associated with methamphetamine and problems of public health. Though the criminal justice response to crack is imbued with harsh sentences and overtly tough on crime sentiment, lawmakers have focused on limiting precursors to attack the meth problem at both the State and Federal levels. Some suggest meth’s synthetic makeup makes precursor restrictions the most logical response. Yet others argue the focus on precursors reflects waning enthusiasm for mandatory minimums and the decreasing centrality of the war on drugs (Stern 2006).

Still others suggest latent racism drives punitive approaches for crack, and public health approaches for meth, most often associated with whites (Stern, 2006).

Highlighting the similarities in the drugs, and differences in legislative response, Maryland Congressman Elijah Cummings remarked:

if you were to close your eyes and listen…you would swear they were in any urban community during crack’s heyday…There seems to be more of an emphasis on shutting down these meth labs and trying to figure out ways to treat these addicts and then get them back into flow of society…We don’t get for crack or heroin that kind of support for prevention, treatment and rehabilitation (Stern, 2006).

While each of these explanations may influence the differences in law enforcement strategies for crack and meth, the relatively recent concern for meth may also help explain the methods employed to address it. As O’Malley notes, risk based policing is concerned with the gathering, collection, and synthesis of information, as well as “target hardening” of sites of potential offenses (O'Malley, 2010). Presupposing rational offenders, PSE restrictions,
meth lab cleanups, meth watch programs may all signal risk focused crime control techniques of the criminology of the self by limiting supplies, managing environmental harm, and encouraging neighborhood vigilance. Though these methods may have risen from racism, pragmatism, or the waning desire to prosecute the drug war, they are also examples of risk-based approaches to crime control.

Regardless of these differences, both drugs bear considerable stigma and substantial criminal penalties regardless of legislative activities. Methamphetamines and amphetamines have a long history of abuse in the United States and abroad. First synthesized by Japanese chemists in the late 1890’s the drug managed a variety of ailments including fatigue, obesity, and depression. Like crack, methamphetamine has been associated with motherhood. However unlike the stigma of crack, amphetamines were once associated with the idealized “pep” needed of women to manage the post-war 50s family (Rassmussen, 2008).

Though amphetamine and methamphetamine abuse related issues have presented a variety of difficulties since inception, it became a focus of national drug control strategies relatively recently. Clandestine meth production took root domestically in the early 1960’s as the near-exclusive domain of outlaw motorcycle gangs, regionally concentrated in Philadelphia and the state of Pennsylvania (Jenkins, 1999). By the mid to late 1980’s several west coast cities and southern border-states had seized meth labs, however the market for methamphetamine was regionally concentrated in larger metropolitan areas (Jenkins, 1994). These two points are important as they refute the logic of meth “seeping” from West to East and rural to urban.

In the early 1990’s concern over methamphetamine took a new form, ice (crystal meth). The new form of methamphetamine is more easily smokable and touted as much more
addictive than the “speed” or “crank” forms common to the US at the time. While this
form of methamphetamine had been in vogue in Taiwan, South Korea, and the
Philippines for several years, it was only until it reached Hawaii that it appeared on the
radar of American authorities. Once documented in Hawaii and then in coastal cities
such as San Diego and San Francisco the language of “waves” and “epidemic” ensued
(Jenkins, 1994, p. 12).

To be sure, methamphetamine has never been widely used by rural folks, the
broad middle-class or the American public in general. In fact, in the constellation of
abused and criminalized drugs methamphetamine is relatively unpopular. Nationally for
instance, recent surveys show that only .2 of the population used meth in the past month,
compared to 6.6 using marijuana and .7 using cocaine (Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, 2010). In terms of health risks, emergency room visits
that implicate methamphetamine dropped from 45.2 per 100,000 in 2004 to 20.9 in 2009,
paling in comparison to rates of 158.4 for cocaine and 438.7 for alcohol (SAMHSA,
2011). Drug treatment data show methamphetamine actually ranks a distant fifth for
those seeking treatment. Nationally, meth accounts for 4.4% of the nearly thirty million
admissions since 1992. Though these problems should not be without concern,
frequencies of meth treatment are trivial compared to alcohol which accounts for nearly
47% of all treatment admissions nationally.8 Even the contested crime-drug nexus, finds
meth among the least implicated in crime. The Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring
(ADAM) program screens arrestees for drugs of abuse in ten major US cities. The most

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8 United States Department of Health and Human Services. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration. (2009) Office of Applied Studies. Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) -- Concatenated,
and Social Research [distributor]
recent ADAM report finds arrestees positive for methamphetamine 4.7% of the time, compared with positive tests at a rate of 25.1% and 43.25% for cocaine and marijuana respectively (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2010).

Moreover, the notion that meth is exclusively a “white drug” is hasty at best. As Figure 4 shows, although whites submitted the majority of the positive tests for meth, positive tests for meth were quite uncommon. Moreover, whites arrested for meth represent only about 3.4% of all positive tests submitted. Likewise, the data show the likelihood of violent arrestees testing positive for meth was very low, further contesting the relationship between meth and violent crime. Though thoughtful analysis of meth crimes is continually dogged by a lack of data, existing data cast considerable doubt on the prevalence of meth in the constellation of abused drugs, the exclusivity to whites, and its direct connection to violent crime.

![Figure 4: 2009 ADAM II data](image-url)
Despite data showing that meth has never been the most used drug outside the city, or a uniquely rural phenomenon, meth is synonymous with rural America (Weisheit & Wells, 2010). Though much of the rurality of meth is socially constructed, some recent empirical research offers some insight to the spatial location of meth use and production. For example, traditional social disorganization theories find some support in the explanation meth lab seizure and drug treatment admissions. Armstrong and Armstrong (2009) find poverty is strongly associated with a number of meth indicators. However, other traditional social disorganization variables such as family disruption and unemployment proved inconclusive. Findings that do not fit with the theoretical framework are perhaps more interesting. For instance, the study includes a measure for rurality shown to be a significant predictor of treatment admissions, and arrests for drugs in general, but it does not significantly predict lab seizure rates, or the number of meth samples sent to state laboratories for confirmation.

In a similar study Lu and Burnum (2008) found population size at the census track level to be significant predictor of meth labs seized, suggesting labs are more likely in more densely populated areas, contesting the cultural belief that rural areas are always prime hot spots for methamphetamine production and use. While place may not be a consistent predictor in the studies reviewed, community composition appears to be a consistent predictor of meth indicators in most studies (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2009; Roussell, Holmes, & Anderson-Specher, 2009; Lu & Burnum, 2008).

Measures of racial homogeneity appear to be a relatively reliable predictor of various methamphetamine indicators. Contrary to social disorganization positing that racial homogeneity encourages interaction, social organization and solidarity and
therefore reduced crime, most of the studies cited here found the opposite. In these cases, racial homogeneity reflects large white populations, leading the authors connect white populations to increased involvement with methamphetamine. This is a problematic assumption however, because the studies are narrow in scope and do not include other drugs in the analysis. For example, much of the literature focuses on “socio-demographics of rural methamphetamine use” though important, studies such as these do not consider what might influence use of other drugs of abuse in the same contexts as comparison, because of lack of diversity in the sample or study design.

The rural pilot of the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program (ADAM) that compares rural with an urban location also yields inconclusive results. Most notably, in this rural context methamphetamine was not the most commonly used drug as indicated by self-report and urine analysis at arrest. Although some evidence was found of higher rates of meth use among some arrestees from rural counties, meth ranked third behind alcohol and marijuana. Moreover, the study found rural areas produced a decreased likelihood of a positive drug screen at arrest, with just a slightly higher likelihood of meth. The authors carefully warn that geography and variations in drug markets certainly affect use, and therefore differences do not necessarily reflect racial or cultural differences in drug preference (Herz & Murray, 2003).

Empirical studies of methamphetamine related social problems are few especially when compared to other drugs like marijuana, cocaine and heroin. This problem persists because little consistent data is available. Despite deficiencies in data, findings remain mixed regarding structural and individual level predictors of methamphetamine production and use, contributing to imprecise assessments of meth problems nationally.
One of the more common examples of this imprecision is the tendency to describe meth problems in terms of epidemic. Certainly in relation to other drugs, methamphetamine abuse has never reached this threshold, though some communities may come closer than others. Even though meth use fails to meet epidemic criteria, the persistent use of the emotionally loaded language of contagion speak more to the politics of drug control than empirical realities of the suffering associated with drug abuse (Weisheit & White, 2009, p. 10).

The opening pages of a recent study by the Rand Drug Policy Research Center perfectly illustrate the incoherent and contradictory narrative of meth problems in the United States. The authors describe the situation as “complicated story of conflicting indicators” that “on the one hand suggests meth is a relatively minor drug concern” while citing law enforcement and health officials purporting “meth is the most significant problem facing the populations they serve” on the other (Nicosia, Liccardo Pacula, Beau, Lundberg, & Chiesa, 2009, p. xi). The sources indicating a “relatively minor concern” are the National Survey on Drugs Use and Health (NSDUH) and the University of Michigan, Monitoring the Future program while the other sources cited are surveys of law enforcement personnel conducted by the National Drug Intelligence Center and the National Association of counties. Arguably, these data juxtapose the empirical reality of meth problems reflected by rigorous, systematic data collection to the constructed reality of meth problems represented by opinions of local law enforcement, and an often-cited lobbying group. The tension between empirical data and their cultural construction is inherent to nearly all illegal drug discourse in the United States, not just meth (Robinson & Scherlen, 2007).
As previously argued, meth problems in Kansas appear relatively minor compared to other states like Missouri. Following national patterns, more people seek drug treatment in Kansas for problems with alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. Likewise, adolescents and even high-risk probationers appear to prefer a number of other drugs to meth. Despite this, meth use data still show some interesting trends. For example, the TEDS data mentioned earlier show that although treatment admissions for meth are among the least common they still increased 460% from 1992 to 2007. By comparison, referrals for cocaine and alcohol, the most commonly abused drugs increased only 16% and 41% respectively\(^9\). On face value, these data support the logic of a meth epidemic in Kansas. However, a closer evaluation reveals that Kansas criminal justice authorities mandated nearly 40% of the 40,411 treatment episodes for meth during this time. This becomes more interesting when compared to cocaine treatment episodes mandated by criminal justice authorities about 15% of the time, even though 183,723 Kansans sought treatment for cocaine during the same period. Though this does not discredit the notion that meth problems grew during this time, it does suggest that Kansas authorities placed more attention on meth than cocaine, and this attention may have altered drug treatment rates often cited by authorities.

Regardless of the apparent importance of meth for Kansas authorities, the number of clandestine laboratories seized in Kansas has dropped considerably from the peak of 425 labs seized in 2001. Meanwhile the proportion of drug arrests in Kansas has also remained low and stable during this time. Kansas trends mirror national data that suggest meth use among the general public has been stable among adults and declining among

\(^9\) TEDS data displayed in Appendix 5.2
youth since 1999 (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2009). Despite declining rates of use by the general population, dwindling domestic production, and a decreasing proportion of drug arrests, meth remains the top priority for Kansas Law Enforcement. Surveys of law enforcement authorities conducted annually by the National Association of Counties, Office of National Drug Control Policy and the National Drug Intelligence Center all find meth has remained the “greatest drug threat” in Kansas by substantial margin for the better part of a decade. Additionally, meth prevention, interdiction, and treatment are a cottage industry in many states. Kansas is no different, with active chapters of Drug Endangered Children, and Mothers Against Meth groups. In addition, Kansas pioneered the “Meth Watch Program” now adopted by several other states. Following a neighborhood watch model, and designed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment and the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Meth Watch programs seek to educate local merchants, and the public in general, to suspicious activities possibly related to meth use and production. More recently, Kansas become one of a few states to receive funding from the Rural Law Enforcement Methamphetamine Initiative (RLEMI), further supporting meth interventions in coming years (Strategic Associates International, Inc., 2011).

Kansas places disproportionate importance on methamphetamine, evidenced by frequency of use and local production and in comparison to problems affecting a greater proportion of the population. The effects of this exaggerated interest may now be visible in correctional populations. A recent analysis of racial disproportionality in US prisons reports a significant decrease in the gap between Black and white drug offenders. The study finds that from 1999 to 2005 the percent of African Americans imprisoned for drug
offenses decreased nearly ten percent, shifting proportionally to white drug offenders. While these data may signal victories over racially disparate drug control practices, the report argues they more aptly reflect highly racialized drug markets and increased attention to meth in the largely white countryside (Mauer, 2009).

In 1994 historian, Philip Jenkins, warned the conditions that produced the late 80’s panic over crystal meth had not changed significantly, or by his estimation were likely to, leading him to conclude that local “meth panics” would continue to appear periodically and impose themselves on the national stage. Despite Jenkins’ insightful warning, governments still place meth at the center of broad social and criminal justice strategies focused on security and risk. Edelman (1988) described the continual regeneration of politically motivated crises, enemies, threats and reassurances as the spectacle. Similarly, and following the moral panics line, Chris Greer his colleagues turn us to the “crises of the present” (Greer, Ferrell, & Jewkes, 2008). Rather than individual moral panics and static representations, the crisis of the present, illustrates dynamic social relations at work within a dizzying array of social representations. No longer can we conceive of moral panics as a neatly linear process, rather we should consider panic to be the state of affairs, represented by crises of the present. As Angela McRobbie and Sarah Thornton argue, once viewed as the unintended outcome of journalistic practice, moral panics seem to have become a goal, employed by politicians to secure consent, and media to make certain events newsworthy (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995, p. 559).

As the rationalities of late-modern drug criminalization go, meth users are convenient scapegoats, employed to help bolster political agenda and to deflect attention and explain broader social change. Just as crack cocaine appeared alongside inner-city
deindustrialization and shrinking labor markets, meth appears alongside steadily declining rural populations, withering family farms and the rise of corporate agribusiness (Tunnell, 2006).

However because the crack panic was so firmly built on multiple narratives of the non-white inner city poor, it was highly unlikely to fit the cultural meme of areas without large minority populations or areas of concentrated disadvantage. Whether exaggerated, intentionally crafted, or stumbled upon by motivated actors, threats of a “rural methamphetamine epidemic” immediately gained traction in certain areas of the country and furthered the advance of punitive criminal justice practices and the punitive rationalities of mass imprisonment to new areas.

Figure 5 below sketches the outline of the brief history of the present discussed in this chapter. As the figure shows, certain events increasingly governed through crime, track neatly with ballooning incarceration rates, despite violent crime rates that appear to behave independently. The troubling relationship between crime and incarceration, one that continues to stump theoretical criminology (Young J., 2004), lays bare the political and ideological currents underlying the greatest increase in criminal punishments in modern history (Zimring, 2007).
Figure 5: A brief history of the present
CHAPTER 3 - Governing Through Meth

Law making becomes a matter of retaliatory gestures intended to reassure a worried public and to accord the common sense, however poorly these gestures are adapted to dealing with the underlying problem. -- David Garland, *The Culture of Control* (2001)

This quote from David Garland hints at the political and cultural importance of methamphetamine, viewing the attendant legislation, task forces, and sentencing strategies more as political acts than sincere attempts to ameliorate suffering. With this in mind, this chapter examines the persistent social interest in methamphetamine through the lens of *governmentality* (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006; Foucault, 2007). Typically, this refers to a form of government achieved “through apparatuses of security (police, courts, health and welfare departments, etc.) including the intellectual, linguistic and technical ways in which phenomena are constituted by government as governable problems” (O'Malley, 2006, p. 192). The analysis also makes use of constructionist methods. Though not often integrated, some make convincing arguments that the two approaches are quite complementary (Lippert & Stenson, 2010). For example, *claims-making* describes both how phenomenon like a “meth epidemic” emerges while also theorizing an anticipated response. Similarly, *rationalities* are constituted through government action. Though from different traditions, both concepts clarify the moral stance of an actor, as well as group and policy agenda as the “historical sedimentation of particular problematizations” (Lippert & Stenson, 2010). Thus, governmentality and constructionist approaches are complementary in the attempt to clarify the cultural, political and socially constituted condition of methamphetamine in Kansas.
Employing Simon’s (2007) conception of crime-focused governmentality, as governing through crime, the analysis exposes the construction and problematizations of meth as the key risk to safety and security in the unique context of Kansas and the Midwest. Once problematized, the host of risks, threats, and dangers of methamphetamine link techniques of government to attempts to “achieve order and promote discipline though neoliberal values and customs that combine to constitute bodies of social knowledge” (Mythen & Walklate, 2006, p. 385). Illustrating the problematizations of meth reveals lines of classed, gendered, and racialized power summoned by appeals to punitivity. Through careful examination of news media reports about methamphetamine, this chapter maps the discursive constitution and material shape of meth risks in Kansas. In doing so, it also considers how these rationalities exacerbate social inequalities under the cloak of safety, security, morality, and punishment.

Three components of governmentality - rationalities, technologies, and programs are fundamental to the analysis. First, rationalities describe the basic strategies or logics, articulated as both thought and action. This includes how agents operate, but also how individual subjects interact with governance. For example, the correctional rationalities of the “new penology” center on crime management achieved through diagnosis and actuarial risk management (Feeley & Simon, 1996). This sort of rationality extending from arrest to incarceration is not concerned with the causal nuance of crime, but rather the systematic application of process. As the following analysis shows, meth control follows familiar prohibitionist rationalities of the war on drugs. That is, the approach is stridently reliant on aggressive investigative and arrest tactics, as well as incarceration and coercion, paying little attention to harm reduction. “Technologies are the intellectual
and material means that make some forms of rule possible” (Lippert & Stenson, 2010). Technologies of the new penology, for example, manifest in various forms such as the “Level of Service Inventory” or structured sentencing guidelines, articulating a one-size-fits-all approach to crime management (Christie, 2000; Hallsworth, 2000). Technologies of methamphetamine interdiction, such as the precursor restrictions and others at play here, maximize self-responsibilization through steady reminders that “wicked people exist” (Wilson, 1975, p. 260). Here, cold medicines, starter fluid, and other once banal items link to the producers and users of the methamphetamine, enveloping everyday activities in all-engrossing risks of crime. Though rhetoric weds crack to methamphetamine, meth has taken its own identity in the constellation of criminalized drugs. The most obvious difference is the problematic construction of crack as urban and meth as rural. Despite facts challenging cultural constructions of inner-city “crack heads” and rural “meth heads”, both continue to occupy space in popular culture and are an important point of consideration of the analysis. The anti-meth program illustrated here follows the familiar trajectory of the war on drugs, joining the efforts of politicians, law enforcement, experts, and the media. This program, like the “crack panic” of the late 1980s is built on emotive, zero-tolerance foundations and calls for immediate action against a growing plague that is threatening families, communities, and all those engaged in a moral life.

Though risk and fear problematized and governed through crime are obviously quite important here, emotive punitivity is equally important. As shown previously through the Unnever and Cullen (2010) outline, punitivity flows from cultural beliefs about crime, government, morality, and race. Each of these categories fit with
rationalities of governance by appealing to punitivity. Vindictiveness and punitivity appear when risks are tangible and fear is real. Thus, to become viable techniques of governmentality, the rhetorical frame and discursive shape of meth risks must travel through very specific appeals to punitivity, which signal rising crime, declining morality, impotent government, and racial hatred. A “rural meth epidemic” does all of these things in very discrete ways. Constructed rationalities of a rural meth epidemic appeal to risk-based sensibilities that politicians have failed to protect the public from new forms of crime. At the same time, cases of children endangered by meth-addicted mothers appeal to castigatory notions of decaying feminine morality (Linnemann, 2010). Meanwhile, constructions of meth as “white trash” appeal to a very specific type of racialized punitivity based on marginalized difference among whites (Webster, 2008).

While Unnever and Cullen’s typology is useful for clarification and categorization, they propose too tidy a separation of their “social sources of punitiveness”. Of course, appeals to morality are rarely without a subtext of classed, gendered, and racialized emotion, or vice versa. Likewise, drug panics typically begin as the threat of one new, specific drug – whether crack, meth, heroin, synthetic marijuana, or caffeinated fruity alcohol drinks. Each campaign maps to very specific offenders, victims, spatial locations, and cultures. As such, meth rationalities flow from unique economic, political and cultural conditions, necessitating a certain form of punitive appeal. Therefore, rather than being marshaled by singularities of increasing crime and distrust, declining morality or racial animus, punitiveness is in part bound to a particular culture. These social sources flow together and take on specific moral, classed, gendered, and racialized forms, becoming more or less useful, depending on local context and
techniques of governmentality. In the current context, then, methamphetamine as a “rural drug epidemic” constitutes a distinctive rationality of control and discipline.

Like the rest of the US, people in rural states like Kansas come to understand social issues like meth as they play out on nightly news broadcasts and the pages of small town newspapers. Even though the media are important, they “do not simply and transparently report events which are ‘naturally’ newsworthy in themselves” (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978). Given this, we must consider the institutional matrix of politicians, law enforcement, experts, and the media producing the discursive reality of meth in Kansas. Focusing primarily on one year, and the events leading up to meth specific legislation, this chapter explores the production of ideological logics of security and risk, governed through meth. To begin, consider the passage below from Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius’ 2005 State of the State Address. Setting her safety and security agenda, she names meth as the most significant criminal threat and places it alongside the unpredictability of terrorism and natural disaster:

Kansas cannot be a truly healthy state unless it is both safe and secure. All our citizens must feel safe from crime and secure from the threat of terrorism, and feel protected from the natural disasters that have demonstrated their power, both here and around the world, over the past year.

Effective protection from terrorism and natural disasters requires the best possible communication among a wide range of government agencies. Using Homeland Security funds, we are well on our way to making sure that first responders — police, fire, and other emergency personnel — can talk directly with each other and can coordinate early warnings, searches, rescues, and relief efforts.

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10 The population of Kansas is distributed 32.9 persons per square mile compared to the national average of 79.6 persons per square mile. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20000.html
As for crimes that affect all Kansans, nothing is more important than stopping the illicit methamphetamine industry in its tracks. Working with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, the Kansas Highway Patrol, and the Attorney General, I have charged a task force with developing legislation, and I am pleased that some lawmakers have already embraced this idea by pre-filing a bill on the subject. We simply must make it more difficult for meth producers to obtain the chemicals that they use to concoct their deadly drugs. Oklahoma has already enacted a law that does just this, and I feel confident that we will have strong, effective laws in place by mid-year (Sebelius, 2005).

This particular verse does not set methamphetamine apart as the be-all, end-all social problem for the people of Kansas on its own. Like all social constructions, it carries a kernel of truth. Certainly, illicit drugs of all types have been agenda items for politicians of all levels and continue to rise and fall from public attention. However, with the opening statement of the governor’s address – “Kansas cannot be a truly healthy state unless it is both safe and secure. All our citizens must feel safe from crime and secure from the threat of terrorism” – it is clear that the social health of all rests on prominent features of the modern state, security (Valverde, 2011), risk (Beck, 1996; Simon J., 2007), and fear (Lee, 2007).

First, consider the stage the address gives methamphetamine. The governor problematizes meth as equal and perhaps interchangeable with terrorism and natural disaster. She does not summon familiar specters of gang violence or child predators; instead, she definitively warns, “as for crimes that affect all Kansans nothing is more important than stopping the illicit methamphetamine industry in its tracks.” The statement symbolically sets aside methamphetamine and Kansas as different from other problems and places. Here, unlike in the city, meth represents the panoply of threats and fears of crime in Kansas. In this way, she gives meaning to the risks of the “illicit meth industry” by assuming and constructing consensus of its relevance, while also defining its
social interpretation as unavoidable and very real (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p. 57).

Though the continued adjudication of the global War on Terror and the precariousness of the natural environment continue to invade public consciousness, the risks of meth are less tangible. For instance, despite the growing call for anti-meth legislation the “illicit methamphetamine industry”, measured here as seized labs, had dropped off significantly by the time of this address (Figure 6). In fact, that year a report by the US House of Representatives showed Kansas to have among the largest drops in meth lab seizures nationally (Representatives, 2005). With 583 lab seizures Kansas ranked far behind neighbors Missouri (2,799), Iowa (1,432), and Oklahoma (680)\textsuperscript{11}. Comparatively, meth problems should appear to be less important for leaders in Kansas than for leaders in neighboring states.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{methlabseizures.png}
\caption{Meth Lab Seizures 1994-2008}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{11} Meth lab incidents include three categories: Dump sites, glassware and chemicals, and labs seized.
However, irrespective of their relative frequency, the State of the State address problematizes terrorism, natural disaster, and meth as the chief public safety concerns for Kansas in 2005. The disjuncture between rhetoric and “the real” illustrates the prevailing risk-based rationalities at work. To be sure, meth harbors potential for harm. However just as with a terrorist bombing or a tornado, it does not matter if or when the “illicit methamphetamine industry” confronts the safety of a citizen; it only really matters that one day it could (Mythen & Walklate, 2006).

These problematizations, though steeped in ideology and rhetoric, are effective because they access local history and culture. For instance, the racialization of crack cocaine is so far-reaching that many consider the drug the exclusive domain of urban minorities. This is the case in Kansas as well, even though cocaine users in the state outnumber meth users by a large margin (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2008). Considering the cultural frame of Kansas as predominately white and rural, a crack epidemic is far less plausible than meth constructed as “used by white trash” or even “something nice for the middle class”. Illustrating these potent constructions are surveys of law enforcement consistently naming meth as the main “drug threat” in Kansas and elsewhere in the Midwest (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009). Perhaps because of this, meth continues to demand attention from the people of Kansas while also legitimizing the efforts of small town law enforcement and the campaigns of local politicians once not able to claim the governing through crime mantle.

The following analysis illustrates governmental rationalities of risk, security, and punitiveness flowing through the Kansas methamphetamine control program. This program constructs and solidifies meth as an actionable form for governance, through
efforts ranging from claims-making activities, a stable of task forces, initiatives, and funding opportunities. Despite available technologies to fight drug abuse and addiction, the analysis reveals the anti-meth program in Kansas as one built on logics of prohibition, deterrence, and incapacitation.

Though the chapter focuses on the content of media productions, the frame does not end with media representations. What follows is analysis of law enforcement and political governmentality as reported by the media. Of course, structural factors such as the type of sources reporters rely on and the organization of news agencies themselves influence the frequency and content of the data. Likewise, local culture and the professional ideology of what reporters consider “good news” also structure common sense beliefs about the nature and extent of meth problems.

Since everyday interactions of individuals produce what is known, information gathered from outside these interactions, filtered through official sources, may also represent what is not known (Fishman, 1978; Sacco, 2005). This is not to imply a highly organized strategy to create a methamphetamine panic and ride it to whatever professional or political goals are deemed important. Rather, the analysis shows how meth fits within a broad assemblage of media, government, and law enforcement institutions governing through crime. This assemblage extends the punitive rationalities of mass imprisonment to new locations – communities and lives traditionally excluded from popular discussions of crime and punishment nationally.

Since mid-2004, the Kansas Methamphetamine Prevention Project (KMPP) and the Kansas Alliance for Drug Endangered Children (KADEC) have contracted with a private provider to collect and document all mention of methamphetamine published in
Kansas newspapers. The analysis makes use of these individual articles, as well as monthly statistical summaries tracking a number of data elements. For the purposes here, the population of articles represents those published in a five year period from July 2004 to August 2009. This includes 8,902 individual articles mentioning methamphetamine.

Figure 7 displays the frequency of newspaper coverage of methamphetamine in Kansas from 2004-2009. The data show a large increase in methamphetamine coverage beginning in late 2004, trailing off in late 2005. The spike coincides with Governor Sebelius’ State of the State address detailed above, suggesting important developments in the public discourse of methamphetamine. Because of this, December 2004 to December 2005 is the sampling frame from which the articles are drawn.

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12 Data elements include total number of articles, column width of individual articles, where the articles appear in the paper and total monthly column width, headline, date and publisher.

13 Plots of the total number of articles each month and total column width of articles as indicator of meth coverage proved quite similar, therefore, the total number of articles illustrate the basic frequency of methamphetamine coverage.
Figure 7: Kansas Newspaper Coverage of Methamphetamine 2004-2009

Limiting the data in this fashion identifies a constellation of 3,181 individual articles that make some mention of methamphetamine\textsuperscript{14}. Following Altheide’s Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA), I examined hard copies of each article in a subsample of every third article in the frame\textsuperscript{15}. Rather than focusing on keywords quantitatively or fitting the data to pre-constructed categories, ECA elicits constant discovery and comparison, allowing categories, narratives, and descriptions to emerge organically (Daniels, 1997). This process warrants several full readings of each article to craft and re-craft an analytical form along the lines of theme and content (Altheide, 1997).

\textsuperscript{14} By comparison, during the same time period the service collected data on the keyword “Kansas court system” yielding 10,738 articles, while a similar search of articles mentioning “smoking” or “tobacco” yielded 1,981 placing methamphetamine coverage neither as the highest nor lowest search term of the period.

\textsuperscript{15} Many of the articles are typical “police blotter” reports of arrests and summaries of prosecutions for methamphetamine related crimes. These are generally brief and do not provide much information beyond the relative frequency of meth cases locally. Thus, I excluded these types of articles from the analysis.
1987). After several full readings of each article in the subsample, noting key storyline features, some very broad analytic categories began to emerge.

The first category, which represents the focus of this chapter, includes editorials and press releases containing commentary by local politicians and law enforcement. Articles in this category are important because they include direct commentary from local authorities and are therefore more likely to demonstrate the governmental rationalities of the anti-meth program. Primarily, the articles discuss the meth lab seizures, meth specific legislation, and the murder of a law enforcement officer. Though seemingly disconnected, the course of events during the year intertwines public discussions of precursor restrictions and the shooting death of Sheriff Matt Samuels into a singular narrative. The second group includes community commentary, editorials not from government or law enforcement sources, and announcements regarding meth awareness programs, funding, letters to the editor and so on. The third category contains police blotter and court docket reports. Using the first group of articles, the figure below displays the timeline and the movement of themes throughout the year, illustrating the shifting “common sense” narrative of meth in Kansas beginning with the Governor’s declaration (Gramsci, 1971).¹⁶

¹⁶ Using monthly summaries, the rest of the data were fit to the timeline. It was not necessary to alter the timeline or categories, after reviewing all the articles in this fashion validating the coherence of the timeline categories.
Figure 8: Governing through Meth Timeline
The First Reports of Methamphetamine Precursor Legislation Appear

Late in 2004, a public discussion began on the possibility of banning pseudoephedrine, the main methamphetamine precursor, in Kansas. The clearly drawn plan demonstrates both familiar drug control rationalities and the preferred technologies of control. News reports urged Kansans to follow the lead of neighboring Oklahoma to address its clandestine methamphetamine production and abuse issues. The theme carries two basic rationalities. First, assertions that failure to implement precursor restrictions will lead to an explosion of meth crimes represent punitive rationalities of increasing crime and distrust. More important, however, the articles urge that failure to limit precursors will encourage meth makers from Oklahoma to move north, invoking the threat of spatial others.

Figure 9, below, displays an example of the spatial threat logic with the provocative headline, “Meth Makers Flock Here”. The assertion, while not based in empirical evidence, conjures the fearful notion of throngs of meth-making Oklahomans massing on the southern border of Kansas, urging citizens to take responsibility for their safety by approving precursor restrictions. Figure 9 also shows visual association of the “illicit meth industry” with local drug stores and once mundane boxes of cold pills, instructing the citizenry about the extent of criminal activities in their communities.

In classic signification spiral form, methamphetamine garners public support for policy and politicians with threats of a subversive minority of local and foreign meth users that will not be stopped without new legislative action (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p. 223). Illustrating the gravity of the situation, a number of articles carried the quote below from then Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) director, Larry Welch:
We’ve tried about everything to fight this plague, from education, prevention, and prison to prayer. I’m pleased with the apparent success those efforts have shown. But in the last few months there have been alarming increases of the reports of Oklahomans coming to Kansas to obtain the precursor chemicals and make methamphetamine here. Our success might be short lived. Hopefully the legislature will act quickly to pass SB 27, based on Oklahoma’s successful law, and we can then copy their success in reducing lab seizures by 80%! -Larry Welch, Director of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation

Notions of meth as a plague resistant to traditional interventions figures prominently in these early reports, and urgency is underscored by the Director’s metaphorical problematizations of a meth war. Punctuating the dire stakes, Welch insists the fight against the meth plague necessitated a gamut of tactics from “prison to prayer”, and, though he notes a few successes, the battle is not over. The binary rationality of invasion pervades this theme. For example, the author of an article titled “Good Medicine” quipped“, It didn’t take a genius to anticipate the druggies would move operations into a more friendly state” (Augusta Daily Gazette 2005), underscoring the overstated logic of displacement. At the same time, Welch is inspiring fellow citizens into othering “invading druggies” who cross the boundaries of a neighboring state. These early reports laid foundation for the general rationalities of the anti-meth program.
Senate Bill 27 “Meth Crackdown” Bill Proposed

Articles discussing the introduction of Senate Bill 27 or the “Meth Crackdown Bill” flow consecutively from initial reports about the possibility of precursor restrictions in Kansas. Many of the headlines name Senate Majority Leader Derek Schmidt as the key figure behind the legislation. For example, the headline, “Schmidt Proposes Anti-Methamphetamine Bill”, appeared in a number of Kansas newspapers in early 2005. The article quoted Schmidt, who described the legislation in the following tenor: “We have worked very closely with law enforcement agencies across Kansas to identify a bottleneck in the meth production process… we think we’ve found it, and we’re working to choke it off” (The Emporia Gazette, 2005). Local state representatives discussed the legislation in a similar fashion, as reported in smaller community papers:

17 As Allison Young points out, effective images such as these have power to “reinforce one’s view of the state of society today.” (Young A., 2010)
Senate Bill 27 which I cosponsored is modeled after an Oklahoma system that has greatly reduced methamphetamine manufactured in Oklahoma. In our budget committee regarding the Department of Corrections we have heard that roughly 80% of our prison population has been involved in substance abuse. The KBI reports that 550 meth labs were seized in Kansas last year. It is time we take aggressive action against the manufacture of meth in Kansas. (– Rep. Mark Taddiken 2/17/05)

This group of articles reinforced the importance of following Oklahoma’s lead, as well as the general ambiguity of the extent of the meth problems in Kansas. For instance, powerful yet unsupported estimates such as “roughly 80% of the prison population has been involved in substance use” connect all inmates with drug problems to the proposed legislation. Undeniably, some prisoners battle problems with methamphetamine; however, equating all substance abuse to methamphetamine exaggerates and distorts the realities of local problems. The official knowledge from politicians and law enforcement about drug related difficulties in the United States is typically chock-full of this sort of generalization (Robinson & Scherlen, 2007).

Legislation Stalls

Almost immediately following the proposed “Meth Crackdown Bill”, reports on the slow progress of the legislation appeared. According to media accounts the “legislation was stalled…and a key senator accused chain pharmacies of working behind the scenes to weaken the proposal” (Rothchild 2005). Again, Senate Majority Leader Derek Schmidt is at the center of the discussion arguing, “these folks need to have the courage to say that the convenience of a chain pharmacy outweighs the safety of Kansans” (Rothchild 2005). Advancing the now all too familiar “with us or against us” logic, Schmidt belittles opposition to the bill as a matter of simple convenience, while reminding that support is crucial to the “safety of Kansans”. Again speaking to the responsibilization of personal safety, Kyle Smith of the KBI weighs in stating
“the sooner we can get the Oklahoma approach in place the sooner we can cut down on the problem and the safer Kansas will be” (Hannah 2005).

Interestingly, support did not break cleanly on partisan lines, even among Republicans who introduced it. Some voiced concerns that restrictions could unduly jeopardize the health of some asthma sufferers, for example. Early on, the Chairperson of the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded the issue needed more study, promising to revisit the Bill later, in coming weeks. Although debate about the Bill received substantial coverage, it continued for a brief period, from late December 2004 until mid-January 2005.

**Sheriff Matt Samuels Killed**

The public discussion of precursor restriction and methamphetamine problems in Kansas took on new form on January 19, 2005, following the death of Greenwood County Sheriff, Matt Samuels. The murder of a law enforcement officer is a relatively rare occurrence, especially in Kansas, so the event was certain to command media attention. Early reports of the incident reported, “Samuels was shot around 10 a.m. Wednesday while he was serving a search warrant at a home and an arrest warrant for a man wanted on burglary and theft charges and for violating parole” (Iola Register 2005). This report is correct. Samuels was attempting to serve warrants on his cousin, 23 year old Scott Cheever. Reportedly, Cheever had taken a vehicle and other property from his parents and absconded probation earlier the previous week. Law enforcement issued warrants for theft and probation violation after Cheever’s parents reported the crimes. A tip later led deputies to a farmhouse where Cheever was hiding. By accounts, Samuels went into the home alone, and without his bulletproof vest, to try to convince Cheever to surrender. Cheever shot down a staircase at Samuels, killing him at the scene. The situation escalated into a standoff, in which Cheever shot at other law enforcement officers. Though
methamphetamine undoubtedly played some role, it is very important to acknowledge initial reports showing that neither Cheever, nor the others arrested at the scene were wanted for any crimes related to methamphetamine.

Just a few short weeks later, the popular assumption followed the media consensus that Samuels “was shot to death while serving warrants at a suspected methamphetamine lab in a rural home near Virgil” (Toplikar, 2005). While he was serving a warrant at a house later found to contain meth-making materials, it is a linguistic distortion to present it as a “suspected meth lab”. Certainly, given the attention meth demands of law enforcement, if the home was indeed a “suspected methamphetamine lab” Samuels would not have entered without proper backup and protective equipment.

It is clear that authorities reframed the events, placing Samuels’ death at the center of the public discussions about meth. Despite the particulars of the case, the murder of a respected small town sheriff at the hands of a meth addict immediately changed the face of Kansas’ public battles with the drug. Newspapers ran stories with headlines like “Sheriff Gunned Down” punctuating the apparent seriousness of the local meth crisis. Even though two weeks earlier politicians of both parties expressed serious doubts about the efficacy of PSE restriction, the discussion ceased and turned toward victims of the drug now clearly represented by Matt Samuels.

In *Policing the Crisis* (1978) Hall and his colleagues theorize that in the public discourse of social problems, certain events mark a threshold of sorts, delimiting a point of societal tolerance (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p. 225). With this event, meth smashed through the boundaries of permissiveness and legality, coming to represent very real potentialities of extreme violence. For small town folks bombarded by anti-meth campaigns, the
death brings big city crime stories home as the realization that criminals in their town murder police as well. In this instance, the potentialities of all meth problems, whatever they might be, come to horrible realization signified by the state’s inability to protect its citizens from the predatory uncertainty of late-modernity (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p. 226). In a society that governs through crime, Samuels and other victims are the “representative subjects of our time” (Simon J., 2007, p. 75). Given this, politicians eschewing the needs of crime victims effectively disregard the concerns of the entire community, doing so at their own peril.

Illustrating the attention paid to crime victims, the following call for action in a speech by Governor Sebelius honoring Samuels and other officers, accesses what Simon calls “broad grammar for recognizing and rewarding” (Simon J., 2007, p. 101).

We owe them a debt that cannot be repaid, but one of the best ways to keep Samuel’s memory alive is to recognize daily the sacrifices made by the men and women of the law enforcement community…We must support them and their families. We do that by giving them good training and good salaries and by passing laws that give them the tools to do their job (Puriton, 2005).

Reinforcing drug war rationalities, the Governor equates “honoring” fallen police to an expansion of the criminal justice system en masse, as amplified budgets, extra equipment and net widening legislation. Lost in the Governor’s plea is any critical evaluation of drug control rationalities contributing to this and countless other deaths. While not a venue for public reflection, her notion of “honoring” the fallen encourages the system that produced the death of Samuels to carry on uncontested. Ferrell makes a similar critique of roadside shrines marking deaths caused by high-speed pursuits of simple drug offenders (Ferrell, 2004). Both the Governor’s logic of honoring the fallen, and Ferrell’s insightful critique illustrate the escalating binary rationalities of the war on drugs. Here, the “good” must win, and no cost in budget,
speed, life or freedom is too high. Indeed, as the remainder of the chapter shows, this logic continued after Samuels’ murder.

Figure 10: Public Reaction to Matt Samuels’ Murder

**Number of Labs Decrease**

In a stream of coverage not related to Samuels, state news outlets reported the apparent drop in meth labs after publication of the data by the KBI. Initially, many of the articles conveyed a sense of dismay that Kansas had dropped out of the top ten with statements like: “Kansas, a perennial fixture among states with the most meth lab seizures, has dropped off the top 10 list for the first time in a decade” (Iola Register 2/17/10). Some attempts to explain the
drop were offered by local law enforcement, “Sumner County Sheriff Gerald Gilkey says meth production has become more rural to far less populated areas to “ditch labs” making them harder to detect” (Wellington Daily News 2/16/05). The assertions of a Sheriff from a rural county, in a rural state, suggesting that meth is becoming even “more rural” is a particularly novel explanation for dropping lab seizure rates.

The odd current of disappointment was later joined by disbelief, as stakeholders began citing poor record keeping as an explanation for the drop. “We have to get better stats…The KBI is designed to assist local law enforcement. We don’t want to lean on them unless it begins to hurt funding” (Kyle Smith, KBI 2/21/05). This is not shocking as reporting continues to be an issue for rural law enforcement agencies burdened with small budgets, little infrastructure and support staff. For example, 40 Kansas law enforcement agencies did not report standard UCR data in 200518. Similarly, Agent Smith reported that “nearly one-third” of agencies did not report meth seizure statistics as well. Regardless of the particulars of data accuracy, these articles illustrate the symbolic and real argument to define the social reality of meth crimes in Kansas (Fishman, 1978). It is also important to observe that authorities only offered faulty record keeping and increased rurality of meth production as explanations for the drop, not actual changes in meth production. Further, the discussion began only when a decrease threatened to affect funding for methamphetamine interdiction.

Tensions between reports of the drop in labs and the official position of Kansas Law Enforcement continued until local media responded with a suitable explanation. Writers of the Sterling Bulletin published a retraction, siding with the KBI explanation of faulty data collection. Under the headline “Shame on us!” writers explained they essentially reran other papers’ reports

of the drop as the “lead story on page 1, because it was a very slow news week” (The Sterling Bulletin, 2005). This is important for two reasons. First, the anonymous piece acknowledges that meth news is a likely placeholder for Kansas media during a “very slow news week”.

Secondly, the article dissects the KBI explanation of the drop, citing the lack of accurate record keeping and reporting between counties. The articles show the anti-meth program not only provides a viable avenue to supplemental funding, but a perpetual battle that legitimizes law enforcement, legislators and legislation.

Further, despite the redirection of the 2004 statistical release, certainly the explanation proffered by the KBI is an indictment of accuracy of all meth lab data collected in Kansas, not just the 2004 data.
legislation required all over-the-counter medications containing pseudoephedrine be sold by licensed pharmacists, limiting a single transaction to no more than 3.6 grams and 9 grams in a 30-day period\textsuperscript{20}. Additionally, to discourage “smurfing”, it required customers to be 18, provide photo I.D. and signature. As the quote below shows, a short time after Samuels’ death public debate on the proposal ended as it became impossible to vote against (figure below).

A few weeks ago the bill was limping along…now it’s zooming along, what happened?…Unfortunately the death of Matt Samuels is what happened and it’s the last straw for many people in Kansas who have watched the growth of the meth trade with fear and despair (The Emporia Gazette, 2005).

The quote documents Hall and colleague’s (1978) threshold of extreme violence, speculating new support grew from fear, despair and the death of Matt Samuels. Politicians followed suit as the official record of the vote on the bill shows:

I vote aye on SB 27. This measure will choke off easy access to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine tablets. It is a necessary step to combat methamphetamine production— with all of its enormous social, health, and economic costs. This measure also acknowledges that the meth problem evolves over time, and it puts in place an ongoing process to monitor trends in meth production, to identify opportunities to stem those trends, and to recommend specific steps future legislatures may take to seize those opportunities. The Senate also saw fit in this bill to rename the Chemical Control Act as the Sheriff Matt Samuels Chemical Control Act. This step honors the memory of the late Greenwood County Sheriff who was murdered while serving an arrest warrant at a suspected methamphetamine laboratory. That crime took place just before 10 a.m. on January 19, 2005—the same time the Senate Judiciary Committee was beginning deliberations on SB 27.

My hope is that when historians someday record the story of the methamphetamine scourge Kansas faced during the early years of the 21st century, they will credit passage of the Samuels Act with helping consign that story to history.(- Senate Majority Leader Derek Schmidt, 2/17/2005)

Schmidt’s account is more heroic than true, emboldening the narrative of the meth “scourge” eventually cast to the dustbin of “history” through the diligence of law enforcement.

\textsuperscript{20} Oklahoma also named its PSE restriction bill after three fallen law enforcement officers.
and legislators. Rife with metaphors of war, he restates the constructed half-truth of Samuel’s death “serving a warrant on a suspected meth lab” etching it on the official record of the Kansas legislature (Simon J., 2002). A short time later, however, Schmidt’s comments were less definitive, leaving the door open for continued battles with the drug. “This isn’t a magic bullet that will make meth go away, but it should put a major dent in meth production in Kansas” (Derek Schmidt 3/2/05). The comments also demonstrate an important characteristic of both constructionist and governmentality programs. In a self-sustaining fashion, politicians link one set of policies to another that will presumably work better. Constructionists describe this as a process of demoralization that propels problems into the future, encouraging more policy action and claims-making (Lippert & Stenson, 2010). Likewise, continuous failure as a problem-sustaining feature of governmentality figures in prominently to future events of the methamphetamine program, as Schmidt inserts the subtle reminder that the drug war, and the battle against meth, is perpetual.

Claims made by Schmidt and others regarding the efficacy of PSE restrictions raise important points of consideration. First, a number of strategies were already in place at both the State and Federal level to control the methamphetamine market. With the 1996 Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act and the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, Congress enacted a host of strategies to reduce diversion of precursors to illicit methamphetamine production (Hunt, Kuck, & Truitt, 2006). These laws already prohibited pseudoephedrine in quantities necessary to make methamphetamine. The most palpable effect of the law was moving PSE behind the counter.

More importantly however, at this time, research findings did not support PSE restrictions. Though a widely cited study by Cunningham and Lui (2003) reported promising
evidence that PSE restrictions reduced meth related emergency room visits, others citing the lack of appropriate data and the unmeasured influence of variables outside the scope of existing studies, raised significant questions of such claims (Reuter & Caulkins, 2003). Research continues to validate these concerns finding at best only short-lived disruptions of meth use and distribution following PSE controls, with a full return of all market indicators in 18 months or less (Dobkin & Nicosia, 2009). Never the less, at the time of the vote, claims of “putting a major dent in meth production in Kansas” continued. The relative effectiveness of PSE restrictions and the bold claims of their importance illustrate that the rhetorical value of meth is perhaps most important. Both the public discourse and physical restrictions of PSE in stores are potent technologies of responsibilization and discipline.

Figure 12: Matt Samuels Act Passes

Legislative Accomplishments

Summaries of legislative activities ran statewide as the 2005 session ended. Punctuating the logic of governmentality, major accomplishments appeared in bullet point fashion, featuring
several key issues. The bulleted accomplishments read like a laundry list of wedge issues or signifiers of broader questions of crime, poverty and morality. In many instances, the articles featured headlines with names and pictures of Schmidt and other legislators accrediting their accomplishments, connecting volatile issues to political agenda. In addition to meth, the articles featured sex predators, school funding, health care, abortion, gambling, the death penalty, gun rights, open government, child pornography and the sale of alcohol on Sunday. Each remains at the center of contentious debates, signifying tension between conservative and liberal politics. Yet, despite their perennial importance, Schmidt points to the Matt Samuels Act as “perhaps the single most important thing so far this session has been toughening sales regulations on cold medication that contains ephedrine…” further underscoring the political expediency of methamphetamine in Kansas.

New Law Crimps Meth Production

Though the act went into effect July 1, by early September politicians and law enforcement boldly declared it a success. According to Kyle Smith, KBI spokesperson, “We are seeing a distinct drop as the law goes into effect,” elaborating that “before you could go down to your smoke shop or truck stop and buy it by the case. There was no restriction on it” (Manning, 2005). These assertions are somewhat misleading given the state and federal statutes discussed earlier. Though true PSE was more readily available prior to the act, it was nonetheless illegal to possess the drug in quantities needed for meth production, or in conjunction with other drug paraphernalia. More interesting however, is the speed and context of claims made by Schmidt and others such as “…it was a judgment call and the data show we made the right one” (Manning, 2005).

21 This is a summary of terms as they appear in the data.
Of course, it is highly questionable to claim the effectiveness of any program or legislation in such a short period. It is also important to note, that the claims cited specific meth raids show “drops [of] 64 percent since new law took effect” another very problematic assertion (Figure 13). Once again, it is crucial to note that the claims appear in context of nearly four years of declining lab seizure rates. However, what is most important to recall is the public discussion of the validity of data released earlier that year. Just a few months prior, the KBI disputed the validity of declining seizure numbers as problems of data collection and changes in production practices. Despite these public objections, just a few months later the same officials cited the same data, eagerly claiming similar reductions as proof of the power of their legislation, and legitimacy of their work. The hasty, overstated claims shown here clearly illustrate tough on crime drug control rationalities manipulated to garner support, generate political capital and govern through meth.

Figure 13: Effectiveness of Precursor Restriction

**Meth raids in state down**

*The number of methamphetamine labs raided in Kansas has decreased sharply since a new law went into effect. The law restricts the sale of precursors used in making meth.*

“Since June, we’ve seen more seizures on precursors and the fact we see down 64 percent is even better,” Smith said. The law is enforced after sale, so that even if there’s a small amount of precursor sold, it is considered illegal. Smith disputed the validity of declining seizure numbers as problems of data collection and changes in production practices. However, what is most important to recall is the public discussion of the validity of data released earlier that year. Just a few months prior, the KBI disputed the validity of declining seizure numbers as problems of data collection and changes in production practices. Despite these public objections, just a few months later the same officials cited the same data, eagerly claiming similar reductions as proof of the power of their legislation, and legitimacy of their work. The hasty, overstated claims shown here clearly illustrate tough on crime drug control rationalities manipulated to garner support, generate political capital and govern through meth.
Cheever and Defendants

Throughout the year, the prosecution of Scott Cheever, and three others, for the murder of Matt Samuels received considerable attention. Though all claimed attention, the balance of the large number of articles in the group covered various aspects of criminal prosecution of Cheever. Much of the coverage described sentencing intricacies that later resulted in a sentence of death for Cheever. While sentencing coverage is significant, another stream discursively constructing Cheever as both villain and victim of methamphetamine is an important subtext to the overarching narrative described here.

Headlines like “Accused sheriff killer has checkered past” and “Meth addiction plagued accused killer” hinted at this duality. Emphasizing his victimization, his mother urged, “Scott didn’t do this, Meth did, he’s not a murderer, if it wasn’t for Meth I know he wouldn’t have done it” (Finger, 2005). Following the good gone bad narrative, the articles describe a typical small town boy, involved in sports and his community, until caught up by meth.

He took a job working on oilrigs, she said, and he became hooked on crystal meth. He even actually owed so much money to a dealer, Freisner said, that he tried to rob the Johnson’s General Store in Eureka on May 24, 2000 (Finger, 2005).

The narrative continues describing Cheever’s time in prison, which included “using drugs, disobeying, lying and stealing”. Still, the family hoped that time in prison would “shake him up enough” and though his mother “pleaded with him to stay away from the drug culture that he had fallen into since high school” after his release, he bragged “he had learned seven different ways to make “crank,” or meth, in prison.

The dual narrative of both villain and victim fits the rationalities of governing through meth in a number of ways. First, it shows how the tragedies of meth intertwine both a troubled small town boy and his cousin, a respected Sheriff. This conveys, once again, the ideological
notion that no one is safe from the risks, dangers and threat of methamphetamine. More importantly however, in the traditional American individualistic fashion, the narrative shows that all the events leading up to the murder of Matt Samuels and the eventual execution of Scott Cheever, can simply be attributed to methamphetamine. At no time did the articles mention broader issues of crime control, economic inequality or social isolation most certainly at play here. This story begins and ends with meth, as Cheever’s mother aptly pressed, “Scott didn’t do this, meth did.” This is not to say that meth did not play a role in these events, as it most certainly did. The problem with ending the story this way is it advances the anti-meth program detailed thus far. Under this familiar rationale, communities can attempt to restrict precursors, fund aggressive law enforcement, and come down hard with maximum sentences on community derelicts. However, none of these strategies considers or addresses underlying conditions that exacerbate drug abuse in urban ghettos or small towns.

Figure 14: Cheever and Samuels as Victims of Methamphetamine
Crack Replaces Meth as Drug of Choice

Closing out the year, crack cocaine became the “drug of choice” in Kansas. Quoting local law enforcement, the media advanced the premise that crack emerged because of the concentration on methamphetamine. As one officer claimed “We were spending so much time on meth, we didn’t have as much time to devote to other cases…Now we’re beginning to devote more resources to crack” (Probst, 2005).

Following a chain of events very similar to Fishman’s (1978) study of New York crime reporting, the media created new knowledge about drug use in Kansas. Fishman showed that competition between news agencies encouraged over-reporting on the victimization of the elderly, fundamentally altering the social awareness of crime. Similarly, the logic of “crack replacing meth” grew from one article later picked up by the Associated Press and published by at least 19 different newspapers in Kansas. Crack entered public consciousness, though data did not support notions of “crack replacing meth as the drug of choice” even in one county22.

Eventually, papers recast the article under headlines proclaiming “Crack more prominent in Kansas” and “Crack outpacing meth in Kansas” generalizing questionable assertions to the entire state.

The instance illustrates distortions of local reporting, and potentials of local knowledge production regarding drugs and crime. As Policing the Crisis (1978) shows, story lines emerge from the views of authoritative sources, in this case the comments of one law enforcement office, and one source of data. Given this, the logic of “crack replacing meth” as reported by local news agencies at the end of 2005, holds remarkable implication, as do all the other themes shown here, for how the public comes to know about crime and drugs.

22 A number of data sources consistently show marijuana is most common in Kansas and elsewhere.
The popularity of the story based on the volume of replication, illustrates the importance of drug war narratives for local media as well as the salience of drug related threats, whether methamphetamine or crack cocaine, for local law enforcement. Closing remarks of the article neatly illustrate this: “We’re just lucky we don’t have the heroin cycle in there, like some larger areas do” (Probst, 2005). This also fits with notions of continual failure and demoralization of meth described earlier. Because of the failure of policy, or in this case the over emphasis on meth, another problem rises to fill the void. Whether assertions represent “the real” or not, in crack, like meth, local law enforcement, politicians and the public have another drug threat on their hands.

Figure 15: Crack Replaces Meth

Governing Through Meth Continues

Regardless of all of the public argument on PSE restrictions, Title VII of the Patriot Act, fittingly named The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, resolved it for the last time, imposing the general structure of Kansas and Oklahoma’s laws through the Federal code (Weisheit, 2008). Of course, this does not mean governing through meth disappeared or even diminished. In fact, law enforcement and politicians continue to advance methamphetamine as both a forceful risk and a political accomplishment. For example, in 2007, two years after implementation of SB 27, a new set of leaders praised the overwhelming success of their actions. The quote below, from a press release issued by Kansas Attorney General Morrison, revisits meth problems, and the legislation passed by others:
The 168 seizures represent a dramatic 80 percent reduction from the peak year of meth lab seizures in Kansas in 2001 (846) and a 73 percent reduction in meth lab seizures in the state from 2004 (630), the last year before passage of the Matt Samuels Act. (State of Kansas, 2007)\textsuperscript{23}.

The problems with this statement are the same as those made by Schmidt and others earlier. Despite passed time and changes in political administrations, the effectiveness of SB 27 is viable political capital invoked annually after publication of KBI lab seizure data.

Incidentally, a number of questions arise when comparing official KBI data to the statistics cited in the press release above. Table 1 shows the statistics cited by the Attorney General’s office include chemicals and glassware seized, materials dumpsites found and labs seized, all under the rubric of “meth lab seizures.” Though all relate to meth production, adding actual lab seizures to the ambiguous “dumpsite” and “chemicals and glassware” categories inflates the reported number of actual working meth labs, or at least the public’s perception of what consists of a “lab seizure”.\textsuperscript{24} When focusing on just the number of labs seized, which is what the public instinctively thinks of when imagining “meth labs”, the total is much lower. According to the data cited in the press release, the actual number of meth labs seized in Kansas that year was 48, down from 130 the previous year, a change of 63%.

\textsuperscript{23} http://www.ksag.org/page/morrison-commends-drop-in-kansas-meth-lab-seizures-calls-for-further-action (2 of 2) 10/14/2010 8:15:11 AM
\textsuperscript{24} 168 “labs seized” in 2006 match official KBI data, the other two years referenced do not match official sources. Though the differences between 846 and 847 (2001) and 630 and 583 (2004) may indeed be trivial, they do alter the accuracy of claims made in the statement.
Though impossible to attribute to the Matt Samuels Act, Morrison governs through meth, again claiming a victory for Kansas Government:

We are pleased that meth lab seizures have dropped significantly in the last year. The hard work of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation should be commended, as well as Governor Sebelius and the Kansas Legislature for passing the Matt Samuels Act to keep Kansas communities safe (State of Kansas, 2007).

Anecdotally, states without similar laws recorded decreases in meth lab seizures similar to Kansas\textsuperscript{26}. The claims, free of empirical support, what Young calls “voodoo criminology” are reminiscent of Rudy Giuliani’s claims of the effectiveness of zero-tolerance and “quality of life” policing tactics, despite consistent decreases in crime in other cities and countries not employing these methods (Young J. , 2004). Morrison concludes with the demoralized warning that despite the great accomplishment, the anti-meth program continues:

Despite this great accomplishment, there is still much work to be done to stop the importation and manufacturing of meth and the damage it does to our communities. We cracked down on one source of meth, but we can’t ignore the other sources. For the sake of Kansas families and children, we must put a stop to the production, importation and addiction of meth (State of Kansas, 2007).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Chemicals Glassware & Dumpsite & Labs Seized \\
 & (% Change) & (% Change) & (% Change) \\
\hline
2001 & 186 & 236 & 425 \\
\hline
2002 & 194(+4.3\%) & 223(-5.5\%) & 311(-26.8\%) \\
\hline
2003 & 120(-38\%) & 227(+1.7\%) & 302(-2\%) \\
\hline
2004 & 119(-8\%) & 273(+20.2\%) & 191(-36.7\%) \\
\hline
2005 & 85(-28\%) & 175(-35\%) & 130(-31\%) \\
\hline
2006 & 44(-41\%) & 76(-56.5\%) & 48(-63\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Kansas Methamphetamine Indicators 2001-2006\textsuperscript{25}}
\end{table}

\begin{itemize}
\item Data retrieved from the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Methamphetamine in Kansas seizure statistics http://www.accesskansas.org/kbi/de/stats_meth.shtml
\item Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Ohio all report a decrease in meth lab indicators similar to those in Kansas, while only New York State shows an increase.
\end{itemize}
As a final, yet important element of governmentality, the door remains open for perpetual wars with meth. Certainly, it would weaken the program if he claimed outright victory and ceased the language of war. Morrison’s conclusion perfectly illustrates the changing shape of methamphetamine constructed by Kansas leadership. Boundaries of risk are drawn and redrawn, marshaling fear and remaining more or less salient, depending on the attention cast by those with power to define the issue for the public.

Predictably, the anti-meth program continues, evidenced by the following quote from the 2010 Kansas Attorney General election: “In the Senate, Schmidt led the charge against meth labs, child pornography, human trafficking and Medicaid fraud. He also was the lead Senate sponsor of Jessica’s Law, which puts violent child molesters in prison for life” (Schmidt, 2010). Now as a candidate, meth crusader Schmidt revisits the threats he addressed. Invoking drug warrior credibility, Schmidt’s support of anti-meth legislation figured prominently into his 2010 campaign. Though impossible to estimate the impact of his carefully crafted identity as leader in the “charge against meth”, it is quite apparent that he thought enough of the issue to feature it prominently in his successful campaign.

Proving Jenkins (1994) correct again, the campaign against meth persists and continues to evolve. In 2010, Kansas was one of a handful of states to receive federal funding as part of the Rural Law Enforcement Meth Initiative (RLEMI) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (stimulus). The website, Methpedia.com produced by Strategic Applications International (SAI), administrators of the grant, continue to advance the familiar rationalities of

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27 Retired KBI Director Larry Welch, discussed at the beginning of the chapter, co-chaired Schmidt’s campaign. “Derek Schmidt has a long and distinguished record of standing up for public safety and the needs of Kansas law enforcement,” ”Year in and year out, Derek Schmidt has been a reliable friend of law enforcement in the Statehouse, and he will make a great attorney general for Kansas. I strongly support him.”
meth that “remains a widespread problem…affects rural America in particular, taxing already limited and over-burdened law enforcement, treatment, and public health resources…and remains the largest drug problem in most rural states” (Strategic Associates International, Inc., 2011). Though meth remains a problem, the group perpetuates falsehoods that meth is the “largest drug problem for most rural states” like Kansas. Yet again, with new funding and stage, meth is an ongoing accomplishment and threat demanding the public’s attention. In furtherance of the battle, The Kansas Task Force Addressing Methamphetamine and Illegal Drugs, coordinated by SAI, outlined six goals for methamphetamine interdiction. Of the goals, one best exemplifies the continued logics of governing through meth:

**Goal 5: Increase public awareness and professional knowledge about methamphetamine.** Over the last five years Kansas has experienced a dramatic reduction in meth lab seizures. However, law enforcement continues to be assailed by problems related to meth importation and drug trafficking networks. The decrease in lab activity has led some community members and policy makers to conclude that the problems caused by meth in Kansas have also dwindled. If the public perceives the meth problem in Kansas to be “solved”, it will be difficult to solicit necessary support for funding requests, increased treatment resources, and prevention strategies.

Ongoing awareness efforts are necessary to ensure that the public perception of the meth problem in Kansas is accurate. As new and dangerous meth manufacturing methods, such as the “one-pot method”, become increasingly prevalent in rural areas of the state, community members and professionals must be informed of these emerging trends. Educational opportunities for professionals must be readily available. Law enforcement efforts to address meth, especially in rural communities, are strengthened when retailers report sales of suspicious items, social service providers identify families affected by meth, and prosecutors effectively prosecute meth cases (Kansas Task Force Addressing Methamphetamine and Illegal Drugs, 2010).

Apparently not wanting to be too successful in promoting their own accomplishments, they warn, “if the public perceives the meth problem to be ‘solved’ it will be difficult to solicit necessary support for funding requests”. To this end, the group plans to increase education efforts “as new and dangerous meth manufacturing methods…become increasingly prevalent in
rural areas of the state.” Keeping with the self-sustaining logics of the anti-meth program, the
plan documents how failure of existing strategies animates meth as a legitimate threat, helping to
sustain funding, and support public identity.

This chapter maps an important period in the constitution of meth problems in Kansas,
bolstered by the enduring techniques of governmentality. In summary, consider the following
points. Methamphetamine garners significant attention from Kansas media in the early months
of 2005, despite meth lab seizures in considerable decline and implementation of federal and
state anti-meth measures. The issue peaks when a group politicians and law enforcement
personnel at the federal, state and local levels urge for new funding and legislation similar to
laws passed in Oklahoma to battle the “epidemic”. Proponents rallied support for their agendas
with fearful assertions the state would become a bastion of meth related crimes as “druggies”
“flocked” to Kansas. Though not empirically validated, restricting methamphetamine precursors
was the only tactic proposed to address existing meth problems. Although the proposal was bi-
partisan, the legislation did not initially receive widespread or unanimous support from either
political party.

The meth epidemic claimed new saliency with the death of Greenwood County Sheriff
Matt Samuels. Samuels’ murder was quickly recast as “attempting to serve a search warrant on a
suspected meth lab” though initial reports show he was attempting to arrest Cheever on warrants
for crimes unrelated to meth. Predictably, the crime marshaled a landslide of support for the
legislation later named for the fallen Sheriff. Subsequent reports of the crime, and meth in
general, often featured Samuels and his killer, Scott Cheever, as the public face in the battle
against meth.
Around the same time, citing public data, the media showed that meth labs in Kansas continued to decrease. These reports met considerable ridicule from the KBI, citing the failure of local agencies to record lab seizures appropriately and warning of the loss of federal funding. Despite this, less than three months later, the same officials used the exact same data as overwhelming proof of the success of the legislation. Finally, to close out the year, some began to suggest that crack had replaced meth as the drug of choice in the state.

Beyond 2005, meth continues to signify crime in Kansas, delivering funding to the state and figuring prominently into political campaigns. These events show the discursively shaped reality of meth as key to local drug war rationalities. These rationalities give local authorities a legitimate social problem to battle, and extend the punitive logics of mass imprisonment beyond the granite tropes of urban ghettos. Although the mediated events described above are naturally quite public, the anti-meth program continues to structure everyday life more subtly, as shown in the following “letter to the editor”:

Country rentals are prime locations. Meth labs are growing every day in Kansas. Little houses in rural areas, which can be rented, are prime locations for Meth makers to hide out in. We have lost one sheriff in Greenwood County, which points how dangerous these people can be. Screen your potential renters carefully. Stay safe. (Lindsborg News Record, 2005).

This is just one example of many, illustrating the creeping rationality of meth as the face of risk, crime and fear for the people of Kansas. Though the rationalities, technologies and programs outlined here do not take the form of overtly coercive criminal justice practices directly contributing to swelling prison populations, they do shape the reality of crime and crime control in Kansas. Problematizations of meth maintains it as an actionable problem accessed as necessary to strengthen political campaigns, or support broader law enforcement strategies.
Further, as the warning above shows, the specter of meth hangs heavy in the air, demonstrating the potent responsibilizing power of the anti-meth program, reminding all to “stay safe”.

The next two chapters consider the effects of problem construction, further illustrating how crime marks social differences of race and gender. Chapter 3 considers how crime helps reinforce racial boundaries, even in homogeneous states like Kansas, while Chapter 4 considers how methamphetamine discourse reveals gender inequalities unique to the Midwest.
CHAPTER 4 - Crime, Difference and Rural Life

At the dawn of the twentieth century, in a rapidly industrializing, urbanizing, and demographically shifting America, blackness was refashioned through crime statistics. It became a more stable racial category in opposition to whiteness through racial criminalization. Consequently, white criminality gradually lost its fearsomeness - Khalil Gibran Muhammad *The Condemnation of Blackness* (2010)

As this quote from Khalil Gibran Muhammad (2010) shows, crime is a prominent force shaping the social realities of race in the United States. The quote also relates to one of the more abstract, yet fundamental questions of this project. How do crime and racialized difference feed social exclusion and inequality in the more racially homogenous parts of the country? In other words, how do the starkly racialized narratives underpinning American punitiveness and mass imprisonment operate in areas of the country considered “white”? To explore this question this chapter engages whiteness studies and the concept of ontological insecurity to develop a theory of punitiveness compelled by differences of whiteness. The theory adopts recent research by DeKeseredy and colleagues (2007) to illustrate punitiveness driven by the precariousness of late modernity and a crisis of white hegemony. This thesis rests largely on the constructed sanctity of white rural America, as countered against the social construction of Black criminality and attendant problems of the city.

**Rurality and the Rural Idyll**

To explore the conditions permitting constructions of methamphetamine as white and rural to persist, we must first examine the unique meanings of crime in rurality. Just what “rural” means, continues to escape both academics and policy makers alike. As Michael Bell recently put it, “it is an annoying question, if not an alarming one, that American rural sociologists have never comfortably resolved for themselves: what is the rural?” (Bell, 2007, p.
This fact does not escape the study of rural crime either, as most studies do not provide a clear operational definition of exactly what rural means (Weisheit & Donnermeyer, 2000). Policy makers tend to rely on quantitatively driven definitions of urban and rural spaces, or what Bell calls the “first rural”. Bell’s “first rural” is characterized by numerical, spatial and binary objectivity. In other words, first rural definitions are quantifiable, can be found on a map, and exist against definitions of urban spaces (Bell, 2007). Doing just this, the US Census Bureau and the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide the two most commonly cited definitions of urban and rural. On the one hand, the US Census somewhat simply asserts a “territory, population and housing units not classified urban constitute rural” defining urban as settlement areas with more than 2,500 residents (US Census Bureau, 1995). While on the other, the OMB defines “rural areas” as a jurisdiction that is not located in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) but in a county that has a population less than 50,000. “Rural states” according to the OMB are states with a population density of 52 or fewer persons per square mile or a state in which the largest county has fewer than 150,000 people. Kansas has two cities with over 150,000 population yet still qualifies as “rural” based on population density. The use of two seemingly separate definitions by two agencies within the federal government underscores the ambiguity of rurality. This ambiguity often has real consequences. For example, as it relates to methamphetamine, the OMB definitions recently determined access to federal funds allocated to “rural” law enforcement to “combat methamphetamine” (RLEMI). Interestingly, had the census definition been used, Kansas would not have qualified for funds from the RLEMI. Given this example and countless others, it is clear that these floating conceptions shape the social reality of what rural is, and therefore what rural crime means.
Obviously, these sorts of distinctions present some contradictions. For example, some argue the rise of mass society blurs boundaries between urban and rural, making the distinctions hardly discernable. Still others point to enduring cultural characteristics as evidence of the difference of rural areas despite the massification and globalization of society (Johnson & Beale, 1995). Given the shortcomings of static “first rural” definitions, Bell’s “second rural” informed by immediacies of culture and the ghosts of place fills in some conceptual blank spots, warranting his full description (Bell, 1997):

Second rural, then, is a rural of associations. It calls upon the connections we have long made between rural life and food, cultivation, community, nature, wild freedom, and masculine patriarchal power, and the many contradictions we have also so long associated with the rural, such as desolation, isolation, dirt and disease, wild danger, and the straw-hatted rube. It is the rural of what Williams called the “golden echo” of rural goodness, as well the “leaden echo” of the rural we fear and reject. It is romantic. It is terrifying. It is empowering. It is imprisoning. It is Never Cry Wolf. It is Deliverance. It is The Wizard of Oz. It is The Grapes of Wrath. Second rural, the rural of ideas, is by no means always ideal (Bell, 2007, p. 409).

In this way, the politics of the second rural, as Bell calls it, uncover “invisible othernesses interrogating intersections of power and culture in the rural” (Bell, 2007, p. 409). Therefore, combining both epistemological and ontological dimensions as a rural plurality is crucial to the understanding of the narcopolitics of the rural.

Former Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill famously coined the phrase “all politics is local”, reminding of the local roots of national politics. This simple observation helps further clarify the rise and staying power of methamphetamine as a unique social problem associated with the rural. Muhammad (2010) shows constructed Black criminality not only helped shore up white supremacy, but also as with other forms of white privilege, made white criminality virtually invisible. This fact continues to shape policing tactics, prison demographics and the whole project of mass imprisonment. However, when considering the anti-meth program
described above, we must confront how meth brings spaces and populations typically excluded from discussions of crime, risk and fear, back into the fold.

Bolstered by pop-culture coverage in books like New York Times bestseller, *Methland: The Death and Life of an American Small Town* the uncritical narrative of meth, as destroyer of wholesome rural life appears fixed in popular discourse. *Methland* opens with a description perfectly opposed to Elijah Anderson’s famous description of the trek down Germantown Avenue to Philadelphia’s core. Invoking the rural idyll forcefully, the book’s author Nick Redding, describes his travels into Iowa farmland, through small towns dotting the landscape, and streets filled with small businesses and lined with maples and oaks. Though picturesque, Redding makes certain to convey a sense of dread floating on the breeze, “Against the oppressive humidity, the night’s smell begins to take shape. Mixed with the moist organic scent of cut grass at dew point is the ether-stink of methamphetamine cooks at work in their kitchens” (Redding, 2009, p. 6). Here in clear, uncertain terms, Redding asserts that in some places in “small town” America you can quite literally smell the meth in the air. Artistic license aside, this assertion seems quite absurd for even the most drug-plagued neighborhoods. Regardless, the sheer popularity of this book and the countless others like it, suggests that the narrative of threatened, collapsing rurality, or as Redding puts it “the death and life of an American small town” is marketable, indeed. A few however, are not so quick to reproduce such logic. In a thoughtful review of *Methland* New York Times literary columnist Timothy Egan critiques the calculus of rurality and meth crimes:

Like a brief, intense summer squall, a media storm passed over small-town America a few years ago, stripping away what was left of the myth of the rural idyll to reveal a cast of hollow-cheeked white people smoking meth behind the corn silo. It was going to destroy the heartland, this methamphetamine epidemic, just as crack cocaine had done to the inner city. There was no George Bailey in this version of Bedford Falls. No John
Mellencamp melodies on the soundtrack. Just toothless boys on bikes peddling some nasty stuff cooked up from cold medicine and farm products. And then it all passed, as these things do, the damage done, leaving the impression of rural America as a broken land, scary. (Egan, 2009).

As the passage shows, refashioning drug war standards to rural meth users makes for an interesting story. The narrative of natural disaster and epidemic, laying siege to a pure land and innocent people is clear, as are links to stigmatized cocaine users of the city and previous decades. Whether consciously or not Egan identifies the rise and fall of mediated moral panics and the symbolic and real wreckage wrought by faulty policy and political aggrandizing. Perhaps most critically, Egan dismisses the causal marriage of meth and rural life so anxiously bred in newspapers arguing, “meth is a symptom of this collapse, not a cause. And though its presence in small towns can be cancerous, it never took over rural America…national surveys suggest that there are about 1.3 million regular users of meth — hardly an epidemic in a country where 35 million people said they had used an illegal drug or abused a prescription” (Egan, 2009).

By describing the spread of urban social problems to the less traveled parts of the country with the introduction of methamphetamine, a narrative of “rural idyll” as romantic and peaceful pastoral life forms in opposition. Methamphetamine’s intrusion marks a certain cultural space, as the crime, violence, teen-age pregnancy, economic and “moral poverty” plaguing the city reaches the last bastion of respectable whiteness-rural America. The proliferating narrative of the collapse of rural life constitutes and reifies the myths of rurality. Scholars describe this as the frontier narrative, which depicts white settlers as rightful inhabitants of frontier and rural places, forming opposition against the invading depravity of urban blackness (Furniss, 2006).

For examples of the cultural binaries of “urban nightmares” (Macek, 2006) and the rural idyll we need look no farther than the 2008 Presidential election and Vice Presidential Candidate
Sarah Palin’s remarks about “little pockets” of the “real America”. Palin’s real America fits nicely within the frame of the rural idyll as the domain of the true and virtuous. It is precisely because this narrative accesses broader narratives of the threat of urban violence, pathological dependency, moral poverty, and white supremacy that it continues to play very well with large segments of the public. As Palin suggests:

We believe that the best of America is not all in Washington, D.C. We believe” -- "We believe that the best of America is in these small towns that we get to visit, and in these wonderful little pockets of what I call the real America, being here with all of you hard working very patriotic, um, very, um, pro-America areas of this great nation. This is where we find the kindness and the goodness and the courage of everyday Americans. Those who are running our factories and teaching our kids and growing our food and are fighting our wars for us. Those who are protecting us in uniform. Those who are protecting the virtues of freedom. (Stein, 2008)

Like Goldwater, Palin illustrates the appeal of the rural idyll, revealing her primary campaign strategy, rallying traditional values against the non-traditional other. Obviously, by invoking the “real America” Palin symbolically locates other areas of the country inhabited by people that do not meet her meritocratic standards of hard work, patriotism, and the courage of “everyday Americans”. Assertions such as these have a way of animating physical space. As critical geographer David Sibley correctly observes, our feelings about others have a way of shaping our feelings about places. Just as idealized notions of “real America” create boundaries of difference, they also help define the self (Sibley, 1995, p. 5). Reminiscent of Goldwater’s “violence in the streets” Palin’s “real America” simultaneously reflects and reinforces a parochial myth about virtuous parts of the country where people live simple lives by noble rules, uncorrupted by the haste, materialism and perhaps most importantly immorality of the city.

Indeed, this idealized rurality remains the center of a mythical national identity. Just as the construction of the 50’s family persists as an ideal type to contrast the supposed depravity of “other” family types, the myth of simple life that exists in a spatial and temporal vacuum persists
as an effective rhetorical tool illustrating the declining morality of large swaths of the public. As Palin reminds, the kind, good, courageous citizens that run factories, grow food, teach children, fight wars, and most importantly wear our uniforms to protect our virtues and keep us free spring from her “real America”. These stark images engage latent yet widespread resentment towards those who do not meet this standard, the urban undeserving poor, while strategically championing hegemonic whiteness (Wall, 2011). The power of this narrative hints at reasons for the lack of interest in rural crime, as subject all but dismissed for the balance of twentieth century. As Donnermeyer and colleagues note, if mentioned at all, scholars employed rurality an ideal type, to contrast urban crime (Donnermeyer, Jobes, & Barclay, 2006). Given absolute power of racialized notions of criminality, and the political and corporate focus on major urban population centers, the relative indifference to rural life is not surprising. However, despite constructed notions of the rural idyll, some crimes such as domestic violence and substance abuse are on par and in some categories eclipses rates of urban crime (Donnermeyer J., Rural Crime: Roots and Restoration, 2007).

Like elsewhere, representation of rural crime are perhaps most important to this study. Looking at the cultural constructions of rural crime, the binaries summoned by Palin’s “real America” are evident. For example, Russell Frank’s (2003) unique study of newspaper depictions of rural crimes illustrates some of the themes discussed above. Similar to Palin’s assertions, he finds “big-city” newspapers characterize small towns as sleepy slow moving places, where most residents know each other and where doors are unlocked. Not surprisingly he finds that urban news coverage of small town violence reify the intractable belief that “bad things don’t happen in good places” (Frank R., 2003). Connected to this representative belief, are some consistent dichotomies; the city is noisy, dirty, exciting, culturally diverse, and above all dangerous. Logically then, if the city is all these things, then small town must be quiet, clean,
boring, culturally devoid, and quite safe (Weishet, Falcone, & Wells, 2006, p. 15). However, in the context of this idealistic version of rurality, a “rural drug epidemic” no longer able to access the adverse stereotypes of the urban, is forced to take new form.

**Racialized Difference and Marginalized Whiteness**

Kansas is among the whitest and most racially homogenous states in the nation, with nearly 80% of the population white, non-Hispanic, compared to 65% nationally. However, when looking at the more rural parts of the state, demographic categories become even more homogenous. For instance, a recent survey of several rural farm towns in Kansas by The Carsey Institute finds a population that is 98.8% white, 51% female, 57% protestant, 32% college educated, and 61% Republican. Moreover, the survey finds a population concerned with social problems as 65% reported illegal drugs sales as an ongoing problem and 30% of those surveyed report they moved to rural parts of Kansas to escape the threat of urban crime. Likewise, residents were also concerned with broad social change, as nearly 90% described declining populations and 86% mentioned dwindling job opportunities as major concerns (The Carsey Institute, 2007).

These data are important as they hint at social and cultural relations shaping attitudes about crime and difference in rural parts of Kansas. For instance, when Palin invokes “real America” or a Governor declares meth “white trash” boundaries of difference are defined and maintained. Constructions of a “real America” and meth as “white trash” both bear the heavy stain of racial and spatial bigotry, albeit in slightly different ways. Just as “real America” draws distinctions between good and bad Americas, white trash marks difference in forms of whiteness28. White trash, a slur with a long history, presents a unique conflation of both

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28 Whiteness is a flexible set of social and symbolical boundaries giving shape, meaning, and power to the social category white (Wray, 2006, p. 6).
ethnoracial and class boundaries. Because the theory proposed here rests in arguably less diverse contexts than many urban centered criminological theories, it adopts Wray’s notion of social differentiation:

To resolve tired and tiring debates about how much analytical weight to give race versus class, or gender versus race, and so on, or about whether we are conceiving of such terms in essentialist or anti-essentialist ways, or about what exactly it means for something to be socially constructed, we should allow our methodological focus to resolve to a level of greater abstraction-social difference-and a larger domain of social practices-social differentiation (Wray, 2006, p. 6).

By focusing on difference, both “real America” and “white trash” are seen as projects of differentiation policing race, class, gender, and spatial boundaries simultaneously. This level of abstraction allows us to consider, more easily, the subtext of meaning of meth as a rural drug epidemic. Signaling a shift or transformation of the politics of punitiveness, or perhaps an escalation, punishment and racialized difference have come to include subordinate forms of whiteness and white criminality. Perhaps the first hint of this transformation appears in Charles Murray’s controversial 1993 editorial in the Wall Street Journal, warning of “The Coming White Underclass”⁹. Certainly, “the underclass” is an important sociological concept though it has typically described problems of inequality related to poverty, vocational and educational marginalization (Hayward & Yar, 2006). Important to the analysis here, is that Murray shifts the meaning of underclass from a structural descriptor to the individual level, deploying a strong sense of moralism. In this use, the underclass are viewed less as those victimized by the faltering welfare-state, and more a dependent class eschewing work and traditional values for the hedonism of single parenthood and other abhorrent behaviors. (Hayward & Yar, 2006; O'Brien & Yar, 2008).

Drawing on data purporting alarming rates of “white illegitimacy”, Murray fits now familiar “tangles of pathology” and “moral poverty” to poor whites (Bennett, Diulio, & Walters, 1996). Channeling Moynihan, Murray makes the huge, yet familiar leap from single parenthood to moral depravity, and crime asserting…”surely the culture must be "Lord of the Flies" writ large, the values of unsocialized male adolescents made norms -- physical violence, immediate gratification and predatory sex. That is the culture now taking over the black inner city” (Murray, 1993).

This argument was not new at the time, with roots running even deeper than Moynihan’s influential thesis. New however, is that perhaps for the first time in the era of mass imprisonment a prominent commentator applies the logic of moral poverty to the new frame of a white underclass proclaiming “…the black story, however dismaying, is old news. The new trend that threatens the U.S. is white illegitimacy.” As the passage below shows, Murray theorizes a new frontier of social policy and the dichotomous culture wars adjudicated daily on pages of newspapers and the scripted arguments of the nightly news. He notes the emerging white underclass is already numerically superior in all of the familiar “pathological” indicators of poverty, pregnant single mothers on welfare, jobless men, and crime, with one caveat, that until recently “whites have not had an "underclass" because the whites who might qualify have been scattered among the working class. Most prominently, he draws parallels between his underclass and ubiquitous “white trash”.

Instead, whites have had "white trash" concentrated in a few streets on the outskirts of town, sometimes a Skid Row of unattached white men in the large cities. But these scatterings have seldom been large enough to make up a neighborhood. An underclass needs a critical mass, and white America has not had one (Murray, 1993).
By describing the growing population of deprived whites as “white trash” Murray defines cultural and cognitive boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable identities, or in this case, deserving and undeserving forms of whiteness (Gans, 1995). Rehashing a thinly veiled culture of poverty, he cites sexual and social policy revolutions, broad shifts in cultural norms, and structural changes in the economy for the “murky” causal picture leading to this supposed change. At its core Murray urges that the “calculus of illegitimacy” springs forth from disregarded family values and deviation from the mythical fifties family structure—as did Moynihan before him.

The warnings continue with urgency arguing for corrective action—if not taken the crisis of white illegitimacy will grow to a “critical mass” leading to explosions in “crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, homelessness and homelessness…because [illegitimacy] drives everything else.” In a fashion profoundly similar to Bennett’s and colleagues (1996) concurrent assertions of the “moral poverty” of the Black community, he outlines indicators of crisis.

Look for certain schools in white neighborhoods to get a reputation as being unteachable, with large numbers of disruptive students and indifferent parents. Talk to the police; listen for stories about white neighborhoods where the incidence of domestic disputes and casual violence has been shooting up. Look for white neighborhoods with high concentrations of drug activity and large numbers of men who have dropped out of the labor force. Some readers will recall reading the occasional news story about such places already (Murray, 1993).

Clearly, Murray’s warnings draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable whites with behavioral terms of “teachability” “indifference” and the race baiting standards of drugs, violence and unemployment. Perhaps most notably, however, he implies poor whites are spatially and socially dislocated from poor the Blacks that Bennett and colleagues aimed their thesis toward, suggesting somehow that the structural problems that face the urban Black poor have, to this point ignored marginalized whites. Moreover, just as with the super predator thesis,
Murray claims “illegitimacy” will come to affect certain “white neighborhoods” as a plague just beginning to rear its head.

This prophecy also leads to familiar policy conclusions. For Murray, two paths out of the crises brought about by the tangles of a new white illegitimacy face the public. The first requires shoring up of an authoritarian, centralized state. The other solution proposed, not surprisingly is marriage. To reinvigorate the state of marriage Murray calls for increased stigma on the crimes of single motherhood. Definitively he suggests that if communities looked down upon single mothers, eventually the phenomenon would wane. Further, he argues for full-scale economic warfare unmarried parents, by cutting “generous” public assistance allotments to encourage more socially acceptable forms of dependency built around churches and nuclear families. Though these suggestions do not venture well outside of the conservative social policy playbook, they project familiar logic to new places. With blunt certainty, Murray builds the case for a new group of derelicts maintained at the bottom of the social order through state coercion, as either overt repression or quasi-social engineering. This logic carves rhetorical space for the “white [trash] underclass” once concentrated to certain streets or the outskirts of town, drawing parallels to the large swaths of minorities partitioned in urban ghettos. In effect, the social-structural processes supporting the disproportionate punishment of people of color move on to new characters and spaces. Theorizing the implications of Murray’s assertions, Colin Webster describes how culturally constructed distinctions among whites, support processes of criminalization and exclusion:

Whiteness is most ‘visible’ and most likely to be racialized and criminalized in its marginalized or subordinate forms. Hegemonic white ethnicity—typical of powerful white elites—tends to retain only an implicit view of itself as ‘white’. Whiteness is rarely evoked or mobilized as an ethnic resource or as a target of racialized discourses other than in situations of scarcity, competition or rapid social, economic and demographic
change. It is here *in extremis* that white ethnicity comes to have salience, and form an identifiable shape, profile and presence. (Webster, 2008, p. 308)

Webster’s thoughtful insights, coupled with Murray’s formulaic assertions show how the exclusive politics of late-modern social and criminal justice policy expand to include subordinate forms of whiteness. Obviously, the structural forces making mass imprisonment a reality do not spare so-called rural and white parts of the country. However, the call of the “coming white underclass” and warnings of “spreading illegitimacy” opens up theoretical insights for the politics of punishment in largely homogenous areas like Kansas.

**Ontological Insecurity and Punishment**

The steady advances of globalization and neoliberalism continue to shape local economic, political and cultural relations (Kimmel, 2003); and though these effects may be most apparent in developing nations, the social fallout of economic transformations appears in rural America as well. Over the last century, many rural men have transitioned from farm owners, and extractive laborers, to working in service industries, meat processing, construction and various other forms of less autonomous, less secure labor. This transition encouraged shifts in social relations as the privileges and status of “primary bread earners” diminished (DeKeseredy, Donnemeier, Schwartz, Tunnell, & Hall, 2007). The resultant gendered political economy inspires many men to deploy masculinity as a resource shore up public and domestic patriarchy (Kimmel, 2003, p. 603).

DeKeseredy and colleagues (2007) argue this shift and its attendant challenges to masculinity normalize various behaviors leading to separation and divorce as well as physical and sexual abuse. In a similar fashion, some scholars suggest the growing and widespread social insecurities of late modernity inspire emotive and punitive forms of justice. Perhaps not coincidentally then, the sharp increase in incarceration and the escalated wars on drugs and crime
coincide with the ascendancy of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies favoring free market solutions to social welfare problems. Some scholars describe the fear and apprehension of economic, cultural, and social uncertainties as *ontological insecurity* (Marle & Maruna, 2010). The well-cited passage below from Jock Young’s landmark *The Exclusive Society* captures this concept perfectly:

> Because of ontological insecurity there are repeated attempts to create a secure base. That is, to reassert one’s values as moral absolutes, to declare other groups as lacking in value, to draw distinct lines of virtue and vice, to be rigid rather than flexible in one’s judgments, to be punitive and excluding rather than permeable and assimilative. (Young J., 1999, p. 15).

In a somewhat Durkheimian sense, what Young argues here, is that increasingly exclusive sensibilities and emotive punishments rise from the needs of individuals to make sense of reality. Consequently, as the risks of late modernity shake the once ideal types of family life, nationality and racial supremacy, some take measures to secure their worldview through an essentialism emphasizing a traditional or “real” nature of the self and society. Though a somewhat abstract assertion, it is compatible with other theories and studies attempting to connect the fear-drenched emotionality of late modernity and its increasingly punitive criminal justice systems (Maruna, 2008). Van Marle and Maruna (2010) connect the expansive theoretical and empirical Terror Management (TMT) literature to ontological insecurity. TMT presupposes that humans are constantly at work to moderate the certainties of their own mortality. To manage the terror of death people nurture a cultural worldview supporting religious and spiritual rituals, traditional family values, an afterlife, and the hope for an enduring effect on the living world after death. This sort of cultural worldview lends everyday life a sense of permanence, order, and meaning. TMT theorists assert however, that the risks of modernity and challenges to cultural sensibilities diminish the ability to manage the terror of one’s eventual death. Therefore, just as Young
argues, when tangible threats to safety appear or once taken for granted certainties erode, individuals seek security and police moral boundaries, lending support to repressive and punitive approaches to criminal justice and public life (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997).

Others illustrate the emotionality of late modern punishments similarly. For example, noting the overreliance on various demographic differences such as race, sex, political orientation, racial prejudice and religiosity as explanations for punitive beliefs, Johnson (2009) finds anger crucial in shaping the public’s attitudes about criminal justice. With the exception of fear of crime, the literature on punishment has largely ignored the role of emotion in punitive attitudes. However, she finds anger, fear, as well as income, political conservatism, individualistic orientations to all significantly predict punitiveness. Taken in sum, her findings fit quite nicely with ontological insecurity and risk leading her to conclude “one possibility is that anger about crime is linked to feelings of anxiety, threat and resentment resulting from macro-level changes in the economy and the social order” (Johnson 2009).

Likewise, Hogan and colleagues (2005) link economic insecurity and blame to punitiveness. In perhaps the only study of its kind, the researchers find that respondents who attribute welfare, affirmative action, and immigration for declining wages are more likely to support punitive criminal justice responses. Additionally, they find that among white males their measure of blame is the best and most consistent predictor of punitiveness, while political conservatism and fear of crime are more important among women and racial minorities. The findings lead the authors to conclude that punitive attitudes may have a shared origin in attitudes toward the “undeserving poor” lending support for an “angry white male phenomenon” (Hogan et al 2005: 405). The study links insecurities similar to those described above and the cultural narratives of blame and the politics of “backlash” to punitive beliefs and support for punitive
policies towards law-breakers (Frank T., 2005; Gans, 1995). Similarly O’Connell (2010) finds the exaggerated cultural representations she calls “redneck whiteness” forms in opposition to the perception that urban life is increasingly multicultural and liberal (O’Connell, 2010, p. 537).

Some argue the election of Barak Obama, further agitated the crisis of white hegemony. Recent empirical research by Unnever and colleagues (2010) finds that whites are much more likely than Blacks to believe that race relations in the United States will dramatically worsen during Obama’s term. Further, they find whites were more likely to believe Obama’s election would make it easier for Black Americans to advance their careers and open up more opportunities for Blacks in national politics. However, the same study finds that while Black’s outlooks about life generally improved with Obama’s election, both whites and Blacks were less hopeful of criminal justice reform. The study suggests contradictory fallout of the country’s first Black president. While Blacks are generally more hopeful, whites believed the election would roll back race relations, and neither group believed the election would significantly affect mass incarceration, illustrating both an emerging crisis of whiteness, and the supremacy of current punishment practices (Unnever, Gabbidon, & Higgins, 2010).

**A Theory of Rural Punitivity**

It is important to consider how punitive beliefs and support for repressive criminal justice programs link to cultural beliefs about difference. For this study, it is particularly important to flesh out these issues in the context a relatively rural, racially homogenous states like Kansas, that do not comport with stereotypical constructions of urban crime. The figure below presents a model of rural punitivity, in the effort to understand why methamphetamine, a relatively rare drug, remains at the forefront of public safety initiatives for states such as Kansas. Combining challenges to racial and masculine identity, against a backdrop of social change, the model
suggests that difference becomes an important mechanism to make sense of and normalize everyday life.

As many of argue, the model begins with the assumption that the inevitable social and economic transformations of late modernity exaggerate feelings of insecurity. Social constructions of the rural idyll, holding that rural parts of the country are representative of wholesomeness and traditional morality, exaggerate this state. In the effort to reaffirm moral and social boundaries in an increasingly uncertain world, some police boundaries of difference. In racially homogenous areas, this may appear as class conflict; however, it leads some to consider varying degrees of racialized difference among whites, as well. Thus social relations upholding notions of difference as “white trash”, with meth racialized as a “white trash drug” may hold implication for the resiliency of methamphetamine as a uniquely rural phenomenon.

![Figure 16: Conceptual Model of Rural Punitivity](image)

**Figure 16: Conceptual Model of Rural Punitivity**

Though no public opinion data specific to methamphetamine use and users are currently available, the Survey Research Center at the Institute for Policy and Social Research at the University of Kansas provides data on the public’s attitudes towards more general criminal

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30 Adopted from DeKeseredy and colleagues’ rural masculinity crisis/male peer support model of separation/divorce sexual assault (DeKeseredy, Donnermeyer, Schwartz, Tunnell, & Hall, 2007).
justice issues in Kansas. Collected in 2007, the data include responses from a randomly selected sub-sample of 500 drawn from a larger stratified sample of 2,315\(^{31}\).

Perhaps the most striking response from the survey is the level of concern paid to issues of drugs and crime relative to other social problems of the day (Figure 17). At the precipice of collapsing housing markets and a worldwide recession the data show “drugs and crime” command nearly as much apprehension as broader categories of “jobs, taxes, and the economy”. This is a very important beginning point theoretically, as ontological insecurities marshaling punitive notions of social difference relate directly to crime and economic conditions (Young J., 2007).

![Figure 17: Most Important Problem Facing Kansas](image)

\(^{31}\)“The response rate for the survey was 22 percent, which is in line with industry averages. The poll has 95 percent confidence with a margin of error of +/-4 percentage points. The margin of error reflects the interval in which the data collected from this survey would be within +/-4 percent of the distributions reported in 95 out of 100 surveys conducted among adults in Kansas” (Pew 2007:3).
The data also reveal some interesting details about the public’s attitudes relating to theories of punitiveness discussed above. For instance, several items find support the increasing crime/distrust model, as only about 15% of the respondents believe that sentences for “serious violent offenders” have become more severe in recent years. Similarly, only about 21% reported they believe that the average prisoner spent more time in prison than they did ten years ago. When asked specifically about child molestation, over half believed first time sex offenders spend less than ten years in prison and nearly two-thirds believed that all prisoners in general served less than half of the actual sentence imposed. Underscoring themes of the increasing crime distrust model, the respondents were generally off the mark when compared to actual Kansas policies.

For example, with the adoption of mandatory sentencing policies sentence lengths in Kansas have increased, generally following national trends. In fact, the average sentence in terms of time served for violent offenders increased from 29 months in 1993 to 41 months, accounting for an overall increase of 41% in time spent prison, out-pacing the national average increase of 15% by a significant margin. This growth occurred in spite, or perhaps due to the implementation of presumptive sentencing practices in 1993.

Table 2 displays changes in standard sentences in months for felonies level 1 through 3 by criminal history between the years 1994-2009. As the table shows, a defendant with a level 1 felony presenting offense and a criminal history score of A (3 or more prior person felonies) is subject to a term of presumptive imprisonment of 232 months greater in 2009 than in 1994 (620 vs. 388 months). The table also shows a defendant sentenced for any level one felony is subject to an average sentence increase of 9.5 years greater in 2009 than in 1994. Similarly, guideline changes are greater by criminal history score, with the highest score subject to an average
sentence increase of 12 years across the top three felony categories. While important to note the greatest changes occurred in sentences for the most serious felonies, the data show that Kansas moved toward harsher punishments for these offenders during a relatively short period, disproving public beliefs of permissive criminal justice.

Table 2: Sentencing Guideline Changes 1994-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity Level</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>Average Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>+232</td>
<td>+220</td>
<td>+120</td>
<td>+95</td>
<td>+88</td>
<td>+80</td>
<td>+73</td>
<td>+66</td>
<td>+58</td>
<td>+9.5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>+175</td>
<td>+164</td>
<td>+77</td>
<td>+71</td>
<td>+65</td>
<td>+60</td>
<td>+55</td>
<td>+49</td>
<td>+44</td>
<td>+7.5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>+39</td>
<td>+36</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>+1.6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Difference</td>
<td>+12 yrs</td>
<td>+11.6 yrs</td>
<td>+5.9 yrs</td>
<td>+5.0 yrs</td>
<td>+4.6 yrs</td>
<td>+4.25 yrs</td>
<td>+3.7 yrs</td>
<td>+3.4 yrs</td>
<td>+3.1 yrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prisoners have been required to serve at least 80% of their imposed sentence since 1995 when Kansas adopted “truth in sentencing” type policies. Despite high profile campaigns promoting Jessica’s Law that imposes a mandatory 25 year sentence for a first conviction for several types of child molestation most respondents believed that sentences for these types of crimes were less than ten years. These data show that the public generally believe that the criminal justice system in Kansas is growing “softer on crime” supporting the escalating crime and distrust model as a motivator of punitiveness.

Connected to notions of the permissiveness of the criminal justice system are beliefs about prison life. When asked about services available to prisoners prior to release 64% and 48% believed prisoners received vocational/educational and drug treatment services respectively.

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These data again contradict the actualities of the prison system in Kansas that provides services to 18% of prisoners in need of job training and drug treatment to 36% of those with need (Pew 2008). The discrepancy between these data again reflect the consistent belief that the criminal justice system provides more rehabilitative services than it does, if not the belief that the system is soft and coddles prisoners by providing superfluous support. Finally, when asked “because of tougher laws passed by the legislature the Kansas prison population is growing do you think the state should build more prisons?” over half responded yes. Though, when given the option of seeking alternatives to imprisonment more were in favor of other less expensive options.

Table 3 below displays the responses to this question and a number of others that reflect general attitudes toward crime and criminals by a number of key demographic variables. The first question displayed in column one asks respondents “are you satisfied with life in Kansas”. For the purposes here, “satisfaction” is a proxy for “ontological insecurity”. Though not specific, notions of satisfaction certainly relates to individual understandings and attitudes about life in Kansas. In broad terms, the vast majority of respondents are not “satisfied” with Kansas, though no statistical difference between categories is apparent. It is important to consider how this variable may reflect the general outlook that this sample of Kansans have on life, though it cannot be assumed that satisfaction with life in Kansas has worsened over time. Regardless, the data present a snapshot of a general undercurrent of insecurity. As discussed previously, some theorize that punitive attitudes and calls to reaffirm moral boundaries increase when people feel that their living conditions are deteriorating and their lives are unsecure and uncertain.

The next column displays demographics by respondents for those naming drugs and crime as the most important problem facing Kansas. For this group the only significant difference in respondent descriptor categories is between those with a college degree and those
without. As research has shown, education often mediates the public’s fear of crime (Lee, 2007). It is interesting that though drugs and crime was the second greatest worry, the lack of statistical difference between basic demographic categories perhaps provides evidence of the inescapable concern for crime and drugs.

More differences appear in responses for the question “what should be the top priority for dealing with crime in Kansas?” This question has four possible responses separated by preferences for prevention and rehabilitation compared to enforcement and punishment. This is the best available measure to examine respondent’s preference for punitive criminal justice practices. The data show, men believe the role of the criminal justice system is to enforce and punish more than women, whites prefer this approach more than non-whites and those identifying as conservative more than those identifying as liberal. In sum, the data provide some support for punitive orientations extending from racial and political identity and correspond nicely with the “angry white male” phenomenon of punitive orientations (Hogan, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2005).

The final two columns in the table reflect general attitudes toward current criminal justice policies and the consequences that grow from them. The first column represents the question “because of tough laws passed by the legislature...the prison population is growing. Do you think the state should build more prisons?” Again differences appear between racial categories and political orientations with whites and conservatives favoring expansion of correctional institutions. Perhaps this reflects differences in commitment to the direction of already established policies. Alternatively, perhaps white and non-white respondents have different social understandings of the harmful effects of imprisonment. Regardless, it appears that non-whites and liberals are less committed to the expansion of imprisonment as a response to crime.
The final question provides an additional distinction to the question of prison expansion. As a follow up, researchers asked, “*In order to build and operate the additional prison beds it will cost 500 Million dollars over 10 years. Alternatively, the state could avoid having to build prisons by keeping offenders from failing on probation and ending up in prison. Which strategy should the state pursue?*” Of the possible responses, the data here reflect respondents that favored new alternatives to avoid building more prisons. Again, political ideology appears to be an important factor in the responses with conservatives favoring alternatives to incarceration significantly less than liberals, despite the caveat of less costly alternatives. Additionally, older respondents favored cost saving measures to prison expansion. Together, the data suggest political ideology, race and sex bind tightly with beliefs about crime and punishment, lending some support for the theoretical model proposed above.

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33 Possible responses: A. Build more prisons B. Seek alternatives to avoid building prisons C. Build some prisons and seek alternatives.
Table 3: Contingency Table for Key Variables and Demographic Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Satisfied w/Ks.</th>
<th>Drugs &amp; Crime</th>
<th>Punishment</th>
<th>Build Prisons</th>
<th>Alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>49.4*</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>40.6*</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>44.9*</td>
<td>58.3**</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>36.1*</td>
<td>34.7**</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>50.3***</td>
<td>58.7*</td>
<td>41.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>30.7***</td>
<td>50.0*</td>
<td>50.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>18.0***</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Degree</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>32.3***</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 or Older</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>61.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 or Younger</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>41.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Above</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Below</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exploring these concepts further, the table below presents a pair of logistic regressions focusing on two general concepts. The first model explores why some respondents appear more concerned with crime and drugs and the second examines for support punishment and enforcement oriented criminal justice policies. These two indicators are very important to this study conceptually as they reflect the salience of drugs and crime and the formation of punitive beliefs.

The model predicting “drugs and crime” yields only one significant finding. As with the bivariate analysis, only education significantly predicts concern for drugs and crime. The model shows that those with at least a college degree are about 57% less likely to be concerned with drugs and crime, than those with less education. This finding may suggest that education as a proxy for social engagement reduces misinformation shown to enhance fear of crime and drugs. Perhaps equally as interesting are the remaining variables that do not reach accepted thresholds.
of statistical significance. Political orientation, satisfaction with life in Kansas, and being “very concerned with crime” did not prove to be significant predictors for those naming crime and drugs as the chief social problem in Kansas. Further, variables estimating punitive and rehabilitative orientations do not share a significant relationship with concern for drugs and crime, perhaps suggesting that punitiveness is influenced less by concern for crime than by other unmeasured values.

The second model, predicting preference for punishment and enforcement more aptly reflects findings of the literature. As with the drugs and crime model, education is important in predicting preference for punishment and enforcement. The model shows that those with a college degree or higher are about 36% less likely to think punishment and enforcement should be the primary function of the criminal justice system. One of the strongest relationships in the model is political orientation. Those identifying as politically conservative are more than twice as likely to favor punishment and enforcement as their politically liberal counterparts. Obviously, this finding holds implications considering the conservative political tradition in Kansas. Not surprisingly, those in favor of building more prisons in response to crime were also about twice as likely to prefer punishment and enforcement as those who favored alternatives to incarceration.

Moreover, opinions of rehabilitative services share a significant relationship with punitive orientations. When asked if the lack of drug treatment or job training services was a major barrier to reintegration upon release from prison, those supporting these services appear less control and punishment oriented. However, obvious differences appear in support for drug

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34 For example, Gallup recently ranked the states in terms of political ideology and found that only 19% of Kansas residents identified themselves as liberal, ranking Kansas as the 16th most conservative state
treatment compared to job training, with those favoring job training about 88% less likely to favor punishment and enforcement.

**Table 4: Logistic Regressions for Greatest Social Problem and Criminal Justice Priority**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Characteristics</th>
<th>Drugs &amp; Crime</th>
<th>Punishment &amp; Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.968 (-.032)</td>
<td>1.345 (.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.516 (-.662)</td>
<td>1.287 (.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.003 (.003)</td>
<td>.996 (-.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.926 (-.077)</td>
<td>.962 (-.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>.432*** (-.839)</td>
<td>.637* (-.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1.579 (.456)</td>
<td>2.239*** (.806)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with Kansas</td>
<td>1.159 (.147)</td>
<td>1.484 (.395)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Concerned about Crime</td>
<td>1.101 (.096)</td>
<td>1.007 (.007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Punitive Values**

| Recidivism Likely          | 1.447 (.370)  | 1.269 (.238)               |
| Once a Criminal Always a Criminal | .904 (-.101)  | 1.161 (.150)               |
| Punishments are Less Severe | .932 (-.070)  | 1.526 (.423)               |
| Build More Prisons         | 1.278 (.246)  | 2.076*** (.730)           |

**Rehabilitative Values**

| Very Important for Drug Treatment | 1.539 (.431) | .349* (-1.054) |
| Very Important for Job Training  | 1.433 (.360) | .115*** (-2.116) |

| N                            | 490           | 480                        |
| -2 Log Likelihood            | 547.817       | 587.264                    |
| Model Significance           | .002          | 0.00                       |
| Pseudo R-Square              | .062          | .183                       |

*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001
As described in Chapter 2, and as Beckett and Sasson argue, “conservative politicians have worked for decades to alter popular perceptions of crime, delinquency, addiction, and poverty, and to promote polices that involve getting tough and cracking down” (Beckett & Sasson, 2004, p. 46). As demonstrated here, the residue of the tough on crime movement is quite apparent in the values and beliefs of Kansas residents. Fitting with the theoretical model, the data show a strong undercurrent of insecurity or “dissatisfaction” with life in Kansas, and concurrent beliefs that the criminal justice system is ineffectual, failing to both rehabilitate and punish offenders appropriately.

These views also reflect the long-standing traditions of rugged individualism coursing through the veins of American public life and social policy. Just as the welfare queen came to signify racialized criminality and dependency, the cowboy characterizes the mythical industriousness, masculinity and rugged individualism of white men (Boris, 2007). As an ideal opposite to the feckless hedonism of welfare cheats, the rugged individualist accomplishes the American dream through individual choice and strength of character. As such, just as the mythical the “cowboy-soldier hero model” (Boris, 2007, p. 603) conquered the frontier, problems of crime and punishment are best decided by tests of individual character and demonstrations of “grit” (Furniss, 2006). Thus, neoliberal social policies that punish rather than support gain the most support among white conservative males (Hogan, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2005; Johnson D., 2009; Unnever & Cullen, 2010; Unnever, Gabbidon, & Higgins, 2010).

Even though the analyses presented here are not specific to meth crimes, they hold implication for criminal justice policy and the exploration of punitive beliefs in Kansas. The data suggest race, sex, political conservatism and a general lack of information figure prominently in the formation of cognitive landscapes and individual sensibilities supporting
punitive approaches to law breakers. For the more complex models, the sparse significant findings of concern for drugs and crime perhaps reflect lack of variance of the data and the salience of fear of drugs and crime in general. Similarly, though satisfaction with Kansas does not relate significantly to either concern for drugs and crime or punitive orientations, broad dissatisfaction may have also influenced the findings. However, overall the importance of education and political conservatism provide a frame to consider the unique circumstances of crime control in a primarily white, rural state.

As I have argued, methamphetamine use and abuse in Kansas and nationally remains an important issue for government, the media, and the public ensuring its unique position in the politics of punishment. Further illustrating this, the next chapter documents how mediated reports of meth crimes are gendered illustrating a dichotomy between constructions of masculine and feminine criminality.
CHAPTER 5 - Gendering the Crisis of the Present

Crises of representation and control, moral panics over missing children or sex workers or muggers, murderers and murderous conflicts made visible or invisible – all return us to the broader crisis of the present moment. Within it the deformities of globalization surface in matters of migration and imagined community, in panics over foreign tourism and foreign justice, in the dislocated fears that course through worldwide internet communities…circulating from fly posters to websites to video clips, and yet grounded still in gendered, racialized, and class-based notions of ideal parents, ideal victims, and unknown perpetrators. Within it…there can be no understanding of war, crime, or terror without an inquiry into media, culture, and meaning. -Greer, Ferrell, & Jewkes, Investigating the crisis of the present (2008).

As the quote above hints, the aim of this chapter is to examine representations of meth crimes and meth users in the news media. In doing so, the chapter shows how general anxieties about meth users both reinforce and spring from parochial beliefs about acceptable femininities and masculinities. Specifically, the chapter compares differences in reports of men and women’s involvement with the drug. Emerging from these depictions are culturally constructed notions of female meth user’s hyper-sexuality, immorality, and inability as parents which stand in contrast to concurrent constructions of male meth users as calculating entrepreneurs and criminal mad men. The chapter also offers a conceptual frame to consider how this sort of mediated dichotomy emerges from and reinforces popular understandings of meth users in rural spaces. Paying close attention to such representations provides a glimpse of broader arrangements that structure social life, revealing socially contrived identities wrapped in the cloak of crisis. As Chris Greer and his colleagues warn above, within the crises of the present “identities remain mediated accomplishments, circulating from fly posters to websites to video clips, and yet grounded still in gendered, racialized, and class-based notions of ideal parents, ideal victims, and unknown perpetrators” (Greer, Ferrell, & Jewkes, 2008, pp. 7-8).

35 Most of this chapter is published as “Mad Men, Meth Moms, and Moral Panic: Gendering Meth Crimes in the Midwest” Critical Criminology: An International Journal Volume 18, Issue 2 (2010), Pages 95-110
A powerful example of meth use as both a mediated crisis and accomplishment comes from official state sources as the Montana Meth Project (MMP). The MMP describes itself as a large-scale exercise in prevention consisting of, “an ongoing, research-based marketing campaign…that realistically and graphically communicates the risks of methamphetamine to the youth of Montana” (The Montana Meth Project, 2009). The campaign uses television, print, and radio formats built around graphic depictions of teen meth users as pimps and prostitutes who prey on family, friends, and strangers. Scare tactics aside, the print ads are overtly sexualized, racialized, and gendered representations of meth users. For example, of the fifteen print images available on the organization’s website, all of them feature young white users and more than half feature women. In addition to graphic depictions of users picking scabs or “meth bugs” and being raped, each ad contains a warning like “15 bucks for sex isn’t normal. But on meth it is” (Montana Meth Project 2009).

Though MMP administrators claim the project is responsible for significant reductions in teen drug use, the efficacy of project and its tactics remain in doubt. For instance, a recent study finds claims of success are based evaluations with significant methodological problems (Erceg-Hurn, 2008). Arguments of effectiveness aside, MMP style tactics exaggerate a dichotomous way of thinking about gendered criminality pitting the sexual promiscuity of young women against the unpredictable violence of young men. Despite critique, several states such as Illinois continue to invest in MMP style projects. When examined in context of bygone drug panics, amplified media and governmental attention, and public service campaigns like the Montana Meth Project, it is clear that meth presents a new threat – and one with very clear racialized and gendered elements.

The moral panics framework has been used extensively to examine things like the “meth
epidemic” discussed here, and is a useful starting point for this chapter. The term moral panic first coined by Jock Young (1971) and elaborated Stan Cohen (2002) has been used extensively to examine the emergence of all manner of social problems. While popular among academics, it is one of the few concepts found in popular culture and invoked on television and in print by government officials and the media (Garland, 2008). Moral panic describes the media and authorities’ exaggerated reaction or “collective mistake in understanding” to the behavior of a particular group or cultural identity—the folk devil (Ferrell, Hayward, & Young, 2008, p. 48).

Often folk devils are young, poor, and powerless emblems of social change and the scapegoats of life in an ontologically uncertain world. In the midst of panic, the public feeds on stylized and exaggerated depictions of a new enemy, as media officials, pundits, and politicians champion traditional morality. Simultaneously, socially accredited experts like Bennett and DiIulio, pronounce diagnoses and solutions to calm fears and sway public sentiment. In many cases, reactionary policies that promote inequality remain long after the panic retreats from popular imagination.

As the name implies, moral panics are often said to be symptomatic of social decay, an element perhaps most evident when discussing the place of women and racial minorities in drug panics. History is awash with instances where drug use, illicit sex, welfare dependency, and single parenthood blamed as the cause rather than a correlate of more general social change (Boyd, 2004). Moving forward to the crisis of the present, daily newspaper reports, news broadcasts and multi-mediated public service campaigns lead the public to conclude that the phenomenon of the female meth user is a symptom of decay of the core of American social life: motherhood, childhood, and family. Here are women that presumably shirk traditional working-class values of motherhood and service to family for the idleness and debauchery of drug use.
While unique in representation, intersecting cultural constructions of race, class, gender, age, appear in both the bygone crack craze that ensnared urban Blacks and the growing meth panic aimed at the white countryside. This is interesting considering that moral panics often represent a contradiction, offering the public both a scapegoat and an object of envy able to transgress and subvert the structural traps of everyday life (McRobbie and Thornton 1995). As Young asserts “It cannot be accident that the stereotype of the underclass with its idleness, dependency, hedonism and institutionalized irresponsibility, with its drug use, teenage pregnancies and fecklessness, represents all the traits which the respectable citizen has to suppress in order to maintain his or her lifestyle” (Young J., 2007, p. 42). When viewed individually, panics appear episodic, they seem to rise and fall at the whim media and public attention. However, if we pay attention to the cultural script of drug panics and make connections between crises of the present, like crack and meth, a new narrative appears. Here meth is not a new drug epidemic, rather a particular face or point context and time emerging from the monolithic backdrop of risk, crisis and security (Feeley & Simon, 2007). Though immensely influential, the greatest problem with the moral panics schema is its misapplication. Often it is used as a blanket approach to social problems leaving the identities of folk devils and the contexts that produced them assumed or underdeveloped (Gelsthorpe, 2005). For instance, Miller’s (1998) ethnographic work shows a broad continuum of gender at work in crime, even in highly masculine endeavors like street robbery. As she correctly argues, though the mandates of masculinity and femininity are pervasive, viewing crime as a predominately-masculine endeavor is problematic (Miller, 2002). This is important as phenomena like a “rural meth epidemic” reflect a prism of gendered, racialized and classed notions simultaneously. However, as with the previous chapter, rather than focusing on particular intersectional identities, at a higher level of
abstraction, this chapter shows how meth shores up gendered differences “as a means of conceptualizing the lines of power in society” (Jewkes, 2004, p. 85). With this in mind, this chapter examines the “gendered, racialized, and class-based notions of ideal parents, ideal victims, and unknown perpetrators” and the exclusionary fallout of a “rural meth epidemic”.

Table 5 below illustrates the dichotomy between newspaper reports of meth crimes in the Midwest. With the examination of Miller’s gendered criminal dichotomies in mind, the sample of articles and the analysis were set up to get at differences representation in meth crimes between men and women. This does not imply that differences within categories do not exist. Certainly, the media represent a continuum of genders when reporting on meth crimes, just as gender “done” by meth users is not dichotomous. However, to aid clarity and because of the ongoing analogies between meth and crack using “welfare queens” this chapter is focuses differences between men and women and representations of female meth users specifically.

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36 Detailed description of methodology contained in Appendix A.
Table 5: Newspaper Descriptions of Meth Crimes 1995-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes in sample articles</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex/weight loss/energy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large amounts of drugs or money</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in the methamphetamine market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple possession</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale-distribute</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mule/bystander</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing chemicals or precursors</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal virility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacked or fled police</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons involved</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse-neglect/custody/social services</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome of involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean/treatment</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison sentence</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire/explosion and injury/death</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gendered Reasons

The first and perhaps most striking contrast is reasons for use or involvement with meth. Thirteen percent of the articles suggest that women begin to use meth as a weight loss strategy, for energy to accomplish household tasks, or to enhance sex. Conversely, the articles commonly portray men as rational actors, becoming involved as a business decision connected to economic opportunity, as evidenced by descriptions of large amounts of drugs or money. This dichotomy is possibly the most interesting finding of this research, describing male involvement simply as a business decision while women assume the risks of methamphetamine for banal and vain reasons related to sex, housekeeping, and appearance. Recalling Miller’s (2002) work, this is very much a static and gendered portrayal that perpetuates and extends the connection of feminine criminality to monolithic social structures that shape human behavior.
(i.e., boys will be boys). As women’s reasons for using meth are reflect appropriate femininities, the motivation of men appear to rarely come into question. In this context then, women’s experiences as drug users are marginalized and sexualized, if not trivialized. For example, a consistent suggestion is that women use meth as a weight loss strategy characterized by the term “Jenny Crank Diet”, as the following passage from the Topeka Capital Journal asserts:

One woman said the drug helped her lose weight by taking away her appetite for everything --- except meth (Hrenchir, 2000).

Other mediated depictions underscore the collision of drug use, sexuality, and expectations of a physique that fits the racialized, classed beauty norms of modern American life.

Her life was then a merry-go-round of men and drugs. She eventually settled on meth as her drug of choice, because it helped her stay awake and keep her weight down (Eiserer, 1999).

Here the report suggests that meth use for women is just an accessory or tool to attract men. The article typifies women as those who “eventually settle” on meth to help stay awake in the “merry-go-round” of illicit sex with multiple partners. This statement constructs women’s meth use as nothing more than a whim, accommodating the moral depravity of promiscuous and lurid sexual habits. Again, this proposes a gendered dichotomy of offending that Miller (2002) and others have caution against. Although the analyses will later show that women are disproportionately punished for child abuse and neglect resulting from meth use, in this instance oddly, the data purport that women begin using meth to be more effective mothers.

The young mother felt energized. ‘It makes you motivated,’ she said. ‘You get a lot of stuff done. That’s what I like so much about it. I could take care of my kids, get the housework done and not get burned out (Range, 2000).

Here is a strange presentation of meth use encouraged by highly gendered norms. In
contrast to men, women start using meth so they can keep up with their housework and children. Hidden within this image, as Bonilla-Silva might agree (2006), are discussions of “housework” and “taking care of my kids” that carry implications diametrically opposed to previous depictions of the welfare queen, who presumably did neither. In this narrative, rural or suburban, and therefore white women, fall prey to a new invader, in part because of the gendered nature of their daily life. Perhaps, as the data seem to suggest, the behavior of meth using women is somehow mitigated because it results from their attempt to satisfy long standing social expectations. The passage below illustrates the disparity between masculine and feminine norms that persist even when under the influence of meth:

One can often tell where ice is being smoked, because the woman in the house will be a compulsive cleaner and the place will be spick and span. The man, meanwhile, will have become what police officers call a “tweaker”, overcome with a manic urge to take things apart, and so car and machine parts will often be scattered on an immaculate lawn (Goldberg, 1997).

As the Times describes, meth users follow the typical trajectory of gendered social expectations, masculine or mechanical chores for men, while women are compelled to clean their homes. Finally, the following excerpts depict women as not only able to accomplish typical middle-class suburban wifely tasks on meth, but also being able to over-perform such duties on the drug.

It blew her mind away, she got so much energy from it that she could clean five or six homes a day and still take care of her own home (Range, 2000).

It’s amazing what you can accomplish when you’re on meth…it’s the superwoman drug. Women use it to be superwife, superemployee, and super thin (Cuniberti, 2003).

The excerpts above carry the clear suggestion that women begin using meth to become “superwoman”, “superwife”, superemployee”, and “super thin”. All of these
characterizations stand in clear contrast to depictions of men and starkly oppose the depravity of the inner city other central to the crack panic. Moreover, when the media tells us what it means to be a “superwife” it also imparts very clear racialized meanings that in turn construct notions of ideal criminals and ideal victims, in a new social context. The final interesting depiction suggests that women use meth to perform sexually. As the Omaha World Herald describes:

Dubbed by some experts as the "woman's wonder drug," the highly addictive drug can provide a sense of unlimited energy and focus. It suppresses the appetite, causing its users to shed pound after pound without effort. And meth can enhance sexual performance (Range, 2000).

Interviewing a law enforcement official, The New York Times adds that meth helps the user perform as a sex worker: “There may be piece of it related to weight loss,” he said, and “a piece of it related to enabling prostitution, it’s a drug that allows you to deal with your feelings of remorse” (Goldberg 1997). Both quotes give descriptions of how meth can aid women in performing gendered and sexualized tasks expected of them.

This selection of quotes correspond with broad cultural mandates requiring women to remain thin, keep a clean house, keep up with children, and perform sexually. Regardless of the validity of these assertions it leads to the belief that women are so vain that they involve themselves in the drug market to manage their appearance and their households. Meanwhile, tales of men involved with methamphetamine revolve around rational business decisions and the sensual lure of the criminal lifestyle. These depictions diminish the agency of women inside and outside of the meth culture, while also constructing mitigating narratives of the rural or suburban user as victim to “womanly duties” that clash with descriptions of her inner-city counterparts. Moreover, while many believe drug users assume a master status that overrides individual
identities, summary depictions of meth users seem to exaggerate taken for granted identities. In this context, the vanity of the feminine form is exaggerated to such a degree that weight loss, sexuality, and household chores sit at the core of meth related crime and deviance.

**Meth Jobs and Criminal Virility**

The next category, duties in the meth market, reflects the type of activities individuals have in the meth trade. Though the categories are similar, the data clearly suggest that men are responsible for the production and sale of meth (54.3% and 51.4% respectively), and women remain accomplices, mules, or bystanders. This finding is similar to Maher’s (2000) observations of the Brooklyn crack market that shows while crack using men and women shared similar risks, methods used by women to stay afloat in the illicit crack market were consistently subordinate to men.

According to the data, men are primarily responsible for securing chemical precursors, manufacturing, and distributing the drug; women are responsible for delivery or operate as assistant to a man more centrally involved. This finding also complements Collison’s (1996) findings that drug dealing activities help construct ideal masculinities for men with little other social resources. The following excerpt details how men secure chemicals necessary for production, a theme that appears in 30.5% of the sampled articles, as opposed to women who appear involved in this behavior in about 7.6% of the articles.

As Morbach returned to patrolling Nebraska 92, he saw another man filling a 1-gallon gas can from a tank of anhydrous ammonia, a farm fertilizer that can be used to make meth. Morbach said the suspect ran and he tackled him in a nearby farm field. The suspect…said that the other man was an accomplice and that they planned to make meth in the 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera parked by the ammonia tank, Morbach said. Equipment and materials used to make methamphetamine filled the car’s trunk and front passenger seat (Spencer K., 2000).
Similar to previous binary descriptions of masculine and feminine “tweaking” behaviors (mechanical vs. household tasks), the sample portraits these behaviors as decidedly masculine-men who do the important work of chemical collection and production while women fill in the blanks. Although the dichotomy is clear, it is not clear whether this division of labor is entirely constructed by the media or if the data depict actual differences in duties. Regardless, the mediated depictions illustrate perceived differences in use between men and women. Whereas men are often portrayed as rational or violent producers or distributors, women are marginalized. The following passages further document this hierarchy, illustrating how the gendered nature of everyday life is present in meth culture as well.

June Garcia’s trial started Monday. She was charged with conspiracy to distribute …methamphetamine. The crime is a felony punishable by as much as 20 years in prison and a 1 million dollar fine. Garcia was not the main player in the drug ring, but testimony and evidence showed she was clearly involved (Waltman, 2007).

This passage contains an obvious contradiction. Apparently for June Garcia, her role in distribution may result in a prison sentence of 20 years. Regardless of the severity of her punishment, the media assert that somehow Ms. Garcia was “not the main player” in the conspiracy leaving the reader to wonder what type of punishment the “main player” might receive – but more centrally leaving the reader to assume someone more powerful and instrumental was the main player, someone other than June, someone who is in fact likely male.

In an even more direct manner, the St. Louis Post Dispatch reports that “Women, [are] traditionally couriers for boyfriends or husbands who sell drugs…” (Bryant, 1999) again underscoring the hierarchical nature of depictions of Midwest meth culture. Other media reports tell us of a variety of accomplice roles that women occupy, whether mule or maid. One woman describes the extent of the duties necessary to remain in the good graces of her dealers: “I
cooked their food," she said. "I washed their clothes." (Winter 1997). Facing yet another double stigma, some accounts propose that regardless of their position in the meth industry, women often share an equal or greater burden of criminal punishments.

At the time, authorities seized a package, which was delivered to the house, that they say contained 32 ounces of methamphetamine, James Johnson III already pleaded guilty in the case. He was the main player in the drug case and testified Tuesday that Taylor (his girlfriend) helped him ship drugs from the Phoenix area to Aberdeen (Waltman, 2007).

The article referencing another case in which the man, though already convicted, is the “main player” and helps convict his girlfriend. Ultimately, this theme illustrates that mediated depictions of the meth trade are not substantially different from “mainstream” social life, women’s duties and activities remain subordinate to men’s.

**Mad Men and Meth Moms**

Again, clear divisions in the type of interactions individuals had with law enforcement are also evident in the data. The media suggest that men are much more likely to use weapons, or attack or flee from authorities. This reaffirms the depiction of women as passive actors and suggests that men possess more criminal agency then women. However, the clearest division in terms of descriptions of criminality is child abuse. As it relates to meth, women are almost exclusively held responsible for the abuse and neglect of children. Very little discussion of male responsibility for abuse or neglect cases appears in the sample. This finding mirrors broader social norms, placing the bulk of child rearing duties at the feet of women. The finding also reveals gendered responsibilities of the meth culture, as well as the official responses to child abuse.

The media report that the behavior of men is more erratic and criminally volatile than that of women. For example, I find that the data depict men attacking or fleeing police four
times as often as women, as evidenced by the following passages:

At 9:21 pm, Monday police say they tried to pull over the men’s truck for a lane violation near the intersection of Interstate 70 and Highway 47. A chase ensued with speeds reaching 110 mph, and during the pursuit, police saw numerous items being thrown from the passenger window of the truck (Weisch, 2005).

Troy police responded to the Dollar General Store…Employees told police that the man had gotten into a truck and driven behind the building. Police drove to the back of the store, saw the truck, and found the man inside a trash bin (Weich, 2003).

These articles support the narrative of male unpredictability and the ongoing distinction between masculine and feminine criminality. When authorities confront male meth users, they confront strong, sometimes violent opposition. This however, appears to not be the case for women or their attempts at alluding authorities are not quite as publicized. In any case, the media provide clear and distinct competing narratives in behavior differences between men and women. Other articles describing sophisticated levels of security and weaponry used by male dealers also help construct the “mad man” identity of men in the meth trade. As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch describes:

Police searched the home Wednesday morning. Officers found five pipe bombs inside the kitchen, a shotgun, an assault rifle, a .357 Magnum and a crate holding about a thousand rounds of ammunition, authorities said…The level of paranoia is the highest we’ve ever seen…We’ve seen surveillance equipment and stuff like that, but it has never gotten to the point where bombs were being manufactured (Munz, 1999).

As the article describes, men are not only sophisticated in their methods, but are dangerous and increasingly paranoid in their activities. Other depictions of men contacted by authorities vacillate between unpredictable and bizarre conduct, as this narrative describes:

Harr was stopped Jan. 21 for traffic violations…The officer asked the man who is 6-feet-9 inches tall and 200 pounds if had any weapons. The man pulled back his coat to reveal two knives (Munz 2000).

Though this article successfully conveys male criminal threat, it is impossible to verify the actual
context of this arrest. The introduction of physical size and the mention of weapons transform a mundane drug arrest into a strange tale of potential violence. These tales of male criminality are examples of what Reinarman and Levine (1997) call the routinization of caricature or cases in which the media rhetorically construct unusual events as everyday occurrences. In this case, the media tells us that men are either rational actors, or tweaked-out mad men.

Meanwhile, the data present a concurrent, yet altogether different narrative of feminine criminality. For women, their criminality reflects their failures as mothers. Recall this theme that contradicts previous assertions suggesting that women become involved with the drug so they can “keep up with their kids” and “keep a clean house”. This seems to reflect that the media construct “meth moms” as a new folk devil, emblematic of a new threat to traditional morality seeping into Midwestern communities. Additionally, victimhood is an important indicator of the tenor of this panic. Existing media accounts of meth related child abuse portray the children as pure victims of circumstance. However, as we recall this was not the case for children of inner-city crack using welfare queens, constructed as “super-predators” in worst cases and “burdens” to taxpayers at best. While I do not argue the potential harm that children of drug using parents face, the construction of the “meth mom” provides a clear illustration of the media’s portrayal of racialized and gendered differences between men and women in urban and rural contexts. On one hand, meth involved men are exonerated from the task of raising their children, a task which falls squarely upon the shoulders of women. On the other hand, women failing at parenthood are particularly shameful and easily reviled. This theme is associated with women in 40.3% of the articles, while it appears in less than one percent in the male sample. The following quotes provide examples of some of these instances:

A woman settled her drug debt by ‘lending’ her 11 year-old daughter to drug dealers who
gave the girl drug-laden shoes and used her to mask their crimes (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1999).

Weeping as her 5 year-old daughter watched, a 22 year-old Omaha woman captured in Bolivia pleaded guilty Thursday to a Federal charge of conspiring to deal methamphetamine in Omaha (Strawbridge, 1999).

Despite the fact that no one would excuse these behaviors, the media report them as though mothers are solely responsible. Virtually, no mention of men’s failures as parents appears in the sample. Additionally, other instances detail how mothers victimize their children by providing them the drug or encouraging them to traffic meth. Both of the following examples describe such circumstances:

A Lincoln (Neb) woman has been charged with supplying marijuana and methamphetamine to her two eldest daughters. Cheri L. Ball, 33, was charged Tuesday with two felony drug charges and felony child abuse. A single mother, she was accused of using drugs with her two daughters ages 17 and 13. She also has an 11-year old daughter (Omaha World Herald, 1997).

A 49-year old mother told police Thursday night that she supplied her son with methamphetamine to help him work long hours at his job as a cook (Omaha World Herald 1997).

The question persists, what has been the role of men in the lives of children of meth users?

Where are media reports of “meth dads” who shirk child support payments, who are inconsistent or altogether absent fathers and leave women to raise families on their own? Yet, in detailing accounts of fatal abuse or neglect cases, little discussion of father’s culpability is found. Furthermore, when women fail, not only do they face potent ridicule, they are often deemed incapable of ever being a mother, as the passage below describes:

It is undeniably that Theresa Hernandez has no business being a mother. The 31-year-old Oklahoma City woman has had five children, all of whom were removed from her custody because of criminal activity and drug use (Tulsa World, 2007).
The assertion that Theresa Hernandez “has no business being a mother” is a powerful one. Statements about her age, number of children, and drug use detail what crimes she has committed against middle-class values. Similar to the cultural calamity surrounding Nadya Suleman, better known as “Octomom” single woman placed at the center of a national spectacle after giving birth to octuplets outside of marriage is equally contemptible for violation of middle-class notions of motherhood and family. Thus, as with welfare queens and crack babies, the media suggest that the meth mom is a cause rather than a correlate of the decline of Midwestern family life.

A theme punctuated by former drug czar, Barry McCaffery’s assertion that meth “one of few things powerful enough to shatter a mother’s love for her child” (Goldberg, 1997). Although, the deleterious effects of meth are undeniable, the discussion of meth use and child abuse invariably focuses on the failures of women as mothers. Within the crisis of the present, society comes to realize how vile a creature the meth mom is, as she victimizes the most vulnerable among us.

Redeeming Good Victims

The final broad category is the outcome of the cases. These themes are most similar between men and women, however, some differences warrant discussion. First, several of the articles discuss the aftermath of a meth lab that exploded, resulting in fire, injuries, and often death. The sample indicates that men are almost exclusively involved in these sorts of situations. This finding is reflective of the type of positions men seem to occupy in the meth trade, such as obtaining chemicals or running labs. It also again indicates that male behavior is perhaps more explosive, and volatile, compared to women’s banal, if not pitiful behaviors. More curious though, is the consistent theme of women who seek and obtain some sort of redemption through
drug treatment. While prevalent in descriptions of women, not one account of a man attempting to overcome meth via treatment appears in the sample. The lack of male “success stories” perhaps indicates that women are considered redeemable victims, while men may be too far gone for salvation. This is another interesting dichotomy, illustrating competing constructions of gendered culpability. First, men are typically not portrayed as victims of the drug or the social circumstances leading many to drug use. The data tell us that men have made a decision to manufacture meth and are deserving of the consequences, whether death or jail. Meanwhile, the articles tell stories of women attempting to recover their lives for themselves and often their children. And although they carry the stigma of meth they also carry elements of a good victim, in that they offer a promise of return to a drug free lifestyle. Often efforts at treatment correspond with the children and family that they have failed as a part of their involvement with meth. As one mother describes “I’ve got two babies in DHS…I’ve got a lot to change for (Sherman, 2006).

This statement once again connects women’s failures as mothers, and the hope for redemption, to meth use. Other accounts discuss women’s efforts to regain the trust of the community once becoming involved with the drug:

What we showed the world today is she is going to earn her right back into the community, and she’s going to do so quickly and she’s going to do so in a way that says to women all around the world that it’s not a crime to stop using drugs (Evans, 2007).

When her 6-year old son asks her why, she said, she has to explain her addiction. She said the drug she now calls the devil takes your morals and values… and you don’t realize it’s happening (Nygren, 1997).

These passages describe how women must rationalize their bouts with meth to themselves and their children, and in many cases fault themselves for lack of “morals and
values”. Further, once confronted by authorities, it appears that these drug using women and mothers must take special efforts to “earn her right back into the community” (Evans, 2007). However, I did not encounter a similar assertion regarding men in the sample. It is unclear why these media accounts only portray women users as hopeful for reform. I suspect that this makes good news because the idea of redeemed women suggests that some of the harm constructed around drug use can also be repaired, signaling hope for traditional middle-class, Midwestern values. It is equally important to note the media do not encourage collective responsibility for conditions promoting meth use. In the typical American individualistic tradition, the stories document individual pathologies, permitting collective repulsion and social exclusion.

These news accounts provide a glimpse of differences in constructions of masculine and feminine criminality, illustrating how women are demonized, othered, and excluded. The media suggest women begin using meth to keep up with children, manage households and their weight. Again, similar to Miller’s (2002) work with street robbers, and Lisa Maher’s (2000) work with sex workers, the media insist that women occupy the lowest rung in the meth crime hierarchy, and are often the dupes of men driven by the sensual allure of crime. The public confronts meth-using women for their failures as mothers, while concurrently forgiving the parental responsibilities of men. At last, when these stories reach conclusion, men shuffle off to prison, while a few women remain hopeful for redemption. These highly gendered dichotomies show how the media construct drug users as unique objects of exclusion and inclusion (Greer & Jewkes, 2005).

When juxtaposed against the late-eighties crack panic the racialized construction of meth becomes quite apparent. Meth brings the depravity of urban drug panics to new spaces. As Webster (2008) argues, these mechanisms distinguish between different forms of whiteness, sift
through markers and meaning, and identify those acceptable and those not. In meth, small town authorities and rural claims-makers have their own social problem to wage war against and to legitimate control efforts. Meth as the crisis of the present illustrates the contours of a drug panic not built upon the tidy stereotypes associated with minority populations and the threat of urban violence. It also illustrates lines of power and the reach of punitive ideologies that make mass incarceration a reality. As Jenkins (1994) showed over fifteen years ago, the fears surrounding methamphetamine are not new, therefore the current panic is not a recycling of an old format but its latest stage, representing the next turn in exclusionary processes separating the social wheat from the chaff.

The previous two chapters show how crime marks social differences of race and gender, the final chapter considers how these notions of difference inform the work of police in Kansas. Paying close attention to punitiveness, the chapter illustrates how methamphetamine and drugs more generally prop up aggressive law enforcement practices and further justify drug war rationalities.
CHAPTER 6 - Policing the Drug War beyond the Ghetto

The police, prosecutors, and courts have an insatiable need for offenders in order to justify their existence, and poor minorities bear the brunt of that need. But poor minorities are not the only ones who suffer being processed and labeled deviant. Working-class white youths in the suburbs and small towns are the functional equivalent of the ghetto poor. –William Chambliss Power, Politics and Crime (2001)

This study shows how methamphetamine legitimizes the actions politicians, shores up racialized and gendered social difference, and advances the punitive rationalities of the war on drugs to the “heartland”. The quote above from William Chambliss cuts to the core of this effort. Criminal justice institutions are firmly entrenched as a part of modern society. However, as Chambliss recognizes, their very existence rests on the presence of problems and problematic people, showing that the criminal justice system has a stake in phenomenon like methamphetamine, especially in rural areas.

Bringing these rationalities to the context of policing methamphetamine, noted drug policy expert Mark Kleiman argues, "If you talk to rural deputy sheriffs about meth users and urban cops about crackheads, you're going to hear exactly the same thing: These are bad scary people" (Stern, 2006). The binary logics of war and enemy appear yet again in this quote. Lending the plight of rural areas some legitimacy, Kleiman urges meth brings “bad scary people” like those in the city, to rural areas. Right or wrong, this logic grants small town law enforcement their very own epidemic providing at last, full entry to the war on drugs.

Policing the Crisis (1978) reminds that certain characteristics of police units, such as increased militarism, high levels of discretion, officers’ beliefs in the decaying morality of the public, and a desire for law and order, that set the stage for repressive law enforcement campaigns. In the case of late 70’s Britain, police lashed out at young Black immigrants blamed for an exaggerated rash of muggings. In the case of present day Kansas, we consider how
politically and culturally constructed meth problems detailed previously shape the work of law enforcement across the state. This is important, because like all of us, police are subject to these structural forces, but also because of their unique position within the community, they also help shape social beliefs about crime more generally. Therefore, this final chapter considers how the broad prohibitionist strategies and rationalities of the Kansas anti-meth program animate a unique social problem, and aggravate social inequalities occurring alongside drug use.

Revisiting Unnever and Cullen’s (2010) models of the social sources of punitiveness, this chapter explores both the extent of punitive logics of police officers in Kansas, as well as the pathways supporting them. It therefore explores notions of increasing crime and distrust, moral decline, and racial animus, in the worldviews and cognitive landscapes of respondents. To get at these ideas as they relate to meth use, the chapter follows the widely cited surveys of the National Association of Counties (NACO) and the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). These surveys measure officers’ accounts of “greatest drug threat” locally. Supporting the logic of meth’s rurality, the surveys find officers in rural locations consistently report meth as the greatest danger\(^{37}\). The data also show, though urban officers report meth problems, they are much more likely to report problems with crack cocaine and other drugs. Using the most recent NDIC data, the table below illustrates the urban/rural dichotomy, perhaps mirroring the public understanding of methamphetamine as a drug primarily produced and consumed in rural communities. Framing questions around notions of “greatest crime problem” and “greatest drug problem” provides an analytic frame examining boundaries of drug markets, and the populations associated with them. Therefore, the chapter makes use of study locations representing a

\(^{37}\)Survey item: “Indicate the drug that poses the greatest threat to your area, the drug that most contributes to violent crime, and the drug that most contributes to property crime in your area.” 2008 National Drug Threat Survey, US Department of Justice
continuum of rural, semi-rural, and urban contexts, somewhat representative of Kansas. Each represents a unique profile in terms of community problems related to methamphetamine and other drugs.

Table 6: NDIC Drug Threat Survey (Kansas 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greatest Threat</th>
<th>Metropolitan-Urban</th>
<th>Micropolitan-Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methamphetamine</td>
<td>13 (50%)</td>
<td>19 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Drugs</td>
<td>13 (50%)</td>
<td>12 (39%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Site 1, characterized as the urban site, is in the southern half of the state and is the largest city in Kansas. The city is in a relatively dense urban county with a population nearly a half million residents. This location also boasts the largest police department in the state with nearly 600 sworn officers. I met with officers from two different patrol locations, one located on the southern half of the city, while the other was the eastern quadrant.

Sites 2, 3 and 4 are in the southeast corner of the state, within close proximity of each other. Generally, the southeastern part of the state is desirable because of elevated meth lab seizure rates. Sites 2 and 3 are adjacent and part of the same judicial district, while site 4 is just southeast of sites two and three. Though all are rural, there is some variance between the three sites in terms of population and department size.

Access, location, community size and relative problems with methamphetamine determine study locations. Because meth arrest data are not available, a number of different data sources illustrate meth and drug problems more generally. Obviously, meth lab seizures provide the best estimate. Data for 1998-2010 seem to show urban locations outpace the rural locations over time. However, controlling for population size suggests the rural locations have a relatively larger problem with than the urban location. The proportion of drug arrests of each location also

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38 Key demographics of research locations are displayed in appendix A.
serves as an indicator of local drug problems. For example, over 20% of the arrests made by police in the urban location in the years 2003-2009 is nearly double the state average of 10.5, suggesting site 1 spends more time processing drug offenders than the other locations. One of the rural locations has an elevated proportion as well, though the agency had only 206 total arrests in seven years\(^\text{39}\). The final indicator provided in Table 7, is the percent of positive drug tests submitted by community corrections probationers. Community corrections is a sentencing alternative to incarceration typically reserved for violent or repeat offenders and therefore serves as a proxy for the highest risk individuals in each community. The data reflect all drug testing results in the years 2004-2010. Again, these data vary from the other indicators, suggesting that locations 2 and 3 have the greatest problem with meth among probationers. It is important to note however, that positive tests for marijuana and cocaine outpaced methamphetamine in all locations.

The indicators presented here do not provide consistent evidence of any one location having greater meth problems than the others. For instance, while location 4 had the highest seized labs per capita, drug crime rates were on par with the rest of the state, with drug arrests in the urban location were double the state average. Even though positive tests are higher in rural locations, the data show that other drugs are used more often than meth. These simple indicators are certainly not conclusive proof of the degree of community meth problems; they do however provide points of comparisons between the study locations, suggesting a complex picture of drug production and consumption patterns not easily divisible between urban and rural categories.

\(^{39}\) Data retrieved from: http://www.accesskansas.org/kbi/stats/stats_crime.shtml
Table 7: Meth and Drug Indicators for Study Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban (1)</th>
<th>Rural (2)</th>
<th>Rural (3)</th>
<th>Rural (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Labs Seized 98-10</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labs per 1,000 population 98-10</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Drug Arrests 03-09</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Positive Drug Tests for Meth</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary data source of this chapter comes from 37 in-depth issue focused interviews with officers at each of the four locations. At each site, the officers were designated by a supervisor who selected participants based call load and availability. The interviews followed a schedule (appendix b.) and typically lasted about an hour, though several neared two hours, and one cut short by a bomb threat lasted just thirty minutes. Following the theme of the NACO and NDIC surveys, the interviews focused on the greatest problems of crime and drugs from the officers’ perspectives. To this end, questions sought to explore how officers related crime problems to broader issues of community health, quality of life, and social change. To begin I explained that the research was exploring how the officers viewed their communities and their work in terms of what they thought the most pressing problems to be. Further, I explained an interest in how their jobs might be different in communities that might not carry the same call volume or deal with the same type of problems. When meeting with the respondents, explanations of the study made no mention of methamphetamine, and though some eventually learned through others of the focus, I took care to allow discussion of methamphetamine to occur organically.

40 I also completed approximately 14 hours of “ride along” observation with police officers, and spent fifteen days in study communities.

41 A private provider later transcribed audio recordings the interviews verbatim. Officer’s names are not included and numbers represent the departments to maintain confidentiality.
Analysis: Urban Location

Quality of life

To initiate the interview and build rapport, we discussed how long the officers had lived in the area, and their impressions of the general quality of life in the city. This line of questions was very open ended, allowing them to describe characteristics of the town they found important. In instances where the police officers did not mention issues related to crime, I asked them to tell me how they would advise their children or a younger relative to stay safe in the town, or I asked them to rate local crime on a ten point scale. These questions helped ground the individual officer’s outlook about their communities, crime problems, and general attitudes about life. The overwhelming consensus of the respondents was that quality of life in the area was quite good. Though these questions attempted to get at notions of “increasing crime and distrust”, no responses fit this theory of punitiveness. Interestingly however, while all discussed improving quality of life as it relates to crime, a few even mentioned “not knowing how bad it was in the 1990s” either as an officer, or a resident of the area.

Hmm. Good question. I would say it’s gotten a little bit better. I’m trying to think about the crime trends and things like that. I would say it’s gotten a little bit better to about the same, and I’m judging based on the stories that I hear from officers that have been here before me, you know, on how things were even before I got here. The crime was pretty bad and the way that they went about doing things was, it was a lot busier. There was a lot more crime and things like that, so I think it’s actually, slowing, progressively getting better (Patrol Officer site 1).

To further situate my understanding of how the officers felt about the dangerousness and volatility of their work, I asked them to identify situations in their experience that are more dangerous than others. Likewise, we also discussed the type of calls they found frustrating to deal with. Both of these questions are important moving forward because they suggest key points of concern for the officers, albeit from slightly different perspectives. The officers often
spoke of the volatility of police work when asked to identify the most dangerous part of their job, describing a general feeling of never really knowing what to expect from a call. Keeping with this mindset, some added it was actually a good safety strategy, noting that settling in on one type of crime as a sort of complacency obscuring other less salient dangers.

The biggest danger? Well, maybe just getting relaxed and assuming nothing bad is going to happen. Because you go a lot of days and it’s mundane. It’s a job that can be mundane and, you know, two days are never alike really, but not every day is going to have some car chase or shoot out or knockdown, drag out fight, and so that’s a problem a lot of us have is just getting kind of relaxed and letting our guard down and then you’re not being as safety conscious as we should be (Patrol Officer site1).

Though many urged the general dangerousness of policing, many named specific offenses such as calls regarding “mental” “signal four” or people with mental health issues, armed suspects, or crimes in progress. Despite the diversity of calls, perhaps the most commonly named dangerous and frustrating call was domestic violence.

Not one particular thing. I mean people say domestic violence cases are dangerous to go to. Car stops are dangerous to go to, or perform. It’s just being kind of, to me I have a green light, yellow light, kind of like a stoplight, for an officer. I train officers too that come out of the academy. So being in a yellow light situation all the time, being aware of things. Knowing anything can happen because I’m married. My wife used to always ask me, you know, are you going to get off on time or are you going to be able to—I don’t know what’s going to happen ten seconds from now. So I mean, not really one particular thing because any particular person or group of people you deal with, things can change (Patrol Officer site 1).

Keeping with the theme of uncertainty, the quote also shows traffic stops present a number of unknowns. In fact, two officers described being hit during a routine traffic stop, while another officer was present at the shooting of a fellow officer at a routine traffic stop. These findings document one important caveat; when asked about the dangers and frustrations of police work, none of the officers mentioned anything involving illicit drugs. This is an interesting
finding given the considerable amount of time and resources devoted to drug control nationally and locally.

The next line of questions directly explored the officer’s beliefs about crime in their community in terms of day-to-day importance. The vast majority of the officers identified thefts and burglaries as most important to the community. This is not surprising given that simple theft and larceny are among the numerically most common crimes locally and nationally. However, additional exploration of this belief revealed one of the most consistent themes of the data. Overwhelmingly, the officers asserted the property crimes like simple theft and burglaries are drug related.

It involves drugs. It all surrounds, your burglaries, your robberies, a lot of this, the prostitution that’s in the area, it all surrounds drugs period. Whether that be meth, crack, cocaine, heroin (Site 1 patrol officer).

Given the consensus of the connection between drug and property crime, many of the officers argued for the continued importance of drug interdiction. The quote below shows the rationality that drug use as the engine of a wide variety of crimes.

That’s something we focus on. Because you know, actually drugs in my opinion, leads to so many things. And you know, you get somebody one day they have a job making a living for the family and the next thing they’re, you know, experimenting in whatever narcotic they’re choosing to experiment in and they get hooked on that, now they lose their job, they lose their family so now they’re out here having to support their habit, so they’re out here committing crimes. You get larcenies, you get burglaries, robberies, prostitution. It all stems, if you ask all these people and you check to see what their recreational, what they do for recreation it’s usually a drug. They usually, you know, involved in crack cocaine or meth (Site 1 patrol officer).

While the quote above presents a general description of how addiction leads to property crimes, other descriptions of those responsible for crimes in their community were more explicit. For example, this officer describes an apparently simple nexus of crime, environment, and race.
It’s all drug-driven. My favorite kind of crime to target, and the one I personally believe affects families on a more quality of life level is burglary. It invades their privacy. There’s mostly rental homes that I deal with. A lot of folks don’t have rental insurance, so that’s something I educate them on all my calls. I love hunting burglars. Typically they are anywhere from middle aged to high school students. They’re typically black and I’d say probably 40% of them are gang members (Patrol Officer site 1).

This officer obviously demonstrates the drugs and crime connection, however he is more specific by placing an age and race on the offenders. However unlikely, he describes all burglaries as “drug-driven” committed by young, Black youth. Given this and the context of the conversation, his notion of “hunting burglars” as those responsible for the balance of crime in his community is startling.

This is an important finding. Though quite difficult to confirm if drugs drive the balance of property crimes in the research locations, it is none-the-less evident that the officers believed this the case. As such, empirical research continues to ponder a number of related hypotheses on the drugs and crime nexus he describes. For instance, as this officer suggests drug use causes crime, yet others argue crime causes drug use and still others suggest that unknown factors encourage both drug use and crime or the relationship is reciprocal. In addition, some simply assert there is no relationship between drugs and crime. The point being, this very complex relationship is subject to ongoing debate in the academic literature. However, despite the debate, many if not all of the respondents identified drugs as the key causal feature of the balance of crime in their communities. As Stevens (2007) shows these sorts of exaggerated and imprecise gut-level claims, especially from street level experts like police drive policy and inform opinion, even though they are based on a collision of “dark figures” and unknowns about both drug use and crime.

Discussions of the etiology of crime and offending lead naturally to specific questions about community drug problems. As with the previous set, this line began with the simple
question “what drug presents the biggest problem for your community”. Of twenty respondents, ten (10) named crack as the greatest drug problem, followed by meth (8) and marijuana (2). The theme continued when discussing an area known for prostitution on the south side of the city, many officers mentioned the connection to crack.

When I stated here, it was all, it was either cocaine or crack cocaine and then it’s eventually moved to meth amongst the white prostitutes. The Black girls are still, yeah, they still smoke crack. I think a lot of them will use either one though, whatever is going to get them high (Site 1 patrol officer).

This hints at another important finding that becomes more evident in relation to responses of rural officers. As both the quote above and the following quote illustrate, though the data reveal distinct beliefs about racial differences between crack and meth users, none of the respondents had a distinct theory of why theses difference occur.

No, not really. I don’t know what their preference is for it or why, but it always seems like, since I’ve been here, it used to be crack cocaine was widespread amongst all your nationalities or whatever. And the last five to ten years it seems like the white culture has moved more towards the methamphetamine, where the black culture seems like, the ones that use, they stay with crack cocaine (Site 1 patrol officer).

The quote above illustrates another theme suggesting that drug preferences may be “cultural”. Even though officers described Black, white, and Hispanic crack use, they also often characterized it as a “Black drug”. This notion of drug use as cultural preference continued further with the familiar description of meth as “white man’s crack” as the quote below shows.

Where I used to see crack primarily with blacks or African Americans. And I mean we see whites do it too, but primarily it seems like there’s a big shift, as far as I can see, it’s primarily whites that are using the meth. As far as things changed, I don’t know if anything has really changed. I mean all I know is they get addicted to the stuff and they’re willing to go out and do whatever it takes to get their fix. Just crack was the same way.

I really don’t know. I mean we used to catch people cooking crack, but now I don’t know. I don’t know why. Because I mean there’s different ways. They don’t have to
inject it. A lot of people I catch with meth have syringes but they can smoke it. I don’t know. I don’t know. We used to kind of joke about it a little bit and say, you know, it’s kind of the white man’s crack, you know. Because it was basically what the white guys were using but why it’s primarily white, I don’t know (Patrol Officer site 1).

Clearly, the officers reproduce popular social constructions of crack as “Black drug” or meth as “white man’s crack” despite a clear understanding of why these differences may occur. Though data shows meth users are more likely to be white or Hispanic, crack use is more racially diverse. Helping to explain these differences, Weisheit and Wells (2010) show meth markets appear to take hold in areas that do not have an established cocaine market. They propose that because both are stimulants, and because cocaine is typically much more expensive, dealers choose to sell the more expensive drugs. Meth appears to take hold, according to the pair, when cocaine is simply not available. This explanation offers a solution for racial differences cocaine and meth use driven by market conditions rather than crude racial essentialisms (Weisheit & Wells, 2010). Despite available research the officers often reduced differences to racialized cultural preference.

Etiology of Drug Use

Next, the interviews focused on why some get involved with drugs, both as users and as dealers. In terms of use, the officers voiced an overwhelming belief in the “gateway hypothesis” and addiction growing from the first use. It is important to first recall recent data on drug use and dependency. The most recent NSDUH data finds that roughly 3% of those who have tried methamphetamine reported continued use in the last thirty days. Rates for marijuana and cocaine were much higher, with continued use rates of 34.7 and 9.5% respectively (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2010). These data refute the “not even once” logic of instant addiction; one of the primary claims of the campaigns against drugs like crack
and methamphetamine. In discussing the gateway hypothesis, many officers named marijuana as the primary path to abuse of harder drugs like meth:

Yeah. Maybe they’ve started smoking weed… and coincidental contact with an associate that either uses, let’s say meth for instance, or they have a friend of a friend that uses meth, then you stair step up. So there’s several factors, but everything that I’ve experienced is, someone just doesn’t wake up and decide, today’s the day, instead of Mountain Dew, I’m going to try meth (Site 1 Patrol officer).

Added to the prevailing support for the gateway hypothesis, is the familiar notion that “one try” of meth leads to a lifetime of abuse. Further, as the quote below shows, respondents often related meth to crack when discussing its potency.

Well, it’s highly addictive. I mean you talk to people, you know, that’ll say yeah, hey, the first time I ever hit meth I knew I was screwed. I had a guy tell me that. He goes, the first time I ever did meth, he goes, I knew I was in trouble on the first hit. He goes, I knew I was addicted right then, and yeah, it’s as addictive as crack if anything” (Site 1 Patrol officer).

These faulty beliefs persist for logical reasons. First, research shows that those who use marijuana regularly are more likely to use harder drugs like cocaine. Moreover, a high proportion of hard drug users tried marijuana first. However, research shows that certain underlying psychosocial conditions, and opportunity encourage illicit drug use in general, and the high proportion of marijuana use is due mainly to the drug’s wide availability (Drug Policy Research Center, 2002). Despite research findings, the officers situate their beliefs regarding drug use and therefore crime in terms of individual choice and failings. As the following quote shows, whether for recreation or to escape miserable living conditions, drug use begins with individual choice.
I think a lot of it is it’s a stair step. I can’t say that’s for everybody, but you know, it’s just like anything else. They try something. They go out and get drunk, they’ll have a drink, they get drunk. They try a little weed when they’re at a party or something. Somebody says, well, try some of this. Well, why not? I’ve already smoked a little weed. Let me see what this is all about. They get in the wrong crowd and I think it’s just kind of a stair step type of thing. It may not be for everybody but I think people do the lesser drug and they just, oh, this ain’t really doing it for me or whatever. I don’t know. Some people want an escape. The people that you see sometimes down here, they don’t have much at all. I mean they’re living day to day in a motel room. It’s got cock roaches and everything else. And I think it’s their escape. I can forget about things, feel good, whatever this crap does for them, they can forget about it for awhile. It’s all about life choices. People start off, there used to be a gal that was fairly attractive back when I first started and she was a hooker. And I was like, you know, you need to get out of this stuff. And I tried talking to her to get out of the stuff and she kept using and kept using. Well, she ended up getting AIDS and everything else. And I’ve seen pictures of her when she was younger and she was a very pretty girl. Well, if she’s still alive now I’d be surprised, but you just see the deterioration. These people make poor life choices. Be it they either drop out of school or whatever they’re doing, and then end up getting in a run and they get into this and then it just all feeds on one another down here (Patrol Officer site 1).

This instance illustrates clearly, the logics of drug use as a marker of difference. The officer’s description of the woman begins with her attractiveness as marker of her social acceptability. However as he described, as she progressed with drug use, a number of conditions deteriorated including her appearance, marking the transition from citizen to other.

**Criminal Justice Outlook**

To close out the interview we discussed a number of criminal justice policy issues as they related to policing. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the officers expressed discontentment and frustration about the system being too soft on criminals. As the quote below shows, many officers demonstrated distrust in probation as an alternative to incarceration and a revolving door depiction of the court system.

It’s all about crime and punishment. You know, you do the crime and I don’t see, in my opinion, I know we have the best system around but, in my opinion, I think a lot of it is we’re not punishing these people like we should be. Yes, I understand that the prisons are overcrowded. Yes, we need to keep violent offenders locked in and this person isn’t
violent so we’re going to rotate him back out on probation. Yeah, but they’re back out doing the same thing over and over and over, and we’re sending a message hey, no big thing. Who cares? They got me this week but it may take them a month to catch me again, but until that time I’m going to live large (Patrol Officer site 1).

In this theme a current of “increasing crime and distrust” as well as “moral decline” sources of punitiveness are evident. Similar to Policing the Crisis (1978), the officers describe themselves as the front line in the battle against criminals, that sees the criminal justice system perpetually allow offenders “back out doing the same thing over and over” sending the message that crimes are “no big thing”. This obviously affects how the officers view problems of drug use, crime, the community and how they view their jobs in general, making it more difficult to negotiate the perceived permissiveness of the system without becoming bitter.

Yeah. It seems like, especially here in [Urban] County, like property crimes. I think people assume somebody burglarized my house and they got caught, okay, that’s a felony and they’re going to prison. No, they’re not going to prison. If that’s the first offense, they’re not going to prison. So yeah, I think, and that may be just because they are overloaded. We’re not going to, you know, we’re not even taking these things serious that aren’t person crimes, violent crimes. I don’t know, like you’ve had people plead to 15, 20 burglaries. No, I mean I don’t know how you change a system that’s overloaded and there’s just so much, I don’t know what they’d have to do. Hire a lot more prosecutors Yeah, and start warehousing more people, so I don’t even, I go to work and then go home and I don’t even think about my job. I try not to. I try not to, because if you dwell on that stuff, you get bitter. Maybe I’m kind of bitter already, but I just, I try not to let it bother me (Patrol Officer site 1).

Similar to the increasing crime and distrust model this officer suggests that the system has failed to address the behavior of some and perhaps the best solution is to start warehousing more people. Finally, and keeping with the notion of permissiveness, many officers strongly supported capital punishment, felon disenfranchisement, three strikes sentences, and harsh prison conditions, often considered indicators of punitiveness (Tonry, 2011). For example, highlighting the power of crime victims, the quote below illustrates the belief that some crimes warrant abhorrent prison conditions.
I’ve seen things, and it’s been several years ago. It was a maximum security prison they were showing and it was somewhere in California. And you couldn’t even be Jeffrey Dahmer and get sent to this place. I mean you had to be basically the 1% of the bad asses out there. You were sent to a prison because you killed somebody or something and you went into the prison system and you either killed a guard or somebody like that, then they sent you to this particular prison. Okay. Twenty-three hours a day you were in your single cell and the only person you had contact with was the guard. You were out one hour a day to shower and eat, exercise or something. And it really graded on me when they had these attorneys saying this was inhumane. Because I’m like well wait a minute. What did these people do to get here? What about the victims? I get frustrated about when I see everybody so worried about the criminal now that’s in the penitentiary, boo hoo. What about his victims? What about the child or the person that he took their life away from them and the family that has to deal with this? And then you’re worrying about this guy? I have a bit problem with that.

I’d just assume stick a needle in his arm and say goodbye. I mean I really don’t have a problem with that because if you do that to somebody else, why are we paying to give you air conditioning and working out with weights and everything else. Well, you’re no use to me. No use to society (Patrol Officer site 1).

Here the officer’s opinions about criminal justice policy and certain offenders are quite clear, for him some people are clearly no use to society. In this case, the bad people that end up in places like super-maximum security prisons are disposable. This sort of punitive rationality though quite evident in the broader society, also animates policing activities as a stridently us versus them endeavor.

**Rationalities of Urban Drugs and Crime**

Conversations with the urban police officers reveal findings that fit with the general rationalities of narcopolitics or the war on drugs more generally. Perhaps the most important belief demonstrated by the officers is that drug use and drug users are responsible for the balance of crimes in their community. Additionally, the officers described a clearly racialized frame of drug use, mentioning crack, as the biggest drug problem in their community and the belief African Americans are the primary users and traffickers.

Supporting the gateway hypothesis, most officers felt users began with marijuana or even alcohol and tobacco, eventually graduating to harder drugs like meth and crack. Likewise, most
supported the notion of personal choice, despite the complexities of long-term hard drug use. Further, many offered very little hope of recovery for hard drug users with the belief that one use leads to addiction. Finally, many suggested that criminals in the community reflected degrading morality emboldened by the permissiveness of the criminal justice system. Not surprisingly, nearly all of the officers favored more aggressive if not punitive law enforcement methods. Taken together, the themes illustrate racialized notions drug use and crime, characterized by a core of hard drug users, solely responsible for their predicament, also responsible for the balance of street crimes in their community. In turn, many officers were skeptical of the effectiveness current practices and drug treatment, leaving them to conclude expansion of prison and jail space the only viable option to address the problems. These strategies directly reflect the highly individualistic strategy of the war on drugs, favoring incapacitation over rehabilitation, and a zero tolerance approach to crime control, built on notions of increasing crime, distrust, failing morality and racial animus.

Analysis: Rural Locations

When comparing rural and urban analytic frames, it is important to consider how policing varies qualitatively between locations. Rural and small-town policing agencies tend to focus on crime prevention and public service, compared to urban departments that seek to control crime through arrests. Additionally, because of location and lack of services in many rural areas, rural police are often required to perform more duties than their urban counterparts are, such as animal control, or extended mediation between parties. Furthermore because of visibility, small town officers are often more cognizant of personal relationships during the course of their work, often directly affecting street level decision-making (Weishet, Falcone, & Wells, 2006).
The similarities between contexts more likely outnumber differences, however extending from notions of the rural idyll many regard rural policing as dramatically different from urban policing. Typically, these notions revolve around pastoral constructions of highly organized rural towns, where residents all know each other, and nothing of note ever happens. Indeed, the findings of the literature and a few of the respondents support these notions. In fact, empirical studies of rural policing activities show that rural police spend considerably more time dealing with tasks like animal control, and alcohol crimes, than officers in rural locations. The view of rural and small town law enforcement as less important, and perhaps less exciting also continues to feed retention problems for rural agencies (Payne, Berg, & Sun, 2005).

This is an important consideration moving forward, as the cultural constructions degrading the legitimacy of rural law enforcement may encourage some to over emphasize problems such as methamphetamine, in the effort to show the importance of their work.

Anecdotally, the following excerpt from an editorial in the Junction City Daily Union, titled “Barney Fife Need Not Apply” perfectly illustrates the thankless, dangerousness of law enforcement in Kansas, while refuting the rural idyll.

> Our officers are asked to respond to emergent situations… and must keep up to date in the latest techniques of both the criminal and the police unit and work with other offices in the count and the state in tracking down meth labs, marijuana fields and other illegal activities…Barney Fife need not apply for a job out here in central Kansas. He would be eaten alive. And for that matter, so would Sheriff Taylor (Kimbrell, 2004).

To legitimize the dangerousness of policing in Kansas, the author identifies “meth labs, marijuana fields and other illegal activities” perhaps characterizing her understanding of crime in the state. Though merely anecdotal, the very existence of an editorial such as this suggests a backlash against the “Barney Fife” depiction of Kansas police supported by the unique dangers of meth labs, marijuana, and “other crimes”. 
Quality of life

As with the urban locations, the interviews began with a general discussion of the community, change and quality of life. For officers in the rural locations, opinions regarding quality of life were less resolute. In all instances, the officers described local job markets with a sense of uncertainty; this was not the case with urban officers. At sites 2 and 4, officers specifically mentioned quality of life changed by job loss and dwindling opportunities in general, as the following quotes demonstrate:

[This is] a small town. Approximately 6,400 people approximately. We have lost one of the local factories to somebody in Mexico, you know how that goes. Just a small town atmosphere. You know everybody and everybody is friendly. They wave at people. During the day shift, they wave at you and stuff. Maybe not the night shift, but the day shift… I think the biggest notice will probably be in the fall when the school year takes over. Then we’ll know how many people we’ve actually lost. (Patrol Officer site 2).

Similarly, as with changes in the community, many of the respondents reported more discrete changes related to crime. One veteran officer with 26 years of experience described the trajectory of changes in his community with the following:

Sure. When I first came here 26 years ago, we had a population of about 2,000. Many of those folks were elderly folks that had generational ties to the community maybe clear back into the mid-1800s when the town was first settled. A lot of them were business people, maybe children or grandchildren of early business people here. There was a sense of prosperity. So many of those folks have died. Many of those businesses that were prominent business, prominent names in this community also died. Then as a result, a lot of the homes fell into disrepair, decay.

We have several folks who own a number of properties. They rent them out cheaply. They rent a house for $75, $150 a month. So that brought in a new element. We have people moving in from larger areas like maybe Kansas City, Topeka, Wichita because rent is so cheap here and, if they’re on any type of public assistance, their rent check will go further. Now, the big argument here is welfare is so easy here and I always tell people, the standard for welfare is the same whether you live here or in Colby, Kansas. It’s no different. The difference is this. We have people who are slumlords that offer
housing for $75 to $150 a month. That same housing in a large city would probably be 4 or $500 a month. So those public assistance dollars stretch further.

They don’t work. A lot of them are on disability or public assistance. And when they come, they bring their problems with them. Sometimes you’ll have family members follow them, friends follow them, and then it begins to grow (Patrol Officer site 3).

Though this description is more detailed and candid than most, it suggests obvious changes in community composition. The officer attributes undesirable changes in his community to unscrupulous property owners and welfare recipients seeking cheap rent. This is important as it shows the officers have very particular ideas of what factors contribute to social change in their communities. Moreover, some of the officers argued that the lack of job opportunities directly contribute to crime. For example, this officer makes the familiar connection between unemployment, dependency, drugs and crime.

Yeah. And it’s not the only industry that went out. There were several places that employed people and the industrial park that went out of business. So there was a lot of job loss here in this community. There were people that just couldn’t get out and now they’re on state assistance. I think a lot of them have turned to stealing and manufacturing of drugs. I’ve seen this community go in the toilet, so to speak (Patrol Officer site 4).

Though this officer suggests job loss caused the community to “go in the toilet” and others described the housing market as an engine of change, almost all suggested a latent cultural change in the community over time. Similarly, several officers suggested that changes in the broader culture encourage changes in their communities. For example, this officer describes changes in community safety in terms of the visibility and overt behavior of some of his “frequent flyers”.

Less safe, no. Different safe, yes. This is just society and mankind as a whole has changed. It used to be that things were done under the cloak of night if you will. Now it doesn’t really matter. People will do whatever, whenever, any time of day. So the citizens are more aware of the crime but I wouldn’t say it’s really changed a whole lot. I
mean fortunately we are a smaller community, so we don’t have the excitement of other, of your large metropolitan areas. We just kind of, like I said, it’s not really any less safe, basically, for lack of a better term, and forgive my candor here, but they’re called frequent fliers. People we deal with. (Patrol officer site 2)

Each of these themes relate to one of the biggest differences observed between rural and urban respondents. In the rural locations, perhaps because of size and visibility, changes in the community reflect cultural changes related to a distinct group. Whether describing outsiders attempting to stretch public assistance dollars further, the brazen behavior of frequent flyers, or the criminogenics of the recession, the officers connected social change to the behavior of specific types of people. The feelings about the changing community also fit with ontological insecurity described earlier. Whether attributed to a new group or broad changes in “society and mankind” the officer recalled these characteristics when describing the community.

This theme continued in discussions of the types of crime the respondents felt presented the greatest difficulties. As with the urban locations, the rural interviews included questions exploring officer’s beliefs about crime in their community. Importantly, discussions of crime featured drugs even more prominently than in the urban locations. However, contrary to the urban officers that focused on drugs driving property crime, many of the rural officers described larger tangle of drugs and crime including domestic violence, and crimes against children.

No, I understand. That’s hard. I would almost, it’s hard for me to separate maybe three of what I would call your primary criminal issues that we deal with a lot. One is the narcotics or the drug issue. Two is your domestic violence issue. And three is your child crimes issue. I mean if I’m going to talk about broad, categorically speaking. I think those three are the primary ones that we deal with more so than anything (Patrol Officer site 2).

This officer describes a “hard to separate” triad, of drugs, domestic violence, and child abuse feeding off one another. Again, this is a more nuanced depiction of community crime and drug problems than described by urban officers that focused on drugs driving the property crime
problems. Moreover, though the officers mentioned marijuana and other drugs sporadically, each officer described methamphetamine as a key contributor to all manner of crime problems in their communities. For example, though the officer identifies domestic violence as a major problem and concern, he asserts that this and other problems relate back to methamphetamine.

But I would say probably domestics. Even the domestic that we go to all the time, it’s the same family, because the situation is already volatile. Both members are already mad. And in, I’m not going to say most cases, but in a lot of cases neither one of them want you there. So, neither one is your friend because neither one of you want your nose in their business, even though we were called there to potentially save someone from danger. And being that meth is a big problem here, domestics are a big problem here, I would say a lot of the really heated arguments are, this is really an impoverished part of the country I guess. There are a lot of people that live either at or below the poverty level here. So a lot of the arguments that we have are amongst people of that status that typically use the meth. Meth has a lot of side effects, I’m sure you’ve heard. Hallucinations, paranoia. Do you’re in a domestic where the situation is already volatile with a person that’s on drugs and is paranoid anyway. So you go into a situation like that and your officer safety has to be spurting out the top of your priority list because you really need to just focus on this situation needs to be handles the safety way it can. I’d say that’s probably the most dangerous (Patrol Supervisor site 4).

Again, we find that officers believe that drug use is the chief motivator of all other crimes. As the quote shows, methamphetamine is at the core of this relationship, even though the contribution of other drugs seems plausible. Though the officers’ accounts are clear, it remains unclear to what degree methamphetamine actually affects daily activities. Recalling local arrest statistics, the rural locations reported a relatively small number of drug arrests, with sites 2 and 4 reporting rates below state averages, and nearly half that of the urban location. For example, for site 4, the most recent public data show 93 arrests for drug and drug paraphernalia crimes (Kansas Bureau of Investigation, 2010). However, in 2009 arrests for marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, represent about 95% of all drug arrests nationally. If these data followed national trends, it also follows that about 5% or less than five arrests relate to methamphetamine. Even if all drug arrests were for meth crimes, they would still only represent 10% of all arrests made that
year (State University of New York, Albany, 2009). While the lack of drug specific data continues to be problematic, these data draw the officer’s assertions regarding the degree of methamphetamine problems in their communities into question.

Supporting the fuzzy logic of local meth problems was the lack of a coherent theme of how the drugs reached the community. For example, the quote below from a detective in community 4 suggests local clandestine labs are the source of the meth in the community.

As far as meth goes here, I would say the biggest majority of our supply comes from local production. We do have people that travel out and will go to other larger metropolitan areas such as Kansas City or Tulsa and pick up and bring back and we probably even have a little bit that’s transported in, but a lot of ours is local usage and they’re just making enough for themselves to get by (Detective site 4).

Still other officers discussed clandestine labs in terms of past events. In fact, sites 2 and 3 had not seized a meth lab in the three years prior, further drawing in the realities of local meth problems into question. Some, like this officer attributed efforts made by state and local law enforcement for changes in local production in changing the shape of local meth markets.

Manufacturing of methamphetamine is the worse. It kind of slacked off there for a while because we were hitting it so hard, specifically the KBI taskforce, the HIDTA Task Force. Those were really pounding them and it kind of backed off there for a while in this immediate area, but it has picked back up with, they’ve discovered different precursors and methods, like the shake and bake. So we’ve seen kind of a spike in it here this last year. And of course, marijuana is always big (Patrol Officer site 4).

Other officers reported that while labs may have dwindled, the majority of the methamphetamine in their communities comes in from major cities or Mexico.

I think a majority of it is coming from south of the border. And all that does is it makes the produce a little bit more expensive for the end user. If they want it, they’re going to get it. So I think the labs that we’re seeing around here now are people that are just, they’re trying to make up their own products so they don’t have to, and kind of boost their own economy just a little bit. I don’t think that the usage has dropped off because I’m not seeing a decline in people that we’re arresting for it (Patrol Officer site 2).
Across communities, the officers provided competing descriptions of the logistics of the local meth markets. It is important to note that all three agencies are in close proximity, consistently worked together and shared information across jurisdiction. Therefore, it is unlikely that the meth market conditions were substantially different between the three locations. Rather, the incoherent responses regarding market specifics reflects a great degree of knowledge about how much of the drug is in the community or even how it arrives. Despite this, the officers generally agreed that regardless of source and supply, demand and use remains high locally.

Perhaps most interestingly the officers did not access explicit notions of race at all when discussing how the drugs arrived in the community, whether trafficked in or produced locally. This is perhaps in part due to the racial homogeneity of the rural locations, but also because of the cultural construction of meth as a white drug. Though the officers inferred class with discussions of “welfare” and those living “below the poverty level” the officers did not mention racial minorities explicitly. However, within the context of racial homogeneity, the officers’ focus on class fit with forms of marginalized whiteness discussed at length earlier.

**Etiology of Drug Use**

The next group of questions of why some begin using drugs like meth more closely resembles the beliefs of urban officers. Rural officers conveyed a very strong belief in the gateway hypothesis and the role marijuana plays in initiation of harder drugs like methamphetamine. The quote from an officer at site 2 clearly demonstrates the causal link between marijuana and methamphetamine:

I think it just boils back down to, I can pretty well bet you 99.9% of them start off with marijuana and they thought ah, marijuana didn’t do nothing for me. And then they’ll have a friend of a friend who gets hooked onto it or started. I mean some could probably even be drinking a drink and they might put something in their drink or whatever, and
they might like it and just keep going. So that’s my belief. It starts out with marijuana (Patrol Officer site 2).

Clearly the “not even once” logic of instant addiction extends to the beliefs of police officers in both contexts despite years of data suggesting otherwise. Of course, this does not suggest that police exist in a vacuum separate from the broader culture. However, perhaps speaking to the power of this ideology, nearly all officers in both contexts supported the gateway hypothesis, and reaffirmed the notion that meth is instantly addictive.

I’ve had anywhere from 30 to 50 people that just said, you know what, I’ve done marijuana. I’ve done pills. I’ve done this, I’ve done that, but you try one hit of meth and it is like nothing you’ve ever experienced. And they just say one, it can 100% be true that one hit and they are hooked. It is just such a highly addictive drug and fairly easily accessible. So it’s valid, I believe (Patrol officer Site 3).

I’m not totally in disagreement. Obviously, methamphetamine keeps you up for hours on end and, when it is coming to that, you could work on it. I think a lot of that is improbable. They equate the first time use to meth as 100 drops of dopamine. One drop, not even one drop of dopamine is equated to an orgasm. So if you imagine that hundreds of time and then the stigma is, dopamine is toxic to your brain. Once you’ve got that one drop you’re basically chasing the dragon is what we’ve always called it. You’re never going to get that same effect. And I think that’s probably more geared towards the addiction. Maybe the first time they used it, that might have been it, but I don’t believe any long-term use (Patrol officer Site 4).

Exploring the etiology of choice further, we discussed the ideas that people use meth to work longer hours, or to lose weight, presented by popular culture. These questions reveal further the consistent belief that the problems of drug use and crime boil down to individual choice. As the quote below illustrates, when asked about meth use aiding employment, the description of local users routinely involved unemployment.

I have not seen that around here. I guess you could say that in the beginning or that could be an argument, but I’ve yet to see one of these people have a steady job at all or have anything of a decent life established and maintained. They have nothing going on for them at all. So I don’t agree with that. I mean that might be the excuse for someone on why they started it at first, but just kind of again trying to think about the people that we
deal with around here with it, they never had anything going with them in the first place because they were choosing not to do anything with their life (Patrol officer site 4).

I think the ones that we deal with, they’re unemployed. They’re loners. I mean they typically don’t have like a steady residence. They just float around, stay with friends, stay here, stay there. They’ve got nothing. They don’t have anything going on in their life and we deal with them all the time. And irregardless if it’s for meth, I just mean for a ton of other things. Stealing or whatever. Anything. It’s those type of people. They don’t have a job. They have nothing better to do. They don’t have any bills. They don’t have anything (Patrol Sergeant Site 4).

Similarly, the officers dismissed the notion that women use meth as a weight loss strategy, noting its powerful effects.

I’ve heard that. I don’t see it. I try to, and I don’t know if, I may be one of the only ones that does it, and I don’t know if it’s really pushing the boundary or not, but if I hook up somebody that either I know is on it or that I suspect is on it and I’ll kind of ask a little bit more. Nothing to really condemn them criminally, but I’m curious. I ask quite a bit of people if they use it why they use it. And they usually say it’s just for the rush. I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone say well, I needed to lose some weight.

Beliefs regarding how a person might come to use methamphetamine revolve notions of irresponsibility, apathy and hedonism. The officers described users, once initiated to alcohol and marijuana, continuing to chase the next high or rush. Moreover, the officers typified users as ideal social derelicts. Unemployment, homeless, and vagrancy were key themes while the officers failed to discuss users managing a home, family, or job.

**Criminal Justice Outlook**

Not surprisingly, officers strongly supported traditional law enforcement tactics rather than rehabilitation to address the meth problems in their communities. As represented by the quote below many officers voiced the belief in the revolving door nature of current criminal justice practices.

Because ultimately we’ve seen the probation. We’ve seen the rehabilitation and ultimately just, in my opinion, it doesn’t work. I mean just give them the prison time, give them the time, when they come out they do it again. Give them a longer prison time
and get another conviction. It’s just, you know, these people come out and they just go straight back to it. We see it time and again. They’ll come out I think with the best of intentions of wanting to stay clean, but they meet that one person who introduces them to that other person and they just get right back (Patrol officer site 4).

Mirroring the criminal justice polling data examined in chapter four, the officers often described the criminal justice system as lenient, characterized short sentences and the inability to deter criminal behavior. Moreover, as the quote about also shows, the interviews revealed a deep current of skepticism toward drug treatment, especially when court mandated. When asked about what strategies the officers would pursue if they had the flexibility to do so, many described aggressive zero tolerance approaches as the quote below clearly demonstrates.

That would be my, what my plan would be would increase our detective division and put some teeth in our detective division and let them go out and start working on this stuff, because if you get that you could, it’s just a food chain. If you start at the top and start knocking down the problem, the real source of the problem, then you’re going to fix the property crimes. That’s what I think my opinion is. If you’re going to fix the problem within the community, and I’m saying [Site 4] because I don’t do anything outside the city. If I was going to try to do that within my community, I’d beef up my detective division and give them free reign do out and address this. Aggressive, zero tolerance and start busting some heads and get these dopers off the street. That’s what I would do (Patrol officer site 4).

This officer views drug problems as key to community health, and his ideal method to solve this problem is equally as clear. Aggressive, zero-tolerance police work emphasizing enforcement and punishment characterized by the notion of “busting heads” figured prominently into many of the officer’s policy suggestions. Incidentally, this quote also demonstrates the language of other, used by many of the officers to describe people they deal with. The officers often described offenders as “frequent flyers” “dopers” and even “shitbags”, further punctuating their otherness. Though not surprising, this language demonstrates how the officers viewed some, not as fellow citizens or neighbors, but as alien, different and separate.
Rationalities of Rural Drugs and Crime

The interviews show that like police in large cities, rural officers blame drugs for the balance of the crime in their community. However, unlike the urban officers that mentioned a wider variety of drugs, every rural office named methamphetamine the primary drug problem. The rationality follows then, that meth problems relate to broader indicators of family and community dysfunction. Also not unlike the urban officers, rural officers supported a trajectory of meth use beginning with alcohol and marijuana, built firmly upon personal choice. Though the officers attributed community problems to meth, very few articulated a clear understanding of local markets, or how the drugs arrived in the area. Finally, the officers demonstrated overwhelming support for aggressive and punitive law enforcement strategies, perhaps fed by concurrent beliefs of the permissiveness of the criminal justice system. Perfectly illustrating this singular logic is the response below to the question of what an officer would show to demonstrate the effects of methamphetamine on his community.

I could show you houses. I could show you properties that are decaying and people living in them that probably shouldn’t be living in because they can’t afford to live anywhere else because whatever money they do have is going to support their habits. I could show you children in foster care due to drug use and the lifestyle that goes along with it. I could take you over to the jail and introduce you to some people that would, I could probably introduce you to some people that would say yeah, I’m using and I wish I’d never started. I mean you get that type of thing, too. One thing about a small community is you get to know people and so there is a lot of people out there that are using that will talk to you, because you know them. And so, when you talk to them, what you find is, you sort of categorize them a little bit maybe, or I do, is you have those that are hooked that wish they’d never done it but they’ve made that decision and so they’re suffering the consequences of that. And then you have those that are enjoying the ride, which they tend to be the more violent sort of in your face type thing, people. But you know, I could show you that and you could probably talk to some of those guys, and I’m sure they’d be willing to talk to you and tell you the story of their own life and you could see, I would say on a numbers issue, when you begin to look at unemployment, you see a lot of small town unemployment due to narcotics use, marijuana use and alcohol use or abuse because it rolls over in their work ethics and ability to perform menial tasks in any kind of work environment. So, as far as how it impacts the community, it impacts your jobs, your growth opportunities, maintaining good employment. You could probably talk
to a lot of your businesses, especially your factor work. It’s difficult to maintain good employees because a lot of drug issues that go on with that (Patrol Officer site 3).

Clearly, for this officer like many others, meth drives nearly all forms of community dysfunction. From individual living conditions, and the state of the physical environment, meth appears to be the cause. Likewise, the misery of meth use, whether remorseful or wantonly aggressive is quite apparent with prisoners in the county jail. Even vast issues of a faltering economy and joblessness, and declining work ethic appear to directly flow from methamphetamine.

Fitting with increasing crime distrust and moral decline models of punitiveness, the officers also demonstrate beliefs that crime is emboldened by the diminishing morality of citizens as well as the permissiveness of the criminal justice system. However, unlike the urban locations that also accessed notions of racial animus when attributing burglaries to young Blacks that are “40% gang members” explicit descriptions of race did not appear in the discussions. This is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the racial homogeneity of the communities makes it unlikely for police to place the balance of crime problems at the feet of a visible racial minority. This important finding suggests a model of punitiveness that differs from Unnever and Cullen’s (2010) assertions resting primarily on racial animus. As illustrated by the theoretical model below (Figure 18) the data suggest that in locations without a visible racial minority or in instances where crime is strongly associated with marginalized whites, race is less salient. The lack of a visible racial other diminishes the power of racial animus making other social sources of punitiveness more important. Consequently, the politics and racialization of methamphetamine as “white” are reciprocally reinforced, appearing again as the greatest drug threat, despite the lack of data confirming such.
Regardless of the sources of punitiveness, the beliefs demonstrated by the officers are not new or even unexpected—they are identical to the rationalities of previous drug panics, zero-tolerance policing and the broader strategies of the war on drugs. If it is indeed consensus that meth is the primary cause of community misery, then those responsible, meth cooks, tweakers, pill smurfers, or even a person appearing to be a “meth head” are subject to potent scorn and social exclusion. Here, as with previous chapters detailing how meth is central to the expansion of punitive rationalities, the legitimacy of political and law enforcement activities, and the maintenance of social boundaries, these sorts of divisions do nothing to improve community safety or alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable.

Figure 18: Social Sources of Policing Punitiveness
In these disparate voices we can hear the closure occurring – the interlocking mechanisms closing, the doors clanging shut. The society is battening itself down for ‘the long haul’ through a crisis. There is light at the end of the tunnel – but not much; and it is far off. Meanwhile, the state has won the right, and indeed inherited the duty, to move swiftly, to stamp fast and hard, to listen in, discreetly survey, saturate and swamp, charge or hold without charge, act on suspicion, hustle and shoulder, to keep society on the straight and narrow. Liberalism, that last back-stop against arbitrary power, is in retreat. It is suspended. The times are exceptional. The crisis is real. We are inside the ‘law-and-order’ state. -Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts *Policing the Crisis* (1978)

This rather dystopian quote from *Policing the Crisis* (1978) came from thinking about how the criminalization of street youth linked up with racism and anxieties about crime and immigration in 1970s England. Remarkably, the lens through which the authors view their study allows them to see a state with the right, if not duty, to “hold without charge” and “move swiftly, stamp fast and hard.” Today’s punitive criminal justice system is a product of the cumulative effects of history, and, though oddly prophetic, Hall and his colleagues probably could not imagine the law-and-order state of the post 9-11 world since realized.

The US has willingly waged wars on crime and drugs for the past 40 years. First, as a strategy to reorganize shifting national politics, social unrest was racialized and criminalized by opportunistic politicians (Barker, 2009). Connecting political dissent and crime with maxims of “violence in the streets” and “law and order,” conservative politicians courted disillusioned southern democrats, amplifying racial suspicion and anger (Beckett & Sasson, 2004).

Once politicians realized the utter effectiveness of crime as a platform, “tough on crime” strategies influenced a broad range of policy areas, blossoming as governing through crime (Simon J., 2007). Thus, long-standing issues of poverty, homelessness, delinquency, and neighborhood inequality viewed primarily through the lens of crime, gave rise to increasingly punitive social policies (Wacquant, 2009). As such, social theories explaining crime, poverty,
and inequality as outcomes of individual failings, or as unavoidable social facts, gained traction. Viewing social problems as indicators of individual pathologies or natural conditions advanced a host of social policies built around punitive notions of deterrence and incapacitation, harnessing the risk-focused actuarial techniques of the “new penology” (Garland, 2001). Crime control, and social policies in general, became a combination of anti-modern and emotive projects designed to punish and humiliate modernist projects accomplished through attempts to assess, diagnosis, and treat risk.

In late-modernity, punitive “three-strikes” policies, offender registries, and felon disenfranchisement all appear as logical responses from a society increasingly governed through crime. As time passes, the thriving relationship between crime control and everyday life becomes increasingly apparent. As famously argued by Wacquant (2000), the brute force of mass imprisonment saturates the lives of the inner-poor with the “prisonized” management techniques of the state, while the mutualities of community and prison ensure the continued economic and social subordination of many of the most marginalized places in country (Clear, 2007).

Forty years on, this is the state of things—a sad hypocrisy of the “land of the free” that imprisons more of its citizens than any other nation on earth. While mass imprisonment receives little fanfare from a public apparently content with its injustices, academic criminology lends relatively little credence to these issues outside the context of the city. In keeping with Hall and colleagues’ warning, this project reveals how mounting concerns for risk and security, governed through crime, alters life in social landscapes once excluded from discussions of crime, punishment, and mass imprisonment. As such, this final chapter contemplates key points of the
research and sketches an outline that locates meth control in the advancing politics of criminalization.

Drug users are among the most reviled among us—blamed for all manner of delinquency and disorder. Often, “he must have been on drugs” is the best explanation for the unexplainable. It is in this way that meth criminalization is not new or unique. The drug wrecks lives and undoubtedly contributes to crimes, as well as family and community dysfunction. What is new here is how meth criminalization follows established patterns and rationalities of US criminal justice, expands latent projects of securitization and risk management, and advances punitivity and mass imprisonment.

For individual politicians and governance, a “rural meth epidemic” is very useful, for there is perhaps no better way to prove patriotism and generate admiration than to call for war (Bourgois P. , 2008, p. 582). Leaders learned long ago of the instant credibility earned when appearing to act on behalf of the community or protect the innocent, making a viable enemy a political imperative. Regardless of how often they appear in print or the news, institutionalized panics like a “meth epidemic” remain in the background of everyday life, accessed for instant capital following high profile events or during political campaigns.

Racialized as a white drug, methamphetamine signifies crime for areas not marked by the stereotypes of urban crime. Just as mythical ruralities reinforce notions of dangerous urban landscapes, meth as the “new crack” transforms pastoral notions of ideal rural life. Accessing cultural memes and fears of decaying morality, the politics of the anti-meth program point to “meth moms” as denigrator of traditional “family values;” individualistic politics emphasize the pathologies of drug users and frame drugs as the sole cause, rather than a symptom, of crime and
disorder. These governmentalities encourage the misapplication of resources toward the singular pursuit and punishment of drug users, and dismiss harm-reduction strategies altogether.

Finally, a credible enemy endows small town law enforcement full access to the war on drugs. Though once relegated to policing “dogs, drunks, disorder, and dysfunction,” the fight against meth ushers in new tactics, technologies, and funding (Payne, Berg, & Sun, 2005). With increased specialization and militarism also comes increasingly coercive and harsh tactics, further transforming the everyday realities of police work. As it transformed the ghetto (Wacquant, 2000), the war on drugs distorts social relations in small town America. As the figure below plainly demonstrates, once “armored to fight rural meth,” the mentalities of rural law enforcement come to more closely resemble an occupying force, rather than members of a community whose job is to protect and serve (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).

Figure 19: Militarization of Kansas police in the battle against methamphetamine
Though the war on drugs and the anti-meth program prevail, they are not without critique. As the following excerpt from a veteran community corrections officer demonstrates, some on the front lines of the war on drugs recognize its fundamental contradictions.

Right now, it’s so much easier to get prescription drugs through a valid prescription from a doctor and they can get you the same rush as you’ll ever find with meth, that I think there’s other drugs that are becoming as prevalent or more than meth, and I think the politicians, it always sounds good to the general public to pander to their fears and I think that’s what a lot of times they’re doing. The same with it’s always easier for a police department or Sheriff’s department or whatever to ask for more money and say we’ve got a meth problem. And I think they’re just pandering to the fear of the general public.

Though candid, this respondent was the only to agree with the general tone of this research. As demonstrated throughout, most government, media, and law enforcement officials continue to view meth as a significant cause of community dysfunction rather than a correlate of such. The advanced politicization of meth, vindictive social relations, and increased militarism of police are outcomes startling enough on their own; viewed together, they reveal distinct contours of a broader strategy of governance.

To be sure, the anti-meth program in Kansas and elsewhere in the US has employed repressive law enforcement and sentencing strategies, commonplace to the war on drugs. For example, a person convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine in Kansas is subject to a minimum sentence of 138 months in prison. The 11.5 years is the “mitigated” category of the lowest criminal history score in the sentencing guidelines established by the legislature.

Though the minimum sentence is considerable, the range of 138 to 204 months is not very broad. As guidelines require, a person with absolutely no arrest history is subject to over ten years imprisonment, while those with the most violent histories face, at maximum, five years

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more. The fact that guideline sentences increase relatively little, even for those with the most violent histories, perhaps illustrates the desire to impose harsh sentences regardless of previous behavior. Comparatively, the eleven-year minimum is twice as long as the five-year mandatory minimums established by the 1988 Anti-drug act, one of the most notoriously punitive provisions in national history.

Expanding the punitive rationalities of the anti-meth program further, the Kansas Legislature recently revised child endangerment statutes to include meth-specific language\textsuperscript{43}. Although much shorter than sentences for manufacturing meth, sentences for “aggravated child endangerment,” a person felony, range from an underlying term of 5 to 17 months in prison. Sentence length aside, what is most important here is that the amendment only names methamphetamine as an aggravating factor, leaving child endangerment from other forms of drug activity as misdemeanors and, by definition, substantially less serious. In addition to the direct differences between misdemeanor and felony convictions, person felony crimes, especially those involving children, carry a number of collateral consequences that will continue long after the sentence has been satisfied. These obvious disparities further reveal an emotive desire to exclude and punish certain meth offenders, and to a greater degree to comparable behaviors.

These two examples of meth-specific enhancements reflect the criminology of the other and familiar rationalities of the war on drugs. However, less obvious, and perhaps more important, is how these rationalities encourage projects of self-governance and responsibilization that alter the lives of many (Lea & Stenson, 2007). The whole meth control project, from media coverage to legislation, makes subtle and not so subtle changes to the thoughts and everyday actions of the public. With each transaction the relatively lengthy ordeal necessary to purchase over-the-counter cold medicine reminds the public of meth labs, meth heads, and meth crimes,

\textsuperscript{43} KSA 21-3608a
and, ultimately, of vulnerability (Waiton, 2009). These projects keep the risks of drugs and crime alive in the minds of the public and generate perpetual support for punitive prohibitionist strategies.

As the anti-meth program evolves, new techniques develop, further normalizing risk and security as a part of everyday life. Pushing the risk management logics of PSE restrictions further, some states and even cities now require a doctor’s prescription for any substance containing pseudoephedrine. Kansas is at the center of this new strategy. Recently, the city of Parsons, in the southeast corner of the state, passed an ordinance effectively “scheduling” any medicine containing pseudoephedrine. Taking effect June 1, 2011, the ordinance intends to aid in anti-meth making efforts by requiring a doctor’s prescription for cold and asthma medication containing pseudoephedrine. Insisting the action is necessary to combat the “local meth epidemic,” Parson’s Police Chief John Keele remarked, “We know this ordinance won’t cure the problem that many communities like ours are facing, however it will send the message to smurfers and meth heads that they are not welcome in Parsons” (City of Parsons, Kansas, 2011). The ordinance makes possession of any ephedrine or pseudoephedrine product within the city limits a Class A misdemeanor, similar to possession of marijuana, and carries a jail sentence of up to one year and a fine up to $2,500. Though these punishments are in place, the Parsons City Attorney advised, “In all likelihood, if a person were to be convicted, they would probably be fined anywhere from $125 to $200 and be given a 30 day suspended jail sentence with unsupervised probation” (Albertini, 2011).

While these are perhaps examples of knee-jerk prohibitionism, the chief’s admission that the ordinance “won’t cure the problem,” and the prosecutor’s prediction of substantially lesser penalties and “unsupervised probation,” draws into question both the efficacy of the law and its
purpose. This leads us to consider why the city would pass a law considered ineffectual from the outset, and, once passed, why it would not take prosecution seriously. The answer to these questions may lie in the chief’s assertion regarding the “message sent” by the law. It seems evident that both the police chief and prosecutor see the law more as a symbolic gesture than a pragmatic crime control effort. In this case, the broad community receives the “message” of meth risks, alongside the so-called “pill smurfers” and “meth heads” it was supposedly written for.

Governing through “message” is increasingly important in late-modern crime control, long since detached from welfare state methods. For instance, Kansas won praise for innovating “Meth Watch,” since adopted by numerous other states and Canada. Following Neighborhood Watch, the program combats meth problems by educating local merchants and the public to surveil suspicious activities possibly related to meth use and production. The very premise of both programs is to control crime through the constant reminders of local dangers and risks. These programs govern crime from below by encouraging individual vigilance in security and management of risk. This sort of project also exemplifies neoliberal, post-Keynesian crime control strategies by reducing costs and shifting responsibilities to individuals and neighborhoods (O'Malley & Palmer, 1996).

Figure 20 below of a Meth Watch sign, from one of the communities described in Chapter 6, illustrates how meth risks are present and observable while also blending into the fabric of typical neighborhoods simultaneously. Metaphorically, the image represents the normalized features of anti-meth programs quite well; salient dangers of meth blend neatly into everyday life and the background of neighborhoods and communities.
American foreign and domestic policy has a tremendous influence globally; US criminal justice is no different (Punch, 2009). Given the “Americanization” of crime control, we must consider how the anti-meth program described here fits within the structure of criminalization and control globally (Aas, 2007).

Just as the war on drugs militarizes criminal justice domestically, the aftermath of September 11 supports ideology and legislation escalating the wars on drugs and terror as projects of securitization globally. Recently, Hallsworth and Lea (2011) sketched an outline of what they call the security state. The pair envisages a de-bordered globalized state built firmly on punitive risk-focused and pre-emptive criminalization, sustained under the guise of the global wars on drugs and terror. Extending cultures of control and governmentality to a global scale, the security state “searches for new technologies of power and risk management aimed at ‘external’ threats that, in a globalized world, may originate in the next street or in the next continent” (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011, p. 142). Like many of the theories described above, the
authors posit that the security state emerged with the demise of the welfare state. Once politicized, a multitude of problems were henceforth governed through crime, moving criminal justice institutions and the politics of risk to the foreground of governance. In the security state, however, lines between global and local risks blur as the fight against international drug and human trafficking and global terrorism crosses state borders and obscures sovereignty. Consequently, distinct lines between law enforcement and military action are no longer apparent, as the rationalities of the global war on terror and the war on drugs merge and reciprocate. Policies and tactics, mutually reinforced, transfer from the street to the battlefield and back again—coalescing terrorist organizations, international drug traffickers, and street-level drug dealers into the “enemy population” that fuel a borderless project of securitization (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011).

We need look no further than the notorious prison at Abu Ghraib for an example of the emerging security state. Housing “enemy combatants” plucked from numerous countries, Abu Ghraib, at its peak, “swelled to more than 10,000 inmates, including women and children as young as nine years old” (Hamm, 2007, p. 262). With a prisoner to guard ratio of 75:1, the facility was twice the size of Angola prison in Louisiana, making it the largest US correctional facility of its day, a shocking implication for a military prison (US Department of Justice, 2008). Regardless of size, the torture and indefinite detention exposed at Abu Ghraib are now sadly commonplace in the global war on terror. An obvious fusion of military and criminal justice, Abu Ghraib demonstrates how the global subject, though imprisoned by the US, is simultaneously excluded from the protections of the rule of law (Agamben, 2005).

This state of “non-citizenship,” or what Agamben calls homo sacer, places both the state and select subjects outside the law (Agamben, 1998). Just as Hall and colleagues predicted years
before, the security state rises as a “state of exception”—a response to exceptional times, normalizing the coercive management techniques of criminal justice in the foreground of everyday life (Brown, 2006). In the security state and states of exception, enemy combatants (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011) and sexual predators (Spencer D., 2009) are non-citizens or bare life, subject to indefinite detention in military prisons or civil commitments in state hospitals.

Viewed through the lens of the security state, Sebelius’ warnings of terrorism, natural disaster, and the “illicit meth industry,” as well as the Combat Methamphetamine Act of 2005, passed as part of the highly controversial Patriot Act take new form. As the quote below, from President Bush on the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, clearly reveals, methamphetamine supports the “enemy population” of “international terrorists and local drug dealers” revealing the contours of the security state.

This bill also will help protect Americans from the growing threat of methamphetamine. Meth is easy to make. It is highly addictive. It is ruining too many lives across our country. The bill introduces common-sense safeguards that would make many of the ingredients used in manufacturing meth harder to obtain in bulk, and easier for law enforcement to track…The bill also increases penalties for smuggling and selling of meth. Our nation is committed to protecting our citizens and our young people from the scourge of methamphetamine.

The law allows our intelligence and law enforcement officials to continue to share information. It allows them to continue to use tools against terrorists that they used against— that they use against drug dealers and other criminals. It will improve our nation's security while we safeguard the civil liberties of our people. The legislation strengthens the Justice Department so it can better detect and disrupt terrorist threats. And the bill gives law enforcement new tools to combat threats to our citizens from international terrorists to local drug dealers.-- President George W. Bush
March 9, 2006 (The White House, 2006)

Invoking the “scourge of methamphetamine” as instantly addictive and ambiguously dangerous, President Bush symbolically combines the war on drugs and the war on terror with reciprocating policies and tactics used against “terrorists…drug dealers and other criminals” alike. Efforts to
restrict pseudoephedrine to “combat” methamphetamine and the global war on terror are unique parts of the same risk-focused securitization project, encompassing both the street and battlefield.

Just as the anti-meth project encourages responsibilization locally, the globalized risks of the security state influences individual action. For instance, consider a newspaper article drawn from those included in Chapter 3. The article (Figure 21) advertises a series of upcoming trainings in Wichita, Kansas, instructing citizens on “terror spotting” (Finger, 2005). Again quite reminiscent of the 2005 state of the state address, the article quotes a counter-terrorism expert pleading for personal vigilance.

Who's going to notice these indicators out in the community? Law enforcement? They can’t be everywhere all the time. They can’t be expected to be. That’s just unrealistic. That’s why classes are being created for the public to learn what to watch for…It’s not unlike recognizing the signs of other threats—such as the meth house or the drug dealer. What you’ll see with meth labs is a funny smell, cellophane over the windows, traffic going in and out. Learning to recognize tip-offs of terrorist activity is the same idea as that (Finger, 2005).

Here, the expert ties both risks terrorism and methamphetamine to the unique landscape of Kansas with the warning that law enforcement “can’t be everywhere all the time.” The governmentalities demonstrated here are much more subtle than top down, coercive conceptions of governance. Whether from jihadist or meth dealer, the plurality and penumbra of risks invade every corner of social life necessitating projects of securitization and self-governance.
The consequences of the growing concern for risk and security are perhaps most evident locally. Recall recent estimates suggest about .2 of the US population regularly uses meth. For Kansas, this figures a population of about 6,000 regular users, of which about one-half seek treatment each year. Since 2001, Kansas social services served about 15,109 children a year because of the drug and alcohol abuse issues in their homes. During this time, nearly 11% of these cases, or 1,662 children per year, came to the attention of authorities because of meth use (State of Kansas SRS, 2010). Certainly, these data demonstrate that drug use affects more than just the user. However, the extent of attention meth receives from the media, government, and public suggests a problem of far greater proportions. Even if these estimates are grossly incorrect, doubling the number of regular users and number of children served by child
protective services, it still suggests a total population of only about 15,000 people per year that are directly affected by methamphetamine.

The problem is that other issues are ignored in the process. By comparison, each year nearly 120,000 children in Kansas live below federal poverty guidelines—meaning they do not have enough food to satisfy the bare minimum daily requirements established by the government. Moreover, in terms of general health outcomes, counties described in chapter 6 ranked 74, 89, 93, and 94, respectively, of 98 total counties, counting them among the unhealthiest and most deprived places in the state. As volumes of research shows, this sort of deprivation contributes to increased mortality, disease, depression, poor educational attainment, delinquency, and interpersonal-violence (University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute, 2011). Despite indisputable evidence, Kansas and many other states seem to place more importance on issues like methamphetamine, rather than long-standing indicators of inequality like child poverty.

This myopic focus is the greatest pretense of the war on drugs. From the governmentalities of meth use, to beliefs of individual police officers, this project demonstrates how the exaggerated focus on methamphetamine obscures broader social inequalities. Just as Nixon shunned social unrest born of long-standing inequalities with his declaration of “public enemy number one” and the war on drugs, methamphetamine problems claim the attention of the public, our leaders, and resources at the peril of all others.

Currently, Kansas has no fewer than fourteen programs dedicated to methamphetamine (Severin, 2011). However, like the rest of the nation, the state expends most of its energy and resources on risk reduction and aggressive law enforcement tactics. Nationally, outside of

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44 Kansas fared a bit better ranking 23 on overall health outcomes.
needle exchanges, very few harm reduction strategies are in use to address meth related difficulties. This does not suggest a dearth of rehabilitative programs for drug users. In fact, the Office of Justice Programs currently offers 140 “effective” or “promising” programs shown to reduce drug use in adolescents and adults, or to help chronic users recover, whether in the community or in prison (Office of Justice Programs, 2011).

Despite the dominance of deterrence and incapacitative philosophies, in 2003, Kansas, with Senate Bill 123, took progressive measures toward decarceration of drug offenders. The bill mandates drug treatment and community supervision for non-violent “first time” drug felons. As an alternative to imprisonment, SB123 integrates detoxification, drug education, outpatient and in-patient treatments, and relapse prevention with existing community corrections programs for terms of up to 18 months. While the creation of SB123 perhaps represents a preference for rehabilitation over incapacitation and surveillance, its efficacy and future has been under scrutiny since inception. Three years after implementation, evaluators concluded that though the program increased treatment delivery in some areas and served roughly 1,400 drug users per year, it had not succeeded in its goal of diverting them from prison. Rather than diverting drug users from prison as intended, the evaluation found the program pushed low-level drug offenders from lesser forms of community supervision to the intensive probation and community corrections programs administering SB123.

Similar to the critiques made of drug courts, the evaluators conclude that SB123 effectively “net-widened” the Kansas criminal justice system, enhancing punishments for low-level drug offenders under the guise of treatment and decarceration (Stemen & Renfigo, 2009). Despite these shortcomings, programs that integrate a variety of social supports with court
supervision offer some improvement over the brute warehousing of non-violent drug users (The Urban Institute, 2011).

The problems of drug use are complex, and, though society may never concoct a panacea, at least 140 programs offer some promise, according to the OJP. If policy makers intend to solve the complex problems of addiction, then no approach should be dismissed without cause or because they do not fit a particular political ideology. Policy makers should develop a balanced approach to drug use, focusing on prevention and intervention, and using incarceration only to secure the public from its most violent citizens.

**Discussion and Directions for Research**

The political and cultural representations of crime and criminals are the focus of this project. As Hedges reminds, “when we speak of those we fight only in the abstract we strip them of their human qualities” (Hedges, 2002, p. 14). As shown here, representations governed through meth are exactly this, an abstraction disconnected from relationships, people, and places. Once a reality, indifferent social policies that exacerbate the suffering of the vulnerable seem somehow less important.

With the representation of meth and crime in general, thus lies perhaps the greatest opportunity to affect change in the short run. For academics studying crime, this demands a thoughtful effort to produce accurate depictions of crime and those who commit them — what Barak (1988) calls “newsmaking” criminology. For Barak, newsmaking criminology is a process of demystification striving to affect the “common sense” logic of crime and justice, and to establish credibility for criminologists to inform the public and affect policy (Barak G., 2007). Not unlike the growing call for a “public sociology,” the aim is to reach beyond academia and inform discussions “about issues that affect the fate of society” (Burawoy, 2005, p. 7). The
movements to connect the public to academic research presuppose the professional, if not moral, obligation to challenge distorted representations, like those detailed here, contributing to ineffective, injurious social policy.

A few simple changes can develop a more accurate depiction of meth crimes in Kansas and move toward the newsmaking criminology and public sociology described by Barak and others. First, accurate data collection will help to outline one dimension of meth problems more clearly. Over the last decade, authorities have invoked “meth epidemics” despite the lack of verifiable data and, at times, in direct contradiction to the data that exists. The absence of meth-specific arrest data is a significant obstacle to establishing newsmaking and public sociologies of methamphetamine in Kansas.

As the dispute over lab seizure statistics described in Chapter 3 shows, such data weigh prominently in the public understanding of local meth problems. Drug crime-specific data, though collected at various points by multiple criminal justice agencies, is presently not available in a uniform fashion at the state or local level, making analysis and fact checking difficult. For that reason, arrest, conviction, and sentencing data should reflect specific offense information to allow for detailed analysis, rather than simply recording all drug arrests into one category as is the current practice. Although official data sources are fallible, estimates of meth arrests in particular is a crucial first step toward holding specious claims of “meth epidemics” to account. Accurate data will also aid in policy development and implementation.

Qualitative research focusing on the effects of meth use and aggressive criminalization in small town and rural settings, like those featured here, will help build a more complete picture of meth problems. This sort of approach will also address the shortcomings of the governmentality approach used throughout. Governmentality comes under critique for a number of reasons.
First, some claim the focus on “discursive governmentality” as rationalities of governance, and its focus on texts, separates the analysis of governance and policy from empirical realities; and, more important, lived experience (Stenson, 2005). Focusing on rationalities implies a totalizing omnipresent conception of power and a passive subjectivity devoid of human agency (McKee, 2009). Furthermore, some argue the approach is insensitive to social difference and assumes that power falls equally on all, despite the complexities of identity, social location, and context (Cooper, 1994). Recognizing these shortcomings, Stenson (2005) advocates for a “realist governmentality” approach, combining both discursive governmentalities “from above” (see Chapter 3) with accounts of the regulated conduct of targeted populations as responsibilization and governance “from below” (McKee, 2009).

Although interviews with law enforcement reflect the regulated conduct of subjects, both governing and governed through crime, what is missing from this research are accounts of the political subjectivities of meth users. Therefore, future research with rural meth users should include both interview and ethnographic techniques to expose material effects and unintended consequences of anti-meth policies. As recently argued by Wacquant (2009), both social welfare and correctional programs employ the same strategies to socialize, medicalize, and penalize the disenfranchised poor. Wacquant’s conception opens up opportunities to evaluate the effects of anti-meth projects ranging from mandated correctional programs like SB123 to voluntary community based treatments.

As powerfully demonstrated by Bourgois and Schonberg (2009), this sort of approach links the social suffering of drug abuse to a continuum of structural inequalities and symbolic violence exercised through state interventions. Whether meth problems in Kansas are wholly constructed, symptomatic of declining morality, or a temporary escape from the drudgeries of
late-modern life, meth users are uniquely positioned subjects of both assistential and correctional power. As such, research should listen to stories of meth users to help identify pathways leading some to use, and to identify the harmful and beneficial effects of current anti-meth strategies. A realist approach will not only inform policy, but also will emphasize resiliency and agency of marginalized drug users.

**Some Final Thoughts**

Since this research began with a story, it seems fitting to conclude with one. Once settled on the topic, I became increasingly sensitive to indicators of local meth problems. Not only did I scour media reports, I also searched the physical environment and the faces of people I passed on the street for signs of methamphetamine. Sometime around the beginning of the project, I visited the farm operated by my family for the better part of a century. Curious if my aunt or any neighbors had encountered a lab, or had anhydrous ammonia stolen; I talked to her about meth problems from her perspective as a rural farmer and long-time resident of Kansas. Though neither she nor her neighbors had discovered a lab or had fertilizer stolen, she did provide one particularly interesting case. She recalled how a law enforcement officer visited the farm to hunt and remarked that he couldn’t believe how many “meth heads” he spotted passing through their small farm town. Strangely similar to Nick Redding’s descriptions of “smelling meth in the air” in *Methland*, my aunt described the officer’s insistence that “nearly every other person in town” looked like they were on meth. Certainly, if these observations proved true, her small farm town in Northeast Kansas would meet epidemic proportions and become *Methland* outright.

Hyperbole aside, what is important is not the empirical facts of meth use in this particular corner of the state, but the cultural beliefs existing alongside them. Late-modern concerns with the risks of crime supported through countless face-to-face interactions like this constitute the social
reality of methamphetamine. So, for my aunt and others, it matters less that only three meth labs have been discovered in her county in more than ten years, and more that local culture supports the ideology of meth epidemics. Though I looked closely, stories like this were the most tangible evidence of a “rural meth epidemic” encountered.

Like all of us, personal biography delivers me here, and to this project. The frustrations motivating this project are born of more than a decade of work in the criminal justice system. Whether as a prison guard, probation officer, or child welfare worker, I witnessed and took part in the suffering and inequalities this project sought to reveal. Thankfully, work within a system rife with contradiction and dysfunction led to sociology and the study of crime, as an avenue to pursue social justice.

Sociologists propose to draw conclusions about the social world through systematic observation and objective analysis. However, active participation in the subject of study makes value-free objectivity an elusive, if not foolish, goal. Like Howard Becker (1967), who famously asked, “Whose side are we on?”, no attempt was made to hide personal and political sympathies.

Lost in the political maneuvering and self-sustaining glut of American criminal justice is the critical realization of what it means to lead through coercion and govern through oppression. Our social responses to crime are not only unjust, they are unhealthy. Governing through fear and crime exhausts social capital, squanders resources, and weakens democracy (Simon J., 2007, p. 6). More deeply, constant reminders of the risks and dangers of crime encourage us to look on with suspicion, to close off and shut down.

By illustrating the mechanisms and consequences of social constructions like a “rural meth epidemic,” this project seeks to shift social concern toward more central, long-standing problems. Ultimately, my hope is that research such as this will encourage politicians and the
public to treat racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty with the same sense of urgency as terrorism, natural disaster, and the “illicit methamphetamine industry.”
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Appendix A - Elaborating on Data & Methods

From the outset, the intent was to build this project around a set of very broad questions and then to approach them from relatively diverse theoretical and methodological directions. However, due to the theoretical vantage point, the relative infancy of methamphetamine problems, and the tendency of mainstream criminology to “embrace methods wholly inadequate and inappropriate for the study of human affairs,” this study makes use of a wide variety of theories, data, and methods (Ferrell, 2009, p. 2). As such, the project fuses theoretical tenets of symbolic interactionism (Altheide, 1987), constructionism (Young J., 1971), governmentality (Foucault, 2007), and functionalism (Wacquant, 2009), as clarified through content analysis, quantitative analysis, and interview research techniques. Though on the surface the approach may appear unorthodox, as Ferrell notes, many “foundational works have emerged from idiosyncratic, impressionistic, and ‘undisciplined’ approaches that bear little resemblance to any formalized methodology” (Ferrell, 2009). This diverse approach is necessary to understand and more fully illustrate the complexities of methamphetamine as a creative construction, and to reveal its place in the advancing politics of criminalization and mass imprisonment of the contemporary US.

Chapter 3

As it stands now, Chapter 3 was not part of this original configuration. The author stumbled upon the robust wealth of data gleaned from the years of news clippings, in the attempt to gather interesting anecdotes and broaden the scope of understanding of the history of meth specific legislation in Kansas. Immediately, however, it became obvious that the systematic and rigorous fashion that the articles were gathered not only would support analysis, but also would provide a wealth of insight into the trajectory of the anti-meth program, unmatched by nearly any
other conceivable source. To put it more bluntly, even though they did not fit the original research plan, this collection of articles was too valuable to dismiss. More important, beyond the richness and utility of the data, as cultural criminologists point out, crime and its agencies and institutions cannot be understood apart from their constructed and mediated representations (Ferrell, Hayward, & Young, 2008). Thus, the social realities of methamphetamine and social responses to meth use and users emerge from and reinforce mediated representations, requiring serious attention of researchers.

To bring rigor and depth to the study of news media representations of meth in Kansas, Altheide’s important Ethnographic Content Analysis (ECA) (1996) is the primary method. ECA blends traditional content analysis with qualitative interview techniques and participant observation. The approach demands a reflexive engagement between the researcher, documents, and the particular context that produced them. This means that engagement with data takes precedence over predetermined methodological or even theoretical constraints, encouraging a fluid process that changes with the data and discovery. ECA is also superior to traditional quantitatively driven content analysis, as it seeks to connect documents to culture, and the process and array of objects, symbols and meanings shaping social reality (Altheide, 1996, p. 2). Though ECA and grounded theory are clearly similar, ECA is not interested in hypothesis testing or oriented toward theory development. While comparison, contrast, and sampling are central to both approaches, ECA focuses more on generation of clear descriptions and definitions of materials and concepts.

For Chapter 3, data consist of more than ten years of newspaper articles making some mention of methamphetamine. Thousands of pages of scanned articles made analysis by a lone researcher a nearly unmanageable task, yielding a theoretical sample the most efficient strategy.
Monthly summaries of the articles proved invaluable and identified 2005 as a particularly important year for methamphetamine in Kansas. Once focused on 2005, protocols were fashioned from a sample of roughly one-third of the total articles available. Developing the investigative protocol, or way of asking questions of a document in consistent fashion, was a process of several stages.

The first and most obvious step was a full read of over 1,000 articles in the subsample. This stage identified editorials, announcements, and crime reports as the broadest analytical categories. Because of content, the first category of articles, including press releases, interviews with local officials, and editorials about meth-related issues, proved most useful for analysis and serves as the focus of the chapter. Once sorted, each article in the subsample was reread and then categorized, based on general content and topic. Organized in this fashion, a coherent theme followed a linear path, representing several intertwined and changing narratives throughout the year. This is best understood in terms of a protracted news cycle, as meth coverage followed topics that diminished over time. Once a rough timeline of events emerged, the number of articles at a particular time point and the depth and length of coverage helped gauge relative importance. Coding of articles proceeded by category, making note of the specific focus, the actors quoted, location of publication, visual representations, and etcetera. Interesting and unusual excerpts, as well as quotes representative of themes, were cataloged and used for the final write-up of the chapter. However, prior to the final write-up, article descriptions helped fit all the articles within the 2005 frame to the analytic categories of the timeline. In most cases the headline, publication venue, page number, column width, and length determined where each article belonged on the timeline. In cases where it was unclear where the article fit on the timeline, it was printed and coded in the established fashion. The timeline as initially conceived
did not require alteration, even after articles published from December 2004 to December 2005 were included, further validating the protocol. Following the analytical steps described, the story of events related to meth emerged, clearly reflecting theoretical tenets of governmentality and governing through crime (Simon 2007).

Chapter 4

As with Chapter 3, the initial plan did not conceive the chapter “Crime, Difference, and Rural Life” as it ultimately arrived. Again, dogged by the lack of meth-specific data, the intent was to present a wholly theoretical case for the place of methamphetamine in the politics of race and criminalization in relatively homogenous rural and Midwestern states like Kansas. Thankfully, and due to generous assistance from Dr. Donald P. Haider-Markel and the Public Policy Institute at the University of Kansas, suitable data were located to demonstrate the outlines of these theoretical contentions. Though unique and relatively robust, the data are not without certain limitations. The most obvious shortcoming is that the data do not pertain directly to methamphetamine. However, many of the questions reflect preference for law enforcement tactics focused on punishment and enforcement. This is a crucial theme of the chapter and the study as a whole because of contentions that meth problems have been overblown, which lead to punitive responses by the public. Additionally, though all respondents are from Kansas and the data do not delineate between urban and rural contexts, the assumption is that Kansas itself is a rural state. While this may be a minor shortcoming, the aim is to present a theoretical case elaborated by data, not the other way around. As such, the chapter offers valuable theoretical insight into preference for punitive approaches to law-breakers across various categories of social life in the unique context of a rural state.
Often in the social sciences, and increasingly in the study of crime, complex statistical models are preferred. However, for this chapter the simplest analysis proved most powerful. For example, bivariate analysis (Table 3) illustrates differences between variables and lends relatively strong support for theoretical assertions. The aim of the logistic regression models, again, was to provide a relatively simple test and illustration of the theory. Even though multinomial logistic regression, different combinations of variables, and transformation techniques may have improved model fit and the relative strength of the findings, it is doubtful that it would have added significantly to the argument. The following tables illustrate coding strategies, descriptive statistics, and correlations between variables.
Table 8: Model Variables Coding

1. Most Concerned with Drugs and Crime, is a binary variable with those naming drugs and crime the greatest concern coded 1, all others 0.
2. Favor Punishment and Enforcement is a binary variable with those responding “punishment and enforcement” should be the primary duty of criminal justice coded 1, others 0.
3. Male 1, Female 0
4. White 1, Non-White 0
5. Age is a continuous variable
6. Income is a binary variable with those below the state median code 1, all others 0.
7. College Degree or greater 1, others 0.
8. Conservative is a binary variable with those responding “conservative or very conservative” coded 1, others 0.
9. Satisfied with Kansas, is a binary of those responding “satisfied or very satisfied” coded 1, all others 0.
10. Very concerned with crime 1, others 0.
11. Recidivism likely reflects those responding released prisoners are likely or very likely to reoffend upon release from prison 1, others 0.
12. This is a binary variable, regarding reasons for recidivism with those responding “once a criminal always a criminal” as 1, others 0.
13. United States is “not successful at punishment” coded 1, others 0.
14. Punishments are less severe than ten years ago coded 1, others 0.
15. In response to prison overcrowding: “build more prisons” 1, others 0.
16. Reentry services needed “Drug treatment important” 1, others 0
17. Reentry services needed “Vocational training important” 1, others 0.

Table 9: Descriptives of Model Variables

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<th>S.D.</th>
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<th>Maximum</th>
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<td>4. White</td>
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<td>11. Recidivism likely</td>
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix of Model Variables

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Chapter 5

Chapter 5 analyzes the construction of meth crimes by examining a sample of Midwestern newspapers following the same general strategy of Chapter 3. The sample includes papers in Midwestern states of the HIDTA (High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas) program of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP 2009). Queries of the Lexis/Nexis Academic database with general search terms of male and female involvement with meth identify articles for this study. These queries produce two separate samples, one for men and one for women, that are mutually exclusive. The sample is drawn from articles published from 1995-20071. Articles are eliminated that do not contain the specified search terms but do not pertain to illicit involvement with methamphetamine. Additionally, to help ensure ease of comparison between men and women, I eliminate articles that are unclear as to who is the main actor or subject of the report (i.e., a married couple arrested together). After theoretically restricting the sample, the sample consists of 210 articles (105 male, 105 female). To examine the data, I use a combination of quantitative and qualitative strategies. For the quantitative portion of the study, I identify the main depictions of men and women’s involvement with the meth trade. For example, one article tells the story of two men arrested while attempting to steal anhydrous ammonia, commonly used in meth production. The article also describes a wild police chase led by the men. In this instance, I identified several important elements of involvement in the meth trade: the men were involved in production - rather than simple distribution or possession, they were involved in obtaining chemical precursors - and when contacted by authorities they went to some lengths to resist apprehension. All of the articles were examined in this manner. After I developed preliminary summary depictions, I reviewed the articles again and categorized them by several emergent themes. While many of the themes cross over between men and women,
several themes do not. Presentation of the data in this manner permits comparison between the two samples. After comparing the samples, several points of divergence in the narratives of men and women’s meth involvement become apparent. I then focus on these differences, relying on ethnographic content analysis (ECA) to examine differences between the samples. After coding, the data fit into four general analytic categories: reasons for involvement, role in the meth market, criminal virility, and outcome of involvement. I include a brief discussion of the analytic categories developed from the quantitative analysis, and then expand upon each of these themes in detail in the qualitative analysis.

Chapter 6

As Punch (1989) has shown, field research focusing on police work presents a number of special considerations. Arguably, policing is the most secluded and protected corner of the criminal justice system. Typically, law enforcement organizations are overly private and governed by a high degree of suspicion toward outsiders. This fact obviously shaped the course of the current research and influenced the selection of study sites as well as the presentation of the research to participants. As Punch (1989, p. 178) suggests, I found it necessary to develop tactics to circumvent the built-in defenses that conceal and protect the reality of police work.

The special circumstances of researching police work makes very clear the importance of the researcher’s position and status. For instance, I used my identity as a white man, a Midwesterner, a “K-Stater,” and my law enforcement background to gain access to the research sites. Most obviously, I used professional networks to make contacts with administrators at the four study sites. The sample was theoretical and purposive. Had these agencies declined to participate, I would have had no other choice than to change my research plan. In fact, I originally intended to include county sheriff agencies in the sample. However, because I could
not gain access to the sheriff’s office at site one, I chose not to include these agencies at other sites. Professional contacts, though invaluable, were only partially responsible in gaining access.

As a former probation officer, I enjoyed insider status (Pierce, 1995). Honorary status may be more accurate, however. As a probation officer in Kansas, I was not armed but had other limited powers afforded the law enforcement community. Moreover, as several of the respondents revealed, probation is often viewed as part of the problem with criminal justice, as a system of rehabilitation rather than punishment, and a “slap on the wrist” for recidivist criminals. Though some officers voiced these opinions of probation, I was most certainly viewed as more of an insider than a person without law enforcement experience, or from an agency considered hostile toward law enforcement. This position was important to gain access to the departments, but even more important to the interview process. Though the interviews followed a script, initial rapport-building conversations regarding the background and goal of the research followed a much more organic trajectory. Often, I elaborated on experiences as a corrections officer and probation officer to draw on commonalities and to reassure the officers that I was not “out to get them.” On several occasions, when discussing the frustrations of police work or behavior of offenders, officers would add, “you know what I am talking about,” or, “I am sure you’ve seen this too.” These instances demonstrated perceived commonalities between me and the participants, reinforcing a team-approach to the interview process.

Policing is a hyper-masculine, racially homogenous profession. As a rather large, white heterosexual male, I am uniquely positioned to policing research. Mirroring national trends, the study sites were staffed by primarily by white male officers. In fact, as the table below shows, the sample approximates the sex and racial composition of police in Kansas, a population that is over 90% male, and white. Because I appeared to fit with the demographic of the departments
and policing in general, I was able to optimize trust-building; in turn, officers were more likely to speak candidly.

While conducting fieldwork, I also worked as a forensic interviewer – a job that kept me involved in the law enforcement community. These experiences prepared me for the subtleties, nuance, and jargon of policing culture. Fitting in with officers in terms of appearance, presentation, and class background – as well as being able to speak the insider language and to demonstrate knowledge, understanding, and empathy to the work of police – proved crucial to the fieldwork process.

Setting up interviews with administrators, I described my interest in methamphetamine. However, I couched the topic in a larger interest, such as differences in community-level problems between urban and rural contexts in Kansas. At the rural locations in particular, I emphasized the focus on unique conditions of law enforcement in small towns. All of the administrative contacts requested to review the interview schedule and protocol before agreeing to participate. Though I communicated a tacit interest in methamphetamine to administrators, I did not inform individual respondents of this focus. When meeting with officers, I introduced the research as focusing on their opinions of local crime problems, public policy issues, and the differences in policing between urban and rural contexts. I introduced the topic of methamphetamine only as part of a dialog about the most pressing crime and drug problems in the community (see interview schedule). In all cases, the officers themselves brought up the topic of meth. Obscuring the true focus of the research proved a necessary safeguard against interviewer influence and social desirability effects, while still aligning with ethical concerns of informed consent.
Getting to know the Communities

In total, I made eight trips (3 urban, 5 rural) to study locations, spending 15 days in the communities. In addition to the semi-ethnographic interviews, I conducted five hours of “ride alongs” with officers in Sites 1 and 3 (Sites 2 and 4 discouraged riding along with officers). To further develop my interview schedule and situate knowledge on drug enforcement in Kansas, I also interviewed narcotics officers in Manhattan, Kansas, and probation staff in Marysville, Kansas. Though not included in the analysis, I logged another 14 hours of observation and ride-along time with canine officers in Manhattan, and with felony probation officers in Marysville.

To situate myself in local culture, I explored each town, ate at local restaurants, read online and print versions of the local news, visited shops, and tried to get a general sense of life at each site. On several occasions, my research and the topic of meth came up in conversations with local residents eager to discuss crime. Additionally, I visited locations of meth lab seizures provided by the DEA http://www.justice.gov/dea/seizures/ks.pdf. This practice proved useful, as many of the locations were simply country roads, lending another dimension to understandings of local meth problems. Additionally, on more than one occasion, officers could not recall circumstances of seizures at certain addresses or in town in general. I documented my observations with detailed field notes, recordings, and photographs of meth lab locations, as well as other points of interest like the “Meth Watch” found in Site 4.
Table 11: Demographics of Study Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Site 1</th>
<th>Site 2</th>
<th>Site 3</th>
<th>Site 4</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tr>
<td>Persons per sq. mile</td>
<td>453.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>79.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population change 00-08</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>-13.30</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Persons under 18</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Persons 65+</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23.50</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>96.90</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>88.70</td>
<td>79.6</td>
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<td>% same house 95-00</td>
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<td>% HS graduates</td>
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<td>86.00</td>
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<td>% BA or higher</td>
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<td>15.2</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>25.80</td>
<td>24.4</td>
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<td>Home ownership rate</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>81.40</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>69.20</td>
<td>66.2</td>
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<td>Median housing value</td>
<td>83,600</td>
<td>40,900</td>
<td>34,300</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>83,500</td>
<td>119,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median HH income</td>
<td>49,518</td>
<td>37,919</td>
<td>32,942</td>
<td>37,289</td>
<td>50,174</td>
<td>52,029</td>
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<td>% below poverty</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>% children below poverty</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>26.80</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>21%</td>
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</table>
White men appear overrepresented in the sample, however, the distribution by sex (34 men, 3 female) approximates law enforcement demographics statewide currently made up of about 91% male officers, and more than ninety percent white (Kansas Bureau of Investigation, 2009).

Table 12: Respondent Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<td>W</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>lb</td>
</tr>
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<td>Urban</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>lb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
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<td>W</td>
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<tr>
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<td>W</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>la</td>
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<tr>
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<td>la</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>la</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>la</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>lb</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
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<td>la</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>4</td>
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\(^{45}\) White men appear overrepresented in the sample, however, the distribution by sex (34 men, 3 female) approximates law enforcement demographics statewide currently made up of about 91% male officers, and more than ninety percent white (Kansas Bureau of Investigation, 2009).
Interview Schedule

Introduction: My name is Travis Linnemann, I am a Ph.D. student at Kansas State. My research examines community problems from the perspective of law enforcement. Your participation in this research will help explain how community problems differ in urban and rural areas. Your participation is confidential. All identifying markers will be removed from the interview materials. Any other descriptors that may arise through our interview will be disguised to ensure confidentiality.

I will first ask some background information about your life. After this first brief section, I will ask your permission to tape record the conversation simply so that I may be accurate in my reporting. The tapes will, of course, be held in strictest confidence and will be available only as a check for accuracy of statements. We can pause or discontinue the use of the recorder at any time. Do I have your permission to tape record portions of our conversation? +Tell them a bit about my background +

I. Background Information: Biographical: Age, employment, family, education

1. Is ___ a good place to live?
   a. What makes this so?

2. Have you always lived here?
   a. How long? Do you ever think of leaving? What keeps you here?
   b. What changes have you noticed in your community? Good/bad?
   c. Why do you think these changes have occurred?
   d. If you had to describe your town in one word, what would it be?

3. Why did you get into police work?
   a. How long?
   b. What types of training/education have you had?
   c. Specialized drug training?

4. What is the biggest danger you face in your job?

5. What is the most frustrating part of your job?

6. What is crime like in this town on a scale of 1 to 10 (least-worse)
   a. What types?
   b. Why is this?

7. In terms of your work as a police officer where does drug crime rank in relation to other problems in the community?

8. What is the number one drug problem in _________?
   a. Probe about meth if not mentioned
   b. Where does it come from?

9. What do you think of the Crack= City, Meth=Country comparison?
10. Some statistics suggest racial differences in drug use do you find this to be the case?

11. In your town are drugs and drug users confined to certain parts of the town?
   a. Why are certain drugs associated with certain areas?

12. What do you know about Shake & Bake? (One pot meth cooking method).
   a. Is this around? How common?

13. Why do people use?
   a. Methland Conclusion valid?
   b. Jenny Crank Diet?

14. Why do people get involved with dealing?
   a. Does this have anything to do with the available opportunities in Wichita?
   b. Are there a lot of legitimate jobs in this area?
   c. Does drug use/production become a viable option if not?
   d. Does meth help people keep up with more than one job?

15. Ever had to deal with a “Meth head”?
   a. Do they present any particular concerns?

16. Does Methamphetamine have a particular impact on local families?
   a. Children? Economic impact?

17. What is your department/task force doing about meth?

18. How might your job be different in a small town/jurisdiction?

19. Are there any offenses that are more important to prosecute than others?

20. How do you feel about the rest of the system—Courts, Probation, Corrections?

21. KS has invested a lot in SB123-Rehab for drug offenders, what are your thoughts on this approach?


23. Felony convictions omit offenders from a number of rights and resources, how do you feel about restricting offenders from:
   a. Housing-Employment-Federal Financial Aid-Voting

24. Many states are considering legalizing marijuana, how do you feel about this?

25. As it relates to your community and job, what are your hopes for the future?
Appendix B - Endnotes

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i Methamphetamine is a synthetic psycho stimulant that produces intoxication, dependence, and psychosis. Methamphetamine has mood-altering effects, behavioral effects such as increased activity and decreased appetite, and a high lasting 8 to 24 hours. Methamphetamine is a DEA Schedule II drug, available only through a highly restricted prescription procedure. Medical uses include treatment for narcolepsy, attention deficit disorder, and obesity (National Institute of Justice, 2000).

ii Similarly, this misconception also appears in fear of crime data regarding the safety and security of local neighborhoods. For instance, The Gallup Poll began asking "Is there any area near where you live--that is, within a mile--where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" in a systematic manner in 1967. Respondents reporting “yes” to this question have remained relatively stable and above 60% in each wave of data despite fluctuating crime rates or other social change often related to crime (Gallup 2009).

iii While the author’s find support for all of the models and the Racial-Animus model in particular, they also are clear to note what amounts to colinearity problems between the models. For example, it is very difficult to partial out the direct effects of the Moral Decline and Racial-Animus models because of the race-coded language inherent to discussions of urban crime. As I have detailed above, the conservative “tough on crime” approach is often grounded in racialized beliefs about the moral decline of urban (i.e. minority) families which in turn lead to crime and delinquency if not pockets of cultures of poverty. Indeed, when combining the main measures of each model together in the same regression model, beliefs about the crime rate, racial resentment, religiosity, conservatism, and authoritarianism remain significant predictors of punitive attitudes. However, the models presented by the authors fail to determine if each of these measures are not reflective of a broader latent construct predictive of punitiveness.

iv Incidentally, the article also displays what appears to be crack cocaine above the headline. Though no mention of crack is made in the article, the apparent mistake perhaps illustrates a relative ignorance to the realities of illicit drugs.

v Though already restricted, moving products containing PSE behind the counter certainly entered the public’s consciousness. Additionally, retailers were required to keep records of sales. Although this mirrored Oklahoma’s law, the records kept locally did not allow law enforcement to share information between cities or counties. This is important, as it appears to continue to allow “smurfing” to continue across counties and jurisdictions due to lack of real time communication between parties. Further, for the first time the law provided prosecutors the ability to charge retailers for selling prohibited quantities of pseudoephedrine or failing to maintain adequate records of sales. The act also mandated that all law enforcement agencies in the state collect and report meth lab seizure data to the KBI in a standardized manner. Finally, in general terms, the MSCCA reflects legislation passed by Oklahoma, as championed by lawmakers earlier in the year.