THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:
1885-1918

by

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This thesis is respectfully dedicated to those who have served American Military Intelligence, particularly those like Captain Douglas Crowe who fell in the cause.
PREFACE

American historians generally view the period from the end of reconstruction until the beginning of World War I as one of great change, as the United States developed from an individualistic to an urban bureaucratic society. Many of these historians build their interpretations on what Louis Galambos has called an "organizational synthesis". Galambos describes this as "a shift from small-scale, informal, locally or regionally oriented groups to large-scale, national, formal organizations." The new organizations, according to Galambos, were characterized by a bureaucratic structure of authority.¹

Historians have noted this movement towards organization throughout the period 1877 to 1920. In his Rendezvous with Destiny, Eric F. Goldman ² thus characterizes the "bureaucratization" of American life as essential to late 19th and early 20th century reform, while Samuel Haber describes "scientific management" and efficiency as the heart of the bureaucratic approach to reform.³ In an analysis of social workers from 1880 to 1930, Roy Lubove notes the emergence of the "expert" in American life, which raised "idealization of expertise" to cult status.⁴ In his The New Empire, Walter LaFeber emphasizes the systematic expansion of American interest overseas as a product of economic and social pressure, fostered by both business and government and leading to military commitments.⁵ Finally, in his landmark survey, The Search ⁴
for Order: 1877-1920, Robert H. Wiebe ties together all these disparate
trends as he describes change in American society in explicitly organi-
zational terms. With the breakdown after the Civil War of traditional
local and regional systems of power and status, Wiebe writes, a new
middle class emerged, determined to achieve power and leadership through
bureaucratization. This trend toward centralization and identification
by skill rather than by community represented a fundamental shift in
American values from individualism to efficiency, expertise, continuity,
 systematic controls and group action.

The strength of Wiebe’s book lies in the author’s ability to inte-
grate and synthesize diverse elements of change in the fifty year period
he addresses. Yet he fails to consider military developments in these
terms. This is particularly unfortunate since the history of the United
States Army at the turn of the century was also characterized by increas-
ing centralization. A number of major changes occurred in the Army from
1890 to 1910, many of them aimed at adopting civilian ideas about
scientific management and efficiency to military purposes. During the
same period, the Army was one of the most important agencies in creating
the new American empire. The more the Army expanded its operations, the
greater its requirement for efficiency, centralization and the use of
experts.

The establishment of a War Department General Staff in 1903
climaxed a quarter-century’s effort to improve control and management
at the top. While special Army agencies for such functions as supply,
ordnance and administration had developed in Washington before the
Civil War, Army leaders became increasingly concerned after 1880 with the need to bridge the narrow specialties in order better to coordinate planning. The Spanish-American War of 1898 illustrated how great the deficiency in coordination was. At the same time, America's outward thrust in the 1880's and '90's imposed new requirements on the Army for collecting intelligence information. It was not surprising, therefore, that the War Department created a Bureau of Military Information in 1885 to provide such data. This bureau was supplemented in 1889 when the first Army attaches were dispatched overseas. Together the bureau and the attaches gave War Department leaders the nucleus of an intelligence system.

Students of American military intelligence have concluded nonetheless that with few exceptions no significant work was done in the intelligence field until the United States entered World War I in 1917. Most of these writers have noted that George Washington was an effective intelligence officer as well as commander, that certain Civil War generals were particularly good at intelligence, and that creation of a General Staff in 1903 provided for an intelligence section. But these were isolated events, they argue; there was no trend, no plan and no tradition for a War Department intelligence agency until the great war in Europe. Invariably, they depict the War Department as entering the war in 1917 without intelligence bureau.

Russell F. Weigley thus has remarked: "At the beginning of the war, only two officers and two clerks had been concerned with gathering intelligence. . . ." 7 Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former CIA
Executive Officer, makes exactly the same point, adding that "When American military forces found themselves at war, an intelligence department was manned, only to be drastically reduced in size or disbanded at the cessation of hostilities." An official history of the War Department intelligence agency written in 1952 concludes that in 1916 "the entire Military Information Section of the War College Division of the General Staff comprised only two officers and one clerk." Taking a somewhat broader view, former CIA chief Allen Dulles notes that intelligence had made a beginning as a War Department agency before 1917, but that it had dwindled until "World War I found us again without any real intelligence service." All of these writers are technically correct, but they leave the false impression that in 1917 an intelligence rabbit was pulled out of the War Department's hat.

This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the Military Information Division (MID) established in 1885 was both theoretically and practically the parent of the World War I agency. The MID developed rapidly in response to War Department needs and was one of the few elements of the Army staff to perform well at the outset of the Spanish-American War. It continued to play a prominent role in military planning during the first decade of this century. Its expertise was recognized when it was made one element of the new General Staff, and it was widely respected for the first few years of the staff's existence. Then, for a variety of reasons, the intelligence agency fell into disuse from about 1910 until 1916. The sudden reappearance of an
effective Military Intelligence agency in 1917 thus seemed particularly dramatic, especially because it was a much larger organization than its predecessor. The functions of the new agency, however, were quite similar to those of the old. In short, while it is easy to understand why the rejuvenated departmental agency of World War I seemed novel to many in America at the time, its foundation actually had been laid with care over the previous thirty years.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To an unusual extent, this thesis is the product of many minds. The writer, while responsible for its shortcomings, owes a great debt to others for their ideas, advice and assistance. First of all, many thanks are due to former colleagues and students, including one extraordinary Marine Corps officer, at the U. S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Symbolically, Major Edward E. Wilson represents them all. This project would never have been undertaken without the challenging and helpful attention of Mr. Ditmar Finke, US Army Military History Center in Washington. And it could not have been accomplished without the invaluable research assistance rendered by Ms. Joyce Eakin, US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. and Dr. Timothy K. Nenninger of the National Archives in Washington. Colonel W. F. Strobridge and Major H. H. Nicklas Jr., both of the U.S. Army, provided constant encouragement and criticism, while Mrs. Marguerite Jones had the difficult task of typing the final manuscript from various jumbled drafts. Professors Burton I. Kaufman, Jacob W. Kipp and Donald J. Mrozek, Kansas State University, carefully guided me through this new experience, giving me an entirely new perspective on history. In particular, to Dr. Mrozek must go credit for suggesting that this study had implications broader than just the military establishment, while Dr. Kaufman patiently directed me, time and again, back to the path of clear thinking and honest
writing. As always, final thanks must go to my wife, Karen, without whose interest and support no worthwhile project would ever be undertaken.
GLOSSARY

Military Intelligence - the end product of collection, processing and interpretation of all available information about one or more military aspects of a foreign nation or area which is of significant value to military planning or conduct of operations. It is sub-classified as

Tactical (or combat) intelligence - that knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain needed by a commander in the conduct of combat operations, generally at corps or lower level.

Strategic intelligence - that knowledge of foreign or enemy capabilities and probable actions relating to national objectives which assists in formulating plans at national level.

Military Information - unevaluated data of use to military forces in producing intelligence; it may come from any source, be true or untrue, and still play a part in refining intelligence; before World War I, the term was used more or less synonymously with "military intelligence" in the American Army.

Positive intelligence - a general term applied to the full array of collection methods used by an intelligence agency.

Negative intelligence or counterintelligence - a general term applied to all measures taken to protect against enemy intelligence col-
lection, sabotage or subversion.

General Staff - a concept which evolved in the American Army from a broad to a specific definition; following the Revolutionary War, it referred to all the senior assistants to the Army's commanding general; by the Civil War, it referred to the ten bureaus which provided specialized assistance to the commanding general in such fields as quartermaster, subsistence, pay and medical; after passage of the General Staff Act of 1903, it specified a coordinating and planning body which was headed by a Chief of Staff who replaced the Commanding General as the chief adviser to the Secretary of War.

MID - refers to either the Military Information Division (1885-1908) or the Military Intelligence Division (1917-...).
CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Various influences shaped the structure of American military intelligence, beginning even before the American Revolution. During the years between the creation of an American Army in 1775 and its entry into World War I in 1917, intelligence operations were molded by European methods and especially by military necessity. As long as the United States relied on a small and uncomplicated military system to insure internal pacification, the intelligence system remained simple. However, as the United States began to look outward, military leaders considered essential a centralized intelligence service in Washington. As the intelligence agency developed, civilian leaders as well as military became dependent on it.

From the beginning of the Colonial period, those who lived on the frontier routinely collected information about their enemies, the land they settled on, and the weather. A settlement's safety depended on knowledge of the Indians as well as of the lay of the land and the lines of communication; the latter made mapping necessary. Later, as the English colonists encountered French and Spanish interests along the frontier, knowledge of their whereabouts also became essential. However, there was no need for a formal intelligence organization; the colonists obtained this information by going out and getting it. Only occasionally, as with the establishment of Rogers Rangers in 1756, did
the colonists give special attention to an intelligence problem like re-
connaissance.  

As a frontier soldier and the chief of the revolutionary army, 
George Washington was an effective innovator in intelligence work. With 
Braddock in 1755, Washington had experienced a painful lesson in the 
importance of knowing the enemy's capabilities and the lay of the 
terrain.² As the commander of the Continental Army, therefore, 
Washington took special pains to learn all he could about each opponent 
and to choose the time and place of every battle to give the Americans 
an advantage. In fact, Weigley feels that "no general in American 
history has surpassed, and probably none has matched, the care and 
thought which Washington gave his intelligence service."³ Through the 
use of a network of spies, careful reconnaissance, and study of the 
enemy's habits Washington remained well-informed about the British 
throughout most of the Revolution. 

As Weigley also points out, however, staff work was a continuing 
weakness in Washington's Army. Congress specified the composition of 
the staff, using the British Army as its model. Washington had such 
specialists as a quartermaster, paymaster and engineer to assist him, 
but there was no provision for assistants to the commander to plan or 
coordinate the staff effort. The result was that Washington served as 
his own intelligence officer much of the time. 

The American staff problem improved, however, when Baron von 
Steuben joined Washington's staff in 1777. Steuben had served many 
years under Frederick the Great of Prussia, who emphasized the generalist
nature of staff work. Thus, Steuben was well-trained in both planning and intelligence collection, and he frequently prepared intelligence estimates for Washington. The latter valued good staff work, particularly intelligence, but he had little success in fostering a similar interest in his subordinate commanders. Since few of the revolutionary leaders believed they needed a staff, Steuben's efforts to teach them fundamentals were more resented than appreciated. At no time during the war was there a central agency for intelligence work.

Unfortunately, the little about intelligence that had been learned during the war was quickly forgotten. At Washington's urging, Congress established an elementary general staff in 1796, which presumably would have taken the intelligence staff function into account, but the staff was never manned properly. Not for another hundred years did Congress permit the Army to design an effective general staff; this reluctance on Congress' part probably resulted from the absence of formal military training in America and from distrust of the European military thinking it represented. In any case, the Army quickly reverted to its role as the executive agent for westward expansion and the military intelligence function again became limited to scouting and mapping.

Although lack of a central intelligence agency would remain a problem for many years, one component of good intelligence work was present. The exploratory missions assigned to Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenants William Clark, Zebulon Pike, and John C. Fremont and others were part of a systematic effort to gather information to support expansion. Beginning during the Revolution, the American Army had
accorded special significance to geography and surveying as information
gathering functions distinct from those of the military engineers, to
whom mapping normally fell. The Army even created the post of "Geo-
grapher of the United States of America." Such post-war explorations
as those of Lewis and Clark and Pike continued this tradition. In the
War of 1812, a topographical engineer unit was established for the
first time. Its mission was explicitly to gather intelligence in
order to support military operations. After the war the size of the
topographical engineers unit was reduced, but it continued to play a
vital role in westward expansion. As an example, Captain Benjamin L.
E. Bonneville's 1832 mission beyond the Rocky Mountains was to fulfill
a precise strategic intelligence requirement:

It is desirable . . . that you note particularly
the number of warriors that may be in each tribe
or nation that you meet with; their alliances
with other tribes and their relative position as
to a state of peace or war . . . their manner of
making war; their mode of subsisting themselves
during a state of war, and a state of peace; their
arms, and the effect of them; whether they act
on foot or on horseback; detailing the discipline
and maneuvers of the war parties; the power of
their horses, size and general description; in
short, any information which you may conceive
would be useful to the government.

In 1838, the Corps of Topographical Engineers now numbering thirty-six
officers became a separate agency from the Corps of Engineers. It
maintained its separate status, specializing in reconnaissance and
mapping, until 1863 when the wartime need for officers forced its
abandonment.

The work of the topographical engineers was, unfortunately, an
exception to the Army's general disinterest in intelligence. The War of 1812 revealed far more accurately its outlook: virtually no intelligence work was conducted during the war at any level. As Bruce W. Bidwell, a student of intelligence history, has pointed out, America was so poorly prepared for war in June 1812 that, despite the fact that operations against Canada were planned immediately, there were no maps available of the border areas. Furthermore, the War Department had little knowledge of the location of British forces in Canada and no idea what action they would take when war was declared. As for an American attack on Canada, no one knew what reaction to expect from either the whites or the Indians who lived along the border. The abortive effort by Brigadier General William Hull to invade Canada from Detroit in the summer of 1812 perfectly illustrates Bidwell's point. Hull blundered about, unable to locate the British forces and their Indian allies, while the British commander, Major General Issac Brock, not only knew Hull's location but caused him to act in predictable ways by feeding him false information. In the end, Hull decided to surrender Detroit without a fight to an enemy force only equal in size to his own. Nor is there any evidence that Army authorities learned from Hull's debacle.

In the years between the end of the War of 1812-14 and the Mexican War of 1846 some intelligence work was undertaken by the Army. Not only did the topographical engineers continue to study the interior, but the government made some attempt to learn about foreign military developments which might benefit or threaten America. Much of this
effort depended upon the casual reporting of State Department representatives and private citizens since the first permanent military attaches were not sent abroad until 1889. However, a few officers were sent to Europe as observers. As an example, Sylvanus Thayer visited several European military schools before becoming Superintendent of West Point in 1817; the pivotal changes he made in that school's curriculum were based on the European systems he had seen. In 1829, Lieutenant Daniel Tyler, a member of the faculty at the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, visited France and learned enough about a new French artillery system which he was later able to develop for the American Army. And, in 1839, Lieutenant Philip Kearny Jr. attended a French cavalry course where he learned of the effective use by the French of cavalry for reconnaissance. Each of these three visits contributed to an improved American Army in the Mexican War, and to both the Union and Confederate armies in the Civil War.  

Nonetheless, the War Department still needed an intelligence coordinating and planning office in Washington. Nothing better illustrated this need than Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jessup’s blunt statement at the beginning of the Mexican War:

As to the complaint in regard to the want of land transportation, it is proper to remark that there was no information at Washington, so far as I was informed, to enable me or the War Department to determine whether wagons could be used in Mexico.

The problem of maps of Canada and Mexico was not to be solved, in fact, until after an intelligence agency was formed in the War Department.

Once involved in the Mexican War, however, the Army made better
use of intelligence than at any time since the Revolution. Topographical engineers were with forces operating in New Mexico, California and Mexico itself, producing maps which played a useful part in the post-war territorial settlement. In Mexico, the Americans also used cavalry extensively in order to reconnoiter the terrain and locate the enemy. Furthermore, in the absence of reliable maps, commanders soon made it their practice to use engineer officers for special reconnaissance missions, giving future leaders like Captain Robert E. Lee, and Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard, George G. Meade and George B. McClellan a taste of intelligence work. An especially interesting and effective espionage network was established in the field (a notoriously difficult task) by General Winfield Scott's inspector general, Ethan Allen Hitchcock. Local bandits, organized into a unit designated the "Mexican Spy Scout Company," proved highly useful from the American landing at Vera Cruz through the capture of Mexico City. Scouting enemy positions, it provided security for the march columns, and even finally slipped into the capital city in order to map its defenses.

In short, the Mexican War saw significant improvements in American tactical intelligence. But again nothing was done to establish a departmental intelligence agency. Significantly, a close observer of Army policy, Major General Emory Upton, criticized this inaction a few years later when he pointed out in his *Military Policy of the United States* that war planning would never improve until the War Department created an intelligence agency. His point, of course, would be well illustrated again in 1861.
Between the Mexican and Civil Wars, American officers continued to
journey intermittently to Europe. They frequently returned with
valuable technical information, especially from the Crimean War. But
there seems to have been no appreciation of the improved staff systems
being used in Europe. Thus, when the first shot was fired at Fort
Sumter, the Union had essentially the same staff system that had
existed since the Revolutionary War.  

It is little wonder, therefore,
that both sides (because the Confederate armies were modeled on those
of the Union) proved much better at fighting than at planning during
the first months of the war.  

While operational techniques were in-
novative and generally efficient, there was never anything approaching
central management on either side. Similarly, intelligence staff work
was almost nonexistent, so that there was no way that the high command
or civilian leaders of either side could get a complete picture of the
enemy situation.

It is true that two Union men involved in intelligence (commonly
called "secret service"), Lafayette C. Baker and Allen Pinkerton, both
wrote memoirs claiming to have headed the U. S. Secret Service, thinly
implying that this was the elusive central agency. But, as Edwin C.
Fishel has pointed out, their assertions were completely misleading
since no single agency ever coordinated intelligence work. Baker and
Pinkerton worked for different Union commanders at the same time,
neither with remarkable success at collecting useful information.

Though less publicized, intelligence management in Richmond was equally
weak.
One interesting development of the Civil War was the lessened importance of espionage. Theretofore, spies had been one of the few ways of gathering information about an enemy; however, technical developments such as the telegraph and the manned balloon offered important new opportunities. While espionage agents produced much worthwhile data for both sides, it was seldom as good—or as important—as in the American Revolution. In general, espionage networks were localized and aimed at temporary targets, thus doing little to increase the strategic intelligence available to Washington and Richmond.20

In contrast to these national problems, some excellent intelligence operations were carried out at the tactical level. From the beginning of the war, cavalry was used to an unprecedented extent, mostly for information gathering since the advent of rifled weapons made cavalry charges impractical. Initially the cavalry advantage lay with the rebels. As Weigley explains

[b] because Union cavalry in the early days of the war was notoriously inferior to Confederate, Union commanders were notoriously hard put to discern, until too late, the enemy’s strength and what he was doing with it. Their ignorance does something to explain several of the grossest blunders of Union generalship early in the war...21

As the war progressed, the Union cavalry improved at information gathering and at denying the Confederates their former freedom of reconnaissance.

Aerial reconnaissance, performed from balloons, was another standard procedure for gathering intelligence for the Union Army; the
Confederates were interested in the idea, but their only balloon was captured in 1863. The best of the balloonists, Thaddeus S. C. Lowe, impressed President Lincoln when in June 1861 he sent the president a telegram from 500 feet above Washington—the first electrical message from an aerial vehicle. Lowe's other achievements included adjusting artillery fire by telegraph, effectively using a camera over the battlefield, and operating from a barge in the Potomac River. However, because the use of balloons was never popular with senior Army generals, it gradually fell into disuse.22

Other important intelligence gathering methods included signal intercept, prisoner interrogation and the use of enemy newspapers. Of these, signal intelligence was one of the most reliable because it obtained enemy orders and reports as they were sent. Both sides became adept at observing enemy signal flags; although messages were sometimes sent in code, it was often useful just to learn which units were communicating. Later the codes could be broken. As a deception technique, both sides used false messages at times, often with good results. In a very few instances, telegraph messages were even intercepted.23 Prisoner interrogation, while more prosaic, was as useful as any source to Union forces, especially for reconstructing the Confederate "order of battle" (organizational structure).24 As for the use of newspapers, both sides suffered from uncensored reporting of valuable military information in its own press. Neither side resolved the problem of balancing freedom of the press against military security.25

In perhaps the most important military intelligence development of
the war, the Army of the Potomac, in desperation, found an intelligence staff officer in 1863, Colonel George H. Sharpe, who headed the Bureau of Military Information—the first such agency in America. The Bureau was a complete tactical intelligence organization which collected information using spies, scouts, cavalry and signal intercept, processed it, and produced accurate intelligence estimates for the commander. Sharpe directed the entire operation, planned its activities, and was accountable to General Hooker for its results. This was a far better system than at any time since General Washington ran his own intelligence network, and it was widely imitated, although not as successfully, throughout the Union Army. 26

When the war ended, the Army began something of a tradition for American intelligence: the organizations developed so slowly and painfully during the war were summarily forgotten. The intelligence men of the Union Army soon disappeared without even writing down the doctrine they had created. This was significant because it made the later creation of a War Department intelligence agency that much more difficult. 27

Despite the Army's major role in Reconstruction, military intelligence was not specifically involved in this activity even though it was sorely needed. Initially the provost-marshal assigned to the occupied South had to decide which southerners to arrest and the Army was also faced with the problem of allocation of scarce commodities and control of the transportation system. Later, it and the Freedmen's Bureau had to control violence against blacks and soldiers without
really knowing who was behind the attacks. In each case, an intelligence agency would have been able to provide data on the terrorists, the economic base of occupied areas, and the lines of communication.

Along the frontier a different kind of insurgency faced the Army. It had to unlearn doctrine associated with conventional operations against regular forces in order to deal effectively with Indian guerrilla tactics. This kind of war demanded an effective military intelligence and security organization which the Army did not have. Quite naturally, the War Department turned to Indian scouts as collectors of information, but they were not always dependable. Too often small Army units, and their scouts, were left fighting for their lives at unexpected times and places. Even when intelligence was available, communications were not reliable enough to insure offensive success or absence of surprise. Just how much a centralized intelligence organization could have done to improve the situation will never be known since it was not tested. But later experience against insurgents in Cuba, the Philippines and Vietnam suggests that it could have helped considerably in identifying and locating Indian forces and moving Army elements against them. The Indian Wars did serve, however, as a training ground for the men who were soon to create and staff the first War Department intelligence agency.

Several other intelligence-related developments occurred in the years after the Civil War. The Corps of Engineers resumed its mapping in the West and sent a number of missions to reconnoiter the Canadian border. Similarly, the American purchase of Alaska in 1867 led to a
series of Army mapping expeditions. Furthermore in 1870 Congress made
the Army Signal Corps responsible for the first national weather report-
ing service, and all mapping expeditions thereafter also gathered
meteorological data. 30

While these traditional Army functions of mapping and frontier
pacification were going forward, Major General William T. Sherman, the
commanding general from 1869 until 1883, was directing other elements
into something of a renaissance. More carefully than ever before, the
Army looked to Europe for the best and most useful military thought.
West Point began slowly to change its strictly engineering orientation.
The War Department introduced a translation of Clausewitz in America,
and General Sherman himself visited Europe where he observed Prussian
military performance against France.

This period of American military history, which Walter Millis has
styled the "Managerial Revolution," also saw profound changes in Army
command and staff procedures which, in turn, led to the establishment
of an intelligence agency. No individual more exemplified or affected
these events than Emory Upton. An 1861 graduate of West Point, Upton
was one of the brilliant prodigies of the Civil War. A thrice-wounded
brevet major general at 26, Upton became one of the Army most studious
and articulate leaders after the war. An acknowledged expert in tactics,
he was made superintendent of cadets and an instructor at West Point. 31
In 1875 General Sherman sent him on a trip around the world to examine
other military systems; although he was supposed to concentrate on
Asia, Upton was fascinated by the Germans. One result of this trip was
his first book on strategy, *The Armies of Asia and Europe*, which contained a strong plea for a general staff system—including an intelligence office—like that of Germany. 32 Returning to the U.S., Upton began writing his Military Policy in which he tried to demonstrate why the U.S. needed to reform the Army. Upton strongly supported John C. Calhoun's idea of an "expansible" regular army which would control the militia; to overcome the traditional War Department weakness in planning and leadership, Upton also urged adoption of a General Staff. Regrettably, before he could polish his ideas or present them widely, chronic illness drove him to suicide in 1881. 33

Before his death, Upton often discussed with General Sherman and others the possibility of America engaging in an overseas war. Furthermore, various boards of officers visited Europe after 1880 to look at gun foundries, proposed elaborate improvement of the deteriorated coast artillery positions, and pondered the need for better reserve systems should mobilization be required. 34 The War Department sent several officers abroad in 1880 "to avail themselves of all opportunities within their reach of obtaining information of value to the military service of the United States" and to submit their findings to the Adjutant General. 35 All this activity pointed toward greater interest in foreign military developments and implied a need for an intelligence agency to direct the information gathering effort and compile the results. In addition, the new interest in Europe indirectly supported establishment of an intelligence agency by promoting reform in the Army educational system. Justifiably concerned about the
professional education of officers, General Sherman initiated a post-
graduate school system to improve periodically an officer's knowledge
of his own branch as well as to prepare him for higher command and
staff assignments in the event of war. In 1881, Sherman established
the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; this school, later designated the Command and General Staff
College, became the heart of the Army educational system. Over the
next quarter-century, the educational system evolved into a pyramid of
service schools culminating at the War College. And from this school
system came officers at last qualified to do general staff work such
as intelligence. 36

Thus by the 1880's a number of new Army programs and interests made
the establishment of a War Department intelligence agency essential to
effective management. Thoughtful Army leaders were expressing concern
about the nation's lack of military information. The growing interest
in foreign military developments was unmatched by the establishment of
any agency to collect, store or retrieve such information. The War
Department was thinking about the possibility of a foreign war, yet
there was no agency to watch for threats. Finally, there was a strong
desire among some soldiers to see a variation of a European-style
general staff introduced in America, and all such staffs had an
intelligence bureau. Underlying this interest in intelligence was
America's new attitude toward foreign developments. In turn, foreign
involvement would soon demand that America have an alert and responsive
Army capable of overseas war.
CHAPTER II
THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND ITS FIRST INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

In October 1885, the War Department established an intelligence agency as a new division in the Office of the Adjutant General. The semi-official Army and Navy Journal reported: "Its title has not yet been determined upon, nor its duties fully defined, but its general object will be similar to that of the office of Naval Intelligence" established in 1882.¹ Despite the disclaimer, the Journal called the new office an "intelligence bureau" as it described the screening of applicants for clerical positions. The duties of clerks, who would be assisting an officer "well qualified for the purpose," would be "to collect information concerning the coast defences and interior topography of the harbors of Central America, New Mexico, Cuba and Canada, and probably one or two other countries."²

Most writers have said that the immediate stimulus for such an agency was a request for information from Secretary of War Endicott on a foreign country. The Adjutant General, R. C. Drum, who was expected to have the information, admitted that he neither had nor had the means of acquiring it.³ This incident may be apocryphal since it is not mentioned in the first staff report on the agency, written a few years later. What is clear is that Drum, regarding military information as his responsibility, formed an agency to collect "military data on our own and foreign services which would be available for the
use of the War Department and the Army at large."

From the beginning, the new intelligence agency was a conscious imitation of European military systems and, as such, was part of a larger struggle in the American Army to establish a General Staff to plan and coordinate War Department activities. This is reflected in a report on the new agency in the Washington Star: "It is said, in behalf of such a bureau, that the success of the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian War was largely due to the fact that through a system of this sort Germany had accurately informed itself of all the points of strategic importance in France. . . ." A staff report written in 1891 further emphasized the point, saying "it is unnecessary to add that in foreign services, notably the German, the part of the staff corresponding to the Adjutant General's Department is charged with obtaining and collating military information. . . ." In short, the War Department, conscious of a need to acquire and store information systematically about foreign countries, drew on European example and assigned the function to the Adjutant General.

Drum, who had considerable latitude in organizing his new agency (which may not have acquired the title "Military Information Division" until 1886), attached it to the Military Reservation Division, Miscellaneous Branch, headed by Major William Wolkmar. The selection of the Reservation Division was deliberate since it was responsible for all Army-owned land and the new agency was responsible for American war-making capability and topography as well as foreign countries. In 1886, General Drum sent letters to the heads of the principal War
Department agencies asking their assistance in "increasing the efficiency of the 'Division of Military Information'" by having their officers report on intelligence gathered during their travels. As Drum remarked, "(t)here is hardly a journey which can be made by an officer in his own or a foreign country which may not be made productive of valuable results." Drum also sent a request for similar information to the commanders of the various geographical departments, adding a special plea for "reports made by officers of hunting and fishing trips or of scouts near our borders." The next year he sent another confidential letter to selected post commanders directing reconnaissances of Canada by "officers carefully selected for their tact and ability" with a view to making an accurate military map in case of hostilities with Canada. The maps were compiled but never printed because of their sensitive nature.

Drum also assigned MID responsibility for recording the status of the militia, thus emphasizing the broad nature of information he wanted MID to acquire. In a confidential letter to the adjutants-general of the various states, Drum requested that MID be kept informed of the "strength, equipment and availability of the National Guard, for service in case of a sudden demand." This function, too, would remain with MID for years.

In setting up MID operations, its first chief, Captain Daniel M. Taylor, and General Drum agreed that only through centralization and efficiency could the MID meet the War Department's need for information with the few personnel available. Following the example of the State
Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence, they adopted a card file system as the best for storage and retrieval of data. Next Drum acted to give MID more control of information collection and dissemination. A confidential order in 1889 brought MID to the forefront of War Department activity by designating it a separate division under his direct control. Concurrently, the Secretary of War approved a proposal from Drum requiring that all information received from the newly-established military attaches be sent immediately to MID for disposition. The Secretary also made MID the repository for all War Department reports which would have recurring use. Finally, he required that all War Department materials transmitted to foreign governments first be sent to MID for dispatch to the appropriate American attaché. His purpose was clear: if the attaches were to get information from their hosts, they needed something to give in return.

Congress had established the attaché system in September 1888 and linked it to the MID by providing money in the same act for "a clerk attendant on the collection and classification of military information from abroad." The initial detail of five Army officers departed in early 1889 for Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Secretary of War instructed them to use all legal means to gather any information which seemed useful "in order to give early notice of any new or important publications, or inventions or improvements in arms, or in any branch of the service. . . ." All reports from attaches were to be treated as confidential information so as not to offend the foreign governments involved, and Secretary Endicott specified those
who could have access to the reports. The official direction of attache activities came from the Secretary of War, but in practice MID directed them almost from the beginning.

During the years until 1892, MID devoted most of its efforts to creating a data bank, but it also proved capable of providing information on demand. For example, in 1891, in response to a request from the Inspector General, MID was able to summarize the numbers and types of weapons available to eleven European nations. The same year, responding to a complaint about the absence of "any authentic maps of the country on our northern boundary, or of Mexico," MID began preparing maps of those areas. Because a great deal of information on the Canadian border was already on file, MID produced maps of that region by late 1891; maps of Mexico and Cuba were in preparation, based on information obtained by "officers specially selected for the work" who apparently had been sent to those countries. 14

As the value of the intelligence agency to the War Department grew, a power fight began within the staff for control of the MID. In his report to the Secretary of War for 1891, Brigadier General A. W. Greely, the Chief Signal Officer, made a bid to take control of the MID on the somewhat doubtful basis that the Signal Corps had been given the responsibility in 1890 for "collecting and transmitting information for the Army by telegraph and otherwise. . ." 15 The dispute lasted more than a year and led directly to important and needed improvements in the MID.

As one of the first responses to General Greely's ploy, MID made a
self-study and prepared a summary of what it considered to be its responsibilities. This gave the entire staff a chance to comment on the role of an intelligence agency. The summary noted that MID was receiving a significant amount of confidential information from the attaches "and some is obtained in such a way that not a little trouble would be caused should the fact be known abroad." As long as MID continued to work directly for the Commanding General of the Army and the Secretary of War (through the Adjutant General) there would be no trouble; even though the American system did not have a military intelligence division responsive only to the minister of war as did many European nations, the report continued, the system in Washington was acceptable to the foreign governments. But should Europeans learn that other agencies, like the Signal Office, were also seeing the information, they might act to prevent Americans from collecting it. Thus, to protect the valuable source of attache-provided information, MID should remain a part of the Adjutant General's office. The Adjutant General agreed wholeheartedly, pointing out that in "foreign countries, Military Intelligence Divisions are under the General Staff. . . ." In the absence of a General Staff, the Adjutant General constituted the nearest equivalent for the American Army; and any transfer of the MID would inevitably break the easy communications between the two senior leaders of the Army and their intelligence agency.

General Greely responded to these assertions by asking the Secretary of War why only one officer was assigned to the MID at the
time, if it was such an important function. Greely also attacked the practice of "detailing" officers at random from various arms to the important job of collecting military information. He proposed instead the establishment of a permanent corps of professional information officers for both the MID and attaché posts. The Signal Corps, Greely concluded, had only recently been increased in size and his "young, energetic officers, trained and tested by the various executive and practical duties of the Signal Corps" were ideally suited to take over MID and reenergize it. 18

The immediate response to Greely's appeal was an important memorandum from Major General John M. Schofield, the commanding general, to the Secretary of War. Schofield defined the intelligence agency's responsibilities while asking that MID be retained in the Adjutant-General's office. Agreeing that the Adjutant-General was the American equivalent of a General Staff, Schofield went even further. "The duties of the information division are as broad as the military service and the art of war itself," he remarked. Thus, the MID could not be restricted to one agency like the Signal Corps, but must be thought of as a "general intelligence division" which would serve the entire War Department as an information bank. 19 This comment presaged the creation eleven years later of a separate intelligence section on the General Staff. More immediately, Schofield's support convinced the Secretary in favor of the Adjutant General, J. C. Kelton. On March 15, 1892 Kelton proposed a sweeping reorganization of the MID. Referring to it as an "intelligence division," Kelton remarked
(w)hile satisfactory work has been done and commendable progress made by the Information Division as now constituted, it is submitted that the gradual expansion and development of it should be continued, it being a conceded fact that it is not yet either in the scope of its work or in the rank and number of its personnel, abreast of the sections of the general staff of foreign countries known as "Intelligence Departments."  

Kelton then recommended that MID be headed by a carefully selected Assistant Adjutant General instead of a detailed officer, that he be given several officer assistants selected for their future worth to the Army, and that the mission of MID be broadened and formalized. Kelton accurately noted that the "comprehensive sphere of an Intelligence Department" required that both MID and attache personnel should be selected from all branches of the Army, not just the Signal Corps, in order to insure that the necessary skills and experience were available.

It seems probable that Kelton's memo had already been approved by the Secretary of War because the implementing War Department General Order was issued only three days later. The order spelled out MID's functions in detail for the first time. According to the order, the chief of MID was to be selected from the Adjutant General's office by the Secretary of War. The division would thereafter be responsible for the collection and classification (i.e., categorization) of military information for both foreign countries and the United States. It would also have responsibility for directing the military attache program, for preparing military maps and for maintaining a reference library, for collecting information on the various state militia, for
planning the use of militia and volunteers in the event of mobilization
and for planning the "concentration of the military forces of the
United States at the various strategic points on or near the frontiers
of the country," and, finally, for establishing and operating a War
Department museum for "military relics" scattered throughout the War
Department. To handle this ambitious new mission, Colonel Robert
Williams was placed in charge of MID, assisted by Major Arthur
MacArthur. 22

The new general order thus ended General Greely's attempt to seize
the MID. The result of his efforts was a much clearer definition of
what MID should be doing for the War Department; it had a new mission,
better organization and more personnel. And, significantly, the con-
cept of an intelligence agency was closely linked to the increasing
demand for a European-style General Staff.

Colonel Williams lost no time reorganizing MID. He soon reported
that his division, while continuing to collect information through the
attaches, was also gathering additional data on the militia, planning
for emergency mobilization, and developing contingency plans for
campaigns against "our neighbors," presumably meaning Mexico and
Canada. In his report, Williams also proposed a unique new scheme by
which the officers of MID would be used as intelligence staff officers
with volunteer units in the event of another war. 23 While it is un-
clear why Williams singled out volunteer instead of regular units for
his proposal, this was an imaginative solution to the Army's long-time
tactical intelligence problems. At any rate, Williams continued to
innovate, adopting a functional organization for MID in 1893 which would last a decade. Dividing the MID's responsibilities into five major areas, Williams then established appropriate sections: Militia, Frontier, Map, Latin America and Progress in Military Arts (Figure 1). Finally, the chief of MID summarized the agency's responsibilities:

... the serious business of the office is to prepare detailed information for the Secretary of War and Commanding General, in order that as the advisers of the President in military affairs, they may know where to turn for the necessary facts, should they be called upon for expert military opinions in the event of threatened war. 24

Discounting the likelihood of a war with Europeans, MID would focus on Europe's developments in training, techniques, weapons and military theory. Meantime, the work of the Frontier and Latin American Sections was advanced by both personal reconnaissance and analysis of information available from other sources.

From 1892 until the Spanish-American War, the work of MID progressed steadily. The Secretary of War was able to report in 1894 that MID had amassed 30,000 index cards. A series of MID topical studies was inaugurated that year with publication of reports on the Hawaiian Islands, organization of the German Army, and "The Organized Militia of the United States." The ranks of the attaches were expanded by dispatching personnel to Mexico and Japan. 25 Apparently the idea of a centralized agency for information appealed to many, because in 1895 MID reported "the calls for military information [were] unceasing and [came] from officers of all grades, Members of Congress, other civil officers of the government, and occasionally from civilians
Figure 1
MID AFTER REORGANIZATION OF 1892

President

Secretary of War

Commanding General

Adjutant General

MID

Progress in Military Arts

Northern Frontier

South American Countries

Militia & Volunteers

Geographic Commands

- Army Units

*War Department bureaus: Adjutant General, Subsistance, Ordnance, Medical, Judge Advocate General, Quartermaster, Pay, and Inspector General

Nelson, 21
Babcock Memo,
Sept. 28, 1893
who [had] no connection" with government. 26 Reports that year included a detailed analysis of the maneuvers of several European powers the previous fall. In 1896, the agency produced five special reports, including one on the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, distributed 6,000 volumes of all types at home and abroad, and began compiling the first complete military map of the United States--a project not completed until about 1915. 27

Numerous requests were made for additional space and more money from 1894 onward, as the work and personnel of MID expanded. Beginning with one room on the ground floor of the State-War-Navy Building, MID gradually took over three additional rooms; yet this was deemed wholly inadequate by the Adjutant General. 28 As a MID staff report pointed out in September 1897, the division was concerned not only about space but also security; much of the work of the agency was confidential in nature, yet the proximity of the office to the building main entrance brought them a constant stream of visitors. As for the problem of money, the average annual operating budget for MID, including all attache expenses except their salaries, was only $3,400. This figure seems modest when compared with the allocation of $18,000 for Signal Service and $179,000 for horses for the cavalry and artillery. However, MID's appeal for an increase to $6,000 was unavailing. 29

During 1897, the pace of activity in MID increased dramatically, with the collection of information now "as much systematized as the limited number of officers on duty" would permit. As usual special reports were produced, with particular emphasis given to one on the
Greek and Turkish military systems. But the major emphasis in MID was on Cuba. The agency had been collecting data on Cuba since 1892, and it redoubled its efforts in that program because of the possibility of war. The military attache in Madrid, Captain (later General) Tasker H. Bliss provided important and accurate information on Spanish planning and deployment of troops to Cuba in mid-1897. Cuban insurgents also supplied data to the MID through their organization in New York. The Map Section, aided by its newly created photographic facility, was urgently preparing maps.

The continued growth of MID and its readiness for war depended largely on the personality and talent of its various chiefs throughout the period because the agency largely directed itself. True to his commitment of 1892, the Adjutant General continued to provide aggressive and imaginative officers to head MID. Colonel Williams was succeeded by Major (?) John B. Babcock in 1893. In 1895, Colonel Thomas M. Vincent became chief, and then in March 1897 Major Arthur L. Wagner took charge. As the Secretary of War noted, Wagner was a man "whose previous studies had specially fitted him for this work..." In fact, Wagner was probably the best qualified choice available, and there can be little doubt that he had been selected because of the growing importance of the MID to the War Department. A graduate of West Point who had seen combat against the Sioux and Utes, Wagner was widely known in the Army for his innovative instruction at Fort Leavenworth. Serving with the Infantry and Cavalry School continuously from 1886 until 1897, Wagner was the author of the first American book on tactical intelligence, The
In a second work, *Organization and Tactics*, he made a strong plea for a staff intelligence officer with all major field headquarters. Both his books were used as required texts throughout the Army education system, insuring that his ideas were well-known among the younger officers.  

When Wagner took charge, the MID staff in Washington consisted of eleven officers, while sixteen attaches were on duty from Tokyo to Vienna. Wagner planned to expand the attaché force to twenty-five. Forty officers reported to MID from assignments with the militia. Wagner ordered a continuation of all existing work, based on the 1892 order, but he soon found that he had to focus his attention on Cuba. The only important program which Wagner had to abandon was a plan to improve collection from open sources such as periodical literature so that MID would be less dependent on the attaches. That worthwhile idea was continued after the war.

On December 28, 1897 Wagner authored a memorandum, presumably for the Secretary of War, proposing that "an officer be detailed to proceed to Cuba to examine into and report on the military situation." He explained that while MID was satisfied with the general information it had regarding the opposing forces in Cuba, he was not content with the information about the specific fighting qualities of the Spanish and Cubans. This kind of information could only be provided by a trained military observer. Since it would necessarily be a volunteer assignment, Wagner gave assurances that he could find a dozen volunteers—"but that I should prefer to have the detail given to an officer now
on duty" in MID. 37 There is no evidence that the memorandum produced any response; however, it was rewritten on February 26, 1898, ten days after the sinking of the battleship Maine. 38 After a delay, the new request was approved. Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan was sent to meet with the insurgent leader Garcia.

Rowan's selection was no accident. He was chief of MID Frontier Section and one of the most experienced intelligence officers in the Army since he had been conducting covert reconnaissance in Canada since 1890. Furthermore, Rowan's mission was paralleled by another covert effort against Puerto Rico in the person of Lieutenant H. H. Whitney, another MID officer who sailed disguised as a British seaman on a merchant ship in May 1898. Both officers returned with valuable intelligence before American forces were deployed. 39

What was significant about the Rowan and Whitney mission was that they were self-assigned tasks, undertaken by MID because a staff officer, Wagner, had anticipated War Department needs. Because there was no tradition in the American Army for systematic intelligence work, particularly not at the War Department, it did not occur to either the Commanding General, Nelson A. Miles, or the Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger, to direct MID to collect any information on Cuba. On the other hand, it seemed obvious to an experienced staff officer like Wagner to use the capability of MID to produce information for planning; and, to their credit, Miles and Alger quickly saw the value in the idea. This incident really anticipates the relationships of the MID to the General Staff over the next two decades--frequently
intelligence was produced because MID undertook to do so and the staff used it if and when it was given to them.

Not content with just dispatching his young assistants to collect information, Wagner was anxious to create an intelligence staff for the forces invading Cuba. He proposed, and Miles approved, creation of a Bureau of Military Information in the Field to accompany Major General William R. Shafter to Cuba. Wagner, who with two assistants made up the Bureau, had intended to land as soon as possible in Cuba in order to begin collecting military intelligence. But Shafter felt that he did not require intelligence about the enemy (a view that proved incorrect) and he refused to accept the Bureau. Wagner therefore spent several days debriefing Frederick Funston, a filibusterer who had just returned from Cuba; Funston commented later that Wagner had done a thorough job but that he (Funston) had little information about Santiago. Like Wagner, Funston had the feeling that neither Shafter nor Miles wanted information about Cuba, the Spanish, or the insurgents.

As Wagner later explained, he finally went to Cuba as a volunteer aide to a division commander. There he performed front-line reconnaissance from Daiquiri to Santiago. He subsequently served on Miles' staff for the invasion of Puerto Rico. Wagner's commentary on Cuban operations is interesting for two reasons. First, he had been a member of a joint Army-Navy board which had considered the problems of overseas military operations before the war. The board had unsuccessfully recommended several steps for mobilization and embarkation of an Army found for the Caribbean which would have eliminated much of the con-
fusion Wagner found at Tampa. Secondly, Shafter's refusal to use the intelligence bureau left Wagner seething. He declared that the bureau would have been useful to Shafter but that to recognize its worth would demand "a certain degree of system and intelligent organization in the military force to which it was attached." Considering that Wagner's remarks were made in an official report, this was blunt criticism. It reflected the dedication which Wagner brought to every assignment. Moreover, it established an aggressive style consciously imitated by Wagner's subordinates at MID in years to come.

The MID's structure proved less adaptable to the demands of the Philippines campaign than for Cuba. Since MID had not anticipated action in that theater, several months passed before it was able to send adequate supplies of maps, terrain studies and similar intelligence material which had been available immediately for the Cuban force. Furthermore, much of the initial information was of questionable authority. For example, an aide to Major General Wesley Merritt, commander of the Philippines expedition, received a confidential report from MID, only to discover that it was a copy of information on the Philippines from the Encyclopaedia Britannica. This gap in MID coverage probably reflected War Department surprise at the requirement for troops in the Pacific. It seems likely that had Wagner and his staff suspected that the Philippines would be invaded, they would have been gathering data. In any case, General Merritt realized that he could not wait for MID to supply him with maps and information. Therefore, early in 1899, he established a Bureau of Insurgent Records in
Manila, whose mission was to provide intelligence on Filipino insurgents, and to collect information on the population and the islands. Redesignated as the Military Information Division in 1900, the bureau was to maintain the close relations with MID in Washington for many years. 45

In Washington, MID was nearly stripped of officers because of the mad rush to the battlefronts. By June 1898, only two of the previous eleven MID officers were left at the War Department, and five of sixteen attaches were still on station. Many of the officers had been recalled to their regiments, pointing up another disadvantage of the "detail" system. The two remaining officers, Captain Lloyd C. Scherer and Lieutenant Ralph H. Van Deman, assisted by about ten clerks, published "Notes on Cuba," "Notes on Puerto Rico" and "Notes on the Philippines," and produced and disseminated maps of all three areas. They also maintained the war map which Wagner had established in the White House before he departed. The ability of this handful of men to meet the Army requirements for both the Caribbean and Philippines was duly acknowledged as a tribute to the efficient organization and expert knowledge fostered by Wagner and his predecessors. President McKinley himself praised the work of the MID, indicating among other things that Colonel William's goal of providing expert knowledge when it was needed had been achieved. 46

There was another important result of the successful MID performance in the War—the impression it made on Lieutenant Van Deman. As it turned out, that lanky infantryman was to be the one person providing
continuity in the War Department's intelligence system for the next twenty years. Wagner, who was a lieutenant colonel when war was declared and a full colonel in 1900, unfortunately did not return to MID. Thus it fell to his subordinates who had seen what MID could do to carry on the ideas of the organization.

As the Army reorganized itself in the post-war years, correcting deficiencies and preparing to police the new empire, MID continued to operate just as it had. The mission assigned in 1892 was still in effect in 1903. William's initial organization remained almost unchanged. The information MID collected continued to be valued by the War Department, but the agency received little guidance on what to collect or how to present it. Apparently the War Department decided that MID knew what it was doing and simply let it go its own way. That approach worked out reasonably well in the 1890's, but it remained to be seen how it would fare as America became a world power and more dynamic Army leaders took charge.
CHAPTER III

THE MID AND THE GENERAL STAFF: APPARENT SUCCESS AND SUDDEN DISAPPEARANCE

There can be little doubt that MID was held in high esteem by the War Department as a result of its contributions in the Spanish-American War, particularly when compared with the other bureaus like Quartermaster, Commissary or Ordnance. The "Dodge Commission" appointed to investigate the Army's conduct of the war was unstinting in its praise of the MID.\(^1\) As a result of this fine reputation, which few other elements of the War Department staff enjoyed, MID was adopted directly and uncritically into the new General Staff. Yet there were significant shortcomings in the intelligence system, having mainly to do with the relationship of MID to its superiors, which should have been resolved. As it happened, the perception of how MID should function was considerably different within that agency than in the Chief of Staff's office.

Scarcely had the Cuban campaign ended when MID resumed its normal, generally self-directed, pattern of operations. For example, in 1899 the Secretary of War reported that MID had continued to publish special studies and maps, with special emphasis on Alaska. He also pointed out that the division was working on an official photographic history of the war. Most of the MID officers had returned to Washington, and six attaches were on station. In a precedent setting move,
three officers were ordered to the Transvaal to observe the Boer War.\footnote{2} In 1900, MID drew attention primarily to the reports coming in from its observers in the Transvaal, using the financial problems of those officers and the nine attaches to ask Congress for extra funds to defray their expenses. This was a serious problem, not adequately resolved until after World War I. "In South Africa the military attaches of other nations had liberal allowances, but in the case of our attaches they had none, other than their pay and mileage, while their expenses were heavy." The report summarized the problems of the attaches by saying that the nature of the job required expenditure of large sums that could not be compensated under existing law, "therefore the choice of military attaches must be restricted to the few officers who have incomes in addition to their pay. . . ." MID also reported producing maps of China for American units operating there.\footnote{3}

In 1901 MID Washington began to receive information from the Philippines' Division of Military Information, the new name for the former Bureau of Insurgent Records. This "bureau of military intelligence" was headed by Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Joseph T. Dickman, who was assisted by Captain Ralph H. Van Deman.\footnote{4} In his recollections of the period, Van Deman noted that the work of the Manila MID was tactical intelligence and counterintelligence. The former, used to plan operations, came from both paid agents and from the laborious checking of captured insurgent records. The counterintelligence program was, of course, aimed at preventing the insurgents from gaining information on American operations; but it was also
designed to check the numerous Japanese agents operating in the 
Philippines. Van Deman, who was to serve in the islands three more 
times in his career, saw tangible evidence of Japanese expansion in 
Asia from 1901 onward which greatly concerned him.\textsuperscript{5}

By 1902, MID was collecting information as aggressively as before 
the war. For the first time that year, formal liaison was established 
with Naval Intelligence for the exchange of information. The Army 
asked Congress to increase MID's operating budget from $6,640 to 
$10,000 in order to defray costs for an attaché office in Havana; and 
it raised again the issue of attaché pay and allowances, this time 
suggesting unsuccessfully that all attaches be promoted temporarily 
to at least lieutenant colonel with a corresponding pay increase.\textsuperscript{6}

MID also resumed its interest in Canada, with the chief of MID urging 
General Miles to authorize a resumption of mapping and reconnaissance 
halted for the war with Spain; there is no evidence that any action 
was taken on this request.\textsuperscript{7} And the Philippines Commander proposed 
that the Manila MID become a branch office of the War Department intelli-
egence agency; Washington MID concurred eagerly because Manila was 
producing valuable intelligence not only about the Philippines but 
also nearby countries through a network of "intelligence officers" 
appointed to American units throughout the command.\textsuperscript{8}

While MID continued its traditional approach, however, vast 
changes were occurring in the rest of the War Department staff. In 
1899, President McKinley decided to follow the latest trends by bring-
ing in a management expert to reorganize the Army. His choice was the
distinguished lawyer and prominent Progressive Republican, Elihu Root, who led the Army into something of a renaissance.

As Robert Wiebe points out, there was an effort throughout government to "manage a disorderly environment," as the United States entered a new century as a world power. Scientific managers like Root believed that this could be achieved best through a centralized organization headed by a firm, informed executive. What he saw in the Army was a cumbersome and unresponsive machine crying out for reform. His thinking coincided with the ideas of many progressive-minded Army officers who thought of reform in terms of Emory Upton's philosophy, and it soon developed that Root had adopted Upton as his military ideal.

The new Secretary readily identified several problem areas, the worst of which was the uncoordinated operations which existed within the War Department. The Commanding General commanded very little and was not himself responsible to the Secretary of War. Each of the ten bureau chiefs had direct access to the Secretary for decisions, and, if unsatisfied, custom permitted them to appeal to their friends in Congress. No agency was responsible for planning all aspects of a military operation, as the recent war had demonstrated. Thus the Quartermaster General planned for clothing, Subsistence for food, Ordnance for weapons, but no agency coordinated their plans. The problem of coordination was compounded by the fact that officers in the bureaus in Washington tended to "homestead," staying for 10, 20, or more years. Not surprisingly, they became stale in thought and indifferent to the soldiers in the field. A contemporary observer,
Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, commented that the "distribution of power and influence [was] almost reversed. That not the line, but its servant the staff, [was] virtually supreme..." 10

Fortunately, Root found the very man he needed for an aide in Major (later Major General) William H. Carter of the Adjutant General's office. Carter was a widely-respected critic of the existing Army system who also had read extensively in American Army history. Together Root and Carter decided that fundamental changes were needed. Specifically, they wanted the War Department to have a planning staff. They also believed that an agency was needed to evaluate changes in military technology, that there must be a system of procuring and training an adequate supply of competent officers, and that there must be a workable reserve system. As Root knew from reading the Dodge Commission report, each of these areas had been a serious problem in the recent fracas with Spain. 11

To determine how to implement their ideas, Root and Carter created a model for a general staff. In February 1900, Root established a board of officers under Brigadier General William Ludlow and directed it to form a War College. The responsibilities of this War College were to "further the higher education of the Army" through detailed analysis of the entire military system and "to serve as a coordinating and authoritative agency" for the War Department. 12 Significantly, the MID was temporarily attached to the Ludlow Board to provide it with an intelligence capability and place to store data. George S. Pappas, an historian of the War College, has noted that what Root intended was a
"general staff rather than an educational institution." But functional confusion existed from the very beginning of the General Staff, and the War College remained part staff agency, part educational body until America entered World War I.

The Ludlow Board substantially agreed with Root's ideas about using the War College as a temporary substitute for a General Staff until Congress could enact legislation creating such a staff. But it insisted in its final report late in 1900 that the War College and General Staff be ultimately separate, mutually supporting agencies of the War Department; their purposes were not the same and mixing the two would cause confusion. Steps to replace the War College Board with a permanent organization began in July 1902 when a new board was convened to set up the first course. It was authorized and funded as part of the General Staff Act in 1903 and the first class began in 1904. From the outset, the first president of the Army War College, Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, strove to keep its educational function separate from the General Staff, but this was to be a losing battle.

What of the MID? How was it to fit into the new scheme? It is evident that Root, Carter and Ludlow agreed that the military information function had to be taken into account in constructing the General Staff. During a visit to Europe, Ludlow had read Spenser Wilkinson's *The Brain of an Army*, an analytical discussion of the German General Staff first published in 1889. Much impressed, Ludlow gave Root a copy of the book, which stressed the importance to the General Staff
of an "Intelligence Department." In his official report to the Secretary, Ludlow specified that, as a temporary General Staff, the War College would have to be responsible for military information, but he continued that the MID should go to a permanent General Staff as quickly as it could be enacted.  

Apparently the Ludlow Board had stimulated many in the Army to think about intelligence because the Journal of the Military Service Institution selected "The Organization and Function of a Bureau of Military Intelligence" as the topic in 1902 for its annual creative writing contest.  

Both the first and second prize winners, Lieutenant Edwin R. Stuart and Captain T. Bentley Mott, assumed that such an organization would be adopted as part of the coming General Staff since it had proved so important to the German system. Both were aware of previous MID activities and assumed that the intelligence bureau would be even more successful if an equal partner on the General Staff. Stuart made a particularly sophisticated analysis of the mission of the agency. Recognizing that no intelligence bureau could collect all useful information, the proposed organization must be able to predict the source of the greatest threat to the United States at any particular time, then be able to collect accordingly.  

In his essay, Mott noted that "preparedness is almost the whole duty of a chief intelligence officer. He must be ready at the most unexpected times and in the most unexpected places, and always beforehand." Mott, who was the attache in Paris, was particularly concerned about European jealousy of American foreign trade as a source of
conflict. The Europeans must be watched, he warned.²⁰

Root and Carter viewed the MID as a necessary part of any thoughtful, informed and forward-looking General Staff. In his first and unsuccessful attempt to get congressional approval of a General Staff in 1902, Root commented that the principal purpose of the proposed agency was to create "a body of officers trained to consider the military policy of the country and to prepare comprehensive plans for defense."²¹ Carter simply assumed that the MID would be a separate part of the new agency because of its proven value to the War Department.²²

Congress finally passed the General Staff Act in February 1903. The bill accomplished two major objectives: it created a General Staff Corps headed by a Chief of Staff—who replaced the Commanding General—all of whom were detailed to the staff for four years; and it charged the General Staff with planning for national defense and mobilization and with supervising the functioning of the Army, including most of the old bureaus. The act did not specify the internal organization of the General Staff, and Root gave that responsibility to the War College Board.²³

In his meticulous study of the General Staff, Major General Otto L. Nelson offered a thoughtful summary of the logic the War College Board used in designing the staff organization. Nelson characterizes the choice the Board had to make as between what he refers to as a "thought-organization" and a "will-organization." In other words, would the General Staff restrict itself to planning, or would it also
supervise the execution of plans and orders? Would this small group of officers, inexperienced in the concepts of planning all aspects of a particular military plan, be allowed to visualize situations, write plans, and let someone else execute them? Or would they serve as assistants to the Chief of Staff whose job was to insure compliance with his orders. This issue was to be particularly crucial to the future of the MID because it had been operating independently as a "thought" organization since 1892. Unfortunately, neither the Board nor the MID seems to have realized that this was a problem. Nelson concludes that the Board's recommendations, which were adopted in August 1903, left the issue to be decided by whomever was the incumbent Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{24}

The original organization of the new staff called for three divisions. The First Division handled primarily administrative matters, absorbing some of the planning responsibilities of the Adjutant General's office. The Second Division, which continued generally to be called MID, retained responsibility for collecting information on foreign countries, directing the work of the military attaches, maintaining a library and historical files, and mapping. But the orders did not give MID any responsibility for planning or policy making.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, the Third Division was responsible for military education, including the War College, war planning, and supervision of certain technical fields such as coast artillery. As Nelson remarks, this original structure "showed no great organizational clarity." For instance, the Army War College remained for several years
as a separate entity from the General Staff, even though the faculty of the college was composed entirely of the officers of the Third Division and they were responsible both for teaching and staff work. 26

At first, the new General Staff did not measurably change MID's responsibilities. It received six of the forty-four officers authorized to the General Staff; this was approximately the number of officers assigned to MID in 1902 and it seemed a fair share of the General Staff corps. Its new chief, Major William D. Beach, took steps at once to consolidate and formalize certain relationships (Figure 2). The Manila MID was made a branch office and subordinated to the attaché section. 27 Next, Beach obtained responsibility for liaison with foreign military attaches in Washington, explaining that this was necessary because "a somewhat rigid system of debit and credit with military attaches" existed everywhere; if MID controlled the official information given the French attaché, for example, the American attaché in Paris probably would obtain more information. 28 Finally, MID took charge of the War Department library, which had the effect of making MID more important to the War College. 29

In theory, the General Staff concept seemed ideal. This was a period when regularization, improved organization and increased efficiency were greatly admired in nearly all segments of American society. Thus, The Nation could comment in glowing terms about the efficiency and practicality of the new agency, which it referred to as the "corps d'élite" of the American Army. "Primarily, the General Staff is a simple business provision. It makes possible in Army
Figure 2
MID AS PART OF ORIGINAL GENERAL STAFF IN 1903

President

Secretary of War

Chief of Staff

Bureaus
Geographic commands
Army units

First Division
Militia & Vol.
Training
Pers. mgmt.
Army educ.
Transportation

Second Division

Third Division
War Plans
War College
Signal
Artillery
Coast Artillery
Engineers

Publications
Monographs
Mil. Attaches
Manila Office
Classification,
Carding & Library
Maps & Historical

Beach Memo, Aug. 27, 1903
Nelson, 67-69
administration the foresight and preparation for the future to be found in every successful business house." If the General Staff had only existed a few years earlier, The Nation speculated, the worst abuses of the Spanish-American War would have been avoided. At any rate, the Staff now existed to serve as a "bureau of information and a group of military business men planning for the future."  

Unfortunately, this concept was not so well understood by the General Staff officers themselves. Organizational problems abounded for the next few years. The question of the actual responsibility of the General Staff was not to be resolved until 1917. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some officers thought of the staff as a panacea, while others frankly distrusted it. By the same token, while all agreed that the War College was a good idea, some thought of it exclusively as an educational institution while others tried to make it the center of War Department information collection and planning.  

The first War College class consisted of only nine officers including one, Captain John J. Pershing, who was promoted to brigadier general and sent to Manila before graduation. General Bliss intended that those officers selected as students would become the backbone of the General Staff. Therefore they were not only carefully chosen but also took an active part in the General Staff's planning, "learning by doing." The first class worked on a variety of potential operations for various parts of the American empire, using intelligence from the MID. As a matter of fact, General Bliss specifically rejected the use of the War College as an intelligence bureau, stressing that the
function was properly placed in the Second Division. The MID seemed inseparably tied to the War College by the library, by its information files and country studies, and increasingly by the attaches. For instance, the 1904-05 class scrutinized the Russo-Japanese War, and almost all their information came from MID's fifteen attaches attached to the belligerents.

At the same time, much of MID's work had little to do with the War College. Mapping remained a major effort and MID resumed the military map of the United States in 1904 with the help of other branches of the government. It also initiated new mapping operations in Latin America and the Far East. As the foreign mapping program evolved, it led to what might be called today "strategic surveys" of selected countries. An MID report summarized the program as designed to have available complete information covering any particular nation. Beginning in 1905, MID began to compile "a military monograph for each country embracing as far as practicable everything to be considered in estimating war strength, so that a single document covering all desired information, completely indexed" would be available to the War Department. The attaches collected most of the information for these monographs, and MID developed a complex directive telling them what to obtain and how to compile it.

To supplement the attaché reports, MID began sending in 1906 selected officers on covert reconnaissance missions to foreign countries similar to the MID missions to Mexico, Canada and Cuba in the 1890's. These reconnaissances not only increased greatly the information avail-
able to the United States, but they also acquainted many Army officers with intelligence work for the first time.\textsuperscript{37} At the same time, the visits served to involve the United States in a number of countries where the American presence was not necessarily desired.

One of the first countries for which the War Department wanted improved maps was China. MID directed, therefore, that its Manila office undertake a topographical mapping project of the rail and road routes from Peking and Tientsin to the seaports which would be used in case of the evacuation of Americans from China. Captain Van Deman, who had returned to his regiment in the Philippines after graduating from the War College in 1905, went to China in July 1906 with another officer to begin mapping. Even though operating covertly, they found themselves closely watched by Japanese agents in China. At the end of six months, the two men left China believing that Japan intended to dominate the country.\textsuperscript{38} Van Deman stopped briefly in Manila but was soon on his way back to Washington to take charge of the MID Map Section.\textsuperscript{39}

Van Deman may have initiated a similar clandestine collection program in Latin America in 1907, a program continuing MID's aggressive reconnaissance effort. This involved a sophisticated and carefully planned operation, using officers travelling \textit{inognito}. The case of one participant in the program, Second Lieutenant (later General) Joseph W. Stilwell, who went to Central America in 1907, illustrates the attention MID gave the program. A language instructor at West Point, Stilwell received a form letter from MID in June 1907 which
gave him explicit instructions on the mission: "As you are not ex-
pected to take anything with you in the field that would reveal your
identity or in any way show that you are an agent of the government..."
most of the requirements were to be memorized and the papers returned
to MID. All correspondence would be through an address in Washington
which was not associated with the government, while Stilwell himself
would use an assumed name. Code words would be employed to show he
had arrived on station or to signal him to return immediately. The
letter concluded by assuring him that the War Department would dis-
claim any knowledge if he were caught, and that "discovery would be
greatly to the prejudice of your military reputation." Stilwell
spent six weeks in Guatemala collecting information. After trips
to Mexico in 1908 and again to Central America in 1909, he applied
once more to the War Department in 1910 to go to Latin America.
Since the MID by then had gone out of existence, the request went to
Brigadier General W. W. Wotherspoon, Chief of the War College Division.
Wotherspoon asked the Chief of Staff to decide on the issue because
the State Department had asked the Army to stop sending officers on
such missions to South America "as it was liable to complicate the
situation." Did the Chief of Staff wish to raise the question with
the State Department? The answer was "no," but the reason was am-
biguous: the acting Chief of Staff "did not approve of sending these
young officers down there for the purpose on account of the effect it
has had upon some of those who have been down in the past." As
this exchange of correspondence made clear, the program was widespread,
with a number of men involved over several years. MID was continuing in the tradition of aggressive pursuit of information for the War Department that had characterized operations since birth; but, just as importantly, this pursuit was coordinated with both War Department and State Department objectives.

Intra-government coordination and good planning are well illustrated by MID's contributions to the second occupation of Cuba. By the summer of 1906, it had become obvious that the Cuban government, installed by Washington when it ended its occupation in 1902, was foundering. The Chief of Staff, Major General J. Franklin Bell, ordered the General Staff to plan for potential operations in Cuba. This was to be the first test of the General Staff's ability. Drawing on the work of the first two War College classes, the staff soon assembled an operations plan which Bell then sent to President Roosevelt; the plan was both realistic and pessimistic. Bell told Roosevelt that Cuban pacification would be difficult, requiring at least 15,000 troops to restore order. Bell also proposed sending two officers to Cuba to gather intelligence first hand. Roosevelt agreed.

By mid-September, the Staff had produced a complete plan for the reoccupation of Cuba calling for three forces of 6,000 men each. It warned that the Cuban insurgent was a capable fighter who would be difficult to separate from his population base or jungle hideouts. MID provided estimates of the enemy and the environment, as well as maps, terrain and population studies from information on file. Roosevelt approved the plan and U. S. Marines made the initial landing
on September 29, while the Army soon followed. When the "Army of Cuban Pacification" began landing in Havana on October 6, it brought with it several men from MID, who established a headquarter in Havana. They organized the country into 26 intelligence districts, coinciding with the dispersal of the occupation forces. The responsibility of the intelligence men was to identify the insurgents, including their hiding places, sources of supply, and sympathizers in the civilian population. The information was then compiled by MID, Havana, and was used extensively by both Army planners and the Provisional Governor of Cuba (first, Secretary of War Taft, later Charles E. Magoon).

Allan G. Millett has analyzed the role of the General Staff in the second intervention in Cuba and found that it played an active supervisory role. Millett concludes that it arrogated the right to direct activities of the occupation forces, and that this was acceptable to the field commanders. It seems likely, therefore, that both General Wood and the next Chief of Staff, Leonard Wood, saw the General Staff's role in the Cuban intervention as justification for using it that way on a regular basis—a decision which led to further organizational difficulties since the idea of the traditional independence of the field commanders from the Washington bureaus was not yet dead.

The most immediate organizational effect of Cuban operations on the General Staff was the flow of staff officers to Cuba. In MID in early September there were nine officers, and the chief was able to maintain a five section organization: each officer had responsibility for a particular function (attaches, library, publications) and for
monographs on a group of countries. The monographs were considered "the most important professional work of the officers of the division."

A month later, there were only four officers left in the MID and all were assigned to one section without defined responsibilities. Captain C. D. Willcox, who had served under Arthur L. Wagner in the MID in 1898, commented that MID had to have a constant cadre of personnel if the intelligence needs of the Army were to be met; it was not sufficient to have a flow of information from the field if there were not sufficient manpower to process the information. Willcox also made an important point where he noted that because MID had limited assets, it had to determine where the greatest danger to the nation lay, then concentrate its collection efforts. Willcox wanted to focus MID's efforts on Latin America, but the chief executive had another threat in mind.

Early in 1907, President Roosevelt directed MID to provide weekly memoranda on Japanese activities. Van Deman was responsible for producing them. Late in the spring, General Wotherspoon, the War College president, attended a White House meeting at which Roosevelt said he was going to send the American battleship fleet to the Pacific. The President commented that he was worried about a possible Japanese attack on the West Coast, a fear based in part on MID's reports. Thus Van Deman felt that MID had provided intelligence which had a direct bearing on American defense planning--the trans-global sailing of the "Great White Fleet." This is in turn influenced Van Deman's ideas about what the proper relation of a War Department intelligence agency should
be to those making important policy decisions. In his view there should be an unimpeded flow of questions and responses. He made this his guiding principle in the years to come. 50

Yet at this time MID began a losing battle for its existence as a separate section of the General Staff. In June 1907 the War College and Third Division (by now generally called the War College Division) moved from their temporary quarters downtown to Washington Barracks (now Fort McNair) on the outskirts of the capital. Naturally, War College officials were concerned about losing the direct access to MID that they had long enjoyed. Actually, the problem had been foreseen two years before, when construction began on the War College building. A special committee of the chiefs of the three General Staff divisions meeting to consider the effects of the move concluded that "the reasons for moving the Second Division, General Staff, to Washington Barracks, [were] not sufficient to overcome the objections thereto." 51 It soon was apparent that the Third Division not only wished to have MID move to Washington Barracks but also wanted control of the MID. Major Beach, chief, MID, was concerned about losing its independence and having the departmental agency separated from headquarters. He urged that MID not be moved and that it "continue to perform its present duties and such others as may be assigned to it independently of any other division, office or official except the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War." Either moving or subordinating the MID to another section would alter the easy exchange between War Department chiefs and the MID and sever its relations with other
elements of the War Department. Furthermore, it would hurt MID’s rapport with foreign military attaches. Finally, it would probably cost MID valuable information from the State Department and Naval intelligence. The crux of the MID position, of course, was that its mission was to support all the War Department, not just the War College Division.

Van Deman recalled later that for a time MID sent information for the War College out to Washington Barracks daily, but the fact that only one automobile was available for the purpose made the system too slow. In May 1908, General Bell accepted General Wotherspoon’s pleas and the MID was ordered out to Washington Barracks. The division scarcely had begun to unpack when Wotherspoon was urging a complete merger, since “the housing of two completely separate organizations in one building had not worked out as well as he had believed it would...” General Bell agreed. On June 24, 1908, a “minor reorganization” of the General Staff occurred; the three divisions were dissolved and replaced by two sections. The First Section retained the same functions as the old First Division, while the Second Section was the product of the merger of MID and the Third Division. Since the latter was, by law, headed by a brigadier general, naturally the chief of the Third Division became the chief, Second Section. The former MID became the Military Information Committee (MIC) and its officers were soon assigned teaching duties as well as intelligence work.

The question remains, why did the Chief of Staff approve such a merger when it was obvious that he would lose access to his intelligence
agency? Various answers were suggested. Van Deman, a participant in
the entire dispute and one who had known General Bell since 1901 in
the Philippines, offered the least flattering explanation. According
to Van Deman, Bell, as the Provost-Marshall of the Philippines Depart-
ment, had gotten into a dispute with MID, Manila, over the disposition
of an alleged Japanese agent. General MacArthur, the departmental
commander, decided in favor of MID, but General Bell never forgave the
intelligence section. Thus Van Deman felt Bell was getting revenge in
destabilizing MID. 57 In his National Security and the General Staff,
Nelson concluded that Bell's entire tenure, 1906 to 1910, was a period
of regression for the General Staff. Bell had come to the position
with a complete four-year program already developed. With his ideas
firmly fixed, Bell had no need of a planning organization, Nelson
speculated, and he therefore used the General Staff as an instrument
of his will to see that his orders were obeyed. 58

Bidwell, in his intelligence history, offers the most generous
interpretation. He suggests that Bell simply did not understand very
well the function of the General Staff or his own position. After all,
the whole concept was only five years old. By directing that MID move
out to Washington Barracks, despite the strongest possible objections
from his intelligence chief, he deprived himself and the Secretary of
War of the military intelligence they needed for planning and decision
making. The result was that the officials were soon without any
departmental intelligence agency, just when the world situation, from
the Mexican Border to the middle of Europe, made the need for intel-
ligence imperative. 59

Alternatively, General Bell's decision may be viewed in bureaucrat-
ic terms. As Wiebe points out, the scientific management approach to
government stressed executive action. 60 Decisions were made at the
top and orders flowed therefrom. This was the way President Roosevelt
operated, and why should not General Bell do the same. General Bell
consistently showed himself to be a strong executive. And, while
Congress had abolished the position of Commanding General of the Army
with the General Staff Act in 1903, that did not prevent General Bell
and his successors from wanting to command the Army. At the same time,
the authority of the Chief of Staff did not go unchallenged within the
Army. The bureaus in particular were restive, with Adjutant General
Fred C. Ainsworth virtually refusing to accept General Bell's supremacy.
Under these circumstances, Bell undoubtedly saw the General Staff as his
most reliable tool for imposing his will.

In dealing with MID, Bell may have remembered unfavorably the
independence of its Manila Branch, as Van Deman suspected, and he
clearly had no appreciation of the need for an intelligence agency.
Although Bell did not comment directly on the MID, some insight into
his views is offered by an analysis prepared for Bell of a scathing
memorandum opposing the move and merger from the last chief, MID,
Lieutenant Colonel T. W. Jones. Major E. M. Smith of the War College
Division, writing in July 1908, disputed Jones' contention that the
function of the MID was the most important single element of the
General Staff. "In my opinion, the Author has not demonstrated his
point. Similar arguments, I understand, have been put forth by the sanitarians and signal men in the Army and the engineers in the Navy." In fact, "(h)istory does not justify such a great role to the bureau of information," Smith wrote, and he cited a number of battles won without good intelligence to prove his point. Addressing himself to peacetime intelligence work, Smith degraded intelligence gathered on Venezuela for the first Chief of Staff, General S. F. M. Young:

"Examination appears to disclose the fact that most of the information could better be collected by clerks at small salary, at any rate by statisticians, rather than highly paid and highly educated officers." 61 Discounting the hyperbole, it seems apparent that few officers on the General Staff, outside the MID, understood the nature of intelligence work.

With Bell's approval, General Wotherspoon soon proceeded to dismantle the MID organization so carefully developed. Van Deman reports that for a time "a semblance of a distinct organization for military information work was maintained. But it was only a semblance." All of the MID records and personnel were dispersed throughout the War College Division. 62 Wotherspoon did take some interest in the work being done by the MIC. For example, he initiated action, apparently successfully, to have Van Deman's tour on the General Staff extended beyond the statutory four years so that he could complete the cataloguing of the "mass of maps that have accumulated for years." 63 But as the months passed and the former MID veterans completed their General Staff tours, intelligence production suffered. Additionally, Wotherspoon
thwarted most of the intelligence program through his absolute control of the section's assets. Van Deman recalled bitterly that neither clerks nor typewriters were ever assigned to MID, and the former intelligence men simply could not keep the work alive.

Beach, Jones, Van Deman and others tried without success to convey their sense of the importance of MID to Wotherspoon. But Wotherspoon, long associated with the War College, saw MID as a group of valuable General Staff officers who could be better employed within the War College Division (WCD); after the merger, he had sixteen of thirty-one officers on the staff. Wotherspoon believed that the War College was the brain of the General Staff--its use of students to "learn by doing" meant to him that good plans were being written and dependable future staff officers were being trained. As for the importance of intelligence, Wotherspoon probably had not seen enough evidence that the function was unique. In fact, the MID had been quite parochial throughout its existence, normally behaving like busy plumbers. They worked alone from the rest of the staff, talked in an unknown language about "secret service" matters, and never wrote anything for external distribution except under duress. Aside from Wagner's books, the first American intelligence doctrine was not written until 1916, even though there was a well-understood oral tradition within MID. When they needed more money or manpower, or when threatened with extinction, MID issued sweeping claims of success for their efforts; while often true, these claims would have been more convincing to the rest of the General Staff if MID had been heard from more frequently.
Actually, the problem of narrow vision and confused efforts were characteristic of the General Staff from about 1906 until after America entered World War I. The reoccupation of Cuba had been a success for the staff, but without definite goals, such as a war to plan, its focus blurred. John McAuley Palmer, who first served on the General Staff as a captain in 1910, commented later that "it takes more than an act of Congress to make an efficient General Staff. Our progress was slow at first because very few officers knew the real meaning of the phrase." As Palmer points out, more than thirty years would pass before an officer, General Malin Craig, educated and staff-trained as conceived by the Root Reforms, became Chief of Staff. Looking back to the original proposal, Palmer claimed that neither he nor any other officer he knew had "any conception" of what Root intended in 1903: "To us, the new General Staff appeared to be a sort of busybody staff created to butt into the business of every other staff activity. And this is precisely what Secretary Root did not want. He did not want (it) to be a super-administrative agency to do what was already being done."

Palmer's point bears specifically on the organizational confusion Wotherspoon created in the new Second Section, as well as on the more general complaints about the "inefficiency" of the General Staff which were being heard by 1910. Palmer's "busybody" organization aptly described the new Second Section. A look at its functional responsibilities shows that General Wotherspoon intended the section to be the hub of the War Department. It was responsible for intelligence, including the attaches and the photographic gallery. It published non-technical
Figure 3

GENERAL STAFF FOLLOWING REORGANIZATION OF 1910-1911

President

Secretary of War

Chief of Staff

Geographic commands
Army units

Bureaus

Coast Artillery
Militia
War College
Mobile Army

Clerk
War Plans
Library
Distribution
Photo
Military Information

MID, Manila
Attaches Abroad

Officers Abroad
Collecting Info.

Crozier to Chief of Staff, Jan. 27
Nelson, 135
 manuals and issued military publications, maps and documents. It planned for future strategic, tactical and logistic operations and all field maneuvers. All military education, including the War College, belonged to the section. And finally, it had responsibility for permanent fortifications, submarine defense, field engineering, signaling, and military resources of the country. To accomplish this awesome task, Wotherspoon had fewer than thirty officers, including the War College students.  

In mid-1910, Leonard Wood succeeded Bell, and he was determined to impose his forceful will on the Army, beginning with the General Staff. Wood believed that the War Department planners did not understand the real situation faced by the Army in the field, and he was certain that organizational conflicts on the staff were at least partially to blame. Before taking over as Chief of Staff, Wood commented that the War Department "was still wallowing about trying to adjust the relations of the new General Staff to an entrenched and jealous bureaucracy and not succeeding very well." The difficulty stemmed, Wood believed, from confusion over responsibilities. "The departments (of the War Department) seem to be becoming more and more disorganized. Orders emanate from different sources, and there seems to be little control or centralization." Believing that a more function-oriented staff would correct some of the difficulty, Wood directed that the two-section staff be converted into a four-division organization: Mobile Army, War College, Coast Artillery, and Militia Affairs. The War College Division (WCD) was to be the chief planning agency, and it retained most of the old Second Section's functions, including military
information (Figure 3).

As Nelson points out, Wood's objectives for the General Staff were not significantly different than those of Bell. He wanted a body of assistants to coordinate his directives and policies throughout the War Department. While the new organization at least initially was successful at coordination, "it opened the door to meddling in administrative details and to acts which actually came within the operating sphere rather than the staff sphere." There is no indication that Wood was initially concerned about intelligence, although he was to become so later in his term.68

Wood had to deal with another factor which had been contributing to the General Staff's difficulties for several years--the long-smouldering feud between it and Adjutant General Ainsworth. General Ainsworth deeply resented the "general stuff" because it impinged on his role as the connecting link between the headquarters of the War Department, the rest of the Army, and all agencies outside the War Department. The direct communications which had existed between the MID and the military attaches since 1889 came under Ainsworth's fire in 1907 as a part of his larger fight with both the General Staff and its Chief. His office issued an order that year directing that all official correspondence to officers of the Army must pass through his section.69 The MID and later the Second Section continued to deal directly with the attaches until 1909. Apparently responding to a demand from Ainsworth that the Second Section be forced to comply with the 1907 order, the Assistant Chief of Staff took the position that
the Section could communicate directly with the attaches only to give
directions for collecting information and to receive their reports.
Any other directions to an attaché, including an order to go from one
place to another to collect information, could be given only by the
Adjutant General. The Second Section was expressly forbidden direct
communications with either the State Department or the Navy. This
made for an unwieldy situation since the military attaches worked un-
der ambassadorial supervision in overseas posts and most of their com-
munications were transmitted in diplomatic pouches. Too, Naval Intel-
ligence had been a continuing source of useful information for the
War Department through the MID and Second Section. Although the record
is unclear, it seems that the Second Section and later the WCD frequent-
ly ignored these regulations until 1917 when they were finally rescind-
ded.

As for General Ainsworth, his sudden retirement in 1911 (in lieu
of court-martial for insubordination) did not end his campaign against
the General Staff. Ainsworth had powerful friends in the Congress who
were incensed that he was virtually thrown out of the Army. Largely as
an "act of revenge" on the General Staff, Congress passed a law in
1912 reducing its size and placing major restrictions on which officers
might serve on the staff; the effect was to cause wholesale re-
assignments from the staff and further disruption of its efforts.7

Having settled the Ainsworth affair, which helped establish the
authority of the Chief of Staff, Wood turned to the question of
"preparedness." The preparedness effort was aimed at readying the
Army (and to some extent the country) for war. Intelligence played little part in the preparedness campaign because Wood could not point to any specific foreign threat. On the other hand, as revolution flared in Mexico in 1911, threatening to spill over into the United States and thereby aiding Wood's preparedness fight, WCD was able to provide information on Mexico from its remaining intelligence files and monographs.

Generally, intelligence work stagnated after 1910, reaching a nadir in 1915. As MIC became enmeshed with the routine functions of the War College, WCD's general duties went increasingly to MIC. For example, on February 3, 1912 the Chief of Staff approved a new directive "to further expedite the work and increase the efficiency of the War College Division;" the directive specifically stated MIC's responsibilities. Of eight functions, four were related to intelligence. But they were all passive measures, dealing with carding, filing or writing reports. This approach was antithetical to the traditionally aggressive intelligence program of the old MID, and it poorly served the War Department's needs. Furthermore, the MID experience had shown the need for a group of trained intelligence men on the General Staff who could take scraps of incoming information and refine them into usable intelligence. But the whole WCD staff "floated" among various committees; no one was assigned fulltime to intelligence work. In short, without aggressive collection direction from the War Department, the information acquired by the attaches and others was of doubtful value; and without careful processing by knowledgeable
personnel, little intelligence would be forthcoming. A similar approach by the British in 1588, for instance, presumably would have found the Spanish Armada anchored in the Thames with Sir Francis Walsingham, Queen Elizabeth's intelligence chief, still quietly carding data from a six-week-old Madrid newspaper, trying to find a misplaced agent report, or inspecting long bow ranges.

General Wood apparently noticed how little intelligence he was receiving. In early 1913, he wrote a memorandum to the chief, WCD, in which he condemned the lack of continuity in military information work. Commenting on the inadequate program of acquainting new staff officers with intelligence, Wood said that all intelligence information was treated equally, when some evaluation obviously was needed. Moreover, he noted that officers going to overseas intelligence assignments, such as attaches, seemed ignorant of what information MIC already had and what it needed. The military monograph files were far from complete, especially in regard to China and Japan. Finally, Wood referred to an apparent lack of coordination between the Army, Navy and State Department in intelligence matters. Wood's memorandum was an accurate yet incomplete indictment of WCD's failure to attend to intelligence work. Unfortunately, Wood did not order WCD to take any corrective action, and the reply from the chief, WCD, only made excuses for inaction. In fact, the division did not change its approach for two more years.

The Wood memorandum and WCD response illustrated the lack of understanding that, to be effective, an Army intelligence program must be centrally directed. In 1913, the initiative to gather information lay
in the field with the handful of collectors—the attaches, military observers and whatever special missions might be undertaken. No agency in the War Department was comparing what was known with what information was needed on any foreign situation, despite the fact that the Army in general was increasingly interested at this time in overseas, primarily, European developments. 77 No better evidence that intelligence was misunderstood existed than the assertion by the chief, WCD, in 1914 that there were too many attaches abroad. Of the approximately twenty-two, he wanted to recall eight from Europe, citing expense and a shortage of personnel, leaving officers only in France, Germany and England. He also favored having attaches in Japan, Central America, Brazil, Chile and Liberia. Fortunately, General Wood ignored him. 78

While WCD took a detached attitude about European developments, it remained sensitively attuned to the worsening situation in Mexico—a crisis that triggered the assembly of a division in Texas in mid-1913. Finally in February 1914, Colonel John Biddle, Chief, WCD, proposed to General Wood that a number of officers of the Southern Department be designated as intelligence officers with the additional duty of collecting information from refugees about Mexican affairs. Wood approved the idea and the order was transmitted to Brigadier General Funston, commander of the Southern Department. However, the order restricted the intelligence officers from crossing the border to collect information. 79

About two months after Funston was told to collect more information,
he found himself occupying a piece of Mexican territory. On April 21, 1914 as part of President Wilson’s efforts to enforce an embargo on arms shipments to Mexico, American Marines seized Vera Cruz. On May 1, Funston moved to the port city and took command of all forces there. Funston’s small force, and in fact Wilson’s whole Mexican policy, were threatened by an uncoordinated and ad hoc “intelligence operation” shortly after the Americans occupied Vera Cruz. Perhaps indicating how little faith he had in WCD’s ability to collect information, General Wood decided to send a “special intelligence agent” to Vera Cruz. Captain Douglas MacArthur, Wood’s protege, went to Mexico. Neither assigned to intelligence nor trained for the work, he gave Funston a perfunctory explanation of his mission, passed through the lines, killed several Mexicans, and returned with little useful information. MacArthur’s effort was the kind of haphazard approach widely used by senior American commanders in the Revolution, Mexican War, and Civil War, but which had not been necessary as long as the MID was operating effectively. While some long range reconnaissance missions had been undertaken, including those of Rowan, Whitney and Stilwell, they had been coordinated in advance with national objectives.

After the outbreak of war, American attention shifted abruptly from the Mexican border to Europe in the fall of 1914. This ended the discussion in WCD of bringing home attaches. To the contrary, the new chief, WCD, Brigadier General M. M. Macomb proposed to the new Chief of Staff, General Wotherspoon, that the attaches remain at their posts, and that separate American Army observers be accredited to the armies...
of the combatants. General Macomb, who was to become quite interested in
intelligence, emphasized to General Wotherspoon the opportunities
presented by the war for obtaining information for American defense
planning.82

By November 1914, the WCD's capability for overseas collection in-
cluded at least thirteen attaché posts, as well as observer groups with
the French, German, Austrian and Japanese armies. The only significant
administrative problem was in France, where authorities refused until
1916 to let the observers travel freely at the front. The French go-

government preferred to keep the American observers in Paris, while the
latter were understandably eager to get to the front.83

In early 1915, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison ordered a comp-

te review of American military policy. After six months of study, the
WCD produced "A Statement of the Proper Military Policy of the United
States," a voluminous document which covered the entire issue, from a
review of the military problems facing the country through a recommended
defense program. Nelson called the "Statement" a model of General Staff
work, providing for the first time in American history a complete
picture of both the current and desired military posture. The intel-
ligence contribution was in the form of monographs, maps and informa-
tion from Europe on the military situation there.84

One difficulty facing all War Department planners was American
ambivalence about the European war. President Wilson was obviously
reluctant to proceed very far with intelligence collection, war plan-
ning or preparedness if it risked greater American involvement. This
was illustrated when the President read in the newspaper that "It is understood that the General Staff is preparing a plan in case of war with Germany." Was that statement true, Wilson wanted to know. If it was, he wanted "every officer of the General Staff" relieved and banished from Washington. The Chief of Staff assured the Secretary of War that the law enacting the General Staff required it to do contingency planning and that the War College "had studied over and over again plans for war with Germany, England, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico etc. . . ." 85

In mid-1915, intelligence touched bottom. WCD was reorganized into two sections: Military Information and War College. All personnel of WCD were assigned to the MI Section and its primary function was to do "current General Staff work." The title "Military Information" was preserved because Congressional allocations were made in that name. No individual was assigned to plan for the collection of intelligence, and incoming information was filed by whomever happened to receive it. 86

At this juncture, the Army's most experienced intelligence officer, Ralph H. Van Deman, fortuitously returned to the General Staff after several years of troop duty. Van Deman was appalled at the virtual lack of an intelligence program. Information from Europe was simply scanned and filed, while reports from the intelligence officers on the Mexican border were stacked, unread, on a desk in the corner of an office. No thought was given to potential uses for this information. Van Deman made it his first priority to develop a system for reading each report as it arrived, preparing summaries of the information for the WCD staff, and efficient filing. Van Deman wrote later that this
was a mundane beginning, but it seemed the best place to start when there was no program. And, too, the general nature of all assignments to the WCD meant that Van Deman had various non-intelligence responsibilities. 87

But a new attitude toward intelligence was not long coming to WCD. In a proposed reorganization of the General Staff, submitted on November 15, 1915, General Macomb wrote of the need to reestablish a separate military information section as part of a restructured War College Division. The information section would be sub-divided into country committees, similar to the structure of the Military Progress Section of the old MID. The Macomb proposal, which Chief of Staff Hugh L. Scott rejected without comment, revealed WCD interest in improving intelligence, but it did not call for reinstating an intelligence agency as a separate division, equal to the War College. 88 That would come later.

In early 1916, Van Deman succeeded momentarily in making intelligence from Europe available to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. This was a long-standing part of the WCD mission, which it had ignored for years. Unfortunately, the first document sent to Kansas was a highly sensitive British report on engineering techniques which had been obtained by the American attache in London on a promise that it would be kept under tight security. Word somehow got back to the British, who protested strongly. That ended for the time being the program to disseminate intelligence information outside Washington. 89
At about the same time, intelligence from the Mexican border gave no warning of Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico. In response to that raid, President Wilson ordered Brigadier General John J. Pershing to pursue the insurgent Mexicans into Mexico, leading in turn to much improved intelligence information on the situation in Mexico.\(^{90}\) Probably drawing on his experience with counterguerrilla operations in the Philippines, Pershing appointed an aggressive young cavalryman, Major James A. Ryan, as his intelligence officer. Ryan immediately began establishing a "service of information" which proved particularly efficient after the Pershing Expedition settled into one area as a base of operations.\(^{91}\) "Frequent and copious information reports" were sent by Ryan to the War Department, apparently providing ample information on the situation in Northern Mexico.\(^{92}\)

Pointing to a somewhat improved overseas collection capability, Van Deman launched his campaign to reform the War Department intelligence system in March 1916 with one of the most important statements ever written on American intelligence. In a lengthy and frank historical review of the development of departmental military information function, Van Deman described WDC's intelligence performance as incompetent.\(^{93}\) But, rather than simply criticizing, the "Historical Sketch" contained an analysis of the problem and a scheme for improvement. In fact, it is a brilliant essay on military intelligence including how it is obtained and processed and made available to decision-making authorities. Since Van Deman referred throughout to an evolutionary growth of intelligence doctrine in the American Army which came to fruition in the old
MID, and since no Army manuals or civilian publications existed from which he could have drawn his ideas, Van Deman was most likely expanding on the concepts of the original MI agency. As he made clear, he was codifying and interpreting MID principles developed over the previous thirty years. The "Historical Sketch" became the blueprint by which Van Deman reestablished the MID in the War Department, and thus there can be no doubt of the final influence on World War intelligence of Colonel Wagner, Major Beach, Colonel Jones and others who developed MID. Moreover, since it was unprecedented when written and contains the fundamental doctrine of current American intelligence, it must be viewed as a basic document in the field.

The genius of the "Sketch" is that it related MID's experience to the needs of 1916. Van Deman returned repeatedly to a single theme: the War Department must have an efficient information system able to plan for future contingencies. Without such a system, American planners were operating in the dark. Moreover, since the only "school" for intelligence work was the General Staff, if the General Staff continued to ignore the intelligence function, there soon would be no one in the Army who knew anything about it.

Van Deman described in detail how the existing system subverted the military information function by requiring full-time effort on "current General Staff work." The "Sketch" acknowledged that much data was coming in from attaches, observers, and other sources, but these were self-directed efforts, likely to get only the most available information instead of that most needed. As Van Deman remarked, "the most
necessary and essential kind of information . . . does not come in of its own accord or as a matter of routine. It must be actively sought and traced out and proved up." Furthermore, even the most important information received was likely to be mishandled. Military information work, while not requiring any "special intellect," did require individuals who were trained and accustomed to the special discipline of intelligence. But the WCD organization did not permit any individual to develop the discipline.

The crux of the matter, Van Deman said, was that the underlying concept of the General Staff had been eroded by the loss of its intelligence agency. The time had come, therefore, for the General Staff itself to correct this situation. The merger of the MID and WCD in 1908, as well as the staff realignment of 1910, had been accomplished by direction of the Chief of Staff, and he certainly could restore the MID to separate status. Pointedly, Van Deman observed that "it will not answer to say, when we are tried and found wanting, that Congress did not furnish us the means to accomplish the desired results, because we have not used the powers we have." What the General Staff should do, he wrote, was make the MID separate again, free "from all those duties which do not pertain to military information work." The chief, MID, must be responsible directly to the Chief of Staff and must have his own personnel and files. Where the restored MID was housed was not consequential; it seemed best to be near the Chief of Staff, but the agency could stay with the War College at Washington Barracks.

Van Deman's staff paper came at a propitious time because it dealt
with some of the very complaints that Congress was registering as it passed the National Defense Act of 1916. While it adopted much of one piece of General Staff work—the "Statement of Proper Military Policy of the United States"—Congress made clear its belief that the staff was spending too much time on petty matters not related to the national defense. Noting that the General Staff was disorganized, Congress tried to impose orderliness and efficiency. Two of the four staff divisions—Coast Artillery and Mobile Army—were abolished and the number of General Staff Corps officers available was greatly reduced. Finally, the Act specified that the General Staff might only perform duties of a "general nature" and might not engage in "administrative" functions. While this represented Congressional revival of the Ainsworth-Wood affair in some respects, it also reflected genuine problems with the General Staff organization.97

Just three weeks after Congress registered its complaint with the National Defense Act, General Macomb forwarded Van Deman’s "Sketch" to the Chief of Staff with a strong endorsement. Macomb not only agreed that the functions of military information were being improperly handled, but he found that the "Sketch" reinforced his own perception that the entire General Staff was an "unscientific and unsatisfactory organization." Only a complete overhaul, restoring the original concepts of a General Staff devised in 1903 by Root and Carter, would cure the defects. A "scientific" reorganization would make the War Department "vastly more efficient, not only so far as the service of military information is concerned, but also in regard to all those duties that
pertain to the General Staff."\textsuperscript{98}

Despite Macomb's strong plea for reorganization, the conservative Chief of Staff, Hugh L. Scott, took no action. But he was resisting the tide. Reform-minded officers like Macomb and now-Major General Carter were determined to bring the General Staff back to the state of efficiency it possessed in earlier days. And Macomb in particular was determined to improve intelligence. When American participation in the European war began less than a year later, the nucleus of a new MID already existed.
CHAPTER IV
REEMERGENCE OF THE MID

General Peyton C. March, who became Chief of Staff in early 1918, commented that when he took over he "found the Military Intelligence an unimportant section of another General Staff division. It is unbelievable, but when we entered the war it consisted of two officers and two clerks." March had served in the American Expeditionary Force in Europe and knew that all the belligerents attached great importance to intelligence. Furthermore, he himself saw the need for reliable information at the War Department. Thus, March felt obliged to give intelligence special attention. By the time of the Armistice, he remarked, "I had increased the strength of this division to a highly specialized personnel consisting of 282 officers, 29 noncommissioned officers, and 948 civilian employees." MID provided information of great value to the War Department, State Department, Department of Justice, and various other government agencies.\footnote{1}

The myth that American military intelligence was invented during World War I is rooted in the sort of well-meaning but misleading praise lavished by General March. Even assuming that the General Staff, and more particularly Van Deman, had absorbed all the techniques of organizing a bureaucracy, it would still have been a remarkable achievement to expand MID so greatly in only 18 months while maintaining the effectiveness which General March credited to the intelligence
agency. "As the new MID developed greater and greater efficiency," he wrote, "its reports were sought by all the departments of the government..." When President Wilson sailed to the Paris Peace Commission in December, March sent twenty officers from MID with him. March concluded by saying that, while its work often had to be secret, MID received "the repeated encomiums of all who knew about it."²

In fact, intelligence had much more than 18 months to prepare. From 1915 onwards, the Army was intensely conscious of "preparedness" for war, and intelligence followed this trend. This fact is not obvious in the official records of the WCD, which suggests that little intelligence work was done before April 1917, but it becomes clear when the efforts of General Macomb and Van Deman are examined carefully.

A proposal Macomb made in July 1916 to the Chief of Staff, calling for a complete overhaul of the General Staff, gives evidence that the foundation was already being laid for later expansion of intelligence. According to his recommendation, MI would be a separate division. Macomb defended this suggestion by pointing out that the original General Staff had had a separate MID, that while it performed well it had been improperly merged with the War College in 1908, and that the information function had suffered ever since.³ He identified a major problem when he remarked that he personally found it impossible to oversee properly the functions which legitimately belonged to WCD and intelligence work. Once again, however, General Scott took no action.

Intelligence activities beginning in the spring of 1916 formed a discernible pattern suggesting a de facto if not a de jure intellig-
ence organization. For the first time since 1908, WCD took an active interest in new methods of collecting information. For example, WCD helped plan the airplane as such a tool, taking as their example the extensive use the European armies were making of the airplane for reconnaissance. The experience of the aircraft supporting Pershing's expedition in Mexico indicated the need for a strong central control of the new machines to get maximum results from them, and WCD urged successfully that the aviation agency become part of the General Staff.

Similarly, the field of signal intelligence—an area almost unknown to Americans despite the long history of coding and code breaking in Europe—won the War Department's interest. Mobile radio-intercept stations were deployed along the Mexican border in 1916 to support Pershing. Results of monitoring Villa's tactical radio nets were provided directly to Pershing if they were in "clear text" or to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, if they were coded. In either case, the War Department also received the intercepted information.

In addition to looking for new ways to gather information, the War Department suddenly became conscious again of counterintelligence. The new Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, took the first action in this area. Faced with the problem of protecting military secrets and controlling rumors, Baker ordered the Adjutant General to establish a "Bureau of Information" in June 1916. The new agency was charged with "proper dissemination of military information given out to the press of the country," preventing "the spread of false information," and
controlling the dissemination of "information detrimental to the military interests of the government." The officer-in-charge was Major Douglas MacArthur.

Overseas, the collection of military information improved. The attache force had been increased to at least 23 officers by 1916, with eight more officers assigned to the military observer group with the French (apparently there no longer were such groups with the other belligerents after 1915). That group continued to have difficulty getting to the front, although their trouble seemed to have been less with the French than with the American military attache.

WCD sought detailed information on trench warfare to use in training American units, while the attache, Colonel Spenser Cosby, objected to the independence of the American observers. With considerable reluctance, Secretary Baker ordered Cosby relieved of his duties in order to clear the bottleneck in Paris. The observers soon reached the front and began to report the needed information.

Although not many officers were employed in such assignments, some men were still being sent on "confidential" intelligence gathering missions throughout 1916. One such mission was dispatched in April in response to reports that small groups of Japanese soldiers were landing secretly in Mexico and training just south of the Mexico-Arizona border. Captain Sidney F. Mashbir, of the Arizona National Guard (later the Army's chief Japanese language officer in World War II), volunteered to investigate; like Stilwell before him, he was warned that the Army would repudiate him if he were caught by Mexican author-
ities. He spent several weeks mapping the area and looking for signs of the Japanese visitors—he found little evidence.10

What emerges from these seemingly-random events is a pattern of WCD building a skeletal military intelligence agency prior to authorization for a new MID. As part of that effort, WCD advocated appointing intelligence officers in each of the six territorial departments of the Army, which included both Hawaii and the Philippines (where the MID, Manila, still was operating). The Chief of Staff agreed and the War Department directed that an intelligence officer be established under the supervision of the Chief of Staff of each of the departments. Significantly, these intelligence officers were considered a part of WCD while performing such intelligence functions. The departmental intelligence offices were directed to create files like those of WCD, and all information in the files would be considered confidential.11

To gain additional information on how to organize a resurgent MID, WCD directed the military attache in London, Colonel Stephen L. Slocum, to approach the British Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence for suggestions. Slocum, who had begun his attache experience about 1900 in Russia, provided a cogent summary of British methods and some procedures manuals. The British were reluctant to provide information at first because Slocum was not technically an "ally;" however, they soon relented. He found that all intelligence operations were divided into two categories: collection and denial of information. Within these broad categories, functional subsections were organized and designated numerically. As a General Staff agency, the Directorate
made policy for the most part rather than directing operations, although some activities were controlled from headquarters.

Slocum was unable to learn anything about the nature of the intelligence service organization with various tactical units. But the British gave him information he felt was especially useful for counterespionage operations because of the large German-American population in the United States. He wrote to MID, "I regard it of the utmost importance for us to establish a Bureau of counter-espionage, as it is especially needed in our case." He planned to examine further British censorship of the press and of the mails and overseas cables. He believed that censorship of mail and cables to be "one of the strongest weapons in the hands of Great Britain."12 The censorship to which Slocum referred was a means of denying spies in England overseas communications; he reported that the British were not concerned about reading domestic mail.

In some respects, the first phase of MID's resurgence came in February 1917. Because of the "tremendous amount of military information from abroad which had literally swamped" the War Department, Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn (who had just replaced Macomb as chief, WCD) cancelled most of the regular curriculum of the War College, substituting intensive study of information reports from overseas as a means of preparing the Army for war. Kuhn's decision violated the spirit of the National Defense Act of 1916—which had prohibited the use of War College personnel for General Staff work—suggesting that he felt the situation was becoming critical.13
In March, Kuhn—who had extensive intelligence experience—took another step towards organizing a separate intelligence agency by proposing that selected National Guardsmen be appointed as intelligence officers and he brought to Washington for training by the General Staff. Both the Militia Bureau and the Chief of Staff concurred, and a confidential order went out to the state adjutants-general to make such appointments. While the evidence is not entirely clear, it appears that at least some of these National Guard officers received intelligence training in Washington before war was declared.14

By the first week of April, 1917, then, the nascent departmental intelligence agency had grown to much more than the mere "two officers and two clerks" referred to by General March. The agency had a full complement of military attaches, a system to send special observers to trouble spots abroad, and a skeletal organization in the Army's regional departments and National Guard divisions. Great quantities of information were flowing in, and the chief of WCD had demonstrated his faith in intelligence by committing his only reserve to its analysis. Most important of all, Van Deman and Kuhn had formulated a plan of organization which emerged almost as soon as war was declared against Germany on April 6.

On April 11 Kuhn submitted a carefully prepared proposal, "Organization for Intelligence Work," to the Chief of Staff. "As a state of war now exists," the plan read, "it must be recognized that it will be imperative to establish promptly an organization for handling military intelligence." The organization must be part of the General Staff, and
it must be headed full-time by a General Staff officer, assisted by detailed military personnel and permanently employed civilians. The new agency must be the central intelligence agency in the War Department, directing all subordinate intelligence offices, and providing for all types of intelligence work. Clarifying this last point, General Kuhn identified three primary areas of concern for the new agency: espionage, counter-espionage and tactical intelligence. Kuhn wanted permission to create a new Military Intelligence Section within the WCD, to which he would assign as chief one of the officers already in the division (Van Deman). He pointed out that WCD had already submitted an emergency estimate of $1,000,000 for "Contingencies--Military Information Section" to Secretary Baker for submission to Congress. 15

Kuhn's memorandum made an interesting distinction between the information gathering procedures that WCD had used traditionally (attaches, mapping) and a "military secret service" (espionage and counter-espionage). In a significant aside, Kuhn revealed that Van Deman had been directing "secret intelligence work" for the past year in close cooperation with the State Department, Department of Justice, and Treasury Department. Despite a shortage of funds and personnel, "a vast amount of information has been collected and collated which will be of vital importance to whatever agency shall be charged with the duty of carrying on the work of military secret service." 16

Finally, Kuhn emphasized that another important intelligence function had to be incorporated into any new General Staff agency—the coordination of the Army's tactical intelligence efforts. This program
must be centrally controlled, Kuhn said, because "(i)nformation is as essential to modern armies as ammunition." Thus, Kuhn identified four functional responsibilities which had to be assigned to a new military intelligence section: military information work as it had been handled traditionally by WCD; espionage; counter-espionage, and tactical intelligence services. As the war progressed, these were the major functional responsibilities of the MI agency.

Even after war was declared, Kuhn and Van Deman had difficulty getting General Scott to reestablish an intelligence agency. Scott even told Van Deman that he did not believe the American Army needed an intelligence service, and that if the British and French had intelligence agencies, "there was no reason why we should not say to them, 'Here, we are now ready for service—we should be pleased if you hand over to us all the necessary information concerning the enemy which your intelligence services have obtained.'" Van Deman found he could not change Scott's mind and "after two or three such interviews, he became exasperated and ordered (Van Deman) to cease his efforts with respect to the organization of a military information service." Un- daunted, Van Deman succeeded in bringing the matter before Secretary Baker, who approved Kuhn's proposal on May 3. Once again, the Army had a functioning intelligence section, although it remained a part of WCD until the following February. Van Deman was appointed its first chief.

The new agency made good use of the intelligence experience of America's allies, going so far as to adopt the term "military intel-
ligence" for its revitalized staff agency because the British called it that.\(^{20}\) Van Deman soon received a memorandum from the newly-arrived British intelligence liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Dansey, which described in considerable detail the inner workings of his directorate. Apparently responding to a request from Van Deman, Dansey discussed intelligence operations ranging from the "secret service" collection of information, to the importance of deceiving the enemy through false data deliberately "leaked" to him. The overriding theme of Dansey's essay was the need for central control. "In conclusion, I venture to point out that bitter and costly experience have shown that centralization of records and information, and complete coordination of effort and co-operation are demanded if an intelligence organization is to be efficient, and if unnecessary expenditure is to be avoided.\(^{21}\)

In a series of memoranda, General Kuhn outlined to the Chief of Staff the organizational plan for intelligence which Kuhn and Van Deman had developed. Despite General Scott's earlier rejection of the idea, Kuhn again expressed his belief that there should be a separate MID as part of the General Staff, "as soon as sufficient officer personnel becomes available." In the meanwhile, the MI Section, WCD, would be the Army's central intelligence bureau. No attempt would be made at the time to create rigid regulations for intelligence work because "it is realized that we are only beginning a work which will increase enormously in the near future." However, the MI Section had to address one problem immediately: how to authorize expenditure of the recently-appropriated $1 million for military intelligence "contingencies." The
Secretary of War seemed to have the authority to approve "confidential vouchers" to conceal the exact purpose of the transaction. Within two weeks, Secretary Baker sought an opinion from the Treasury to confirm it. While there is no record of a reply from the Treasury, the War Department soon began using the "confidential vouchers" for all types of intelligence expenditures.

The MI Section would be composed of three branches: Administration, Information and Censorship. Administration would absorb most of the traditional intelligence functions, receiving responsibility for the attaches, for the collection, processing and dissemination of information to the staff and training units, for maps, and for supervision of all subordinate intelligence officers. Two new functions would also go to Administration—the analyzing of enemy codes and ciphers, and cooperation with the General Staff intelligence agencies of other countries. The second branch, Information, would be responsible for espionage and counter-espionage, for "establishing and maintaining a central register of individuals," for economic intelligence about enemy countries, and for obtaining information about an enemy through translations of foreign letters and documents and the enemy's press. In other words, the Information Branch would be responsible for what Kuhn and Van Deman called "Secret Service." Finally, the Censorship Branch would cooperate with other agencies of the government in censoring mail, cables and telegraph, and even commercial radio. It would make policy for Army censorship of correspondence and communications in the field, and it would establish policy governing the press when its members accompanied the Army into the field.
In order to formalize American "secret service" work, Kuhn next prepared a memorandum defining the term and providing some basic principles. Following the British lead, he divided the work into "positive" and "negative" aspects. He considered the latter to be the greater problem. The threat from enemy agents in the United States was threefold, Kuhn wrote: collection of military information and its transmission back to the enemy nation; enemy promotion of social discord; and sabotage of important goods or facilities. To prevent these activities, the United States government would have to discover and neutralize the enemy agent; to accomplish that goal, a coordinated system of civil and military counter-espionage agents, as well as censorship, was required. Because of the inherent limitations on the authority of military officials in the United States, Kuhn stressed in this and subsequent documents the need to obtain the approval of civilian authorities in all the most obvious cases of military jurisdiction. Above all, Kuhn wrote, "secret service" must be centralized, and this would be the value of the "central registry." Since the General Staff was responsible for coordination anyway, the MI Section would establish the registry. Kuhn noted that WCD already had on file a great deal of information of subversive activities directed against America, mostly collected before the declaration of war by attaches and intelligence officers in the various territorial departments. Some of this data had been collected by other government agencies, and they would also have access to the central registry. In short, the registry would act as a clearing house for all government secret service activity.
Almost as an after-thought, Kuhn took up the "positive" side of intelligence. Information about the enemy would be collected by attaches, prisoner interrogations and the airplane--the traditional approach. But intelligence agents would also have to be sent into enemy countries.\(^\text{25}\)

What was remarkable about the various plans devised by Kuhn and Van Deman was not so much their complex and multi-faceted nature. Most of the intelligence methods they proposed had been tried in one form or another during the years since 1885. Furthermore, most of the problems they identified, such as enemy agents in the United States or the need to censor the press and overseas communications channels, had been recognized earlier, particularly during the Spanish-American War. What was new was the emphasis they gave to organization--their insistence on coordinating all government agencies, military and civil, in order to insure against failure and duplication. Even though the original MID had tried to coordinate its efforts with national strategy and had conducted liaison with the State and Navy Departments, never before had anyone conceived of a central registry of all government intelligence operations.

The Chief of Staff apparently was sufficiently impressed with the need for intelligence to agree to all of Kuhn's proposals, except the most important one--a separate MID. Shortly thereafter, General Scott went to Europe. He was replaced temporarily by General Tasker H. Bliss, who was succeeded by General March in early 1918. Only after March took over was it possible to reestablish the MID (Figure 4).
Figure 4

MID AFTER REORGANIZATION OF AUGUST 1918

President
  |
Secretary of War
  |
Chief of Staff
  |
Geographic Commands
  |
    - Army Units
  |
    - Operations Division
    - War Plans Division
    - Executive Division
    - Military Intelligence Division
    - Purchase, Storage & Traffic Div.
      - MI 1 Admin.
        - Positive Branch
          - MI 2 Info.
          - MI 5 Collection
          - MI 6 Transliteration
          - MI 7 Photos
          - MI 8 Codes & Ciphers
          - MI 9 Graphs
        - Negative Branch
          - MI 3 Morale
          - MI 4 Observation of For Influence
          - MI 10 Censorship
          - MI 11 Control
          - MI 13 Graft & Fraud

*Except AEF

Nelson, 255
Churchill, "MID and the General Staff"
By the end of April, it was a foregone conclusion that an MI Section would reestablished within WCD; but, as Kuhn had suggested several times, the problem was where to get officers to fill the expanding intelligence structure. While the problem afflicted all of the General Staff, and in fact, the entire Army in mid-1917, the MI Section needed an unusually high proportion of commissioned personnel. Van Deman noted that of the more than two hundred officers who finally served in the MI Section, and later the MID, there were never more than six Regular Army men. Where were the rest to come from? Van Deman received permission to commission men in the National Army formed through the Selective Service Act of 1917. He recruited and commissioned men he knew could help establish the new bureau, and then used them to identify and recruit others. He used a similar procedure to employ hundreds of civilians for the MI Section.26

The newly-commissioned officers performed in an array of jobs which expanded as the requirements for intelligence work were further refined. For example, Van Deman recruited at first only for the MI Section; however, he soon had to provide officers for the headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe. Later, the MI Section provided men for intelligence jobs with the divisions in training, and finally a coast-to-coast network of intelligence offices had to be manned.27

One of MI Section's first needs was linguists. As Van Deman wrote Acting Chief of Staff Eliot, American units needed interpreters under military control. Because he wanted to attract educated men, Van Deman urged that they be commissioned. He proposed a temporary
table of organization allocating French and German linguists to each headquarters from division to army. General Bliss and Secretary Baker agreed, so that what had been a problem in Mexico and Cuba did not become one in France.28

In several instances, individuals came to the MI Section with new ideas which proved to be important to the war effort. A concerned code clerk from the State Department appeared in Van Deman's office, for example, soon after war was declared to say that the American Army needed to break coded messages, just as all the European powers were already doing. The clerk, Herbert O. Yardley, was soon a first lieutenant in charge of an MI Section signal intelligence bureau which he created.29 This operation grew relatively slowly, since America had little experience in cryptography; however, it became one of the most important elements of the Army's intelligence system by war's end and it ultimately became the Army Security Agency.30

Partly to aid Yardley in establishing the cryptographic bureau, Van Deman sought authority in June to send liaison officers to the British and French General Staffs. The value of this idea was reinforced by a request from the British Army's Director of MI for a liaison officer to transmit information to Washington and coordinate their respective intelligence sections.31 General Bliss approved, and officers were sent to Paris and London. Over the next few months, they developed a close and productive working relationship with both the British and French intelligence bureaus. Apparently even the cryptographic bureaus—what the French called the "Black Chamber"—cooperated
closely, with the French and British training their new allies in basic cryptography. This was remarkable because of the traditional secrecy blanketing all signal intelligence work.\textsuperscript{32}

With his organization expanding in several different areas at once, Van Deman issued instructions in early July to insure centralization and coordination of effort. Although aimed at only a small group, this first standard operations procedure, "Instructions for Department Intelligence Officers," became the model guide for the intelligence bureaucracy and was the Army's first such general directive. It combined instructions on the mechanics with the philosophy behind intelligence work. More important, it emphasized the centralized nature of intelligence operations, making clear that departmental intelligence officers were part of a national system which could make available to them the combined efforts of all agencies, civil as well as military. The "Instructions" specified a format for a weekly intelligence summary to be given by the intelligence officer to his commander, the first standardized intelligence report. And he explained in considerable detail the use of six forms required for the expenditure of confidential funds.\textsuperscript{33}

Reflecting the WCD concern about American security, the "Instructions" focused on negative intelligence, establishing the counter-intelligence doctrine still used by the Army. Each intelligence officer had to be alert for any signs of "enemy agents, suspected agents, and enemy sympathizers, whether within our military forces or in civil life." Particular watch should be kept for letters containing secret writing or codes; if any were found, they were to go immediately to MI,
Washington. The Germans had proven efficient in Europe at espionage, sabotage and subversion and there was reason to believe similar activities would be attempted in America as well. The best defense against this threat was vigilance, the instructions said, as well as a nationwide system of intelligence agencies working in coordination with appropriate civil authorities, and a national center for investigations at the MI Section.  

Concern about enemy intelligence operations in the United States led the MI Section to establish early in the war a widespread domestic security program. There were enough examples of actual and attempted sabotage and espionage to justify real concern in the summer of 1917. German agents were caught with secret inks and codes in their possession, leading to increased demand within government for censorship of overseas mail.

The Secretary of War was particularly concerned about aliens born in Germany or one of her allies who were in the U.S. Army. If it seemed appropriate, field commanders had the authority to take any of several steps against such aliens, ranging from transfer to immediate discharge. If an alien were suspected of disloyal activity, his commander was to report the circumstances immediately to the MI Section. At the same time, commanders were cautioned against unfair or unreasonable suspicion. Mashbir, by then a major working in New York City, recalled that War Department concern was heightened by the discovery that some German officers, acting as agents of their government, had entered the U.S. Army as early as 1914 simply by enlisting under false names.
Van Deman summarized his concern over the threat from German agents in American uniform in a letter to Felix Frankfurter, then serving as a special assistant in the Secretary of War's office. Claiming to know that there were German agents in the American Army, Van Deman wrote that "most of us are convinced that his agents and propaganda have been and are responsible for many of the conditions now obtaining here which are so seriously interfering with our preparations for war." 39

With Secretary Baker's concurrence, the Army played an aggressive role in domestic security throughout the war. MI Section established branch offices in New York and seven other cities, and Washington handled a program of recruiting and commissioning trained investigators from police and detective agencies. 40 Van Deman accepted the aid of the American Protective League, a super-patriotic volunteer organization of perhaps 200,000 members formed in 1917 to watch for subversive activity within the civilian population, in conducting investigations. The controversial APL also proved useful in gathering information such as maps and photographs of potential American military objectives in Europe. 41 The MI Section established and monitored programs to detect enemy agents in the various service groups supporting the war effort such as the American Red Cross and the Young Men's Christian Association. And it developed a system of "silent watchers" within the Army itself to report to MI suspicious actions by soldiers or civilians. 42 While these activities may appear too severe today, two points need to be made: first, as Van Deman always stressed, Americans had no previous experience with German-style intelligence operations; second, MI
Section seems to have made considerable effort to insure that investigations were complete and that no one would be smeared.\textsuperscript{43} In all, more than 500,000 security investigations were accomplished by the Army intelligence men, and a number of espionage and sabotage cases were successfully prosecuted.\textsuperscript{44} A Negative Intelligence Branch was established within the MI Section by early 1918 to oversee the entire operation.

A second functional responsibility which the MI Section assumed under the April 11 memorandum was a continuation of the traditional role of providing military information to the War Department. The section thus continued the logical development of the old MID, interrupted since 1908. The worldwide collection of information through such agencies as attaches, observers and special missions was combined with newer American intelligence interests such as espionage and cryptography into what became known in 1918 as the Positive Branch. Although more people were working in the Positive Branch than had ever worked for old MID, the objective was the same: to answer questions from the General Staff on short notice about any part of the world. It was not sufficient to know what had happened six months earlier; MI's goal was to predict the developments of the next day or week. The focus of their efforts was Germany, but collection went on world-wide. Positive Branch developed a highly sophisticated approach to analyzing the component parts of a nation's war-making capability—one which closely resembles the current format for a strategic appraisal. The "Strategic Index" was organized around four factors: Political, Combat, "Psychol-
ogic" and Economic. Each of the factors was sub-divided for more detailed study. For example, in the case of Germany, an intelligence study, divided into 48 categories, drew certain conclusions from her status as an ethnically cohesive, largely agricultural country with a warrior tradition.45

To support wide-ranging studies like the "strategic indexes" required an array of information sources, and these belonged to Positive Branch. Much information came from the attaches, while less was provided through espionage. The Branch had an extensive translation section which studied foreign newspapers, journals and documents of all types.46 Yardley's cryptologists provided valuable information from signal intelligence as well as from the breaking of codes and discovery of secret writing in censored letters.47 Additionally, Positive Branch was responsible for maps, which they specialized in collecting and reproducing on short notice: when American forces occupied part of Siberia in August 1918, they had maps made especially for them by the Positive Branch.48

The third function MI Section assigned itself was that of developing a tactical intelligence system. This proved an important and time consuming task. Because Van Deman knew that it would be months before the first combat troops could be deployed to Europe, he gave full attention to this problem only after the Positive and Negative systems were organized. Van Deman brought the need for training tactical intelligence personnel to Frankfurter's attention in August, seeking his help in establishing a program to bring all new men to Washington
"where they can be instructed by the only officers now in our service who know anything about the work." The difficulty he faced was that American tactical units had only been authorized General Staff Corps officers since 1913. Even then regulations did not specify that the staff men would do intelligence work, calling only for organization of a "service of information." Furthermore, this authorization only went down to brigade level. In short, there was no provision for intelligence sections in combat units, even though both Pershing and the War Department recognized by mid-1917 that the intelligence staff officer was going to be essential in Europe.

The MI Section had no voice in establishing the AEF intelligence system, but it was assigned the responsibility for most of the training. Pershing determined the organization of his own staff en route to Europe, adopting a primarily British approach. In turn, Major (later major general) Dennis E. Nolan, Pershing's intelligence officer (G2), adopted the British system in toto. This meant that every combat unit from battalion up would have an intelligence section, and that somehow MI Section, WCD would have to train several hundred intelligence officers. Additionally, each intelligence section had a requirement for enlisted intelligence men who also would require special training.

The training of intelligence personnel posed a unique problem for the War Department, and the MI Section devoted much of its effort to developing a suitable program. Simply stated, few men knew how to train for tactical intelligence work because so few had done it themselves and because there was no tradition for it in the American Army.
Yet, to be effective, intelligence men would clearly have to have additional training in scouting, map reading, document handling, prisoner interrogation, photographic interpretation and other skills not available at most training centers. All Van Deman could do was draw on his own experience, that of the men who had worked in the tactical area, and of course that of the British.

In November 1917 MI Section held a nine-day course in Washington for chief intelligence officers of all divisions preparing for departure to France; the officers then returned to their units to train their subordinates. The next month, Pershing sent an urgent message to Washington declaring that "trained intelligence officers [were] an absolute necessity for each organized division and corps." He went on to urge that each division chief intelligence officer go to France immediately to train and observe until his unit arrived. Van Deman agreed that such experience would be valuable, but he wanted them to return to their divisions after a few weeks to teach their subordinate intelligence operatives. The War Department adopted the latter procedure. In the meantime, the American staff college at Langres, France, included an intelligence course in its instruction which provided the essential training for the burgeoning G2, AEF.

By August 1918, MI had developed a comprehensive plan for training intelligence personnel. Marlborough Churchill (who succeeded Van Deman in June when the latter was ordered to Europe) won General March's approval for a training scheme by which a number of experienced intelligence personnel would be recalled from Europe so that every new
battalion and regiment would have at least one experienced intelligence chief. The intelligence personnel of each division would form a provisional battalion for six weeks of training in all aspects of European combat. They would be shown films of the fighting and be familiarized with the maps, captured documents, equipment and reports which would soon become the tools of their trade.\textsuperscript{55} It does not appear that any men trained according to this new plan got to Europe before the Armistice, but the plan represented a bold and realistic approach to a continuing problem.

Van Deman also provided men to Nolan for negative intelligence. Shortly after Pershing's staff arrived in France, Nolan sent his colleague in Washington a request for fifty trained, French-speaking investigators to handle counter-espionage work for G2. With the help of various civilian detective agencies and newspaper advertisements, Van Deman located fifty qualified men in relatively short time and sent them to Europe.\textsuperscript{56} They formed the nucleus of an organization designated the Corps of Intelligence Police on August 13, 1917. The CIP expanded to about 450 men by November 1918 and was retained after the war as an operating agency under MID, Washington.\textsuperscript{57}

In addition to its three primary functions, General March later made the MI Section responsible for two additional tasks: censorship and graft investigation. While the former was a part of any complete negative intelligence program, the latter should not have been associated with intelligence.

Censorship had been a traditional concern of Army leaders since at
least the Civil War, and at first the Secretary of War administered it directly in an effort to balance security against freedom of the press and mails. Military censorship essentially concerned three areas in World War I: postal and telegraph communications, press and propaganda. The object of the first two was to prevent disclosure to the enemy of potentially damaging military secrets, while the contribution of censorship to the propaganda experts was to provide information damaging to enemy morale. In July 1918 the MI Section took over responsibility for the entire function for the War Department in order to centralize the effort, and because the Secretary of War belatedly had recognized that censorship should be considered a part of negative intelligence. 58

In the United States, censorship of both the press and individual communications depended largely on voluntary cooperation. Apparently it worked out well, except that the British felt throughout the war that the Americans were too lenient in allowing military information to be published. 59 In Europe, Pershing decided to give all censorship responsibility to G2 in August 1917, and thus a well-developed censorship system existed by the time the first American units entered combat. As at home, no major problems arose over censorship in the AEF. 60

Although the MI Branch (as it became known in February 1918) had not wanted the task, it assumed responsibility with great success for investigating of graft and fraud. In the spring of 1918, the Quartermaster General appointed a staff officer to inquire into possible criminal corruption in the letting of contracts to supply the Army.
Concluding that a serious problem existed, that officer recommended that the Quartermaster establish a sixty-man bureau to investigate such crimes. When the proposal reached the Chief of Staff, however, General March concluded that the job could be done less expensively and more efficiently with the existing intelligence investigative service. Colonel Churchill, concurring reluctantly, recommended that MID should be responsible for all graft investigation in the War Department. March agreed, and MIB took charge of the function in August 1918. Churchill later claimed that MIB did its job so well that it saved the government $8 million. Nonetheless, as Van Deman and Churchill argued, criminal investigation was inappropriate work for the General Staff because it diverted the intelligence section from what should have been its only concern—aiding the commander in dealing with the enemy.

Before the war ended, March assigned two other functions to MIB: Port Control and military morale. The purpose of the former was to monitor the flow of passengers on trans-Atlantic ships as a means of detecting possible enemy agents; soon after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Port Control also concerned itself with communist agents and propaganda passing through U. S. ports. As for military morale, its purpose was to "stimulate and maintain the morale of the troops." Apparently concerned about the faltering morale of the British and French troops toward the end of the war, the Chief of Staff directed MIB to organize a Military Morale Branch in early 1918. The decision to give morale to the intelligence agency was a return to the original General Staff concept of the MID: an organization to collect and make available to the staff whatever information it needed. MIB thus gathered
information on the state of American, allied, and enemy morale, including the actions being taken by allies and the enemy to protect their own troops' morale while degrading that of the enemy. From this information, MIB made estimates of American morale—which remained relatively high throughout the war—and suggested steps to enhance it. In October 1918, General March separated morale from MIB and made it an independent branch within the General Staff.64

The task of overseeing these diverse functions—from chasing spies to issuing directives to training centers not to call Italian-American soldiers "wops"—obviously demanded the extensive bureaucracy to which March had alluded in his earlier praise of the intelligence agency. During its eighteen months at war, the MI agency went through three periods of development. The first, of course, was Van Deman's successful battle to gain semi-independent status for the MI Section within the War College Division; next, as part of a General Staff reorganization, on February 7, 1918, it became the autonomous MI Branch within the new Executive Division; finally, on August 26, 1918, the Military Intelligence Division was reestablished as an equal element of the General Staff. With that reorganization, the staff had four divisions: MID, War Plans, Operations, and the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division. At the same time, the directorship of MID carried with it promotion to brigadier general. Thus, Churchill, who had taken over from Van Deman as a lieutenant colonel in June, was promoted twice in 90 days, pinning on a star in late August.65

Despite all the praise given the "new" MID for its contributions
during the war, it did not perform in any revolutionary way. Its mission was not so different from that of the MID in 1906 or even 1892. In March 1908, just before its merger with WCD, Colonel Jones had stipulated that the MID mission was to collect information from around the world. It was to gather data and produce intelligence on all aspects of a country's military efficiency so that General Staff planning would be rapid and accurate. In this way, MID would anticipate all threats to America, and it would be the eyes and ears of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. While these functions clearly expanded during World War I, Churchill saw his responsibility in the same terms Jones had—as a service to the General Staff and its chiefs. He commented that "investigation in practically every field and every country" must go on so that MID could "cover the whole world." Although America was in a war with Germany, MID needed to look beyond the fighting front. In the first place, more than just military force was involved; there were "economic, psychologic, social, political and even literary forces engaged," each of which played a part which must be weighed. Secondly, MID collection must look beyond the Germans and their allies to "each country of the world and to every people. The question of winning the war is far too complicated...to be answered by a study only of the powers and resources of the nations in arms." The view of the chief, MID, had changed relatively little in those ten years.

The reestablishment of the MID on the General Staff during World War I resulted from three related causes: the War Department's need for reliable intelligence information; the successful record of the
original MI organization in supplying that information from 1885 until 1908, and the perseverance of a few individuals who viewed the problem and its solution in organizational terms. Additionally, Pershing's decision to make intelligence a principal staff agency in the AEF undoubtedly helped persuade the War Department to follow the same approach. The reason that the MID seemed like a new scheme to many in the War Department was simply a combination of the widespread confusion over the real role of the General Staff, the somewhat cloistered atmosphere of the original MID, and of course the ten year interruption in its separate status.

In the final analysis, the difference between the "new" and the "old" MID was primarily one of technical capability. Signal intelligence and aerial surveillance, while known to the Americans as early as the Civil War, became highly effective sources for the MID only during World War I. Positive and negative intelligence had both been employed by the Army since the American Revolution, but it was not until World War I that it became systematized and centrally controlled by the departmental intelligence agency. Finally, the whole network of collectors available to MID grew vastly during the war years, and the communications they had back to Washington were faster and more accurate. But the principles of 1918 were those of the original MID and in fact can be traced back to 1892. What Churchill called "the present correct organization" in 1920 was a direct outgrowth, he said, of the bureaucracy which MID had developed before 1908. Since Churchill was not involved in earlier MID developments and could simply have taken
credit for creating a new intelligence agency in 1918, he undoubtedly was sincere in claiming a close kinship to the original MID and in identifying the relationship as critical and evolutionary. Furthermore, the War Department decision to retain the intelligence division in the post-war General Staff agency was based on both its wartime success and Churchill's constant reminders to General March that the original staff had an MID. 68
EPILOGUE

Although the MID went through some bleak periods during the years between the wars, it survived as a separate General Staff agency. The staff did not always listen to or use the MID properly. Yet the MID always retained its independent voice, as it still does today. While it was not always well informed for a variety of reasons, the division never again lost centralized control of its collection system as it had before World War I.

As was the case throughout the War Department staff, MID's wartime success had been based in large measure on developing an effective bureaucracy manned by skilled personnel. Having achieved this "present correct organization," Churchill and his colleagues took steps to insure continuity in the post-war era: they wrote regulations, had "after-action" conferences, and preserved at least the skeleton of all the wartime intelligence bureaus. The new intelligence experts were conscious of a need to secure their hard-won knowledge so that "the next war won't begin like the last" without a functioning intelligence agency. For their part, senior Army officers accepted unreservedly the idea that they still needed in peacetime a continuous flow of information from all over the globe in order to make correct decisions. In short, the War Department found that intelligence requirements for a world power were effectively met by the intelligence agency which had developed within the General Staff from 1885 to 1918.
Following the Armistice, General March ordered the War Plans Division to design a post-war organization for the War Department. The results, hammered out over several months, were incorporated into the National Defense Act of 1920. That Act essentially validated the usefulness of the General Staff concept. Based on the act, General March retained approximately the same four-division General Staff he had established in late 1918: Operations, Military Intelligence, War Plans and Supply.\(^1\) The MID kept all its wartime functions except for fraud and graft investigation.\(^2\) An important change made by the Act was inclusion of the General Staff concept in the organization of the new territorial sub-divisions of the War Department, the corps areas. This addition, which called for an Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence in each corps headquarters, paved the way for an intelligence network throughout the peacetime Army structure, thus greatly facilitating wartime expansion of the tactical intelligence system.\(^3\)

When General Pershing became Chief of Staff in 1921, he made some further modifications to bring the General Staff into accord with the AEF staff system, and this alignment remained essentially in effect through World War II.\(^4\)

Following World War I, General Churchill acted to apply the lessons learned by intelligence men during the war. In the winter of 1920, he held an MID conference in Washington to which he invited as speakers many of the key intelligence men of the AEF. The record of that conference indicates clearly that they were conscious not only of the importance of the doctrine they devised during the war, but also
of the effort required to retain that knowledge during peacetime. For example, General Nolan warned that "in the pressure of many things" the Army was likely to lapse into the habits of pre-war days, assuming that information needed about the enemy would be readily acquired when the troops arrived on the battlefield. General Churchill agreed, remarking that all who had done intelligence work knew that one had to "preach the gospel" of intelligence daily to keep it alive. "Everyone that knows anything about intelligence has to keep preaching that national doctrine, so that when we begin the next war, we won't begin it like the last."5

Although the efforts of these men to maintain an intelligence system were not lost, they did suffer as MID struggled with its organizational problems over the next twenty years. By 1938, for example, a staff report evaluating the progress of MID noted that it had undergone fifteen reorganizations since the war, each seemingly less effective than its predecessor, and all based on existing "peacetime arrangement and housing facilities" rather than along functional lines. The report asserted that the emphasis on current operations had submerged much of the important work of MID, including planning, doctrinal development, domestic intelligence and censorship programs, and most administration.6 Apparently the situation had not improved markedly by the beginning of the war; Nelson notes that, while most War Department personnel were sympathetic to the goals of MID, its continuing "functional confusion" over planning versus operations limited the agency's effectiveness throughout the war.7
Perhaps if Churchill, Nolan or Van Deman had been available to lead MID through the inter-war years, these problems might not have occurred. However, Churchill contracted sleeping sickness soon after the war and retired in 1924. Nolan, who was an infantryman at heart, went on to command a corps area as a major general before retiring in 1936; he never returned to intelligence. As for Van Deman, his last intelligence assignment, as chief security officer for the American peacetime commission in Paris, ended in 1919. Thereafter he spent his career in infantry and non-intelligence staff positions, becoming a major general and commanding an infantry division before retiring in 1929. However, General Van Deman's intelligence career did not end in 1919. He devoted the rest of his life to establishing a complete set of files on the membership and literature of the American Communist Party. He interrupted that activity to serve as an adviser to MID during World War II, but returned to the study of what he viewed as the Communist threat to the internal security of the country. When Van Deman died in 1952, his library—which had been compiled with support from the Army and Federal Bureau of Investigation—was turned over to the Army intelligence central registry.

Although the principal intelligence men of World War I were not available to head MID, the division did benefit from the experience of many younger men. Furthermore, two of the wartime agencies continued to function in support of MID between the wars. In 1921, a group of former intelligence men, most of whom had returned to civilian life, formed an ad hoc auxiliary, the Military Intelligence Officers Reserve...
Corps, which served as a vehicle to keep reservists interested in intelligence and in communication with MID. Following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, many of the MICRC men were available to move into intelligence positions.  

Interestingly, some of the MICRC officers served on active duty as enlisted men in the Corps of Intelligence Police. The CIP, established by Nolan in 1917, had dwindled down to six men by 1920. But rallying after 1921, it served as an investigative arm for MID and a nucleus of experienced men when the war began. By 1941, CIP (soon to be CIC) had about two hundred agents and its own school.  

The other wartime intelligence agency which served MID between wars was the cryptologic bureau. Following the war, its founder, Herbert O. Yardley, convinced the War and State Departments that they should fund its peacetime operations. Working under the clandestine control of MID, Yardley and his assistants provided a steady flow of useful intelligence throughout the 1920s. President Hoover's selection of Henry L. Stimson as his Secretary of State, however, spelled the end to departmental funding of the bureau. Virtually abandoned by the MID as well, Yardley left government service in disgust. He wrote a book, The American Black Chamber, in which he described in embarrassing detail his former bureau's activities. Although Yardley's disclosures set back American signal intelligence, another AEF veteran, William F. Friedman, picked up the pieces. By the mid-1930s, the cryptologic agency, known now as the Signal Intelligence Service, was functioning efficiently again; indeed it was Friedman's group which broke the
Japanese diplomatic code, the "Purple System" before World War II. 13

The backbone of MID's overseas collection program remained, not surprisingly, the attaches. General George C. Marshall made this point clear when, none too flatteringly, remarked: "Prior to World War II, our foreign intelligence was little more than what a military attache could learn at dinner, more or less over the coffee cups." 14 This comment was not entirely fair to either the MID or the attaches. The former did have other agencies at work, while the latter frequently went well beyond dinner conversation to gather information. Nonetheless, it was probably the most dependable agency, just as it had been for the years before World War I. The best known of the pre-war attaches, Colonel Joseph E. Stilwell, made clear that it was sometimes not sufficient just to gather information--Stilwell complained that he often had difficulty getting MID to accept and use it. 15

Despite its shortcomings, MID contributed effectively to War Department planning throughout the inter-war years. More importantly, it provided reliable information for the War Department's use. When World War II began, MID and its subordinate agencies expanded rapidly enough to support the Army requirements levied on it. 16 In short, the agency begun in 1885 was found successful in two world wars, and was so organizationally sound that it managed, with the exception of a ten year period, to retain its position on the General Staff.
PREFACE


9Department of the Army, "Status of the Army Intelligence System" (an unpublished manuscript, Washington, 1954), 17. This document is in the author's files.

CHAPTER I

1Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 7-10; 25.

2Ibid., 23-24.


5Ibid., 183-184. West Point was created in 1802 as an engineer school, and, while this was an important beginning in the professionalization of the Army, the Academy was not interested at first in "well-rounded officers."


7Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U. S. Army (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), 133.

8Goetzmann, Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863, 428.

9Bruce W. Bidwell, "History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff" (unpublished manuscript, Washington, 1961), Part I, 29. Bidwell's eight-volume study, done under contract between the Army and The Johns Hopkins University, comprises the only known Army effort to document MI development carefully. Regrettably, seven of the parts are still classified; therefore, all references will be to Part I.

10Ibid., 30-34.

11Ibid., 42-43.

12Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), 208. Upton had committed suicide in 1881 and the manuscript for this book was held by a friend for many years. It was published at government expense at the direction of Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1904, then periodically reprinted thereafter.
13 Goetzmann, 142.

14 Bidwell, 45.

15 Ibid., 47-51.

16 Upton, 215. Upton called this intelligence agency a bureau of military statistics.

17 Hittle, 187.

18 Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 241-245.

19 Edwin C. Fishel, "The Mythology of Civil War Intelligence," Civil War History, Vol. 10, n. 4 (December 1964), 345. This number of Civil War History, an issue devoted to intelligence and security, contains the most complete discussion of Civil War intelligence the author has seen.

20 Dulles, 37.

21 Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 239.


23 Fishel, 356-358.

24 Ibid.


26 Fishel, 356-358.

27 Ibid. Fortunately, the official records of the Union Army contain many intelligence reports, making it possible for historians to reconstruct some of Sharpe's work.

28 Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 256-262.
29 Ibid., 268.

30 Bidwell, 84-97.

31 Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 275. Upton had already written several books on tactics.


34 Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 283.

35 General Order 64, War Department, August 25, 1880.

36 Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 273-274.

CHAPTER II

1 Army and Navy Journal, October 10, 1885, 1.

2 Ibid.

3 W. A. Simpson to Assistant Secretary of War, "Brief Outline of the Origin, Growth and Work of the Military Information Division, Adjutant General's Office," February 21, 1902. File MIG 639-13, Record Group 165, National Archives.


5 Washington Star, October 1, 1885, 1.

6 Vincent Memo., September 1891.

7 Staff memorandum, "Memorandum for the Adjutant General, U. S. Army," September 11, 1891. File AWC 639-2, RG 165, NA. The policy of granting hunting and fishing leaves to gather information lasted for about 40 years.
8 Staff memorandum, "Memorandum for the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army," March 17, 1892. File MIC 639-14, RG 165, NA.

9 "Memo for the AG," September 11, 1891.


11 "Memo for the AG," September 11, 1891.

12 Simpson memo, February 21, 1902.

13 Ibid. Although naval and military officers had frequently represented the United States with foreign governments before 1889, this was the first formal recognition of the attaché system.

14 "Memo for the AG," September 11, 1891.

15 U. S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of War (hereafter referred to as Sec. of War Annual Report), 1891 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891), Vol. 4, 3. Greely, who had led a famous and tragic Arctic expedition from 1881 to 1884, was a tough and wily competitor who forced the AG to present his case for retaining MID logically and carefully.

16 "Memo for the AG," September 11, 1891.

17 Brigadier A. W. Greely, "Remarks" on a draft General Order prepared by the Signal Office, January 12, 1892. File 639- , RG 165, NA. Greely's point about "detailing" officers was valid. In fact, the problem of inexperienced officers being detailed to MI work was only resolved in 1962 when Military Intelligence became a Regular Army branch.

18 Major General John M. Schofield to Secretary of War, "Memorandum," January 20, 1892. It should be remembered that at the time, the authority of the Commanding General over the various bureau chiefs was not very effective. It was common for the Secretary of War to resolve disputes of this type.

19 J. C. Kelton, "Memorandum outlining the Functions of the Adjutant General's Department and Tracing the Origin and Development of an Intelligence Division. . . .," March 15, 1892. File 639- , RG 165,
NA. The date is incorrectly shown on the front page of this document as 1893.

20. Ibid.

21. General Order 23, War Department, March 18, 1892.

22. Colonel Robert Williams to Secretary of War, "Memorandum," May 7, 1892. File 639- , RG 165, NA.

23. John E. Babcock to Adjutant General, September 28, 1893. File MIC 639-3, RG 165, NA.


28. Lieutenant Carl Reichmann, "Notes on the Military Information Division," September 14, 1897. File MIC 639-5, RG 165, NA. This summary is one of the best available on the activities of the MID from 1885 until its writing.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 116.


34. Staff Memorandum, MID to AG, September 28, 1897. File MIC 639-6, RG 165, NA.

35. Reichmann Memo, September 14, 1897.


38 Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1901), 42. Whitney was nearly captured, owing to newspaper accounts of his mission published while he was on it.

39 Arthur L. Wagner, Report of the Santiago Campaign (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing, 1908), 11-13. This official report was submitted by Wagner in 1899, then printed by his publishers with Army approval two years after his death.

40 Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), 156-157. The two wars in questions are the insurgent campaigns in Cuba before 1898 and the Philippines phase of the Spanish-American War and the succeeding war with the Filipino insurgents.


42 Ibid., 138-141.

43 Thomas Bentley Mott, Twenty Years as a Military Attache (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), 57.

44 U. S. War Department, "History of Intelligence Office, Philippine Department." This unsigned, undated summary was probably prepared in Manila in 1918. File MID 10560-152, RG 165, NA.

45 Simpson Memo, February 21, 1902.

CHAPTER III


5. Ralph H. Van Deman, "Memoirs," (an unpublished manuscript in three parts, 1948-50, located in the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachua, Az.), I, 10-13. See Also "History of the Intelligence Office, Philippine Department."


7. Staff Report, "Memorandum for the Lieutenant General Commanding the Army," Adjutant General's Office, March 17, 1902. File MIC 639-14, RG 165, NA.


14 Ibid., 20-21.

15 Ibid., 22-23.

16 Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of the Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff. Second Edition. (Westminster: Archibald Constable, 1895), 139-146. The copy used by the author, borrowed from the Fort Leavenworth Library, bears mute evidence of the information collection role of the attaches; it was purchased by the attache in London in 1900 and resided in MID until 1911.

17 Brigadier General William Ludlow to Adjutant General, October 31, 1900, as cited in George P. Ahearn, "A Chronicle of the Army War College" (an unpublished manuscript, April 6, 1918, contained in the U. S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.), 5.


19 Ibid., 163.

20 Ibid., 186, 204.


22 Carter, 9.


24 Ibid., 64-65.

25 Ibidwell, 145. The absence of planning responsibility in the mission statement seemed to defeat the purpose of the General Staff, and this too caused trouble later for the MID.

26 Nelson, 67-68.

27 W. D. Beach to Secretary, General Staff, August 27, 1903. File MIC 639-20, RG 165, NA.
28 Robert Shaw Cliver, Acting Secretary of War, to Secretary of State, August 28, 1903; John Hay, Secretary of State, to Shaw, September 4, 1903, File MID 639-44, RG 165, NA.


30 "The General Staff," The Nation, LXXVI (February 12, 1903), 105.

31 Ibid.

32 Pappas, 35.

33 Ibid., 34-37.


36 Ibid. For an example of the information required of the attaches, see Major William D. Beach to Lieutenant John McClintock, Military Attache, Vienna, October 16, 1905. File MID 3057a, RG 165, NA.

37 Jones Memo, "Important Work."

38 Van Deman, "Memoirs," I, 17-20. He was assisted by Captain (later Colonel) Alexander B. Coxe.


40 Thaddeus W. Jones, June 1, 1907. File WCD 4493-a, RG 165, NA. This letter was annotated "Stillwell" by hand in one corner. The same file contains a brief letter to Stilwell dated June 17, 1907, signed by Jones, authorizing him to travel.

41 Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in

42 Stilwell to Brigadier General W. W. Wotherspoon, May 31, 1900; Wotherspoon to Secretary, General Staff, June 4, 1910; Secretary, General Staff to Wotherspoon, June 27, 1910. File WCD 4493-a, RG 165, NA.


45 Ibid., 120-122. Strangely, neither of the two officer agents was from MID.

46 Ibid., 130-131.


49 Captain Cornelius D. Willcox, “Memorandum for the Chief of the 2d Division,” October 17, 1907. File MIC 639-30, RG 165, NA.


52 Staff Report, “A Brief Summary of the Establishment and Progress of the Military Information Division. . .,” March 21, 1907. File MIC 639-31, RG 165, NA.


54 Ibid., 24.

56 Pappas, 57-58.


58 Nelson, 102-103. Since Nelson also thought that the merger of MID and WCD was an unimportant event, it was scarcely concern about intelligence that led him to criticize General Bell.


60 Wiebe, 227-229.


62 Ralph H. Van Deman to Chief, War College Division, "Historical Sketch of the steps taken by the War Department for the collection, classification and distribution of military information in the Army" (hereafter referred to as "Historical Sketch"), March 2, 1916, 12. File WCD 639-113. This is one of the most important documents produced in the period covered by this thesis.

63 Wotherspoon to General Tasker H. Bliss, September 17, 1909. File WCD 639- , RG 165, NA.


66 Nelson, 132-133.

67 Staff memorandum, Office of the Chief of Staff, September 26, 1910. File WCD 639-5, RG 165, NA. Actually the Militia Division did not join the General Staff from the Secretary of War's Office until mid-1911.

68 Nelson, 134-135.

69 General Order 215, War Department, October 22, 1907.

Nelson, 175-176. This was the "Manchu Law" which required that two years of the previous six he served with troops. This was pernicious because it came at a time when the Army was crowding officers through the two-year course at Fort Leavenworth to prepare them for the General Staff. Also see Palmer, 147-148.

Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 330-341.

Bidwell, 166.

Staff report, Office of the Chief of Staff, February 3, 1912, as cited in Van Deman, "Historical Sketch," 17.


For example, the Journal of the Military Service Institution from 1911 until 1915 devoted most of each issue to what the Europeans were doing and this affected the American Army.

Colonel John Biddle to Colonel Hodges, "Military Attaches," February 9, 1914. File WCD 8336-1, RG 165, NA.

Biddle to Chief of Staff, "Collecting Data on Mexico," February 28, 1914; Adjutant General to Commanding General, Southern Department, "Detail of Officers to Act as Intelligence Officers," March 4, 1914. File WCD 8383-3, RG 165, NA. This was a relatively early use of the term "intelligence officer" when referring to a specific assignment. It had been used in the abstract since the 1890's or earlier. The restriction on crossing the border lasted until Pershing crossed after Villa in 1916.

Weigley, History of the U. S. Army, 347.

D. Clayton Jones, The Years of MacArthur, Volume I, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 116-122. Wood made an abortive effort to obtain a Congressional Medal of Honor for MacArthur, but the
War Department blocked the action.

82 M. M. Macomb to Chief of Staff, "Military Observers with Foreign Armies," August 3, 1914. File WCD 8679-1, RG 165, NA. Macomb noted that he would direct all actions of the attaches and observers, despite the AG's claim of that responsibility in 1907.

83 Pidwell, 180-182.

84 Nelson, 177-179.

85 Bliss, 106-107.

86 Staff Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, "Names of General Staff Officers on General Staff Work, their specific duties and the different committees organized," May 3, 1915. File WCD 639-99, RG 165, NA.


88 U. S. War Department, "History of the General Staff" (unpublished manuscript, Washington: 1929(?)), 294-295. This very useful study is located in the US Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

89 Van Deman, "Memoirs," I, 32.


91 Major General John J. Pershing, "Report of the Punitive Expedition" (Colonia Dublan, Mexico: October 10, 1916), 23. This report is located in the Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth, Ks.

92 Pidwell, 185.

93 Van Deman, "Historical Sketch," 26-31. Van Deman specifies that the Pershing Expedition information was not used in his "Memoirs," but he incorrectly places the time in 1915.

94 Van Deman, "Historical Sketch," 19. This section contains a very modern description of how intelligence work should be done.
95 Ibid., 31.

96 Ibid.


98 Van Deman, "Historical Sketch," 33-34. Macomb's comment is appended to the basic document. It is also noteworthy that at about the same time, Macomb wrote another staff paper on the problems of the General Staff in which he simply endorsed the earlier comments in Van Deman's "Historical Sketch." See Macomb to Chief of Staff, "Reorganization of the War Department General Staff under the provisions of the Act Approved June 3, 1916," July 28, 1916. File WCD 639-129, RG 165, NA.

CHAPTER IV

1 Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1932), 226.

2 Ibid., 227.

3 Macomb to Chief of Staff, July 28, 1916.

4 U. S. Air Force, The United States Army Air Arm: April 1861 to April 1917 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, May 1958), 156.

5 Ibid., 167-176.

6 David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 322-324; Van Deman, "Memoirs," I, 62. It should also be remembered that the celebrated Zimmerman telegram, which played a major part in America's declaration of war, was intercepted by the British at about this time as it was being sent to Mexico.


9 Brigadier General Charles A. Treat to Chief of Staff, "Organiza-
tion of Military Observers in France as a 'Mission,'" November 14, 1916. File WCD 8679-232, RG 165, NA.

10 Sidney Forrester Mashbir, I Was an American Spy (New York: Vanatage, 1953), 5-10. Strangely, Mashbir found what he believed was strong evidence of the Japanese soldiers presence, but he never learned what if anything the War Department concluded.

11 General Order 15, War Department, April 25, 1916, as cited in Bidwell, 191.

12 Attache Report, "Organization of the British Intelligence Service," No. 4, 378, March 28, 1917, File WCD 9944-a-3, RG 165, NA. The initials on the document indicate it was read by both Van Deman and Kuhn.

13 Pappas, 83. As soon as war was declared, the War College was closed and the 19 students reported to their units.

14 Bidwell, 197.

15 Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn to Chief of Staff, "Organization for Intelligence Work," April 11, 1917, File WCD 639-142, RG 165, NA. This document, in addition to its importance for emerging intelligence doctrine, also contains the first definite reference to a War Department intelligence (rather than information) agency.

16 Ibid.

17 Colonel William S. Graves to Chief, WCD, April 13, 1917, File WCD 639-15-____, RG 165, NA. The final digit in the file number is illegible.


19 Ibid., I, 35-36; Graves to Chief, WCD, April 13, 1917.


21 Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Dansey to Van Deman, "Memorandum on Military Intelligence Directorate," May 1, 1917, File WCD 9944-a, RG 165, NA.

22 Kuhn to Chief of Staff, "Organization of the Military Intelligence
Section, WCD," May 11, 1917. File WCD 639-145, RG 165, NA.

23 Haker to Comptroller of the Treasury, May 24, 1917. File WCD 7793-210, RG 165, NA.

24 Kuhn to Chief of Staff, "Proper Organization of a Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, and general rules for its guidance," May 11, 1917. File WCD 639-149, RG 165, NA.

25 Kuhn to Chief of Staff, "Method of handling secret service matters. . . .", May 13, 1917. File WCD 639-150, RG 165, NA. Not surprisingly, once the "positive" and "negative" branches had been developed, the imprecise term "secret service" was dropped.


27 Ibid.

28 Kuhn to Chief of Staff, "Interpreters with force for France," May 23, 1917. File WCD 10100-1, RG 165, NA.

29 Herbert C. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1931), 34-35. This book, written after Secretary Stimson abolished the Black Chamber in 1929, was a rather amazing expose which allegedly caused some 19 nations to change codes systems.

30 Kahn, 351-386.

31 Kuhn to Chief of Staff, "Liaison," June 14, 1917. File WCD 9971-35, RG 165, NA.

32 Kahn, 336-337.

33 Van Deman to Departmental Intelligence Officers, "Instructions for Departmental Intelligence Officers," July 23, 1917. File WCD 10186-1, RG 165, NA. A copy went to each of the six geographical departments.

34 Ibid.

35 Van Deman, "Memoirs," I, 46-47. Whether or not the German threat was as great as MI thought is not clear; however, Van Deman and others did believe it to be great and therefore acted properly to meet the threat.
36 Ibid., 47-51. The Germans did use incendiary devices disguised as coal to destroy several ships by sabotage. The FBI caught the principal saboteur and he eventually showed MID how the devices were made.

37 Adjutant General to Commanding General of all Departments, Divisions and Camps in the United States, "Reports Concerning, and disposition of all alien enemies in the United States Army," August, 3, 1917. File WCD 10560-152-204, RG 165, NA.

38 Mashbir, 18-21.

39 Van Deman to Felix Frankfurter, August 30, 1917. File WCD 10186-3, RG 165, NA.


41 Emerson Hough, The Web: The Authorized History of the American Protective League (Chicago: Reilly and Lee, 1919), 42-54. The APL was actually an amalgamation of several organizations which then was brought under the umbrella of the APL by the Department of Justice. Estimates of its strength vary from 65,000 to 300,000. The APL gave its members rank, and they had representatives serving full-time in the MID.

42 U. S. War Department, "MIB Bulletin for Intelligence Officers, 8," May 13, 1918. File MID 9104-92, RG 165, NA. This is one of a series of then-classified documents designed to keep intelligence officers at all levels of developments affecting their work.

43 U. S. War Department, The Functions of the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff (Washington: October 1, 1918), 14-21. Cited hereafter as Functions of the MID.

44 March, 227-228.


46 Ibid.
47 Kahn, 352-353.

48 Functions of the MID, 8.

49 Van Deman to Frankfurter, August 30, 1917.


52 Ibid., 2-5.

53 Colonel P. D. Lochridge to Chief of Staff, "Instruction of division intelligence officers," December 10, 1917. File WCD 10155-71, RG 165, NA.

54 Reports of Commander-in-Chief, AEF, XIII, 11.

55 Churchill to Chief of Staff, "Training of Positive Intelligence Personnel," August 21, 1918. File MID 10580-22, RG 165, NA.

56 Van Deman, "Memoirs," I, 63. They may have been found too quickly since several turned out to be wanted by various police agencies.

57 U. S. Army, The Founding of the Army's First Counterintelligence Organization (Fort Holabird, Md.: 1967). The CIP was redesignated as the Counterintelligence Corps in 1942 and still later as the Intelligence Command.


59 Churchill to Van Deman, September 16, 1918. File MID 10560-235, RG 165, NA.

60 Sweeney, 116-119.
Churchill to Chief of Staff, "Establishment of an organization to handle cases of graft. . .," July 1, 1918. File MID 10560-54, RG 165, NA.


Functions of the MID, 25.

Ibid., 23-24; March to Adjutant General, "Organization of the Morale Branch, General Staff," October 15, 1918. File WCD 639-224, RG 165, NA.

Functions of the MID, 4; General Order 80, War Department, August 26, 1918.

Jones Memo, March 28, 1908.


Ibid.

EPILOGUE


Ibid., 289-290.

Ibid., 296.

Ibid., 299.

U. S. War Department, "Records of the General Staff, Record Group 165" (Washington: National Archives), n.p. This collection is located in the library of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Az.

Lieutenant Colonel C. M. Busbee to Commandant, Army War College, "Military Intelligence Organization," August 2, 1938. File G2 10560-653, RG 165, NA.

Nelson, 521-535.


10. Andrew D. Pickard, "An Intelligence Branch" (an unpublished student research report, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks: 1961). There were no official reserve branches in the Army until 1951; the MI Reserve Branch was established the following year.

11. The Army's First Counterintelligence Organization.


16. The establishment of the Office of Strategic Services as a parallel and somewhat competing organization with MID indicated a lack of confidence in the MID. But the issue is too complex to be addressed in this thesis. For further details, see Nelson, 526-529.
APPENDIX

OFFICERS ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS (1880-1920)

The following list, while not complete, represents a significant number of those officers affiliated with intelligence work during the period covered in this thesis. The accompanying capsule descriptions only reflect intelligence assignments.

Adams, F. P., assigned to G2, AEF as a captain in July 1918.
Ahern, George, P., assistant in MID in May 1917 as a retired major.
Allen, Henry T., attache in St. Petersburg as a lieutenant in 1889 and in Berlin in 1897.
Anderson, Edward, assigned to MID as lieutenant in 1897.
Averill, N. K., attache in St. Petersburg as a captain in 1911.
Babcock, John B., chief, MID in 1893-94 as major (?).
Babcock, Walter C., assigned to MID as lieutenant April 1898-April 1899.
Barber, Henry A., attache in Havana in 1909 as a major.
Barker, John W., Military observer with French Army as major in November 1916; liaison officer to Inter-Allied Bureau in June 1917.
Barrows, David P., Chief, Manila MID from January to August 1918 as major; Intelligence Officer, AEF Siberia until Spring 1919 as major and lieutenant colonel.
Beach, William D., Chief, MID 1903-1906 as major; Chief, MID Manila in September 1912 as colonel.
Biddle, Nicholas, Officer-in-charge, New York City office, MID June to October 1918 as major and lieutenant colonel.
Biddle, W. S. Jr., attache Berlin as a captain from 1902 to 1906.
Bingham, T. A., attache Berlin in 1889 as captain.

Biscoe, Earl, attache in Chile in April 1914 as captain.

Bliss, Tasker H., assigned to MID then attache in Madrid in 1897 as captain.

Borup, H. D., attache in Paris in 1889 as captain.

Bowley, Albert J., attache in China in April 1914 as major.

Boyd, Carl, attache in France in November 1916 as captain.

Brewster, Andre W., assigned to legation in Peking and Seoul in August 1902 as captain.

Briggs, Allan L., attache in Vienna in April 1914 as captain.

Callan, Robert E., Chief, Manila MID October 1915-July 1917 as major.

Campanole, N. W., intelligence officer Mexican Punitive Expedition in 1916 as captain; assigned to G2, AEF, in 1918 as colonel.

Carter, C. M., attache in London in 1897 as captain.

Cassatt, E. R., attache in London in 1903 as captain.

Castle, C. W., assigned to MID, Manila in 1902 as captain.

Cecil, George R., attache Berne in 1903 as major.

Chamberlain, John L., attache in Vienna as lieutenant.

Chubb, M. W., Chief, Manila MID from July to December 1917 as captain.

Church, James R., military observer in France in November 1916 as major.

Churchill, Marlborough, military observer in France in November 1916 as captain; assigned to AEF G2 in 1917 as major; Chief, MID, from 1918 until 1923 as lieutenant colonel through brigadier general.

Clark, Robert S., relieved from MID and assigned to Peking in 1903 as lieutenant.

Conger, Arthur L., assigned to G2, AEF in 1917-18 as colonel.

Cosby, Spencer, attache in Paris 1914-16 as major and lieutenant colonel.

Coxe, Alexander B., Chief, MID, Manila September 1905-March 1906 as lieutenant; reconnaissance mission to China with Ralph H. Van Deman
in 1906; assistant in MID in May 1917 as captain; G2 AEF in 1918 as colonel.

Dengler, F. L., assigned to G2, AEF in May 1918 as colonel; MID, Positive Branch and Geographic Branch, August 1918 to April 1920 as colonel.

Dickman, Joseph T., Chief, Manila MID in 1900 as lieutenant colonel.

Dorst, Joseph H., observer with Greeks during Greco-Turkish War in 1897, also attache Vienna 1897 as captain.

Dunn, George M., attache in Italy in 1914 as colonel.

Dunn, John M., MID July-September 1918 as lieutenant colonel; MID Positive Branch in April 1920 as colonel.

Dunning, Samuel W., intelligence officer in Hawaii in 1907 as major.

Dwyer, Charles G., attache in Mexico in 1897 as lieutenant.

Edwards, Eaton A., relieved from MID in April 1903 as major.

Ferguson, Harley B., assigned MID in 1903 as lieutenant.

Friedman, William F., G2 AEF (G2A6) from May 1917 to February 1919 as lieutenant.

Furlong, John W., MID Washington in September 1906, then MID Havana until November 1908, then MIC Washington in January 1909 as captain.

Gaillard, David Dub., MID Washington in September 1906, then Chief, MID, Army of Cuban Pacification as major.

Gibson, W. W., Chief, MID Manila August 1903-September 1905 as major.

Gordon W. H., Chief, Manila MID March-November 1906; Chairman, MIC Washington in January 1909 as captain.

Hale, Harry C., MID, June 1903-November 1905 as captain.

Harris, Floyd W., relieved as attache, Brussels in 1897 as lieutenant; assigned attache, Vienna in 1903 as captain.

Harris, Frank E., Chief, MID Manila December 1912-October 1915 as major.

Hawkins, Hamilton S., MID in 1917 as colonel.

Hein, C. L., attache Vienna in 1889 as captain.
Helms, Birch, MID in November 1918 as captain.

Herron, Joseph S., MID in 1903 as captain.

Hill, R. G., MID in 1897 as lieutenant.

Hill, William P., Military observer with French Army in November 1916 as veterinarian.

Hodges, H. C., Chief, Manila August 1907-February 1908 as major.

Hoffman, Albert L., MID in November 1918 as captain.

Hanna, W. E., assigned Havana legation in 1903 as captain.

Hughes, Rupert, MID (Chief, censorship) in September 1918 as major.

Humphrey, Chauncey R., legation in Caracas July-September 1903 as captain.

Irons, James A., attache in Japan in April 1914 as colonel.

Johnston, F. E., attache in Brazil in April 1914 as major.

Jones, Thaddeus W., Chief MID 1907-1909 as lieutenant colonel.

Judson, William V., military observer with Russians, Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 as captain; Chief, military mission to Moscow 1917-18 as colonel and brigadier general.

Kellogg, Sanford C., attache Paris in 1897 as major.

Kerr, John B., relieved as attache Berlin in 1903 as lieutenant colonel.

Knudsen, F. L., MID in November 1905 as captain.

Kuhn, Joseph E., observer with Japanese, Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 as captain; observer at German and Austrian Army maneuvers June-November 1906 as major; military mission to Germany December 1914-March 1915 as lieutenant colonel; attache in Berlin March 1915-December 1916 as colonel; president Army War College February-August 1917 as brigadier general.

Livermore, W. R., relieved as attache to Copenhagen and Stockholm in 1902 as lieutenant colonel.

Lenihan, Michael J., MID from 1906-1909 as captain.

Langhorne, George T., attache in Brussels in August 1897 as lieutenant; attache to Berlin in April 1914 as major.
Lippman, Walter, MID (propaganda) in August 1918 as captain.

Logan, James A., military observer to French Army in November 1916 as major; liaison officer to Inter-Allied Bureau in Paris in June 1917.

Lynch, Charles, MID September 1906-April 1907 as major.

Macomb, A. C., Chief, Manila MID in July 1903 as captain.

Macomb, Montgomery Meigs, Wheeler Survey Expedition 1876-1883 as lieutenant; special duty with Intercontinental Railway Commission Expedition and Survey, Central America 1891-1896; Observer, Russian Army, Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 as major; President, Army War College April 1914-October 1916 as brigadier general.

March, Peyton C., military observer with Japanese, Russo-Japanese War in 1904 as captain.

Martin, W. F., attache in Guatemala in 1914 as captain.

Mason, C. H., MID in 1917 as colonel.

Masteller, K. C., Chief, Negative Branch, MID, in September 1918 as colonel.

Menober, Charles T., MID July 1903 as captain.

Miles, Sherman, attache in Bulgaria in April 1914 as lieutenant; MID in 1917, then sent to AEF G2 as major 1918; Department G2 in 1940 as brigadier general.

Moorman, Frank, AEF G2 in 1918 as captain.

Mott, T. Bentley, Attache in Paris 1903; MID in April 1905 as captain; AEF G2 in 1918 as colonel.

Muir, Charles H., MID November 1905-September 1906 as captain.

MacArthur, Arthur, assistant in MID in 1892 as major.

McCain, W. A., MID Negative Branch in 1920 as colonel.

McClintock, John, attache Vienna October 1905-March 1907 as lieutenant and captain.

MacDonald, G. H., assistant in War College for monographs in 1915 as retired lieutenant colonel.

MacKinlay, William E. W., MID, Manila in 1902 as lieutenant.
Nolan, Dennis E., MID in November 1905 as captain; G2, AEF 1917-1919 as major through brigadier general.

Cakes, J. C., MID in 1903 as captain.

C'Keefe, C. F., MID, Manila in 1900 as captain.

Osborne, James I., MID in July 1918 as lieutenant.

Parker, Frank, military observer to French Army in November 1916 as major; liaison officer to Inter-Allied Bureau in Paris in June 1917.

Peshine, J. H. H., relieved as attaché in Madrid in September 1897 as captain.

Post, J. C., attaché in London in 1889 as major.

Potts, R. D., Chief, MID in 1906 as colonel.

Reber, Samuel, Chief, Manila MID January-August 1907 as major.

Reed, H. A., MID in 1897 as lieutenant.

Reeve, Horace M., MID in 1903 as captain.

Reeves, James H., relieved Peking legation in August 1902 as captain.

Peichmann, Carl, MID in September 1897 as lieutenant; observer, Boer War in 1900; observer with Russians in Russo-Japanese Army in 1904; intelligence officer, Central Department in 1917 as colonel.

Rhodes, Charles D., Intelligence Officer, Philippines, 1901 as captain; MID, Washington July 1903-November 1905 as captain.

Rice, Edmund, attaché in Tokyo in July 1897 as captain.

Riley, Armin, Chief, MID, Manila in December 1918 as captain.

Renayne, James, Assistant in War College for maps and monographs in May 1915 as retired captain.

Rowan, Andrew S., special reconnaissance duty in Canada in 1890, duty with Intercontinental Railway Survey in 1891, MID in 1893-1898, mission to Cuba in 1898, as lieutenant.

Ryan, James A., Intelligence Officer, Mexican Punitive Expedition, 1916, as major.

Scherer, Lloyd C., MID April 1897-98 as lieutenant.
Schwan, Theodore, assistant in MID in 1893 as major.

Scriven, George P., attached to MID with special duty to World's Columbian Expedition in 1891 as lieutenant; MID in 1893 as captain; observer with Turks in Greco-Turkish War and attache in Rome, 1897.

Sillman, R. H., attache in Peking as a captain in 1915.

Simons, W. H., MID in 1897 as lieutenant.

Simpson, William A., MID in 1899 and in 1903 as lieutenant colonel.

Shelton, George H., MID from September 1906-March 1908 as captain.

Slocum, Stephen L. '11, Relieved as attache to St. Petersburg in 1902 as captain; attache to London in 1917-18 as colonel.

Squier, George C., attache in London in April 1914 as lieutenant colonel.

Stimson, Henry L., special duty in MID and liaison officer to British intelligence in 1917 as major.

Straughn, Hugh, Chief, Manila MID in 1918 as captain.

Taylor, Daniel M., reconnaissance of Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, first chief of MID in 1886-89 as captain.

Taylor, Harry A., liaison officer to British intelligence in June 1917, intelligence officer at Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Va., November 1918-April 1919 as captain.

Taylor, John R. W., MID, Manila in 1900 as captain; attache Turkey in 1914 as major; assistant in Army War College in May 1915 as retired major.

Thompson, J. K., Chief, Manila MID, April 1906-June 1907 as captain.

Todd, Henry D. Jr., Chief, Manila MID, 1912 as major.

Van Deman, Ralph H., MID 1897-99 as lieutenant; MID Manila 1903; MID Manila and reconnaissance to China 1905-06; MID Washington 1906-1909 as captain; War College 1915-17 as major; Chief of MI agency, War College 1917-18 as lieutenant colonel and colonel; special duty with AEF G2 1918 as colonel; intelligence officer for American Commission to Paris 1919 as colonel.

Vestal, Samuel C., MID April 1907-January 1909; Manila MID 1910 as captain.
Vincent, Thomas M., Chief, MID October 1895-November 1896 as colonel.

Volkmar, William J., Chief, Military Reservations Division, AG Office, overseeing MID in 1885 as major.

Wadham, Sanford H., Military Observer to French Army in November 1916 as major.

Wagner, Arthur L., Chief, MID in 1897 as major; special duty in Cuba as lieutenant colonel.

Ward, Cabot, G2, Services of Supply, AEF in 1918 as captain.

Whitney, Henry H., MID in September 1897; special mission to Puerto Rico in April 1898 as lieutenant.

Willcox, Cornelius DeW., MID in 1897 as lieutenant; MID in September 1906 as captain; Chief Manila MID from November 1908-July 1910 as major.

Williams, John R., MID 1896-97 as lieutenant, then assigned to Berne as attache; assistant in War College, monographs, in 1915 as retired colonel.

Williams, Robert, Chief, MID in 1892 as colonel.

Wisser, John P., attache in Berlin in 1907-08 as colonel.

Wittenmayer, Edmund, attache Cuba in April 1914 as major.

Wood, Norton E., attache in Spain in April 1914 as captain.

Wood, Cliver E., Tokyo legation in 1903 as major.

Yardley, Herbert O., MID (MI-8) April 1917-Summer 1919 as lieutenant to major.

Young, Charles, Attache in Liberia in April 1914 as major; Young was to be the highest ranking black officer in World War I.
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This collection contains most of the archival material used in this thesis.

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THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: 1885-1918

by

MARC B. POWE

B.A., Texas A. and M., 1961

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1974
THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: 1885-1918

This thesis studies the development of the War Department intelligence agency from its establishment in 1885 as the Military Information Division (MID) of the Adjutant General's Office until its eventual emergence as a wartime General Staff agency. It also analyses the organizational trends in civilian society that paralleled the specifically military phenomena of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

American military historians have held traditionally that modern military intelligence began in World War I. Those who were aware of the earlier MID generally dismissed it as insignificant because of an interruption in its separate existence from 1885 to 1918. At the same time, the War Department's increasing emphasis on bureaucracy, which helped account for the rise of an intelligence agency, was symmetrical with the growth of scientific management and the doctrine of efficiency in American society as a whole.

A brief review of military intelligence efforts in America from the Colonial era through the Civil War reveals a steady interest in localized tactical intelligence and a concurrent deficiency in national coordination of information gathering. In 1885, however, responding to the perceived need for a coordinating agency to manage information gathering and processing, the War Department established the MID on the model of the Office of Naval Intelligence. From 1885 until the Spanish-American War, contemporary documents reveal steady improvement of the agency's operating efficiency and increasing acceptance
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of it by Army leaders. Many of these Army leaders intimately associated the MID with the larger question of whether the American Army should have a European-style General Staff. The period culminated in the successful performance of MID before and during the War with Spain.

After 1898, the Army went through a period of reform under Secretary of War Elihu Root, resulting in the creation of a General Staff. The MID was a prominent part of that original staff and was closely aligned with another Root creation, the Army War College. Documents from the period show that MID performed well as a modern, sophisticated intelligence agency for several years, maintaining a flow of information from all over the world to the staff. However, most Army officers of the period had a relatively poor understanding of the General Staff's role, and a reorganization of the staff in 1908 submerged MID within the War College Division. It remained there for almost ten years while the intelligence function withered until only a handful of attaches were providing almost the only intelligence available to the General Staff. Only the efforts of a few officers, experienced in the original MID, preserved the nucleus of intelligence doctrine until 1915 when MID began to prepare for American entry into World War I.

By 1916, the new leaders of the War College Division had become sympathetic to reestablishing MID as a separate agency to manage Army intelligence. Original documents and first-hand accounts demonstrate that the General Staff felt the need for an independent MID two years before that step finally occurred in 1918. A number of high-ranking officers supported the intelligence section of the War
College in drawing heavily on both previous MID experience and that of the British and the French during the World War, so that it had a complete set of plans for expansion ready when America declared war in April 1917. Only unfamiliarity with MID's background made the agency's rise seem miraculous, beginning with only two officers and a clerk in 1917 and expanding in 18 months to an effective organization of more than one thousand personnel. The good reputation that MID made during the war, partly because of that rapid expansion, insured MID's separate status in the post-war General Staff.

A brief review of the post-World War I years confirms the conclusions of this thesis: the MID devised in 1885 was the parent and most important influence on the wartime intelligence agency of 1918; the struggle for MID's existence was part of the larger question of the role of the General Staff which was finally resolved by the end of World War I; and these developments were closely linked to organizational developments in civilian society during the period.