THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH MULTIPLE PENCIL MARKS THROUGHOUT THE TEXT. THIS IS THE BEST IMAGE AVAILABLE.
CONFLICT AMONG AUTHORITIES AND SOLIDARY GROUPS:
A STUDY OF FOREIGN CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE U. S. A.

by

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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Introduction

Dahrendorf (1958:174) once stated, "every society experiences at every moment social conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous." War is probably the most intensive and extensive expression of social conflict. The history of China in the twentieth century can not be exempted from social conflict: either civil war or international war plagued contemporary China. The communist troops became stronger and stronger after eight year's war against Japan from 1937 to 1945 and they finally seized control of the whole of mainland China. On the other hand, president Chiang Kai-shek's government, representing nationalist China, withdrew to Taiwan in 1948 after many military setbacks in the war against communist troops.

After the end of the second world war, Japan surrendered Taiwan and Chiang's government came to and took over Taiwan. Many native Taiwanese were antagonistic to these newcomers, that is, Mainlanders, and a widespread clash between the native Taiwanese and the mainlander troops occurred on February 28, 1947. President Chiang's government suppressed the clash. Many native Taiwanese and Mainlanders were killed. Some of the native Taiwanese fled to Japan where they organized to destroy Chiang's government and to achieve an independent Taiwan. This organization later developed into the Independent Taiwan Movement. For the past twenty-four years, a principal objective of Chiang's government has been to counter-attack mainland China, and Mao's government has had an objective of liberating Taiwan, while the
Independent Taiwan Movement had the objective mentioned above. Up to now none of them has achieved a prescribed objective.

According to the Asia Student, March 17, 1973, there were 9302 Chinese students from Hong-kong and 8703 students from Taiwan attending colleges in the United States in 1972. Some are Mainlanders and others are native Taiwanese. Many foreign Chinese students brought the domestic conflict when they came to the United States. Those who support Chiang's government are called "the Right"; those who support Mao's government are called "the Left"; those who support Independent Taiwan Movement are called "the Independents".

The problem to be dealt with here is the social conflict among these students and to use their expressions on the conflict as indicators of conflict among Chiang's government, Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement.

B. Review of the Literature

Social conflict is an old topic in sociology, that has been misunderstood or neglected in recent years. Scholarly consideration of social conflict can be dated to Polybius (c.205-125 B.C) in the West or Han Fei Tzu in ancient China (Martindale, 1960: 129). Modern conflict theories are represented in Marxian conflict ideology, the social Darwinistic thesis as expressed by Spencer, Sumner, Small in England and the U.S.A., and the German conflict theorists such as Gumpowicz, Ratzenhofer, Oppenheimer and Simmel (Martindale, 1960: 151). Among modern theorists, perhaps Marx and Simmel had the deepest influence on contemporary sociological theorists. Contemporary versions of Marx's and Simmel's theories can be, with some revision, seen respectively in Ralf Dahrendorf's Toward a Theory of Social Conflict (1958), Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1959), and Lewis Coser's The Functions of Social Conflict (1956).
Contemporary conflict theories arose out of criticisms of Functional theories in the late 1950's (Coser, 1956: Dahrendorf, 1958). Before that period, functionalism, especially that of Parsons, had dominated sociological thought for more than two decades (Gouldner, 1970: 138). Functionalists generally put conflict in residual categories or looked at conflict as pathological or abnormal. For example, the micro-functionalist Moreno regarded social conflict as symptoms of social disease (Hoglund and Ulrich, 1972: 73); Parsons, the macro-functionalist, regarded social conflict as having "disruptive, dissociating, and dysfunctional consequences." (Coser, 1956: 21). Because the functionalists ignored or misunderstood social conflict, that study was neglected during the period of that school's sway (Coser, 1956: Gouldner, 1970).

During the late 1950's and the early 1960's, sociologists began challenging functional theory, especially Parsons'. Gouldner vividly described the rising emotions against functional theories. He claimed two sources of the opposition to Parsons system were "(1) the development of a distinct culture of the young, and (2) the very rapid growth of the welfare state following World War II." As to the first, Gouldner said:

"This new structure of sentiments may be summarily characterized as consisting of those elements expressed in the New Left, on the one hand, and in Psychedelic Culture, on the other. Both of these are, as I will later elaborate, deeply dissonant with the sentiments and assumptions embedded in the Parsonsian synthesis... Parsonsianism will be felt to be irrelevant by the young adherents of the New Left no less than by the exponents of Psychedelic Culture." (1970: 160)

As to the welfare state, he said:

"Most specifically, in its conception of the equilibrating process as largely spontaneous in character and as self-perpetuating. Not starting from a situation in which conformity
had broken down, Parsonsian analysis never considered the mechanisms that may be mobilized deliberately, by the state and other institutions, to prime the social process when it has failed. The infra-structure of Parsonsianism remains pre-Keynesian, insofar as it conceives of the relation among institutions, or actors on the tacit model of spontaneously equilibrated laissez-faire economy rather than of a state-managed welfare economy...Parsonsian theory is thus partly out of phase with a mature welfare state, and it is considerably out of phase with emerging Psychedelic Culture. It is becoming, at least partially, irrelevant to the administrative needs at the society's management level, while at the same time, it does not congenially resonate the new structure of sentiments emerging among potential recruits in younger groups." (1970: 162)

In sum, functional theories failed to resolve problems facing contemporary societies, such as war and violence, racial confrontation, economic exploitation. Hence, the theoretical perspective of conflict arose to meet problems confronting contemporary societies. Conflict theory is more relevant to contemporary society than is functional theory. Conflict theories do not look upon contemporary society as utopian. On the contrary, conflict theory rejects the utopistic view, such a view does not pertain to contemporary industrial societies. This is quite different from functional theories (Dahrendorf, 1968: 107).

Conflict theories arose in reaction to functional theories. "Stability and change, integration and conflict, function and dysfunction, consensus and constraint are, it would seem two equally valid aspects of every imaginable society" (Ralf Dahrendorf, 1958). While the functional theories emphasize the former term, the conflict theories emphasize the latter term in each set of pairs. Social conflict theories have gained popular acceptance and academic status in sociology in recent years.

C. Theoretical References and Distinctiveness

According to Coser (1956: 7), social conflict means "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the
the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals." Social conflict is characterized by a high degree of mutual relevance and high uncompatibility of interests (Deutsch, 1966).

Social conflict among Chiang's government, Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement is basically over political power. Dahrendorf's (1958) conflict model is based upon power and authority relations which make his model relevant to the present study. His conflict model includes the following steps:

1. In every imperatively coordinated group, the carriers of positive and negative dominance roles determine two quasigroups with opposite latent interests. We call them 'quasigroups' because we have to do here with mere aggregates, not organized units; we speak of 'latent interests,' because the opposition of outlook need not be conscious on this level; it may exist only in the form of expectations associated with certain positions. The opposition of interests has here a quite formal meaning, namely, the expectation that an interest in the preservation of the status quo is associated with the positive dominance roles and an interest in the change of the status quo is associated with the negative dominance roles.

2. The bearers of positive and negative dominance roles, that is, the members of the opposing quasigroup, organize themselves into groups with manifest interest unless certain empirically variable conditions (the conditions of organization) intervene. Interest groups, in contrast to quasigroups, are organized entities, such as parties and trade unions; the manifest interests are formulated programs and ideologies.

3. Interest groups which originate in this manner are in constant conflict over the preservation or change of the status quo. The form and the intensity of the conflict are determined by empirically variable conditions (the conditions of conflict).

4. The conflict among interest groups in the sense of this model leads to changes in the structure of their social relations, through changes in the dominance relations. The kind, the speed, and the depth of this development depend on empirically variable conditions (the conditions of structural change).

As to the social conflicts among foreign Chinese students, two points demand to be mentioned. First, they do not have political authority, but are
potential partisans in the sense that, for a given decision, they are "affected by the outcome in some significant way" (Gamson, 1968: 32). Second, they back a particular political authority and oppose others. The relations between foreign Chinese students and their views of the different Chinese governments - Mao's and Chiang's, are the kinds of relations that prevail between potential partisans and authorities. Gamson's model is useful supplement to Darendorf's conflict model for exploring conflict among Chinese students away from home. Gamson states the relations between power and discontent as from the perspectives of influence or of social control.

"On the one hand, the relationship between power and discontent may be described as one form of potential influence. The agents of influence (potential partisans) are those actors who are affected by the decisions and actions of authorities. The targets of influence (authorities) are those who make binding decisions. When one asks about this relationship as a potential partisan, he takes what was described above as an influence perspective.

On the other hand, this relationship may be described as one of social control. The agents of control are authorities acting in their capacity as agents of the system. The targets of control are potential partisans whose actions can potentially disrupt the orderly functioning of the system. When one asks about this relationship as an authority, he takes what was described above as a social control perspective." (1968: 18-19)

And:

"There is a major difference in the influence and social control perspectives on the meaning and significance of social conflict. The social control perspective leads to an emphasis on stability. Conflict, under this view, represents a failure of social control - the failure of contain influence...

The influence perspective on the other hand leads to an emphasis on change. Conflict has a different meaning, rather than a failure of social control, it is likely to be viewed as part of a social movement aimed at changing the content of decisions, the incumbent authorities, or the regime itself. Such potential partisans might be revolutionary or counter-revolutionary ... (1968: 142)
Here, potential partisans are "that set of actors who, for a given decision, are affected by the outcome in some significant way." (Gamson, 1968: 32). It includes three solidarity groups, that are: confident solidarity group, neutral solidarity group and alienated solidarity group. Solidary groups are "collections of individuals who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel that they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate". (Gamson, 1968: 34)

In addition to Dahrendorf and Gamson, Coser discussed functions of conflict between groups and conflict within a group (1956, 1967). The present study adopts ideas from each of these three as its major theoretical frame of reference. However, this study has some theoretical distinctiveness not treated in their work.

1. The present thesis unlike Dahrendorf, Gamson, or Coser will consider conflict among a triad. Dahrendorf discussed conflict between supraordinated and subordinated group; Gamson discussed conflict between authorities and potential partisans; Coser generally discussed the functions of social conflict. None of them discussed conflict among multiple authorities or multiple potential partisan groups. The present study will study conflict among three potential partisan groups and among different authorities and in this regard will be distinctive from those models.

2. This work will study conflict as an exogenous factor. Chiang's government has no control over Mao's, nor does Mao's government control Chiang's government. There is no relation of supraordination and subordination between them. In this sense, the conflict is with an outside group. Besides, there are exogenous factors (to be discussed later) affecting Chiang's government, Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement. Exogenous conflict is an important part of this study.
Dahrendorf did not discuss exogenous conflict. Whether he thought there was insufficient knowledge or time to consider exogenous conflict or he thought it was an unnecessary discussion is not known. For example, if we combine system A and system B into an oversystem C, then conflict between A and B would be considered conflict contained within system C (Dahrendorf, 1958). In this case, since system A (Chiang's government) and system B (Mao's government) have no control over each other, it is meaningful to treat them as engaged in exogenous conflict. Coser discussed conflict with an outside group. However, his focus concerned the functions conflict with an outside group had for the observed group. In that instance, Coser was essentially concerned with conflict as an integral effect. Exogenous conflict as an element of this work distinguishes it from contemporary conflict sociologists.

3. This thesis will study different authorities (supraordinate groups) and different multiple partisan groups (subordinate group). Both Dahrendorf and Gamson treated conflict between a single supraordinate group (authority) and a single subordinate group (potential partisan). This study goes beyond contemporary conflict theory.
CHAPTER II

CONTENT ANALYSIS AS METHODOLOGY

A. Methodology

The method used for this study is content analysis. Berelson (1952: 489) defined it as being "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." Although the definitions of content analysis are divergent, three characteristics are generally emphasized: objectivity, system and generality (Holsti, 1963: 3). Content analysis has been quite often used in recent years to analyze data in sociology, anthropology, psychology, political science and communication research. The technique may be applied to verbal data (open-ended responses to interview questions, responses to Thematic Apperception Test) and is suitable to computer analysis of data. Basically, it is an attempt to classify systematically and objectively the scattered materials into categories for treatment. In fact, if we see content analysis in a broader sense, it is a method of grouping data into categories.

Social phenomena can hardly be studied without content analysis. Sociologists have used it for years. For example, Znaniecki (1918-1920) used it to study the personality and social change of Polish peasants when they immigrated to the United States; Lowenthal (1961: 109-136) used it to study popular heroes in magazines finding the popular heroes had changed from idols of production to idols of consumption; Sorokin (1974) utilized it to study the dynamics of mentalities he associated with idealistic, ideational and sensate cultures.

However, content analysis has limitations and difficulties. Janowitz (1970) discussed three problems of content analysis research:
1. Organizational and administrative problem; content analysis often has to incorporate data covering a wide time span to be quantitatively valuable. That is especially so when historical change is dealt with. This is often such a massive work that it is beyond an individual researcher's effort.

2. Substantive problem: Content analysis generally results in independent and discrete studies. Although there might have been provocative qualitative studies, they often did not stimulate replication and application in further more precise quantitative studies. Janowitz' criticism is that content analyses are not cumulative as is required if knowledge is to be increased.

3. Methodological and theoretical problem: There are two important methodological problems of content analysis. One is the problem of objectivity of coding procedures, the other is the problem of sampling. Both problems are relatively unexplored. As to the theoretical problem, "content analysis has to involve the application of historical, cultural, psychological and legal frames of reference with various levels of meaning, subleties, and efforts at explication of ambiguities" (Janowitz, 1970: 214). It is not an easy job to do content analysis.

Unlike Holst, Janowitz is not optimistic about this kind of research. He (1970: 208) pointed out that there has been a decline in using content analysis as compared with other research techniques. This view is contrary to Holsti's viewpoints (1969: 23). The support this thesis draws from Holsti is eroded by Janowitz's views. However, negative views are acknowledged and the design of this thesis will deal with those negative views as far as possible.

B. Recording Units

In order to classify content data, we must select the units to be coded. Generally, there are five units to be observed for coding (holsti, 1969: 116):
1. Single words or symbols - the smallest unit in content analysis, but it is the most time-consuming unit to observe.

2. Themes - "a single assertion about some subject" is observed (1969: 116).

3. Character - the coder "tallies the number of persons, rather than the number of words or themes, into appropriate categories" (1969: 117).

4. Sentences or paragraphs are analyzed according to codes.

5. Item - coding in which the entire article is characterized.

For the present study, items have been chosen as the coding unit. Items will be used because analyzing them will be less time-consuming and the overall tone of the article can be grasped.

The foreign Chinese students publish many magazines in the United States. For present purposes, five magazines were chosen to be included in content analysis. Other magazines may be used as references for documentation. The five magazines are: (1) Independent Taiwan ("Tai-Du"), (2) Viva Formosa ("Toklip Taiwan"), (3) "Ye-T'sau", (4) "Tiao Yu Tai", and (5) The Free Man ("T'ze Yeu Len"). These were selected because they have large circulations and they represent different political orientations. Independent Taiwan and Viva Formosa are oriented toward Independent Taiwan; Tiao Yu Tai is oriented toward Mao's government; The Free Man is oriented toward Chiang's government; Ye-T'sau is neutral in political orientation. This tendency can be shown in the following table:
TABLE 2-1
POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF FOREIGN CHINESE STUDENTS MAGAZINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Ind. Taiwan Combined with Viva Formosa</th>
<th>Magazine's Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Chiang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con-Chiang</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Mao</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con-Mao</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-I.T.M.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con-I.T.M.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 418.2 > R (= 28.9), \text{ significant at .05 level. d.f. = 18} \]

Note: 1. Independent Taiwan has the largest circulation amounts, however, it was not published until March, 1972. Therefore, before March, 1972 the contents of Viva Formosa was added to allow for more time span for treatment. Both magazines support Independent Taiwan Movement.

2. Some cells have frequencies of less than 5, which is a handicap in using chi-square. The cell distribution of this table are such that inspection indicates the different political orientations of the magazines. However, a chi square value was computed for this and later tables in the thesis in case some future student would want statistical data for purposes of comparison.

Using items as recording units often result in items not readily fitting certainly into a single category (Holsti, 1969: 117). For example, in the above table, we can see that most of the items of Independent Taiwan and Viva Formosa
fall in the categories of Pro-Independent Taiwan Movement and Con-Chiang; 
Tiao Yu-Tai fell in Pro-Mao and Con-Chiang; The Free Man fell in Pro-Chiang 
and Con-Mao. In order to solve this problem, one principle has been used 
throughout the coding process: that is, to use the most strongly emphasized 
category. For example, if one article is Pro-Chiang and Con-Mao, but Pro-
Chiang is emphasized more strongly than Con-Mao, then, the article is put in 
the category of Pro-Chiang.

The period for study is two-years, starting from April, 1971 to March, 
1973. The magazines include 99 issues and the number of articles exceeded 
1500. That number is too many to be covered. Hence, sample articles were 
chosen. Because different magazines include different numbers of pages, and 
numbers of articles, the following rules were applied:

1. As nearly as possible 100 articles were chosen from each magazine 
that represented one of the four political orientations. If the total number 
of articles were less than 100 in the two year period, then, all articles were 
coded. According to this rule, all the articles in Ye-T'sau and The Free Man 
are included.

2. If the total number of articles are over 100, some articles will be 
randomly selected so that the number of articles will be approximate 100. Two 
articles were chosen from each of the 59 issues in Tiao Yu Tai. Five articles 
were chosen from the 22 issues of Independent Taiwan and Viva Formosa combined. 
Since one issue only included one article the total number are 106 rather than 
110.

3. All conceptual units included in each article were categorized. For 
example, if an article discusses coalitions among the triad and an ideological 
debate over socialism, we classified it in the coalition category and ideological
debate category simultaneously. Most articles presented only one or two conceptual units.

C. Categories

One of the central problems in any research design is to develop and to decide categories to be used. Categories give us an analytic scheme for grouping data. There is no standard way to develop categories. Hence, the process is somewhat trial-and-error depending on the researcher's insight, his research problem, and his familiarity with the data. There are principles to aid in developing and selecting categories (Kerlinger, 1964: 606; Holsti, 1969: 95; Lazarsfeld, 1972: 223).

1. It is important that categories are developed according to research purposes and theoretical frame of reference. In this thesis, the categories are based on a comprehensive outline of the research areas. In order to do this, first, concepts were clearly defined, and, second, indicators were clearly and operationally defined to classify articles.

The study is an exploratory research of social conflict. The categories were developed and established after many trial-and-error explorations between theoretical problems and empirical data. Categories to be used are: political orientation (independent variable), political aspects, political reform, nationalism, socio-economic aspects, ideological debate, identification, coalition and compromise. Here, political orientation is the independent variable while all the others are regarded as dependent variables. It is the over-all hypothesis that different political orientations will manifest different viewpoints on political aspects, political reform, socio-economic aspects, nationalism, ideology, identification, coalition and compromise. Social conflict can be regarded from these different viewpoints.
a. Political orientation: This category specifies each article's political preference for or dislike of Chiang's government, Mao's government or the Independent Taiwan Movement.

b. Political aspects: This category includes basically political agreements among the triad. Most articles reflect rancorous conflict (Cameron: 1969) such as scorn for deception and dictatorial methods of violence and revolution by the Independent Taiwan Movement.

c. Nationalism: This examines the impact of an exogenous factor (that is, the conflict between China and Japan over Tiao Yu Tai territory) on Chiang's government, Mao's government, or the Independent Taiwan movement and how that factor influences potential partisans.

d. Political reform: This category includes articles written by the potential partisans that discuss political reform of Chiang's government.

e. Socio-economic aspects: This category includes articles by the potential partisans approving or scorning the socio-economic situation under Chiang's government or Mao's government.

f. Ideological debate: This includes articles discussing socialism, Maoism, or capitalism which reflect specific political orientations of potential partisans.

g. Identification: This category includes articles that discuss identification problems (e.g. do native Taiwanese dentity themselves with China or with Taiwan?) that native Taiwanese and Mainlanders have.

h. Coalition and compromise: This category includes articles discussing coalition and compromise among Chiang's government, Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan movement from the viewpoints of the various authorities or potential partisans.
2. The categories should follow logical correctness. Categories should be exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and independent. Exhaustiveness means that each conceptual unit should be assignable to a cell of the independent variable and to a cell (that is, sub-category) of the categories of the dependent variable. All 364 articles were assigned to dependent variable categories and 321 out of 364 articles were assigned to a cell of the independent variable's category. The remaining 43 articles show no particular political preferences and are not included in this study. The 43 unspecifiable articles represent a loss of 12 percent and are regarded as a measure of deficiency of the data-gathering process.

Mutual exclusiveness means that each theoretical unit should be assignable to one cell and one cell only. The present study meets this requirement both in the categories of the independent variable and of the dependent variables. All theoretical units fall only in a particular cell.

Independence means "the assignment of any object to a cell in no way affects the assignment of any object to that cell or to any other cell" (Kerlinger, 1964: 609). The present study does not have such a problem because each theoretical unit can not affect the assignment of another article to any cell.

3. Categorization should follow a single classification principle: a variable is treated separately because each is conceptually different. (We would not treat sex and social class in a single dimension because they are conceptually different and belong to different dimensions.) The study does not violate this rule.

The following categories are the outline representing the analytical conceptual scheme.
Independent Variable: Political Orientation

(1) Pro-Chiang
(2) Con-Chiang
(3) Pro-Mao
(4) Con-Mao
(5) Pro-Independent Taiwan Movement
(6) Con-Independent Taiwan Movement
(7) Neutral

Dependent Variables:

(1) Political aspects
   a. Pro-Chiang
   b. Con-Chiang
   c. Pro-Mao
   d. Con-Mao
   e. Pro-Independent Taiwan Movement
   f. Con-Independent Taiwan Movement
   g. Neutral

(2) Nationalism (Reaction to Tiao Yu Tai)
   a. Tiao Yu Tai — China has sovereignty
   b. Tiao Yu Tai — Taiwan has sovereignty

(3) Political reform in Chiang's government
   a. Pro
   b. Con

(4) Socio-economic aspects
   a. Pro-Chiang's socio-economic programs
   b. Con-Chiang's socio-economic programs
c. Pro-Mao's socio-economic programs  
d. Con-Mao's socio-economic programs  
e. Neutral  

(5) Ideology and Ideological debate  
   a. Pro socialism  
   b. Pro Maoism  
   c. Pro capitalism  
   d. Con socialism  
   e. Con Maoism  
   f. Con capitalism  
   g. Neutral  

(6) Coalition and compromise  
   a. Pro "United China Movement"  
   b. Con "United China Movement"  
   c. Pro coalition between Independent Taiwan Movement and Mao's government  
   d. Con coalition between Independent Taiwan Movement and Mao's government  
   e. Pro compromise between Independent Taiwan and Chiang's government  
   f. Con compromise between Independent Taiwan and Chiang's government  

(7) Identification  
   a. Mainlander and Taiwanese identify with China  
   b. Mainlander and Taiwanese identify with Taiwan  
   c. Taiwanese identify with Taiwan  
   d. Taiwanese identify with China
CHAPTER III

THE TIAO YU TAI EVENT AND TRIADIC CONFLICT

A. The Tiao Yu Tai Event

1. The Rise of Exogenous Conflict

Tiao Yu Tai is a small group of uninhabited islands located between Taiwan and Okinawa that have been used by fishermen as a shelter from bad weather when fishing at sea. There was no argument over the sovereignty of Tiao Yu Tai until 1968. In that year, Japan and the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported on the large oil resources near the islands. Then both the Republic of China and Japan became interested in the islands' sovereignty. Each government collected historical, geographical, and international law materials that favored its case for sovereignty of Tiao Yu Tai islands. On September 10, 1970, the Japanese government officially claimed that the Tiao Yu Tai islands belonged to Japan. The government of the Republic of China disagreed with the Japanese government's declaration. Newspapers of the People's Republic of China also published the opinion that the Tiao Yu Tai islands belonged to China.

Verbal conflict over sovereignty of Tiao Yu Tai became intensive between the Chinese and the Japanese people. Foreign Chinese students also acknowledged this conflict in discussing Tiao Yu Tai sovereignty at the University of Wisconsin and at Princeton University in November, 1970. Shortly after that in December, 1970, a meeting of students protested the Japanese declaration and sought affiliation with other Chinese student associations to defend Tiao Yu Tai. Other Chinese student associations responded by strongly supporting

Before the issue of Tiao Yu Tai sovereignty was raised, foreign Chinese students were generally apolitical or apathetic about political affairs. However, this issue aroused them to widespread concern concerning Tiao Yu Tai and other political affairs as well. The change can be observed in articles in magazines published by foreign Chinese students. Before Tiao Yu Tai was an issue, they published few magazines, and articles often were not related to political affairs. However, after Tiao Yu Tai, they began publishing many magazines that had political affairs as a major concern. To indicate the force of Tiao Yu Tai, 80% began publication after Tiao Yu Tai was raised.

The Tiao Yu Tai event unified foreign Chinese students and raised their political awareness. They responded to verbal conflict between Japan's and China's claims by becoming unified and cohesive along classic lines suggested by Coser. (1956: 92)

Exogenous conflict generates high morale and unity among foreign Chinese students, causes them to commence publishing magazines, and also mobilizes them to protest against opponents of China.

2. Solidary Groups: Consensus and Conflict

(1) Consensus:

Exogenous conflict was considered above as exerting internal force to establish a more extensive medium of communication than had existed.
Communication has connections with consensus and conflict also. Before considering those concepts, it is necessary to consider Gamson's distinctions of groups engaging in conflict: "[A solidarity group] ... differs from [a] quasi-group in including some common identification or feeling of political 'we' ... interest groups are formal organizations which represent the demand of such a solidarity group in the political system" (1968: 34). Therefore, a solidarity group is different from a quasi-group or an interest group. We regard foreign Chinese students involved in Tiao Yu Tai movement as a solidarity group because they have a sense of political 'we' against Japan. That is, they have a sense of being Chinese with a collective interest in China that involves neither a preference for Chiang's government nor for Mao's government. Almost 90 percent of the articles discussing the Tiao Yu Tai event began by expressing a collective Chinese interest as the frame of reference. On the other hand, Japan is a "negative reference group". Forming a solidarity Chinese group resulted from opposing Japanese action.

Group consensus prior to the conflict is an intervening variable to be considered. If a group lacks basic consensus, outside conflict leads not to cohesion but to general apathy (Coser, 1956: 92). The Tiao Yu Tai movement aroused a basic Chinese consensus that served to unite foreign Chinese students. (The Intellectual, Vol. 42, p. 23, April, 1971)

(2) Conflict and Political Cleavage

The views of Chiang's government regarding the Tiao Yu Tai movement have not yet been discussed. When the Tiao Yu Tai event occurred, foreign Chinese students wanted Chiang's government to react to Japanese claims by sending a fleet to occupy the islands, or by closing Taiwan Strait to Japanese shipping. However, Chiang's government did not react strongly against Japan. Two reasons
were that Chiang's government needed Japan's support to keep its seat in the United Nations, and Taiwan's economy was dependent on Japan. Therefore, a wide gap existed between the foreign Chinese students expected actions of Chiang's government and the actions of that government. As a result, some students were quite dissappointed with Chiang's government. (Tiao Yu Tai T'sien Pao, Vol. 2. p. 5, Feb. 1971)

Chiang's government was not able to react strongly against Japan nor could that government capitalize on the patriotism of foreign Chinese students. The dilemma for Chiang's government resulted in lessening student support of Chiang.

Another structural factor also reduced support for Chiang's government. Mao's government was regarded by foreign Chinese students as an alternative authority. Some of the students, who were disappointed with Chiang's government turned toward Mao's government. It appeared that Mao's government was growing stronger and they hoped that Mao's government might stand firm in the Tiao Yu Tai event. If there had been no alternative, they might not have turned away from Chiang.

The Tiao Yu Tai movement initially concerned exogenous conflict against Japan. That conflict aroused and capitalized on the viewpoint of a collective Chinese interest in defending the Tiao Yu Tai islands. The event created a movement built on the basic consensus that integrated Chinese peoples. The failure of Chiang's government to react to the emotion of nationalism expressed by the students, resulted in student disappointment and many became bitter against and scornful of Chiang's government. Exogenous conflict resulted in the transforming of implicit internal conflict into explicit internal conflict. As a result, comments on the Tiao Yu Tai event emphasized internal conflict (within the population of foreign Chinese students) instead of external conflict with Japan. The following talbe illustrates this:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>No. of Conceptual Units</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside Conflict</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Conflict</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking Cooperation among Themselves</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows that although Tiao Yu Tai event was originally an exogenous conflict, it triggered off the explicit internal conflict and began stressing endogenous conflict rather than exogenous conflict. April is used to separate the later period from the earlier period because the Rights and Lefts split openly in the meeting at Washington on April 10, 1971. As The Free Man, Representing the Rights, criticized the Lefts (Vol. 1: 2, Oct., 1971):

"After that (the Washington meeting on April 10, 1971), the Tiao Yu Tai movement changed direction drastically. Although those in charge of the movement were still the same, they were no longer without political preference, they transformed this cooperative, patriotic movement into a pro-communist movement. They no longer cared about Tiao Yu Tai. Although the title was still Tiao Yu Tai movement ostensibly, their efforts were actually devoted to the United China Movement. They claimed to learn from the general public .... In fact, learning from the general public means to learn Mao's thoughts because they were turning away from the general public gradually. For them, China no longer meant those territories, peoples, and cultures, but changed to mean the People's Republic of China." (Translated by Sheu)
The Left students criticized both Chiang's government and the Right students as well. This was fully manifested in a "Chinese Affairs Meeting" at Ann Arbor, Michigan on September 3, 1971. In this meeting, the students for the first time openly regarded the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China. As a result, some of the Right students left the meeting (United Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1971: 21). This meeting was evidence of the open split in the Tiao Yu Tai movement and afterwards the movement declined.

The latter period of the Tiao Yu Tai movement did not unify Chinese students, but, contrarily, separated them. They separated into solidary groups—the Lefts and Rights. One reason is that the Tiao Yu Tai movement had become concerned with political orientations. Political orientation had become a basic value with no consensus on political means—some preferred Mao's government, some preferred Chiang's government.

A most significant difference between the early period and the later period of Tiao Yu Tai movement is that early conflict resulted in basic consensus (nationalism was the pattern of consensus and it was suitable for the Chinese people to defend Tiao Yu Tai territories) among students, while later conflict disrupted the basic consensus by different political orientations: Pro-Mao or Pro-Chiang. In George Simpson's terms, the former is communal conflict which involves an acceptance of common ends and is integrative; the latter is non-communal conflict involving no common ends and is disruptive and dissociating (Coser: 1956: 75).

3. The Flow of Trust Dimension

Because the Tiao Yu Tai movement concerned China, the Independent Taiwan Movement was not involved in the movement. There were only three articles
related to the Tiao Yu Tai movement in the Independent Taiwan and Viva Formosa magazines. Hence, both the Rights and the Lefts scorned the Independents as traitors to the Chinese people; the Independents reacted against both Rights and Lefts. Because each side regarded two others as an outside group, the conflict among three solidarity groups increased the internal cohesion in each group. Both internal solidarity and division among the foreign Chinese students was manifested in there being separate meetings of those adhering to the three political orientations. Those meetings emphasized the strength and unity of each solidarity group. The first was the Chinese Affairs Meeting of the Lefts at Ann Arbor, Michigan, as mentioned above: the second was Chinese Anti-Communism Meeting of the Rights at Washington D. C., December 25 to 28, 1971, attended by some 500 students (United Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1971: 24); the third was Taiwan Affairs Meeting of Independents at New York on December 25, 1971, attended by 400 people (Independent Taiwan, Vol. 1, 1972: 20).

Gamson's three types of solidarity groups are confident solidarity group, neutral solidarity group and alienated solidarity group. He said (1968: 54):

"Any solidarity group may be characterized by a particular value (or range of value) of Pb (probability) ... Confidence is the belief that for any given decision, Pb = 1.0. Confidence in authorities means that they are perceived as the group's agents, that the group members identify with them ... Neutrality is the belief that for any given decision Pb = 0.5 ... Alienation is the belief that for any given decision, Pb = 0. Alienation from authorities means that they are regarded as incompetent and stupid in achieving collective goals and biased against the group in handling conflict of interest."

Gamson also proposes that authorities rely on different controlling procedures per type of solidarity group: persuasion when the group is confident;
inducement when it is a neutral group; and insulation when the group is alienated (1968: 180-182). During the Tiao Yu Tai movement, Chiang's government could not identify students as belonging to confident, neutral or alienated solidary groups. However, Chiang's government tried to persuade them which was appropriate if all students had confidence in that government. However, persuasion did not succeed. On the contrary, some turned toward Mao's government as mentioned above.

In the sum, the Tiao Yu Tai movement weakened trust toward Chiang's government but strengthened trust toward Mao's government among confident, alienated and neutral solidary groups. The flow of trust after the Tiao Yu Tai movement can be delineated from the relations between authorities and solidary groups in Chart 3.1.

Chart 3.1: The flow of trust orientations after Tiao Yu Tai movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Solidary Group</th>
<th>Chiang's Government</th>
<th>Mao's Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confident</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienated</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:  R: Reinforce existing orientation of trust

+: Increased confidence

-: Decreased confidence

The event and the movement among foreign Chinese students in the U. S. A. resulted in gains for Mao and losses for Chiang.

B. Social Conflict Among The Triad


(1) Contents of Conflict:
As mentioned above, Gamson proposed that an alienated solidarity group tends to rely on constraint resources as means of influence. Constraints are "the addition of new disadvantages to the situation or the threat to do so, regardless of the particular resources used" (Gamson, 1968: 75). Expressions of constraint resources presented in the magazines indicate points of criticism, and conflict.

The manifest interest of the Independent Taiwan movement is to destroy Chiang's government to achieve an independent Taiwan. Table 3.2 shows the verbal constraint resources expressed in 43 articles in The Independents magazines against Chiang's government.

**TABLE 3-2**

**CONSTRAINT RESOURCES EXPRESSED BY INDEPENDENTS AGAINST CHIANG'S GOVERNMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents of Constraint Resources</th>
<th>Conceptual Units</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dictatorship</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Threatening of Revolution</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Claims of Self-Determination</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economic Exploitation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relative Deprivation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Constraints of dictatorship, economic exploitation and relative deprivation are perceived by the Independents as structural circumstances that caused a persisting political conflict with Chiang's government, constraints of revolution and self-determination, on the other hand, are perceived as means to achieve Independent goals. Most specified comment refers to features of the government than to means the Independent Taiwan Movement may use.

a. Dictatorship: The Independents regard this as the most important structural factor conducive of conflict against Chiang's government. It involves the following criticisms: the mass slaughter of Taiwanese during the "2.28" event of 1947; the Independents lack political freedom because Taiwan was put under martial law and speaking against Chiang's government was severely suppressed; President Chiang's undue worship as a charismatic leader (cult of personality); Chiang's government can not represent Taiwan because it is illegal and, moreover, it controls Taiwan by military and police force (Viva Formosa, No. 43, April, 1972: 26).

b. Economic exploitation: This constraint criticizes both the financial gap between rich and poor and the corruption of government. The Independents blame Chiang's government and the capitalists for exploiting proletarians. The proletarians -- farmers, laborers, miners -- work hard to survive while capitalists lived luxuriously without hard work. The corrupt government does not consider the welfare of the poor. Finally, the wealthy exercise undue political power and benefit from bringing foreign industry to Taiwan while the poor are powerless and exploited. (Viva Formosa, No. 38, October, 1971: 26).

c. Relative deprivation: The concept of relative deprivation (Merton, 1957, Chap. 8) refers to the unequal distribution of political power between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. That is, Taiwanese have less political power than
do Mainlanders. The Mainlanders enjoy more political power although they number two million as compared with thirteen million Taiwanese. The minority (Mainlanders) governs the majority (Taiwanese). Although the political power of Taiwanese has been increased recently the Mainlanders still dominate.

d. Self-determination: This is an important goal of the Independents. The Independents believe that if all people on Taiwan express their political preferences, the independence of Taiwan rather than uniting with mainland China will be chosen. Therefore, the Independents assert the right of self-determination by all people on Taiwan. (Ye T'sau, Vol. 13, January, 1973: 13).

e. Violence and revolution: Chalmers Johnson defines violence either as behavior which is impossible for others to orient themselves to or as behavior which is deliberately intended to prevent orientation and the development of stable expectations with regard to it. He defines revolution as "the acceptance of violence in order to cause the system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent upon this perception of social failure"(1966: 12).

The Independents threaten to achieve independence of Taiwan via violence and revolution. They regard Chiang's government as too decadent to be changed by political reform. Violence and revolution are better ways to benefit people of Taiwan. Moreover, reform is a myth because they don't believe Chiang's government will change. They discuss methods for violence and revolution, citing such revolutionaries as Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara and Castro. (Independent Taiwan, Vol. 5, July, 1972: 12).

(2) Empirical conditions of Social Conflict.

Dahrendorf (1958: 171-183; 1959: 157-240) specifies three empirical circumstances of social conflict — conditions of organization, conditions of
conflict, and conditions of structural change. The conditions of organization embrace technical conditions (a charter, a leader, certain norms and certain material requisites), political conditions, at least a guarantee of freedom of coalition, and social conditions that allow communication among members of the quasi-group, and recruitment into the quasi-group. Concerning the conditions of conflict, Dahrendorf regards social mobility opportunities of individuals and the presence of effective mechanisms for regulating social conflicts as having relevance for the intensity of social conflict. Finally, as to the conditions of structural change -- the intensity of conflict, the capacity of the rulers to retain power and the pressure potential of the dominated interest group concern structures.

The Independent Taiwan Movement established an organization overseas. They have a leader (Dr. Peng Ming-Min), a charter (Declaration of Independent Taiwan Movement by Peng Ming-Min and others), an ideology seeking independence, communication by magazines and meetings among members of the quasi-group and freedom to organize in Japan and the United States. However, organization is strictly forbidden in Taiwan. Their activities in Taiwan are illegal and are underground. As to the conditions of conflict, there is still no effective mechanism for regulating the conflict between Chiang's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement. Although there is some cooperation between Chiang's government and some Independents because of their common opposition to Mao's government, to be discussed later, it does not involve cooperation between Chiang's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement. Any Independents cooperating with Chiang's government are regarded as traitors to the Independent Taiwan Movement. Chiang's government does not view the Independent Taiwan Movement as legal.
The degree of intensity of social conflict is high because the Independent Taiwan Movement claims violence and revolution as means to fulfill its goals. Finally, concerning conditions of structural change, Chiang's government effectively controls Taiwan, Independent Taiwan Movement activities are forbidden in Taiwan, so the movement's pressure potential on Chiang's government is limited. Besides, Chiang's government invited more Taiwanese into the cabinet recently which softened the conflict between Mainlanders and Taiwanese.

The pressure potential of Mao's government on Taiwan increased when that government entered the United Nations. Both Taiwanese and Mainlanders now share the same boat.

All of these seem to be disadvantageous to the Independent Taiwan Movement and attenuate its pressure potential on Chiang's government. Structural change seems quite unfeasible. Were structural change of the sort visualized by the Independents to occur it would be revolutionary change.

If we combined Dahrendorf's conflict model and Gamson's power perspectives, the social conflict between Chiang's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement is summarized in Chart 3.2.
### Chart 3.2

**Social Conflict Between Chiang's Government and the Independent Taiwan Movement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Conflict</th>
<th>Power Perspective</th>
<th>Social Control Perspective</th>
<th>Influence Perspective</th>
<th>Conditions of structural change: Independence movement unsuccessful to present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quasi-group</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mainlanders</td>
<td></td>
<td>Insulation sources used effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Remain in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Conditions of organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Well-organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Interest group</td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Chiang's government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Manifest Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td>C. Preserve Status quo, counter-attack mainland China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of conflict: intense</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of structural change: Independence movement unsuccessful to present</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Organized overseas but suppressed in Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Independent Taiwan Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C. The independent of Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Constraint on resources used, e.g. self-determination, Violence and revolution ineffective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Chiang's Government and Mao's Government

Conflict between Chiang's government and Mao's government concerns the manifest interests of Chiang's government to defend Taiwan from being taken over by Mao's government, and to counter-attack mainland China to once again be installed as the Chinese government. On the other hand, the manifest interest of Mao's government is to liberate Taiwan. Each has particular confident and alienated solidarity groups. The Rights are a confident solidarity group to Chiang's government but are an alienated solidarity group from Mao's government. The Lefts are a confident solidarity group to Mao's government but are an alienated solidarity group from Chiang's government. Table 3.3 shows the content of constraint resources used by the Lefts as presented in 48 articles in Tiao Yu Tai magazine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Conceptual Units</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dictatorship</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic Exploitation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Traitor of Chinese People</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Deception</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dictatorship and economic exploitation are structurally conducive elements of social conflict by the Lefts against Chiang's government. These are the same two factors the Independents raised against Chiang's government. However,
the Lefts give more attention to dictatorship and less to the exploitative element.

(1) Dictatorship: This centers on the abridgement of political and civil rights. Political power is centralized in a few officials of Chiang's government and the civil rights of speech, publication, association, are precluded by martial law.

(2) Illegitimacy: Chiang's government can not and does not represent China, nor the people of Taiwan. Taiwan is illegally controlled by military and police forces. These are quite similar to the Independents' criticisms (Tiao Yu Tai, Vol. 35, November, 1971: 2).

2. Economic exploitation: This focuses on proletarians being exploited by the bourgeoisie. The social welfare of lower class people was neglected; the distribution of wealth between poor and rich is unequal—the rich are getting richer, while the poor are getting poorer. These criticisms are similar to those raised by the Independents.

3. Traitor to Chinese people: The Left scorned Chiang's government for betraying the Chinese people, for its policies favoring the elite, for allowing investment conditions that attracted foreign capital but sacrificed the interest of labor, and for seeking outside allies to fight inside opponents (Tiao Yu Tai, Vol. 30, October, 1971: 2).

4. Deception: Chiang's government is accused of trying to cover up unfavorable news and has deceived people by false news. The Lefts state Chiang's government falsified the history of peace talks with Mao's party in 1949, and purposely disregarded Tiao Yu Tai movement.

The Left magazine criticized Chiang's government and praised Mao's government. This praise and support was manifested by simple trust or by
reasons for praise. Twenty-two conceptual units are Pro-Mao's government (No. of articles: 20) of which 12 manifest trust and 10 manifest reasons for praise in the Tiao Yu Tai magazine.

a. Simple trust are Pro-Mao conceptual units that favorably quoted talks of Mao or other government officials, or introduced news or policies of that government.

b. Praising with reasons: The Lefts support of Mao's government emphasized its structural conduciveness of the following kinds:

(a) Prosperity of China: Mao's government was praised because China was prosperous within a decade of its rule. Eight hundred million people are being sustained in a new-China (Tiao Yu Tai, No. 44, December, 1971: 5).

(b) Equality: The intellectual enjoyed high social status in traditional China. Those who used their minds governed, those who use their hands were governed. That situation changed after the revolution and especially after the Cultural Revolution. One goal of the Cultural Revolution was to decrease the inequality between intellectuals and workers and farmers. Hence, the social status of proletarians has risen. The tendency toward equality had economic, social, and welfare aspects. The differences of living standards and incomes of occupational groups has been reduced. There is no wide income gap between rich and poor, between city-dwellers and rural people. Intellectuals no longer enjoy automatic social status while today's workers and farmers occupy statuses higher than ever before (Tiao Yu Tai, Vol. 44, December 1971: 3).

There are health, educational, and welfare programs covering all people. These public programs are distinctly different from traditional China. The Lefts also stress that China now has a good goals, high morale, the people are industrious and unselfish, and China is free from exploitation by other countries.

Social conflict between Chiang's government and Mao's government is summar-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Conflict</th>
<th>Power Perspective</th>
<th>Social control perspective</th>
<th>Influence perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quasi-group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conditions of organization</td>
<td>A. Well-organized</td>
<td>The Lefts (confident group to the People's Republic of China)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Interest Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Manifest Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conditions of conflict: intense</td>
<td>A. Well-organized</td>
<td>Insulation resources used effective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Mao's government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Liberate Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Structural change unsuccessful</td>
<td>Still preserve the status quo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pressure is potential is still limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.3: Social Conflict Between Chiang's Government and Mao's Government
3. Interaction Patterns of Triadic Criticism

The Rights, the Lefts and the Independents scorn each other but each directs criticism differently. The Right criticizes Mao's government, the Left criticizes Chiang's government, and neither is much concerned with the Independent Taiwan Movement. The Independents criticize both Chiang's government and Mao's government, but are concerned more with Chiang's government than with Mao's government. This can be shown Table 3.4.

**TABLE 3.4**

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF CONCEPTUAL UNITS OF CRITICISMS AMONG MAGAZINES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Free Man Conceptual Units</th>
<th>Tiao Yu Tai Conceptual Units</th>
<th>Ind. Taiwan &amp; Viva Formosa Con. Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criticize Mao's</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticize Chiang's</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticize Ind. Taiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 96.7$  R (=7.81) Significant at .05 level, d.f. = 3

The following Chart delineates patterns of criticisms among solidary groups.
Chart 3.4: Interaction patterns of criticisms among solidary groups.

Key:
- Solid line represents intense criticism
- Dotted line represents less intense criticism

The foreign Chinese students magazines affiliated with a Chinese government (PROC and ROC) regard the opposing government as its opponent but do not regard the power of the Independent Taiwan Movement to be sufficient to warrant attention. The Independents have to go underground in Taiwan. Wherever they act, they represent a potential not an actual government. Hence, it seems that among the conflict groups affiliation with an official government gives that group power and other conflict groups pay attention to actual power.

The threatening power of Chiang’s government and Mao’s government are highly regarded by opposite solidary groups. Hence, the Rights and the Lefts as opposing solidary groups attend to political opponents.

Perhaps another explanation accounts for this interaction patterns of criticism. Both Chiang’s government and Mao’s government want to cooperate with the Independent Taiwan Movement, at least for the present. Therefore, articles criticizing the Independent Taiwan Movement were few. (This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter) (Ye T’sau, Vol. 15, April, 1973: 11).
CHAPTER IV

UNITY, COALITION, CONFLICT IN TRIADS

A. Peace Talks And United China Movement

In November, 1972, Ye T'sau and the Bridge magazines proposed peace talks between the Kuomintang party (nationalist China) and the Communist party (Communist China) to unite China. The declaration for peace talks aroused widespread reactions among foreign Chinese students. Later, the declaration was formulated as the United China Movement.

1. Peace talks among Chinese governments were proposed because peace talks between North Korea and South Korea, East Germany and West Germany and the parties to the Vietnam war had influenced foreign Chinese students. The memorandum between North Korea and South Korea stressing unification of one people, despite their ideological and institutional differences, especially impacted these students. Their declaration (Ye T'sau, Vol. 12, November, 1972: 1) said:

"We know the difficulties of the problem of uniting China. Nor do we neglect the different living styles of both sides on ideological and institutional patterns. We simply regard the supreme goal of one people is to unite and that goal outruns differences in beliefs, ideological patterns and institutions. Based upon racial feelings and the supreme national interests. We can see no reasons why Kuomintang party and Communist party can not proceed to peace talks immediately in order to unite." (trans. by Sheu)

Peace talks brought convergence and compromise between capitalists and communists of other split nations and peoples. Students visualized healing the split between Chiang's government and Mao's government as beneficial to Chinese people.
Peace talks were to reduce difficulties Chinese peoples were experiencing. Conflict and hostility between Mao's government and Chiang's government caused Chinese people to suffer inconvenience and tragedy. Warfare resulted in deaths, disrupted families, and slow economic growth because of military expenses. Furthermore, the conflict between Chinese governments impaired the national interest of over-all China. Many foreign Chinese students hoped for a unified country again (Ye T'sau, Vol. 12, November, 1972: 2; The Bridge, Vol. 25, November, 1972: 3).

The difficulties suffered by Chinese people and the discussion of peace talks raised expectations of peace talks among Chiang's government and Mao's government and the United China Movement.

Each government responded differently to the movement. Mao's government welcomed peace talks although premier Chou En-Lai qualified that support by raising the status of Taiwan after Taiwan unites with mainland China.

On the other hand, Chiang's government strongly opposed peace talks with Mao's government and United China Movement. They described the United China Movement as activated and controlled by Mao's government. Their opposition cited Mao's government as untrustworthy and peace talks as a means by Mao's government to defeat Chiang's government. Also they cited the history that the Chinese communists became stronger and stronger as there were talks between them but the communists never kept promises (The Free Man, Vol. 14, January, 1973: 20).

2. Peace talks allow the big power to swallow the small power. The Right thought it was not then convenient for peace talks because Chiang's government had many domestic problems to be solved. Peace talks with Mao's government might decrease the morale of anti-communism, bring out the domestic
conflicts and destroy Chiang's government. The more powerful often uses peace talks as a device to decrease hostility, to attenuate the inner cohesion of the less powerful, to bring about the explicit inner conflict within the less powerful, and, finally, to subjugate the small (Ye T'sau, Vol. 13, January, 1973: 8).

3. Peace talks imply compromise but Communists do not compromise. The essence of communism to Chiang's government and the Rights involves violence, destruction, and inhumanitarianism. They believed communism was unacceptable to people living on Taiwan. Because neither part would depart from its beliefs and practices there was no reason for peace talks (The Free Man, Vol. 14, January, 1973: 8).

The Rights argued that if both were combined into one unit, it was merely formal, not substantial unity, because neither would surrender its way of life. The unification of over-all China would have to be a step by step process. If a long period were taken then the differences in ideologies and systems could be gradually and naturally decreased. Only at a much later date could they unite without strain and conflict (Ye T'sau, Vol. 13, January, 1973: 7).

B. Cooperation Between Chiang's Government and Independent Taiwan Movement

When Chiang's government was ousted from the United Nations and Mao's government acquired its seat, both Chiang's government and Independent Taiwan Movement faced more pressure from Mao's government. Chiang's government found it difficult to convince other nations that it was the legitimate government of China. On the other hand, because Mao's government, like Chiang's government, claims Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, it would be fatal to the Independent Taiwan Movement once Mao's government takes over Taiwan.
The Independents, as Chiang's government and the Rights, oppose the United China Movement. The goal of the Independent to achieve the independence of Taiwan would be thwarted by combining mainland China and Taiwan. They criticized the United China Movement because it ignored expectations of the Taiwanese in wanting Taiwan to be independent. (Viva Formosa, Vol. 41, January, 1972: 7).

It now appeared to be easier to achieve independence of Taiwan with Chiang's government than it had been when the Republic of China held the U. N. seat. Because of these facts, some Independents sought to cooperate with Chiang's government (Viva Formosa, Vol. 41, January, 1971: 30). Now, Chiang's government needed to cooperate with the Independents in order to concentrate on and to cope with Mao's government. After all, it was advantageous to face one opponent rather than two opponents (Viva Formosa, Vol. 49, September, 1972: 48).

That some Independents are cooperating with Chiang's government caused a schism in the Independent Taiwan Movement. Those Independents who regard Chiang's government as willing to compromise, and capable of being reformed have turned to cooperate with Chiang's government. Those Independents who regard Chiang's government as totally corrupt and unremediable, and insist that revolution is the only way to save Taiwan will not cooperate with Chiang's government. Moreover, they believe that reform of Chiang's government is impossible. Hence, these radical Independents expelled those who turned to cooperate with Chiang's government in order to purify the movement (Viva Formosa, Vol. 49, September, 1972: 49-50).

C. Coalitions in a Triad: Model Analysis

Caplow (1968: 1) defined a triad as "a social system containing three related members in a persistent situation." The three organizations being
observed are involved in a social system that focuses on political control of Taiwan. A common experience of triads is that they tend to involve a coalition of two members against the third. The premium for forming coalitions is the relative power of the members (Caplow, 1968: 2). Mao's government is the most powerful, Chiang's government is the second in power, and the Independent Taiwan Movement is the least powerful member. We designate Mao's government as A, Chiang's government as B, and the Independent Taiwan Movement as C. It is not probable that a coalition of B and C could upset A. A Type 6 power relation from Caplow (1968: 6) is $A > B > C$, $B + C < A$ and this is not a productive situation for forming any coalitions because A does not need the others and forming of the others can not upset the superior power of A. No "revolutionary coalition" is possible.

It appears more plausible for an AB or BC coalition to be formed than does an AC coalition. This is so because C contributes so little to any coalition that it must, if it is to share power, coalesce with B. This reasoning is based on Caplow's "equitable expectation." (1968: 37). His reasoning was taken from a psychological assumption deduced by Gamson (1961: 376): "Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contributed to a coalition." Gamson (1961: 376) also deduced strategical consequences:

"When a player must choose among alternative coalition strategies where the total payoff to a winning coalition is constant, he will maximize his payoff by maximizing his share. The theory states that he will do this by maximizing the ratio of his resources to the total resources of the coalition. Since his resources will be the same regardless of which he joins, the lower the total resources, the greater will be his share."

Therefore, if C joins with B, C's share of total resources will be larger. C could participate in larger total resources if it joined A but its fractional share would be smaller. Hence, it is unlikely that an AC coalition is to be formed.
This is similar to the patriarchal family in which the father's dominance can not be overthrown by any combination of wife and children, it is very rare for children to join with father (Caplow, 1968: 49-94). Following this proposition, it would be more plausible to form coalition between Mao's government and Chiang's government (AB) or between Chiang's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement (BC) than would be a coalition between Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement (AC). This seems to be supported from previous discussions. There is cooperation between Chiang's government and the Independents; there are efforts for peace talks and United China Movement between Mao's government and Chiang's government; and there are few Independents seeking coalition with Mao's government; Mao's government welcomes the Independents to join her in order to put more pressure on Chiang's government.

Since it is more plausible to form an AB or a BC coalition, B has the choice of determining whether to form a coalition with A or with C. Chiang's government may decide either to join with Mao's government or to cooperate with the Independent Taiwan Movement. Chiang's government could evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of joining with Mao's government or cooperating with the Independent Taiwan Movement. This evaluation considers three important problems. First, what share of power would be given by Mao's government; second, what expectations would Chiang's government have of merging with mainland China; third, what possibility is there of compromise between different ideologies and systems. The latter two factors are "nonutilitarian strategy preferences" which occur when inclinations to form a coalition with others are unrelated to the other's resources (Gamson, 1961: 375). Thus, the principal problem involves the possible compromises to be made between ideologies and beliefs.
Even so, let us examine each factor more closely. The share of power attained by Chiang's government would be close to the ratio of resources they could contribute to the coalition. Chiang's government could increase its share of power by increasing its possible contribution through continuing a high rate of economic growth, maintaining the confident support of the general public, or increasing the military importance of Taiwan.

As to the second factor, what expectations would Chiang's government have for merging Taiwan with mainland China? The elite in Chiang's government are mainlander, and want to merge Taiwan with mainland China. However, this expectation could be attenuated. For example, there are new Taiwanese elites who do not want to join with mainland China. They may fear losing power if such a coalition is forged. Besides, time is another factor. As the length of time that mainland China and Taiwan are separate is increased the likelihood that separation becomes permanent is also increased.

The third factor -- the possibility of compromise between different systems and ideologies -- is the largest stumbling block to a coalition between the nationalist and communist Chinese. Though there are peace talks between North Korea and South Korea and East Germany and West Germany, the possibility of convergence between communist countries and capitalistic countries is still unforeseeable. As long as Mao's government is strictly socialistic, it will be difficult for Chiang's government to coalesce with Mao's government.

Although Caplow proposed that relative power is important in coalition formation, it seems that the "nonutilitarian strategy preferences" among Chiang, Mao, and the Independent Movement are more critical to coalition in this triad.

The unlikely prospects of easy coalition among political organizations has influence on the foreign Chinese students organizations. As solitary
groups affiliated with particular political organizations, student groups' actions are dependent on action of political organizations. At best, foreign Chinese students in the U. S. A. will have only marginal influence on Chiang's government, Mao's government, or the Independent Taiwan Movement.
CHAPTER V

CONSEQUENCES OF TRIADIC CONFLICT

We know conflict is not necessarily pathological, conflict has social functions. The conflict among Chiang's government, Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan movement has lasted for more than a decade. Is there any benefit to the triad, to the Chinese people from this conflict? Before examining these, let us review some characteristics of this conflict.

A. Some Characteristics of the Conflict

Discussions of social conflict often deal with consensus and legitimacy. Both consensus and conflict concern conflict behavior and sentiments of hostility. Conflict includes sentiments of hostility, but hostility does not necessarily lead to conflict behavior. Lower caste Indians may feel antagonistic toward upperclass people, but interclass conflict is rare because all classes accept the caste distinction (Coser, 1956: 33-55). In such an instance, Coser considers legitimacy to be a crucial intervening variable. Whether sentiments of hostility lead to social action depends on the negatively privileged group believing rights to which it is entitled are being denied. Only by comprehending legitimacy can we relate sentiments of hostility and conflict behavior. Therefore, hostility, legitimacy, and consensus are axes of this study of social conflict.

The conflict under study is realistic conflict. Each side suffers frustrations of its specific demands. Chiang's government wants to counterattack mainland China; Mao's government wants to take over Taiwan; the Independent Taiwan Movement wants to achieve Taiwan's independence. Each suffers frustration, moreover, the frustration has been long term.
The relationships among the triad have resulted in hostile feelings and in conflict behavior because each side regards its position and claim as legitimate. Chiang's government and Mao's government claim Taiwan is part of China, and each claims to be the legitimate government of China. The Independent Taiwan Movement claims legitimacy on the grounds that Taiwan was separate from mainland China for many years and on the assumption that most Taiwanese want independence.

Conflict does not necessarily lead to dissolving society, on the contrary, it can unify society. Kornhauser (1958) argues that modern mass society maintains integration by multiple group conflicts in which groups are split so much that any one group does not control the society. A crisscrossing of interests prevails. But why is some conflict integrating and other conflict dissolving? Coser (1956: 75) proposes an intervening variable: Does conflict occur concerning the basis of consensus, or does it take place within the basic consensus? (Coser, 1956: 75). As to the former, modern society maintains its integration because the division of labor creates interdependence (basis of consensus) and exerts pressure against a radical break. Conflict over the end is illustrated by the American Dilemma of racial relations. Americans live with the idea of equality and with the practice of racial discrimination—such a dilemma is disrupting and dissociating.

The triadic conflict studied is noncommunal conflict. Chiang's government and Mao's government mutually regard the other as evil, violent and illegitimate. The Independent Taiwan Movement wants Taiwan separated from China which poses a difference from Chiang's government and Mao's government. The conflict is over basic ends—no common end has been achieved by any members of the triad. Conflict among the triad is likely to continue.
B. **Functions of Conflict for Chiang's Government**

The main function of triadic conflict for Chiang's government has been political reform of that government. Reform was triggered particularly by the expulsion from the United Nations. Expulsion on October 25, 1971, shattered Chiang's government. As long as Chiang's government kept her U. N. seat, that government was legitimate. When Chiang's government no longer represented China, what did she represent? In addition, Chiang's government no longer being in the United Nations decreased the legitimacy of ruling Taiwan and made the Independent Taiwan Movement's claim to self-determination of people on the island and the independence of Taiwan more legitimate. Mao's government and Chiang's government claim that Taiwan is part of China made Mao's government's demand over the sovereignty of Taiwan more legitimate after she entered the United Nations.

When the U. N. unseated Chiang's government, peoples of Taiwan were shocked and especially students reacted strongly. Open and bitter criticism of the government occurred. Facing internal and external pressures, Chiang's government was forced to make some improvements, among which was political reform.

Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, son of President Chiang, reformed the government in the following ways:

1. Economic development: Since the United Nations defeat, Chiang's government began economic development efforts to regain stability within the island and in international relations. Before the U. N. defeat, economic development was sometimes sacrificed for political or diplomatic reasons. Since the United Nations defeat, economic development has been freed from political and diplomatic hindrances and has become the most important focus
of Chiang's government. The government has even considered trading with communist countries which was previously forbidden. Counterattacking mainland China was replaced by economic development as the supreme goal, at least temporarily. To survive through economic development has become the goal of Chiang's government and of many people on the island.

2. Sharing power with the Taiwanese: Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo invited Taiwanese to his new cabinet. Vice-premier Hsu, Interior Minister Lin, Transportation Minister Henry Kao and some at large ministers became cabinet members. Besides, the governor of Taiwan province and governor of Taipei City, who are Taiwanese, were appointed. Chiang's government gave political power to Taiwanese to establish harmonious relations. In addition, Chiang's government had invited key members in the Independent Taiwan Movement to join the government as mentioned earlier.

3. Fighting corruption: one reason many foreign Chinese students had turned away from Chiang's government to become Lefts or Independents is their concern with the corruption of Chiang's government. Since he became premier, Premier Chiang has worked hard to wipe out corruption and bribery and government officials were ordered to lead proper private lives. These efforts won trust to the new cabinet (Ye T'sau, Vol. 12, November, 1972).

4. Increasing attention to lower class welfare: Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement criticized Chiang's government for neglecting the welfare of lower class people and for exploiting them (Ye T'sau, Vol. 15, January, 1973: 9).

"the economic development of Taiwan used to emphasize the expansion of production power and capital increase while neglecting labor's benefits as a result. Besides, owing to martial law, labor is not permitted to strike, a labor union is merely an empty name .... Because laboreres are not well-organized and are
not permitted to strike, they do not have bargaining power in working conditions, salary and welfare. Under these situations, how can we talk about labor welfare."

Besides laborers, the other major lower class people – farmers are also regarded as exploited (Ye T'sau, Vol. 13, January 1973: 10):

"According to the report of Sun Yuan-Chun (economic minister) the average annual income of the farmers is 7,000 NT dollars, and the average annual income of non-farmers is 16,000 NT dollars. Farmers compose 42% of the population, hence, we can regard the low income of farmers as a serious problem."

And:

"Premier Chiang's new cabinet became aware of the problems of farmers and laborers, and adopted many policies to improve conditions of farmers and laborers (Ye T'sau, Vol. 13, January, 1973: 5)."

(Both paragraphs trans. by Sheu.)

All four aspects mainly considered domestic issues of Taiwan. Premier Chiang's new cabinet has put aside, at least temporarily, the remote goal of counterattacking mainland China. The longtime national supreme policy has been replaced with the more realistic consideration of the survival of Taiwan. Some people call this the "Taiwanization of Taiwan".

Following Camson's model of power, Premier Chiang's reforms depended on persuasion, instead of insulation and sanction. Persuasion is a means to obtain peoples' trust. The government made political decisions that served the public interest to increase popular trust. Some foreign Chinese students trusted the new government and some did not. Those students who were confident with Chiang's government were persuaded, other groups were not persuaded. Alienated solidary groups tend to distrust the new government's political reforms. This is illustrated by Table 5.1:
TABLE 5.1
RESPONSES OF GROUPS TO POLITICAL REFORM
(number shows theoretical unit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Orientation</th>
<th>Pro-Chiang</th>
<th>Con-Chiang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Distrust</td>
<td>0(A)</td>
<td>10(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform is Trusted</td>
<td>6(C)</td>
<td>1(D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using Fisher exact one-tailed test, \( D = 1 < R (=3) \), Significant at .05 level.

These data collected from 15 articles confirm Gamson's hypothesis that authority tends to rely on persuasion as a means of social control on confidant solidary group, because they are easily convinced, and authority tends to use insulation, or inducement as means of social control on non-confidant solidary groups, because they are not easily convinced.

Those students trusting political reform cited reforms as serving the public benefit. Those students who distrusted the political reforms said the reforms were not for the public benefit, but were for the survival of Chiang's government. Martial law and strict censorship were still in force. Still others criticized reforms because reforms did not build a rule-of-law, but were to build Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo as a charismatic leader (Tiao Yu Tai, Vol. 38, November 1971: 1).

Analyzing trust or distrust of political reforms indicate the discrepancy between a confident solidary group and an alienated solidary group. That discrepancy reaffirms our hypothesis.

C. Function of Conflict on the Independent Taiwan Movement

Based upon the tragedy of "2.28 Event", in 1947, the Independent Taiwan
Movement was emotionally oriented in the early period -- they wanted revenge, to kill Chiang, or kick out his government and the mainlanders. However, as the situation changed and conflict continued, the Movement has replaced or added goals. One change showing goal displacement is the movement has shifted from the original emotional orientation to a reason-oriented movement. They began to look more reasonably and realistically to the future of Taiwan. This is manifested in the following aspects:

1. Trying to get mainlanders support: In the early period of the Independent Taiwan Movement it was trying to absorb only Taiwanese. However, since Tiao Yu Tai, their policy was revised and enlarged to include all peoples in Taiwan, that is, Taiwanese and mainlanders. They distinguished between mainlanders and Chiang's government and its followers ("Chiang's gang" as they called them) and welcomed mainlanders to join the movement (Ye T'sau, Vol. 13, January, 1973: 13).

2. Proposing policies for governing Taiwan: Rights and Lefts often criticized the Independent Taiwan Movement because it wanted independence but did not have substantial plans for governing Taiwan. The Independent Taiwan Movement faced this criticism and has begun to explore Taiwan's problems and to propose plans governing and policies applying to an independent Taiwan. These proposals can be found in Chen Lung-chi, The Independence and Governing of Taiwan.

3. Cooperating with Chiang's government: The entrance of Mao's government into the United Nations and the changed international relations that resulted therefrom were not favorable to Chiang's government or to the Independent Taiwan Movement. Some key figures in the Independent Taiwan Movement favored cooperating with Chiang's government. Although many of them still
have doubts about this cooperation, it shows a tendency to consider Taiwan in a way that is more than emotional resentment against Chiang as the "outside intruder". Whether it is advantageous to cooperate with Chiang's government may be questionable, but it is functional in the sense that the movement's concern for Taiwan outruns its hostile feeling against Chiang's government or the mainlanders.

D. Function of Conflict on Mao's Government

During the early days following its seizure of mainland China, Mao's government proposed liberating Taiwan by force. However, as conflict continued, the policy was revised to liberate Taiwan peacefully. That policy became especially attractive when Mao's government entered the United Nations. Then peace talks with Chiang's government were welcomed. In addition, Mao's government tried to understand Taiwan more concretely and substantially and to consider Taiwan's status when merged with mainland China -- should Taiwan be a province or a self-governing unit of China (Tiao Yu Tai, Vol. 70, December, 1972: 8).

Premier Chou En-lai emphasized that liberating Taiwan would not use force hastily, nor did he want to see a bleeding Taiwan. The reason he wants to talk with Chiang Kai-shek is to consider our countrymen in Taiwan and to prevent warfare.

E. Function of Political Conflict on Foreign Chinese Students

The conflict among Chiang's government, Mao's government and the Independent Taiwan Movement aroused or sustained the political awareness of foreign Chinese students -- Rights, Lefts, or Independents. Political awareness was strengthened by the Tiao Yu Tai movement and by Mao's government replacing Chiang's government in the United Nations. Since 1968, they have considered the future of Taiwan.
Is it more advantageous for Taiwan to become independent or to merge with mainland China? If Taiwan joined mainland China, would interests of the peoples in Taiwan be sacrificed? Such puzzles may never be solved. But concerns for one's country is maintained by pondering its problems. As Confucius said: "Nation existed because of pressure; nation perished because it became too comfortable." and "Nation perished because there was no external pressure." That outside pressure strengthens inside cohesion, as Coser emphasized recently and Confucius emphasized historically, is manifested among foreign Chinese students.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Content analysis was the research technique used to analyze data throughout the study. The limitations of content analysis did not severely handicap this study. The categories developed are useful to study conflict among Chiang's government, Mao's government, and the Independent Taiwan Movement and also conflict among foreign Chinese Students in the U. S. A. Moreover, it may be generalized to study conflict between authorities and solidarity groups.

Gamson's power model, Dahrendorg's conflict model and Coser's discussions of the functions of conflict were applied throughout the study with a satisfactory goodness of fit and some of their hypotheses were also tested with the positive results. Furthermore, in addition to power distribution, the study also showed "nonutilitarian strategy preferences" to be important to coalition, especially among different ideologies and socio-economic systems.

Social conflict among Chiang's government, Mao's government, and the Independent Taiwan Movement is manifested in conflict among foreign Chinese students in the U. S. A. This conflict is brought about initially by the Tiao Yu Tai event and ensuing events which integrated foreign Chinese students around an issue relevant to the Chinese peoples wherever they lived. Divergent political orientations later destroyed and replaced the basic consensus and conflict commenced with the result that three active clear-cut solidarity groups were formed: the Right, the Left and the Independents. Each group backed a particular authority and criticized other authorities and solidarity groups. Conflict among the authorities continues as no authority has achieved its objectives. There has been no structural change among members of the triad.
Both authorities and solidarity groups expressed their wish to resolve conflict. There are exogenous and endogenous factors facilitating this effort. Peace talks between nations of the same people and changing international relations of Mao's government and Chiang's government are exogenous factors. The bitter experiences of Chinese people and the long-term impaired national interest of over-all China, which are occasioned by conflict between Chinese governments, are endogenous factors.

Hence, solidarity groups and authorities have discussed cooperation and compromise. The United China Movement among students, that stressed peace and unity of China as its objectives, was one result of that discussion. The authorities discussion of cooperation and compromise are manifested in cooperation between Chiang's government and some members of the Independent Taiwan Movement, and in the proposed peace talks between Mao's government and Chiang's government. The possibility of coalition formation among them is closely related to their relative power, to "nonutilitarian strategy preferences", mainly ideological preferences, and to degree of desirability of an integrated China.

The conflict has had functions for authorities and solidarity groups. The political reforms of Chiang's government, the changing attitude of Mao's government toward a peaceful way of liberating Taiwan and the changing orientation of the Independent Taiwan Movement over Taiwan's future are functions of conflict for authorities. The function of conflict for solidarity groups is represented in the political awareness among foreign Chinese students and an active concern for their homeland. However, foreign Chinese students actions or movements derive from political conflict or cooperation among authorities who may act without regard for the students interests. Because students act
as a result of external actions, and because the students are geographically
remove from the authorities, their enmity, conflict, or coalition will have
only marginal influence on particular authorities.
The writer of this thesis would like first to express his sincere thanks to Professor Wayne Rohrer. The writer owes his interest in this topic, the suggestions he made in helping me formulate theoretical problems and the preparation of this thesis to Professor Rohrer. In addition, appreciation is also expressed to Professor Rohrer's careful and patient examination of this thesis.

The writer is also indebted to those who kindly supplied me all the Chinese magazines -- the raw materials.
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CONFLICT AMONG AUTHORITIES AND SOLIDARY GROUPS:
A STUDY OF FOREIGN CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE U. S. A.

by

JIA-YOU JOE SHEU
B.A., National Taiwan University, 1970

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MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1973
ABSTRACT

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