MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES IN THE SEVENTIES

by

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INTRODUCTION

The question of how to provide manpower efficiently and equitably for the military services of the United States has evoked and generated popular, therefore political, controversy since before the signing of the Declaration of Independence. There was great unwillingness even in the Revolutionary War to meet General George Washington's need for troops by conscription. Reluctantly the states invoked some short term militia drafts to fill manpower quotas imposed by the Continental Congress for the Continental Army.¹ This was the beginning of a long history of reliance on conscription to fill the wartime ranks of the services. Until recently, this need for conscription manifested itself only in times of war emergency. With the exceptions of 1940-41, when war in Europe made United States entry into World War II very likely and the post war years 1948-1973, there has been no peacetime draft in the United States.² For the more than half of the United States population that is less than 30 years old, however, the draft has been a continuous factor in their lives; a natural state of affairs that has reversed a historic status quo.³

The President has set July 1973 as the goal for ending the draft and the establishment of an all-volunteer
armed force. There continues to be a serious question as to whether or not the nation can fill its military manpower needs without the motivation of draft inspired enlistments, or under a total volunteer system.

Statement of the Problem

The chosen problem is to analyze alternative methods of procuring military manpower that are available to the people of the United States in the 1970's, to reach conclusions based on the analysis and, within appropriate limits, to recommend a preferred alternative.

A Brief Background of Military Manpower Procurement

Historical:

For our purposes it is important to note at the outset that national conscription has existed for only about 35 of the almost 200 years since the Declaration of Independence. Conversely during all other periods, volunteers have met the military manpower needs of the nation, although often with justifiable doubt as to the adequacy of their numbers. Indeed, their short numbers have never resulted in national military defeat. At times during the War of 1812 such an assertion might have generated considerable argument. A
draft was nearly enacted in December 1814 but Andrew Jackson's victory in the Battle of New Orleans reinforced the agreement to end the war (already negotiated under the Treaty of Ghent) and eliminated the earlier need for enactment of a draft law.  

Conscription first was used nationally in the Civil War following the ineffectiveness of the Militia Act (July 18, 1862). This method was set forth in the 1863 Conscription Law. Even though the law closed the loop holes of the Militia Act, it was inequitable and discriminated against the poor. It therefore received a violent reception. This was particularly true in New York where federal troops were required to restore order. To avoid violence, the states supplemented existing federal bounties and the number of volunteers ultimately exceeded the number of draftees by a factor of twelve to one. In 1863, only 10,000 draftees entered the Army. During the entire war, two percent of the total force was conscripted.  

The obligation of military service is not new. Prehistoric men flocked together to improve the effectiveness of the common defense. All able-bodied men were expected to fight any common enemy. The principle of military service obligation has been passed from generation to generation over the ages. The requirements for an individual of a community to bear arms in the United States can be traced to the colonies.
Colonists believed that all able-bodied men were obligated to be ready to fight a common enemy when needed. The requirement for military service in the militia was deemed to be obvious and the responsibility was assumed by early Americans. This assumed responsibility evolved into laws and ordinances passed by the colonists and these acts represented the first crude form of conscription in this country. The Constitution of the United States authorizes the Congress to call able-bodied men to serve in defense of the nation. As we have noted, this was first ineffectively done through the Militia Act of 1862 as amended. The militia obligation for all citizens to drop the plow, grab a rifle, and locally meet a common enemy gave birth to the myth of a universal national service obligation of the citizen that persists today—without a legal basis. Militia conscription can not be used as a precedent, or as a part of a continuing American tradition, without ignoring the differences—and misunderstanding the similarities that exist between national military service and militia service.

In 1903 and 1916, militia reform laws were promulgated perpetuating the myth of an American tradition of universal service by automatically including nearly everyone in the militia but maintaining exemptions that dated back over 100 years, thus keeping 18th century exemptions in force in the
20th century. 14

In view of the cited historical experience of ineffective and controversial legislation for national conscription, it was unusual that Congress, upon American entry into World War I, rapidly enacted a draft law to prevent "...indiscriminate voluntarism..." and the early sacrifice of the "...bravest, most zealous, most active men...". 15 After the war, the force strength, historically small, was again reduced to small regular components, and the reserve components, particularly the National Guard, were drawn into closer association with the regular forces. This was significant in that it marked the official establishment of federal fiscal control over the state militia for the first time in United States history. 16

The first peacetime draft was proposed in 1940 and signed into law on September 16th of that year. This law was used to provide more than 10 million of the total 16 million men who served in that war. 17 The entire manpower pool that was registered and classified for induction was 36.6 million. Draft inequities, first observed in 1862, remained a problem with the peak percentage of blacks serving in the Army (other services had less) being 8.75 instead of the planned 10 percent that was proportionate to the Negro part of the population. 18
Paradoxically, inequity in the opposite direction has been charged in contemporary society with allegations that disproportionately large numbers of blacks saw combat duty in Vietnam and suffered more than their share of the casualties. (Substantiating the allegations are figures that indicate 22.8 percent of the men in combat units in Vietnam in 1965 were Negro. Also during the first 11 months of 1966, 22.4 percent of American troops killed in action were blacks). 19

When World War II ended the draft did not, and policies for deferment remained essentially unchanged. The draft lapsed March 31, 1947, until re-enactment on June 24, 1948. No effort was made during that draft free interlude to raise voluntary enlistments through the initiation of new incentives. This lackadaisical approach toward solving manpower procurement problems set the tone for the next 20 years. Selective Service, therefore, was the system in effect when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. President Truman unsuccessfully advocated passage of a Universal Military Training act to have all men serve one year. This effort was intermittent after World War II until in 1951 a law titled Universal Military Training and Service Act was passed. It provided for increased sources of manpower for induction but by no means could it be said that it provided for universal military training. 20 Since the draft
could not provide trained personnel on short notice, reserves were recalled to active duty. Later, however, the draft provided increasing numbers of trainees for use in Korea. The grave problem once again was one of inequity—since all qualified personnel were not needed—who would go? This inequitable condition has been a continuous problem since World War II. Over the years, however, more public concern with this system has developed and previously muffled complaints have swelled into outcries during the protracted Vietnam War. As a result of public dismay, in December 1969 alternative selection procedures to minimize inequities were developed and implemented in the lottery system. By executive order 11527 issued on April 23, 1970, President Nixon eliminated the most inequitable deferment classifications from Selective Service policies. Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, Director of Selective Service, in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, described the Presidential action as one of phasing out deferments based on an individual's occupation.  

President Nixon, on March 27, 1969, concerned by the long period of public dissatisfaction with the draft and the weaknesses of conscription as the means of filling peacetime and limited war requirements for military manpower, appointed an Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The
Commission was asked to develop a comprehensive plan for the elimination of conscription and a means for moving toward an all-volunteer armed force. It is politically noteworthy that this action was taken at the peak of the Vietnam War (measured in terms of numbers of troops deployed in that war) and followed up campaign promises made in the 1968 election. It is also noted that it was not a directive to examine the feasibility of an all-volunteer force but rather it was a task to the Commission to come up with a plan for such a program and methods for its implementation. 23 Pending confirmation of the probability of success of the program by the Commission, a tentative decision had been made. Formulation of a new manpower procurement policy was already well under way.

**Alternative Military Manpower Procurement Methods (Options)**

Recall that part of the problem is to analyze alternative methods of military manpower procurement. What different procurement methods are available? One simple possibility, not pursued further here, would be to have no method at all. A basic assumption that forces are required will follow, the acceptance of which will eliminate this possibility as a practical choice. Another possible method would be some form of national service that would be universally required of all
youth in America. Military service would be one of the several ways a citizen might fulfill his or her individual responsibility. This alternative concept would involve compulsory service of approximately four million youth per year in a program financed and administered by government. Aside from the aspect of compulsion, the budgetary costs are estimated to be very high with efficiency and public support projected to be very low.24 A national service system includes many problem areas outside the scope of military manpower procurement. Since these problems are currently unlikely to be debated or resolved, this alternative possibility is not further considered in this paper. There remain then essentially three options:

1. An all-volunteer armed force—the members of which all serve willingly without either implicit or explicit governmental coercion. This system was in effect during all nonwar periods from 1784 until 1940 and is the goal of the current President.

2. A mixed volunteer—conscript force—the system that has been in effect since 1940 except for a brief lapse in 1947-1948.

3. An all-conscript force—this option can be and is eliminated from detailed consideration by recalling that in World War II, when manpower needs, though atypical, were the
greatest in our history, only 10 of the 16 million men who served in that war were drafted. First, an all-conscript force has never been needed and second, other factors being equal, basic human nature and behavior suggest valid motivations for greater efficiency of a volunteer at any task over that of one performing under some form of duress, however slight. An all-conscript force is therefore not considered a desirable, necessary, or viable option in American society.

This paper, therefore, will analyze only options 1 and 2. Some consideration of option 3 will be applicable to the comparison of other national military manpower procurement systems in chapter II.

Thesis Objective

The over-all objective of this paper is to analyze the stated alternatives for procuring military manpower for the armed services of the United States in a projected peacetime environment of the 1970's. The analysis will determine: (1) advantages and disadvantages of each option (1 and 2); and (2) arrive at conclusions about the military manpower procurement systems and which best meets the national requirements within established parameters of investigation.

In order to accomplish the objective, research efforts
must be directed toward specific questions, the answers to which should be developed by completion of the project. To that end the following multipart question is pertinent:

What is (will be) the effect(s) of option 1 (2) on the (1) United States citizen—as a responsible individual?, (2) United States—as a viable democratic society and nation state?, and (3) United States armed forces effectiveness in peacetime or wartime?

Needed Assumptions

Certain assumptions are required to limit this analysis to manageable proportions. The following apply throughout the paper.

1. The nation will require armed forces in being through the 1970's therefore there will be a requirement for military manpower and for a practical means to procure that manpower. The environment affecting the United States will be one of peace or, at worst, limited war. If it is otherwise a following assumption (3) will apply.

2. Department of Defense armed forces will vary in total strength from two to three million personnel. (See peacetime years# in table I-1.) The level established by the Administration and the Congress is arbitrarily accepted as a
capable military force to accomplish any nationally anticipated assigned missions. This presumes the maintenance of the manpower strength of the designated forces with personnel already either trained or capable of being trained within acceptable time limits. Defense forces are, for purposes of this paper, those shown in table I-2.

Table I-1: Total Force Structure, Military Personnel, 1950-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total DOD Force (millions)</th>
<th>Active Duty as % of 18-45 Male Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950**</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955#</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960#</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965**</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*The Korean War started at the end of FY 1950 and ended in 1953.
**The buildup for Vietnam started in FY 1965 (Notes added).

Source: Table 4-I: The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 36.

Budget projections place the most probable strength between two and two and one half million. Since it is within these projections, convenient for the paper, and close to the current
level, an assumed total force of 2.25 million (distributed to the services in the percentages indicated in table I-2) is used. The budgetary costs of this force level are representative and data are available to support the analysis. It can not be assumed that costs vary in linear proportion as force strengths fluctuate.

Table I-2: Alternative Force Level Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Force Size (millions)</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
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Source: Table 4-II: The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 37.

3. In the event of national emergencies (such as would require a general mobilization) a "standby" system of conscription will exist and will be instituted as in World War II.

4. Program budgetary costs will not be the determining factor in a policy decision to implement an all-volunteer force concept although such costs undoubtedly will play a significant part in its political acceptability as a manpower
procurement alternative.

5. The attitudes, motivations, and desires of young people now serving on active duty are essentially similar to these characteristics in the people who will man the armed forces in the next few years.

6. Military manpower procurement policies are inseparable from national socio-political-cultural considerations, however, the effects of these factors are not susceptible to explicit and detailed evaluation. They are discussed in general in Chapter IV.

Applicable Definitions

In order to insure a common frame of reference selected definitions are provided in Appendix I.

Analysis Methodology

Nature and Sources of Data:

Research data were obtained from: (1) books, articles and newspapers; (2) reports, pamphlets and surveys; and (3) government publications.

Books, articles and newspapers. An extensive amount of information regarding military manpower procurement and
associated problems is available. This is particularly true of information on the all-volunteer armed force. Books are generally available to provide historical background and insight into the problem. Articles in newspapers and other periodicals are of current interest and serve as excellent sources of opposing opinions. The major difficulty has been to determine which data are pertinent to the problem.

Reports, pamphlets and surveys. The major portion of the data reviewed was in this category. Many Department of Defense conducted or sponsored studies and surveys were screened. The conclusions of many of these documents are similar thus appearing to reinforce each other although the period covered collectively by them spanned the entire 1960's and 1970-71. Large quantities of statistical data were compiled and used in these studies but little of it has direct application to this paper.

Government publications. Much information is available in the form of government publications to include commission reports, white papers (in the cases of Germany and Great Britain) and Congressional hearings. The Gates Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force was a very important source. Worthy of note is the almost complete absence of governmental (or other) documentation or discussion
of military manpower procurement problems in Australia and Canada, a fact that may be significant in itself.

**Data Collection Techniques for this project.** No primary data were collected. Formulation and administration of an attitudinal data survey was considered but this procedure promised to add little of value or relevance that was not otherwise available. Therefore all data used were extracted from the type source materials listed above.

**Data Analysis.** This phase of research and processing was most important because, with the several rare but significant exceptions mentioned for Australia and Canada, the vast amount of data available created distinct problems in the selection of relevant materials. Necessary and appropriate data were selected and extracted through the use of a sequential and critical process of screening, reviewing and studying the cited sources.

The plan of analysis and the organization of the paper are oriented by chapter on the general models that follow. In this and chapter II, respectively, historical background and analysis were used supported by statistical backup data as appropriate. In chapter III, the core and bulk of the problem analysis is contained (earlier chapters serving primarily to
provide background and comparison standards). The research
and analysis design paradigm is based on a composite of three
models. They are the:

**Rational actor model**—This model includes consideration
of rational options in terms of pertinent advantages and dis-
advantages and the selection of value maximizing choices.

**Organizational process model**—In this model design, inputs
and preferred alternatives are provided by bureaucratic offices
such as the military departments, Selective Service, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and Congressional committees.
These are reviewed and viable options that are outputs become
inputs into the composite model.

**Governmental politics (elite decision-maker) model**—one
in which the National Security Council and Inner Circle con-
sider the inputs from other models/sources and recommend options
to the President. He makes a decision that is, in this case,
subject to Congressional concurrence in the form of legislative
and funding support. 26

There is obviously a great deal of overlap and inter-
face in this investigative process but, hopefully, these
analytical procedures have been used as appropriate in an effort
to determine the most effective method of procuring military
manpower (or failing that—the best compromise option) for
the nation.

The use of the model(s) is not explicit. That is to say no attempt is made to formalize the models by establishing and following a rigid format, e.g., detailed discussions of organizational inputs do not appear from departments such as Health, Education and Welfare. For example, such inputs might be pertinent as they affect force quality criteria from an educational or national health standpoint.

The models are used implicitly only to provide a flexible conceptual framework and serve as a mental checklist for the writer in order to insure consideration of all applicable criteria, and to maintain the direction and purpose of the analysis.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter the statement of the problem, minimal necessary background and military manpower procurement alternatives, thesis objective, needed assumptions and analysis methodology have been discussed. This chapter has been designed to introduce and define the problem, provide the tools and establish a conceptual framework germane to an understanding of the subsequent chapters.
FOOTNOTES


3 Rafuse, Study 1, op. cit., p. III-1-1.


5 Ibid.

6 Rafuse, Study 1, op. cit., p. III-1-2.

7 Ibid., p. III-1-11.

8 Ibid., p. III-1-16.

9 Ibid., p. III-1-19.


12 Rafuse, Study 1, op. cit., p. III-1-4.

13 Ibid., pp. III-1-2 through III-1-4.

14 Ibid., pp. III-1-20 & 21.

15 Ibid., p. III-1-23.
16 Ibid., p. III-1-25.
CHAPTER II

MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze comparatively the methods of military manpower procurement now in use in several nation states and the reasons that these methods have been chosen. The most important bases for selection of the nations to be examined are: similar democratic governmental forms and philosophies, similar defense requirements, similar modern industrial societies and with one exception—common heritage, cultural background and major language. The states are Great Britain, Canada, Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As has been noted, military manpower problems are not new. They involve many conflicting nonmilitary considerations in any nation but these conflicts are particularly hard to resolve satisfactorily in democratic societies because of their cultural, social and political natures. Basically the unchanging manpower questions are how many servicemen are needed? how are they procured (recruited or involuntarily inducted)? how are they trained? how are
they retained? how are they controlled? and how are they best used?¹

According to Erwin Hackel the answers are many but one consideration overrides all others:

   Attempted solutions to these problems are innumerable and infinitely diverse. But there is one fundamental choice that has always borne and continues to bear on all possible alternatives, and all other choices are secondary to this one: should military manpower rest on the soldiers' own free will, or on compulsion? should soldiers be induced or coerced?² should they be volunteers, or conscripts?

These then are the questions facing all states. To determine how and why each of the selected states reaches its particular answer to these questions is the problem in this chapter. Analyses of their national approaches to and motivations for selection of a given system of military manpower procurement will contribute to a better understanding of the political and military factors that affect the current debate toward manpower procurement policy in the United States. This chapter will provide the background and bases for comparison thereby setting the stage for chapter III, "Military Manpower Procurement in the United States."
Method of Examination

The data available for this are best suited to historical background analysis using statistical backup where possible. A great deal of information is available for the examination of British and German manpower problems. Published information is limited, however, to support the investigation of areas of concern in Canada and Australia. Consequently greater than usual reliance is placed on the implications resulting from the apparent lack of national and academic interests in this policy area or of other requirements to fill these data voids (which in themselves may be significant). Other important information sources are interviews with highly qualified field grade officers from these states.

Assumptions. In addition to those listed in chapter I some necessary assumptions are:

1. All states will use a form of option 2 (mixed volunteer-conscript) that approaches option 3 as a limit in a general (major) war.

2. Procurement problems in a major war will be subordinated to vital national interests (survival is assumed to be vital) therefore manpower procurement problems then
will not be significant. It is re-emphasized that analysis consequently will be concerned only with military manpower procurement policies applicable to peacetime and limited war situations.

Organization. The remainder of this chapter is developed in two parts:

First, National Considerations Affecting Manpower Procurement Policy—a discussion of the policy of each state is included. These discussions will generally touch on these areas: the political and military background; the current military situation in terms of required strength, manpower availability and present procurement methods; and the status of existing armed forces in terms of public support and force capabilities; and second,

Conclusions—after the individual examinations of the states are completed, a cross state comparison, summary and conclusion discussion are provided.

National Considerations Affecting Manpower Procurement Policy

As a prelude to this discussion some general comments are appropriate. First, no army has ever existed on the basis of pure voluntarism or pure coercion. If a
nation maintains a military procurement system that approximates option 3 forces (for analytical purposes--states such as Sweden or Switzerland), it is safe to say that the officers are volunteers in one sense or another. This is true under any manpower scheme. There is not anywhere an exclusively conscript army--there is always a hard core, however small, of truly voluntary professional soldiers. By design none of the nations selected for comparison will approximate an option 3 type force. Universal service may be cited at times as a theoretically desirable type procurement system but, in fact, that situation does not exist in the nations being considered. Therefore, except when contrasts between close approximations are beneficial to the discussion, option 3 as a practical manpower procurement method in peacetime can be and is hereafter ignored.

Any investigation must consider, recognize and avoid the pitfalls of possible comparison of data that may not be directly comparable. Minimizing that possibility was, in part, included in the rationale for selecting the countries for analysis. Exploration of detailed national problems of manpower procurement can produce only similarities--not identities. These similarities, properly considered, will permit valid comparisons. Finally, it must
be re-stressed that the discussion is applicable to peacetime forces. Their missions are to be prepared for war—thus by maintaining the peace, they implement the doctrine of deterrence. 4

**Great Britain**

Britain has a tradition of providing manpower for her armed forces by conscription. This tradition is traceable back to Cromwell in 1640 and a reputation for conscription suggests its practice for centuries earlier. 5 Impressment was the usual mode of recruitment under the late Tudors and into the early 17th century for service abroad. 6 Conscription has continued off and on throughout the annals of Britain, however, peacetime conscription has a relatively short history—being introduced in 1939 prior to World War II to build up the reserves. After the war conscription was maintained for 12 years. At policy making and popular levels peacetime conscription had been regarded as a temporary manpower procurement expedient to be terminated at the earliest possible time. The policy of conscription was therefore abolished in 1957 7 when plans were announced to phase in all-volunteer forces by 1960. Since then the British have depended solely on volunteers to man their armed forces. 8
British conscription (National Service) differed from United States Selective Service: between 70 and 80 percent of those British men who registered served, compared to the pre-Vietnam rate of service by registrants in the United States which was about 52 percent (this figure does not include volunteers already in service so the percentage of available British males serving was even greater).\(^9\)

Conscription was under increasingly heavy political fire in England from 1953 (the end of the Korean Conflict and the last lengthy combat deployment of large British forces). This criticism continued and its growth was reflected in British personal opinion polls until the Minister of Defence, Mr. Sandys announced the government's plans to end conscription.\(^10\)

A recent study of the British decision determined that:

There were five main arguments for abolishing conscription: the smaller manpower requirements made possible by the British decision to achieve an independent nuclear capability, the inefficient use of national service manpower, the lessened number of officers required for training, the slower rate of turnover to be expected in a volunteer force and the general "feeling" that in a nation based upon democratic traditions and the rights of the individual man, compulsory peacetime service was undesirable.
The political rationale for the policy decision to end peacetime conscription naturally followed the end of the Korean War and the reduction of other oversea military commitments. The development of a national strategic nuclear retaliatory capability reduced British defense reliance on conventional forces. These two complementary factors permitted a steady decline in troop requirements. Domestically the growing demand for trained men in civilian industry, occurring concurrently with a projected excess of young men of military age in the early 1960's, made conscription increasingly unsuitable politically as a means of meeting force manpower needs. 12

Manpower strengths in Britain by service and method of procurement (volunteer or National Service) are shown in table II-1. The average total strength for the six years was 803,000 of which 37 percent were conscripted. This strength level could not be maintained without a draft or politically unacceptable changes in recruiting incentives. For reasons discussed earlier, the 1957 White Paper outlined future defense policy. The plan was to reduce the force level by 45 percent (from 690,000 in March 1957 to 375,000 in March 1962). The projected size of the military manpower pool of young men turning 18 was expected to increase from
Table II-1. Strength (in Thousands)

Male All Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As of: 31 Dec.</th>
<th>ROYAL NAVY</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>ROYAL AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REGU\textsuperscript{1}</td>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>REGU\textsuperscript{1}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>135.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>139.2</td>
<td>207.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>133.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>214.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>132.2</td>
<td>213.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>115.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>227.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>202.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>218.3\textsuperscript{2}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{1}Regular includes Short Service and Extended Service and Boys.

\textsuperscript{2}Includes 14.3 Recalled Reservists.


From: Table III. 3.2.: Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, p. III-3-14.
approximately 350,000 to 425,000 per year during the period 1961-1965.13

Conscription was considered wasteful, uneconomical and inefficient because of the resultant need for a large training establishment and numerous personnel in transit. Useful and full employment of conscripts was difficult to achieve and the hidden costs (such as taxes in kind on the draftee, his alternative value to himself and society in the civilian market, etc.) were actually considered to be excessive.14 Regular officers and men assigned to the training base to handle recruits amounted to 21.5 percent of the total service manpower. This high training overhead resulted from the large personnel turnover in the forces caused by the National Service two year tours. Arrival of replacements and departures of separatees to and from units at four month intervals reduced unit training levels to the lowest common denominator of individual or subunit proficiency. This unavoidable and undesirable cycle contributed to low morale and boredom among the regular personnel thus creating leadership difficulties and frustration for the young officers.15 A combination of all these factors produced dissatisfaction among the people and service members alike. The decision to end conscription therefore resulted from political and economic
factors with by far the most important reason being a popular
majority call for a return to voluntarism and traditional
English rights of personal liberty. 16

Table II-2. British Armed Forces-
Total Strength
(in thousands)
(as of June 30 of each year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>R.N.</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>R.A.F.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>393.0</td>
<td>236.1</td>
<td>745.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>110.1</td>
<td>361.1</td>
<td>215.9</td>
<td>687.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>101.8</td>
<td>318.2</td>
<td>180.1</td>
<td>600.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>287.4</td>
<td>165.9</td>
<td>550.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>251.8</td>
<td>158.1</td>
<td>503.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>217.4</td>
<td>149.6</td>
<td>458.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>192.8</td>
<td>141.3</td>
<td>424.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>181.1</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>408.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>185.5</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>407.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>187.3</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>406.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>187.5</td>
<td>120.5</td>
<td>401.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>189.0</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>399.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From: Table III. 4.1: Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, p. III-4-3.

How effective has the all-volunteer (option 1) force program been? All-inclusive measurement criteria are difficult to define but certainly the major criterion for practical assessment of program success must be whether the
established manpower strength levels have been met. This is the standard used here. Table II-2 indicates the force level changes that occurred between 1956 and 1967. Recall that the effective date of attainment of an all-volunteer armed force was to be in 1960 and the established manpower requirement at that time was 375,000 personnel. It is obvious that this goal was met for the period cited in the table. It is also clear that the trend has been toward fewer recruits each year. This situation was and is caused by three factors: demand constraint—a condition that dictates that the services voluntarily restrict enlistments as the Royal Air Force did in 1963 to bring the service strength into balance (see table II-3), a shrinking population base and manpower pool (since 1966), and a falling enlistment rate. The effects of these factors are strikingly displayed in tables II-3 and II-4 (annotated). In 1971 and 1972 the over-all strengths dropped to 380,000 and 372,331 respectively. In the latter year, Britain's population increased by 250,000 to 56,250,000. Paradoxically, military pay and incentives in Britain are comparable to most occupational fields and probably exceed civilian income in manufacturing.
Table II-3. British Total Male Accessions in the Volunteer Period:
1961-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>31,832</td>
<td>6,072</td>
<td>12,294</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>51,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>36,607</td>
<td>6,495</td>
<td>11,654</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>55,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>23,881</td>
<td>7,518</td>
<td>3,563</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>35,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>30,388</td>
<td>7,132</td>
<td>4,638</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>42,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25,591</td>
<td>6,688</td>
<td>6,307</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>39,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>25,610</td>
<td>6,572</td>
<td>7,214</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>40,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>21,313</td>
<td>6,201</td>
<td>7,168</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>35,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>17,125</td>
<td>4,305</td>
<td>6,816</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>29,031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Underlining added)


From: Table III. 4.4.: Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, p. III-4-6.

A rise in the unemployment rate of a nation usually motivates higher enlistments but this is not true in Britain where there is a strong negative correlation between unemployment and enlistment rates. This unique relationship appears to stem from a lack of individual confidence regarding an unemployed Englishman's chances (as he perceives them) for re-employment in a civilian job or skill during periods of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>MARINES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Underlining added)

1Entries represent annual accessions as a percentage of the 15-19 year old male population. Differences between total rate and sum of separate services are due to rounding.

Source: Table IV and population data from Annual Abstract of Statistics, Table II, page 12.

From: Table III. 4.5: Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, p. III-4-6.

high employment. Such concern has the effect of causing the unemployed to standby waiting for the job market to improve rather than to enlist. Greater confidence in the probability of re-employment seems to influence the Englishman to try the service more readily. (The British serviceman can buy out of enlistment or procure a discharge by purchase—an opportunity that ameliorates many of the negative effects of the long
terms of enlistment which are usually six or nine years. He is able to leave the service by this procedure if he is dissatisfied and has a reasonable certainty of being rehired for his civilian job without delay when employment demand for workers is high.

These verities raise some questions as to the viability of the all-volunteer force concept in Great Britain. Hackel writes:

Agonizing second thoughts on the wisdom of the abolition of conscription were voiced in last year's (1969) debate on the Defence Estimates in Britain. (parenthesis added)

A senior British officer on duty in the United States was interviewed concerning his opinions with regard to the optional choice of manpower procurement. He testifies that a general approval of the all-volunteer approach by both the British citizenry and the senior members of the military is prevalent. At the same time he recognizes several major program deficiencies. His comments follow in part:

All-volunteer forces produce a more professional service and they are happier, easier to train and more exciting to serve in... Their quality is much better because (they are) better motivated, but technical soldiers (are) more difficult to find, train, and retain. Strength goals have not been achieved for some time. Recruiting is a major and constant problem. Recruiting is expensive leaving less of the defence budget for new equipment. Discipline and morale are infinitely superior.
In my opinion, the current method is the best method available to meet the conflicting needs of the country, service, and individual. In my opinion, our Regular and Reserve Forces are too small to meet unforeseen commitments outside NATO and our dependent territories. My professional opinion is that we have the best solution to the manpower procurement problem (because it permits) well-led units which ensure each man has job satisfaction, and training that is adventurous and fun. (We must) Get satisfied soldiers to recruit their friends.23 (parentheses added)

The current strength status of the forces in Great Britain must be judged to be not very good. The deficiencies are not insignificant even when one accepts a debatable premise that the force goals or requirements are militarily realistic. A total force of 375,000 would be, if maintained, minimally capable of meeting Britain's commitments to NATO and her dependent territories.24 That manpower goal now is not being met. There is an annual recruiting shortfall of 10,000 soldiers, of which most are in the infantry but some of which are in other services. This situation prevails in spite of vigorous recruiting campaigns. (These programs have recently yielded some improvement).25 Another critical problem is the inability of option 1 forces to provide a sufficient output of trained men returning to civilian life to man the reserves. This is a main criticism of Britain's system of long service volunteers.26 Paradoxically, long service retention in the
active forces improves professionalism and efficiency thereby reducing the size of the annual new manpower input requirements into each of the services. Here the trade-offs are clearly defined as advantages for one defense need (active forces) and as equally clearcut disadvantages for other defense requirements (such as organized reserves, manned and trained to back up the active forces).

To summarize the rationale and motivations for Great Britain's decision to abolish conscription in her armed forces in favor of all-volunteer forces, it must be said that the evidence certainly supports the all-volunteer force proponents' claims in that this option provides improved service morale, discipline, motivation, efficiency and stability. But after 12 years in the option 1 mode there is also some growing apprehension that insufficient numbers of volunteers will be forthcoming to maintain the strengths of the services, particularly in the ground combat arms, already believed to be at a minimum effective force level. The recruiting shortfall is being attacked vigorously by the services with limited success through increased and improved recruiting methods. They are, however, still not attaining the 35,000 new accessions considered necessary each year.27 The situation is not yet critical and the current more
harmonious world environment will probably provide time for continued efforts to make the otherwise effective option 1 approach successful in reaching desired force levels.

Canada

Canada has a unified all-volunteer (option 1) military force. Historically Canada adopted conscription only for World Wars I and II. Even then, conscription was used with constraints on the military employment of draftees. A political decision was required in order to deploy conscripts to oversea combat areas.\(^{28}\)

Hackel, in his discussion of domestic political problems in some nations writes:

> All-volunteer forces, quite naturally, have the most matter-of-fact way of justifying their manpower system. Still, political considerations are at least as prominent as others. Britain and Canada had a variety of reasons to abolish conscription, but the main reason, at least in the public arena, was the belief held by politicians of all major parties that conscript service in peacetime was contrary to national traditions and decidedly unpopular. This belief continues to be held strongly.\(^{29}\)

This quote seems to sum up accurately the political aspects of conscription in Canada. A little more analysis is required to understand the strong popular anti-conscription bias there.

Canada has a population of 21,800,000 \(^{30}\), roughly
one-third of which is of French ancestry. There is, therefore, a lack of the strong patrimonial unity of purpose required to make conscription politically viable. Such unity has been attained only for issues of national interest. This type motivation or interest has not been observed in Canadian history except during the two world wars.

The military objectives of Canada are, in priority: defense of Canada, defense of the North American Continent (in conjunction with the United States), participation in the NATO security alliance and as contingents of United Nations peace keeping forces. There are conflicting data concerning the official manpower requirements necessary to attain these goals. They vary from a high of 100,000 down to 84,000 uniformed personnel. The actual requirement does not bear significantly on the analysis since these strengths all seem to be easily attainable. (Total Canadian forces represent less than 0.4 percent of the population.)

The all-volunteer force in Canada is accepted by the government, the people and the services as a highly desirable social and political norm. The Canadian serviceman is among the best paid in the world, enjoys the respect and high regard of his civilian counterpart, and is recognized as a professional. For these reasons, in part, he is a member
of a well-led, well-disciplined, well-trained, highly motivated and competent force. The Canadian Armed Force in 1971 had an average of seven candidates volunteering for every force vacancy developing from attrition. This pool of volunteers permitted selective recruiting by the service resulting in very high quality manpower input into the force. A volunteer surplus to choose from has been a happy fact (with one exception) in Canada according to the officer interviewed. Expanded volunteer mobilization procedures were required and introduced to provide manpower, with some reduction in quality, for the Korean War. Unlike in Britain and the United States, a draft was not required for that war. 32

The small size of the Canadian force tends to reduce or eliminate manpower procurement problems faced by larger nations. Charges of a lack of patriotism, or deprivation of the citizens' rights and duties to serve, or of "mercenary" forces are not raised. Allegations of isolation of the forces from the society are not heard because isolation of the military does not exist to a significant degree in Canada. If there were a necessity to increase the force size to say 1.5 percent of the population (approximately 330,000), then the situation would no doubt qualify as an emergency and would require extraordinary mobilization recruiting procedures or conscription.
This is a possible problem not within the purview of this analysis. The peacetime needs of the armed force have been met easily by using available incentives to elicit positive voluntary response.  

It must be noted that Canada has reduced the uniformed force strength (or requirements) over the past few years. Hackel cites a strength of 92,000 in 1970, and *The Military Balance* reduces this figure to 85,000 in 1971 and in 1972 to 84,000. The pertinent point of consideration is that with small manpower requirements an all-volunteer force becomes not only desirable but quite practical. The United States early in 1970 had a force of approximately 3.3 million or 1.6 percent of the population. This size force under option 1 would be very costly in terms of budgetary expense (so much so that the United States government since 1948 has not considered it practical to ask the people to support a volunteer force at that level). It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the size of the peacetime force in relation to the nation's population is a definite constraint on the prospects for success of an all-volunteer manpower procurement concept.

Comment now seems appropriate regarding the meaning of the void in published information in Canada on this subject.
The existence of such a void supports a *prima facie* argument and conclusion that the all-volunteer option of providing military manpower to meet Canada's peacetime needs is not considered worthy of serious argument in that country. It is so uncontroversial that there seems to be no need for internal debate because an apparently satisfied public accepts this method of manpower procurement as a desirable and natural *status quo*.

**Australia**

Military manpower procurement in Australia has been similar to Canada only in the sense that prior to 1966 conscription has historically been relegated to World Wars I and II. Popular appeal of military life is not now and never has been very high among the Australian people. Samuel P. Huntington writes:

> While the American people like their political candidates to be military heroes, they want their military experience to be an interlude in, or a sideline to, an otherwise civilian career.

S. Encel quoted Huntington's analysis as being directly applicable to Australia and went on to comment:

> ...a history of citizen military effort in two world wars has further contributed to the relatively low esteem enjoyed by the
professional soldier. The fact that Australia's greatest military commander, Sir John Monash, was a citizen soldier with a distinguished civilian career, is another factor of some psychological importance. Perhaps the most typical of popular attitudes to military glory is summed up in the private soldier's wisecrack: "The only kind of soldier I want to be is a returned soldier."

In 1965, as might be surmised from the attitudes described above, a politically unpopular decision was made to reinstitute conscription effective in 1966 in order to provide Australian combat assistance to South Vietnam. This put Australia on a partially mobilized footing. Such action was necessary to enable a country of approximately 13 million people to support an armed force of about 88,000. It should be noted for comparison that Canada with a population of about 22 million presently maintains a force of 84,000 with volunteers. Australia does not have the manpower pool to support such a volunteer force at a politically acceptable level of budgetary expense. Nor, as is implied above by Encel, are the Australians as a people historically motivated to volunteer. He adds:

...Regular soldiers, complains one writer, "were treated by their Government and by the Australian public as more or less of an unnecessary evil."

The military has had a bad image as a profession in Australia. This image, in addition to poor conditions of
service, a high national employment level (in Australia there is a direct relationship between unemployment rates and enlistment rates), and a heritage of citizen soldiers (in national emergencies) has not been conducive to the attraction of a sufficient number or quality of men into the regular Australian defense forces. Like other nations (Britain and the United States) this has been particularly true for the Army. The Navy and the Air Force seem to possess and provide enough glamor, technical training, travel and other attractions to meet established manpower goals with volunteers. The Army, on the other hand, has problems because of its generally unattractive ground combat role. Those men attracted to enlist are primarily 17 and 18 year olds who are adventurous and immature. These characteristics contribute to disciplinary and training problems with resultant losses in unit effectiveness. Contrary to the case cited for Britain, senior officers of the Australian Army have been pleased to have conscription. This is also in direct and marked contrast to the desires of senior officers in Canada. In Australia, the argument is that conscription has provided more mature (20 year olds), better motivated (by prospects of fighting in Vietnam) and higher quality servicemen. Paradoxically, after the conscription program got underway in 1966, which was
earlier mentioned as an unpopular decision, the people adjusted to it and generally supported the use of draftees and the war effort in Vietnam. For reasons quite like those in the United States this pleasant bubble of popular support (for the government) burst with the result that conscription came under heavy attack in 1972. From the Australian public viewpoint, with all combat elements out of Vietnam the need for conscript forces was questionable in the absence of a direct threat to Australia and the historically poor support by the populace for the military has reasserted itself. For the first time in 23 years, the Labor Party won the national elections on December 2, 1972. One of Labor's major campaign promises, to terminate the draft and return to volunteer forces, was immediately acted on when Labor assumed office.  

In the opinion of the officer interviewed for this paper (prior to this event), the current force level in the Army cannot be sustained without conscription, even with acceptance of lower mental and physical standards. Pay is not a major problem in that it is already comparable to associated civilian wage scales. This positive aspect is offset however by poor housing, frequent transfers, few desirable overseas stations (such as Singapore) with poor and varying education provisions (standards differ greatly) from
post to post for the serviceman and his family. 41

Thus, military manpower requirements similar to those of Canada are observed with completely different motives for adopting what are now essentially similar solutions. One system has been tested and is apparently successful while the other, on the surface at least, has less optimistic prospects. In Canada, the volunteer force has been accepted and has the respect and support of the populace. In Australia, indications are that the forces, to be fully manned, must rely on conscription for quality and quantity. This basically comes from a historically poor image for the Army and a lack of public regard for professional military people that denies the necessary popular support for the services. Consequently the rapid return to option 1 all-volunteer forces in Australia for political rather than military reasons implies governmental acceptance of some unavoidable dilution of defense capability. The underlying reasons have been discussed but to summarize briefly, the primary explanation for Australia's military manpower procurement dilemma appears to lie in the political culture of the Australian people which puts a premium on dislike of military service, 42 and the period 1965-1972 represents a deviation in public policy from what logically could have been expected of this political culture.
The Federal Republic of Germany

Unlike any of the three nations previously discussed, the Federal Republic of Germany, hereafter referred to as West Germany, has a long national record of conscription. She was one of the early converts to universal military service. From 1814 to the end of the Nazi era, except for a short period between 1919 and 1935, the Prussian and its successor German state consistently imposed peacetime and wartime obligatory service...a longevity record unequalled elsewhere.43

Prior to that time conscription was legal in Prussia only for the militia. Nevertheless it was used during wartime beginning in 1688 by Frederick I, King of Prussia. Frederick William I continued conscription from 1713 (illegally) to procure regular soldiers even in peacetime. The reform era following Napoleon's victories in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt saw progressive innovations in all spheres of government to include the military.45

Military reformers did not emphasize universal service as a method of ensuring civilian control. They stressed such service as a method of enhancing military strength and of teaching citizens the proper ideals. On March 17, 1813, the King (Frederick William III) legally established the principle of universal service (with some rights of substitution).
The war of liberation had been declared against Napoleon on March 16, 1813. This declaration produced the institution of universal service in a few days—something that the reformer Scharnhorst had tried and failed to achieve in years. 46

It is a debatable question to argue that universal service was a precipitant of Prussian military professionalism. Huntington wrote that:

...aristocratic amateurs could be tolerated in the officer corps only so long as the rank and file were long-term regulars. When the latter became amateur soldiers...a much more capable and experienced leadership was necessary. This is why we virtually always find a direct relation between the "nation in arms" and professionalism, not only in Prussia but elsewhere. 47

Marshal Blucher endorsed a "national army". He told Gneisenau that "no one in the world should be exempt; and it should be a scandal if someone hasn't served." 48

With this national heritage and political culture as a backdrop it is easy to understand how Germany, even today, naturally seeks to continue option 2 mixed volunteer-conscript military manpower procurement. Of course, much has transpired in the interim between Frederick I and today, but for a number of different reasons conscription under the concept of universal service has been the goal in Germany except for the period mentioned earlier after World War I
and again briefly after World War II. In the words of Chancellor Willy Brandt, "...Universal conscription is indispensable to our national defence. It allies citizen and the soldier. The Federal Government is striving for greater equity in conscription." 49

The Federal Minister of Defence expanded on Brandt's statement of policy by writing:

The Federal Government continues to adhere to universal conscription. This foundation of our security policy, so essential to our further development, will be strengthened by a programme ensuring greater equity in conscription. A large number of eligible men of military age will be called up; their service will be shorter, their training streamlined. Their time in the reserve will be shorter, but more active.

The Minister of Defence, however, went on to state the importance of volunteers:

More long-term volunteers are to be attracted to the Forces. It is intended to eliminate manpower deficits in combat units. Education and training within the Armed Forces are being reorganized. That will make the forces more proficient, attract purposeful young men, and assure a smooth transition from military life to a suitable civilian career. Vigorous efforts are required to win enough volunteers for the Forces in a dynamic society characterized by a surfeit of jobs and diminishing understanding (sic) for the need for national defence. 51

It is noted that he also stressed the need for long-term
volunteers in the policy statement even though the prime emphasis is on universal service.

West Germany has established required defense force personnel requirements based on two facts—the national commitment to the NATO alliance and the threat posed to the alliance and West Germany by strong Warsaw Pact forces. This military necessity constitutes a fairly large drain of manpower for a nation of less than 60 million that is enjoying a full employment economy and supporting a total armed force of 481,000 personnel. This number represents 0.8 percent of the population. Of the total force, 48 percent of the servicemen are volunteers. It is obvious that a large number of draftees are required to fill the personnel void.

The West Germans today have, because of their recent military disasters, little love or respect for the military. The forces are necessary evils to be tolerated, and provided without enthusiasm. Thus the principle of universal liability to military service seems to be the only politically satisfactory means to fill the ranks. This policy requires that eligible men, with very few exceptions, must serve in order for the system to be equitable. Greater equity in conscription is considered to be essential to maintain public support in meeting defense manpower needs. Accordingly, the German
government has reduced the conscript term of service from 18 to 15 months. This permits the call up of more registered young men. All qualified registrants are supposed to serve in the armed forces or a comparable kind of service. Physical standards have been relaxed and the age limit for conscription has been extended from 25 to 28. Very few exemptions are granted. The percentage of the manpower pool serving will rise from approximately 60 percent to about 75 percent as a result of these reforms. The 25 percent not serving are those physically unable to meet lowered standards or will be among the few exemptions approved, e.g., only son to run the family farm or business, etc. An indication of the numbers of conscripts to be affected over the next decade is shown in table II-5. Note particularly the 15 months columns since this is the term of service that the West German government has approved.
**Table II-5**

NUMBER OF AVAILABLE MEN IN WEST GERMANY FIT FOR AND LIABLE TO MILITARY SERVICE, AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES 1972-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Requirement for conscripts given a constant share of long-term volunteers</th>
<th>Requirement for conscripts given a growing share of long-term volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18 mos.</td>
<td>16 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>234,500</td>
<td>182,800</td>
<td>220,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>231,400</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>203,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>238,800</td>
<td>202,800</td>
<td>234,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>239,800</td>
<td>188,200</td>
<td>218,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>202,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>259,900</td>
<td>199,400</td>
<td>206,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>264,300</td>
<td>191,800</td>
<td>225,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>278,600</td>
<td>200,200</td>
<td>214,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>197,700</td>
<td>206,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>294,100</td>
<td>194,100</td>
<td>210,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>297,100</td>
<td>199,300</td>
<td>219,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The changes now in effect are detrimental to the stability, efficiency, and capability of the forces as the turnover rate goes up. The government is interested in raising the number of long-term volunteers thereby lowering the percentage of conscripts. To encourage this, new enlistment bonuses have been offered and soldiers are trained for their eventual return to civilian life. The military training program is oriented to achieving this goal. 55

The West German armed services form a strong peacetime deterrent force. It seems that the people and their government have chosen option 2 (mixed forces) as the best method of manning their forces. It also appears that under historical and current domestic conditions in West Germany, universal military service is the only logical method. The Federal Republic appears to aspire to a goal and a manner of implementation that has not been previously attainable in West Germany or elsewhere—that being to reduce inequity to the minimum by having almost all eligible men serve. This one problem may prove to be unsolvable in terms of the numbers of qualified men available for conscription and the considerably smaller corresponding demands of the services. 56 Also to be remembered and evaluated is the resultant reduced efficiency and capabilities of the forces. On the other hand,
the system has the definite advantage of providing a large pool of trained reserves. Most important perhaps is that the chosen method of procuring military manpower apparently has the solid, if unenthusiastic, support of the populace.

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze comparatively the methods of military manpower procurement in several selected nation states in order to set the stage with a background and bases for comparison for the analysis of United States systems in the next chapter.

The historical ways of providing manpower for the military services and philosophical, political and military criteria have been cited for each state. Major differences and similarities have been noted.

When classifying the selected nations according to the use of option 1 or 2, it is observed that Great Britain and Canada are definitely in the all-volunteer category. Equally clear is the fact that West Germany has adopted option 2 or the mixed volunteer-conscript force. The Federal Republic of Germany has so chosen while recognizing and emphasizing a political need to implement, as nearly as possible, a modified concept of universal service to minimize
the inequities of a draft. Such inequities occur when not all available manpower is needed. Existence of inequity was the prime reason for Great Britain's decision to abolish conscription in 1957. The British felt conscription in peacetime was not compatible with democracy and the Germans feel that required force levels are not available without conscription. Therefore, to be as nearly fair as is possible, a form of universal service is the best German solution.

The Canadians have always had, except for a brief period during each World War, an all-volunteer force that has thrived on professionalism and the high respect and strong support of the people. Australia until December 1972 has been clearly in the option 2 category. This has been true in spite of an all-volunteer heritage and political culture similar to Canada's. Except for the Vietnam War period Australia historically has been anti-regular military and has maintained only cadre type forces in peacetime. Popular support for a regular military is lacking but, that fact notwithstanding, a return to all-volunteer force has been ordered by the new Labor party government.

The analysis in this chapter has attempted to establish the national motivations for these manpower procurement choices and to evaluate the effectiveness of the
choices in providing capable defense forces. Accepted has been an assumed fact that attainment of national manpower goals can be equated with providing an adequate defense capability. Some nations such as Great Britain and Australia are having difficulties meeting their goals. A final determination as to the viability of option 1 in a larger nation is still not possible. Criteria such as national unemployment levels have been shown to have opposite effects on enlistments in Britain to the effects observed in the other three countries where rising unemployment normally means there will be also a rising enlistment rate. The attitudes of the citizens of each country toward the military forces show wide variances in impact on the availability of volunteer manpower and the governmental provision of incentives to attract such manpower. Recognition of the social and welfare aspects of military service and the initiation of training programs for the ultimate return of servicemen to civilian life have been observed. The threats perceived by the people to their national existence have a great bearing on the national popular willingness to support and maintain the status of the forces. For instance, Canada has a relatively small force and the people do not really feel threatened by external forces.
The force is small enough for volunteer incentives to be effective and enjoys the support of the people so it is effective. To the people of West Germany the threat is quite significant and is visible, therefore, considerably greater national force requirements are acceptable. Social and political conditions there, however, do not favor volunteer forces as a viable manpower system to meet the recognized need.

Perhaps the only conclusions that can be stated safely here are that each nation's historical and political cultural values regarding the methods of military manpower procurement that are acceptable to the populace, the national attitudes toward the military establishment and the perceived needs of the peoples to provide for and insure the availability of necessary national defense forces are the most important criteria. Each nation, using appropriate criteria, has selected and implemented a particular form of the two general options for manpower procurement. Each nation appears currently to be attaining its goals although Great Britain and Australia are likely to have to shore up their programs to maintain success.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 1.

3 Ibid., p. 1.

4 Ibid., p. 3.


9 Flanary, Study 3, op. cit., pp. III-3-1 to III-3-3.


12 Ibid., p. III-3-12.


17. Ibid., p. III-4-4.


20. Ibid., p. III-4-21.


23. Private interview with a senior British officer (Colonel, British Army), Kansas, October 1972.

24. Ibid.


26. Ibid., p. 11.


28. Private interview with a senior Canadian officer (Lieutenant Colonel, Canadian Forces), Kansas, October 1972.


31. Interview, Canadian officer, op. cit.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


36. Hackel, *op. cit.*, Table 1, p. 4.

37. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*,


40. Private interview with a senior Australian officer
(Lieutenant Colonel, Australian Army), Kansas, October 1972.


42. *Ibid.*


50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., p. 11.

53 Hackel, op. cit., p. 4.


55 Ibid., p. 67.

56 Ibid., pp. 40-47.
Chapter III

MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to document and analyze the alternative methods of procuring military manpower in the United States during the 1970's. A peacetime or limited wartime environment is projected. The analysis proceeds with the military manpower procurement methods under consideration limited to those that have been defined as options 1 and 2 (all-volunteer and mixed volunteer-conscript forces respectively) for the reasons discussed in chapter I.

The international political environment in 1973 is one of negotiation with the ideological enemies of the United States, causing some gradual reduction in tension. This altered and hopeful atmosphere results from some initial successes with the Soviet Union in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It also follows the initiation of diplomacy with the Peoples Republic of China. A negotiated agreement for a cease fire as the first step to end the Vietnam War has been signed. Additional agreements
to cease fire in all of Indo China are anticipated. Total United States force withdrawal from Indo China is likely.  

Domestically, the political situation is one in which the American people are pleased about the probability of ending the involvement of United States forces in the war and desirous of a redirection of national resources to domestic needs. The Vietnam War has been a nationally divisive episode over a long and a difficult period. It has been a particularly traumatic experience for the citizens of the United States because of genuine differences in beliefs as to the propriety of the national involvement. These divisions have been further reinforced by the American citizens' popular and characteristic dislike of conscription, a cultural trait that was already observed in the Revolutionary War.  

Current and projected United States manpower availability for the rest of this decade far exceeds the requirements of the assumed 2.25 million level force (or of a possible 3 million man force, if needed). Annual accessions required to maintain the 2.25 million force under volunteer-conscription procurement (option 2) are estimated at levels varying from 362,000 (most optimistic) to 378,000 (most pessimistic). The Gates Commission estimates that under an all-volunteer (option 1) system the necessary accessions
will be 290,000 men per year. These estimated annual accession needs can be compared to the United States male population attaining age 18 of 1,930,000 in 1970 and estimated to be 2,114,000 in 1975. With these statistics in mind the method of analysis becomes the next area of discussion.

Considering the parameters of established facts and assumptions, and the apparent surplus of qualified manpower under these parameters, the beginning sentence of this thesis can be restated at this time to ask--how can one answer the question 'how does the United States efficiently and equitably provide necessary military manpower'? As suggested earlier, any system no doubt will be a compromise but the goal must be the best compromise. In order to approach the problem systematically, a combination model was described earlier. The specific design follows.

In this discussion options 1 and 2 are considered viable individual systems. These military manpower procurement systems may vary within the systems themselves but for thesis purposes, the systems as entities are separate and independent. Each of these options when adopted will affect and be affected by changes in certain criteria. For this analysis, five separate criteria have been selected and
considered. They are labeled according to the categories of force that make up necessary components of both systems. These force categories are: force quality, force quantity, force capability, force costs (hidden, initial and maintenance) and force desirability. Each will be further defined as its category is discussed. Options 1 and 2 are each held constant along with four of the five criteria as the effects of variances in the selected force category are examined. When the artificialities of this mechanical process of evaluating the relationships of each criterion on the two systems are eliminated, the comparative suitability of one system versus the other hopefully will be apparent.

The last preliminary question is--what is a good system? Or what constitutes an ideal system? A somewhat utopian answer is provided here as that military manpower procurement system which provides an established level of qualified manpower and defense forces competent to accomplish assigned missions with the greatest exercise of justice for those serving individuals and the minimum expenditure of national resources compatible with meeting the other requirements. Such a system should be the national goal, at least in theory.
Analysis of Criteria

Each designated criterion will be discussed in turn to determine its effect on the suitability of the two systems.

Category 1 is force quality and pertains to the physical, mental, and moral ability and aptitudes of each potential and actual serviceman. Each of these qualification areas have established historical measurements that provide classification data for each recruit. Force quality must be analyzed by considering the input of personnel into the military service manpower pool in terms of their classification in each of these areas. It must be analyzed also in terms of how these quality levels may vary under the two procurement options. These quality levels at the lower limits may be called acceptance criteria.

Lower level limits or standards for acceptance criteria are established by mental, physical and aptitude testing. These standards may be lowered in times of extreme manpower shortages to enlarge the national pool of manpower considered acceptable. In peacetime and for force levels considered herein it is undesirable to reduce acceptance standards since modern military equipment is more complex
hence more difficult to use and maintain. This fact necessitates the procurement of capable personnel to insure efficient performance. In the cases of moral and physical qualifications, the determinations are relatively uncomplicated today. Under the moral heading, a record of conviction of a felony crime is disqualifying as is any deviation from accepted norms of heterosexual behavior. All others qualify. Years of experience by the services in physical testing and examination permit classification and establishment of acceptable physical standards. The number of citizens not qualified for military services under these criteria is not insignificant yet for peacetime military manpower needs they do not present a major military (as opposed to societal) problem. Accordingly, they are not discussed further here.

On the other hand, mental qualification standards do cause considerable concern to the military services. For example, candidates for the services are tested by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and are divided into five mental groups. Group V, the lowest group, is exempt from military service by law. Group IV is of marginal utility without specialized training. The percentages of accessions over the past 20 years by mental group is illustrated by table III-1 below.
### Table III-1. Mental group distribution of enlistments and inductions:
**Department of Defense**
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mental group</th>
<th>FY 1953</th>
<th>FY 1965</th>
<th>FY 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.............</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II............</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III...........</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV............</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adm acceptee.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total...</strong></td>
<td>886</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 4-VIII: *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*, p. 45.

The trend has obviously been upward in mental quality of enlisted men since Groups II and III reflect percentage increases over the period while Group IV inductions have been reduced by 9 percentage points and administrative acceptees for induction (low qualifications waived) have been practically eliminated. 8

John A. Sullivan in a Gates Commission study indicates that four main arguments have been used to support the need for high quality personnel in the services:
a. Modern military technology: its application requires more high mental group inputs.

b. Reduced training costs: smarter recruits learn faster, fail less and even if less able men are trainable, it is only at higher costs.

c. Fewer disciplinary problems: the probability of serious disciplinary problems is in direct proportion to the mental capabilities of recruits hence rejection of low quality recruits reduces the costs of maintaining discipline.

d. Providing potential non-commissioned officers: the higher the quality of recruits the more potential they possess for advancement to meet force leadership requirements.9

The arguments cited, if valid, support option 2 military manpower procurement (mixed volunteer-conscript force). This is the case because the men can be involuntarily inducted to meet mental qualification requirements that probably will not be fully met by those men attracted voluntarily under current enlistment incentives. Without greater budgetary and Congressional support, there is evidence to indicate that true volunteers to equal the quality of draftees or reluctant volunteers will not be attracted.10 Sullivan's study, on the other hand, concludes with the conjecture that
lower mental quality personnel might not be unsatisfactory and that motivation and on-the-job experience can minimize the effects of lower mental quality inputs. He concludes that 25-30 percent of the Army and Marine Corps strengths and 20-25 percent of the Navy and Air Force strengths could acceptably be mental group IV personnel. He bases this on the premise that the need for highly qualified men could be reduced by substitution of civilians and use of less sophisticated equipment.\textsuperscript{11} The Air Force in a recent analysis, however, states that over-all quality has already declined and "It is axiomatic that to maintain a quality force structure it is necessary to begin with quality personnel..."

Gen. John D. Ryan, United States Air Force Chief of Staff (quoted in the analysis) was more emphatic on August 10, 1971 when he said:

\begin{quote}
Quality must set the tone for our future recruiting....During the past year quality has fallen off...This is an intolerable situation...It represents a trend that must not only be stopped but reversed.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Civilian substitution for military personnel in support functions can be used to a limited degree in the Continental United States but this proposal has severe limitations when the contingency of overseas deployment exists. The civilian, today at least, can not be ordered overseas
into a combat zone. Other disadvantages to civilianization are additional budgetary cost and the elimination of a necessary United States home base area for personnel with military skills that are required in overseas units. Reduced sophistication of equipment is always desirable but usually is at cross purposes with the aim of greater military efficiency per individual service man based, as it is, on increasing hardware complexity. Both of the conclusions by Sullivan suggest budgetary and defense material development aims that are counter to trends of recent years. While, as Sullivan suggests, some of the service arguments in support of requirements for high mental quality personnel may be less important than they at first appear, it is not clear that the acceptance of lower mental standards among recruits in order to achieve a volunteer force is an acceptable solution for either the manpower procurement dilemmas of today or of the future.

A tentative conclusion in the discussion of force quality is that an all-volunteer concept will not provide an adequate number of qualified personnel without added enlistment incentives. For this reason option 2 remains the most efficient current legal means of procuring the desired quality individual in the services. (Note: By direction
of the Secretary of Defense the Selective Service is no longer being used except for some medical personnel.\(^{13}\) Neither option is decisively supported by consideration of force quality alone. The discussion of category 4 force cost factors probably will provide a more definitive basis for a valid conclusion for this category.

Category 2 is an analysis of force quantity criteria or the capability of the procurement systems to provide the necessary number of qualified personnel to the military services. Force quantity can be achieved under option 2 without supply problems because of the number of qualified young men in and joining the national manpower pool. As discussed above, the number of accessions required under this option for the 2.25 million man force level is at most 378,000 per year. Assuming a very conservative acceptance qualification level of 50 percent among those men turning 18 each year, the pool can provide more than one million men per year in new eligible manpower. Since historically many enlistees do not come out of the new pool, i. e., they are older than 18, it is reasonable to predict that probably only one out of three eligible men would be drafted annually in the unlikely event that there were no 18 year-old enlistees (each enlistee of any age would obviously reduce draft requirements by one).
The disadvantage of option 2 derives precisely from this fact—only one-sixth of those men reaching age 18 each year (one-third of those assumed to be qualified) would be required to serve involuntarily—an obvious continuation of the inequity and injustice that the Selective Service system has perpetuated. This aspect will be discussed more appropriately under category 5.

The main disadvantage of option 1 is that with current pay rates and other incentives, it is not yet certain that required force strengths can be maintained in a zero draft—all-volunteer environment. Certainly caution based on the British experience is warranted here. It was noted in chapter II that British forces require 35,000 accessions per year from a population of over 56 million and are currently not meeting this goal. The Gates Commission estimate of United States annual accession requirements of 290,000 from a population of 210 million \(^{14}\) under option 1 exceeds as a ratio of needed accessions to population the British needs/population ratio by a factor of 0.14 percent to 0.062 percent. Stated another way, the annual accessions needed in the United States are more than twice as many in proportion to the population as is the case in Britain. This may be a fallacious comparison, however, because no evidence has been
uncovered in this research to support a presumption that
British male motivations toward the military service have
any relation to the same motivations in the American male.

Indeed, from the detailed and highly technical analyses
conducted and published in support of the Gates Commission re-
port, it seems feasible and probable that added incentives can
be provided in the United States to attract necessary personnel--
probably of the quality needed for the assumed peacetime force
level--particularly if civilian or female (Women's Army Corps-
WAC) substitutions are made where occupational requirements
permit (lab technicians, clerks, etc.). Voluntary enlistments
are also directly related to national unemployment levels
therefore the attractiveness of the services improves noticeably
in periods of high unemployment. This relationship was par-
ticularly noticeable when unemployment acted in combination
with other factors such as draft vulnerability to motivate
young men to volunteer. With elimination of the draft (or
the implementing of option 1), this motivating factor disap-
pears and the reluctant (draft motivated) volunteer must
be replaced in the accessions by the true volunteer.

A recent national survey of high school students
provides some evidence that the Gates Commission conclusions
are valid. Over-all 27 percent of the students polled said
they would be "inclined to join" an all-volunteer military for a limited time (32 percent of the boys and 21 percent of the girls). Of the remainder 31 percent said they would not be inclined to join and 35 percent were not sure. Assuming survey validity for the entire youth population and using earlier requirements and supply data, 32 percent of the more than one million eligibles per year (a conservative guess considering "not sure") considerably would exceed the 290,000 estimated accession requirements. These are admittedly unvalidated assumptions but the data do track with the findings of much more detailed studies.

The advantages of true volunteer recruitment include longer personnel retention (three or four year enlistments versus two year conscription) hence greater force effectiveness. Less accessions would be required per year to maintain any given force level. In theory, if not in fact, under option 2 with two year tours one-half of the first term force will turnover each year. If the tour length is extended to three or four years the turnover each year drops to one-third or one-fourth of the first term force per year. The effect is not linearly related however because greater individual job satisfaction and proficiency are obtained, training personnel overhead and costs are reduced, assignment stability is increased,
and unit mission effectiveness is improved through better teamwork, training, leadership and morale. All these factors combine to give a total benefit greater than the sum of its parts. The resulting improvement enables fewer personnel to provide the same effective military force as a larger force composed of members with shorter retainability. Again, to relate this to the earlier data, some 290,000 men input each year as replacements under option 1 will provide the same defense capability that will require 362,000 to 378,000 annual replacements under option 2 to reach the 2.25 million man force level goal. This lower Manning level will obviously produce some savings in pay and training costs, but these savings will not equal the additional costs of financing an all-volunteer force. Advantages of either option are therefore not overwhelming in this category but a strong argument for option 1 begins to emerge when the question of the inequity inherent under option 2 is not swept under the table and is considered to be an important factor in a free society.

To summarize, force quantity requirements can definitely be met under option 2 and appear to be feasible under option 1. As will be developed in the category 4 analysis, the major advantage of option 2 is lower budgetary cost--its disadvantage personal inequity and injustice. The
latter will emerge in the category 5 discussion. The major advantage of option 1 is nullification of the inequity of option 2: a secondary advantage is attaining a given level of equivalent defense force effectiveness with fewer people--its disadvantage is higher national budgetary expense.

Category 3 is a discussion of force capability as system criteria. Force capability must be relative to some established military goal. Such a goal may be implicit but for purposes of this paper a force level of 2.25 million personnel under the residual option 2 force organization or its option 2 equivalent is assumed to have some measurable capability in terms of specific units, i.e., an Army of \( x \) divisions, a Navy of \( y \) ships and \( z \) planes, an Air Force of \( a \) missiles, \( b \) bombers and \( c \) fighters, etc. with \( d \) percent operational at any time. These quantifiable measures also have a degree of efficiency element, such as ten support personnel for each fighting soldier. A decrease in the ratio of supporting to supported personnel ultimately provides more men for combat duty from those in any given level force, thereby providing a greater force capability or effectiveness for that particular force level. That is to say that, an actual 2.25 million option 1 force will have an actual effectiveness equal to some higher level option 2
Force capability advantages accrue to option 1 primarily because of facts already developed which include increased retention, greater individual and unit efficiency, higher motivation, better job satisfaction, lower training costs and greater unit stability—all contributing to higher force morale. This list of advantages presumes public willingness to pay the price of recruiting and maintaining such a volunteer force—an economic fact of life that readily becomes the prime disadvantage since willingness to pay this price has not yet been established.

As has been the case since World War II, option 2 can continue to provide the necessary defense manpower but it has the disadvantage of requiring more people to attain the same level of capability as option 1. See tables III-2 and III-3 for comparable requirements for enlisted personnel under the two procurement options. Underlining has been added to highlight data relating to the 2.25 million force level and Department of Defense enlisted strengths.
Table III-2. Alternative Force Strength Objectives by Service Component Under a Continued Draft (Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE LEVEL</th>
<th>TOTAL DOD</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. (3.0 million)</td>
<td>3,000.0</td>
<td>1,285.3</td>
<td>721.2</td>
<td>228.2</td>
<td>765.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer total</td>
<td>380.7</td>
<td>154.2</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted total</td>
<td>2,619.3</td>
<td>1,131.1</td>
<td>640.4</td>
<td>208.0</td>
<td>639.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| B. (2.5 million)  | 2,500.0   | 1,007.0| 605.0 | 206.0         | 682.0     |
| Officer total     | 335.7     | 130.9  | 73.0  | 18.2          | 112.8     |
| Enlisted total    | 2,164.3   | 876.1  | 531.2 | 187.8         | 569.2     |

| C. (2.25 million) | 2,250.0   | 837.0  | 569.0 | 199.9         | 645.0     |
| Officer total     | 303.4     | 109.1  | 70.0  | 17.6          | 106.7     |
| Enlisted total    | 1,946.4   | 727.9  | 499.0 | 181.4         | 538.3     |

| D. (2.0 million)  | 2,000.0   | 746.0  | 514.0 | 165.0         | 575.0     |
| Officer total     | 272.0     | 98.0   | 64.3  | 14.6          | 95.1      |
| Enlisted total    | 1,728.0   | 648.0  | 449.7 | 150.4         | 479.9     |

(Underlining added)

Source: Table 1.1.1, Ol and Forst, Study I, Part I, Volume I of Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. I-1-4.
Note that 1,946,400 enlisted personnel under option 2 (table III-2) can be replaced by an equivalent force made up of an enlisted strength 1,886,300 under option 1 (table III-3) without any loss of military capability.

Table III-3. Voluntary Enlistment Rates and Sustainable Force Strength in the Absence of a Draft (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUE VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT RATES</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>MARINE CORPS</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>DEPT. OF DEFENSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With 1. No pay increase $E_0^*$</td>
<td>1.285</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>3.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recommended pay increase $E_0^*$</td>
<td>1.919</td>
<td>1.427</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>1.356</td>
<td>5.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ratio $E_1/E_0^*$</td>
<td>1.493</td>
<td>1.443</td>
<td>1.492</td>
<td>1.436</td>
<td>1.465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| SUSTAINABLE FORCE STRENGTH WITH NO PAY INCREASE |  |
|-----------------------------------------------|------|------|---------------|-----------|----------------|
| By 4. FY 1975                                 | 620.1| 553.9| 167.9         | 558.4     | 1,909.3        |
| 5. FY 1980                                    | 649.0| 604.4| 191.5         | 571.4     | 2,016.3        |

| SUSTAINABLE FORCE STRENGTHS WITH RECOMMENDED PAY INCREASE |  |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|------|------|---------------|-----------|----------------|
| By 6. FY 1975                                             | 784.8| 690.5| 234.4         | 683.9     | 2,393.6        |
| 7. FY 1980                                                | 877.9| 798.2| 268.3         | 753.5     | 2,697.9        |

| EQUILIBRIUM ALL-VOLUNTEER ENLISTED STRENGTH OBJECTIVES |  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------|------|---------------|-----------|----------------|
| FORCE LEVEL                                            | 8. 2.0 million | 624.3| 439.0         | 148.0     | 471.2          |
|                                                       | 9. 2.25 million | 691.9| 487.2         | 178.6     | 528.6          |
|                                                       | 10. 2.5 million | 827.1| 518.6         | 184.8     | 558.9          |
|                                                       | 11. 3.0 million | 1,046.9| 625.3       | 204.8     | 628.2          |

Aside from this discussion of tangible measures of effectiveness, the moral inequity inherent in the Selective Service System must be considered as affecting force capability. As a direct consequence of this disparity under option 2 procurement personal inconvenience, disruption of family, education or occupational planning pending service completion has been the uncertain lot for a minority of eligible citizens. This situation actually represents an unfair and regressive tax in kind on those citizens required to serve involuntarily at less compensation than that for which they would voluntarily enlist. In 1970 this tax was estimated to be about $2 billion per year or an average of $3600 per man for draftees and draft motivated volunteers.\textsuperscript{17} Such financial unfairness superimposed on the more readily observed forced investment of valuable years and risk of combat is unconscionable and divisive of national unity.

In any discussion of force capability the question of how the nation will provide for its defense in a general war must be squarely faced. For convenience in this paper the logical assumption was made that "standby" conscription would be implemented however it must be considered briefly. Indeed, two separate and distinct groups analyzed the whole question of manpower procurement in 1966 for the President
and the Congress. These groups were the "Marshall Commission" (previously cited) and the "Clark Panel"[^18], a body convened by the House Committee on Armed Services. Both groups independently concluded that option 2 was the necessary national choice because of the lack of emergency flexibility of an all-volunteer force. Mobilization capability was cited as the prime reason for maintaining the Selective Service and conscription as a necessary fact of modern life.[^19] The Gates Commission Report on the other hand says that military preparedness depends on forces in being rather than ability to draft untrained men. Reliance must be placed on ready reserve forces to provide immediate support to the active forces in the event of necessity, therefore, the Gates Commission recommended maintenance of a "standby" draft that can be put into effect promptly (with Congressional approval) should circumstances indicate a need for mobilization of a large number of men.[^20] The Selective Service System remains intact today but is not now being used as efforts are continued to validate the President's military manpower procurement goals.[^21] Conscriptation authority will expire June 30, 1973, and new legislation will be necessary to provide the "standby" draft after that date. There is indeed a lack of mobilization flexibility and capability but it seems to be a condition
common to both options and one which the current world atmosphere will permit, at least for the foreseeable future. It is probably appropriate at this point to reiterate that the charter of the Gates Commission was one of developing a means or plan to attain an all-volunteer force but this area of possible bias does not appear to have affected the Commission recommendation. Indeed, it reached about the only logical solution regarding the problem of general mobilization requirements applicable to either system when the prevailing political climate in the United States was considered.

To summarize, the analysis of factors affecting force capability seem to support option 1 strongly under the peacetime constraints that apply.

Category 4 is one of force costs. Costs must be subdivided into budgetary costs and hidden costs. The budgetary expenses can be classified as (1) initial (one time expenses incidental to initiating an all-volunteer force) and (2) maintenance (incremental annual costs after stabilization of the force at the prescribed level). Budgetary data from the Gates Report are used primarily herein because they are available and reasonably accurate. Quoted data are stated in terms of additional incremental budget expenditures required to support option 1 manpower procurement
in excess of budget expense related to option 2. In other words, expenses cited for option 1 are in addition to option 2 expenses which are not cited. In this instance, however, a raise in pay under option 2 is included in the initial expense estimates (see table III-4) because pay equalization funds that were long overdue regardless of the system used were included therein. The raises were approved by Congress and the initial expenses are now sunk costs of either option.

Prior to beginning the detailed discussion of estimated expenditures, it is appropriate to differentiate between hidden costs and budget expenses since the latter do not accurately state the total costs of option 2 to the nation. First, the implicit tax in kind referred to earlier is not subject to accounting practices. Therefore, for option 2 forces, the expenditures indicated in the budget consistently are understated. When these hidden costs are recognized, a strong case can be developed that option 1 costs are lower in the long run. For example, option 2 forces include draftee manpower—a condition that results in low re-enlistment and high turnover rates among draftees and reluctant (draft motivated) volunteers. As has already been noted, retention improves force quality in terms of experience and force capability in terms of attaining a given level of
military effectiveness with fewer personnel. Also the military services may have a tendency to use manpower less efficiently under option 2 because manpower utilization decisions are usually based on perceived or budgetary costs. On the surface this seems logical and desirable, but funds often are not provided to accomplish necessary but menial tasks therefore military personnel may be diverted from training or other missions to perform them, i. e., housekeeping details such as kitchen work and installation cleanup. Since budgetary costs (to the nation) are significantly understated, decisions intended to minimize budgetary expenditures may have just the opposite effect when the actual costs of such "economies" on defense capabilities are recognized and tabulated. Under option 1 the services have a greater incentive to economize on manpower because the budgetary costs are visible and properly identified.

Second, the draftee is part of a system that is practically insensitive to the alternative value of that individual to the civilian economy, e. g., if a draftee would volunteer only if offered $8000 per year and a true volunteer exists who would enlist and be equally productive in the military for $6000 per year, the difference of $2000 is a real cost of the draft reflecting a difference in civilian
productivity of the two individuals or in their tastes for military life. The difference also constitutes a hidden and wasted cost of option 2 although it is impossible to precisely identify and measure.

Lastly, the social inequities of a draft that does not require all eligible young men to serve (for the very logical and valid reason that all are not needed) impose costs that are no less real for their subtlety. Some examples are: unequal policies of deferments and exemptions, postponed and distorted careers and personal plans, college students who are poorly motivated academically yet highly motivated by deferment, premature marriages and family production for draft avoidance, restriction of personal freedom of registrants (such as the need to ask and receive permission to travel outside of the United States), uncertainty during the period of draft vulnerability (missed job or educational opportunities) and last but not least—involuntary induction into the services of some misfits for service. All of these examples (by no means all inclusive) represent very real costs of option 2 that definitely have but cannot be assigned dollar values. 22

As is implied so far in this discussion, the financial costs of option 2 are the cheapest possible rates in
terms of the budget expenditures needed to maintain a given level of defense. This is because during the first year of service life for enlistee or draftee (at the time of the data compilation—1970) the total military compensation (all military pay and allowances) represented only 62.5 percent of equivalent (comparable) civilian compensation ($3251/5202). The second year the serviceman's position improved minimally to 67.8 percent ($3935/5803) of which, in both cases $500-600 of military compensation was payment in kind, bonuses, incentive pay, etc. \(^\text{23}\) Under option I proposals these total compensations are more equitable but still not equal to civilian compensation (year of service—YOS = 1 is 96.7 percent or $5041/5202 and YOS = 2 is 97 percent or $5631/5803). \(^\text{24}\)

The estimated additional budget expenditures for an all-volunteer force initiated in fiscal year (FY) 1971 using the force in being plus required accessions to meet the annual fiscal year end strength are shown in table III-4. This is an added budget increment based on the Gates Commission proposed pay changes in 1970 dollars. The proposed changes represented about 67 percent raises for one and two year enlisted personnel, therefore the net pay increase budget increment would be $2.7 billion if all Commission planning assumptions were valid. Since Congress imposed unforeseen
year end strength reductions but actually granted a higher raise for servicemen with less than two years service the actual expenditures approximated the estimates thereby permitting their continued use for this analysis.

Table III-4. Additional budget expenditures for all-volunteer force FY 1971 (billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic pay increase</td>
<td>$2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficiency pay</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve pay increase</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Medical Corps expense</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting, ROTC and misc.</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.24</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less added Federal income tax</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net addition to budget</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table 11-I: The Report on the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 126.

Table III-5 indicates the estimated average added budget increments for FY 77-79 (without adjustments for inflation-1970 dollars). Of prime interest are the estimates in the 2.25 force column. They are referred to herein as maintenance costs.
Table III-5. Additional budget expenditures for all-volunteer force
FY 1977-79 average (billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2.0 Force</th>
<th>2.25 Force</th>
<th>2.5 Force</th>
<th>3.0 Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic pay increase.......</td>
<td>$1.58</td>
<td>$1.86</td>
<td>$2.24</td>
<td>$5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves…………………..</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proficiency pay………….</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical…………………..</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous…………..</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total…………………..</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less turnover related savings(^{1})</td>
<td>- .16</td>
<td>- .19</td>
<td>- .32</td>
<td>- .50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net of turnover related costs………….</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less additional Federal income tax(^{2})………….</td>
<td>- .29</td>
<td>- .34</td>
<td>- .42</td>
<td>- .97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net budget increase….</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1}\)These are savings from reduced turnover over and above the direct pay and allowance savings that accrue as a result of force reductions.

\(^{2}\)These are the additional Federal income taxes that will be collected as a result of the increased basic pay and other additional compensation paid to members of the active duty and reserve forces. They should properly be deducted in calculating the incremental expense for an all-volunteer force.

Source: Table 11-I: The Report on the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, p. 126.
For this force, after stabilization under option 1, the estimated average annual additional expenditure increment is $1.74 billion over estimated budgetary expenditures for an equivalent option 2 force. At that time because of accumulated savings, maintenance expenditures will be reduced by about $1 billion per year from the initial added expense increment. Recall that early in the paper a statement was made that there is no direct proportional relationship between added force manpower and expenditures. This statement is substantiated here by noting that maintenance estimates for an increase of 3/4 million men (to 3.0 million) represents very nearly a three-fold increase in the added expenditure increment ($1.74 to $4.55 billion). The reasons for these differences are readily apparent in tables III-6 and III-7 for the 2.25 and 3.0 million men forces and are not discussed further.
Table III-6. Estimated budget expenditures for mixed and all-volunteer forces
FY 1977-79
(for force of 2.25 million men in billions of 1970 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mixed Force</th>
<th>All Volunteer Force</th>
<th>Increment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military pay and allowances: active-duty forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Enlisted</td>
<td>$12.70</td>
<td>$14.46</td>
<td>$1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Officers</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Total compensation</td>
<td>17.24</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and turnover-related traveling costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enlisted</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Officers</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Total training and travel costs</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Military pay/allowances</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Training and travel costs</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Total reserve forces</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other budget increments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Medical personnel</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Recruiting, ROTC and misc.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Total other items</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Total</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td>21.73</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Less added Federal income taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Net budgetary increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III-7. Estimated budget expenditures for mixed and all-volunteer forces  
FY 1977-1979  
(for force of 3.0 million men  
in billions of 1970 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mixed Force</th>
<th>Volunteer Force</th>
<th>Increment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military pay and allowances:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active-duty forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Enlisted</td>
<td>$15.79</td>
<td>$20.41</td>
<td>$4.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Officers</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Total compensation</td>
<td>21.66</td>
<td>26.45</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training and turnover related travel costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enlisted</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Officers</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Total training and travel costs</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>-.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserve forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Military pay/allowances.</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Training and travel costs</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Total reserve forces</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other budget increments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Proficiency pay</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(first-term enlisted men)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Medical personnel</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Miscellaneous</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Total other items</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Total</td>
<td>24.51</td>
<td>30.03</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Less added Fed. income taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Net budgetary increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes $27 million for additional ROTC scholarships and $53 million for additional recruiting expenditures.

In summary, category 4 force costs analysis of option 1 versus option 2 indicates added budgetary expenditures are required to implement and sustain option 1. These expenses should not be emphasized, however, because all study groups recommended a significant pay raise to service personnel in July 1970 to correct the obvious pay deficiency—a one which had resulted in some married servicemen not being able to provide for their families. This pay raise has taken effect and is a sunk cost factor—a direct expense for either option. Since it is already in effect, it removes some of the financial sting of initial costs of option 1.

Nevertheless, the higher budget expenses required to support an all-volunteer force remain a lucrative target for budget cutters in an economy minded government. This budget vulnerability could represent a real threat to the proper maintenance of viable forces. The provision of adequate funds for national defense are, in the final analysis, dependent on the public attitudes of the United States citizen. The real question here is not whether the nation can afford to pay for an adequate defense but who bears the costs—the general public or that small part of the citizenry that (as the alternative) involuntarily serves at great personal and financial sacrifice. The taxes in kind and other hidden costs
on conscripts are excessive and unfair. Such injustices are unacceptable in a free society. These considerations therefore resoundingly support the increased budget expenditures needed to support an all-volunteer or option 1 force. Such expenses must be provided in addition to other defense budgetary needs and not at their expense. 25

Category 5 is force desirability—an analysis of problems not yet raised or discussed in detail. It will raise the questions of patriotism (belief in the citizen's moral responsibility to serve); arguments that the presence of draftees in the services insures preservation of civilian authority, individual freedoms and democratic institutions; and the claim that a volunteer force will be black or poor in excess of the proportion to their numbers in the populace—essentially creating a mercenary force. Each area of concern will be addressed in turn.

The question of patriotism and the "right or duty to serve" are often debated issues. Most of the references used to document this paper have touched on this question—many more than once. It can be established however that the "traditional" belief or a moral responsibility to serve is not historically supported for a peacetime non-crisis situation. 26 It is in fact a myth. The myth needs to be exposed
and the people informed of the facts. The draft has not been a peacetime fixture except since World War II. It has been in effect for only about 35 years of the nation's history— including wartime. The only American armed service proposal to combine universal service with concepts of right and duty was proposed by Henry Knox, George Washington's Secretary of War, in his Knox Plan. It was never enacted and remains a discarded idea. The absence of this "right or duty to serve" has not, in fact, had a negative effect on patriotism when the need for military manpower has been clearly established. The rush of volunteers at the outbreak of every war through World War II or in times when the public has clearly perceived danger to the Republic indicates that historically there has been no decline in patriotism as a result of having a peacetime volunteer defense force (or for any other reason). Opponents to these arguments point out areas of genuine concern and differences between defense problems facing the nation today and the historical situations in which emergency conscription sufficed. Senator Sam J. Ervin, North Carolina, of the Senate Committee on Armed Services believes that:

"An all-volunteer army would do serious injury to our national character because it would restrict service to those who make a
career of the Army. One of the intangible things that makes citizenship understandable is that a multitude of Americans serve a short time in our military forces and then return to civilian life. The dual role places military and civilian responsibilities in a balanced perspective in our national life.29

It must be noted here that Senator Ervin cites no authority, study, or basis for his arguments other than his personal convictions, which might in fact be sufficient were it not for the previously cited inequities that his arguments ignore. He does mention the apparent reversal by the Gates Commission Report of the earlier Marshall and Clark Commission determinations (that an all-volunteer armed force in the United States was not feasible or desirable). He does not comment that the primary basis for the Marshall and Clark recommendations was a lack of manpower procurement mobilization flexibility in emergencies— an omission which somewhat biases or invalidates Senator Ervin's logic.

The contention that the presence of draftees in the services insures the preservation of civilian authority, individual freedoms, and democratic institutions is also a myth that does not stand up under critical analysis. In this debate, the presence of draftees is depicted to be a politically restraining factor on the military leaders provided by option 2 that is not present under option 1.
A look at the question of whether conscripts insure the preservation of civilian political authority is helpful. Most draftees—to include draft motivated officer volunteers and enlisted personnel—enter the military establishment at the lowest levels in their category and remain in the service for only two years. The idea that these people contribute significantly to policy formulation and decisions, or that they have the capacity to temper the recommendations and actions of military leaders and commanders any more than do any other young Americans, is fallacious.

Civilian control of the military has always been a strong political tenet in the United States. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex phenomenon, it can be said that feared military intervention in political matters occurs only when civilian political leadership is weak and indecisive or its legitimacy is called into question. 30 A look at the personalities and records of recent Presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon indicates none that could be characterized as weak in their executive leadership. Nor could the civilian Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Laird be so classified over the majority of the past 12 years. If weak civilian control of the military ever develops as a factor encouraging
United States military intervention in the national political processes, the idea that any system of manpower procurement of lower echelon officers and men serves as a valid means of precluding such a disaster certainly cannot be supported or rationally accepted. The idea ignores the fact that all officers with more than two years service are volunteers as are all enlisted personnel with more than four years. The Air Force has always been all-volunteer, the Navy and Marine Corps predominantly so, and only the Army—with its greater requirements for ground combat soldiers—has been forced to rely heavily on the draft. To carry this argument for conscription as a national insurance policy against military political intervention to the ultimate level of absurdity, the Army is the only secure service—all the others are possible mutineers against their civilian chiefs. There is not and never has been any valid basis for such an idea in the United States.

Senator Ervin, quoted above, by implication raises the argument of isolation of the military from the society as a concern when he alludes to the desirability of the return of first term servicemen to the civilian community under the draft option. The implied conclusion is that the same situation would not occur under the all-volunteer option. This
conclusion, according to the Gates Commission deliberations, is not a valid one—indeed after the first term of service (which would be one or two years longer than existing draft obligations) about 65 percent of the men enlisted under option I can be expected to leave the service. The study indicates that the rate of turnover in the all-volunteer force will be 75 percent of the turnover in the mixed force. Stated another way 52 percent of the projected volunteer force will continue to be first termers compared with slightly less than an estimated 60 percent of the comparable mixed force. The difference in force effectiveness comes from longer first terms, with the built-in advantages of such longer tours rather than markedly higher retention past the first enlistment.

The last discussion area in this category deals with the possibility of the presence of disproportionately high percentages of minority members in the volunteer force, specifically black and poor men. This is an assumption not supported by documented examinations although it is an area of possible future concern. Negroes made up 11 percent of the enlisted force in Vietnam in 1966-67; however as mentioned in chapter I, a much higher proportion (22.4 percent) of 1966 combat deaths in Vietnam were black. This situation occurred because combat units were approximately 20 percent black.
The Negro soldier has a record of heavy volunteering for elite combat units (such as airborne).\textsuperscript{32} 

In 1970, the Gates Commission determined that 10.6 percent of the total enlisted force was black, (an even smaller percentage were officers) or slightly less than their proportion of the population. The Commission projected that no fundamental racial proportion changes would occur under option 1.\textsuperscript{33} The Army proportion of blacks is expected to increase from 17 to 19 percent between option 2 and 1 respectively. The over-all (all services) percentage will be about 15 percent for an option 1 force that is equivalent to the 2.5 million force under option 2. (Data are not available for 2.25 million force). The relevant comparisons are between the racial mixes of the two procurement alternatives. Physical, mental and moral standards for enlistment will restrict a disproportionately large number of entries from either the minority races or the poor. Among true volunteers presently serving in the armed forces, blacks serve in proportions almost equal to their numbers in the population.

The nonwhite population is growing faster than the white so the trend in over-all population of 17-20 year old non-whites will increase almost linearly from 1965 to
1985 (from 12 to 15.8 percent). This closely parallels normal population increases. The conclusion one must draw with respect to black enlistments is that, even if the projected estimates are low, the errors are likely to be small and are not likely to create an unacceptable racial imbalance in the services.

Arguments that the higher pay of an all-volunteer force will attract large numbers of youth from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds can be discounted similarly. This condition has been true because the military pay rates have been attractive to those people having less opportunity and capability to compete for higher civilian wages, especially in a high unemployment environment. Improving the economic incentives of the military does not reduce the attractiveness of the services for these poor candidates. It does, however, increase the attractiveness of the services for those people who have higher civilian earnings capabilities thus increasing the supply of better quality people willing to serve voluntarily and providing some selectivity in manpower recruiting. A disproportionately high 30 percent of the population of the disadvantaged sector are presently unable to meet the minimum standards for service. Unfortunately, higher military pay would not change this failure rate so the net
gain should be for better quality personnel recruitment by attracting higher economic level input. 36

Will this force suddenly become one of "mercenaries" because of improved pay and other conditions? Are today's career force members mercenaries? "Mercenary" usually applies to men who enlist for pay alone. Volunteers for the American armed forces have been and are motivated to do so for a number of reasons to include a sense of duty. 37 Improving conditions of service and eliminating financial hardship does not change the basic attitudes or motivations of recruits—it simply removes some of the negative factors in arriving at a decision to enlist or not enlist. Arguments that rest on an assertion that providing military personnel with compensation comparable to their civilian contemporaries in the society that they are required to protect makes them "mercenaries" are so irrational and irrelevant that rebuttal is unnecessary.

To summarize the discussion of force desirability, the analysis has been concerned with questions of the validity of alleged "traditional beliefs" in support of each citizen's "right or duty to serve", and hence the relative effects on patriotism of the two options. There is little doubt that there is a requirement for all Americans to serve in time of national emergency and this need justifies a "standby"
draft. It is equally clear that such a "duty" does not exist historically or culturally for peacetime or nonemergency periods. Patriotism in America has never been lacking in times of danger to the Republic and no evidence exists to indicate that a peacetime method of voluntarily filling military ranks will affect the popular fervor or support for the nation. (On the other hand, a continued peacetime draft and other factors not within the scope of this paper conceivably can have a negative effect on patriotism).

Similarly the contention that draftees serving as citizen soldiers act as a viable restraint on military political intervention in the United States has been shown to be a spurious idea. The hypothesis that an all-volunteer force will eliminate the historic interface between civilian and military in the population is also invalid. The majority of first term military personnel will continue to leave the services when their first tour is completed thus maintaining a fresh input of youth and vitality into the services and not substantially changing the relationship of servicemen returning to civilian life that prevails under option 2. The concern that minority races and poor will make up a disproportionate amount of the force as a result of added enlistment incentives under option 1 is a decided possibility,
but conversely, improvement of the conditions of service life has the unquestioned effect of attracting personnel (other than blacks, poor, etc.) who would not otherwise consider enlisting. Therefore the earlier anxiety in this area appears to be unwarranted at this time. It appears appropriate that actions be taken to insure that a proper ethnic and socio-economic balance among force personnel will be carefully monitored and maintained as option 1 incentives are implemented. Over-all, from the standpoint of force desirability, the evidence supports option 1.

Summary

This chapter has been designed to analyze and assess the relative advantages of the two military manpower procurement options. The first category, force quality, evaluated in terms of the over-all aptitude of recruits, supports option 2 because it makes available a larger number of potential recruits and involuntarily inducts only the well qualified. To attain a comparable level of quality without the draft will be costly in terms of budgetary incentives, if indeed it is possible at all.

The category of force quantity does not appear to be a problem at this time because of the supply of potential
manpower available throughout the 1970's. The force quantity requirements are currently being met on a volunteer basis. Since sufficient personnel recruiting appears to be feasible, this criterion can be judged to support the option 1 system. In this case the major advantage is elimination of the involuntary service of a minority of young Americans; the major disadvantage is the increased budgetary cost.

Force capability can be excellent using either option but the job can be accomplished with fewer people under option 1 as a result of increased individual productivity, job satisfaction, longer retention, etc. Fewer people accomplishing the mission without loss of military effectiveness somewhat compensates for the higher budget requirement.

The force costs discussion, if confined to budgetary expenses, clearly supports option 2 because it appears to be cheaper. However, when the hidden taxes in kind are recognized and monetary savings are computed based on longer retention, unit stability and higher morale, etc., the budgetary costs seem to be well within acceptable limits for the other benefits gained. With these qualifications, option 1 is judged best.

The final category of force desirability also supports option 1. In peacetime, the nation has no requirement
for all its manpower to serve and the inequity or injustice of requiring a very small segment of the population to serve involuntarily is apparent. The true volunteer usually is better motivated and does a better job over a longer term than does the conscript. The patriotism, service isolation and "mercenary" questions present no rational arguments to counter the advantages of the all-volunteer force.
FOOTNOTES


6Gates Commission Report, op. cit., Table 4-VI, p. 43.


8Gates Commission Report, op. cit., Table 4-VIII, p. 45.


23. Ibid., Table 5-II, p. 53.

24. Ibid., Table 5-III, pp. 58-59.

25. Ibid., p. 19.

26. Ibid., p. 131.


31. Ibid., p. 133.


34. Ibid., p. 146.
"20% of Enlistments in '72 were Black" Army Times, February 21, 1973, p. 8. Article indicates that Black enlistments during last three months of 1972 were 18.3, 20.2, and 19.9 percent of the Army totals. This is in excess of estimates cited and should be viewed as an indication of a possible inaccurate long-term projection.


Ibid., p. 17.
Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter is designed to serve several purposes, the most important of which is to formalize conclusions about the most effective methods of military manpower procurement in the United States during the 1970's. As a part of that purpose a recommendation and prediction are provided. This segment is at the end of the chapter.

A second goal is to briefly address some ideological and cultural aspects of military manpower procurement that have a bearing on the problem of system selection but which have not been judged appropriate for explicit discussion in the preceding portions of this paper. This segment follows this introduction.

Following the part just mentioned is a segment, the purpose of which is to summarize and coherently tie together the first three chapters.

Effects of National Ideological, Political and Cultural Differences

In the course of research and writing this thesis,
the importance of national differences in political culture and ideology has been observed in each state's decision process of selecting a military manpower procurement system. This observation has suggested that analysis be addressed to the reasons why such considerations are more important than actual defense needs in the choice of manpower options. The assumption is that military manpower procurement policies are inseparable from national socio-political-cultural considerations. This is an assumption that appears acceptable as a fact without detailed documentary support. Accordingly the effects of political, cultural, social and ideological factors have been considered and evaluated herein even though they have not been specifically identified and systematically or formally discussed. Because the considerations are inseparable from the more concrete and explicit criteria that have been examined in detail, their effects necessarily are integrated into the findings and conclusions except as addressed below.

As was discussed in chapter I, conscription has never been popular in the United States. Chapter II illustrated that the same attitude obtains today in Britain, Canada, Australia and to a lesser degree in the Federal Republic of Germany. Within a period of two months (December
1972-January 1973), two of the nations examined have eliminated conscription as a form of military manpower procurement in peacetime (the United States in practice and Australia officially). The military leaders in any of the nations reviewed are unlikely to be happy about unilateral reductions in active defense forces in an age when, for all the hopeful talk of international accommodation, they observe no move toward significant reductions in the forces of potential enemy nations. To the contrary, there is considerable evidence of continued military buildup in the Warsaw Pact nations.¹ Some American political and military leaders view the situation with alarm and are outspoken about their concern and what they perceive to be national apathy.² Others, no less concerned, recognize the socio-political-economic facts of life and counsel the maintenance of forces of quality and effectiveness if their quantity must be reduced. General Maxwell D. Taylor (United States Army, Retired) is in the latter camp and recently wrote:

The major advantage of the all-volunteer Army, as I see it, is the opportunity to eliminate the malcontent and the sub-standard, and to replace them with people who are, or show promise of becoming, loyal soldiers capable of doing their part in carrying out the increasingly complex Army missions.
The payroll cost of a volunteer force will be so high that we will not be able to afford a large Army; either a shortage of dollars or of volunteers, or of both, will impose a reduction in size below the level which the importance of the Army mission would justify. But I, for one, would accept such a reduction without complaint, feeling like Gideon that a few reliable men are more likely to defeat the Midianites than a horde which included "the fearful and afraid."3

In this passage General Taylor has recognized that the people of the United States, for political and cultural reasons as well as economic factors, will insist on reducing the military departments of the Department of Defense to barely adequate strength levels. This being almost certain, he argues for force quality and capability.

What are some of the underlying reasons for this characteristic and predictable public response? They include a general historic dislike of standing military forces of any strength, a feeling originated by the American forefathers and shared by their heirs. The same feelings are no less prevalent today because of the tragic misunderstanding of the political nature of the recent involvement in South East Asia. General Taylor describes this situation as it applies to the Army.

...In addition to being the symbol of a particularly unpopular war, the Army is
held responsible for drafting unwilling young men and forcing them to fight and sometimes die in an "immoral" war. It is held liable for most of the brutalities and cruelties of that war as it has been portrayed by press and television.... Few respected voices have been raised to defend the Army, although it is an institution which ultimately guarantees the preservation of our Constitution and the American system based upon it....

This type of traditional political cultural philosophy has engendered suspicion in the populace against a strong professional military force. The defense needs of the state are in conflict with inherent and acquired cultural values of the citizenry.

Professor William H. McNeill of the University of Chicago pointed out, in a paper presented at a national conference on the draft in December 1966 at the University of Chicago, that the United States has until recently remained close to the militia tradition characteristic of barbarian and simple agrarian peoples. He wrote:

...Thirty years ago the professional army of the United States was minuscule—less than 100,000 in a population of 120 million. Local police forces, National Guard units commanded by state governors, together with widespread possession of firearms by ordinary citizens all meant that no centralized monopoly of armed forces existed within the country. This indeed, was the hope and intention of the Founding Fathers, among whom a close and
indissoluble relation between the exercise of political rights and the possession of arms and practice in their use was taken for granted.

Nothing that has changed since the eighteenth century invalidates the wisdom of the men who fought the revolutionary war and drafted the Constitution. In the long run it still is true that the possession of arms and practice in their use must coincide with the effective exercise of political rights... 4

In a separate paper prepared for the same conference, Colonel Samuel H. Hays discussed an equally important set of considerations.

...The principle issue is how best to raise and maintain in a democratic society the efficient and effective Armed Forces which our country needs in its present world position. Allied to this issue is the problem of the manner in which the Armed Forces should relate to the society which raised them. Finally, there is the issue of the relative value which should be placed on the overall welfare of society as compared to the demand for equal individual treatment. 6

Hays recognizes that there are no easy answers to these issues—they have stimulated discussion and controversy since the birth of the Republic. The founding fathers arrived at a general consensus on the subject which because of changed circumstances is not applicable today. Hays wrote:
Today, we find ourselves, willingly or not, in a position of preeminent world power during a period of rapid and accelerating technological and social change. These conditions directly influence the type and size of forces we must maintain and the problems involved in their recruitment. Most agree that our international position, with the extensive responsibilities which our power position places on us, requires the maintenance of Armed Forces of a much greater magnitude than in previous eras.... Since the end of the Korean War the Department of Defense has felt that such forces must amount to over two and a half million men organized to cope with a variety of situations. Whenever we have tried to reduce these forces a crisis arose, such as those over Berlin or Cuba, which forced us to rebuild them....

McNeill went on to conclude that military service has represented, does and will continue to represent the "ball and chain attached to political privilege". He defines political privilege as "the exercise of an effective voice" in determining public policy. He reasons that the armed services therefore must remain small or some form of universal military service is needed to provide a secure basis for democracy. If the changes in technical conditions no longer permit attainment of high efficiency by a citizen army, McNeill asserts that the democratic political order is at least potentially in danger. He continued:
If the United States decides nevertheless to accept the risks of relying on long-term-service professional troops of the sort suited for conducting distant low-grade wars and for garrison duty overseas, then devices must be found for linking military leadership more closely with the leadership of civil society. The existing policy of exempting the future leaders of civilian life from military service positively invites divergence of viewpoint and seems almost suicidal in a democracy....

This is a type of political concern that is obviously real and has significant effect on what type of military manpower procurement system the nation selects but it is one that is also steeped in ideology, a conceptual ideal that is practically impossible to measure. On the other hand, to fail to recognize the implications and importance of such concerns would invalidate the conclusions of this effort.

Although not specifically responding to Professor McNeill, Colonel Hays discussed the question of military civilian interface.

In considering the ... issue ... of the relation of the Armed Forces to society, we must take notice that the same change which is transforming our Armed Forces is also affecting our society. The changes wrought in society by the technological revolution play an important part in our consideration of the relative position our Armed Forces should occupy. Military institutions are a reflection of the value system of the societies which
produce them. In a technological world of growing interdependence on local, national and international levels, the interrelationship between economic, political, social and military institutions grows continually closer. Because of this growing interdependence, issues which arise in either national or international arenas become continually more complex and difficult of solution...

Hays continued, addressing the problem of the complexities and tensions engendered by social and technological changes and the emphasis that such change places on the motivation, morale, teamwork and loyalty of the armed forces, by writing:

...Our society places a heavy responsibility on them (armed forces) and rightfully expects them to produce. Their motivation, morale and teamwork are affected by a wide variety of factors. The educational and social level of their membership, caliber of leadership, the severity of deprivation of the normal advantages of civilian life—all play a significant part. Underlying them all is the degree of social approval and recognition which each member thinks he receives in return for his deprivation, risk or sacrifice...

Today more than ever before the Armed Forces must relate positively to society. Their members must perceive that they are performing a vital social function and one which is recognized and awarded an appropriate status by the society as a whole. On the other hand it is perhaps equally important to the welfare of the society that this relationship be positively and continuously expressed....10 (parenthesis added)
Even though the preceding excerpts of ideas of concerned Americans are necessarily limited in scope and length, they serve to effectively illustrate the impossibility of attempting to analyze military manpower procurement options without considering the inseparable and essential nature of political, cultural, ideological, and socio-economic aspects of the national system and their effects on the procurement options.

It should readily be apparent also that these same considerations, addressed from the examined nation's historical viewpoint, affect the system in the states that are discussed in chapter II. References are often noted in researching British military manpower policy that conscription does not square with the British citizens' views of democracy. The idea of the virtue of the citizen soldier coming to his nation's aid and an attitude of disesteem for a professional standing defense force are prevalent in Australia. The anti-military posture persists without regard to how efficient or inefficient the resulting force may be in terms of costs or effectiveness today. Canada, on the other hand, seems to consider a highly regarded, well paid professional military establishment as the only acceptable solution. Germany's military manpower procurement policy is so intermeshed with
political, historical, cultural, social, economic and actual defense considerations, most or all of which are conflicting in nature, that the only acceptable solution there has been option 2 with continual efforts exerted to minimize the inequity of involuntary service.

This paper has recognized the importance of these factors and at the same time, the impossibility of establishing valid controls for these criteria to eliminate or limit their effects. The attempt has been made in a broad sense to compare the national political systems and reasons for the procurement means used in Britain, Canada, Australia and West Germany. A more deliberate and quantifiable analytical approach was made in chapter III for the United States but it is recognized that there, too, the results fall far short of an ideal scientific empirical model. The combination model that is described in chapter I serves as a skeletal and organizational blueprint or author's checklist only rather than as an explicit detailed research design. The analysis, nevertheless, is believed to be a valid and logical study of a very important, if not critical, area of political concern in the free world today.
Summary of Analysis

In chapter I, the research subject area was introduced, the problem was stated, the background was presented, the scope of the problem was limited, the assumptions were identified and justified and the methodological approach was discussed. In chapter II, the individual systems of military manpower procurement of four selected nations having common political interests with the United States and some commonalities in heritage, culture and government were described, analyzed and compared to determine the causes for selection of these military manpower procurement systems and to evaluate their effectiveness. Recognition of the difficulties of comparison of noncomparable national traditions and motivations was necessary and their effects considered when arriving at conclusions. Nevertheless this cross national analysis set the stage for the United States military manpower procurement discussion which followed in chapter III.

Analysis Review--United States Military Manpower Procurement Options

Proceeding from a brief introduction that described the international and domestic political environments in 1973, an analysis of considerations affecting the two viable procuremen
options was undertaken. These options were (1) to develop conditions conducive to and fund for an all-volunteer armed force or (2) to continue with some form of mixed volunteer-conscript force similar to the system that has been in effect for the past 30 years. The options represented two independent systems. Analysis criteria were selected as force quality, force quantity, force capability, force costs and force desirability.

The study was oriented toward development of empirical and testable support in so far as possible for each force category criterion. Unfortunately this has not been always possible for reasons previously stated. Category 1, the force quality analysis provided no clear cut advantages to either option for entirely different reasons (without considering tangible costs that are better addressed under category 4); however, over-all a slight advantage accrues to option 2 because of the access it provides to the total national manpower pool.

Category 2, force quantity has strong advantages accruing to each of the options but option 1 emerges the stronger primarily because of the smaller equivalent force it requires (fewer personnel—for which there appear to be sufficient numbers of true volunteers) and the distasteful
moral compromise required of the society in order to support continued selective conscription.

Category 3, *force capability* considerations must address both peace and wartime problems, thus a standby draft apparatus must be maintained for this category under either option. For peacetime needs, the *force capability* analysis supports option 1 because any given defense force requirement is attained by expending less manpower with an all-volunteer force. This obtains because of improved motivation, proficiency, stability and over-all conditions of service.

The category 4, *force costs*, investigation really boils down to determining who pays for the national defense. If the general public pays in terms of higher budgetary costs (translated as taxes) for option 1 (as it pays for all other functions of government), then the increased expenses are shared by all the citizens (to include the service members). If, on the other hand, some service members are involuntarily forced to serve or are motivated by impending induction to enlist, then they are being taxed in kind at unfair and excessive/regressive rates. In peacetime these costs of option 2 are unconscionable because they are not morally acceptable in a democratic society. The investigation supports option 1 even though it is at some additional, yet far more equitably
distributed budgetary expense. The added costs are not excessive when the nation's capability to pay and the dire alternatives of not providing adequate resources for national defense are considered.

In category 5, force desirability, the examination was focused on the major objections applied to option 1 by proponents of option 2. These are some of the socio-economic-political-cultural aspects that can be addressed empirically to a limited degree. Some of these are a sense of erosion of citizen patriotism, an excessive number of blacks and poor in the services, isolation of the military from the society from which they are recruited and must protect (allegedly this promotes military intervention into politics) and the possibility of emergence of a mercenary force. These arguments, while certainly within the realm of possibility, were found to be primarily based on emotion, sentimentality, faulty logic, erroneously high estimates of budgetary costs\textsuperscript{11} and gross ignorance of the hidden costs and inequity of conscription. Thus the category 5 examination supports option 1 also.

If we assume that each examined criterion carries equal weight and total the results, option 1 will prevail by a factor of four to one. Obviously each criterion should not be weighted equally. Perhaps force capability,
recognition that any force provided that is less than capable of providing effective national defense is a total waste, should be weighted heaviest with moral considerations such as justice, equality, patriotism and other components affecting _force desirability_ running a close second. The relative weights of _force quality, force quantity_ and _force costs_ may be appropriately considered to be individual or collective value judgments not within the purview, competence or requirements of this effort. It does seem justifiable to say that _force quality_ considerations, the only ones that weakly support option 2, do not override the support that is provided in the other four areas for option 1.

In chapter I the thesis objective was stated as "to analyze the stated alternatives for procuring military manpower for the armed forces of the United States in a projected peacetime environment of the 1970's". To focus the research efforts toward accomplishing the objective a multi-part research question was formulated. The question was: "What is (will be) the effect(s) of the option 1 (2) on the (1) United States citizen--as a responsible individual?, (2) United States--as a viable democratic society and nation state? and (3) United States armed forces effectiveness in peacetime or wartime?" It is believed that inherent response
to the parts of this question have been evident but, for clarity, a specific answer(s) for each part of the question follow(s).

The effects of option 1 on the United States citizen are to preserve individual liberty, to treat each individual with equality and justice, to compensate adequately and to respect military service performed by volunteers. Nevertheless the implementation of this option must make clear the duty of every citizen to serve in times of true national emergency (as determined by the President with the concurrence of the Congress) and to support the active armed forces in the performance of assigned missions at all other times.

The effects of option 2 on the American citizen are to perpetuate a system of involuntary sacrifice and servitude by a small minority of citizens because there is no need for all eligible men to serve. These patent injustices and inequities are not in consonance with the principles on which this nation was founded. Conscription can be morally justified only when the national existence is in peril.

The effects of option 1 on the United States as a viable democratic society and nation state can be to re-establish the good reputation of the United States politically and militarily at home and abroad. It provides military
representatives who are professional volunteers and who are proud to be a part of the nation's active armed forces. It will serve to reduce or eliminate the divisive guilt feelings among the populace and thereby serve to reunify the people behind their national armed services. The effects of option 2 on the United States are well known. They are apparent today as the people recognize the undesirable characteristics of conscription in peacetime. Citizens are concerned about the internal divisions in the nation that this system has created as it was used to provide manpower for a misunderstood and unpopular war. Though option 2, or any defense scheme, is not cheap, it is less expensive for the general public in dollars than option 1. However, the concurrent expenditure of national moral fiber associated with option 2 appears to be far in excess of real monetary savings.

The effects of option 1 on the United States armed forces are multiple and generate mixed feelings in the forces. These feelings run the gamut from concern to challenge to job. There are concerns about the number and quality of individuals that will enter the services and about the sometimes fickle support of the Congress; there are the challenges to the forces to recruit, reform, revitalize and reestablish themselves as the world's greatest defense forces; and there is joy that
this can be done with highly motivated, highly respected, well supported and well compensated volunteer personnel eager to face the task that is theirs. These effects also apply to limited war, if necessary, because the military professional accepts this as a part of the job, but the individual and the armed forces collectively expect and deserve governmental and popular national support in the performance of assigned missions. The effects of option 2 on the armed forces will be less dramatic but will result in the reconstitution of effective forces. This option is a viable method of providing needed manpower. There is little doubt, however, that the continued use of conscription in peacetime will perpetuate personal dissatisfaction among many affected force members and among the populace. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the defense missions will be accomplished but more personnel will be required to achieve a given level of capability, greater national internal division will be evident, better educated yet poorer motivated people will be inducted and personnel turnover, morale and disciplinary problems will persist.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Liberty is not a trinket to be cheaply purchased at a bargain counter. It is the most priceless of all possessions, purchased at the price of sacrifice—retained at the price of vigilance. For this reason, courageous peoples striving for ideals of freedom and human dignity have always been willing to pay the price. The price of liberty is clear, but default in payment would be tragic. America has never defaulted. 12

There is no one perfect system of military manpower procurement that could solve all the seemingly apparent problems in such an operation. However, the Selective Service System has stimulated adverse reactions from the citizens of this nation. Recommendations have been made and programs implemented to abandon conscription in favor of total volunteer recruitment. An all-volunteer force seems to be a cure to the problem; and it has the support, at least for the present, of the people and the government. Nevertheless, there are many whose support for the idea is heavily qualified by worries that it may not work. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Roger T. Kelley, focused on one of the key problems facing the nation as the option 1 all-volunteer concept is implemented. Kelley, addressing the National Association of Real Estate Boards, said:
The All-Volunteer Force means that the Armed Forces must trade effectively in the same market place from which you draw your employees. The right people will be attracted to the Armed Forces only if the expectations of service life are adequate. And the right people will be retained by the Armed Forces in sufficient numbers only if these expectations are realized.13

The primary conclusion of this thesis is that the tentative policy decision to change the peacetime method of obtaining personnel for the armed forces to an all-volunteer system is the best compromise for the United States today. It is also concluded that "standby" conscription must be maintained for use in the event of national emergency and that the reserve component forces must be maintained in a high state of readiness at all times.

It is recommended based on the preceding research and analysis that the United States government continue its recently initiated efforts to fund for, recruit and support an all-volunteer armed force at levels adequate to meet the immediate defense requirements of the nation at whatever budgetary expense is required. It is predicted that such support will permit attainment and maintenance of the established force manpower goal within acceptable expenditure levels. Conversely, failure to provide the funding support
will be the ultimate expression of false economy and will
defeat the system with possible tragic results for the
United States.
FOOTNOTES


4 Ibid., p. 10.


7 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

8 McNeill, op. cit., p. 121.


10 Ibid., p. 11.


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APPENDIX I

Applicable Definitions

Assigned Missions. Those tasks that are designated or are anticipated to be designated under certain situations for which a capability is needed or assumed to be necessary when a government determines the established force level.

Compatible with Other Requirements. This phrase is used herein in two contexts: (1) compatibility with vital national interests and justice—that is in time of emergency some people suffer and the exigencies of the situation unfortunately override the more just and deliberate processes desirable in manpower procurement, and (2) used in connection with expenditures of national resources—recognizing competing national programs and requirements for limited assets. This serves as a constraint on national capability in any area of governmental action, requiring the allocation of priorities to such programs.

Competent Defense Forces. Armed forces possessing the military capability to carry out tasks assigned by their government. Herein they include the combined forces of army, navy, air force and marines or their equivalents.

Established Force Level. That level of military manpower
that the government of any specific nation state has determined meets its defense needs. In this thesis, this level is arbitrarily assumed to be militarily adequate to accomplish vital national defense goals.

Justice. The administration of a legitimate legal military manpower procurement system in a manner that is proper and fair for all citizens serving or subject to potential military service under the law.

Military Manpower. Refers to personnel to man the forces. Personnel need not exclude women where duties are appropriate.

Military Manpower Procurement System. A system (any system) used to provide manpower to the military services (used interchangeably with option or method).

Minimum Expenditure. Achieving a given goal, usually governmental, at minimum cost in terms of national resources expended.

Model. Research vehicle/design for analysis of the problem--usually of empirical, normative or engineering types.

National Resources. Resources of a given nation state--in this paper it means primarily manpower, money and material.

(Procurement) Options. The military manpower procurement system under which manpower is provided. Those under analysis herein are designated by number: Option 1--all-volunteer force; Option 2--mixed volunteer-conscript force; and
Option 3--all conscript force (not further considered as a suitable option for United States forces). See alternative military manpower procurement methods (options) discussed in chapter I for a detailed discussion of each option.

Qualified Manpower. Personnel available in the armed services or those eligible for military service within the national manpower pool who meet designated minimum mental, physical and moral standards. Included are men with prior training to prescribed skill levels or those with the potential for being satisfactorily trained within an acceptable time period.

Recruit. Any individual entering the armed services regardless of the method of procurement, e.g., enlistee or inductee.

Reluctant (draft-motivated) Volunteer. Those individuals that enlist to avoid, or in preference to, being drafted.

Selective Service System. A system providing for the selection of certain males, who meet established age, physical, and mental qualifications, to be inducted involuntarily (conscripted) into the armed services for a specific period of time.

The Draft. Used interchangeably with conscription and induction under Selective Service.

The Lottery System. The method most recently used to determine by lot the order of selection of men required for the
Selective Service system of military manpower procurement. 

**True Volunteer.** Those individuals that would enlist in the armed services whether or not conscription (draft) was in effect.
MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES IN THE SEVENTIES

by

REID A. BARRETT

B. S., The United States Military Academy, 1956

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

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requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

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How to efficiently and equitably provide manpower for the United States armed forces is a controversial problem. This thesis examines the history of the problem and analyzes the alternatives available for procuring military manpower in the United States in the 1970's. Based on the research, a conclusion and qualified recommendation regarding a preferred procurement method are developed.

The over-all approach is to briefly review the history of military manpower procurement and to establish acceptable methods of analysis. This process includes the conduct of a comparative cross national historical analysis of the military manpower procurement systems in use in four states that have comparable motivations for requirements and problems to those present in the United States. This is necessary in order to determine the reasons for the selection of the existing system in each examined state.

With the stage thus set, the alternative methods of all-volunteer (option 1) and mixed volunteer-conscript (option 2) systems were determined to be the only two feasible independent systems of procuring military manpower. Five force category criteria were investigated to determine the advantages and disadvantages of these systems. The criteria were force quality, force quantity, force capability,
force costs and force desirability. Empirical evidence was a sought for but not always attainable goal. Indeed, because of political, cultural and socio-economic considerations, a totally empirical examination was neither possible nor desirable. This is particularly true when considering the components of the force desirability criterion.

The investigation resulted in a conclusion that, under established constraints and assumptions, the best method of procuring military manpower in the United States in the 1970's is the all-volunteer system. Force quality alone, of the criteria considered, was weakly supportive of the mixed volunteer-conscript system. Force capability was found to be the most important criterion since a less than capable defense force is a total waste. Assuming adequacy of established force requirements, a given capability can be attained with fewer personnel and greater individual justice and equality for the citizen under the all-volunteer force concept. These latter considerations were and are major ones in a democratic society and override some increased, but more equitably distributed and financed, budgetary expenditures.

A recommendation is made that the United States government and the American people enthusiastically and materially support the all-volunteer force concept. With
such support, evidence is available to sustain a prediction of probable success of the all-volunteer system in providing necessary and proper manpower for the armed forces. Conversely, lack of such popular and political support will jeopardize the national armed forces defense capability and, hence, the viability of the United States.