JOHN BULL’S PROCONSULS: MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ADMINISTERED THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1815-1840

by

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B.A., Kansas State University, 1973

M.A., Kansas State University, 2002

AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had acquired a vast empire that included territories in Asia, Africa, North America, and Europe that numbered more than a quarter of the earth’s population. Britain also possessed the largest army that the state had ever fielded, employing nearly 250,000 troops on station throughout this empire and on fighting fronts in Spain, southern France, the Low Countries, and North America. However, the peace of 1815 and the end of nearly twenty-five years of war with France brought with it significant problems for Britain. Years of war had saddled the state with a massive debt of nearly £745,000; a threefold increase from its total debt in 1793, the year war with the French began. Furthermore, the rapid economic changes brought on by a the state that had transitioned from a wartime economy to one of peacetime caused widespread unemployment and financial dislocation among the British population including the thousands of officers and soldiers who had fought in the Napoleonic Wars and were now demobilized and back into the civilian sector. Lastly, the significant imperial growth had stretched the colonial administrative and bureaucratic infrastructure to the breaking point prompting the Colonial Office and the ruling elites to adopt short-term measures in running its empire.

The solution adopted by the Colonial Office in the twenty-five years that followed the Napoleonic Wars was the employment of proconsular despotism. Proconsular despotism is the practice of governing distant territories and provinces by politically safe individuals, most often military men, who identified with and were sympathetic to the aims of the parent state and the ruling elites. The employment of this form of colonial governance helped to alleviate a number of problems that plagued the Crown and Parliament. First, the practice found suitable employment for deserving military officers during a period of army demobilization and sizeable
reduction of armed forces. The appointment of military officers to high colonial administrative positions was viewed by Parliament as a reward for distinguished service to the state. Second, the practice enabled Colonial Office to employ officials who had both previous administrative and military experience and who were accustomed to make critical decisions that they believed coincided with British strategic and national interests. Third, the employment of knowledgeable and experienced army officers in colonial posts fulfilled the Parliamentary mandates of curtailing military spending while maintaining security for the colonies.

Military officers of all ranks clamored for the opportunities of serving in the colonies. General and field grade officers viewed service in the colonies as a means of maintaining their status and financially supporting their lifestyles. Company grade officers, who primarily came from the emerging middle class, saw colonial service as a means of swift promotion in a peacetime army and of rising socially. Competition for overseas administrative positions was intense and officers frequently employed an intricate and complex pattern of patronage networking.

The proconsular system of governing Britain’s vast network of colonies flourished in the quarter century following the Battle of Waterloo. In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars the British officer corps contributed men who became the principal source for trained colonial administrators enabling Britain to effectively manage its immense empire.
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If I have forgotten anyone let it be some small consolation that I am indeed appreciative to one and all that assisted me in putting this project together.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Karen, with appreciation for all of her help, encouragement, and love.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The career of the ancient Egyptian official, Amenhotep Huy, who lived nearly 3,500 years ago, is chronicled in the wall paintings of his tomb. Tomb inscriptions and accompanying art reveal that Huy began work as a civil official serving as “royal messenger in all foreign lands.” This position essentially was that of an official letter carrier, who conveyed important dispatches and documents throughout the empire. These bureaucrats thus gained an intimate knowledge of the empire as thoroughly seasoned and well-traveled military officials. As time passed, Huy worked his way up both the administrative and military ladders, eventually becoming the modern equivalent of a lieutenant general in the Pharaoh’s chariot forces.

Historians of Bronze Age cultures have noted that Huy’s military/administrative position was not unique to Egypt’s New Kingdom polity, and that Huy’s appointment heralded a trend toward viceroys who worked in both a military as well as a civilian administrative capacity. As Huy’s ability improved, the Pharaoh bestowed greater responsibilities on his servant, entrusting him with the important position of “Overseer of all the gold lands Amun.” As an overseer, Huy’s duties included not only supervising gold production, but also protecting these vital resources against hostile neighbors. Egyptologists conjecture that Huy governed his province from the fortified city of Faras, ruling the native Nubian population in the name of the pharaoh. John Coleman Darnell and Colleen Manassa argue that fortresses on the edge of the empire functioned not only as administrative centers similar to those of the Roman Empire 1,300 years later, but also as core bureaucratic centers. Huy, like subsequent administrators of Nubia, had two deputy administrators assisting him in governing the province. One deputy, Penniut, oversaw affairs in Wawat, the northern half of the province; and the other governed Kush to the south.

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1 John Coleman Darnell and Colleen Manassa, Tutankhamun’s Armies: Battle and Conquest During Ancient Egypt’s Late 18th Dynasty (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), 107.
Furthermore, each deputy also supervised ministers of agriculture, treasury, military forces, and a host of scribes who recorded the day-to-day details of the colony’s administration.\(^2\) As chief military officer in the territory, Huy was expected to fulfill many duties and responsibilities that were both military and civic. Indeed, research by Andrea Gnirs, John Darnell, and Colleen Manassa note that New Kingdom Egyptian generals, while spending their entire careers in the military, were routinely called upon to work in both civil and military administrations.\(^3\)

The practice of proconsular despotism appears to be as old as statecraft itself. New Kingdom Egyptians, the Romans, the Ghaznavid Empire around Lahore in the Middle Ages, the early Mughals of the Delhi Sultanate, the Spanish maritime empire of the sixteenth-century, as well as the British, practiced this form of colonial administration in their empires’ distant provinces.\(^4\) Proconsular despotism is the political practice of governing colonies and provinces by selected elites, frequently military men, who identified with and were sensitive to the strategic aims of the parent state. As Ronald Hyam observes, the British proconsular phenomenon of the nineteenth century attracted a distinct type of individuals usually drawn from ruling elites.

Furthermore, these elites, because of the constraints imposed by time and distance, routinely


\(^4\) S. M. Ikram argues that the early Mughals adopted the practice of combining civil and military offices from the Ghaznavids. The first Mughal emperors, those before the reign of Balban, permitted their provincial governors to act in a semi-independent fashion as the central government was primarily concerned with military control and revenue collection. However, later Mughal emperors were careful not to let their provincial governors assume so much power that they would become a rival for the throne. See S. M. Ikram, Muslim Civilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 92 and 103-106. J. H. Parry and J. H. Elliot note that, initially, the Spanish Hapsburgs employed colonial governors, who for the most part were impoverished Castilian hidalgos with prior military experience. Once these individuals conquered a territory, Spanish emperors allowed the conquerors to enjoy the fruits of their victory. However, the rule of these conquistadores was frequently quarrelsome and brief, and with their departure the highly centralized and bureaucratized Hapsburg Empire imposed controllable viceroys. See J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 62-66; and J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 98 and 204-211.
exercised unfettered freedom of action from the metropole.⁵ Indeed, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, in an age before steam locomotion, travel between Europe and the rest of the globe frequently took months and even years. For example, in 1800, traveling from Europe to India required at least three months of travel time.⁶ Furthermore, individuals who made the voyage to Peru might spend weeks crossing the Atlantic to Buenos Aires, then sailing down the coast of South America, rounding the Straits of Magellan eventually reaching Callao, the port for Lima many months later.⁷ Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey observes that the voyage from Britain to Australia could take as long as eighteen months.⁸ Zoë Laidlaw elaborates by noting that the issue of distance “led governors to modify their actions according to not only their instructions, inclinations and the colonial situation, but also their perceptions of how decisions would be received by the (frequently changing) imperial administration.”⁹ Normally, imperial/colonial administrators of the pre-telegraphic nineteenth century were strong-willed individuals accustomed to making critical decisions that they perceived coincided with British security and national interests.

It is the intent of this study to examine the motives of the Colonial Office as to why it chose to adopt proconsular governance as the preferred method of administration in its colonies in the decades after 1815. This work will also delineate those factors that made members of the British officer corps clamor for overseas administrative posts and the reasons why the practice was London’s best solution in filling senior colonial administrative offices. Subsequent chapters

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⁷ Ibid., 270-71.
investigate the transformation of the British Army in the years immediately following the end of the Napoleonic Wars and examine why the British state embarked on a massive demobilization almost immediately after victory had been attained. Also scrutinized is the composition and structure of the post-1815 British Empire and the state of the Colonial Office that managed this immense entity.

This study examines the social backgrounds of more than three hundred British officers who served in the Napoleonic Wars and then went on to serve Britannia’s massive overseas empire. The accounts of these men who managed the empire for nearly forty years make a fascinating story. Many senior colonial administrators were chosen from Britain’s traditional elites: the aristocracy and the landed gentry. This first generation of administrator was gradually replaced by a remarkable number of middle class officers. This second generation obtained positions of employment through an intricate and interlocking web of networks developed from relationships that included the shared experience of campaign and combat, regimental affiliation, patronage, religion, and family ties. The work concludes with an examination of the life and career of Harry W. Smith, a member of a nascent middle class who, during his career, without the benefit of title, birth, or income achieved high military rank and social stature. His story is typical of the second generation of colonial administrators. Smith, like his contemporaries, was educated, skilled in staff work, competent in command, and as a result profited handsomely from patronage and influential connections.

The proconsular period that flourished in the early decades of the nineteenth century was the sensible solution because it fulfilled a basic need by the British state in governing large swaths of the earth with a minimum amount of money and manpower. Moreover, proconsul rule alleviated a considerable amount of the burden on a small and overworked Colonial Office.
Certain conditions must exist for this practice of proconsular despotism to be practical. The state must have a sufficiently large manpower pool of qualified individuals who are politically reliable and who are willing, if necessary, to maintain the ruling elite’s position of power within the state. This form of imperial control mandates that the individuals chosen to administer far-flung provinces be able to anticipate the goals of the parent state without the benefit of constant supervision. These colonial/imperial administrators, often separated by long distances, needed not only to understand their government’s strategic aims, but also to shape them to fit their particular circumstances without the need for prior consultation with the home government.

In the wake of the defeat of Napoleon, Britain had acquired an empire of significant size and scope. By 1815, the empire consisted of Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Christopher, St. Vincent, Trinidad, Tobago, Berbice, Demarara, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Grenada, Malta, Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Bermuda, New South Wales, Ban Diemen’s, Ceylon, Mauritius, and Honduras. Most of the territories acquired during the nearly twenty-five year war with France were by conquest and had few traditional, historical, religious, racial, or ethnic ties with the parent country. Alfred LeRoy Burt observed that the possessions Britain had acquired in the first decade of the nineteenth century had little in common with that of their parent country.\(^\text{10}\) Ian K. Steele notes that the non-Anglophone nature of these acquired colonies encouraged authoritarian rule rather than the local legislative experiments that had been the norm with those colonies established in the eighteenth century.\(^\text{11}\) In almost every situation these new colonies were beset with enemies both within and without. Faced with this condition,


Henry Bathurst, the Secretary of War and the Colonies, with the approval of a Tory dominated Parliament, adopted a policy of the garrison state in governing these new colonies.\textsuperscript{12} The garrison state as defined by Douglas Peers was a highly militarized administration put in place by the East India Company to govern its holdings in India.\textsuperscript{13} Peers argues that Indian administrators such as Richard Wellesley, Thomas Munro, and Charles Metcalf believed that Indian society was inherently militarized and that the only sound basis for authority in the state rested on a coercive administration resting on military power.\textsuperscript{14} Among the East India Company directors this plan received wide acceptance in that it had the dual benefit of controlling bureaucratic appointments while keeping costs under control. It was long understood by the East India Company that employing military officers in administrative tasks saved substantial amounts of money, as officers’ salaries were much less than those of civilians working in comparable positions. This method of governance had the added benefit of having trained military leaders located throughout the state, on call and available to react to any threat. In essence, the garrison state allowed the East India Company to govern India in the most cost conscious means possible.

In the immediate aftermath of Waterloo, Britain inherited not only a significant empire, but also a massive national debt. In 1815, British debt amounted to nearly £745,000, an almost three-fold increase from the total debt in 1793, the year war with the French began.\textsuperscript{15} Parliament recognized that financial retrenchment was imperative and instituted policies that included

\textsuperscript{12} The notion of the garrison state was largely determined by actual conditions that existed in India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. These circumstances led to highly militarized East India Company administration whose officers were both military leaders and civilian bureaucrats.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 45.

significant army demobilization and substantial budgetary cuts in military spending. As Peter Burroughs observes, “in the decades after 1815 a passion for economy raged in Parliament” affecting all aspects of government spending in all of the ministries.\textsuperscript{16} Significant reductions occurred within the army, whose budget declined from £43 million in 1815 to £10.7 million in 1820.\textsuperscript{17} Concurrent with the budgetary cutbacks were significant manpower reductions as the army’s establishment shrank from 233,952 in 1815 to 102,539 in 1828.\textsuperscript{18} This abrupt drop in strength created hardship for the thousands of professional officers who had served during the Napoleonic Wars. Career officers who had served with distinction suddenly found themselves out of work and in a precarious financial position with scant hope of finding suitable re-employment. As J. W. Fortescue pointed out in his monumental history of the British Army, a substantial majority of the officers of the period were not rich men and could scarcely endure the prospect of surviving for years on their half-pay.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, many officers clamored for duty within the imperial/colonial system. An illustrative example was the emotional plea made by Major Harry G. W. Smith in a letter to his former commander Colonel John Colborne, to use his influence with the Duke of Wellington or with Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the Military Secretary of the Horse Guards, to obtain an appointment for him as an inspecting field officer in the Ionian Islands: “I am a most needy man” desperately seeking a colonial posting.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, officers who had served honorably during the Napoleonic Wars expected some sort of compensation for their sacrifices. Parliament readily acknowledged their service and made some attempt to place


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 164.


these men in the imperial/colonial system. In an 1833 appearance before a Parliamentary committee, Somerset recognized that imperial/colonial assignments were a possible way of rewarding officers for prior service.\textsuperscript{21}

It is the aim of this study to examine British proconsular colonial administration in the thirty-five years that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Proconsular governance was a particular form of colonial administration widely practiced by London metropole and never fully studied by imperial scholars. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo, the Colonial Office, along with the Tory ministry of Lord Liverpool and with the acquiescence of Parliament, instituted a decades long policy of employing military personnel as chief administrators throughout the empire. The British practice of employing military men as colonial administrators was not new and examples exist throughout the eighteenth century. A few of the most notable of these were the colonial administrations of Thomas Handasyd, governor of Jamaica, Thomas Gage, governor of Massachusetts, Guy Carleton, governor of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec, and Charles, 1\textsuperscript{st} Marquess Cornwallis, Governor General of India and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. However, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars the proconsular practice of colonial administration became widespread and employed with great frequency. This practice, born of financial necessity, military expediency, and political practicality, satisfied Britain’s immediate requirement for fiscal retrenchment; the army’s need for a mission in the post-Napoleonic world; and the Tories objective to preserve the aristocratic system both at home and abroad at a time when the status quo was threatened. This study notes that a policy established and perpetuated by an aristocracy and a gentry who wished to maintain the traditional

social structure provided an opportunity for thousands of the “middling sort” officers to assume powerful roles throughout the empire. By the end of the 1840s, when this study concludes, a significant number of the imperial/colonial military proconsuls were self-made men of modest origins. These were men, who through long service, merit, patronage, competency, and education had acquired positions of influence and power in an ever-expanding and sophisticated empire. Frequently these new proconsuls eschewed the aristocratic dictates of their predecessors, preferring instead a Whig ideology that included adopting and adapting each colony’s indigenous cultures into the fabric of their governance.

While this work focuses on the development and practice of the proconsular phenomenon of the post-Napoleonic British imperial/colonial empire, it is also a prosopographical study of the men who filled the myriad of positions in Britain’s global web of colonies and domains. By focusing on their careers and those of their subordinates, this work seeks to understand the evolution of British Empire in the early decades of the nineteenth century. It is evident that Britain was woefully unprepared to govern effectively the significant territorial acquisitions it had gained at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This new accumulation of empire, styled “the Second British Empire” by nineteenth-century writers, included territories on six of the seven continents. The minuscule Colonial Office, recently an appendage to the Office of the Secretary of State for War, was overwhelmed by the size and complexity of its empire. The office’s small staff of bureaucrats had little knowledge of the lands and indigenous peoples they

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22 P. J. Marshall’s examination of Imperial History notes that historians in the nineteenth century recognized distinct differences between the First and the Second British Empire. George Cornewall Lewis and Herman Merivale made comparisons between the “old system” eighteenth century colonies that comprised an Atlantic Empire, based on North America and the West Indies. The British acquisition of territories in Asia, Africa, and Australasia indicated to these historians that the first Empire was evolving into a more global second Empire. J. R. Seely’s Expansion of England published in 1883 clearly differentiates between the two empires. See P.J. Marshall, “The First British Empire” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. V: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 43-53.

Moreover, Colonial Office’s concerns focused on broad issues such as slavery and immigration; the office had little time and even less inclination to devote resources to the narrower concerns and needs of specific colonies. Indeed, the Colonial Office frequently failed to realize many of the newly acquired colonies had non-British institutions that needed to be adapted or modified to conform to the laws, jurisdictions, customs, and traditions of the mother country. For example, in Ceylon, local British administrators worked not only within a framework of ancient Sinhalese institutions, but also within the existing laws and customs of earlier Portuguese and Dutch administrations. Likewise, Cape Colony governors struggled with making Dutch land policy, taxation, and law conform to British practice, a situation that never completely satisfied the colonists or the bureaucrats.

Into this system beset by confusion and indecision stepped the proconsul administrator who ruled rather than governed. The empire of the early nineteenth century bore little resemblance to the ordered empire envisioned by later imperialists such as J. A. Froude and Joseph Chamberlain. Norman McCord noted that there was “no symmetry in character or
function in the British overseas possessions after 1815." Each administrator governed his colony or presidency in a fashion similar to that of an English squire managing his home estate. For nearly four decades, this *ad hoc* system of administration lurched along in the absence of a systemic plan or template formulated by the Colonial Office. Neither the Colonial Office nor Parliament offered much direction, except when it came to the receipt or expenditure of overseas revenue, or to the strategic movement of military forces. As Hyam correctly observes, the British colonial system of the first half of the nineteenth century was not unified by any coherent philosophy, but by a collection of strong-willed individuals who only dimly perceived the intent of Parliament and the Colonial Office. The track records of these individuals were as varied as the personalities who ruled the colonies. Lord Charles Somerset, the second son of the Duke of Beaufort and a conservative Tory, who administered the Cape Colony between the years 1814 and 1826, was frequently characterized as an ineffectual governor. During his tenure, he spent £28,000 of public money on his country residence of Newlands and systematized the rules for fox hunting in the colony. Lord William Bentinck, the second son of the Duke of Portland, a Whig and a Benthamite utilitarian, governed India for nearly seven years from 1828 to 1835. His administration was characterized by enlightened rule that included opening India to foreign capital and raising a middle class of native gentlemen who acted as agents of political, economic, and social development. South Asian scholars have also recognized Bentinck’s accomplishments. Isaiah Azariah notes that Bentinck reoriented India toward a progressive

28 David Cannadine argues that in both the settled and conquered colonies Britain sought to impose a system of governance that replicated a social structure modeled on that, which was thought to exist in Britain. See David Canadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13.
future that included reforming Indian education, improving the status of women, and curbing Thugee-inspired crime. James Kempt, who held a number of administrative posts, was without title or birth. These included that of lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, governor of Canada, and Master General of Ordnance. Kempt was a friend of the Duke of Wellington, had Whig sympathies, and was well regarded as a quiet, fair, and unassuming man responsible for many positive achievements in British North America. Among his accomplishments were the reform of inequities in the system of representation in the Lower Canadian legislature, the heading a commission of inquiry concerning the construction costs of the Rideau Canal in Upper Canada, and an enthusiastic penchant for road building. Kempt is most notable for his even-handedness and for preserving a measure of harmony in the colonies he governed. Even William Lyon Mackenzie, a passionate critic of British rule in Canada, said of Kempt, “this illustrious person, governed in all his public actions by the principles of equal justice, which in the end ever proved the wisest policy…. ”

The proconsular governors and administrators were a varied group. “Church and King” Tories, along with Wellington’s coterie of divisional and brigade commanders from the Peninsular War, dominated the initial cadre. Individuals from this group came primarily from aristocratic and gentry backgrounds. However, by the third decade of the nineteenth century, this “Old Guard” of combat officers from the Peninsula War were being replaced by younger staff officers who were more comfortable managing logistical issues such as equipment, discipline, quartering of troops, and other organizational tasks. These new generations of

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technocrats were much better equipped to handle a more elaborate and sophisticated imperial/colonial administration.

Thousands of books have been written about the British Empire. Andrew Porter has noted that the scope and content of imperial/colonial history is so extensive and vast that scholars, teachers, and students have found it virtually impossible to keep up with all of the available material.\(^{34}\) Indeed, Porter’s exhaustive bibliography lists nearly 24,000 books, articles, and other published materials concerning various facets of Britain’s imperial holdings. Despite Porter’s and his colleagues’ collective efforts, an estimated additional 16,000 works have yet to be catalogued into a comprehensive bibliography of British imperial and colonial publications.\(^{35}\)

In addition to the thousands of works dealing with British imperial/colonial history, scholars who wish to study post-Napoleonic proconsular officers also need to consult scholarly works concerning the British military forces of the period. It is therefore necessary to consult John Holding’s listing of 447 publications dealing with the eighteenth-century British Army, Albert Tucker’s compilation of fifty-nine books concerning the army of the nineteenth century, and Ronald Haycock’s listing of 619 works examining the British army in India, Canada, and South Africa.\(^{36}\) Historiographical sources for British military figures who became proconsuls can also be found in two significant bibliographical sources, Donald Horward’s \textit{Napoleonic Military History: A Bibliography} and Ronald J. Caldwell’s two-volume work, \textit{The Era of Napoleon: A Bibliography of the History of Western Civilization, 1799-1815}.\(^{37}\) However, within this


\(^{35}\) Ibid. xiii.


extensive body of scholarship relatively few books have been published examining proconsular imperial/colonial administrations and their individual administrators in the decades following the Napoleonic Wars.

Professor Stephen Saunders Webb examines proconsular governance in his book, The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681. Webb identifies proconsular rule by employing the term “garrison government” in his study of the genesis of colonial governance by military officers within England and the occupied territories of Scotland and Ireland and its transition to newly settled English colonies in the western hemisphere. Webb argues that from the outset, early English colonization was “as much military as it was commercial.”

Furthermore, the author notes that throughout the seventeenth century England’s colonial administrators were comprised almost exclusively of military men. Like the military officers who served 150 years later in the Peninsula, these officers gained administrative experience garrisoning outposts during Cromwell’s interregnum and Charles II’s restoration. Under this form of rule, colonial government remained authoritarian and centralized even when faced with resistance by local populations that were by tradition libertarian and mercantilist. Webb argues that military officers remained in firm control of colonial populations until 1681 when a compromise was reached between the Crown and the colonies that gave limited authority to colonial legislatures. Although imperial authority remained paramount in the colonies, the compromise of 1681 began a trend that diminished the Crown’s authority in the colonies while strengthening that of the local legislatures.


39 Webb’s research notes that nearly 90 percent of colonial governors were serving military officers. See Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681, xviii.
While similarities exist between professor Webb’s thesis and this study, there are significant differences. In the decades that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British Colonial office employed proconsular administration on a significantly larger scale. The size and scope of the British Empire in 1815 dwarfed that of the colonial holdings of England in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, Webb downplays the role commerce exerted on determining colonial policy by military administrators. Overseas administrators of the post-Napoleonic period were keenly aware that the commercial wellbeing of their colonies ensured their continued employment. During the period of financial retrenchment that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Colonial Secretary Lord Bathurst stipulated that colonial governments become self-sufficient as not to present too great of a burden on the metropole.

A substantial number of scholars such as Ronald Hyam, Douglas M. Peers, John Benyon, John W. Cell, Peter Burroughs, and David Cannadine all recognize that the proconsuls governed imperial possessions in the nineteenth century. However, all of these scholars have limited their observations to specific aspects and not to an examination of the process as a whole. All note the existence of the practice, but none of them analyze it or offer an explanation on the origin and evolution of the practice. Professor Hyam seeks to understand the character of Britons who sought overseas service, noting that a substantial number of them found that they could exercise their talents and indulge their eccentricities in a manner that would normally not be tolerated in Britain.\(^{40}\) Peers comes closest to discussing this practice. He examines proconsularism in India and how this form of administration adapted to the subcontinent’s long established practice of governance.\(^{41}\) Peers argues that traditional Indian society was inherently militarized and that the blending of civil and military spheres insured continuity while offering the British a cost-

\(^{40}\) Ronald Hyam, *Britains Imperial Century*, 1815-1914, 148-150.

\(^{41}\) Douglas M. Peers, *Between Mars and Mammon*, 44.
effective means of administration.42 John Benyon scrutinizes the development of the office of the British high commissioner in South Africa, initially a minor functionary who became a central influence in shaping and controlling British, Boer, and Bantu societies.43 Although the role of the high commissioner is capably defined and examined, Benyon assumes that readers understand the proconsular practice along with its functions and duties. Cell examines the occupational backgrounds of administrators, commenting that thirteen of the thirty-seven mid-nineteenth century governors had military experience. But he fails to note why military men were chosen.44 Burroughs, well known as a leading imperial historian and co-editor of the prestigious Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, likewise observes that the proconsular system existed; but he prefers to emphasize that the constraints of time and distance created a multiplicity of competing centers of authority in each colony that contributed to a less than uniform pattern of colonial rule.45 To Burroughs, these imperial/colonial agents played a mediating role in the governance of the empire, comparing them to “pointsmen on the railway” who interpreted Colonial Office directives by modifying them to suit their specific colonial situation.46 Burroughs notes that far from being subordinates, proconsuls acted on their own agendas by formulating policy that they, and not the Colonial Office, thought to be beneficial. As the Colonial Office Legal Advisor James Stephen observed in 1830, “Though not perhaps men of very large capacity, their proximity to the scene of action is an advantage which in this

42 Ibid., 45.
46 Ibid., 176-177.
case would more than compensate for every other incompetence.” Cannadine observes that the practice existed and mentions the most prominent of the proconsuls, yet he pays scant attention to their careers and their methods of governance. In short, imperial/colonial historians are well aware that until the mid-nineteenth century British overseas administration relied heavily on the practice of proconsularism, but few scholars acknowledge its importance.

Only recently have scholars shown an interest in examining the proconsular phenomenon, in part because of the new interest in the formation of governmental institutions and their operations within the Second British Empire. Zoë Laidlaw observed that for many decades historians of the British Empire have preferred to concentrate primarily on social, economic, and political issues in the individual colonies and paid little attention to the mechanics of administration between the metropole and the colonies. Andrew Porter’s Bibliography of Imperial, Colonial and Commonwealth History Since 1600 lists only twenty-two works applicable to colonial/imperial administration in the early nineteenth century. One reason for this may be that the bureaucratic organization in the minuscule Colonial Office and throughout the empire was largely an ad hoc process. Proconsuls and administrators in the colonies, the “man on the spot,” of the early decades of the nineteenth century were frequently the principal determinants of policy within their provinces. The Colonial Office’s apparent lack of interest in formulating a homogeneous policy may have been a recognition of the constraints of time and distance. However, another prevailing dynamic at the time was Secretary of War and the

47 Ibid.
48 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire, 15-16.
50 Porter lists only 182 books and articles that deal with constitutional, administrative, and legal subjects for the years 1815 to 1931. It is from this list that the twenty-two most applicable books were chosen. To put this issue in greater context, Porter’s bibliography lists nearly 24,000 works that pertain to British Imperial/Colonial history. See Andrew Porter, Bibliography of Imperial, Colonial, and Commonwealth History Since 1600, The Royal Historical Society Bibliography: The History of Britain, Ireland, and the British Overseas, 536-542.
Colonies Lord Bathurst and Counsel for Colonial Business James Stephen’s preoccupation with the slavery issue. It is well documented that Stephen and many in the Colonial Office were members of the Clapham Sect and sympathetic to humanitarian issues such as the suppression and eventual eradication of slavery in the empire.  

The historiographical traditions of the British Second Empire are subject to a wide variety of models. Since the American Revolution, British historians, journalists, writers, and independent scholars have debated the nature of the empire, staking out a number of positions and viewpoints. Among the first to contribute to this rich historiographical tradition were the Whigs and the Tories who championed their respective visions of empire. Nevertheless, these were not the only people who supplied opinions as to the nature of the empire. Radical thinkers, utilitarians, and evangelical Christians as well used the power of the press to disseminate their views. As C. A. Bayly notes, all of these diverse groups agreed that Britain was morally obligated to improve through the means of enlightened government and industry the states they inherited upon the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. All of these critics acknowledged that in the past the Crown had badly mismanaged the empire, culminating with the loss of the American colonies in 1783. Indeed, one of the first to decry previous colonial mismanagement was Paul Colquhoun, who argued in his 1815 work, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and


52 C. A. Bayly notes that since its existence, imperial historians have argued whether there was a distinct “Second British Empire” or one empire subject to a number of permutations. Even the date of the origins of the Second Empire is subject to intense debate with some scholars arguing that the 1783 Peace of Paris was a watershed moment for the Crown’s colonial policy. Historian Vincent T. Harlow argued in the 1960s that the British territorial gains made in 1763 along with the loss of the American colonies some twenty years later convinced ministers and elites that an Empire of expanding trade was more beneficial to the state than one of settlement and territorial control. See C. A. Bayly, “The Second British Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: Historiography, Vol. 5, ed. Robin W. Winks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 60.

Resources, of the British Empire in Every Quarter of the World, Including the East Indies, that the blood and treasure expended, especially in the West Indies and New South Wales, was squandered by ineffectual Crown policies and inept administrators.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, Colquhoun singles out New South Wales as a fitting example of unrestrained expansion without any compensation to the home country observing, “It appears only necessary to state this simple fact, in order to shew the impolicy of establishing a settlement in this distant region of the world, and the slender expectation from the facts which have been disclosed of its ever proving otherwise than a heavy expense to this country, without any hope of remuneration from its trade or any other advantage. . .”\textsuperscript{55} Faced with this sort of criticism, it is not surprising that the first historiographical trend to emerge was that of a series of biographies of earlier successful imperial proconsuls such as Warren Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, Richard Wellesley, and Stanford Raffles who prudently managed their colonies.\textsuperscript{56} Interestingly, all of these works emerged in the 1820s and 1830s, when the practice of colonial proconsular administration was at its height.

In the mid-nineteenth century, colonial/imperial writers begin to change their focus by publishing patriotic colonial histories, especially those of the settler colonies. This historiographical trend coincided with a period of Parliamentary retrenchment in which Imperial garrisons were being withdrawn.\textsuperscript{57} Instead of concentrating on metropolitan administration, historians, scholars, and writers began to look at the possibility of colonial self-government within the institutions of empire. Peter Burroughs argues that during the decades of the mid-nineteenth century, successive British ministries adopted a trusteeship and paternalist stance

\textsuperscript{54} Colquhoun, Patrick. A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources, of the British Empire in Every Quarter of the World Including the East Indies … (London: Joseph Mawman, 1815), 320 and 419.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
toward the colonies that best served Britain’s economic, political, and strategic interests.

Histories praising the hard work, determination, and resourcefulness of the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, and South Africa replaced the earlier proconsular biographies. One of the most significant and influential authors of this period was John Dunmore Lang, a Scottish Evangelical Presbyterian clergyman, politician, and educationalist, who published a series of historical, geographical, political, and religious works on the Australasian settlements. Among his better-known writings were An Historical and Statistical Account of New South Wales published in 1837, and Freedom and Independence for the Golden Lands of Australia: The Right of the Colonies and the Interest of Britain and the World written fifteen years later. In the latter work, Lang argued for the necessity of self-government because government from a distance frequently meant bad government. Furthermore, Lang disliked the aristocratic influences in British society and politics and believed that republicanism better reflected the nature of Australian society.

Canadian administrators and military men Joseph Gubbins and Walter Henry also contributed to this historiographical trend. Gubbins, a lieutenant colonel and inspecting field officer of militia in New Brunswick, published an account of his service describing the full spectrum of life in the colony. His duties that included traveling widely through the territory prompted him to write a descriptive account of the colonists whom he met. Gubbins noted that they were “decidedly American in habit and attitude and had lost British customs in religion,

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neatness, frugality, husbandry and cooking.” Henry’s experiences as a surgeon and officer in the 66th Regiment also offered a glimpse of life in the Canadian colonies. In June 1827, Henry sailed to Canada with his regiment. He remained there, eventually becoming Inspector General of the Army Medical Services of Canada in 1852. While stationed with his regiment, he published his memoirs in 1839. Henry devoted considerable space to his time there, praising the Irish settlers and Canada’s governor, James Kempt.

Besides applauding the industriousness of the settlement colonies, a significant number of imperial historians of the first half of the nineteenth century were also some of the empire’s harshest critics. Many argued that the overseas empire “had provided the instruments of their own destruction.” Writers such as Henry Brougham and John Arthur Roebuck argued that the empire polluted the British constitution, stifling the nation’s economic growth encouraging monopolies.” Brougham, a noted Whig, observed in his 1803 treatise, An Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers, that the “mother country” sent out young men who when they returned were consumed by avarice and voluptuousness, characteristics that had been acquired from overseas service that now infected the citizenry of their home country, damaging the morals of the state. Likewise, John Arthur Roebuck argued in his 1849 book, The Colonies of England: A Plan for Government of Some Portion of Our Colonial Possessions, that because

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62 Henry observes that Irish colonists “of the lower orders improve much on exportation, and in this colony particularly, they became valuable members of society. They leave behind them much of their turbulence and combativelyness, as well as of their mendacious and tipsifying attributes; work quietly, and honestly, and industriously, and generally speaking, get on very well.” See Walter Henry, Surgeon Henry’s Trifles: Events of a Military Life, Pat Hayward ed. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), 213-215.


the colonies had never been governed in a systematic manner, benefits derived from them aided only the metropole. 66 The home country, concerned only with commerce and trade, failed to appreciate the almost limitless potential of its colonies. Roebuck, citing the United States as an example, contended that if all of Britain’s colonies were allowed self-government, both the colonies and the metropole would benefit by yielding significant financial returns and lowering maintenance costs. 67

The scholarly debate concerning the relevance and value of a colonial empire continued for decades. Radical critics contended that continued expansion of the empire increased the power of the executive, endangered traditional English liberties, and quashed the independence of formerly free people, especially in Asia. 68 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, new and significant intellectual trends began to influence imperial historiography. Social Darwinism, nationalism, and capitalism provided scholars with justifications for their analysis. In the last years of the nineteenth century, proponents of the theory of Social Darwinism saw the world divided into two major blocs, strong nation states and weaker ones, or as Eric Hobsbawn characterized the world, “the advanced and the backward.” 69 In 1898, Lord Salisbury bifurcated the political state of the world through the prism of Social Darwinism when he divided the world into two groups, powers that were dying and those living and vibrant. 70 Paul Kennedy observes that Salisbury’s description of his world was correct when scrutinized in the context of the period. China had been recently defeated by Japan during the short 1894-1895 war, the United

67 Ibid.
States had humiliated Spain in the Spanish American War, and France had retreated before Britain over the Fashoda incident.\textsuperscript{71} This notion was not lost on late Victorian and Edwardian British historians who were well aware of the challenges posed by competing continental powers, the United States and Japan, in acquiring overseas empires.\textsuperscript{72}

The subject of nationalism also colored the perspective of historians. Nationalism both encouraged imperialist historians and strengthened nationalist identity among native colonial populations. For example, British historian George McCall Theal’s multi-volume \textit{History of South Africa}, written just after the conclusion of the Boer War, provided an elaborate justification for British occupation of the Cape colonies.\textsuperscript{73} Theal argued that British government and commerce contributed significantly to the development of a stable and prosperous South Africa. The work was also intended as a rebuttal to a strengthening Afrikaner consciousness brought about by their successes in the late war with the British. Rising nationalist identity among native non-European colonial populations also found a voice in nationalist historiography.

Early Australian historians characterized their development as a process of adopting British institutions, technology, and culture to a new setting that fit their unique situation.\textsuperscript{74} Much of this early historiography consisted of journals, scientific accounts, and life in the strangely alien antipodes intended for a curious British public. Most notable among these accounts were William Wentworth’s \textit{A Statistical, Historical and Political Description of the Colony of New South Wales and Its Dependent Settlements}, written in 1819, and James

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\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} C. A. Bayly, “ the Second British Empire,” in \textit{The Oxford History of the British Empire}, Vol. 5, 57,
\end{flushleft}
Macarthur’s *New South Wales: Its Present State and Future Prospects: Being a Statement with Documentary Evidence* published nearly twenty years later. Macarthur’s work is notable in that he championed the industriousness and ingenuity of the primarily convict population despite their hard life under prejudiced and autocratic proconsuls. Yet even in these works there is evidence of a nascent sense of uniqueness and separateness among the Australian population. Robert Hughes argues that Australia’s origins as a penal colony produced a distinctive type of colonist. The transported prisoner, or “assigned man,” worked within a rigid framework of laws and rights. As a result, under the Australian penal system, the convicts became self-reliant, learned an occupation, and were rewarded for doing right. Moreover, the social background of its settlers and the harshness of the land engendered a society very different from that of the mother country.

Imperial scholars have long held a fascination with the question of the benefits of imperial growth and its relationship to capitalism. Ever since the publication of J. A. Hobson’s *Imperialism* in 1902 and Vladimir Lenin’s Marxist elaboration of the thesis some fourteen years later, imperial historians have focused a substantial amount of attention to the relationship between the nineteenth-century British economy and its effect on the rest of the globe, especially in its colonies. As P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins have pointed out, studies of this nature have frequently led historians to adopt a stereotypical view of what Immanuel Wallerstein characterized as the “exploiting metropole.” According to both Hobson and Lenin, capitalist states such as Britain required overseas possessions in order to acquire raw materials to manufacture finished goods that would in turn be sold overseas to emerging and expanding

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75 Ibid., 163.
markets creating surplus funds for future investment. Lenin takes Hobson’s thesis one step further by arguing that monopolistic cartels of manufacturers, bankers, and financiers had to move beyond their own borders in order to dominate the more significant and larger global markets, thus dividing the world into state-sponsored capitalist spheres of influence. After Hobson and Lenin, historians and scholars have devoted a great deal of time and effort in discussing the merits or fallacies of these two thinkers. It may be argued that this debate has attracted significant attention among Imperial historians. Indeed, J. M. Mackenzie has observed that studies of working class resistance to imperialism, the nature of the Boer War, and Hobson’s significance have influenced subsequent historians and the nature of their research. Throughout the twentieth century, Hobson’s controversial thesis has significantly affected the nature of imperial historiography. In 1919, Joseph Schumpeter built upon Hobson’s implications by observing that capitalism, along with Britain’s nineteenth-century social structure produced a unique form of imperialism. Schumpeter stressed that cooperation between the British aristocracy and an emerging bourgeoisie was a significant force behind Britain’s accumulation of colonies overseas. Schumpeter defines imperialism as “the objectless disposition on the part of the state to unlimited forcible expansion.” Professor Schumpeter elaborates on his thesis by noting that in order to retain its power base, Britain’s warrior class required the support of the bourgeoisie in championing “expansion for the sake of expanding, war for the sake of fighting,

82 Ibid.
victory for the sake of winning, dominion for the sake of ruling.”

Elie Halévy, George Bennett, and John S. Galbraith have argued that even though Hobson’s and Lenin’s theses are significant, imperial history cannot be limited to a solely economic explanation, as other important and relevant issues were involved. For example, Professor Halévy argues that the emergence of nineteenth-century evangelicals and the rise of mass journalism were significant forces in promoting imperialism. Likewise, Bennett and Galbraith each maintain that imperialism flourished because of a rise in public humanitarianism, which promoted a widespread belief that Western values, Christianity, and good government would be beneficial to “the backward races” of the colonies.

Forty years ago, J. Gallagher and R. Robinson contributed another dimension to the Imperial historiographical tradition. It is from the work of these two that the distinction between formal and informal empire was defined. Gallagher and Robinson noted that imperial systems could exist as either a formal empire bound to the home country by legal control, or as an informal entity bound to the metropole through influence. Throughout history, imperial regimes

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86 Galbraith argues that during the first half of the nineteenth century British evangelicals were preoccupied with crusading against perceived evils in exotic locations such Africa and Asia. Employing methods that were successful in eradicating slavery in the empire, evangelicals through the means of the pulpit, popular press, and committees such as the London Missionary Society and the Wesleyan Society were able to implement humanitarian reform both at home and abroad. However, Galbraith observes that the residual effects of such a campaign advanced a predilection for even further colonization. See John S. Galbraith, “Myths of the ‘Little England’ Era,” in American Historical Review, LXVIII (October 1961), 34-48. Bennett also believes that evangelical influence played a significant role in colonial governance. Furthermore, he argues that the philosophy of Edmund Burke influenced colonial administrators like Lord William Bentinck, Sir Henry Lawrence, Baron John M. L. Lawrence, and Baron Cromer. All of these men believed that colonial rule was a trusteeship where it was a trustee’s duty to improve the lot of those less fortunate. For these gentlemen, responsible government included education, preventing oppression of the peasants, and generally improving the lot of those that they governed. See George Bennett ed., The Concept of Empire, Burke to Atlee, 1774-1947 (London: Adam and Charles Black, Ltd., 1953).

87 It should be clarified that Gallagher and Robinson borrowed the term “informal empire” from C.R. Fray who used the term in his work, Imperial Economy and its Place in the Foundation of Economic Doctrine, 1600-1932.
have frequently ruled large blocs of territory informally and without the necessity of political formalities. A noteworthy example of an informal empire would be that of ancient Athens and their establishment of the Delian League in fifth century B.C.E. Athenian industry and commerce benefited from the expansion of seaborne trade in the aftermath of the Persian Wars.\(^88\) As a result, Athens was able to exert leadership over a number of smaller, less powerful states in the Aegean Sea that were anxious to partake in the commercial and military benefits that a more powerful state offered. Gallagher and Robinson argued that Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth century controlled a far larger informal empire than their formal overseas possessions would indicate. Hobsbawn notes that in the last third of the nineteenth century, a substantial portion of Britain’s foreign investment went to Argentina and Uruguay, which gave the British Foreign Office considerable influence with those states.\(^89\) Indeed, Paul Kennedy’s research reveals that, in the nineteenth century, British surplus capital funded overseas investment in new railways, ports, utilities, and agricultural enterprises throughout the world, especially in Latin and South America.\(^90\) For example, Argentina discovered a market for exporting its beef and grain to Britain, allowing it to pay not only for imported manufactured items, but also to repay long-term loans thus keeping its credit high for future borrowing. Alan Knight notes that Latin and South American markets, which comprised some 10 percent of Britain’s exports between 1860 and 1913, enabled the island kingdom to exert significant cultural and political influence over the region.\(^91\)

\(^{89}\) Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, 66.  
\(^{90}\) Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, 156.  
Although Gallagher and Robinson’s views have garnered a considerable amount of attention, there recently has been a renewed interest among imperial historians in examining the structure and administration of empire during the proconsular era. In the last thirty years a small number of historians have begun to revisit this important period of British administration. Peter Burroughs, John Cell, Douglas M. Peers, Hew Strachan, and Zoë Laidlaw have made notable contributions to the study of post-Napoleonic British proconsuls and their method of governance. Burrough’s article, “Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire,” notes that the Second British Empire, unlike the earlier Spanish and French empires, was not controlled by an authoritarian metropole. Rather, governance of the empire was based on devolved authority and the metropole’s awareness of local centers of power in each colony. Leadership relied on a “continuous interplay between mother country and colonial communities,” or in other words, constant negotiations between the center and the periphery concerning the imposition of rule and the acceptance of that rule. Proconsuls who governed within the imperial/colonial administration frequently played a mediating role between the directives of the Colonial Office and the desires of the colonial elites. Burroughs argues that imperial/colonial administrators, the “men on the spot,” were key in playing a mediating role

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between London’s directives and actual conditions on the periphery.\(^94\) Because of their unique positions, imperial/colonial proconsuls were extraordinarily difficult to control.

Much of John Cell’s work, *British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy Making Process*, is outside the range of this study; however, his first chapters offer a perspective on the environment in which imperial/colonial proconsuls worked. Cell argues that the Colonial Office in the first half of the nineteenth century was overburdened with work, precluding any possibility of implementing a coherent policy. He observes that in the absence of an established and enforced policy, imperial/colonial administrators and their staffs worked toward an efficient and good form of imperial government, which most administrators realized was a prerequisite for self-government. Cell notes that many of top administrators viewed their appointments as a confirmation of their ability and worked hard to be responsible professional administrators. Furthermore, Cell believes that the Colonial Office operated an efficient meritocracy that recruited competent, occasionally brilliant administrators, refuting the popular belief fostered by authors such as Thackeray and Trollope that those who occupied top colonial/imperial positions were corrupt job seekers.\(^95\) However, it should be noted that Professor Cell’s research considers only those later proconsuls, men who received their administrative positions in the late 1830s and 1840s, men who, according to this dissertation, were the more competent and better-trained individuals.

Douglas Peers’ *Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India* focuses primarily on the administrative structure of the East India Company in India in the years following Waterloo. Peers examines the proconsular rule of Hastings, Amherst, and

\(^94\) Ibid., 176.

Bentinck and notes that because the army was the central institution in India’s colonial regime, it received first claim to available resources. Moreover, the author argues that British officials within the East India Company assumed that Indian society would best accept a militaristic form of rule, as past forms of governance on the subcontinent were inherently militarized. By exercising their power in an authoritarian and arbitrary manner, many of the early nineteenth-century proconsuls in India ran afoul of the East India Company elites, who attempted—frequently unsuccessfully—to restrain their officials. Or example, Peers notes that William Amherst embarked on the First Burmese War despite East India Company instructions. Precarious Company finances and a problematic Company Army militated against engaging in any conflict. Evertheless, Amherst instigated a war that proved to be the costliest and most controversial of the early nineteenth century’s colonial wars without securing any tangible benefits.

Peers’ work is a valuable addition to the study of British imperial proconsularism. India, while not technically a colony at this time, was Britain’s most important overseas possession. As such, both the East India Company and the Crown closely monitored any experimentation in political administration. Furthermore, the significant role played by the British Army both domestically in Britain and overseas in the colonies in the period following its victory at Waterloo cannot be underestimated. Linda Colley observes that Britain’s 130 year-long succession of wars with France was instrumental in forging a national British consciousness from the ethnically diverse kingdoms of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.

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importance of the military was significant enough to preserve the proconsular method of administration despite the reform movements that swept Britain in the 1820s and 1830s. As Peers contends, Britain’s dependence on the sword for maintaining control in India had a significant influence in how other imperial possessions were governed. 99

Hew Strachan discusses the demographics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth- century British officer corps in the opening chapters of his work, The Politics of the British Army. Strachan, supplementing his research with that of scholars such as P. E. Razzell, J. A. Houlding, Louis Namier, John Brooke, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, John Childs, and Alan Guy creates a useful, albeit incomplete profile, of the officers who led the army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 100 Armed with this research, Strachan argues that the British army that fought Napoleon was essentially comprised of “middling sorts” who were, for the most part, career-oriented officers. 101 Likewise, the officers who did not demobilize and accepted half-pay went on to sharpen their professional skills in the incessant colonial campaigning that took place after 1815. Strachan acknowledges that the burden of colonial administration rested on this group, creating a mutually beneficial relationship for the officers and the state. While it was not Strachan’s intent to examine the proconsular phenomenon, he recognizes that this situation did indeed exist.

Zoë Laidlaw is the most recent contributor to the scholarly discussion of the proconsular phenomenon. Laidlaw’s Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution, and Colonial Government examines both the official and unofficial lines of communication

99 Ibid., 1.
100 For example, Strachan examines Scottish representation in the eighteenth century British officers but fails to offer critical statistics that reflect the other ethnicities that populated the corps. Irish contributions that, were significant during this same period are totally neglected in his study. See Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 25-30.
available to the imperial/colonial proconsuls and their superiors at the Colonial Office during the first decades of the nineteenth century. However, her work also considers the operation of colonial rule in the settler colonies before the inauguration of self-government and the subsequent changes to colonial governance in the thirty years after the Battle of Waterloo.¹⁰² During this period, proconsular rule overseas was the prevailing method of colonial governance. Furthermore, this was the period in which fundamental social, political, and religious reforms were occurring both in Britain and in the colonies. As Linda Colley notes, in Britain significant social and political reforms were delayed because of the state’s preoccupation with nearly twenty-five years of war with the French.¹⁰³ Long neglected issues such as Irish Emancipation and Parliamentary reform were again raised with the onset of peace in 1815. Overseas, Britain’s colonies struggled with the issues of slavery, migration, wars, rebellion, and the demands for self-government. British elites, the Crown, Parliament, and the landed aristocracy, all recognized that the American colonies were lost to mishandling colonial governance and had little desire to repeat this mistake.

Laidlaw’s study brings together the intricate maze of official and unofficial connections employed by both the metropole and the colonies in governing the post-Waterloo empire. She examines how these links shaped colonial administration, especially in three areas: how administrators functioned as mediators between the metropolitan government and their colonial subjects; how colonial officials executed their duty in an effort to assure job security; and how

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Those outside the government influenced colonial policy and administration. As the empire grew in size and administrative sophistication, the Colonial Office began to reevaluate the role of personal communications in colonial governance. Consequently, substantial changes occurred in the way traditional networks of communication functioned. In the 1830s, the Colonial Office began to exert greater control over its overseas proconsuls, significantly diminishing their authority. The emergence of local colonial officials who had few personal ties with the metropole further weakened the personal lines of communication that existed between the colony and the mother country.

This dissertation also owes a debt of gratitude to historian William R. Skelton, whose book, The American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 provided the inspiration for this study. This book, which is in part a prosopographical study of the antebellum United States Army’s officer corps, provided the template for creating the social and demographic profiles that figure prominently in this work. During the first half of the nineteenth century, British and American societies, and the armies they fostered, were significantly dissimilar. By examining the collective biographies of the American officer corps, Skelton raises significant fundamental questions applicable to both armies, answering queries such as the social composition, parents’ occupations, education, patron-client relations, and career motivations that were essential in creating a complete profile of individuals who embarked on military careers. Moreover, his skillful discussion of career motivations, group values, and internal

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105 Previous to the Whig assumption of power in the 1830s, personal and informal networks of communication between the Colonial Secretary and his governors were the norm. However, with the advent of the Whigs and the sophistication of colonial administration more formal networks were emplaced that superseded the old methods. See Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, The Information Revolution, and Colonial Government, 5.

106 Ibid., 301.
cohesion within the American officer corps was most valuable and useful in helping understand the officer ethos and applying it to a new model.

Conclusion

Proconsular administration governing an empire’s colonies and territories is nearly as old as recorded history. Britain, long familiar with the proconsular practice, employed this method of governance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but allowed it to fall into disuse as colonial legislatures became more powerful. However, with the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent territorial acquisitions won by Britain at the Congress of Vienna, Britain substantially increased her overseas colonial empire. This fact coupled with the smallness of Colonial Office necessitated a practical and financially cost effective solution in administering Britannia’s global empire. Lord Liverpool’s Tory administration found such a solution by employing experienced veteran command and staff military officers for key colonial administrative positions. This cost effective policy provided the far-flung territories with trained administrators who were politically reliable and militarily competent to protect the colony from internal and external threats.

The historiography of the early nineteenth-century era of proconsular British Imperialism is minimal. A few scholars such as Peter Burroughs, John Cell, Douglas Peers, Hew Strachan, and Zoë Laidlaw have made reference to the proconsular practice.

A minimal number of historians, however, have endeavored to make a detailed study of the practice as it was employed in the post-Napoleonic British Empire or of the men who served during the period as proconsuls. His study endeavors to fill this gap by explaining some of the essential questions associated with British colonial proconsularism of the early nineteenth century. This work will examine the root causes as to why the proconsular practice was
employed at the end of the Napoleonic Wars; why military officers were selected as colonial administrators; the ethnicity and social backgrounds of the officers selected for colonial administrative posts; the networks they employed in achieving coveted colonial postings; and their ability to function in these colonial postings.
CHAPTER TWO: AN ARMY IN SEARCH OF A MISSION: THE POST-NAPOLEONIC BRITISH ARMY

By mid-evening of June 18, 1815, the great and terrible battle of Waterloo ended with the defeat of Napoleon. The battle had raged all through the unseasonably damp and overcast day as more than 200,000 soldiers and 537 cannons fought over less than six kilometers of Belgian countryside. At stake was the fate of Europe. One hundred days before, Napoleon Bonaparte returned from an allied-imposed exile, attempting to reestablish French domination on continental Europe. The human cost of the battle was horrific; French losses numbered 42,000, Prussians: 6,698, assorted allied troops: 9,400, and British casualties amounted to 7,460 men, or 29.9 percent of all of their troops engaged.¹ Waterloo, as Arthur Wellesley the Duke of Wellington proclaimed, “…was the most desperate business I was ever in. I never took so much trouble about any Battle & never was so near being beat. Our loss is immense particularly in that best of all Instruments, British Infantry. I never saw the Infantry behave so well.”²

The British military had beaten the finest forces Napoleon had ever assembled. By defeating “Boney,”³ Wellington and the Army awed Europe and the British public with their martial prowess. The navy that protected Britain for centuries momentarily vanished from the British public’s imagination. By 1815 the public’s memory of the Battle of Trafalgar was as cold as Nelson’s body in its tomb in St. Paul’s Cathedral.⁴ Since 1805, the navy’s exploits were less than enviable. Recently, the navy had fought a lackluster war against the fledgling American Navy in 1812. An 1814 debate in the House of Commons analyzed the reasons why

³ A popular British nickname for Napoleon Bonaparte.
⁴ A December 6, 1816 letter to the London Times requested that the distribution of surplus Waterloo subscription funds include disabled sailors. See Times (London), December 11, 1816.
the Royal Navy fared so poorly against the Americans and suggested that the Admiralty supply an account of the naval actions between January 1812 and November 1813. The British Army and Wellington, on the other hand, defeated Napoleon and now led a coalition of allies in the occupation of France. As Linda Colley observes, “Waterloo had made the world safe for gentlemen again. A British army led by a duke, and officered overwhelmingly by men of landed background who had purchased their commissions, helped destroy a self-made emperor and his legions.” In the process, the army had regained its prominence after a humiliating defeat in America, defeated French republicanism, destroyed Napoleon’s military dominance in Continental Europe, and dramatically enlarged its global empire.

Scholars view the Waterloo Campaign as a footnote to the whole Napoleonic Era. Owen Connelly characterizes the episode as the “glorious irrelevance” noting that Napoleon’s exit from the European stage was appropriately glorious and dramatic. Bonaparte’s final attempt to regain power in France and exert some influence in European affairs was a nearly impossible task. His odds of succeeding were at best slim. Domestically, Napoleon had to reestablish his legitimacy; form a new national government that encompassed all shades of the French political spectrum including Jacobins, liberals, republicans, and even a few royalists who did not flee with Louis XVIII; finance, recruit, and equip an army; and reinvent himself as peacemaker to a

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5 The debate focused on two important questions; why did the British fare badly in the initial ship-to-ship actions and what were the reasons for American successes on the Great Lakes? In determining the answer to the first question, the House of Commons found that the American frigates were larger and better manned than that of their British counterpart. To remedy this situation, the Admiralty decided to cut down 74-gun third-rate ships of the line creating a super-frigate that could match the American vessels. The House also found that their lack of success on the Great Lakes stemmed from neglect by the colonial officials, poor planning by military logisticians, and a failure to crew vessels with adequate crews. The report to the House of Commons ended with the comment, “The great objects of the war . . . had been sacrificed through neglect . . .” See Times (London), December 2, 1814.


7 Ibid.

8 Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon’s Military Campaigns (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1987), 201.
war-weary state. Outside of France Napoleon faced even greater difficulties than those that he confronted domestically. Less than one week after Napoleon’s escape from Elba, the Allies meeting in Vienna declared to Louis XVIII that he would receive the assistance necessary to reestablish public tranquility, and proclaimed that Napoleon was an international outlaw and disturber of continental peace. To accomplish this task the major allies assembled more than 864,000 men in nine separate armies under the supreme command of Austrian Fieldmarshal Prince Karl Philip Schwarzenberg. Napoleon, at the same time, could only muster 210,000 reliable troops divided into eight different armies. In mid-June 1815 Napoleon allocated more than 128,000 men in northeastern France to launch a strike against Anglo-Allied-Prussian forces in Belgium. The short campaign culminated with Napoleon’s defeat at the Battle of Waterloo. That defeat effectively ended Bonaparte’s bid to reclaim France.

Waterloo may have ended one legend but it also created a new one. Napoleon’s falling star heralded the dramatic rise of Wellington’s. In 1815, Wellington was Britain’s most successful military commander. At the outset of the campaign, Wellington was only one of many army commanders who participated in the coalition against Napoleon. After Waterloo, the Duke became the arbiter of the allies and kingmaker for the French. In the uncertain and volatile period following Napoleon’s downfall, Wellington’s authority and moderation enabled a second peaceful restoration of the Bourbons. Louis XVIII, in following the Duke’s advice, demonstrated to the fractious allies that the resumption of the king’s rule was the best solution in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat. Charles Kingsley Webster observes that Louis’ swift and

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11 Ibid. 16-17.
peaceful restoration was due largely to Wellington’s political shrewdness and military decisiveness. With Louis back on the throne of France it was imperative that the Allies frame a second peace treaty. Wellington again was instrumental in drafting an equitable treaty more intent on pacifying than punishing France. The Duke after observing six years of harsh French occupation policies in Spain was anxious to avoid punitive measures. Such means, Wellington noted, “impaired the efficiency of every [occupying] army … and rallied the French nation against the invaders.”

Keeping France stable and quiescent enabled Louis’ return. Extensive discussions by the Allies in the early summer of 1815 determined the future fate of France: Prussia, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Bavaria and Württemburg favored some dismemberment of their former enemy. In a secret memorandum of July 24, 1815, British Foreign Secretary Robert Stewart Lord Castlereagh outlined to Prime Minister Robert Jenkinson Lord Liverpool the views of each of the Allies toward France. Prussia and the major German states desired a weakened France while Russia agreed with Britain that France remain strong to act as a counterpoise to growing Prussian influence in western Europe. The Austrians leaned toward the Russian position but were wary of France and Russia developing “too close a connexion.” Britain had hoped that a lenient policy of returning Louis to the throne and making few territorial demands on France would be the best policy to create a stable France and offer the Allies long-term security in a carefully constructed continental balance of power. France sensed the disparity of positions and played a skillful game of brinksmanship. French foreign minister Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Périgord made it clear to Castlereagh that Louis was prepared to pay reparations but

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 505.
15 C. K. Webster ed., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, Castlereagh to Liverpool (No. 16.), July 24, 1815.
16 Ibid.
would resist any further territorial demands made by the Allies. The foreign minister also hinted that a France without Louis would make the country susceptible to a new Jacobin strongman intent on reclaiming France’s place as a major power. Wellington’s active endorsement of a moderate policy of returning Louis made him the most acceptable choice to administer and command the Allied occupation forces. Austria, Russia, and France found the alternative of turning military and administrative command of the Allied occupation forces over to Marshal Gerherd Blucher and the Prussians unacceptable. Blucher, as commander of the Prussian forces, intended to exact punitive measures on the French populace and, as an example, planned to blow up the Pont de Jena on the Seine, in retribution for Napoleon’s victories in 1806.

The Second Treaty of Paris, signed in November 1815 by the Allies, was harsh but not vindictive. Under the terms, the Allies agreed to allow Louis to remain on the throne, set up zones of Allied occupation, leveled an indemnity 700 million francs on the French to be paid within five years of the signing, and established a consensus among the Allies to prevent any further French aggression. According to Article VI of the treaty, an allied army of 150,000 would occupy the northern and eastern departments of France for seven years with all costs for maintenance paid by France. Britain’s contribution to this force numbered 35,000, and like the Allied occupation of Germany following the Second World War, Wellington’s troops received a specific area of control. The British cantonments, located from Calais to just south of Cambrai, consisted of a mix of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units. However, like all of the occupying

contingents, the British force contained a disproportionate number of cavalry units that provided Wellington with a fast mobile striking force that could quickly react to any emergency.

Under the terms of the treaty, Wellington was designated commander of the multinational occupation force replacing Schwarzenberg who commanded the wartime coalition forces. The Duke was the obvious choice for this assignment for a number of reasons. All of the allied states, including Prussia, acknowledged that he had decisively beaten Napoleon at Waterloo. Moreover, Wellington got along well with Tsar Alexander of Russia. Lord Castlereagh made it known to Lord Liverpool that Tsar Alexander had made Wellington’s overall command a precondition for Russian participation in the Allied occupation. All of the coalition’s participants recognized Wellington’s moderation in handling the French populace following the Battle of Waterloo. His lenient policies toward France discouraged civil war and eased the way for the restoration of Louis XVIII to the throne. There was a calculated reasoning to Wellington’s policy of reconciliation. His chivalry toward the French state and its populace after the fall of Bonaparte ensured a quiet and peaceful restoration. In the summer of 1815 the Duke observed, “if one shot is fired in Paris, the whole country will rise against us.” Overall, Wellington’s command of the situation in the summer of 1815 earned him the admiration of the collective sovereigns of Europe. It was primarily Wellington’s prestige that merited him the overall Allied command, as none of the coalition military commanders could match his

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20 Recent scholarship has called into question the extent of the British, and more specifically Wellington’s contribution, to the allied victory at Waterloo. Peter Hofchröer’s two books 1815: The Waterloo Campaign, Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras (London: Greenhill Books, 1998) and 1815: The Waterloo Campaign, The German Victory (London: Greenhill Books, 1999) argues that the Allied victory was possible only because of the contribution of German soldiers, and in particular, Prussian troops.

21 C. K. Webster ed., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 12, 1815.

diplomatic and military ability. As Wellington biographer, Philip Guedalla, noted, “The Allied policy of moderation in 1815 owed its main driving-force to Wellington.”

The British victory at Waterloo and the nearly three-year occupation of France enhanced not only Wellington’s reputation but also that of the British Army. European perceptions of the British Army changed significantly during the Napoleonic Wars in part because of Wellington’s success at Waterloo. Elizabeth Longford, in her comprehensive biography of Wellington, observes that Napoleon may have outmaneuvered Wellington during the Waterloo Campaign but notes that the Duke and his army in the end defeated the emperor of the French in the climactic battle. “At Waterloo, Wellington’s fire-power served him better than Napoleon’s, his lines better than Napoleon’s columns, his generals better Napoleon’s marshals, even though he had not selected or welcomed all of them; indeed it was Napoleon’s own fault that the army’s idol, Michel Ney, was not at the head of his troops until the eve of Quatre Bras, that a great cavalry commander, Grouchy, was weighed down with the cares of the infantry, and that a great manoeuvrer of armies, Soult, was employed to interpret, if not manoeuvre, nothing but the Emperor’s thoughts.”

Adjutant John Kincaid of the 95th Regiment of Foot (the Rifles) wrote, that Wellington described his army at Waterloo as an “infamous army,” with the worst equipment and the worst staff that he had ever commanded. Yet this untried force, incapable of maneuver, stood in “dumb patient agony” throughout the day of June 18, 1815, fending off what were arguably the finest troops in Europe. All of the allied continental powers of Europe were aware that Napoleon’s troops had consistently beaten them and had occupied their capitals.

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23 Ibid., 282.
26 Longford, Wellington: Years of the Sword, 488.
Wellington and the British, on the other hand, repeatedly defeated the French earning the respect of their enemies and allies. One of the participants of Waterloo, William Gibney, regimental surgeon for the 15th Hussars, remarked on the spirit of the British “the engagement showed skilful [sic] generalship on both sides, and brought out prominently the bulldog courage and obstinacy of the Briton. The result proved the invincibility of natural courage, a good cause, and an experienced general.”27 As Lawrence James observed, “success in war generates self-admiration… and is a vindication of the nation’s collective will and institutions.”28

Wellington and the British Army that had won at Waterloo perceived themselves as exceptional and dissimilar from their continental allies. Unlike the Prussians, Netherlanders, Würtemburgers, and Bavarians, the British troops under Wellington’s command did not exact retribution from the French as they advanced on Paris in the summer of 1815. In a July 14, 1815 memorandum from Castlereagh to Liverpool, Castlereagh noted that if the Allies kept up their depredations on the French populace they would “find themselves circumstanced in France as the French were in Spain, if the system pursued [pillaging] by the Prussians and now imitated by the Bavarians, shall not be effectively checked.”29 British officers who participated in the advance voiced similar sentiments in their unofficial correspondence. Gibney noted that there was substantial looting and destruction by their allies as they marched on Paris:

> That we were following the track of the Allies was only too evident, for it was truly pitiable to observe how the country round had suffered by their march. Whole fields of corn destroyed by the passage through of cavalry, artillery, waggons [sic], and troops of all sorts. The inhabitants were very few and seemed to be scared out of their lives. Their horses, carts, waggons [sic], etc. etc., and in despair believed that they were lost to them, and that now for a long time to come all the miseries of war would be felt in their own country. Many of the houses had been plundered, and wanton destruction pursued; but it

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29 C. K. Webster ed., *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815*, Castlereagh to Liverpool (No. 7.), July 14, 1815.
was pleasant to hear that the owners attributed this conduct to the Prussians and Belgians, extolling the English for discipline and order. It may be so; at any rate I feel assured that no British soldier would have dared to plunder valuables, or attempt to carry them away with him. Death would have been the penalty for his folly.\textsuperscript{30}

Three years earlier Wellington had witnessed the excesses committed by his troops at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in the Peninsula and was determined that such incidents recur. From a practical standpoint, Wellington could not afford a breakdown of discipline within his army. Ill-discipline within his own army would be viewed as contempt for his authority and weaken his stature among the allies. Likewise, the political state of France just after the Battle of Waterloo was too delicate to risk alienating the French populace. Castlereagh and Wellington realized that Allied depredations could turn French popular opinion away from Louis XVIII, perceiving his return as \textit{dans fourgons de l’ennemi}.\textsuperscript{31} Wellington, wishing to avoid further hostilities, desired a quiet resumption of Bourbon rule.\textsuperscript{32}

From Wellington’s and the British Army’s firsthand experience in the Peninsula they understood well how destructive a guerilla war could be on the occupying force. For nearly six years they had witnessed the atrocities perpetrated by both the Spanish and the French. The brutal reprisals and subsequent oppression by the French turned normally passive local populations into enemies. As Charles Esdaile notes “Wherever the French went… their presence provoked considerable irregular resistance.”\textsuperscript{33} The British, as allies of the Spanish, learned important lessons on how to manage restive populations. As a result of their Peninsular

\textsuperscript{30} William Gibney, \textit{Eighty Years Ago: or the Recollections of An Old Army Doctor}, 219-20.
\textsuperscript{31} “in the van of the enemy,” See Philip Guedalla, \textit{Wellington}, 279.
\textsuperscript{32} Veve notes that Wellington became a proponent of the Bourbons in 1814 when it became clear that Napoleon did not intend to negotiate an end to the fighting. Furthermore, Wellington witnessed the extent of the popularity of the Bourbons when he invaded southern France in the spring of 1814. Recognizing that the Louis’ moderation was the best course for stabilizing the domestic situation in France, Wellington encouraged the Bathurst government and the Allies to pursue a policy of restoration and reconciliation. See Veve, \textit{The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818}, 5.
experience, the British Army gained valuable experience in conducting police actions. They better than any other continental army were best equipped in seeing that France remained quiet and pacified despite the enmity harbored by the other occupying forces. This experience proved to be beneficial in the coming years when the British Army would be tasked to police their colonial empire.

Other considerations made Britain the natural choice as the leading ally in the occupation of France. For nearly twenty-five years Britain subsidized and equipped all of its major coalition partners as well as many of the minor ones. British subsidies to allied powers during their nearly twenty-five years of continuous war with France totaled £65.8 million. These subsidies enabled the allies to buy British goods to equip their armies. In 1805 William Pitt’s government signed an agreement with Austria and Russia to grant £1.75 million for every 100,000 men they put into the field against the French. Four years later Britain promised to pay financial subsidies to Austria in the amount of £750,000 in specie and £4 million in bills of exchange if the Emperor Francis II would open a second front against the French in Bavaria and in northern Italy. In accord with the spirit of the 1813 Teplitz Treaty, Britain agreed one year later to subsidize equally the three major allies: Austria, Russia, and Prussia a total of £5 million per annum if each state provided 150,000 troops. British money was not the only commodity supplied in large quantities to the allies during the Napoleonic Wars. British weaponry, accoutrements, and uniforms equipped and outfitted the armies of Prussia, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and many minor German states. In the spring and summer of 1813 transports from Britain

36 Robert M. Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 39.
traveled to Baltic ports delivering 100,000 muskets with powder, accoutrements and flints to Prussia, 100,000 muskets and 116 field pieces to Russia, and 40,000 muskets and cloth for uniforms to Sweden.\textsuperscript{38} Later that same year, British fabric clothed the nearly naked Austrian troops who were preparing to participate in the fall campaign that culminated in the Battle of Leipzig.\textsuperscript{39} The allies became so dependent on British goods and subsidies that when Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo the allied sovereigns received from Britain “return money” that defrayed the expenses of marching home and their subsequent demobilization costs.\textsuperscript{40} 

In addition to supplying the Allied Powers with subsidies and war materials, the gathering momentum of the British Industrial Revolution sought out new overseas markets that were unable to trade with mainland Europe because of Napoleon’s Continental System.\textsuperscript{41} Paul Kennedy attributes Britain’s nineteenth century global preeminence to the kingdom’s ability to trade with the rest of the world while the continental powers contended with Napoleon. Unlike the states of the European mainland, Britain’s insular geographic position allowed it to remain untouched by the ravages of war. The novels of Jane Austen, which explore the lives of the English “middling sort” during the wartime period, reveal that the daily affairs of Britons were little affected by the conflict. Elizabeth and her sisters, from \textit{Pride and Prejudice}, are more concerned with making their daily rounds, drinking tea, and finding suitable husbands than defeating Bonaparte. A Britain free from the ravages of war was, therefore free to develop a

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 287. 
\textsuperscript{39} Austrian Field Marshal Joseph Count Radetsky noted that during an autumn 1813 field parade that artillery and infantry units appeared clad in linen smocks and underpants and lacking cartridge pouches so that their ammunition was ruined if it rained. See Gunther E. Rothenberg, \textit{Napoleon’s Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814} (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), 179. 
\textsuperscript{40} John M. Sherwig, \textit{Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815}, 335. 
\textsuperscript{41} William H. McNeill argues that the Britain’s economic distress that began in 1807 was the largely the result of Napoleon’s imposition of the Continental System baring British goods from the continent. This condition was alleviated somewhat when British entrepreneurs moved into new markets in Latin America and the Levant. See William H. McNeill, \textit{The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000}, 209-10.
solid industrial base. During this generation, of war British overseas trade grew from £27.5 million in 1797 to £51.6 million in 1815 with much of this trade reaching markets in America, Asia, Africa, the West Indies, Latin America, and the Near East. By 1815 Britain, with its industrial base firmly emplaced, clearly led the world in the production and transportation of goods.

Providing protection to this economically vital trade was the Royal Navy. Traditionally, the navy was the first line of defense for Britain and since the Elizabethan Era, had protected its shores against continental enemies that included Spain, the Netherlands, and France. During the eighteenth century the navy’s mission expanded to protect the sea-lanes between the home islands and Britain’s growing colonial empire. Throughout the eighteenth century and into the Napoleonic Wars the strength of the Royal Navy grew exponentially. Michael Duffy, in his research on the role the Royal Navy played in British overseas expansion after the War of American Independence, notes that Britain’s warship tonnage grew from 458.9 million tons in 1790 to 609.3 million tons in 1815, making it stronger than the combined total of all of its rivals. In 1790 Britain’s overseas possessions included Canada, Caribbean islands, Australia, and India. By 1811, Britain had captured all French colonies and its dependents. Britain’s colonial empire increased with the military acquisitions of the Cape Colony, Malta, Mauritius, the Isle of Bourbon, and Les Saintes. These territories became strategic outposts in protecting Britain’s sea-borne lifeline to India. In 1815, Britain had achieved global preeminence through

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44 In a December 1813 Cabinet Memorandum, Castlereagh outlined to the Liverpool cabinet that Great Britain was willing to return certain overseas territories taken during the Napoleonic Wars. “But Malta, the Mauritius, and the Isle of Bourbon, Guadeloupe, and the island of Les Saintes must remain British, Mauritius being considered as necessary to protect Indian commerce and Guadeloupe as a debt of honor to Sweden.” See C. K.
a combination of naval might, economic expertise, and available capital. No other continental power could match this powerful combination. Of the five European powers that comprised the “Pentarchy” at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, all of the other allied states acknowledged Britain as the most dominant and powerful of the allied powers.

British domestic perceptions of the victory at Waterloo were a curious mixture of national pride, relief, uncertainty, and longing for tax relief. Initial reaction by the British public was one of national pride. Four days after the Battle of Waterloo, the Times declared: “Such is the great and glorious result of those masterly movements by which the Hero of Britain prevented the audacious attempt of the Rebel Chief. Glory to Wellington, to our gallant Soldiers, and our brave Allies!”

Wellington, in his battlefield dispatch to the Secretary at War, Henry Bathurst, lauded the army that he had weeks earlier disparaged, “It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that the army never upon any occasion, conducted itself better.” The public responded almost immediately to this affirmation of national pride. Within ten days of the battle, bankers, merchants, and traders voted to adopt the necessary means to offer some sort of compensation to “those who had been wounded in the late splendid and important victory.” Subscriptions for the Waterloo fund poured in from all parts of the kingdom. Donations even came from British subjects residing in Calcutta. For nearly a year victory celebrations place took place throughout the empire. The House of Commons voted, amid loud cheering from its members, “the thanks of the house to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, for the consuremate [sic] abilities, unexampled exertion, and irresistible ardour, displayed by him on the 18th of June, on which day a splendid and decisive victory was gained.

Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815, 124.

45 Times (London), June 22, 1815.

46 Times (London), June 23, 1815.

47 Times (London), June 29, 1815.
over the French army, commanded by Buonaparte in person, whereby the glory of the British nation was exalted, and the territories of our all….” The Chancellor of the Exchequer offered its thanks by granting £200,000 for the building and furnishing of a house suitable to the Duke’s station. Fireworks were set off in London on the evening of November 25, 1815, with embassies and government buildings displaying the inscriptions “Glory to God,” “To Our Heroes Thanks,” and “Peace.” In January 1816, churches throughout the kingdom offered up prayers of thanksgiving for the reestablishment of peace in Europe. At one service the Bishop of London preached the sermon based on Psalms 20: 7-8, “Some trust in chariots and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the Lord our God. They are brought down and fallen: but we are risen and stand upright.” The ultimate accolade awarded to the British soldiers of Waterloo by a grateful nation was the distribution of the Waterloo Medal to all who had participated in the campaign.

The majority of Britons, on hearing the news of Wellington’s victory, experienced a sense of dull relief. Colley notes that after living through nearly a quarter of a century of war many of the poor and even moderately prosperous had little to reason to celebrate. The resulting peace brought unemployment, a depressed economy, high taxes, and a general sense that the nation, after years of warfare with an identifiable enemy, was now sailing into uncharted waters. For centuries a predominantly Protestant Britain had fought France, the foremost Roman Catholic state in Europe. As Colley brilliantly points out, the incessant conflict with France was

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48 Times (London), June 24, 1815.
49 Times (London), November 28, 1815.
50 Times (London), January 19, 1816.
51 The medal and its subsequent roll of recipients resulted from a General Order issued July 29, 1815. This was the first time the British Army award a medal to all soldiers present at a specific battle. See Lawrence L. Gordon, British Battles and Medals (Aldershot: Wellington Press, 1962), 52-53.
the glue that bound the United Kingdom’s social classes and ethnicities together. With Europe finally at peace, Britain needed to turn its attention to long neglected domestic questions. Frank O’Gorman observes that the militarization of Britain during the Napoleonic Wars did much to dissolve national loyalties. Based on statistics compiled by John Cookson, the ethnic composition of the British Army of 1813 consisted of one-half English, one-third Irish, and one-sixth Scots. The effect of the Napoleonic Wars on the British Army resulted in an assimilation of nationalities into a single institution, which in turn drew traditionally competing ethnicities together. One tangible result of the long war with France was that Irish Catholics and Scots began to identify with, and take pride, in the British state. Polite English society turned away from ethnic exclusivity and fully accepted the Scots and Irish into the British state. Some noticeable trends were the union of Ireland’s Parliament with that of England in 1800 and the nation-wide accolades and honors bestowed on King George III during the last two decades of his reign. There was, however, a definite recognition by the Whigs and some moderate Tory lawmakers that the issues of Catholic Emancipation, voting reform, and fiscal retrenchment needed immediate attention once peace returned to Europe.

British lawmakers and the general populace viewed the army with some suspicion even though the army had been a unifying force for the kingdom. Eight months after the Battle of Waterloo members of the House of Commons began to question the constitutional and fiscal necessity of maintaining a large standing army. During the February 27, 1816, parliamentary debates on Army Estimates Lord John Russell, a Whig, argued that an army of 150,000 men

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53 Ibid., 322.
“must alarm every friend to his country and its constitution.” Russell worried aloud that continental powers maintained large military forces for their own security, but Britain, if forced to adopt continental practices by keeping an immense regular force would bid farewell to “to that freedom which they had so long and so anxiously preserved” against Bonaparte. Ever since the restoration of the monarchy in 1661, members of parliament had shown a marked hostility to the idea of a sizeable standing army during peacetime. A sizeable majority of the British public perceived the Army’s domestic functions as protecting sources of revenue, preserving public order, and preventing insurrection. The army’s highly visible role in carrying out these duties frequently incurred the scorn of their countrymen. Richard Holmes notes that, while the army remained unpopular, a significant number of the British populace viewed the Royal Navy positively because it was the instrument that protected commerce and was the traditional first line of defense against invasion. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of the British people would agree with Russell and his fellow lawmakers who preferred to place the security of the kingdom into the hands of the navy that Russell had characterized as “the true bulwark of the island.”

Despite Parliament’s deep-rooted suspicion of a large standing army the cost of maintaining a sizeable land force caused even greater concern. J. W. Fortescue observes that Parliament at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars reverted to its long-standing practice of

56 Times (London), February 27, 1816.
57 Ibid.
58 In fairness to the British military, it is important to note that British units garrisoning Britain during the postwar period of economic distress did engage in rudimentary public assistance programs. In 1816, the 54th Foot, while maintaining order in the manufacturing districts of northern England assisted farmers in gathering the harvest and protecting it from rioters. See Christopher James Atkinson, The Dorsetshire Regiment: The Thirty-ninth and Fifty-fourth Foot and the Dorset Militia and Volunteers, Vol. II (Oxford: Privately Printed at the University Press, 1947), 124.
60 Times (London), February 27, 1816.
slashing the size of its military forces in the name of economy.61 One particular group, the Radicals, suggested that the size of the military establishment just before the French Revolutionary Wars was sufficient in holding the empire.62 In 1780, near the conclusion of the American War for Independence, the cost of sustaining an army of 40,000 men required an expenditure of £12.2 million.63 From an 1816 perspective the costs incurred during the conflict consumed a little more than 12 percent of the national income. To Parliament this sum was significant but manageable. However, projected costs for sustaining Britain’s military at 1816 levels was alarming. In the Parliamentary debates of 1816 Whig economics expert, Frankland Lewis, pointed out that the realm’s current tax revenues could not continue funding the military at its present strength of 166,865 troops.64 Lewis noted that “the interest upon the [national] debt increased to 40 million; the [military] establishment required 23 million, and altogether more than 65 million were to be procured by taxes, which sum was to be deducted from a revenue on land and capital, amounting yearly to 130 or 140 million, so that it was obvious that nearly half that revenue was annually consumed; and was there not considerable danger that we might soon arrive at the end of our resources.”65 In 1817, Nicholas Vansittart the Chancellor of the Exchequer reported that state’s income amounted to £51 million with expenses calculated at £69 million producing a deficit of £18 million.66 Lord Althorp, in the 1818 Parliamentary debates over Army Estimates, voiced concerns that Exchequer bills in the first quarter of the year had

64 Times (London), June 13, 1817.
65 Times (London), February 27, 1816.
66 Times (London), March 7, 1818.
already reached £56 million. If the government was to avoid incurring another large deficit it was necessary to either pass a new tax on the people or reduce the size of the army.

Levying new taxes on an economically distressed society was clearly out of the question. The sudden transition from a wartime economy to that of peace had thrown the economy into a depression as revenues shrank and expenses remained high. Because of public pressure, the Liverpool ministry abolished the emergency wartime income tax in 1816. Annual revenue fell to a mere £58.7 million in 1818, half of revenue received just three years before. The cost of more than two decades of war amounted to £860 million with nearly 80 percent of tax revenues paying the interest on the national debt and another 8 percent swallowed up in war pensions and retired service pay.

Along with these difficulties were the postwar problems of currency stability, agricultural prices, and labor unrest. Despite the Tories’ best efforts at containing domestic disorder and attempting to alleviate local suffering there was a real fear that domestic disorder or even revolution might ensue. The depression affected all segments of British society. A writer in Lancashire reported that in the autumn of 1818 the populace of the Manchester District feared the police and the troops more than they did the workers. As many as 1,200 workers paraded through the streets stopping to listen to labor leaders call for higher wages, an end to the mechanization of the cloth industry, and Parliamentary reform. Workers were not the only ones affected by the nation’s economic woes. Parliament’s implementation of the Corn Laws in 1815

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67 Ibid.
70 Frank O’Gorman notes that the British averted a social revolution in the post-Napoleonic Period because of two important factors. The Liverpool ministry’s wish to uphold strong government through the Six Acts, repressive legislation exercised with some restraint, and the co-opting of the emerging middle class by the power wielding aristocracy creating a cohesive coalition who valued security and stability over reform. See O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History, 1688-1832, 263-4.
caused the price of bread to skyrocket, prompting widespread protests. Indeed, the population found the legislation so repugnant that the government found it necessary to protect the Houses of Parliament with a detachment of troops.\footnote{E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 315.} Willcox and Arnstein note that the price of bread contributed to a domino effect on domestic prices. “The high price of grain, hence bread, would inflate wages and thereby raise the cost of production and the price of finished goods, which businessmen had to market abroad in competition with foreign products.”\footnote{William B. Wilcox and Walter L. Arnstein, *The Age of Aristocracy: 1688 to 1830*, 7th ed., 304.}

Letters to the *Times* in the post-war period reveal Parliament’s need to lessen the suffering caused by the economic crisis. Chief among the writers’ concerns were the prohibitive costs incurred by the military, which many Britons perceived as outright waste. Writers suggested a series of measures that included reducing the number of inspectors of the militia; cutting the rate of pay for general officers with the rank of major general and above; and curtailing allowances and perks received by the Master-General of Ordinances. Others suggested the cessation of half-pay to cornets and ensigns who received commissions without purchase after January 1816; the reduction of the number of junior students enrolled at the Military College; and the abolition of separate riding schools for cavalry regiments.\footnote{*Times* (London), May 7, 1819, May 10, 1819, July 2, 1821, November 12, 1821, December 6, 1821, and July 6, 1822.} Apparently, the most poignant letter concerning the plight of English society was written by “J.B.” and addressed to Lord Liverpool that appeared in the December 1, 1821 edition of the *Times*. In the letter, the writer appealed to Liverpool as “both a politician and as a Christian” to alleviate the suffering of thousands of their countrymen that was “sweeping with rapidity so many honest and industrious men into the gulps of ruin and misery.”\footnote{*Times* (London), December 1, 1821.} In part, the letter reads:
I entreat your attention to the statements of facts which appear in The Times newspaper of this day. What a picture of extravagance on the part of Ministers does it lay before the nation? Whilst the Tax Collectors are dragging the beds and bedding from under the unfortunate poor people of this country, and taking their furniture in execution for payment of the King’s taxes, regardless of the fate of the families dependent upon them for subsistence, how can you tolerate the granting the money, so wrung from the heart’s blood of these sufferers, to be wasted in pensions under the form of commissions in the army without purchase, to those whom your Gazette denominate gentlemen.

Good Heavens! my Lord, whilst the industrious artisans, the small shopkeeper, and the laborious labourer, are starving from the excessive taxation under which they live, how can you sanction their hard earned and last shillings to be torn from them to pamper in pensions the sons of gentlemen in this manner?

Let an inquiry be made as to the claims which these eight gentlemen [listed in the Times as having been granted the commission of Ensign without purchase] have to become pensioners on the people of England [at £438 per annum]; and it will be found that the grossest abuse exists in the selection of young men of family to be stuck to the backs of the starving people of England, like leeches to extract the little remains of blood.

... My Lord, the miseries of taxation at the present moment are only known to the suffers, and those who witness the daily warrants of distress and scenes of misery. By all that is dear, do not drive the people of this country to desperation. Do not insult them, by pensioning from day to day the sons of gentlemen, by adding their names to the army list, whilst you have 10,000 idle officers, anxious for employment, and which you cannot, thank God, give.

Do not squander the public taxes in this open and barefaced manner, whilst the people are suffering such distress. I would call you Lordship’s attention to the fact, that pensions to the amount of £1,600,019 a-year have been granted in the army since the peace, which, at 16 years’ purchase, a more correct valuation than 12 years will amount to the enormous sum of £1,600,304, the value of commissions without purchase.

If this sum of taxes had been remitted to those whose property has been taken by the tax-gatherers, what scenes of distress would have been prevented? What misery to hundreds of families would thereby have been avoided?

Can you talk of economy, my Lord, when such extravagance and profusion is permitted in the army for useless officers whilst you are reducing the hard working and useful clerks in public offices.\(^75\)

Members of Parliament, mindful of public sentiment expressed both in the press and in the streets, wondered aloud if the cost of keeping such a large worldwide military force was necessary during a period of peace. The public consistently argued that because France was no longer a threat Britain should substantially reduce its military establishment. As early as 1816,\(^75\)
Whig and radical parliamentarians proposed reductions that would cut troop numbers without compromising their global commitments. They argued that the 11,000 men stationed in Mediterranean appeared to be excessive. The kingdom would benefit from a substantial savings if Britain reduced their strength in the region by 3000 men. Lawmakers proposed posting 4,500 troops at Gibraltar and another 3,500 at Malta. These numbers would be sufficient to retain their influence in the area. In the East Indies, competition with France had ended and the only probable enemies appeared to be on the frontiers of Nepal and Tibet. The East India Company’s military forces supplemented with Royal troops were thought to be sufficient to garrison the frontier. Current troop numbers in the West Indies also seemed excessive as the British held all of the key sugar islands. Only in Canada was troop strength considered by Parliament to be less than adequate. Because of the increased power of the United States during the late war, a further study on acceptable troop levels would be required. In the meantime, Canada’s vastness and difficult terrain sufficed to deter any invasion from its southern neighbors.

A more powerful argument for troop reduction surfaced one year later when members of the Whig and radical opposition proposed a plan based on British troop levels in 1792. There was, however, a fundamental flaw in opposition lawmakers’ calculations as they had failed to appreciate the need for substantial garrisons in the Cape Colony, Mauritius, and Ceylon; all of which were strategic victualling stations for the Royal Navy. As British trade interests expanded in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the importance of secure sea-lanes to India and to important overseas trading partners were critical to the Liverpool government’s strategic vision. Table A.1 indicates that British troop strengths in all overseas localities had grown substantially during the Napoleonic Wars. Rows two and six reveal that the numbers of soldiers stationed in

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76 J. W. Fortescue notes that the number of British troops posted in the West Indies in 1816 numbered 13,000. See J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. IX, 1815-1838, 50.
colonial garrisons sustained a two-fold increase by 1817. The conservative estimates of the opposition had failed to appreciate that the world had changed markedly since 1789. Likewise, opposition members noted that the military establishment in India experienced significant growth since the peace with France. Furthermore, they pointedly observed that neither the Earl of Cornwallis nor Wellington, who had to contend with hostile French troops, required the number of soldiers that were currently on station in India. Whigs argued that the present Tory administration permitted this situation because every additional Crown regiment sent to India increased the ministry’s patronage and influence on the East India Company and justified keeping a large pool of reserves at home to “afford necessary reliefs” [sic] for the troops overseas. Opposition members proposed that by employing the yeomanry and volunteer cavalry they could preserve domestic order and significantly reduce the current Army strength totals, thus incurring a substantial savings for the state. They further argued that the yeomanry combined with ordinance troops, marines, militia staff, the military college, and military asylum would provide a sufficient number of troops to handle domestic emergencies. It is worthwhile to note that the Tories adopted part of the opposition’s proposal by augmenting yeomanry forces with those of the regular Army to handle domestic disorders. Edward P. Thompson observes that the commingling of the aristocracy and the middle class in the yeomanry solidified the union of the two groups against the working class thus influencing the direction of English history in the nineteenth century. “A common understanding grew up between the aristocracy and the middle class, forming that esprit de corps which was later to carry the day on the field of Peterloo; while at the balls their sisters selected husbands who facilitated that cross-fertilization of landed and commercial wealth which distinguished the English Industrial Revolution.”

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Indeed, in the first six months of 1817, troop strength had dropped significantly as the government and Parliament bowed to public and fiscal pressure. A January 1, 1817 official military troop returns reveal that the army’s effective strength was 9,017 officers, 9,614 sergeants, 3,852 drummers and trumpeters, 339 farriers, and 143,479 rank and file for a total of 157,284 troops. Just four months later, the number dwindled to an effective army strength of 7,623 officers, 8,811 sergeants, 3,561 drummers and trumpeters, 338 farriers, and 134,699 rank and file for a total of 155,032. One year later, the army had shrunk even further as the military carried out a plan of reducing the number of soldiers in companies. The 1818 plan cut ten men per troop in the regiments of Dragoons, sixteen “boys” in the Guards’ cavalry regiments, ten men per company in the Foot Guards, 800 men in eight battalions of infantry, and 15 privates per company in every regiment of infantry, exclusive of India. All of these reductions resulted in a decrease of nearly 31,500 men in the army. The army’s estimated costs to the state for the year would amount to £6,494,290 down, from the £18 million for the previous year.

Lord Liverpool’s Tory government agreed that troop cuts were necessary but disagreed with the opposition on the size, scope, and pace of the reductions. In a March 3, 1818 report to the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston argued the government’s position indicated that reductions were indeed taking place but Britain’s global commitments necessitated the presence of sufficient numbers of troops to garrison the empire. Since the signing of the 1815 treaty with France, Britain’s military establishment declined by 21,000 men and that in 1818 the army numbered 113,640 men. Accompanying costs for the military had also declined by £418,000.

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78 Times (London), April 16, 1817.
79 Times (London), June 13, 1817.
80 Times (London), October 28, 1818.
81 Times (London), February 28, 1818.
82 Times (London), March 3, 1818.
Public records of expense indicate that in 1818 the government’s gross income amounted to £57.6 million, down £21.5 million from just two years before with army expenses calculated as 1.1 million for the year. Parliament’s calls for overseas troop reductions had diminished somewhat because of the Pindari and Kandian conflicts. However, critics of the War Office’s troops numbers and their concurrent expenses were primarily troubled by the size of the forces maintained on the home islands. On March 13, 1818, Lord Althorp argued before the House of Commons that there was little need for garrisoning large numbers of troops in England and Ireland. Since the defeat of France mandated an occupation force, there was scant danger to Britain from a foreign invasion. The government countered by arguing that the troops were still needed as a precaution against social unrest caused by the severe postwar economic depression.

Thomas Dwight Veve’s research on the British occupation force in France notes that in 1817 an estimated 3,600 infantrymen returned from the continental Army of Occupation to garrison England. In his autobiography, Harry Smith comments that when his regiment returned to England in 1818, he, along with many of his troops, was assigned to assist local authorities in quelling labor unrest in the manufacturing districts. Parliamentary backbenchers dismissed this argument as nonsense and an affront to constitutional sensibilities. Lord Althorp observed “It had been our pride and triumph that when the despotic governments were obliged to maintain

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83 Ibid.
85 Vere notes that in 1817, the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Scots Regiment along with battalions from the 21st, the 27th, the 40th, the 81st, and the 88th Regiments of Foot returned to England for garrison duty. See Thomas Dwight Veve, *The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 116.
themselves by a military force, we, with all our privileges, were not molested in their enjoyment by an army."87

In the immediate post-Waterloo period, Liverpool’s government faced grave economic and social problems. Tories feared that if domestic violence should become endemic it would be necessary for the army to restore order. Because of this danger troop numbers in England and Ireland remained unusually high. In 1818 the number of British troops garrisoned in Britain numbered nearly 29,000 men. The Whigs found this number unacceptable and argued that a reduction to something nearer to the 1793 troop totals would yield an annual savings of £180,000 for the country.88 However, domestic troop levels continued to remain high.

In 1819, the Liverpool government continued the practice of reducing the number of active regiments within the regular army. By the beginning of the year, all regiments had lost their second and any additional battalions they had gained during the wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.89 Officers in these disbanded battalions received half-pay and were released from the service.90 Career officers who had served throughout the Napoleonic Wars found themselves in a precarious financial position with scant hope of finding suitable re-employment.91 Charles Messenger cites the case of William Humbley, a first lieutenant who served in the 95th Regiment of Foot. Humbley, commissioned in 1807, served in all of the major British actions of the Napoleonic Wars including the Danish, Peninsular, Walcheren, and

87 Times (London), March 14, 1818.
88 Ibid.
90 Officers whose regiments were reduced or disbanded received half-pay, which placed the unemployed officer in a reserve pool until he was recalled to active service. Although half-pay was meant to be a temporary measure the status and commensurate pay could last for years. An extreme example was that of George Bell, who in 1799, was still receiving half-pay for having served in a regiment that was disbanded in 1713. See Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), 40-41.
91 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1st series (1803-20)
Waterloo campaigns. In 1818 Humbley’s 3rd Battalion was disbanded and all officers went on half pay. Thirty-six years later, at the age of 62, he was called back to serve in the Crimean War. Lord Palmerston reported to Parliament in the early summer of 1819 that savings attributed to the regimental cuts in manpower amounted to an estimated £132,000 in an Army and Ordinance budget of £9.1 million, the lowest expenditure on the military since 1793. The Times reported that critics both inside and outside the government were not satisfied with the government’s cuts on military spending and requested additional pruning of the budget. Further proposals included the abolition of recruiting districts, the limiting of expenditures at the Royal Military College to no more than £12,000 per annum, a severe reduction of staff positions during peacetime, and the cessation of half-pay to 264 ensigns and cornets who became officers after 1815 and who had not purchased their commissions. All of these cost cutting measures would yield a savings of £250,000.

For the next four years, Liverpool’s ministry wrestled with the twin dilemmas of cutting military spending while maintaining an adequate home defense force and a strong military presence in the colonies. Military spending for the years 1820 to 1822 rose slightly averaging £10.2 million per year with global troop strength numbering around 90,000 men and officers. Beginning in 1823, and continuing into 1824 Army expenditures declined to around £8.7 million per year. In 1823, Lord Bathurst reported the worldwide distribution of troops as follows: 20,522 troops stationed in Great Britain, 20,522 in garrisons abroad, excepting India, and 28,196

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93 Times (London), June 3, 1819, and Mitchell, and Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, 397 and 399.
94 Times (London), May 10, 1819.
in Ireland. An additional 19,977 men assisted the East India Company’s military forces in India; however, they were excluded from the rolls and the budget as the company paid their maintenance. In a further effort to cut costs, Lord Bathurst enjoined colonial governors who commanded military forces to avoid costly military operations either on their frontiers or within the colony. In July 6, 1822 members of the House of Commons debated whether colonial revenues should be used to pay overseas defense costs. Stated policy and reality hardly ever coincide and a series of crisis that included the First Burmese War that began in early 1824, the 1825 Bharatpur Campaign in Jat, and the threat of insurrection in the West Indies thwarted the War Office’s attempts to reduce troop level reductions and the subsequent costs. In 1824, the army raised six new regiments, the 94th to the 99th, an augmentation that amounted to nearly 5,000 men. Early in 1825, the Times announced that army strength would increase because of a new levy of 10,000 men of which 5,000 were bound for Ireland and 5,000 for the East Indies. In 1828, army strength increased to 102,539 men primarily because of the need for additional troops in Southeast Asia. Additionally, army expenditures that had fallen for two straight years again began to again rise. (Table A.2)

97 Times (London), February 26, 1823.
98 Douglas M. Peers points out that when William Pitt, Lord Amherst arrived in India to succeed Francis Rawdon, Marquess of Hastings as Governor General of India he would continue his predecessor’s economic drive in reducing the East India Company’s expenses. Peers observes “Unlike Hastings, Amherst was considered to lack initiative and ambition and hence he would prove more receptive to Company directives to reduce Indian expenses.” Unfortunately, the long simmering border dispute with the Burmese Kingdom of Ava resulted in an expensive and ill-planned war requiring substantial numbers of British Army troops and significant amounts of cash. See Douglas M. Peers, Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in Early Nineteenth Century India, Tauris Academic Studies (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), 144-183; and George Bruce, The Burma Wars, 1824-1886 (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), 1-14.
99 Times (London), July 6, 1822.
101 Times (London), January 25, 1825.
Despite their success in significantly lowering the state’s military budgets, the Tories, in response to almost a decade of criticism from the Whig opposition, instituted programs that would further control overseas military spending. Wellington, who had become Master-general of Ordnance after his return to England in 1818, made substantial reductions in his department. In an August 1822 letter to George Ramsay, the ninth Earl of Dalhousie, Wellington outlined the current sentiments of the government.

You are aware that the government has been for some time occupied in the reduction of all departments of the state, a duty which they have been called upon to perform not less by the voice of Parliament than by their own sense of their duty to the publick. [sic] The interests of individuals may render it expedient to keep up large establishments of officers in the civil departments of the government at a period when the army and all its military departments have been reduced so low as to render it scarcely possible to perform the required duties. But the well-understood interests of the state require a different policy. The Parliament and the people must be made to feel that nothing but a view of the publick [sic] interest will occasion the keeping up any employment not absolutely necessary for the transaction of the publick [sic] business.”

Wellington attacked waste and mismanagement in the Ordnance Department. The Department was the military’s largest office, encompassing a number of ancillary branches including artillery, ordnance, engineering, topography, education, and scientific research. The Department also boasted the largest budget of any governmental office. Corruption, abuse, and waste plagued the branch for years, frequently prompting its Parliamentary critics to attack the behemoth department. A January 1819 letter to Wellington by Colonel Philip Riou of the Royal Artillery noted the many abuses he had witnessed. Among Riou’s allegations were the excessive salaries paid to principal commanders that included Colonel George Phipps, the Inspector of Ordnance; Colonel Wiltshire Wilson, the commander at Woolwich; and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Vaughan, commander of artillery at Gibraltar. Riou further complained that

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103 University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, WP1/720/12 Copy of a letter from Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, to Lord Dalhousie, on the proposals for the reduction of the Commissariat in Canada, August 19, 1822.
unscrupulous contractors sold military stores at inflated prices. Wellington soon brought reform to his department. By the middle of the decade, the Duke had abolished sixty-eight offices, saving the government £14,000 a year in salaries. Wellington also eliminated the corps of artillery drivers, incorporating them into the artillery. To further curb spending, the Bathurst ministry, in January 1826, issued a directive to the following British possessions: Ceylon, Mauritius, New South Wales, Van Diemans Land, the Cape of Good Hope, Malta, Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Trinidad, Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, St. Lucia, Heligoland, Honduras, and Newfoundland, placing all military defenses and military buildings under the direction of the Ordnance Department. Colonies with local assemblies such as Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Barbados, and Jamaica were exempt for the moment. Under this new directive, the previously mentioned colonial governors were to turn over the management and upkeep of all military buildings and installations to the Ordnance Department. It prohibited colonial governors and commanding officers from beginning or engaging in any new construction without the combined approval of the Treasury and the Secretary of State. Only Ordnance officers could carry out repairs. This directive effectively took a major portion of colonial discretionary military spending out of the hands of the governors and colonial officials whom, in the past, had been profligate in their spending and careless in their accounting.

Colonial governors who administered colonies that had representative assemblies were also encouraged to be frugal in their defense spending. Attempts at making the colonists share

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104 WP1/613/1 Letter from Colonel P. Riou to Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, drawing the Duke’s attention to abuses in the administration of the Ordnance, January 1819.
some of the financial burden for defense after 1763 had ended in failure with the whole weight of military expenditure falling on the shoulders of the British taxpayer. Moreover, since the American War for Independence, many colonial and treasury officials were reluctant in requiring overseas colonies to contribute toward their own defense. In the decades that followed the American War for Independence, Parliament, the Crown, and the British taxpayer paid a considerable portion of colonial defense costs. Consequently, many governors looked for ways to help defray defense expenses. Methods employed by Lower Canada’s Governor Sir Peregrine Maitland illustrate the measures colonial administrators employed. Maitland in a May 16, 1820 letter to Lord Bathurst, the governor recounted his compliance with a Treasury Directive concerning the financing of a new barracks in Quebec City.

My Lord,

Referring to the latter paragraphs of the 13th December last, respecting the most advantageous mode of complying with the Instructions of the Lords Councilors of His Majesty’s Treasury, to obtain if possible by Exchange Such Lands as were Considered most immediately interfering with the defence of Quebec, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that in pursuance of the plan to be adopted by his Grace the Late Commander of the Forces I directed a piece of ground in the St. Roc’s suburbs of about an acre in extent, and which was reported to me as not required for Government Purposes to be laid out in Building Lots and sold in Public Auction, which has been done this day, and I am happy to say, has produced about three thousand pounds and with the ground already sold for the same purpose, amounting to two thousand three hundred pounds, will go far towards reimbursing His Majesty’s Government for the important acquisition of property purchased in July last from Mr. Ferguson. The remaining sum, three thousand seven hundred pounds can be, I am informed, easily liquidated in like manner.

I have the honour to be
My Lord
Your Lordships Most Obedient Servant
P. Maitland.

In a follow up letter, the next month, Maitland continues to construct new barracks using the same financial arrangements.

22 June 1820

108 Ibid. , 212.
109 PRO, CO 185/156/f130, Lower Canada 1820, Correspondence of Sir P. Maitland.
My Lord,

Referring to that part of my Letters to Secretary Lushington of the 18th of November last, of which I had the honor to transmit your Lordship a Copy on the 24th the same Month, and in which I expressed my hopes, that the sale of the Ground on which the Old Barracks in the town of Kingston were situated, would go far to reimburse the expense of those of stone, which were constructed last year at Point Henry, I have the honor to state that having directed a small proportion of the ground alluded to, to be laid out in Building Lots, it was sold at Public Auction on the 1st Instant, and Produced upwards of £2300, Two thousand three hundred, which sum very nearly covers the expense of the new Barracks and I have every reason to believe, that by bringing occasionally into the market, small portions of the ground, which the Projected Arrangements enable us to give up in the town of Kingston, the completion of the Barrack and the repair of the works at that place may be executed at a trifling expense to the Mother Country.

I have the honour to be
My Lord
Your Lordships Most Obedient Servant
P. Maitland.

Even these actions were not enough to satisfy Parliamentary critics, who continued throughout the 1820s, to attack the military spending of the Tory ministry.

Parliament’s substantial reduction of the military numbers and budget in the decade following Waterloo created severe hardships for many career soldiers. As regiments lost their additional battalions, the first men released from the military were those who were invalids or those on limited military service. In 1816, the 10th Regiment garrisoned the island of Corfu in compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris. While stationed on the island, mandated Parliamentary military reductions eliminated the unit’s 2nd battalion, reducing its overall strength to 1,093 men. Other regiments experienced the same fate as the 10th. Colonel Archibald Campbell’s 6th Regiment of Foot, the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, after the amalgamation of its 1st and 2nd battalions numbered only 760 men while serving with the Army of Occupation in

110 PRO, CO 185/156/f132, Lower Canada 1820, Correspondence of Sir P. Maitland.
France.\textsuperscript{112} The official history of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Regiment of Foot, “the King’s Own,” reports that the 2\textsuperscript{nd} battalion of the regiment was disbanded on Christmas Day 1815. Officers of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} battalion received two months full pay before being placed on half-pay list, and all were given “the option of taking any vacancies in the 1\textsuperscript{st} battalion that might occur during those two months.”\textsuperscript{113} During the first year of demobilization, the army reduced its complement by 26,000.\textsuperscript{114} In addition to the disbanding of the additional wartime battalions, the complements of regimental 1\textsuperscript{st} battalions were also slowly reduced. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion of the 93\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment of Foot, the Sutherland Highlanders, reported in January 1817 a total of fifty-five sergeants, twenty-two drummers, and 1000 rank and file. One year later, the unit contained thirty-five sergeants, twenty-two drummers, and 650 rank and file.\textsuperscript{115} Additionally, the annual strength reports for the 91\textsuperscript{st} Regiment of Foot, the Argyllshire Highlanders, also reflect a slow diminution of its strength between 1815-1830.\textsuperscript{116} (See Table A.3). Besides reducing the complements within regiments, further reductions come about by demobilizing entire regiments. The Times reported in October 1818, that the Army intended to disband of all infantry regiments numbered above the 80\textsuperscript{th} Regiment along with those cavalry regiments numbered above the 16\textsuperscript{th} Light Dragoons. Moreover, “the whole of the Royal Artillery Drivers, together with the Horse Artillery, two


\textsuperscript{115} Roderick Hamilton Burgoyne, Historical Records of the 93\textsuperscript{rd} Sutherland Highlanders, Now the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion Princess Louise’s Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1883), 52-53.

\textsuperscript{116} R.P. Dunn-Pattison, The History of the 91\textsuperscript{st} Argyllshire Highlanders, Now the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion Princess Louise’s (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders), (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1910), 74-75; 114-16.
battalions of the Foot Artillery, and one of Artillery Invalids, will also fall under the necessary pruning hand of Economy.”

Like their civilian counterparts, a significant number of half-pay officers experienced severe economic hardships following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Arguing that they had served honorably throughout the war with France, demobilized officers on half-pay claimed that the state had turned its back on them during peacetime. Writing in early March 1820, Harry Smith pleads with Colonel Colborne of the Horse Guards that an active military posting would significantly ease his economic plight. “I shall not expatiate, but upon my pecuniary necessities I could very -----. I have been living this last year on my regimental pay. The smallness of which has given me such a lesson of adversity I shall be more careful for the future, and am now a most needy …Pray my dear colonel, do for me what you can and let me hear from you.”

Additionally, Wellington’s correspondence is filled with former officers soliciting his assistance in securing them any form of military employment. A sampling of Wellington’s 1819-1822 correspondence reveals that the Duke received solicitations to use his influence in securing posts such as governorships, staff positions, an assistantship in the royal laboratory, Inspector of Fisheries, employment with the Irish Police and a host of general petitions for any available civil and military positions. The plight of these officers is also apparent in their

117 Times (London), October 1, 1818.
118 PRO, WO135/3 “Correspondence Sir Harry Smith, 1813-1846.”
119 WP1/614/9 Letter from Major General Sir B. Bloomfield to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, asking the Duke to reserve a chief vice-mastership of the Royal Laboratory for Colonel Maclean of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 16 January 1819; WP1/649/1 Letter from Lieutenant J. Fitzmaurice to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, requesting him to ask the Duke of Wellington to recommend him for the post of Inspector of Fisheries, 1 July 1820; WP1/676/15 Letter from Lord Hill to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, forwarding a letter and memorial from Major General Johnstone for the Duke of Wellington, 23 August 1821; WP1/677/7 Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Sir John Cameron, enclosing Henry Goulburn's reply to his letter regarding the possibility of Cameron being employed as governor of one of the colonies, 23 August 1821; WP1/677/7 Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Sir John Cameron, enclosing Henry Goulburn's reply to his letter regarding the possibility of Cameron being employed as governor of one of the colonies, 23 August 1821; WP1/716/4 Copy of a letter from Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, to H. Goulburn, sending an application from Lieutenant Blood for employment
responses to the War Office questionnaire, *Statements of Service for Retired Officers.* A few examples will illustrate the hardships they faced while on half-pay. Major Sackville Hamilton Berkley notes that he entered the army in May 1800 at the age of eighteen and served nearly twenty-five years in various regiments, including the 46th Regiment, the 16th Regiment, the 2nd West Indian Regiment, and the 6th West Indian Regiment. Throughout his military career, Berkley served in the West Indies, and was present at the capture of St. Thomas, St. John, St. Croix, and Martinique. In 1819, Berkley was serving as Deputy Adjutant General to the Governor of Barbados, Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton Baron Combermere. We know that Berkley had a close relationship with his commanding officer as he named his first-born son Combermere George William Berkley. Because of the postwar reductions, Berkley’s battalion demobilized February 21, 1825, and he was placed on half-pay and had to support a wife and four children. In a final comment on his situation Berkley observes that he is “ready to serve” in any regiment immediately available.

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120 The War Office’s *Statements of Service* were questionnaires sent periodically to both serving and half-pay officers. The form consisted of fourteen major questions with some questions having multiple sub-headings requiring additional information. Questions included: the Christian surname of the officer; age of appointment to the military; date of appointment; regiments in which the officer served; the successive ranks of the officer; if these ranks were obtained through purchase or non-purchase; each rank held by the officer while on half-pay; whether the officer was placed on half-pay by reduction; whether the officer was “desirous” to return to the service; if the officer was married, and he was, give the date and place of marriage; if the officer had any children, give names of children and the dates of their birth; if the officer while in service received a wound, if so, in what campaign did he receive the wound, if he was granted a pension, and the date the pension began; if the officer was employed in any Civil Officer, he was to give the name of the position and indicate the amount of his annual salary; and give the location of his residence for the last five years.


122 Hart’s *Army List* 1819.

123 PRO, WO 25/750/f229.
The case of Lieutenant Colonel H.C.E. Vernon Graham is also helpful in understanding the hardships demobilization created for long-serving veteran officers. Graham was born in 1779, the son of Henry Vernon of Hilton Park. He entered the army at the age of nineteen as a Cornet in the 10th Light Dragoons in late 1798. Serving in a variety of infantry and cavalry regiments during the Revolutionary and Consular periods, he was placed on half-pay in 1802, “by reduction of the additional Troops of Cavalry, after the Treaty of Amiens.”124 Reappointed to the cavalry when hostilities resumed, he transferred to the 26th Regiment in 1806 where he served in Ireland and England in various staff positions. In 1808, Graham volunteered for more active service and received a posting as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General to Sir John Moore’s army in Spain. After Moore’s death, he served in a number of combat units participating in the battles of Talavera, Aroyo Molinos, Badajos, and Salamanca, where he was severely wounded. However, Graham did not receive any pension for his wound. Sent home to recuperate, he subsequently received an appointment as Inspecting Field Officer of Militia in Nova Scotia with the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1815, Graham left Nova Scotia to command of the 2nd Regiment in the West Indies, “where [he] experienced two attacks of yellow Fever.”125 After Napoleon’s defeat, Graham became an Inspecting Field Officer posted in the Ionian Islands. In February 1828, he was placed on half-pay. At the time of his reduction, Graham was a widower supporting four children. Graham subsequently found employment as Justice of the Peace in the County of Stafford.

Many officers and men who faced reduction because of demobilization chose to leave Britain and make their fortunes overseas. For these officers there were three viable options. They could leave their homeland and settle in a colony hoping to find employment working as a

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125 Ibid.
civilian in a vocation or skill they had learned while serving in the military. They could offer their military services as mercenaries or acquire commissions in the service of a foreign power, private army, or revolutionary force. Finally, they could remain in the army until they found employment in one of the many regiments garrisoning the overseas empire. A significant number of officers found employment while remaining in the military working in either royal or colonial administrative positions such as judicial and legal branches, adjutant positions, inspectors, superintendents, or government agents.

An interesting example of an officer who chose the first option was Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bulteel Harris, who served twenty-two years in the army purchasing all of his grade ranks. At the age of sixteen, Harris graduated from the Royal Military College receiving his Ensigns commission in the 57th Regiment. In 1807, he purchased a captaincy in the Seventy-second Foot. In 1807, the 1st Battalion of the 72nd Regiment was posted at the Cape of Good Hope while the 2nd Battalion remained at home. Since Harris’ records do not indicate any service overseas at this particular time, it can be conjectured that he was posted with the 2nd Battalion. Promoted to the rank of brevet Major, Harris received an appointment of Deputy Adjutant General for British forces in Nova Scotia. In late 1814, his regiment suffered reduction and he was put on half-pay. Harris chose to remain with his wife and one child in Halifax, fulfilling the military and civilian position of Adjutant General to the Governor of Nova Scotia. Hart’s Army Lists reveal that Harris remained at this post until 1834.

126 There is some discrepancy as to the early military career of Henry Bulteel Harris. Harris notes in his 1829 Statement of Service that he joined the Fifty-seventh Foot on March 17, 1806 as an ensign after leaving the Royal Military College. Moreover, he notes that he purchased a Lieutenancy in the Fifty-seventh in December of that same year. The Royal Military Calendar states that Harris joined the Seventeenth Dragoons as a cornet in 1799 and as a lieutenant in 1801. The Calendar indicates that Harris joined the Seventy-second Foot in January 1807 agreeing with the date given on his Statement of Service. See WO/ /187 and United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar, Vol. V., 149.
Throughout the Napoleonic period, it was common for British officers to serve as mercenaries commanding non-British soldiers. During the Napoleonic Wars, British officers commanded soldiers in over 120 foreign regiments of varying quality including Greeks, Swiss, Albanians, Corsicans, Serbs, and Bulgarians.\(^{127}\) Indeed, during the Napoleonic Peninsular campaigns Britain recruited, trained, equipped, and supplied officers to the Portuguese Army and the King’s German Legion that was, in fact, the Hanoverian Army in exile. Moreover, after Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo, a substantial number of demobilized officers chose to offer their services as mercenaries in Símon Bolívar’s and José San Martín’s armies that operated against the Spanish in South America. Between 1817 and 1819, when Parliament enacted the Foreign Enlistment Act forbidding service in foreign armies, it is estimated that some 4,000 to 6,000 former British troops and officers served in the insurrectionist armies.\(^{128}\) From existent records, more than 1,000 British officers served Bolivar in distinctive all-European units such as the Albion (British) Legion, 1\(^{st}\) Battalion Venezuelan Rifles, the Venezuelan Hussars (1\(^{st}\) and 2\(^{nd}\) regiments), and the Artillery Brigade. Bolivar’s London representative, Luis Lopez Mendez, assisted by three British soldiers of fortune, Gregor MacGregor, John d’Evereaux, and Colonel James England were responsible in raising and equipping this mercenary force.\(^{129}\) Lopez knew that demobilization had created a large pool of trained and battle-hardened officers who were desperate for employment. Moreover, British contractors were willing to sell large amounts of surplus military equipment at low prices. Half-pay officers found Mendez’s offer particularly attractive. Every officer who signed on received a higher rank than the one he had held during the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, all officers were promised a pension if they were wounded,

they could not be transferred out of their unit without their permission, and each officer received £40 to outfit his kit. Response to Mendez’s proposition netted a substantial number of soldiers even though Liverpool’s government sought to downplay their involvement. However, newspapers like the Times of London and the Kentish Gazette reported the success of the South American’s recruiting drives. The Times reported that in the fall of 1818, General Gregory MacGregor recruited nearly 1500 troops from Britain and Ireland sending them by chartered vessels to the South American port of Margaritta.

Junior officers, like Gustavus Mathias Hippisley, J. A. Gillmore, Henry Wilson, Charles Smith, Samuel Collins, Charles Chamberlain, Daniel Florence O’Leary, Belford Hinton Wilson, Charles Brown, and James Rooke were especially attracted to this service because they saw little chance of advancement in Britain’s substantially reduced army. Their professionalism, training, and combat experience changed the nature of the wars for independence in South America by significantly improving the insurgent’s chance for victory. Robert Harvey describes the majority of British officers who served in Bolivar’s army as a collection of stoics, idealists, and adventurers who provided a vital bulwark to the his officer corps. Illustrative of this type of officer was Lieutenant James Rooke. Rooke came from a renowned family of military officers. His father was General James Rooke, Colonel in Chief of the 38th Regiment and Member of Parliament for the county of Monmouth. Through his father’s influence, the younger Rooke received an appointment serving as a Deputy-Assistant Adjutant General in Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch/Belgian-German Army of 1815. Just before the Battle of Waterloo, Rooke was attached to the Prince of Orange’s staff and served in this capacity until August 1815 when he received an

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131 Times (London), October 26, 1818.
appointment as a lieutenant in the staff corps of the cavalry.\textsuperscript{134} With demobilization in 1816, the young lieutenant went on half-pay and subsequently joined the Venezuelan Independent Army, recruited by Mendez in London. Rooke sailed to South America in late 1817. It is likely that he paused long enough in St. Kitts to woo and marry his second wife, whom contemporaries described as a beautiful mulatto woman. After Rooke’s arrival in Angostura in late 1817, Bolivar immediately placed him on his staff as an aide-de-camp.\textsuperscript{135} Rooke served with Bolivar during his epic crossing of the Andes in June 1819. In the fighting that followed, Rooke received a mortal wound while leading the Albion Legion in skirmishes that preceded the critical Battle of Boyaca.

Another significant group of officers employed overseas in the aftermath of Waterloo were the men who commanded units of the Honourable East India Company’s Army. The East India Company was a privately held commercial company that administered, in conjunction with Parliament, large tracts of the Indian subcontinent. To protect its territory and interests, the Company maintained three separate military forces headquartered at the administrative centers of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. Douglas M. Peers observes that the maintenance of three separate forces on the subcontinent was a safety measure employed by the company to forestall any “dangerous pan-Indian combinations.”\textsuperscript{136} Company officials believed that in the event of a mutiny one force could quell the other. Nonetheless, tensions existed between the military forces of the three presidencies, as each offered varying rates of pay scale and promotion. For example,

\textsuperscript{134} Charles Dalton, \textit{The Waterloo Roll Call} (London: Arms and Armour Press 1971), 32.
\textsuperscript{135} Bolivar it appears had penchant for British aides-de-camp as he continuously employed them from 1815 to 1828. There was Captain Kent in 1815, Charles Chamberlain, 1815-1817, James Rooke 1817-1819, Daniel Florence O’Leary, 1819-1828, William Ferguson, 1824 –1828, and Belford Hinton Wilson 1824-1828.
in the Bengal Presidency, officers often received commands that were more lucrative and given additional field pay while posted in their cantonments.\textsuperscript{137}

Each presidency force contained two exclusively European regiments, an artillery regiment, and several native infantry or sepoy regiments officered by Europeans. Officers who generally entered the Company’s service came from backgrounds socially inferior to those who entered the regular army. Douglas Peer’s research work on the social backgrounds of Company officers who served in the early decades of the nineteenth century reveals that four percent came from aristocracy, nineteen percent from the landed gentry, and the remainder from middling and professional sectors of British society.\textsuperscript{138} Furthermore, Peer’s study also indicates that many Company officers tended to perpetuate family tradition by following in their father and grandfather’s footsteps of military service. One such military dynasty of this period was the Van Cortlandt-Anderson families, who had officer family members stationed in India, Canada, and the Cape Colony. This military dynasty will be examined in detail in Chapter Five.

Two other groups of officers who practiced their military craft overseas were the foreign military advisors and Inspecting Field Officers of Militia. Britain supplied a small force of military advisors to Portugal to advise and train the Portuguese Army. These officers fulfilled functions similar to today’s Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). During the Peninsular campaigns 359 British officers were posted to the Portuguese Army in an advisory and combat capacity.\textsuperscript{139} In 1815-1816, twenty-eight British officers without regimental commissions remained in Portugal as advisors.\textsuperscript{140}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 75.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Lionel S. Challis, “British Officers Serving in the Portuguese Army, 1809-1814,” in \textit{Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research}, Vol. 27 (1949), 50-60.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Hart’s \textit{Army List} 1815.
\end{itemize}
One of these officers was George Henry Zühleke who served in the regular army for sixteen years before transferring to Portuguese service. He achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel before being placed on half-pay in 1817, when Britain ended its military assistance program to Portugal. Desiring military employment, Zühleke remained on the half-pay list for twelve years supporting a wife and one child. His comments in his 1829 Statement for Retired Officers lead one to believe Zühleke had to leave Britain for Germany in order to support his family.141

Inspectors of Militia were posted in Canada and the Ionian Islands at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. It was the duty of these officers to advise locals in the command and administration of their militia forces. Canadian inspectors remained in the colony only as long as there was a perceived threat from the United States and by 1816, many of these officers were withdrawn to Britain. The Ionian Islands, on the other hand, employed a significant contingent of officers from 1818 to 1830.142 During their twelve-year tenure in the Adriatic, some thirty-four officers served as inspectors of militia.143

The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837 does not enumerate the duties of the Inspector of Militia. However, late eighteenth century inspector’s commissions note that a militia inspector’s principal duties consisted of forming the locals into standard military formations of companies and battalions. Militiamen also received instruction in military discipline, regulations, and orders. In addition to the inspecting officers, the Horse Guards frequently detached regimental sergeants to assist the commissioned inspectors with their training duties. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Napier, who served as an Inspector of Militia in the

141 PRO, W.O. 25/779/f39.
142 Hart’s Army Lists 1818 to 1819.
143 Hart’s Army Lists 1818-1830.
Ionian Islands for eleven years, observed to his mother that as an inspector he had few duties. “I have nothing to do,” he wrote at the beginning of his posting.\textsuperscript{144}

However, military Governors often employed Inspectors of Militia to carry out additional military and civilian administrative duties. During Napier’s tenure along the Adriatic coast, General Sir Thomas Maitland, Chief Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, utilized his subordinate’s talents numerous times. In 1820, Napier operated as a military advisor to Ali Pasha, an insurgent on the Greek mainland fighting the Ottomans. Napier’s plans for Ali Pasha’s army included the formation of “a complete artillery corps of fifty pieces, which were, with all appurtenances, in his magazine; and also drill and organize his troops...” which supposedly numbered 30,000.\textsuperscript{145} In 1822, Maitland appointed Napier as Military Resident of Cephalonia, a civilian/military administrative position akin to a minor governorship. Napier described his role in Cephalonia as a “despotic lieutenant of a lord high commissioner.”\textsuperscript{146} In essence, the assignment conferred almost absolute power over the population and protected them against the long-established feudal oppression.\textsuperscript{147} During his six-year tenure as the Crown’s resident, Napier was responsible for significant improvements to the island’s infrastructure and fiscal health. In his autobiography, Napier cited some of his achievements in Cephalonia: the building of two market places, the construction of 100 miles of roads, 40 miles of which were blasted out of solid rock; a number of bridges; the founding of a girl’s school; the construction of a new prison; and numerous improvements to administrative buildings in local towns and villages.\textsuperscript{148} In addition to his construction projects, Napier also improved the fiscal health of the island reporting that

\textsuperscript{144} William Napier Bruce, \textit{The Life of General Sir Charles Napier} (London: John Murray, 1885), 84.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} William Napier Bruce, \textit{The Life of General Sir Charles Napier}, 89.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 105.
between 1820 and 1827 the yearly revenues averaged £32,111 with average annual expenses totaling £13,385.\textsuperscript{149} With great satisfaction Napier reported that each year he was able to pay into the general treasury at Corfu nearly £19,000.

At the conclusion of the Napoleonic era, Britain had substantially enlarged its overseas empire. For the next three decades, Britain’s military largely ignored the affairs of Europe, preferring to concentrate on its communication and logistic lifelines to India. As Correlli Barnett observes, “the key to British foreign policy and grand strategy after 1815 was not Flanders but India.”\textsuperscript{150} Between 1816 and 1837, the British Army participated in thirteen major campaigns. Only two of these campaigns, the Portuguese Expedition, 1827-28 and the First Carlist War 1836-1837 occurred in Europe. Seven of the campaigns were fought in India and peripheral territories, three in Africa, and one each in Canada and the Persian Gulf. The London Times reported that in 1823 of the 89,426 troops under arms over one half or 48,173 were located in the colonies.\textsuperscript{151} Two years later the number increased significantly as Britain assembled its largest military force between the Waterloo and the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{152} In 1825, of the 100 regular line regiments sixty-eight were located in the colonies. As such, Britain’s active and non-active military officers gravitated away from the traditional locus of power in Britain to colonies on the fringes of empire. There they served in many capacities both military and civilian; a topic that will be examined in detail in later chapters.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{151} Times (London), February 23, 1823.
\textsuperscript{152} British regiments that participated in The First Burmese War were the 1\textsuperscript{st}, 13\textsuperscript{th}, 38\textsuperscript{th}, 41\textsuperscript{st}, 44\textsuperscript{th}, 45\textsuperscript{th}, 47\textsuperscript{th}, 54\textsuperscript{th}, 87\textsuperscript{th}, and 89\textsuperscript{th}.
Conclusion

The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 brought to a close to nearly twenty-five years of warfare. Although Britain was one of the principal victors, the arrival of peace created a whole host of new problems for the state. Britain’s sudden shift from a wartime to a peacetime economy caused considerable economic distress that resulted in substantial shortfalls in revenue that had a significant impact on the army. Parliament’s subsequent fiscal retrenchment mandated that the substantial military forces that had defeated Napoleon be immediately demobilized. In the five years following the Battle of Waterloo, Parliament cut wartime troop levels by more than half from 1813’s wartime high of approximately 280,000 men to just under 90,000 in 1823. Reductions in army strength placed thousands of out of work officers and soldiers into Britain’s already glutted manpower pool.

Officers who had served with distinction during the Napoleonic Wars were particularly hard pressed and clamored for relief. The Colonial Office, with the approval of Parliament, employed many of these officers in overseas administrative positions. Years of campaigning in the Peninsular had made British Army not only a formidable military force but also a military experienced in policing and pacifying restive populations. For the next three decades, British Army who at the end of the Napoleonic Wars was in search of a mission found one in governing and administering significant portions of Britain’s empire.
CHAPTER THREE: THE COLONIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

In 1814, Patrick Colquhoun, a noted authority on statistics and criminal jurisprudence, published *A Treatise on the Population, Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire, In Every Quarter of the World Including the East Indies*. Like many men of his age, Colquhoun was self-educated and had spent his later years investigating methods to better public services. In fact, it was Colquhoun who suggested improvements to the London police force in methods of detection and arrest. His contemporaries characterized him as a pompous and domineering individual, always believing that his opinion was correct. Colquhoun firmly believed that England functioned best when its subjects understood their proper place in the social hierarchy. During his retirement, Colquhoun endeavored to examine the British state and the future direction of its empire that had grown dramatically in the wake of the French wars. In his treatise, Colquhoun argued that the empire offered limitless possibilities for Britain’s “redundant Population” of unemployed and destitute, as it provided distant prisons for banished criminals, guaranteed strategic interests, and, supported by a powerful marine, laid the foundations of global markets and trade for the century to come. Moreover, he noted that with prudent administration this empire could yield incalculable resources and wealth for the home country.

Colquhoun specifically argued that Britain’s colonial empire offered the home country significant financial benefits. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain became the world’s principle provider of manufactured goods yielding enormous profits to the home

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country.\textsuperscript{3} As evidence, Colquhoun pointed to the £15,516,605 in revenue Britain had acquired from colonial trade in 1812. Moreover, the gadfly Scotsman noted that the size and scope of Britain’s colonial empire could easily augment any shortfalls in manufactures or resources the home country failed to produce. He boasted that “the supplies to foreign countries must therefore be to a certain extent furnished though the medium of Great Britain…”\textsuperscript{4}

In 1814, the extent of the global British Empire was impressive. Eschewing continental territorial acquisitions at the Congress of Vienna, Britain instead collected its share of the spoils of war by acquiring a host of overseas French and Dutch colonies. Colonial Office records and Hart’s Army Lists for the three decades following the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna record the following colonies, possessions, territories, and garrison outposts administered by Britain: Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Christopher, St. Vincent, Trinidad, Tobago, Berbice, Demarara, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Grenada, Malta, Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Bermuda, New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, Ceylon, Mauritius, and Honduras. Although the East India Company administered India, Parliament and the Crown closely supervised the company’s activities. Britain in the 1820s exerted authority over some 200 million humans, more than one quarter of the world’s population.\textsuperscript{5}

By 1815, many influential Britons, like Colquhoun, had diverse but well-defined perceptions of the empire, and its place in the world. Among the aristocracy, the gentry, and influential persons, service to the empire was perceived as a duty. Colley, in her examination of British elites noted that headmasters and instructors inculcated public school boys with the

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 73.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{5} Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992), 149.
notion that they comprised a select few predestined for service to the state in either military or in the colonies. Because of their special role in society, generations of aristocratic and gentry males were initiated into a Spartan life that included long separations from their families in boarding schools, participation in exclusively male sports, and an immersion in classical literature that emphasized martial virtues and virile traits. John Colborne Lord Seaton observed that while a student at Winchester School, he took part in a “rebellion” that included holding some schoolmasters hostage, barricading the building, and “hurling down stones from the battlements—the beginning of his military career and love of battles.”

British merchants and early industrialists viewed their burgeoning empire as an exploitable resource, both as a source of almost limitless raw materials and an almost inexhaustible market for finished goods. Eric J. Evans, in his examination of Britain’s early industrial growth, argues that British territorial acquisitions at the Congress of Vienna were of enormous value when measured against the budding Industrial Revolution’s need for global markets. The overseas possessions of Malta in the Mediterranean; Ghana, Tobago, and St. Lucia in the West; and the Cape of Good Hope in Africa took on strategic importance in protecting avenues of commerce for British goods. As early as 1793, Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger noted that the strategic importance of the Cape Colony in securing the trade route to India was as important as Gibraltar in protecting British commerce in the Mediterranean. In addition to the important Indian routes the commercial ties to South America were vital. Eric

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6 Ibid., 170.
Hobsbawm observes that during the Napoleonic period, Latin America depended entirely on British imports and after those Spanish and Portuguese colonies broke with the home country, they “became an almost total economic dependency to Britain.” By 1820, South America imported more than a quarter more of English textiles than that of Europe. The importance of British overseas trade and the protection of their commercial sea-lanes were evident in the Royal Navy’s fleet distribution and force allocation in the early nineteenth century. In 1808, the East India/Cape squadron consisted of forty-six ships including ten ships of the line, nineteen frigates, and seventeen smaller craft; the West-Indies squadron boasted forty-one ships consisting of six ships of the line, thirteen frigates, and a like number of sloops: while in comparison, the Mediterranean Fleet consisted of twenty-nine ships of the line, twenty-six frigates, and twenty-nine smaller vessels. Indeed, in 1814, Colquhoun recognized the importance of British produce and manufactures arguing that exported goods to areas of the world excluding Europe accounted for newly two thirds of all exported goods. British products exported abroad amounted to £34.2 millions in 1814 and £42.9 millions in 1815. In 1836, Whig member of Parliament and author, William Wolryche Whitmore, testified before a Parliamentary committee that England enjoyed an “industrious and pretty well employed” labor force largely because of its manufactures and commerce. Moreover, he continued, that “Since the peace of 1815, … manufactures and commerce of the nation have made unexampled strides.”

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11 Ibid.
13 Colquhoun’s Table No. 3 reveals that “exports from Great Britain to Gibraltar, Malta, Sicily, the Levant, British North America, the United States of America, the West Indies, Asia, and Africa” amounted to £25,585,107 in 1811. See Patrick Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire in Every Quarter of the World Including the East Indies, … 2nd ed.*, 123.
14 William W. Whitmore, June 10, 1836, Minutes of Evidence taken before Select Committee on Disposal
encouraged these entrepreneurs recognizing that flourishing economies in both the home country and the colonies sustained employment and assured the financial independence of the British treasury and the taxpayer alike.\textsuperscript{15}

Humanitarians and devout Christians viewed the empire as fertile ground for acquiring new souls for Christ. Missionaries were the principal agents who spread the faith but emigrants, merchants, officials, and military personnel as well acted as proselytizers. William Wilberforce, a member of Parliament, declared in 1813 that Christian missionary in work in India was “the greatest of all causes” because “our religion is sublime, pure and beneficent [and] theirs is mean, licentious and cruel.”\textsuperscript{16} Some three decades earlier, in 1786, William Knox, a member of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies regarded the role of missionaries in the colonies in a more pragmatic secular light noting that Christianity served as “the best Security that Great Britain can have for their Fidelity and attachment to her Constitution and Interests.”\textsuperscript{17} Many influential elites agreed that Christianity was an essential element in binding the diverse populations to the empire by reinforcing authority and promoting social order.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, the disorganized measures of conversion common in the eighteenth century were discontinued by fresh newer methodical means in the colonies. Chief among the proponents of these changed policies were British Evangelicals who contributed substantially to the propagation and growth of a number of missionary societies. These included William


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
Carey’s Baptist Missionary Society, the Church of Scotland’s Church Missionary Society, the London Missionary Society, and a revitalized Wesleyan Missionary Society.

Missionaries, however, made uneven progress in Christianizing colonial populations. Beginning in the eighteenth century, the accepted belief in the free trade of goods within the empire led to a similar conviction about the importance of a free trade in religious beliefs and practices.¹⁹ Competition was considerable among Christian denominations for converts in the colonies. Anglicans, Methodists, and Baptists made significant inroads among the largely black population in the West Indies, gathering major followings. Both Jamaica and Trinidad boasted substantial Protestant congregations. In the Cape Colony, from 1799 on, the London Missionary Society, whose sole concern was “to spread the knowledge of Christ among heathen and unenlightened nations,” concentrated its efforts there.²⁰ Under the three-decade leadership of Dr. John Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society in South Africa, successive Cape Colony governors either damned him or praised him for his work among the Hottentots and Griquas.²¹ It was not until the Cape Colony’s administration of Governor Benjamin D’Urban’s that significant missionary activity took place among the Xhosas. Colonial officials and missionaries alike discovered that Christianizing the native populations of South Africa was not an easily accomplished task. As John Galbraith points out, Europeans were only partially successful in converting the various tribes of the Cape Colony. Tribesmen and chiefs alike only adopted Christianity for the short-term temporal benefits and frequently reverted back to their

For the most part, the various tribal people of South Africa viewed the theology of the western missionaries as an alien and unwelcome doctrine that sought to subvert their traditional way of life. The situation in Australia was similar to that of South Africa. Missionaries embarked to work in the colony, but their primary task was ministering to the needs of the transported convicts. The first governor of New South Wales, Arthur Philip was instructed not to Christianize the Aborigines. As a result, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, missionary activity in the colony was limited solely to the European population. It was not until the 1820s that the Wesleyan Missionary Society undertook a significant effort to evangelize the Aborigine population. However, Christianizing efforts among the Aborigines, like those of Wesleyan William Walker and William Shelly, were ambivalent. While the successes of these men were severely limited, the attempts at conversion were another instance of British missionaries who believed that Christianity was also a civilizing force.

British middle and working classes had mixed perceptions of the empire. On the one hand, the scope and extent of the empire evoked pride, but with this sentiment came a measure of uncertainty. Colley argues that a significant portion of the British populace debated the status of the empire’s recently acquired inhabitants. Their primary concern centered on the rights of the colonists and responsibilities the home islands had toward their colonial dependents. Were these newly acquired populations to be accorded the same rights and privileges as freeborn Britons? Involved in this issue were a whole host of supplementary and complex questions that included the ethics of economic dependency, the principles of equal rights, and the question of racial

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22 Ibid., 97.
24 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1701-1837, 323.
Edmund Burke, a member of the emerging middle class, argued in Parliament that Providence bestowed on Britain a trusteeship of a considerable portion of the globe. Moreover, he argued that it was imperative that all Britons had a moral obligation toward the well being of its dependent populations. Burke’s viewpoint was rooted in his belief that England’s greatness and power came from the patriarchal benevolence of the distinguished landed families who had been the kingdom’s source of authority and prosperity for centuries. Just as the gentry had taken care of their tenants now Britain must take care of their colonial populations.

While philosophical and ethical questions concerning empire occupied the debates of educated Britons, the ordinary citizen was well aware of the benefits they accrued from the colonies. For more than a century, the political and commercial union of Scotland, England, and Wales gave all of the kingdoms equitable trading rights with the colonies. Now goods transshipped from the colonies to Britain would require only one payment of customs duties. Trade and Navigation Accounts from the early nineteenth century Financial Accounts reveal that Britons imported substantial quantities of coffee, tea, sugar, wine, raw cotton, timber, and silk from their colonial possessions. In the 1820s, the British imported nearly £29 millions in coffee, more than £31 millions in tea, and £61 and a half millions in sugar. Briton’s passion for tea was so great that in 1784, it prompted a French visitor to write “throughout the whole of England the drinking of tea is general ….The humblest peasant has his tea twice a day just like the rich man; the total consumption is immense.”

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However, tea was not the only consumer good in high demand by the British population. The spice trade of the east was highly prized by the Dutch and the British, and competition for these culinary treasures was intense. Cinnamon in particular, found primarily in Ceylon, Malabar, Java, Sumatra, and other East Indian locales was greatly sought after by westerners. However, only Ceylon produced the spice in any quantity. Colquhoun noted in his 1815 treatise that the cultivation of cinnamon appeared to be confined to Ceylon because attempts at growing it in Malabar, Batavia, and the Isle of France had failed. Eighteenth-century physicians believed cinnamon to have both internal and external curative properties. In 1729, noted Amsterdam druggist Albertus Seba wrote of the spice’s medicinal qualities, observing that it “expels wind, and hath been found of great Use in arthritick [sic] and gouty Disorders: It is also a Diuretick [sic].” Some twenty-five years after Seba’s pronouncements, Taylor White, a Fellow of the Royal Society, noted that the increased demand for cinnamon by Britons had caused the price to rise significantly. In 1783, French foreign minister, Vergennes noted that British designs on Ceylon were linked primarily to breaking the Netherlands’s lucrative Indian Ocean cinnamon trade. Geoffrey Powell argues that the richness of the Ceylonese soil and the efficient [farm] management by the Dutch became an alluring target for British acquisition during the American War of Independence. The cinnamon trade remained important to the island until the

34 Geoffrey Powell, The Kandyan Wars: The British Army in Ceylon, 1803-1818; 19th Century Military
mid-nineteenth century, when demand for coffee caused many planters to switch to the production of that crop.

Britons derived significant economic and political benefits from their global empire. The empire, however, was not a homogeneous entity. Modern scholars, such as Vincent T. Harlow, Mark Nadis, John Bowle, and Alfred Leroy Burt have divided the empire into two entities based on chronology, geography, political institutions, race, and ethnicity. The original colonies, or First British Empire, comprised lands acquired prior to the American War of Independence and consisted primarily of possessions in the western hemisphere. These colonies consisted of the thirteen North American colonies, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, the Island of St. John or Prince Edward Island, Rupert’s Land, the Province of Quebec, the West Indian islands of Jamaica, Barbados, most of the Leeward Islands with the most important consisting of Antigua, Dominica, and St. Christopher (better known as St. Kitts), Bermuda, a foothold in India, and some small trading stations in West Africa. The English settled many of these lands in the second and third quarter of the seventeenth century. Only Jamaica, some of the smaller West Indian islands, the West African stations, and territory in India became English possessions by conquest. Helen Taft Manning divides the First Colonial Empire into four classes: the Old West Indies and Bermuda; the Ceded Islands of the West Indies; Nova Scotia and its dependencies, New Brunswick, and Bermuda; and the Province of Quebec. While these colonies were a diverse group, they displayed certain commonalities. During the seventeenth century, Western European Christians settled in all of the colonies located in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the Old West

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Indies contained a substantial Anglo-Saxon population.\textsuperscript{37} Many of these colonies enjoyed a considerable measure of self-government. Even those colonies ceded by France in the Treaty of 1763 received assembly-like legislatures similar to those in the Old West Indies. Manning notes that by 1784, existing colonial governments had assumed a fixed form with a constitution that provided for a governor, an appointed council, and a representative assembly who shared the power of taxation and legislation.\textsuperscript{38} Traditional common law precedence and constitutional guarantees similar to that of England’s 1689 Settlement were bestowed on each of these colonies allowing their legislatures wide latitude in their ability to tax and dispense funds. Moreover, time and distance from the home islands limited the extent of the Crown’s prerogative powers over these colonies.

Through conquest and treaty, the Second British Empire was born at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Most of the newly acquired territories were located in the Eastern Hemisphere. In addition to this increase in territory and population came what Mark Nadis called “a changing Imperial climate.”\textsuperscript{39} By this, he meant that there occurred a noteworthy bifurcation of the empire, which consisted of a group of long held self-governing European settlements and new collection of mostly non-white dependencies.\textsuperscript{40} The lone exceptions to non-European territories of the British Second Empire were the penal colonies of the Antipodes, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. Britain obtained many of these new territories as strategic waypoints to protect its vital sea links to India. During the first half of the nineteenth century, a substantial number of these strategic waypoints grew in size as fear of foreign invasion caused

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 2.
Britain to annex adjacent lands creating buffer zones. Some notable examples of turbulent frontiers that required pacification were Robert Brownrigg’s Second Kandyan War (1814-1816), Charles McCarthy’s First Ashanti War (1824-1831), Charles Metcalf’s First Burmese War (1823-1826), Harry Smith’s Xhosa Campaign (1835), and Charles Napier’s conquest of Sind (1843). These wars of security caused the unplanned expansion of Britain’s imperial domain.

Also problematic was incorporation of British cultural and institutional practices with the long-standing social, religious, and political patterns of the captive state. With their well-developed sense of national identity and purpose Britons frequently sought to wipe away existing institutions in their Asian and African domains with little forethought for the subsequent consequences and difficulties that soon arose in the colonies of South Africa, Ceylon, and the Indian Presidencies. Colonial administrators faced a Gordian Knot of problems in each of these colonies by attempting to replace traditional Dutch institutions with newly inaugurated British ones. For example, in 1806, the British administrative authority in the Cape Colony was forced to grapple with two particularly nettlesome problems. The first was the question of land tenure and the second was an economy based on the convertible rixdollar. Both of these issues would take generations before they were resolved. It was not until Sir John Francis Cradock’s land regulations of 1813, and the Rippon land regulations of 1832 that the issues of land sales and distribution were ultimately solved. The question of converting currency use from rixdollar to British pounds was also thorny. Since the seventeenth century, the colony’s monetary system was linked to that of the greater Dutch global empire. As a consequence, a

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large variety of coins, all in silver and all easily convertible, were in circulation. In 1782, during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, a disruption in the silver supply caused the Cape Colonists to abandon the metallic basis of their currency and issue unsecured paper money. When Britain acquired the colony in 1806, the rixdollar remained the currency of the colony. However, the steady devaluation of the currency and whose inability to be integrated into their world wide empire caused London, in 1825, to make South Africa, along with all other British territories dependent on the pound sterling. Foreign currency, however, remained in circulation within the empire for a considerable length of time. The army used much of this coinage to stock their overseas military chests. A January 24, 1834 Colonial Office circular advised all colonies to send supplies of coins, especially those of the new South American states, to the treasury to be assayed for “gross weight, purity of metal, and degree of fineness” in order to standardize public outlays by the home country.  

India and Ceylon also presented a myriad of difficulties for the British imperial administrators as they attempted to replace traditional ways of life and methods of governance with western institutions. Initially, the East India Company and its bureaucrats coexisted with the native population, rarely interfering with local traditions and customs. For most of the eighteenth century, the Company directors located in Leadenhall Street in the City of London were primarily interested in domestic tranquility and procuring an unending stream of revenues. John Keay observes that Company men of the eighteenth century displayed a genuine respect for Indian traditions and institutions, which they regarded as time-tested and superior to that of their own society. This notion, however, changed during the post-Napoleonic period markedly with the growth of utilitarianism, evangelicalism, and responsible government. Noteworthy changes

that negated previous policies included the 1813 amendment to Company’s charter to allow Christian missionaries to establish themselves in Company territories, the official British policy to disparage Hinduism, and Lord William Bentinck’s replacement of Indian social, educational, and political institutions with those of the west.

Ceylon was another territory that had a British administration grafted onto an ancient non-western culture. Portions of the island were conquered and occupied by both the Portuguese and the Dutch and contained vestiges of these states’ administrations. The unsuccessful management by the Madras Presidency compelled the Colonial Office to take control of colonial administration in 1802. The chief executive office of the colony was a Crown appointed governor who held his office for an undetermined amount of time. In 1828, a term of six years was set, as it was determined that the climate was unhealthy for a lengthy tenure. Ceylon’s governors held a variety of wide ranging and absolute powers in both the Legislative and Executive branches, or as directions from the Colonial Office noted that the colony’s governance was “vested in the Governor alone, subject to revision and confirmation or rejection at Home.”

The governor received advice and assistance in governing from an advisory council consisting of the Chief Justice, the commanding officer of troops, the Principal Secretary to Government, and two other officials nominated by the Governor. A Ceylonese Civil Service, modeled after the Indian Civil Service, assisted this hierarchy. Although specifically banned by the Colonial Office, a number of British military officers frequently filled vacancies in Civil Service

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47 Conflicts between the colony’s first Governor Frederick North and the military commander Major General David D. Wemyss prompted the Colonial Office to combine the duties of Governor and commander in chief. With the appointment of the colony’s second governor General, Sir Thomas Maitland, the Colonial Office began a trend that continued in the colony into the 1840s. See E.F.C. Ludowyk, A Short History of Ceylon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 135-169; and Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule, 41-58.
positions. Many of these posts were located in the recently pacified province of Kandy. The correspondence of Lieutenant General Sir Robert Brownrigg, Governor of Ceylon between 1811 and 1820, disclose the myriad of duties and issues administrators faced. Brownrigg, as both chief executive and military commander, faced issues as diverse as waging a quasi-guerrilla war against the Kandyans, allocating funds for the half-pay of retiring officers, preparing monthly returns for garrisoned troops, building and maintaining a road system, overseeing the postal system, the collection of revenue, dispensing justice, treating with local chiefs, and determining the facing colors of the 2nd Ceylonese Regiment. In many instances, British governors and administrative personnel often were unacquainted with the traditions and ways of life and frequently displayed an insensitivity that offended the local populations. Doctor John Davy, a physician posted to Ceylon and a chronicler of Brownrigg’s tenure, noted that the Ceylonese:

...now ... were inferior to every civilian in our service—to every officer in the army. Though officially treated with respect, it was only officially; a common soldier passed a proud Kandyan chief with as little attention as he would a fellow of the lowest caste. Thus they considered themselves degraded and shorn of their splendor.

British rule on the island remained autocratic until 1848, when Governor George Byng, seventh Viscount Torrington, set in motion a series of reforms that enlarged the franchise.

Despite the apparent difficulties of administering the non-western colonies, British military men clamored for colonial positions upon the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. The pool of eligible and qualified officers was substantial and competition for positions was fierce. The Colonial Office established that only general officers were entitled to colonial governorships. However, there were exceptions for some of the smaller minor and unhealthy

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48 PRO, C.O. Public Dispatches upon Military Subjects.
stations. An 1825 letter from Robert W. Hay, Permanent Under Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, to Lord Fitzroy, James Henry Somerset, military secretary at the Horse Guards, acknowledges Lieutenant Colonel Dixon Denham’s appointment as lieutenant governor of Sierra Leone. Denham’s career record indicates that he joined the service as a lieutenant in the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers in 1811. He served with distinction with the Welsh Fusiliers during the Peninsular War and later with the 54th Regiment at Waterloo. After the war, he transferred to the 64th Regiment in 1819 and with the subsequent army reductions found himself on half-pay with the 3rd Regiment in fall of 1821. One month later Denham received the promotion to the rank of major when he volunteered to lead an expedition to Africa with naval officer Captain Hugh Clapperton and navy surgeon Dr. Walter Oudney. Between 1822-1824, Denham’s expedition explored and mapped areas of Africa south of the Sahara Desert near Lake Chad and along the Waube, Logone, and Shari Rivers. From extant correspondence, it is known that Denham was acquainted with Wellington. In the summer of 1825, Denham shot and killed several lions and other African wildlife, the skins of which he sent to the Duke of Wellington. In 1828, as a reward for his African service, Denham received a lieutenant colonel’s commission and an appointment as lieutenant governor of Sierra Leone. He held the position for five weeks before dying of fever.

50 Information on British settlements located o the west coast of Africa was extremely limited as evidenced by a note written on the back of Lieutenant Colonel Dixon Denham’s letter of appointment. Lord Fitzroy Somerset made the notation “Has the Quartermaster General any map of our settlements on the coast of Africa. If not, I think we borrowed one a short time ago from the Colonial Office. What became of that? If it was sent back, get again and collect such papers as may enable the Commander in Chief to draw instructions for Lieutenant Colonel Lumley.” See WP1/505/1/2 Letter from R.W. Hay to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, December 4, 1827.


52 WP 1/821/5 Letter from Major Denham to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, sending a copy of the route he traveled in Africa and describing the skins of a lion and other animals he has for the Duke, June 20, 1825.
Another colonel who received a senior colonial administrative position was Sir Charles Macarthy who, in 1822, administered all of the British settlements on the west coast of Africa. J. W. Fortescue notes that Macarthy descended from an old Irish family that had taken refuge in France. When the revolution broke out, Macarthy fled France and offered his services to Britain. The young officer first served in the West Indies, and then attained a captaincy in the 52nd under Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe. In 1804, Macarthy became a major in the New Brunswick Fencibles, a Canadian unit that recruited backwoodsmen from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Lower Canada. He transferred to African service in 1811, receiving a lieutenant colonelcy in the Royal African Corps. For the rest of his life he remained in Africa administering Crown territories and assisting in the suppression of the slave trade. As a reward for his services, Macarthy received a knighthood. In January 1824, he was killed along with 177 men in his command while attempting to stem an Ashanti attack on Crown territory. With the death of Macarthy, the Crown transferred its powers back to a mercantile corporation who administered the Gold Coast until 1843, when the government again regained control.

In the years following Waterloo, Colonial Secretary Henry Bathurst established an official policy that considered only general officers for senior colonial administrative positions. In 1821, Colonel John Cameron applied to the Colonial Office for an overseas appointment to administer one of the islands in the West Indies. Bathurst denied his request because he considered the applicant’s rank was not commensurate with the available position. Parliament reaffirmed Bathurst’s policy in 1830 when it directed that only military men holding the rank of

55 WP1/677/6, Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Henry Goulburn, asking for him once again to draw the name of Major General John Cameron to the attention of Lord Bathurst for consideration for the command of one of the islands in the West Indies,” 16 August 1821.
major general or lieutenant general were eligible to administer or serve as governors for all of the major colonies.\textsuperscript{56} Bathurst and a majority of the members in Parliament believed that awarding important colonial administrative positions to deserving general officers was a means of rewarding them for their long and distinguished service. In 1815, there were 550 general officers on active service.\textsuperscript{57} Eighteen years later, in 1833, the number stood at 417, because of death, retirement, and resignation.\textsuperscript{58} Hart’s \textit{A List of the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on Full, Half-Pay, and Retired with Index} for the decade of the 1820s notes eighteen territories and colonies that required military postings.\textsuperscript{59} An August 1827 memorandum from Sir Herbert Taylor, Deputy Secretary at War to the Duke of Wellington on British forces serving in foreign stations, exclusive of India, notes that British troops garrisoned fifteen locations worldwide.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, an 1833 Parliamentary index of garrisons on foreign stations lists thirty-three overseas posts that included governorships, lieutenant governorships, and substantial military garrisons. The Colonial Office, for the period 1820 to 1835, lists twenty-seven territories under colonial jurisdiction excluding the East India Company’s presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.\textsuperscript{61} 

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 2553.

\textsuperscript{59} Territories and colonies with military commands administered by Great Britain include Ireland, the Mediterranean, the Ionian Islands, Gibraltar, North America, Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. John’s Newfoundland, West Indies, Jamaica, Bahamas, the East Indies, Madras, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Isle of France or Mauritius, and St. Helena.

\textsuperscript{60} Territories and colonies with substantial military garrisons mentioned in the memorandum consisted of Gibraltar, the Leeward Islands, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Honduras, Canada, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Bermuda, New South Wales, the Ionian Island, Malta, Sierra Leone and dependencies, Mauritius, and Ceylon. See WP1/895/4 Letter from Sir Herbert Taylor to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, sending a paper on the British forces serving in foreign stations, 4 August 1827.

\textsuperscript{61} Territories and colonies as listed in the 1820s Colonial Appointments (PRO:C.O. 325/20) consisting of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, the Cape of Good Hope, Sierra Leone, Ceylon, New South Wales, Van Diemens Land, Lower Canada, Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward’s Island, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Honduras, Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, Tobago, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Lucia, Mauritius, and the Seychelles.
Regardless of the variation in numbers, there were a finite number of colonial positions available. Moreover, more than 400 general officers had the high rank that the colonial office required for senior administrative positions. Sir Willoughby Gordon’s June 19, 1833 testimony before a Parliamentary committee is revealing. When the committee posed this question: “Although the number of general officers in the British army appears to exceed 400, are there not a considerable proportion of those general officers who are merely receiving the regimental pay of lieutenant colonel or some inferior pay, with the title of major general?” Gordon answered, “I understand that the very large proportion of the general officers of the army are in fact lieutenant colonels of regiments, and as lieutenant colonels and upon the establishment of their regiments, and in order to make those regiments more effective, they were removed from them with the pay of lieutenant colonel, and on that pay they now stand.”

Gordon then produced a detailed accounting of general officers that received reduced pay that read:

Number of General Officers receiving on the Amount of the Pay of their Regimental Rank, when promoted to the Rank of General Officer, c. 1833.
1 General,
3 Lieutenant-generals,
10 Major-generals
33 Major-generals, as lieutenant-colonels of infantry.
1 Major-generals, as lieutenant-colonels of cavalry.
72 Major-generals, who were on half pay, when promoted.

120
13 Major-generals, who were removed from the Foot Guards [in 1821,1825 and 1830]

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Along with the competition for a colonial position was the intense lobbying by general officer applicants for the particularly prestigious and well-paying colonial posts. While the Colonial Office never published a ranking of colonial positions it was common knowledge that

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63 Ibid. June 19, 1836, 2203.
posts in West Africa and some of the smaller islands in the West Indies, that were inherently unhealthy places, ranked near the bottom of the colonial posting pecking order. Ireland, while not technically a colony, and India under the direction of the East India Company ranked at the top of the most sought after colonial postings. Strategically important and economically valuable colonies paid significantly larger salaries. Noteworthy was the colony of Jamaica that offered a generous salary. Jamaica, however, was an extremely unhealthy colony but the center of Britain’s lucrative sugar industry. The governor received £8,000 to £10,000 annually, the chief justice £5,810.3, principal secretary £3,000, and the provost marshal £2,100, for the period 1828 to 1831.64

Comparisons of the two yearly columns in Table A.4 disclose a number of revealing points. However, both columns are incomplete; Colonial Office marginalia note that salary accounts received late were not included in the published form. For example, column three does not list salaries for Jamaica, the Bahamas, Tobago, Montserrat, St. Lucia, the Ionian Islands, and the Seychelles, while column four does not list the administrator’s salaries for Dominica, St. Christopher, Trinidad, Demarara, or for the lieutenant governor of Lower Canada. In addition, salaries fluctuated relative to their financial and strategic value to the empire. Sierra Leone, for example, paid its lieutenant governor a modest £2000 annually. Located on the margins of the empire, Sierra Leone had little to commend itself. Expenses in maintaining a colony of the west coast of Africa frequently outweighed economic benefits. Even the Duke of Wellington realized this when he noted in August 1828, that government expenses in Sierra Leone exceeded its worth to the mother country.65 The Colonial Office paid the lieutenant governor of New Brunswick

64 PRO, C.O. 325/20.
65 WP1/951/42, Copy of a letter from Arthur Wellesley, to W. Allen setting out the reasons why it would be impossible to institute the economies suggested by Allen in Sierra Leone, August 26, 1828.
£1500 annually, a salary barely adequate given governors’ expenses that included providing food for his staff and guests. The governor was also expected to personally pay the living expenses of his aides.

Also notable was the diminution of governor’s salary at the Cape Colony. The excessiveness and profligacy of the administration of Lord Charles Henry Somerset, Governor of the Cape Colony, may have played a role in the Colonial Office’s desire to tighten its purse strings. Somerset, appointed to the governorship in 1814, was a high-Tory favorite of the Prince of Wales who learned habits of extravagance while carousing with his royal friend at Brighton. 66 Somerset, a military man, advanced largely because of his birth and royal patronage. He received his governorship because his prior post as Joint Paymaster at the Horse Guards had been eliminated. Somerset’s notable achievements as governor of the Cape Colony were formalizing a system of fox hunting and spending £28,000 of public money renovating his estate at Newlands. Moreover, the Colonial Office expected its colonies to help shoulder the burden of its upkeep; in the Cape Colony as in Sierra Leone expenses frequently exceeded income. Robert Ross notes that, between 1807 and 1835 there were only three years when Cape Colony exports exceeded imports making the colony’s deficit larger than the volume exports itself. 67

Despite the excessive expenses, physical hardships, and unhealthy climates of many of the colonies, military men fortunate enough to secure a colonial appointment were often assured prestige and financial security if they carried out their duties professionally and competently. Years of honorable military and colonial service frequently culminated in a governorship of a strategically or economically important colony. As the salaries on Table A.4 reveal, many of the

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major colonies paid handsome salaries. Attainment of this goal required administrators to climb the hierarchical ladder that often meant working many years in minor colonies. Throughout its existence, the Colonial Office never issued a formal table of rank among the colonies. However, from existing correspondence all involved in the process understood that a hierarchy of colonies existed.

From July to November 1819, correspondence between Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton Lord Combermere and the Duke of Wellington reveal that this hierarchy existed. In July 1819, Combermere, the governor and commander-in-chief of British forces in Barbados, reported to Wellington that he would accept the proffered governorship of Ceylon, should that position become vacant noting “as in the first place the climate, society, as well as the respectability of Ceylon are much before Barbadoes [sic], and in the second place there may be less difficulty in my getting (with your assistance) the government of Madras upon Mr. Elliott’s retiring.”

One week later, Combermere wrote to the Duke requesting his advice on the Ceylon appointment observing “the distance certainly is very great, and I shall be thrown on one side if I go there, but the question whether I am likely to be employed in the event of anything happening nearer home (which does not seem probable) and whether by refusing the government and command now offered to me I shall not forfeit my claim to any other.” Furthermore, later in this same letter, Combermere points out that the governorship of Ceylon is worth £12000 a year, which is considerably more than his present post, and feels that it would be wrong to refuse the position unless he receives a more lucrative offer. When Combermere’s Ceylon appointment did not immediately materialize, he wrote to Wellington requesting an alternate posting as

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68 WP1/628/9. Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, reporting his acceptance of the governorship and command at Ceylon, should it become vacant, as a first step towards a post at Madras, July 15, 1819.

69 WP1/628/15, Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about his appointment to the governorship and command of the army in Ceylon, July 24, 1819.
Governor of the Cape of Good Hope or in Canada where the death of the Duke of Richmond created a vacancy. Combermere ends his letter writing “Either of these governments would be preferable to that of Ceylon.”70 Two years later, in November 1821 Combermere again wrote to Wellington asking that he again use his influence in securing him either a position in Ireland or a colonial governorship.71

Besides correspondence and salaries, other important considerations assist the researcher in gauging the relative importance of each colony. One of these indicators was worldwide distribution of the Royal Navy’s assets and the British Army’s allocation of troops overseas, revealing the comparative strategic and economic importance of the colonies to Britain. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy was tasked with three specific missions: making the country safe from invasion, protecting its trade routes, and defending the colonies.72 For most of the period, the Royal Navy’s primary mission was to contain and defeat the formidable French navy and its sometime cobelligerents Spain, Denmark, and the United States. Concurrent with this task was the protection of its logistical and communication sea-lanes with its colonies. C. J. Bartlett points out that the Royal Navy, unlike any other navy, needed to construct a fleet to meet any number of contingencies.73 In order to defeat France, the bulk of Britain’s navy was concentrated primarily in the English Channel and the Mediterranean with smaller contingents protecting the colonial lifelines. When the wars with France ended in 1815, the Royal Navy’s priorities changed markedly; thereafter they emphasized stationing British ships in distant waters

70 WP1/634/9, Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about the possibility of Combermere’s appointment as Governor of Ceylon or of the Cape of Good Hope or in Canada, November 6, 1819.

71 WP1/685/11, Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, concerning the likelihood of his appointment to the staff in Ireland, and, in his absence, asking the Duke to put his name forward to Lord Bathurst for any possibility of a colonial governorship, November 12, 1821.


such as the Cape of Good Hope, South American stations, and the Pacific (See Table A.5).

Related to this development was the diminution of naval strength in the English Channel and the Mediterranean. For example, in Malta, the number of British engineer officers posted there can measure the relative importance of post as a strategic base.74 In 1814, Malta had five engineering officers working on the harbor and its surrounding defenses, the number increased to seven in 1818, and by 1830 the number assigned to the harbor facilities was reduced to four.75

After 1815, the Royal Navy established permanent naval bases throughout the world that included Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucia, Corfu, the Ionian Islands, the Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee, the Seychelles, Singapore, and the Chagos Archipelago. In 1792, there were fifty-four ships of various types serving in foreign stations; in 1817 there were sixty-three, and in 1836 there were 104.76 Moreover, the construction records of the Royal Navy in the decades following the Napoleonic Wars indicate that there was a significant increase in the building of smaller classes of ships, which were better suited for long-term patrolling on foreign station. In the decades of the 1820s and 30s, Britain tended to build ships generally of the third and fifth rate.77 For example, between 1815 and 1825, the Royal Navy constructed twenty-six new ships of the line, sixteen of which were the smaller third rates.78 During the same period, twenty-two fifth-rates that were generally configured as large frigates were launched compared

74 Quentin Hughes, Britain in the Mediterranean & the Defence of Her Naval Stations (Liverpool, England: Quentin Hughes, 1981), 130.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 55.
77 Royal Navy ships were classified on a rating system. First rates were three-deckers of 100 guns or more. Second-raters carried between 90 and 98 guns. The third rate, made up of entirely two-decks of guns and could carry between 80 and 60 cannons. A fourth rate ship also had two decks and mounted between 60 and 50 guns. Fifth rate ships were frigates carrying 30 to 40 guns. Sixth rates were smaller ships of various designations, sloops, schooners, cutters, and brigs that mounted 20 to 30 guns. See Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: the Ships, Men, and Organization, 1793-1815 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 40.
78 Ibid., 33.
with only six fourth rates.\(^79\) By 1846, British shipyards had turned out forty-five fifth rates, more than any other capital ship constructed. Additionally, naval actions during the post-Napoleonic era such as the bombardment of Algiers in 1816, the 1824 defense of Cape Coast Castle, operations in the Burmese delta in 1824, the suppression of West Indies slave trade in 1829, and river actions around Canton in 1833 were all fought by British squadrons that consisted mainly of ships of frigate class or smaller.\(^80\) Light craft with shallow drafts operated well in these mainly coastal actions, and Parliament during the period of fiscal retrenchment that followed the French wars was content to build the small less expensive ships. Global strategic considerations, the absence of a major European or American naval power, and budgetary constraints all operated to reduce the need for the Trafalgar era ship of the line.

Worldwide army dispositions also revealed a measure of colonial importance. An August 1827 memorandum from Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Taylor, Deputy Secretary at War, concerning British force strength on foreign stations offers some insight into the comparative value of each colony. Troop garrison totals supplied by Taylor (see Table A.6) indicate the importance of the West Indian sugar islands that, in 1827, garrison 7,356 British troops or nearly 24 percent of the overall overseas British force total. Furthermore, 1833 Parliamentary testimony revealed that British Army dispositions of brigade strength or larger

\(^79\) Ibid.

\(^80\) Lord Exmouth’s squadron at Algiers consisted of five ships of the line, six frigates, and nine smaller vessels. The defense of Cape Coast Castle in 1824 required the services of the frigate, *Thetis*, 46, and the *Swinger*, 12. Operations along the Burmese coast by the Royal Navy consisted of two squadrons that included the *Liffey*, 50, the *Slaney*, 20, the *Larne*, 20, the *Sophie*, 18, the *Champion*, 18, the paddle steamer *Diana*, and a number of small gun vessels. For operations against West Indian slavers, the Royal Navy employed an array of small ships that included the *Monkey*, 1, the *Nimble*, 5, the *Midas*, 8, the *Icarus*, 10, and the *Pickle*, 3. The squadron of Captain Price Blackwood’s Far Eastern Squadron consisted of the H.M.S *Imogene*, 28, and the *Andromache*, 28. See William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present*, Volume VI (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company Limited, 1901), 222-275.
were stationed in the colonies of Barbados, Jamaica, Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape Colonies, Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{81}

Another barometer of colonial worth was the economic value of each colony within the empire. Contemporaries frequently measured colonial significance by assessing the annual value of exports to the home islands. Colquhoun employed this criterion in judging their relative importance. Likewise, in 1826, the Edinburgh printing house of Bell & Bradfute published a treatise \textit{A Brief Sketch of the Political Importance of the British Colonies} that also used the economic worth of each colony to assess its importance. The treatise argued that worldwide colonies afforded Britain strategic outposts required to protect vital commercial sea-lanes. Colonial maintenance, the author argued, cost the state £1,600,000 while the total value of exports yields £60,000,000 and imports more than £40,000,000.\textsuperscript{82} Colonies considered of great importance to the empire include those in the West Indies, the East Indies, and the territories of Canada.\textsuperscript{83} In the 1820s, it was estimated that annually the West Indies produced £3,000,000, the East Indies, primarily that of the East India Company’s presidencies £6,000,000, and the Canadian territories calculated at nearly £8,000,000. Table A.7 delineates the value of products raised annually in the colonies.

One additional document provides evidence as to the economic value of the colonies to the home islands. Although written in 1872, well outside the chronological parameters of this study, the statistics presented in the paper offer insight into the economic worth of the empire, and specifically, the value of particular colonies. Archibald Hamilton’s economic examination


\textsuperscript{82} [John Doe], \textit{A Brief Sketch of the Political Importance of the British Colonies} (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1826), 14-15.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. , 29.
of the empire presented before the Statistical Society acknowledged that Britain’s global empire was the source of its economic prosperity and prestige. Gathered more than three decades after Colquhoun’s, Hamilton’s statistics indicate that while the economic importance of colonies may have shifted, as these dependencies remained vital to the economic well being of the mother country. Noteworthy in Hamilton’s study is the increased economic importance of Canada, Australia, and the Cape Colonies in the 1840s and 1850s, while during the same period, the financial significance of the West Indies, Mauritius, and Ceylon decreased.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed, Canadian imports of British goods during the decade 1840-1850 jumped 11 percent, Australia 26 percent, and the Cape Colonies a substantial 42 percent.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, along with the economic growth Canada, Australia, and the Cape Colonies came a concomitant increase in their populations. The populations of the West Indies, Mauritius, and Ceylon grew at an unimpressive and slower rate. As for the case of the West Indies, the decline can be attributed to Lord John Russell’s Whig government enacting the 1846 Sugar Duties Act that ended preferential tariffs on sugar produced in the British West Indian colonies.\textsuperscript{86} This legislation forced West Indian sugar planters to compete with cheaper slave produced Cuban and Brazilian sugar. The advent of steamship travel lessened the dependency of the navy and merchant marine on Mauritius and Ceylon as victualling stations. Furthermore, in 1839, colonial authorities ended transportation of indentured Indian labor to Mauritius when it bowed to humanitarian pressure noting that such endeavors wasted human life and prolonged misery.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 123.
A hierarchy of colonial worth within the empire can therefore be inferred from the data. It appears that the Colonial Office determined the salaries of their chief administrators in much the same fashion as that of a large commercial corporation. The salary scale was indexed to the territorial extent of the colony, the magnitude of the colony’s administration, the size of its population, its strategic value, and most importantly, to its profitability to the mother country. For example, Patrick Colquhoun reported that in 1812, the colony of Jamaica contained 390,000 souls and had an economic worth of £11,169,339. The total value of its imports and exports amounted to a substantial £19,117,048. Moreover, Jamaica boasted a substantial colonial administration with each of the island’s twenty parishes having a chief magistrate and a bench of justices. Jamaica also had twenty-eight churches and chapels under the supervision of the governor and each had a rector and several assistant churchmen. The vestries consisted of a Custos or chief magistrate, two magistrates, ten vestrymen (elected by the freeholders), and a rector. The vestry held considerable local influence in that it had the power to assess and collect local taxes, allot laborers for the repair of roadways, appoint way-wardens, and regulate the activities of their local constables. The governor carried out his duties from the capital, Spanish Town, and was the chief judicial official of the colony. The governor also worked closely with the colonial legislature that consisted of a council of twelve gentlemen nominated by the crown and a “house of assembly” consisting of forty-three members chosen by the freeholders.\footnote{Patrick Colquhoun, \textit{A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire in Every Quarter of the World Including the East Indies} \textit{...2\textsuperscript{nd} ed, 349-50.}}\footnote{Helen Taft Manning, \textit{British Colonial Government After the American Revolution, 1782-1820} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1933), 122.}

The governor of Jamaica, if he also possessed a military commission, commanded all the military forces in the colony. In such cases, these governors wielded considerable authority.\footnote{In 1812, the island was the homeport to a naval squadron of nineteen ships...}
including one ship of the line and eight frigates. In the 1820s and 1830s, Jamaica figured prominently in the Royal Navy’s mixed success against slavers and pirates in the Caribbean. Jamaica also accommodated a substantial garrison that in 1827 numbered more than 2,500 British troops. Until the West Indian slave emancipation of 1832 significant numbers of soldiers were required to guard against slave disturbances. Indeed, the significant slave uprising on the island in 1830 required substantial efforts by the British Army. Fortescue reports that six regiments were needed to keep order in the West Indies because of “continued talk of emancipation and the imprudent discourse of missionaries on the spot.”

The bureaucratic structure and administrative duties varied from colony to colony. It is not the intention of this study to offer a comprehensive review of each colony’s bureaucratic apparatus and administrative composition, but it is necessary to examine briefly the chief duties of colonial administrators in the post-Napoleonic British Empire. As previously noted, the nineteenth-century imperial domains were administratively divided into three distinct groups. The “settlement colonies” were primarily located in the Western Hemisphere and consisted of core of inhabitants that were ethnically Western European and Christian by faith. In what P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins labeled “exportation of the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688” these colonies were imbued with English political traditions had “something of” a constitution that provided for a Crown appointed governor who worked in conjunction with an appointed council and a representative assembly. These colonies included the islands in the West Indies, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward’s Island, the Canadian territories, and New South Wales.

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90 Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men, and Organization, 1793-1815, 250.
In form and theory, the constitutions and administration in the “settlement colonies” were similar to that of the Westminster model. However, as Philip Buckner has pointed out, there was a great difference between constitutional theory and political realities in these colonies.\textsuperscript{93} In Canada, the fluctuation of property among the population inhibited the establishment of a leisured aristocracy who would normally occupy a House of Lords. It appears that in Nevis and the Virgin Islands, the absence of a resident governor allowed the local assemblies greater autonomy than that generally permitted by a sitting governor. In all of the settled colonies, the governor was a Crown appointed official and chief executive and held a significant amount of power. They controlled extensive revenues; were given the authority to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the assembly; to create courts; to commission magistrates; to issue writs; to grant pardons and reprieves; to make appointments to colonial offices; to dispense money through warrants from the public treasury; to grant land; to summon the militia; to proclaim martial law; and to dismiss officials for malfeasance.\textsuperscript{94} Yet governors in the “settlement colonies” were attuned to the desires of their respective legislatures and worked conscientiously to accommodate them. Governors also worked closely with their council, a chosen body of locals who advised the chief executive on local issues and kept him apprised of popular opinion.

Military men who held governorships in the “settlement colonies” also commanded that colony’s military establishments. A circular letter issued in November 1824 by the Colonial Office mandated that military commands superseded civilian authority.\textsuperscript{95} However, when civilian administrators were present, the military commanders were encouraged to work cooperatively with their civilian counterparts. Military governors, in addition to their civilian

\textsuperscript{94} Helen Taft Manning, British Colonial Government After the American Revolution, 1782-1820, 105.
\textsuperscript{95} United Kingdom, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1837, (London: The Horse Guards, 1837), 457-61.
administrations, oversaw a parallel military establishment that included an adjutant general and deputies, a quartermaster general and assistants, a number of inspectors of militia, a judge advocate and his staff, barracks masters, and various support staffs. As a result, military governors were required to incur the expense of maintaining two separate staffs, supplying them with food and drink.

The second collection of colonies frequently characterized and classified as “the conquered or ceded colonies” by imperial scholars consisted of the Sierra Leone, Cape Colony, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Ceylon. India, administered by the East India Company while not technically considered a colony, received its charter from Parliament, which tied it closely to the Crown. For the purpose of this study, India will be considered a colony within the Imperial orbit. During the nineteenth century, Britain made a conscious effort to govern these colonies but not settle them. As such, each of these territories had a small number of bureaucrats administering to large indigenous populations. Moreover, this group of colonies had long standing political and bureaucratic traditions that were frequently incompatible to Western political models. Imperial administrations in Africa and Asia were initially not based on Western practices similar to those of the “settlement colonies” but were rather a collection of “on the spot” individuals who imposed their authoritarian will on their non-Western populations. This practice often permitted the proconsul to rule his colony unilaterally with only minimal interference by the home government. Nearly one hundred years after Britain’s Asian and African acquisitions, Lord Milner observed that these territories lacked a “rational

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96 “Conquered or Ceded Colonies” is a term used by imperial historians Mark Nadis and Peter Burroughs.
system” of administration. As the nineteenth century progressed, the initially authoritarian governors in the conquered and ceded territories began to work collectively with advisory councils and then later with nominated Executive and Legislative councils. Specifically, the Cape Colony and Mauritius adopted this system. In New South Wales, Sir Thomas Brisbane introduced the institutions of a legislative assembly and a Supreme Court during his tenure as governor. Although the governor appointed all of the legislators, the act was a responsive first step in limiting the governor’s complete autocracy. This small step in legislative deliberation culminated in 1842, when a democratically elected legislative body was given the right to debate local issues publicly. In Ceylon, the successful conclusion of the Kandyan Wars that resulted in the pacification and control of the entire island prompted British authorities to reform the colony’s governmental apparatus. The governor’s authority on the island was supreme, as the war had broken the power of regional chiefs. In each province, a government agent was established who replaced the power of the local chief. These governmental agents, all British civil servants, were autocrats in their provinces holding wide-ranging powers and answerable only to the governor. Their substantial salary of £750 a year reveals the power and importance of their position.

British administration of the Cape Colony was not only highly autocratic but also intrusive and extremely efficient. However, significant differences with the other conquered colonies existed as the British grafted their colonial administration on an already extant Western European administrative structure. The Dutch, who had held the colony since 1652, employed

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100 Peter Burroughs, “Institutions of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, 185.


an administrative system that consisted of an appointed governor, Council of Policy, Council of Justice, and Civil Defense Council, who comprised of appointed officials answerable to the Council of Seventeen in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{103} The British, acquiring the territory in 1806, made only minor and incremental changes in the administration during the hostilities with France. In the decades following the Vienna settlement of 1814-1815, the British solidified their control by making their administration more intrusive and encouraging significant British settlement. Zoë Laidlaw’s research indicates that in 1820, 4,000 British settled in the eastern portion of the Cape Colony to establish a farming community that replicated English society.\textsuperscript{104} Substantial numbers of British immigrants prompted the annexation in 1838 of Queen Adelaide’s Province, and, in 1847 the acquisition of remaining Xhosa territory in the eastern Cape. The Britons’ fondness for efficient government down to the most mundane of services is reflected in the exchange of memorandums in December 1835 between Cape Colony Governor Benjamin D’Urban and his military adjutant, Colonel Harry George Smith concerning the dispatch and delivery of mail between Graham’s Town and King William’s Town\textsuperscript{105}

The third group consisted of dependencies within Europe that, for the most part, were acquired during the Napoleonic Wars.\textsuperscript{106} These strategic locations administered as colonial territories were primarily located in the Mediterranean, and included the Ionian Islands, and Malta. In these locations, Britain extended most or all of the privileges afforded to its own


\textsuperscript{104} Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-1845: Patronage, the Informational Revolution, and Colonial Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 144.

\textsuperscript{105} PRO, W. O. 135/2, Private Papers of George Harry Smith.

\textsuperscript{106} Gibraltar was the exception as the territory had remained in the hands of the Crown since the War of the Spanish Succession. Taken by the British in 1704, the position commanded the passage linking the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.
citizens. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Malta embraced an administration similar in form to those established in Mauritius and the Cape Colony. In Gibraltar, the administrative apparatus consisted principally of military officers who occupied the positions of governor, lieutenant governor, royal engineer, surveyor, and port serjeant. Civilians held positions in the revenue, town major’s, pratique, and judicial departments, but these positions answered to military authority. Likewise, Malta contained a mixed establishment of both military and civilian administrators. Malta, like Gibraltar, was first and foremost a military post. Malta was argued strategically more important than Gibraltar in that its central location made it an ideal post to strike anywhere in the Mediterranean. If the navy suffered a serious reverse, the fleet could safely withdraw westward if its position became untenable. However, all of these outposts were considered vital to British strategic interests and, in the first half of the nineteenth century they were administered autocratically by military men.

Conclusion

By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had conquered or annexed an empire that comprised more than one quarter of the world’s population. An empire of such size and scope offered immense new opportunities for many groups of Britons. The aristocracy and gentry perceived the colonies as a place to extend and strengthen their established leadership roles in British society at a time when the traditional societal hierarchy was being challenged by up and coming industrialists and manufacturers. Merchants and industrialists viewed the empire as an exploitable source of raw materials and as a immense market for finished goods. Humanitarians and Christians saw the empire as fertile soil for converting souls to Christ.

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107 United Kingdom, “Second Report of the Commissioners for inquiring into the Receipt and Expenditure of the Revenues in the Colonies and Foreign Possession (Gibraltar),” in British Parliamentary Papers: Reports from Select Committees and Commissioners on Colonial Affairs with Minutes of Evidence Appendices and Index, 1830-1837; General Colonies, 64-73.

The British Empire, however, was not a monolithic entity, but rather two separate and distinct bodies. The First Empire consisted of colonies and territories acquired in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and were mainly located in the Western Hemisphere with many having local representative assemblies modeled on the English example. The Second Empire comprised colonies and territories that were captured during the Napoleonic Wars and were primarily a collection of dependencies located in Asia and Africa that possessed non-western cultures and traditions. Administrators and governors frequently moved between assignments amid these two empires. Governors posted to the west consistently grappled with colonial legislatures on questions of taxation and local autonomy. Administrators assigned to the east had greater authority but were often faced with the problems of reconciling western forms of governance with long established local traditions.

The British military officers of the post-Napoleonic era enthusiastically embraced the role of colonial administrator despite the bewildering array of cultures and institutions that constituted the empire. Their ability in command and staff responsibilities suited them ideally to manage an empire that was woefully short of experienced administrators. Moreover, the British military had gained valuable experience in both the Peninsula and France in policing occupied restive populations. Chapter Four examines the force pool from which these administrators were drawn.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE GLOBAL WEB OF BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

In 241 B.C. after nearly twenty-three years of conflict, Roman Consul Gaius Lutatius concluded a peace treaty with the great Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca that ended the First Punic War. The Roman historian Polybius commented that this struggle was “the longest, the most continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history.” 1 During the war, ancient authorities noted that the Romans lost 700 quinqueremes, large seagoing vessels employing 300 rowers working four banks of oars, and many hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors. 2 Lutatius dictated the terms of the peace to the Carthaginians without consulting the Senate. Arthur M. Eckstein, in his brilliant work Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C., argues that the Roman Republic’s foreign policy and provincial administrative authority rested largely in the hands of military leaders and governors who frequently ruled overseas territories without senatorial authority or oversight. The First Punic War with Carthage, fought principally in Sicily, was one of the first recorded instances of this practice. The actions of Lutatius in prosecuting a war and negotiating a peace with the Carthaginians were analogous to the power wielded by British colonial proconsuls two millennia later.

Eckstein argues that the Senate normally accepted the decisions and policies of their generals because these individuals also held civil positions as magistrates or consuls, and thus had the authority to govern. Additionally, the Roman Senate of the republican period implicitly trusted the pronouncements of their overseas military commanders, as they were part of the same

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senatorial patrician aristocracy. Commanders’ interests coincided with those of the Senate and the state. All members of the patrician aristocracy desired that the rest of the ancient world perceive Rome and its territories to be robust and strong. Only a capable and strong military could accomplish these aims. Roman strategic policy also mandated that surrounding the empire were client states that acted as buffers against potential adversaries. Rome treated these client states as fides or friends of the Republic who would protect them when they were threatened. It was because of the fides system that Rome fought many wars in the third and second centuries, further expanding its influence and territory. The administration of these newly conquered territories rested in the hands of qualified military leaders who were empowered to make ad hoc decisions concerning the management of their province.

Adrian Goldsworthy endorses Eckstein’s research noting that Roman military commanders were uniquely qualified in assuming both civil and military roles. Because they engaged in the dual roles of political administrator and military leader, Roman commanders knew the political aims of any conflict in which they were involved. Roman generals of the Republic and Empire were frequently members of the senatorial patrician elite who pursued a career or cursus that included “holding a succession of roles, some essentially civilian in nature and others with the army.” Almost without exception, Roman military commanders governed foreign provinces during both the Republican and Imperial periods. Frequently they were young men in their early forties who learned their skills while on active duty. Roman commanders resembled their later British counterparts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in that they were amateurs who received no formal training as officers, nor did they attend any military

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4 Ibid., 121.
college to learn their trade. Additionally, Roman and later the British gained their administrative expertise while serving as subordinates to governors in foreign stations.

For the British ruling elites and senior military officers, the classical Roman Republic provided a model for the formation, governance, and maintenance of Britain’s colonial empire. While this researcher has discovered no contemporary official directives mandating the proconsular administration in the colonies, there is an abundance of circumstantial evidence indicating that the educated were aware of this ancient practice. Ira D. Gruber has analyzed the reading lists of British officers of the eighteenth century and found that these men exhibited a substantial and constant interest in the military literature of Classical Antiquity, especially Rome.\(^5\) Furthermore, Mark Danley’s research has revealed that Bladen’s 1705 edition of Caesar’s Commentaries interested non-military readers as well as army officers.\(^6\) Awareness and interest in Ancient Rome continued into the nineteenth century as architecture, art, fashion, literature, and military science borrowed from the classical models. Wellington prepared for the long sea voyage to India by stocking his sea trunk with a library that included Plutarch’s Lives and Caesar’s Commentaries.\(^7\) Later in life, Wellington, as the victor of Waterloo and as the Master General of Ordnance, would exert significant influence in the selection and appointment of senior colonial officials.

This method of governance, known as proconsular despotism, fulfilled an important function for both Roman and British polities in the administration of their ethnically diverse and vast territorial empires. Proconsular despotism was a means of governance by selected elites


\(^6\) Ibid. 201.

who identified with and were sympathetic to the strategic aims of the parent state. Administrators, frequently separated by long distances, interpreted their government’s strategic aims, molding them to fit their particular circumstances without consulting the home government. Both the Romans and post-Napoleonic Britons engaged in this simple non-sophisticated form of overseas supervision because the home government lacked a consistent colonial policy. Neither the ancient Romans nor the early nineteenth century British civil services possessed the sizeable and competent trained staffs of bureaucrats necessary to manage their overseas empires. Eckstein observes that, in the Roman case, this administrative situation subsisted when the supportive machinery necessary “for the making of coherent, consistent, and centralized policies” failed to exist.8

Post-Napoleonic Britain’s colonial administration was remarkably similar to the Roman model. Imperial growth during the Napoleonic Wars had stretched the administrative infrastructure and bureaucratic apparatus to the breaking point causing the Colonial Office to adopt ad hoc short-term solutions in running its empire. Indeed, even the physical establishment that directed an empire of millions was lilliputian in size consisting of two seventeenth-century houses at 13 and 14 Downing Street in London. Within these decrepit buildings deemed “unworthy of repair,” the Secretary of War and the Colonies and his assistants, an undersecretary, a chief clerk, clerks, librarians, bookbinders, housekeepers, office-keepers and servants labored to keep the empire running.9 The number of civil servants working in the Colonial Office was also indeed small. In 1816, budgetary cutbacks forced the layoff of four clerks reducing the number of permanent clerks from twelve to eight. Moreover, Parliament


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abolished the positions of Under-Secretary for War and Précis Writer. In 1822, additional cost cutting measures took place when the Colonial Office underwent a complete reorganization. Because of administrative restructuring and fiscal austerity, the office discontinued periodic salary increases for seniority and time of service and replaced them with a system of employee pay grades and merit increases. Under these provisions, the Under-Secretary received £2000 annually, while the chief clerk earned between £1,000 and £1,250 per year. Additional clerks, divided into six categories, received annual salaries ranging from £900 to £150 depending on seniority and experience. The number of employees remained static for two years until 1824 when the office reinstated the position of Précis Writer along with that of Registrar and Assistant Librarian. Further reforms resulted in a significant reorganization of the clerks’ office with the reduction of two Senior Clerks and the addition of one extra clerk to the offices of Assistant and Junior Clerk. Moreover, during this period clerks received specific geographical regions to manage reflecting the substantial growth of the Empire and the subsequent need for specialized knowledge of the area.

Throughout the 1830s, the Colonial Office began to add employees to cope with the empire’s growing sophistication and complexity. However, as the Colonial Office increased the number of civil servants their salaries continually declined. Like Dickens’s Bob Cratchit, Colonial Office employees worked long hours for pitiable pay. In 1831, the Secretary of State’s generous salary decreased from £6,000 per annum to £5,000. The Chief Clerk received an annual salary of £650 with the other clerks pay set at £450, £300, £200, and £150 respectively.

10 J.C. Sainty comp. Colonial Office Officials: Officials of the Secretary of State for War, 1794-1801; of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 1801-54; and the Secretary of State for Colonies, 1854-70; Office-Holders in Modern Britain, IV (London: University of London Institute of Historical Research, 1976), 2.
11 Ibid., 3.
12 Ibid., 7.
13 Ibid., 13.
Like other agencies and offices of the Crown, the Colonial Office in the post-Napoleonic period keenly felt the fiscal economies imposed by Parliament. The Colonial Office’s situation was similar to that of the army’s outlined in Chapter One, as each bureaucracy was expected to accomplish more with less money. Parliament demanded that the Colonial Office efficiently administer its domains as cheaply as possible.

Long-serving senior bureaucrats formulated the bulk of the Colonial Office’s policies. During the first half of the nineteenth century, two tireless workaholics occupied this important post, Sir James Stephen and Sir Federic Rogers. Of the two gentlemen, Sir James Stephen had considerable influence in directing colonial policy. Stephen’s first post in the Colonial Office was that of legal counsel, a position that gave him enormous power and prestige. His substantial knowledge of constitutional law, his extraordinary administrative skill, and his impeccable integrity won him respect from both subordinates and superiors. For much of his career at the Colonial Office, Stephen in fact ruled Britain’s overseas empire.\(^{14}\) His reputation was such that his contemporaries nicknamed him “King Stephen” and “Mr. Over-secretary Stephen.”\(^{15}\) Stephen was one of the first colonial officials to realize the difficulty of directing policy to numerous colonies thousands of miles from the mother country. He advised his superiors that the best method of governing colonies was to let local governors and administrators make on-the-spot decisions observing “The wisest Governor may judge erroneously but the wisest stranger to the Country must guess erroneously—at least the chance of guessing right is so slight to be evanescent.”\(^{16}\) As a Colonial Office bureaucrat, Stephen served under twelve secretaries of state, noting in his journal that only two were worthy of their office, William Huskisson and


\(^{15}\) Ibid.

Lord John Russell. Andrew Porter has observed that during the period of Stephen’s tenure, the Colonial Office attracted few able secretaries as the position had little political prestige. Because of office’s poor reputation, Colonial Secretaries left day-to-day colonial business and policy decisions in the hands of the long-term professionals.

The Colonial Secretary determined all senior overseas administrative appointments. Patronage played a significant role in the decision making process. In the decades following Waterloo, Wellington’s influence wielded considerable weight in the selection process. This researcher’s findings indicate that Lord Bathurst rarely ignored the Duke’s recommendations. In March 1830, Wellington explained to Sir Henry Cooke the system of colonial appointments noting that overseas appointments were the gift of the government to worthy individuals. In the letter, Wellington acknowledges that the Colonial Secretary allowed him to recommend individuals to fill overseas posts. Between 1818 and 1830, Wellington received hundreds of letters requesting recommendations for government employment. Job seekers varied from Lieutenant General George Sir Townshend Walker who in 1826 asked for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the army in India to Sir R. B. P. Phillips who in 1828 sought the collectorship of the Customs in Barbados.

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19 University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, WP1/1105/11 Copy of letter from Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington to Sir H. Cooke, explaining the system of colonial and diplomatic appointments, March 5, 1830.
20 Wellington’s extant correspondence reveals that in the 1820s, the Duke received more than 300 requests for recommendations.
21 WP1/863/17 Letter from Sir George Walker to Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, asking to be recommended for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the army in India, October 14, 1826; and WP1/951/63 Copy of letter from Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, to Sir R.B.P. Phillips stating that the collectorship of the Customs in Barbados is not vacant, August 30,1830.
Stephen took a keen interest in the administration and colonial management of the West Indian colonies, leaving the direction to other colonies in the imperial orbit to the onsite governors. Paul Knaplund notes that one of the principle reasons Stephen joined the Colonial Office in 1813 was for the expressed purpose of improving the lot of the West Indian plantation slaves.\(^2\)\(^2\) Scholars such as Bebbington and Cell attribute Stephen’s Evangelical beliefs as the principle reason for his overriding concern for the abolition of slavery. Stephen’s father, James, who had practiced law in St. Kitts from 1783 and 1794, had seen first hand the horrors of slavery, and imparted to his son a hatred for the institution. The younger Stephen was also influenced by his father’s close friendship and collaboration with William Wilberforce, the great evangelical member of Parliament. Indeed, his ties to Wilberforce were strengthened further in 1800 when Stephen’s father married Wilberforce’s sister after the death of his first wife, Anne Stent.\(^2\)\(^3\) The elder Stephen and Wilberforce were also members of the Clapham Sect, a group of influential Church of England evangelicals who felt compelled to act on the humanitarian issues of the day. The group derived its name from a small collective of families who spent time together socializing, worshiping, and working on humanitarian causes at the estates they owned south of London near Clapham Green.\(^2\)\(^4\) During his childhood and adolescence, his father’s close association with the Clapham families significantly influenced his life’s mission.

James Stephen received his education at Trinity Hall, Cambridge and was admitted to the bar in either 1811 or 1813.\(^2\)\(^5\) What is certain is that in 1813, the new lawyer joined the Colonial


\(^2\)\(^5\) There is some discrepancy to the year in which James Stephen Jr. was admitted to the bar. Knaplund notes that he became a lawyer in 1811; while Russell Smandych maintains that it was not until 1813 that Stephen
Office as its legal advisor working on a case specific fee basis. In 1825, he gave up his private law practice when he joined the Colonial Office and Board of Trade, as the institution’s legal advisor. In December 1814, Stephen married Jane Catherine Venn, the daughter of Rev. John Venn, another prominent member of the Clapham Sect. Generations of the Venn family had served as Anglican clergymen. Jane’s brother, Rev. Henry Venn, was Secretary of the Church Missionary Society during the mid-decades of the nineteenth century and notable for his strict lifestyle. Knapland argues that Stephen’s record of service at the Colonial Office as both the chief legal officer and then as Under Secretary reflected his evangelical humanitarian viewpoints. As an evangelical it was his duty to “rid the British Empire of the blot of slavery. [He] sought to bring the Christian evangel of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man to the farthest corners of the earth.”

Stephen’s motivations were driven by an Evangelical belief in that his conversion to Christ gave his life meaning and purpose by working for the betterment of humankind. Consequently, Stephen’s service to others fulfilled an Evangelical view that in making the world a better place others would emulate his example. During his tenure, Stephen assisted in strengthening existing laws governing the 1807 prohibition against the slave trade by establishing uniform slave registries in the West Indies. In the 1820s, the Under Secretary worked tirelessly to eradicate incrementally the institution of slavery despite resistance from planters, restiveness from local assemblies, the expectations of the slaves, the

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combativeness of the Colonial Church, the impatience of the Baptists, and the apprehension of the local governors.

In the early 1830s, British governors posted in the West Indies found the slavery issue to be particularly nettlesome. On one hand, they had to contend with an elite planter society and local assemblies determined to preserve their traditional autonomy and on the other, an activist abolitionist movement in the Colonial Office assisted by reformist Whigs in Parliament imbued with a righteous sense of paternalistic humanitarianism. The Jamaican slave revolt of 1830, followed by severe retribution and the persecution of missionaries thought to have assisted the slaves, contributed to a public backlash by Briton’s educated elites against the institution of slavery in the empire. Led by the Colonial Office’s Under Secretary Henry Grey, the humanitarian reformist movement in Parliament proposed a bill that would end slavery in the colonies. The 1832 Emancipation Bill, subsequently passed the next summer, was curiously one of the few instances that the Colonial Office interfered with proconsular governance. It may appear simplistic to infer sole credit to the Colonial Office for the end of slavery in the West Indies, but the influence of the Clapham Sect centered on Howick, Stephen, and like-minded clerks in the Colonial Office is significant and unmistakable. The apparent preoccupation with the slavery issue by leading figures within the office coupled with the small size of the staff permitted other colonial proconsuls a relatively free hand in administering their colonies.

In need of a short-term and fiscally economic solution, Britain resorted to its long-standing practice of employing military officers as governors. Robert Harvey in his study of the American War of Independence comments that the Crown frequently employed a time-tested practice of appointing colonial governors from the ranks of soldiers or ex-soldiers who presided
over locally chosen legislatures. Douglas M. Peers argues that Britain’s practice of choosing military men was a practical necessity because most colonies were located near hostile neighbors. Security was a primary concern for a significant number of colonial administrators. A competent military leader was an essential prerequisite for the position. John S. Galbraith noted that Britain in the early nineteenth century consistently utilized men of character who were “required to assume vast authority. His [the governor] supreme task was the maintenance of order within his area: failure to do so was the one unpardonable sin; and in the prosecution of that objective he was often led to take actions which were not authorized by his instructions, indeed, in many cases, in direct violation thereof.” Frequently, the principal requirements for governing and administering a colony consisted of having the ability to maneuver and supply the troops needed to pacify either hostile neighbors or the local populace. Helen Taft Manning observes that the colonial governors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century received little formal training in administration, legal training, knowledge of colonial conditions, or history. Their administrative knowledge came primarily from military staff experience gained by Britain’s participation in almost one hundred years of continental wars.

The lessening of tensions that resulted from the concert system and a continuing need to supplement their income, a significant number of British military elites requested administrative positions in the colonies. Lord FitzRoy Somerset noted in the summer of 1833 that the commander-in-chief, with the concurrence of the king, often nominated high-ranking individuals.

32 Ibid., 102.
who had rendered distinguished service during the Napoleonic wars. Defending this practice, Lord Somerset said, “I consider that the just reward of individuals in all ranks, but particularly in the higher ranks, is a very important duty for the Commander-in-Chief to discharge, not only as it affects the officers of the King’s service but the credit of the country and the honour of His Majesty himself.”

Indeed, at the same series of Parliamentary hearings Sir Willoughby Gordon, Quartermaster-general of the British Army, testified that colonial administrative positions were a just reward for soldiers who had rendered distinguished service. Gordon commented, “an officer of very distinguished service is entitled to have something more than the mere allowances of his regiment [regimental pay]; and without these garrison appointments he would have nothing more.”

Colonial Office appointment records for the three decades that followed the Napoleonic Wars confirm that significant numbers of military officers held governorships and positions of administrative importance throughout the empire. This practice continued for nearly thirty-five years. The appointment of military men to senior colonial administrative posts began to diminish around mid-century when the Colonial Office began to fill overseas administrative posts with professionally trained and educated civilian diplomats and bureaucrats. Of the 262 officials employed between 1830 and 1880 as high colonial administrators, fifty-nine of them were active in politics and twenty-four received some legal training.

Tables A. 9, A.10, and A.11 indicate that in the two-and-a-half decades following the Battle of Waterloo over 80 percent of colonial officials placed in important overseas posts were either military men or former military men. The Army predominated in holding administrative

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34 Ibid, June 19, 1833, 2218.
positions while the Royal Navy lagged far behind in securing these coveted overseas appointments. Of the thirty British colonies and territories listed in the 1829 Colonial Appointments ledger only two naval officers held colonial administrative positions while army officers occupied a substantial twenty-two. Six years later, the 1835 Colonial Appointments report yields similar imbalance between the Army and the Royal Navy. Of the twenty-four colonies or possessions listed in the later census, only two naval officers held colonial administrative posts to the nineteen held by army men. Among the military, this disparity was conspicuous as Admiral Sir George Cockburn noted in December 1833, “I do not think our officers have too much to look forward to as compared with officers of equal standing of the army who have commands, regiments, and government [colonial postings], out of number. In France they give the government of their island colonies only to officers of their navy to put them on a par with the army in such matters.”

Earlier that same year, Sir Willoughby Gordon noted to a Parliamentary committee that the French Army was unlike their British counterparts in that, except for Algiers, their regular army had an insignificant role in colonial administration. Naval officers held posts at both Newfoundland and St. Vincent through the first half of the decade. Both locations were the sites of naval bases and the Crown combined the offices of the port commander with that of the governor. However, the Royal Navy considered Newfoundland a minor station with the duty squadron never consisting of more than twelve ships. England claimed the Caribbean island of St. Vincent in the early seventeenth century but it had remained

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38 In 1793, the Newfoundland squadron consisted of one 64-gun ship of the line, three frigates, and five sloops. The Admiralty never considered the port important and ship number assigned to its squadron reflected its lowly stats. In 1797, the squadron consisted of five ships, seven in 1799, thirteen in 1805, and twelve in 1812. See Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: the Ships, Men, and Organization, 1793-1815 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 250.
unoccupied for nearly 125 years. In 1763, the island became a British Crown colony but was lost to the French in the early phases of the Revolutionary Wars. British general Ralph Abercromby regained control of the island in 1797 in a bitter almost genocidal campaign against the pro-French Carib population. The port of St. Vincent, along with Antigua and Port Royal provided bases for the Royal Navy to enforce the Navigation Acts in the Caribbean.

The personal profiles of the men who served as colonial administrators in the 1820s reveal a number of striking demographic and sociological variables (see Table A. 9). The table lists all governors and colonial administrators of the principal colonies and territories under the Colonial Office’s control, 1815-1820, with the exception of India, which the Honourable East India Company administered. Of the thirty-seven men, seven of these men have incomplete personal records and are, therefore, not included in the statistical study. Of the remaining thirty administrators, twenty-three have available birth records or traceable family names showing that nine descended from Scottish families, six were English, four were Irish, two American, one Welshman, and one, James Kempt, was half Scot and half English. The Scots appear to have a disproportionate influence in the army given the size of its population in the early nineteenth century in relation to that of England and Wales. Nevertheless, this number is not surprising as over-recruiting among the clans occurred throughout Scotland during the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, the fine education system present in Scotland made landowners and middle class Scots attractive officer candidates to the British Army. Also well represented were the Irish who

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40 Research reveals that little is known of St. Lucia’s short-term administrators, Richard Augustus Seymour, Robert Douglas, and Edward O’Hara who governed the island between 1815 and 1818.
41 The population of Britain in 1801 (Wales inclusive) was just over nine million; the population of Scotland during the same period numbered more than one and a half million. See P. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, 6.
supplied 21 percent of the colonial administrators in the highlighted period 1815-1829 (see Tables A. 9 and A. 10). All of the Irish listed in the profile came from landed elites, validating Linda Colley’s assertion that in the years following the American Revolution, Irish landowning gentry and titled aristocrats joined with their English counterparts to reinvigorate the elite power structure of Britain. Not surprisingly, four of the eleven English military men listed (Tables A.9 and A.10) were born in areas of Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Sussex, and Kent that were customarily strong recruiting districts because they were more vulnerable to French coastal raids and possible invasion sites. Moreover, twelve of the men or one-third of them came from second-generation military families. This substantial number coincides with Houlding’s research on the eighteenth century British Army noting that a significant portion, estimated to be as high as a quarter of the army, was composed of “army families,” families who for many generations traditionally served in the army. With the increase in British recruiting because of the perceived dangers of the French Revolution and Napoleon’s expansionist aims, it is not surprising that these numbers exceed even Houlding’s estimates. Furthermore, army families were a socially diverse group that cut across socio-economic lines. Rising in the ranks within the British Army depended on both influence and merit. For example, Sir Ralph Darling’s father began his military career as a sergeant in the 45th Regiment moving up through the ranks and eventually receiving an officer’s commission. Like his father, Darling enlisted as a private, rose through the ranks and because of talent achieved the rank of major general in June 1813. Nonetheless, titled gentry also made up a considerable portion of “army families.” Sir Peregrine Maitland came from a well-established military

lineage with at least four other Maitlands listed as high-ranking officers in the 1820 Royal Military Calendar. Furthermore, Maitland’s mother was the daughter of General Edward Mathew. In Maitland’s case, as in many others, patronage and birth played a significant role in promotion.

In addition to birth and social status, a substantial number of the administrators profiled (Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11) were of comparable age (see Table A.12). Of the surveyed thirty-three military men who possess known birth dates, over half (seventeen) were born in the 1770s; thirteen, 41.5 percent were born before 1770; the remaining three, or nearly 10 percent, had birthdates after 1780. Of these thirty-three officers, seventeen of them, or 42 percent of all the military men on the list, received their commissions during the 1790s reflecting a period during the French Revolutionary Wars when the British Army increased considerably. Colley confirms this noting that France’s 1796 abortive invasion attempt on Ireland significantly stimulated British Army recruiting. Army estimates for the year reveal that in 1801, 131,818 men were under arms, troop strength up from 48,849 troops reported in 1792. The average age of all these gentlemen when they received their commissions was seventeen and a half years. The Royal Navy men Charles Brisbane, Thomas Cochrane, and Charles Hamilton were not included

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45 General, the Honourable Sir Alexander Maitland, Bart. Lieutenant General, the Right Honourable Sir Thomas Maitland, Colonel James Maitland, and Lieutenant Colonel, the Honourable John Maitland. The Maitland military lineage is also outlined in Burke’s Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage, Baronetage, & Knightage citing the military careers of Alexander Maitland’s; Frederick Maitland achieved general rank and a member of the Military Board and Augustus, a lieutenant colonel in the Guards mortally wounded at Edgmont-on-Zee, Holland in 1797. See United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service Commission Book Containing the Services and Progress of Promotion of the Generals, Major-Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors of the Army, According to Sonority: with Details of the Principal Military Events of the Last Century, in Five Volumes (London: A. J. Valpy, 1820), Vol. I, 280; Vol. II, 227; Vol. IV, 277; and Vol. V, 125. See also Sir John Bernard Burke, Burke’s Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage, Baronetage, & Knightage, One Hundred & Second Edition (London: Burke’s Peerage Limited, 1959), 1469-70.

46 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 287.

in this statistic as naval trainees normally went to sea at a very young age. Brisbane accompanied his father, at the age of ten, Hamilton at nine, and Cochrane was seven years old when he began shipboard duty. Of Lord Cochrane, naval historian Brian Lavery notes “Lord Cochrane was perhaps the most famous example; [going from nursery to ship] he had been entered at the age of five, and carried on one ship or another commanded by his uncle until he reached the age of eighteen.”\textsuperscript{48} Among the army officers, age anomalies did exist with some officers such as D. Stewart and C. Colville receiving their first commissions at the tender age of eleven. Philip Haythornthwaite, Michael Glover, and J. W. Fortescue note that before the Duke of York’s reforms stipulating, “no person is considered eligible for a commission until he has attained the age of sixteen years,” commissions were sold to all who had the money to purchase one.\textsuperscript{49} Gentlemen of means purchased commissions for their infant sons in prestigious regiments guaranteeing regimental placement when their children became adolescents.

Statistical data supplied in Table A.13 indicates that a substantial number of these colonial administrators received considerable administrative experience while acting in either regimental, division, or army staff positions as either aide-de-camps, military secretaries, brigade majors, adjutants or quartermasters.\textsuperscript{50} The data proves that a substantial number of important colonial officers had prior administrative and staff experience. Of the thirty-three military men listed, twenty-three of them, or 69 percent, were known to have had some staff training prior to their colonial appointments at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. It is important to note that these staff positions were ideal preparation for managing colonial bureaucracies. In 1833, Lord FitzRoy Somerset, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, testified before Parliament

\textsuperscript{48} Brian Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: the Ships, Men, and Organization, 1793-1815, 88.
\textsuperscript{49} Philip Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington, 23; and Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army In the Peninsula, 1808-1814 (London: Hippocrene Books, 1977), 21;
\textsuperscript{50} Unlike the Napoleonic Era French Army, the British did not employ the Corps structure in any of its armies preferring instead to create division-sized formations.
that staff officers were particularly well suited to oversee colonial territories. Somerset argued that “there are certain appointments of which the duties are not purely military, and which officers may have rendered themselves so useful, that Government would feel justified in objecting to any change.” Nevertheless, it is important to briefly outline the role of a staff officer, what his duties were, and the evolution of military staff positions in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

From the early seventeenth century on, a staff officer’s principal duties were to assist his immediate superior in areas of personnel or supply. John I. Alger notes that the term staff originated from the idea that a general relies on these individuals in much the same way, as he would support himself with a cane or staff. As armies increased in size, commanding generals were unable to personally attend to their army’s supporting administrations thereby delegating officers to assist him. In the eighteenth century, European states attached regimental line officers to the commander’s headquarters, assigning them specific staff duties such as gathering and directing of supply, determining march routes and placement of camps, policing the army and administering military justice, and the collecting, housing, and provisioning of prisoners. During the Napoleonic Wars, with the notable exception of the French, staff positions remained temporary and existed solely for the length and distance of a specific campaign. Britain, like many of its Continental European counterparts, produced military staffs but only when necessity dictated—namely to conduct a foreign campaign. British officers detached for staff duty retained both their regimental seniority and pay making these positions desirable. Compared to

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52 John I Alger, Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art, The West Point Military History Series; Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1985), 44.
Napoleon’s efficient *Grand Quartier-General* under the direction of Marshal Louis Berthier, the British system was miniscule and virtually untrained with officers learning the staff trade while on the job.\(^{54}\) However, the long years of campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars created a small cadre of competent officers familiar with organizational and administrative tasks associated with staff work.

Wellington’s Peninsular Army, in particular, received invaluable experience during its six-year campaign in Iberia. Among the lessons Wellington’s staff learned were: how to conduct and supply a campaign hundreds of miles from home and how to control a civilian population when the legitimate civil government had either fled (as in the case of Portugal) or was in serious disarray (as in the case of Spain). Charles W. C. Oman outlined the varied staff duties and obligations of the Quartermaster General’s department in his monumental study of Wellington’s army in Spain. Oman noted that the Quartermaster General’s department was primarily responsible for the efficient movement of the army or of separate detachments while on campaign without the need of the constant supervision of the headquarters. It was the quartermaster’s duty and responsibility to make topographical surveys, to report on roads and bridges, and to evaluate the supply resources of districts through which the army might have to move through in the near future.\(^{55}\) Predictably, the length and scope of the Napoleonic Wars led to considerable growth in the size of British Army staffs. In the autumn of 1813, three Anglo/allied armies operated in Spain. Two of them were located in central Spain and under the direction of Wellington, while the third, an Anglo-Sicilian Army in eastern Spain was commanded by Lieutenant General William Bentinck.\(^{56}\) Worldwide there were substantial

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British forces, all utilizing staffs, operating in the northern German states, Canada, India, and the West Indies. Parliamentary records reveal that at the end of the Napoleonic Wars there were 350 staff officers worldwide still holding their regimental commissions.57

British officers on colonial duty practiced the lessons they had learned during the nearly twenty-five years of war with France. For example, during the three decades following Waterloo, officers in India were frequently detached or seconded from their regiments in order to fulfill staff postings in civil or political administration. Peer’s research on the British Army in India in the 1820s reveals that because of this practice field regiments were often critically short of line officers. In 1820, only 35 percent of the officers in the Bengal Army were serving with their regiments; in 1825, the percentage climbed to 45 percent, but by 1830, the number had again dipped to 40 percent.58 D. A. Washbrook observes that the East India Company, with Parliament’s approval, intentionally and routinely gathered civil and judicial functions into the hands of the military.59 Soldiers received orders to take care attend of duties normally reserved for civilian authorities. Military men adjudicated cases, built roads and bridges, conducted civil affairs, and collected revenues thereby subsuming all previous established civil administrative institutions.60 The opening paragraphs of a January 1829 letter written by R. Nisbet to Captain Benson provide an example of military men carrying out duties normally reserved for civilians.

Lord William Bentinck was so kind yesterday morning as to enquire regarding the method I pursued in making roads and bridges while judge and magistrate at Rangpur, and condescended I believe to ask my opinion as to the practicability of road making in general through the country.

58 Douglas Peers, Between Mars and Mammon, 79.
60 The military administration of India in the post-Napoleonic period did away with Cornwallis’ policy of separation between civil and military institutions.
Having been interrupted by the entrance of different gentlemen, and the announcement of breakfast, I was unable to explain at all what was required. I feel therefore anxious to take the liberty of soliciting the favour of your to submit to his Lordship’s notice the following remarks when an opportunity may offer of so doing.

I understood Lord William to ask first how I made the roads, and bridges, and secondly how I kept them in repair. In reply to the first, I beg to state that all the roads within 5 or 6 miles of the station were made and kept in repair exclusively with the convicts. With regard to roads further distant, my plan was, first to make the road with convicts, and then to place the superintendence of it under the different zamindars through whose estates it passed and they in return vested the management in their village officers (gomasta and patwari) who caused the different ryots in each village to keep in repair as much of the road as magistrates can do so, but to ensure a willing compliance requires a little management. In Rangpur I was so fortunate as to secure the good wishes and co-operation of the landed proprietors, owing to my long residence in the district, and my constant endeavors to conciliate them and also frequent personal communication. The result was, I had only to propose anything advantageous to the community or which justice demanded, and they were not only willing to aid my endeavors but actually did so, most zealously.⁶¹

However, military administration was not limited only to India. British officers served as administrators throughout the empire. In 1835, Colonel Harry Smith, military adjutant to General Benjamin D’Urban, Cape Colony’s governor, with his superior’s approval, administered Queen Adelaide’s Province. From his residency at King William’s Town, Smith conducted provincial affairs that included the building of military posts, supervising a postal system, the creation of a civilian administrative infrastructure that included the creation of a native police force, the enforcement of British and Dutch statures, the establishment of Christianity, and the institution of a western-style education system. With a flair for theatrics, Colonel Smith, seated on a makeshift throne, attended by a policeman holding a staff topped with a brass bed knob, ruled like a nineteenth century Solomon over his territory.⁶² In Lower Canada, Lieutenant General James Kempt chaired a committee that oversaw the construction of the Rideau Canal

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linking Ottawa with Montreal. The canal, originally intended for the rapid movement of troops to counter any invasion from the United States, in effect became an economic arterial lifeline assuring the union between Upper and Lower Canada.\textsuperscript{63} The canal designed and built by British Army engineers, under the direction of Colonel John By, served as a defensible barrier and as an alternate supply route between Montreal to the Great Lakes. In addition, during that same decade Parliament working in conjunction with the Colonial Office selected a considerable number of military men as special magistrates who adjudicated West Indian cases involving the newly freed slaves. The appointment of these officers was a response by the Crown to hear the manifold number of cases brought by former slaves contesting the Emancipation Act’s apprentice clause.\textsuperscript{64} In October 1833, Colonial Secretary Edward G. G. S. Stanley noted that the twenty-five military judges posted in Barbados were neither professional men nor worth their £30 salary.\textsuperscript{65}

Research also indicates that most of the men appointed to colonial office attained the rank of major general or even higher rank before their appointment. In the 1830s, Parliament mandated that only military men holding the rank of major general or lieutenant general be eligible to administer or serve as governors for all of the major colonies. Of the thirty-one who have sufficient personal data, nineteen of these men achieved the rank of major generals around the age of forty-two years. Moreover, twelve of these nineteen, or 63 percent, served with Wellington as regimental commanders, staff officers, or divisional commanders. One officer, Sir James Campbell served with Wellington in both India and in the Peninsula. Wellington kept in


\textsuperscript{64} Gad Heuman, “The British West Indies,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, 477.

close contact with Campbell throughout their service careers. In 1821, Wellington wrote to Major General Sir Herbert Taylor, military secretary to the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief of the British Army, requesting the nomination of Campbell for the Order of the Bath.\textsuperscript{66} The Duke continued to assist his old friend and colleague in finding him a vacancy among the colonial appointments.\textsuperscript{67} Campbell eventually received the governorship of Grenada some five years later.

The typical military governors who served as a senior colonial administrator in the decades following Waterloo were born in the 1770s to families of titled aristocrats. These gentlemen joined the army in their teens, most likely at the onset of the wars with France in 1793. The young officers received promotion quite rapidly usually attaining the rank of colonel mainly through purchase by their early thirties. Nearly 70 percent of them received staff training while serving as an aide de camp, military secretary, adjutant, or quartermaster in the field under the command of a general officer. Frequently, these gentlemen served under Wellington during the Peninsula Campaign gaining the Duke’s attention, respect, and friendship. While serving in the Peninsula promotion came very rapidly as nearly all of the surveyed individuals attained the rank of major-general while still in their forties. Peninsular officers often achieved rapid promotion because of merit, family connections, patronage, and campaign attrition. Estimates put the annual attrition rate during the Peninsular War as high as 1,000 officers a year.\textsuperscript{68}

Colonial appointments soon followed at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Many received their first appointment between 1815 and 1820, although men such as Thomas Maitland, Francis

\textsuperscript{66} WP1/676/2, Letter from Sir Herbert Taylor to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, reporting that the Duke of York has noted Wellington's recommendation of Sir James Campbell, 2 August 1821.

\textsuperscript{67} Wellington actively searched for a posting for his friend. See WP/683/2 Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Major General Sir James Campbell noting that while the vacancy on the Irish staff has already been filled, the Commander in Chief intends to find a situation for Campbell before very long, 6 October 1821.

Gore, and William Bentinck worked in a civil administrative capacity in some of the smaller colonies or in the occupied territories during the wars. Their colonial tenure of office averaged between five and seven years with many of these men exchanging small less lucrative colonial postings for larger, higher salaried, and more prestigious colonies. Lord FitzRoy verified this practice when he testified before a Parliamentary committee that officer’s military or civil appointments “should be held for five years” or longer. An excellent example of this custom was the colonial career of Lieutenant General Sir Peregrine Maitland who in the span of twenty-five years served as the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, governor of Nova Scotia, commander of the Madras Army, and governor of the Cape Colony. The average age of military governors when they received their first colonial posting was forty-eight years. However, there was a wide disparity of age among these administrators with Sir Edward Barnes receiving his first appointment in Dominica at age thirty-two and Sir Tomkyns Hilgrove Turner becoming governor of Bermuda when he was fifty-nine years old. Many of these men continued to work into their seventies holding dual civil administration positions both overseas and in the home islands. Four of the noted individuals, Lieutenant General Sir Benjamin D’Urban, Lieutenant General Sir Edward Barnes, Major General Sir James Colborne, and Lieutenant General Sir Peregrine Maitland each occupied at least four major colonial governorships or prominent overseas military commands during their post-Waterloo careers.

Although the governors and administrators played a prominent role in formulating colonial policy, their staffs were the ones who implemented it. For the most part, many of administrators’ chief subordinates were also military men. For example, in 1816, the governors or commissioners of Malta, the Ionian Islands, the West Indies, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Canada,  

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Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. John’s Newfoundland, the Isle of France/Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and St. Helena controlled civil and military affairs and retained significant military staffs. Examination of Hart’s Army Lists from 1815 to 1835, the 1820 Royal Military Calendar, and Colonial Office Appointment Books reveals that military governors normally, depending on the size and population of the colony, employed an adjutant general, deputy adjutant general, a quartermaster general, deputy quartermaster general, and a judge advocate. In 1830, Lieutenant General Sir Edward Barnes governed the colony of Ceylon. Barnes was assisted by his second-in-command, Major General Sir Hudson Lowe and a military staff that included deputy adjutant general brevet Lieutenant Colonel George Warren Walker and deputy quartermaster general John Fraser. Barnes also had a number of civilian bureaucrats who worked in both a civilian and military capacity. One such member of his civilian staff that served in both a military and non-military capacity was C. E. Layard, the civilian and military paymaster general who earned £2000 annually while working in this position. Normally, military paymasters were staff officers who held the rank of captain or subaltern and were required to carry out military duties such as serving as Officer of the Day, commanding working parties, and sitting on Courts Martial. Likewise, Dr. Forbes, Ceylon’s Superintendent of Vaccine Establishments in the 1820s and 30s, received his salary from both military and civilian sources. However, Ceylon’s colonial establishment at this time was not an isolated occurrence. The colonies of Mauritius, Upper and Lower Canada, and St. Lucia consisted of mixed civilian and military administrations.

70 Information compiled from stations in which officers served on colonial duty; see Great Britian, War Office, A List of officers of the Army and Royal Marines on full and half-pay : with an index (London ?: War Office, printed C. Roworth, 1816).
71 United Kingdom, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1st June 1837, (London: The Horse Guards, 1837), 7.
72 Public Record Office, C/O 325/ 20, Colonial Appointments.
The vast majority of these subordinates assigned to the positions of adjutant general and quartermaster general held the rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel, or major. However, colonels and lieutenant colonels did hold some of the smaller administrative and government assignments. Indeed, in 1831, colonels in residence commanded twenty-four smaller non-overseas posts such as Landguard Fort, Pendennis Castle, Sterling Castle, Isle of Wight, and Heligoland.\textsuperscript{73} The duties of these officers included overseeing and maintaining Crown fortifications and administering them in the stead of their non-resident superior officer who rarely visited their assigned duty station. The War Office, with the consent of the king, frequently bestowed these positions on distinguished veterans, often disabled by wounds. Salaries for these much sought after positions were more than adequate as they supplemented the officer’s half-pay and pensions. For example, in 1830 the resident lieutenant governor of Heligoland was Colonel Henry King. King, a colonel in the 58\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, had entered the service in March 1794 as a cornet in the 25\textsuperscript{th} Light Dragoons.\textsuperscript{74} In 1801, he lost his leg while participating in Abercromby’s campaign in Egypt and ten years later received an annual pension £300 for the lost limb.\textsuperscript{75} Because of his disability and his service to the Crown, the War Office appointed King as governor of Heligoland as a reward for his service. According to the War Office’s description of King’s duties “[he] has no military duty to perform; [but] is Civil Governor.”\textsuperscript{76} For the posting King received an annual salary and emoluments from the garrison totaling £500 along with his half-pay of £200.15 and pension of £300 which amounted to a very respectable £1000.15 yearly income.

\textsuperscript{73} War Office report prepared by Edward Ellice, May 25, 1833.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} War Office, Return of the Names of the Officers in the Army who receive Pensions for the loss of Limbs, or for wounds; specifying, the Rank they held at the time they were wounded, their present Rank, the nature of the Cases, the Places where, and the year when wounded, the amount of their Pensions, and the Dates from which they commence (London: War Office, 1818), 24-25.
\textsuperscript{76} War Office report prepared by Edward Ellice, May 25, 1833.
Like their military chiefs, the subordinate officers who served in administrative and staff positions in the colonies entered the army during either the French Revolutionary or the Napoleonic wars. A survey of officers serving in 1816, 1821, 1825, and 1830 in colonial stations indicates that fifty-nine men occupied important overseas military staff postings. Seventy-six percent of the officers in Table A.13 began their military careers during this conflict. The vast majority of these subordinates who held the post of adjutant general and quartermaster general were colonels and lieutenant colonels. Many of their military careers mirrored their commanding officer’s experience but with some notable differences. Biographical data concerning these officers is not as complete as their superiors, however some inferences are possible. Nine of the thirty-nine men, or 24 percent, began their military careers in the cavalry. Traditionally, officers entering the cavalry came from financially well-off families as the commission purchase price for cavalry regiments, mess bills, uniforms, accoutrements, and horses required a considerable outlay of cash. As David Chandler pointed out, cavalry customarily was the more expensive arm and its gradual decline in significance and numbers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was, in part, due to its high cost, both to the state and to its officers.77 Bryan Perrett, editor of Lieutenant Thomas Brotherton’s memoirs, observed that this officer came from a family of considerable means in that he consistently purchased commissions in cavalry regiments.78 Moreover, Fortescue notes that during the regency and reign of George IV officers spent between £60 to £80, or the equivalent of one year’s pay, on their uniforms as well as horses, weapons, and accoutrements.79 In the years following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, as regent and king, George IV continually changed uniforms making them

more ornate, impractical, and expensive in an effort to match the splendor of the continental powers of Bourbon France, Hohenstauffen Prussia, and Romanov Russia. Philip Haythornthwaite argues that during the 1820s and 30s that all of the major and minor European powers endeavored to make uniforms more ornate and less functional “until the whole process resulted in an overdressed, over-drilled and less efficient version of the mighty armies which had brought about the downfall of Napoleon.”

Four other officers in Table A.13, or 10 percent, began their military careers in the prestigious and highly expensive guard regiments. Officers who purchased guard commissions usually came from the most elite families in the kingdom. Fortescue observed that during the Peninsular War, fifty-one titled gentlemen served in either the Household Cavalry or the Foot Guards compared to 107 titled aristocrats that served in all other regiments in the British Army. Ian Fletcher, who has studied regimental society of the late Georgian and Regency period, has reflected that among the guard regiments only the well connected or titled could afford the concomitant expenses of these socially exclusive military units. Gentlemen who wished to enter the army paid a high price for a commission; a lieutenant colonelcy cost £6,700, a majority £6,300, a captaincy £3,500, and a lieutenancy £1,500. Accordingly, those officers who were fortunate to secure a commission on one of the guard regiments could expect a higher rate of pay than that in the regular line regiments. A major in the Foot Guards received £1 4s. 6d. per day, a

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82 Ian Fletcher, ed. For King and Country: The Letters and Diaries of John Mills, Coldstream Guards, 1811-1814 (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmont, 1995), 18.
83 A lieutenant’s purchase price of £1,500 has the estimated equivalent of nearly £300,000 adjusting for twenty-first century indices that consider comparative values of goods and inflation. Lucy Moore estimated that “in the eighteenth century, roughly one can assume that a shilling was worth about ten pounds in today’s money, and a pound, or twenty shillings, was worth about 200 pounds.” See Lucy Moore, Thieves Opera (London: Viking Press, 1996), ix.
captain 16s. 6d., and a lieutenant 7s. 10d. compared to that of similar officers in line regiments who collected 16s, 10s 6d., and 6s. 6d. per diem. Additionally, officers who served in the guard regiments were prohibited from serving outside of the kingdom during peacetime, only in wartime were they sent overseas. Membership in these socially elite units, however, carried a high financial burden. These officers, known to the rest of the army as “The Gentlemen’s Sons” because of the predominance of titled individuals within their ranks, served as the military escorts to the royal family, and as such, possessed a variety of uniforms for multiple occasions and ceremonies in which they participated. Moreover, the elite of the army found it necessary to belong to a number of expensive and socially exclusive clubs such as White’s, Boodle’s, Brook’s, Arthur’s and Graham’s where important associations were made and patronage was established between general officers, leading politicians, and young socially prominent subalterns.

Connections between general officers and junior officers were important and vital to career mobility. Twenty-one of the fifty-nine officers, a significant 36 percent, served as either a military secretary or aide de camp to a general officer. General officers generally chose aide de camps carefully, as an aide’s principal duty was to convey orders to subordinate commanders while on campaign or in battle. Knowledge of the aide’s character and ability was essential and competent general officers chose their assistants with some measure of care. Frequently aides were the sons of lifelong friends or relatives who showed promise. Lord Lake, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in India during the Marathas Campaign of 1805, invited John Harvey to join his staff as an aide de camp. Harvey subsequently married Lake’s daughter, Elizabeth, one

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84 Ian Fletcher notes that guard officers purchased a variety of uniforms mandated in Army Regulations for specific occasions. Uniform requirements included that each officer owned a dress uniform, undress, and service dress. See Fletcher eds., *For King and Country*, 19.

The relationship between generals and their aides often fostered lifelong friendships, with the senior military man adopting a paternal attitude toward the young officer, assisting the subordinate up the ladder of promotion. For example, Lieutenant Charles Gore, the son of Arthur Saunders Gore the Second Earl of Arran, began his service as an aide de camp to Major General James Kempt in 1812 while posted in the Peninsula. Gore remained with his superior, friend, and patron serving intermittently for the next ten years as Kempt’s aide de camp in the Peninsula (1812-1814), the Montreal District, Canada (1814-1815), Waterloo (1815), and Nova Scotia (1820-1822). Kempt’s high regard for his aide de camp is evidenced by the fact that when he died in 1854 in his will he bequeathed £60475 to relatives, friends, and fellow officers that included his two principal subordinates, Colonel Charles Stephen Gore, and Colonel Campbell.  

For the majority of these subordinates, their careers followed a similar pattern. Nearly all of them, a substantial 81 percent, witnessed combat during the nearly twenty-five years of war with the French. Some observations and informed conjectures concerning their early military service require some examination. Fifty-six percent of these officers served, at one time or another, with Wellington in the Peninsula either in regimental or staff positions. However, this number is not surprising as the Peninsula was the primary British theater of operations against the French during their war against Napoleon. Charles Esdaile, in his recent study of the Peninsular War, argues that the Iberian Peninsula provided Britain an ideal site for arresting the growth of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe. Encouraged by the Portuguese appeal for

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assistance and popular resistance in Spain, Britain committed a substantial portion of its army to this theater. During the six years of combat in Iberia, some 10,000 British officers saw service in Portugal, Spain, and southern France. Likewise, 16 percent of these men witnessed combat in the West Indies, another critical theater of operations. Returning once again to Esdaile’s thesis, Britain’s war aims against France included not only freeing Europe from the tyranny but also eliminating the economic challenge of the Napoleonic Empire manifested in the Continental System. Britain’s solution to this conundrum was to secure their enemies’ overseas empires gaining unfettered access to the West Indian colonies and their enormous commercial benefits. Even before the Spanish opportunity presented itself in 1808, the British Army aided by the Royal Navy gobbled up the French and their allies’ possessions in the Caribbean, assuring their merchants alternative markets to those European ones closed by Napoleon. Evidence of British colonial aggrandizement is further evident by those officers, nearly 16 percent, who participated in the South American (Buenos Aries) Campaign, the Cape of Good Hope expedition, and the conquest of Mauritius.

At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the future careers of these officers typified that of many of their comrades in the British army. All sought continued service in the dramatically downsized British military. However, the army, given its post Napoleonic military mission, considered those officers with staff experience as a valuable commodity. Table A.13 notes that twenty-six of them, or 66 percent of them, had previous staff experience as aides de camp, judge advocates, adjutant generals, or quartermasters. Furthermore, it is apparent that officers with combat service in a specific area of the colonial empire usually remained in that

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88 John Hall has calculated this number based on the Lionel Challis Peninsular War research data. Challis spent nearly forty years documenting the service records of British officers who served in the Peninsular Campaign.

89 Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War, 89-90.
part of the world after the peace. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Sackville Berkley remained in the West Indies for more than ten years after 1815. Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey, who arrived with British forces during the American War of 1812, did not leave Canada until 1826 when he accepted a civil position as an inspector general of the Irish constabulary.90 Both Lieutenant Colonel William L. Herries and Colonel George E. Raitt served more than ten years in Mediterranean posts after the declaration of peace.

The typical subordinate administrator was usually ten years younger than his superior officers, with 76 percent of them receiving their first commission between 1790 and 1808, the year British forces intervened in Iberia. Based on extant records, many of them were well educated and nearly 20 percent achieved higher degrees; the products of Eton, Oxford, Harrow, Lincoln’s Inn, and the Royal Military College.91 Colonel Thomas Drake received both a bachelors and masters degree from Oxford University before attending the Royal Military College, graduating in 1808 and 1810. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Brabazon Brenton was a trained barrister, spending most of his military career in the judge advocate’s office. Six of the thirty-nine officers attended the Royal Military College, the Horse Guards’ rudimentary staff school established by Colonel J. G. Le Marchant in 1800. Le Marchant’s planned school would educate officers intended for duty on the General staff.92 It is important to note that the senior branch of this school was extremely select, with a student population never exceeding more than thirty-four.

90 Harvey returned to Canada in 1836 when he accepted the post of lieutenant governor of Prince Edward Island. See Phillip Buckner, “Harvey, Sir John,” in the Dictionary of Canadian National Biography Online. Available @ http/www.biographi.ca.


92 PRO, WO 25/747 Le Marchant’s Record of Service January 1, 1810.
Socially, these staff officers came from a diverse group and reflected a cross section of British society. Nine of these men (Table A.13), or 23 percent, came from the elites, and of these, four had titled fathers. However, a notable number, eight, or 20 percent, had middle-class/professional backgrounds. Interestingly, four of these men, or 10 percent, of the thirty-nine were the sons of Anglican clergymen with two having fathers who were bishops. The number of men having clergymen as fathers is considerably higher than the average found in Dalton’s Waterloo survey, which notes that more than forty officers present of the 1,795 officers in Wellington’s 1815 Waterloo army were the sons of clergymen or only 2 percent came from fathers who were clergy. This number, however, dispels the notion of the untutored and unmannered country vicar of the early eighteenth century found in Henry Fielding’s novels and comes closer to the reality of the churchmen found in Jane Austen’s works one hundred years later. The rise of Methodism along with Presbyterian and Baptist revivals outside the sphere of Wesley’s movement was largely responsible for the improvement in the quality of both the non-Conformist and the Anglican clergy.\(^93\) Seven of these military men, or nearly 18 percent of them, came from known military families with six having fathers who served in the military and one who had either siblings or uncles in the service. Lieutenant Colonel William George Moore came from a family of military men of which the most notable was his elder brother Major General John Moore, the ill-fated commander of British forces in Iberia.

The subordinates exhibited many of the same characteristics as their commanders with one significant difference. Their commanding officers, or those officers who were the first generation of colonial administrators, were primarily regimental military officers who had witnessed combat and climbed the promotional ladder by commanding soldiers. Many of the

officers listed in Table A.9 such as James Leith, Stapleton Cotton, Benjamin D’Urban, and Frederick Cavendish Ponsonby were field commanders first and administrators second. Like their subordinates, they gained experience and honed their military skills during the nearly twenty-five years of war with France frequently fighting in the peripheral theaters of the West Indies, the Cape Colony, and India. The subordinate or ancillary officers, the fellows listed in Table A.13, with the notable exception of Henry G. W. Smith, also began their service careers in regiments but moved swiftly into staff duties when they exhibited an aptitude for organization and detail. Many of these officers first experienced combat while serving in the Peninsular Campaign. A substantial 52 percent of them served in either Moore’s or Wellington’s force in Spain. As previously noted, a significant 66 percent of them served a substantial portion of their wartime careers in a staff capacity. It is possible to argue persuasively that subordinate military officers were more qualified to handle colonial administrative duties while their predecessors/commanders were more experienced in conducting military operations. Together these gentlemen fulfilled Britain’s genuine need to administer a global empire.

There were inherent weaknesses in the proconsular system as practiced by the British. Time and distance allowed the colonial administrator a relative freedom in governing his colony. Sitting governors and administrators were permitted to make critical policy decisions without the close supervision of the home country. Frequently these administrators either exceeded their instructions or ignored them all together. The Colonial Office repeatedly criticized or questioned a governor’s policy but rarely did they reverse an administrator’s actions. In the three decades following the fall of Napoleon, British colonial policy rested principally in the hands of onsite administrators who determined colonial policy independently of the home country. Moreover, the men chosen for overseas colonial administrative positions were primarily military men who
had held independent command making them more likely to act autonomously when put in positions of authority. Furthermore, many of the military governors listed in Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11 held major commands during the Napoleonic Wars increasing the likelihood of them acting with impunity. For example, Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, in the summer of 1813, conducted independent operations in the Pyrenees Mountains fighting the French at Roncesvalles; and Sir James Frederick Lyon who in June 1813 organized Hanoverian troops for operations with the army under the command of Crown Prince Bernadotte of Sweden. Many of these imperial administrators saw service in Spain under the direction of Wellington, and as such, formed an informal coterie of proven talent and ability available for imperial service abroad. Wellington’s correspondence in the decades following Waterloo demonstrates that the Duke exerted disproportionate influence on army, colonial, and governmental affairs. Historians such as Hew Strachan, Peter Burroughs, J. W. Fortescue, and George Raudzens argue that Britain’s military stagnated in the period between 1815 and 1854 because the army was dominated by the military conservatism of Wellington and his cadre of Peninsular officers, who Peer refers to as “Wellington’s Kindergarten.” Nevertheless, fellow officers who served under him in Spain continually requested his support in finding them sufficiently suitable employment. Wellington’s correspondence between 1819 and 1828 indicate that as commander in chief in France, Master of Ordnance, and commander in chief of all British forces he received a veritable blizzard of requests seeking employment. In an 1819 letter to Wellington from Lieutenant General Stapleton Cotton, Lord Combermere requests that the Duke “do his utmost to obtain an appointment somewhere out of this country to which sufficient emolument is attached.”

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94 WP1/621/14 Letter from the Duke of Newcastle to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about finding an alternative appointment for Lord Combermere, 26 March 1819
Combermere was at this time governor of Barbados and clearly had designs on moving up to a more prestigious and lucrative position in the colonies.

Ronald Hyam has noted that nineteenth-century colonial administrators appeared to attract a specific character type who found opportunities to exercise their talents and practice their eccentricities normally not tolerated in Britain. There are many examples in British Imperial history of magnificent eccentrics such as Sir Thomas Raffles, Sir Charles Brooke, General Charles Gordon, Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, and Colonel Ord Windgate who were imbued with a messianic-like mission of replicating the social structure, mores, manners, and religion of England throughout the globe. Michael Edwardes argues that these unique individuals were Byronic romantics who viewed themselves as instruments who did not witness history but fashioned it. Especially among career military officers who became colonial administrators, there was a sense that by defeating Napoleon they had saved Europe. Moreover, these officers believed providence ordained them with the task of improving humankind by perpetuating British values and civilization around the globe. Britain’s victory at Waterloo reinforced many Britons’ belief that they were the new Israel, an elect nation chosen by God to act as the globe’s civilizing agent. In a sense, the defeat of Napoleon reiterated the centuries old Elizabethan view that English Protestantism manifested itself in a “national self-assertion of a people fighting for its religious independence and its due place in a new European and extra-European order.” This long held exceptionalist viewpoint was annunciated in a sermon.

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96 For further examination of how Britons perceived their empire see: David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
preached in 1759 by Reverend Simon Lavington following British victories at Minden, Quiberon Bay and Quebec. Lavington observed that Britain “counted it our duty to take a delight in ascribing our success to Divine Providence, because it endears and sweetens our victories to consider them as proceeding from God, and as being an eminent and signal display of Divine Favor.” Nearly fifty years later, this belief experienced a revival in the years following the Battle of Waterloo. Linda Colley echoes this sentiment, noting that British society immediately recognized that Waterloo was an event of historic importance in determining Britain’s future destiny. In the decades that followed the battle, Britain’s collective social attitudes and their perception of their place in the world underwent dramatic and significant changes. For example, in 1807, Parliament abolished the slave trade, and two decades later that deliberative lawmaking body provided for the emancipation of all of its slaves in the West Indies. Colley suggests that many influential leaders in Great Britain assumed that as the new Israel its condemnation of slavery was proof of its moral supremacy among the nations. Furthermore, within months of Waterloo the Royal Navy under the command of Admiral Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth bombarded Algiers effectively ending the Barbary States’ state-sponsored captive and ransom system of Christian slaves. This act, ordered by the House of Commons, demanded by a British press and public was further indication that Britain viewed itself as a world leader in championing humanitarian missions. A significant portion of the population subscribed to this notion and believed that how they comported themselves on moral and secular issues would determine their future success and prosperity as a nation. Humanitarianism, religious revival, and hatred of oppression were perspectives directly attributable to the providential mantle

100 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging A Nation, 1707-1837, 360.
Britons believed they inherited because of Waterloo. For the next century this sentiment provided a powerful legitimization for the British to act as arbiters of both the civilized and uncivilized world. Within a year of Waterloo, Britain justified its use of military force against the Pindaris in India as a campaign to restore morality and stability to a lawless region. In the period following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British in India sought to bring a sense of order on the collection of minor states that remained in the subcontinent. Percival Spear argues that it was no accident that in 1818 “British dominion in India became the British dominion of India” by carrying out the unification of the subcontinent under Crown control.102

Two other significant contributing issues to this prevailing post-Waterloo sentiment was the reemergence and redefining of Evangelicalism and the espousal of Utilitarianism among influential members of British society. David Bebbington defines Evangelical Christianity as having four principal characteristics: “conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; Biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and cruciencentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.”103 Christian activism stipulated that souls be won for Christ throughout the world. Evangelicals firmly believed that in making a commitment to Christ brought with it a responsibility to make a difference in the world.104 By their example, Evangelicals strived to others to follow their example in making the world a better place. With the end of the Napoleonic Wars, there was among Evangelicals a renewed interest in reviving global missionary activity. Bebbington attributes the growth of world wide Christianity to these new missionary societies that emerged in the early nineteenth century.105

105 Ibid., 12.
While the majority of English Evangelicals remained apolitical, an activist minority had a major influence on the activities and policies within the Colonial Office. Chief among their concerns were humanitarianism and the correction of social ills in the empire. In the 1820s, a small but vocal group within the Colonial Office determined to abolish slavery in the West Indies. Other institutions, namely the East India Company, also adopted a policy of Christian activism and moral reform. In 1813, Charles Grant, Director of the East India Company, and William Wilberforce, a Member of Parliament and an Evangelical Christian, worked together to propose revisions to the 1793 “Pious Clause” in the East India Company’s charter. The “Pious Clause” stipulated that the company would assume the duty of appointing the Christian missionaries in India and pay their salaries. The 1813 clause proposed that an Ecclesiastical Establishment be set up in India similar to those in England. In itself, the new clause was innocuous and elicited little controversy. However, the Preamble of the clause was noteworthy in that it signaled a new willingness to spread Westernizing influences and values in India through the medium of Christian missionaries. The Preamble is clear in its intentions by declaring “It is the duty of this country to promote the interests and happiness of the native inhabitants of the British Dominions in India; and such measures ought to be adopted as may tend to the introduction among them a useful knowledge, and of religious and moral improvement; and in the furtherance of the above objects, sufficient facilities out to be afforded by law to persons desirous of accomplishing those benevolent designs.”\textsuperscript{106} Grant further argued in a Parliamentary Paper that same year that the benefits of Christianity were not only religious but material as well.\textsuperscript{107} Since the Reformation, the progress of Europe in comfort and wealth was

\textsuperscript{106} George III, c 155, sec xxiii as quoted in Ainslie Thomas Embree, \textit{Charles Grant and British Rule in India} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 270.

\textsuperscript{107} Charles Grant, \textit{Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of Great Britain, particularly with respect to Morals; and on the Means of Improving it}, privately printed in 1797, presented as a
directly attributable to Protestant influence. It is noteworthy that within a few years of Waterloo, 1818, the military governors and administrators of the East India Company began to encourage enthusiastically a missionary movement that had remained dormant in India during the eighteenth century. Especially important to the European missionaries were the newly acquired territories of northwestern India, scarcely touched by Christianity.

At the same time, the East India Company instituted a policy aimed at improving morality and instilling Christian values among its European employees. During his tenure in India Governor-general Richard Wellesley, the brother of the Duke of Wellington, instituted a series of strict measures that condemned open concubinage with Indian women, censured drunkenness and gambling, and publicly denounced immoral behavior. In a view held by British elites and the public at large, a positive moral example would clearly demonstrate the superiority of western institutions to a native population. A substantial majority in Britain believed that a genuine paternalistic, humanitarian, and religious policy toward subject populations would be sufficient to carry civilization to the non-Christian populations they ruled. Indeed, a significant number of senior colonial administrators subscribed to the notion that Christianity was useful as a means of westernizing their non-European subjects. Colonel Harry G. Smith, administrator to Queen Adelaide’s Province on the frontier of the Cape Colony, wrote that after defeating Xhosas in the Eighth Frontier War, he intended to introduce Christianity to the Xhosas as a means to westernize and counter the traditional tribal practices of

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polygamy, witchcraft, and euthanasia of the old and sick. Smith noted in his autobiography, “Having thus gained an ascendancy over these people never attempted before, my mind was dwelling on the great and important subject of their conversion to Christianity, and many is the conference I had with the missionaries upon the subject. Of ultimately effecting a general conversion I never despaired, but I was convinced it could only be through the educating of the youth at the same time introducing habits of industry and rational amusement.”

Military governors of non-western provinces were not the only administrators who championed Christian values. In the Western Hemisphere colonies of Nova Scotia and Lower Canada, military administrators were active in promoting Christianity often preferring one denomination over others and predictably and frequently sparking controversy. D. B. Read, a late nineteenth century biographer of Canadian administrators, observed that Sir John Colborne, lieutenant governor of Upper Canada and then commander in chief of Canada (1828-1839), came into conflict with the Scottish Presbyterian majority of Upper Canada when he insisted on provisioning and maintaining a minority in the Church of England at the expense of the majority. Colborne insisted on implementing a clause in the Imperial Act or Quebec Act of 1791 that mandated portions of crown land in both provinces of Canada to be reserved for the Anglican Church. Anglicans, however, were clearly in the minority in Upper Canada even when the census counted those who professed no religion or whose religious affiliation was doubtful. Colborne infuriated Presbyterians when he continued to endow the established church despite their protests. Fred D. Schneider has argued that the Act of 1791 gave administrators virtually autocratic power, a control that governors frequently used to reinforce the British imperium at

the expense of popular opinion. The employment of this authority, especially following the conclusion of the American War of 1812, conflicted with nascent Canadian demands for a polity nearer to that of English model. Dissident Canadians, under the leadership of William Lyon Mackenzie, made this issue one of their prime grievances during the abortive revolution of 1837. It is apparent that during the 1820s and 1830s those global proconsular administrators espoused a Tory philosophy of benevolent but firm paternalism that would shield their subjects from the contagion of republicanism. In the established old order colonies of the Western Hemisphere, benevolent paternalism often included and tolerated representative colonial assemblies tasked with debating financial issues leaving all other issues for a strong executive.

During the proconsular period, Canadian administrators often grappled with religious questions that became intertwined with associated secular issues, specifically those concerning schooling, political rights, church establishment, and majority representation based on changing demographics. Frequently these issues undermined the proconsuls’ legitimacy and questioned the efficacy of this form of polity especially in colonies with a long-standing tradition of representative government. Graeme Wynn noted the “diverse and fractured” nature of Canadian North America that Britain inherited from France in 1763 revealed fatal shortcomings in this form of administrative government. Moreover, in religious matters many of the military proconsuls were ill equipped to grapple with the highly charged emotional issue of religion.


115 Raymond J. Lahey argued that significant democratic influences from the United States coupled with reform movements in Britain encouraged the demand by Canadians to have a larger share in the decision making processes within the colony. By the 1820s, a spirit of “freedom and toleration” and a movement to end aristocratic privilege prompted native-born reformers to question traditional methods of governance. See Raymond J. Lahey, “Catholicism and the Colonial Policy in Newfoundland, 1779-1845,” in Creed and Culture: The Place of English-Speaking Catholics in Canadian Society, 1750-1930, eds. Terrence Murphy and Gerald Stortz (Montreal & Kingston: McGill’s Queen’s University Press, 1993), 49.

Andrew Porter characterized many of post-Napoleonic imperial governors as Tory-High Church Anglicans who, when it came to matters of religion, often displayed a striking lack of political aptitude.\textsuperscript{117} Two conspicuous examples illustrate this case in point: the 1825 Newfoundland crisis concerning Lieutenant Governor John Cochrane, the Test Act, and his appointments to the executive council and the 1835 case of Governor John Colborne and Upper Canada’s “University Question.”

In 1825, the lieutenant governor of Newfoundland, John Cochrane, appointed an interim council consisting of Justices of the Supreme Court and his military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Burke, to assist him in an advisory capacity in administering the colony. Burke had a long career in the military entering the army in 1805 as a captain in Dillon’s Corps. Initially, Dillon’s Corps, organized during the French Revolutionary Wars, was comprised of officer émigrés from the Irish Brigade of the old French army.\textsuperscript{118} During the Napoleonic Wars, the regiment spent most of its time in the Mediterranean Theater, specifically Gibraltar, Malta, Sicily, and eastern Spain. Many of the officers who served in the regiment were Catholic, as was Burke. However, Burke’s faith apparently did not hinder his career and, by 1812, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Furthermore, by the end of the war the Crown had honored him with the appointment as Companion of the Bath.\textsuperscript{119} After the fall of Napoleon, Burke became military commander of the British garrison in Newfoundland.

In October 1825, Cochrane appointed Burke to his executive council in an advisory post that held little legislative power. By law, Burke was entitled to the position, took the mandatory oaths of office and allegiance, but because of his faith refused the oath of supremacy and Test

\textsuperscript{119} United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. IV, 424
Act declaration of Transubstantiation. Cochrane, fearful of offending Catholic sentiments, prepared to waive these stipulations expecting little opposition from the home government. A similar situation existed in Lower Canada nearly a decade earlier when the Colonial Office allowed the Catholic Bishop of Quebec, Joseph-Octave, to participate in that province’s executive council. This time, however, Bathurst refused to grant the necessary waiver despite the precedent established in Lower Canada. The official opinion of the attorney general stated that it was constitutionally impossible for the king to issue a commission without the mandated oaths. Commissions needed to be set up to review the stipulations and if necessary abrogate the offensive oaths. Therefore, the Colonial Secretary declined to place Cochrane’s nominations before the king. The Catholic majority of Newfoundland, which, in 1827 comprised 52 percent of the province’s population, found Downing Street’s decision unacceptable. The Catholic Bishop of Newfoundland, Thomas Scallan, counseled patience and for the moment, the crisis subsided. Newfoundland Catholics believed that the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 enacted by Britain’s Parliament would apparently end the discriminatory policies aimed at Catholics and end the exclusion controversy in the governor’s executive council. However, the Catholic Emancipation Act was applicable only in Britain, and full Catholic representation in


121 In January 1819, the Catholic See of Quebec was elevated to that of an archdiocese with Bishop Plessis becoming its first archbishop.


123 In the meantime, Cochrane had included a formal list of names that would comprise his permanent executive council. The list included three Catholics, Burke, Patrick Morris, a merchant, and Bishop Thomas, Scallan, vicar apostolic of Newfoundland. Also included in the list were prominent Anglicans Archdeacon of Newfoundland George Coster and Bishop John Inglis of Nova Scotia, who was described by James Kempt, Governor of Nova Scotia as a “one of the most cunning and persevering of men,” stout defender of Anglican interests in the Maritime Provinces. See Raymond J. Lahey, “Catholicism and Colonial Policy in Newfoundland, n. 103, 76; and Phillip A. Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government: British Policy in British North America, 1815-1850, Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, Number 17 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 110.
Newfoundland did not take place until 1840 when the first member of that faith became a representative of the provincial assembly. Cochrane, who initially championed the Catholic cause, became disinterested and did not attempt to appoint a Catholic to the legislature in 1832 when provided the opportunity to select one. Cochrane, like his fellow proconsuls of the period, trod a fine line by attempting to satisfy all influential parties within the colony. Without exception, proconsular administrators were well meaning and “high-minded” and were certainly not political Neanderthals. Nevertheless, Cochrane like his colleagues Colborne, Dalhousie, and Kempt endeavored to establish in Canada an Anglican preeminence despite the fact that the denomination was a minority.

Phillip Buckner argues that proconsular administrators came from a literate and sophisticated segment of the aristocracy and gentry who believed firmly that they were duty bound to serve both King and Parliament. Adherence to the established church figured significantly into their concept of duty. Furthermore, administrators believed that king, Parliament, and the Anglican Church played a significant role in maintaining an ordered society. Buckner writes that all politicians of Georgian and Regency periods were of the opinion that Britain’s stability was the result of a hierarchical society where each person knew his specific place. If this system of order were to break down, and either the Crown, nobility, or people achieved dominance over the others then chaos and anarchy would ensue leading to the demise of constitutional government and the end of the state. Thus, British colonial administrators of the post-Napoleonic era employed this constitutional balance to those colonies with a western tradition, namely the Canadian provinces, the West Indies, and Australia. Fred Schneider, in his

125 Ibid., 59.
126 Ibid.
study of British Imperialism, echoes these sentiments. Schneider maintains that after 1815 the British Empire was a product of an expanding commercial and industrial society that gained influence or control over large portions of the world. It did so through the means of force, ideological persuasion, or settlement “with the object of shaping those societies in the interests of the metropolitan power and more or less in its image.”  

David Cannadine has joined the chorus of Imperial historians by noting that Britons viewed themselves as belonging to an unequal society composed of layered gradations, tested by tradition, and sanctioned by religion. Every individual Briton knew their place and from this starting point, they constructed their empire.

The Upper Canadian secular/religious crisis of the “University Question” precipitated during the tenure of Sir John Colborne also revealed the serious shortcomings of traditional methods of administration and the proconsular system. In the 1830s, radical and reform elements in the province argued that the establishment of a provincial university benefited only privileged elements of a minority Anglican Canadian society perpetuating a stratified aristocratic society similar to that found in England. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography notes that the governor was “a devout Anglican,” and his background certainly supports his preference for High-Church Anglicanism. Colborne’s stepfather was the Reverend Thomas Bargus, educated at Winchester and a Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford, who served as rector of St. Michael’s Parish, Winchester. G. C. Moore Smith, a biographer of Colborne, notes that Bargus “became a second father to his stepchildren and, received from them in return a lifelong

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affection.” Colborne’s known devotion to Anglicanism almost immediately aroused suspicions among radicals and reformers that his conduct would be less than impartial. William Lyon MacKenzie, Colborne’s chief critic and antagonist during the governor’s tenure, characterized him as the leader of a cabal noting in the January 5, 1831 edition of the Colonial Advocate, “He is continually surrounded, flattered, guided and advised by a host of church and state priests, placemen, sinecurists, courtiers, parasites and sycophants….”

Like the Newfoundland controversy ten years earlier, the Upper Canadian “University Question” included not only religious issues, but also essential questions concerning the nature of popular representation and the limits of authoritarianism at the provincial level. The genesis of the problem rested with the desire of Colborne’s predecessor, Governor Sir Peregrine Maitland and John Strachan, Anglican Rector of York, to establish a university in Upper Canada. Fred D. Schneider notes that two conditions were necessary for the establishment of a colonial university that would strengthen ties with the mother country: the university faculty must come from Britain and men chosen to be educated must be from the elite of the colony. Thus, the faculty would be able to indoctrinate in their student the political and economic ideology of the parent state. Under the Maitland and Strachan plan the university’s charter provided for an Anglican president and a governing council consisting of members of the Church of England. Subsequently, a cadre of the educated elite could easily assume the reigns of power when the metropolitan authorities determined that the colony was ready to exercise limited power.

133 Ibid.
Colborne apparently agreed that an educational system in the colony provided mutual benefits for both the governing and the governed. In December 1835, Colborne wrote to Bishop John Bethune, editor of Christian Sentinel and Anglo-Canadian Churchman’s Magazine, and proposed the building of a seminary in Canada which he argued would annually confer on the colony significant benefits, especially from the liberal and extensive education it gives to the colonists.134

As beneficial as a university might be to the population, its establishment would reveal a number of critical issues concerning the changing nature of Canadian society and their views on British administration. By the beginning of the third decade of the nineteenth century, the demographics of Upper Canada had changed significantly with the Anglican elites now a minority. The population of Upper Canada had divided along two principal lines. On one side was the “Family Compact,” predominantly Anglican elites. On the other side was the majority composed of newly arrived immigrants of modest means and evangelical beliefs. The “Family Compact” essentially collaborated with British administrators and as such were members of the colonial elite who comprised the bulk of the local councilors, office holders, sheriffs, militia officers, customs collectors, and members of the judicial system. These individuals were interrelated by marriage and normally espoused conservative primarily Anglican and Tory viewpoints.135 They, along with the governors who exercised a considerable measure of power, dominated the government of Upper Canada in the 1820s and 1830s.136 By the end of the American War of 1812, the majority resented the rule of the few and began to agitate for a greater voice in colonial affairs. Some of the Family Compact’s most vocal critics were settlers

136 Ibid., 201 and 203.
of American descent who maintained small farms in the eastern section of York County and adhered to the Methodist beliefs of Egerton Ryerson and his *Christian Guardian* newspaper.\textsuperscript{137} This activist majority viewed the “University Question” as further strengthening of the power of the Anglican Church and the Family Compact, at the expense of traditional British constitutional practices. Both dissenters and Roman Catholics were fearful that, like the British universities of Cambridge and Oxford, Canadian universities, dominated by Anglican traditionalists, would become bastions of unwarranted social privilege.\textsuperscript{138}

In the “University Question,” reformist and radical politicians were unified in opposing what they perceived to be an attempt by the Anglican Church to acquire greater power and prestige in Upper Canada. Mackenzie, Ryerson, and many dissenters demanded the removal of all tests at existing and proposed universities in Canada, arguing that colleges supported by public funds should be “equally accessible to persons of all religious persuasions and of all classes of society.”\textsuperscript{139} Unfortunately, the Tory council defeated the move, fearing that abolishing the tests would create universities similar to that which existed at London College. Governor Colborne, caught in the middle of the controversy, sought to find a middle road by noting that money earmarked for a university might be better used to create a preparatory school. However, the governor’s decision angered all of the interested parties. Strachan was outraged. Colborne halted progress on the creation of the university. The Colonial Office was unhappy because the governor had acted arbitrarily without their approval, and the reformers believed that the

\textsuperscript{137} Mark Francis, *Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-1860*, 138.
\textsuperscript{138} Canadian universities, like King’s College at Toronto, possessed the right to confer degrees by royal charter thereby limiting enrollment to suitable candidates of the Anglican faith. Furthermore, this new majority comprised of non-conformists and Catholics, who existed outside the sphere of the “Family Compact,” were suspicious that the creation of a new university would further marginalize their ability to receive a university education.
governor had sided with the established elites and disregarded their viewpoints. The fall of Wellington’s Tory Government and the rise of the Whigs under Lord Grey in November 1830 further weakened Colborne’s proconsular authority in Canada. The Whigs believed in the economy of colonial governments and were prepared to turn over issues that such as local expenditure to the local assemblies. Local politicians continued to debate the question that, in time, strengthened their authority and stature and significantly weakened Colborne’s. The Whig’s assumption of power in London portended a move that moderate colonial change would now come from the colonies rather than London.

A number of military administrators who championed Christian values also advocated applying Utilitarian practice to governing their provinces. Utilitarianism, as espoused by Jeremy Bentham, argued that political action should work to generate the greatest good for the maximum number of citizens. Over the years, this philosophy has been refined, debated, and scrutinized. Recently B.C. Postow defined the utilitarian principle as “In any given situation, and group of one or more agents ought to follow a course of action by means of which the group would produce the most good that it can produce in that situation.” David Cannadine argues that British administrators in India such as Thomas Macaulay and James Ramsay implemented a combination of Evangelicalism and Utilitarianism in their administrations. These men, who believed local rulers to be corrupt and native customs barbaric frequently applied western style government and educational practices that they thought “would be efficient rather than ornamental.” Bentham’s philosophy was entirely compatible with the British public’s notion

140 Fred. Schneider, “The Habit of Deference: The Imperial Factor and the ‘University Question’ in Upper Canada,” 82-104.
143 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 22.
of good government. Professor Suresh Chandra Ghosh notes that Bentham’s able disciple John Mill argued in his 1817 work, *History of British India*, that Indian society would be an ideal laboratory for testing reforms patterned after Benthamite models. Mill believed that Western science and knowledge would pave the way for the colony’s economic, political, and social progress.\textsuperscript{144} As noted, at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Britons were convinced of the superiority of liberal government, which in many instances employed Utilitarian philosophy that proved beneficial to all who encountered it.\textsuperscript{145} Britain’s victory at Waterloo, its economic strength, and size of its global empire confirmed this notion of exceptionalism. From 1830 on, the British public deemed their government to be superior to that of the republicanism and autocracy of the continental European states. As a result, Britons felt compelled to spread their notion of good government to those states and peoples whom they believed were governed badly. British proconsular colonial administrations, in particular, were ideally suited for carrying out Utilitarian experiments. Both Bentham and Mill argued that authoritarian administrations were the best vehicles for imposing benevolent policies on a naïve population.\textsuperscript{146} The East India Company’s administrations of the Earl of Cornwallis and Richard Wellesley provided a foundation on which Anglicization of Indian political, economic, and social institutions could take root. Cornwallis, in particular, found the Company’s pragmatic practice of continuing traditional Indian methods of governance to be the source of every evil.\textsuperscript{147} During his tenure as governor general, Cornwallis extended the Company’s control by introducing district administration and British judicial practices. Government interference at the local level was,
however, to be limited to the bare necessities. Professor Eric Stokes notes that Cornwallis followed a Whig philosophy of government that had as its central belief that political power was “essentially corrupting and inevitably abused; that power, to be exercised with safety, must be reduced to a minimum, and even then kept divided and counterbalanced.” East India Company governors who administered British possessions in India after 1815 rarely followed Cornwallis’ methodology. Thomas Munro, John Malcolm, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Charles Theophilus Metcalf, subordinates of either Cornwallis or Wellesley, repudiated Whig philosophy, choosing instead to bring the entire subcontinent under complete British subjugation. Britain would rule India according to British traditions, not Indian ones.

Noteworthy proconsuls who appeared to have applied Utilitarianism to their governing methodologies were Lieutenant Colonel Lachlan Macquarie, who governed New South Wales from January 1810 to December 1821 and Lieutenant General William Cavendish Lord Bentinck, who administered Sicily during the Napoleonic Wars and later became Governor General of India. Peter Burroughs describes Macquarie as a classic example of a benevolent military autocrat who was disdainful of orders and unconcerned with legality. Professor Peter Burroughs of Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, observes that Macquarie heads a list of masterful individuals who acted independently and frequently exceeded Colonial Office instructions “with cavalier exuberance and …impunity.” Macquarie, a career officer had risen through the ranks seeing action in the Mediterranean and India during the Napoleonic Wars. When the 73rd Foot arrived in New South Wales in 1809, Macquarie received an appointment as both regimental commander and provincial governor. The new governor immediately grappled

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148 Ibid., 5.
with a host of problems that plagued the infamous penal colony, including quelling a rebellion, restoring order, and sending the previous governor, William Bligh, of H. M. S. *Bounty* fame, home in disgrace. Macquarie, with his wife’s assistance then, began a nearly two decades authoritarian rule of apparently benevolent Utilitarianism. He instituted a vigorous building program, revamped the judicial administration, integrated convicts into Australian society, curbed rampant vice, instituted temperance, and protected aborigines in Australia and Maoris in adjacent New Zealand. The governor of New South Wales was especially successful in rehabilitating convicts, emancipating them and restoring their rights after they had served their sentences. Macquarie’s legacy in Australia was that he was singularly responsible for converting the nature of the colony from that of prison to that of a vibrant territory financially beneficial to the Crown.

Macquarie’s tenure as a benevolent autocrat brought good government to New South Wales to the greatest number of its inhabitants. Because of its remote location in the empire, Macquarie frequently acted independently implementing his own programs and agendas. As Burroughs points out, administrators separated from the homeland by long distances determined policies compatible with their provinces’ peculiar situations.150 Geoffrey Blainey observes that ships carrying dispatches and news from Australia took between twelve and eighteen months to reach England.151 Early in his career as a governor, Macquarie reduced arbitrary punishments meted out to convicts, frequently advocating clemency.152 His chief judicial officials Ellis Bite and Sir John Wylde, noted that the governor was far too indulgent with the convicts. Macquarie prohibited gaolers and superintendents from punishing prisoners arbitrarily, as he assumed

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150 Peter Burroughs, “Institutions of Empire,” 177.
complete control over prisoner discipline. Macquarie was also responsible for massive building projects that largely benefited the convict population of Sydney. In 1810, the governor began work on a hospital as the building currently in use was little better than “a ruined shed.” Macquarie declined to finance the hospital with government funds instead choosing to use money collected from the importation of rum. In addition to the hospital, the governor rebuilt many of the existing Sydney churches because of his conviction that regular religious services would reform the colony’s convicts. At the end of Macquarie’s tenure, J. Lycett, commented on the city of Sydney in his 1825 work, Views in Australia:

There are now numerous habitations of various descriptions, some excellently built with stone, two stories in height, and many very good brick-built houses. The public Buildings were all erected during the governorship of Major-General Macquarie, by whose active zeal and sound judgment the whole Colony, and Sydney in particular, was improved with rapidity truly surprising. Among other erections which arose under his vigilant superintendence, must be particularly noticed the King’s Stores, Commissariat Offices and Stores, the Guard-house, two Courts of Justice, the General Hospital, the Military Hospital, the Military Barracks, the Governor’s Stables, the new Fort at the mouth of the Harbour, Dawe’s Battery, new Church, Prisoners’ Barracks, Dragoons’ Stable and Barracks, the Market-house, Judges’ Houses, Secretary’s Offices and Swelling, Offices and House of the principal Magistrate of Police, Governor’s Guard House, and General Guard House. Many of these are very handsome large stone Buildings; others of brick, but they are all very commodious.

However, Macquarie’s enlightened humanitarian rule and public building policy did not please the Colonial Office. J. M. Bennett argues that the governor’s good faith standards and progressive policies upset the traditional order, and that Macquarie’s successful governance offended wealthy citizens, judicial officers, and Anglican churchmen, who saw their power and influence diminished. Bathurst’s criticisms of the Macquarie administration in Australia were two-fold in nature. First, he was concerned that governmental expenditures in maintaining the

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153 Ibid., 90.
colony exceeded imperial estimates. On this point, Bathurst was disingenuous, as Macquarie had reduced significantly the government’s cost of sustaining convicts. In 1810, the first full year of Macquarie’s governorship it had cost the Colonial Office £60 to keep a convict, in 1821, the last year of his tenure, the cost was reduced to less than £15 per convict.\footnote{155} Government expenses for keeping convicts in New South Wales had indeed risen. This was largely because of economic unrest in Britain following the end of the Napoleonic Wars causing the crime rate to rise. Between 1810 and 1820, 16,943 convicts were transported to New South Wales from Britain, and 11,250 of these arrived in 1816.\footnote{156}

On the second point, Bathurst sided with the established elites of New South Wales who insisted on reinstating rigorous and harsh oversight of the convicts. Bathurst, in his 1819 instructions to John T. Bigge, Parliamentary Select Commissioner on Gaols, informed him that New South Wales was once again to be “rendered an Object of real Terror” and that any decision motivated by compassion for convicts by Macquarie should be reported.\footnote{157} Bigge’s first report of June 1822 ignored the fact that the governor’s system of repatriating convicts into Australian society was working and instead criticized their integration into Sydney society. Moreover, Bigge disapproved of Macquarie’s building projects, characterizing them as wasteful and unnecessary at a time when colonial administrators should be practicing frugality. Bigge’s biographer, J. M. Bennett notes that the commissioner’s reports were little more than misrepresentations and innuendo created to strengthen his standing with the traditional elites of New South Wales stating that the commissioner reported only what he chose exhibiting an

overwhelming prejudice against Macquarie.\textsuperscript{158} Chiefly because of Bigge’s first and subsequent reports, Bathurst recalled Macquarie, replacing him with another military man, Sir Thomas Brisbane.

William Cavendish Bentinck was well acquainted with Utilitarian practices. Scholars Manazir Ahmad and Eric Stokes believe that Bentinck’s relationship with Jeremy Bentham and John Mill influenced his political philosophy.\textsuperscript{159} Born William Cavendish Bentinck, he came from an aristocratic family who traveled to England in the late seventeenth century in the entourage of William of Orange. Bentinck, while commander in chief of British forces occupying Sicily during the last years of the Napoleonic Wars, employed measures construed as Utilitarian in nature, introducing judicial reforms and principles based on the British constitutional model. While these reforms were largely unsuccessful and short-lived, Bentinck, described by Sir Charles Webster as “A brilliant and unbalanced egoist all the more dangerous because he was also imbued with a species of idealism,” held these views throughout his administrative career.\textsuperscript{160} Indeed, in 1827, when notified that he was appointed Governor General of India, Bentinck wrote Bentham, “I am going to British India, but I shall not be the Governor General. It is you that will be Governor General.”\textsuperscript{161} Immediately upon arrival in India, Bentinck created a sensation by proclaiming that he wanted suggestions from all groups in the colony, both European and Indian to further “the general prosperity and happiness of the British empire in India.”\textsuperscript{162}


\textsuperscript{162} William Cavendish Bentinck, \textit{The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-
As Governor General of India, Bentinck embarked on a program that included improving the efficiency of the Company’s civil service while cutting administrative expenses. In his quest to accomplish these measures, the governor general found it necessary to adopt a plan put forth by Holt Mackenzie, a high-ranking Company civil servant: to reform completely the executive and judicial administrative structure of the colony. Bentinck envisioned that the most cost effective method would be military in form with a European military officer in charge of a district, having the local powers of “judicature, police and revenue.” Under the officer, natives would serve the local populace but always be subject to the European’s oversight. Districts would be under the administration and scrutiny of the province, governed by a commissioner who, in turn, was responsible to one of the three presidencies. The pinnacle of this hierarchy was the Supreme Government “which should exercise authority in all branches of the administration, including the revising, correcting and altering of judicial decisions, wherever it might deem its interference necessary from good and sufficient cause.” Bentinck and Mackenzie believed that these measures would improve efficiency and promote affection by a populace who were no longer burdened with the corrupt and despotic methods of the past.

Bentinck’s tenure in India was also notable for a number of additional reforms he enacted while governor. Chief among these was the transformation of the Indian educational system. Bentinck believed that the adoption of English as the official language and education patterned on western style methods would benefit the population. Beginning in 1813, a chorus of voices that included Charles Grant and William Wilberforce of the Clapham Sect advocated western

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164 Ibid.
education that “informed and enlightened the minds of the natives of India.” Bentinck believed that by educating Indians in Western traditions, the British could fashion a future colonial administration composed of lower and midlevel civil servants. With the adoption of a Western rather than Oriental modes of education, a service class of high-caste Hindus “fulfilled the intention of westernizing reformers of the 1830s to create ‘interpreters’ between British rulers and Indian society.” Moreover, before Bentinck resigned his governorship in 1835, his administration enacted reforms that included the abolishment of Sutee, or the immolation of Hindu widows, and the reform of the East India Company’s military forces.

Along with the incentive of promoting good government similar to the English model, there was the very real attraction by British administrators of furthering their own financial well-being. Yearly salaries for governorships and high-level colonial administrative positions were generous and frequently more lucrative than salaries available at home. For example, in 1830s, the governor of the Cape Colony received £5000 annually, the lieutenant governor of Sierra Leone £2000, the governor of Ceylon £8000, and the governor in chief of Lower Canada £5000. Additionally, military governors received staff-pay commensurate with their rank. In 1828, the governor of New South Wales, Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Darling, earned £4200 annually as governor and £691 19s. 7d. military pay. In most instances, administrators intended to live and work overseas long enough to settle their financial difficulties and save for a comfortable retirement in Britain. Sir Charles Theophilus Baron Metcalf, a career East India

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167 PRO, CO 325/20 Colonial Office Appointment Books.
168 United Kingdom, British Parliamentary Papers: Reports from Select Committees and Commissioners on Colonial Affairs with Minutes of Evidence Appendices and Index, 1830-37, General Colonies (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press Series, 1970), Appendix to the Report Upon Australian Colonies, 88.
political official, believed, that as chief administrator for Delhi, he could save at least 800 rupees a month from his salary of 2000 rupees. In 1810, the period of his Delhi appointment, 800 rupees was the equivalent value of nearly £100.\textsuperscript{169} Metcalf had determined that at this rate, he could invest his savings at a high rate of interest earning nearly £3000 per year, accumulating enough wealth to retire to England in twelve or fifteen years living “in a manner in which I mean to live.”\textsuperscript{170}

Many colonial governors, however, were disappointed that overseas positions were not the panacea to alleviate their acute financial difficulties brought on by army reductions in the wake of Waterloo. Major reductions in the British military in the 1820 placed a significant number of officers on half-pay. Lord FitzRoy Somerset calculated that the troop reductions of 1821 put a substantial 638 serving officers on half-pay.\textsuperscript{171} Additional reductions among staff officers in 1828, 1829, and 1830 culled 108 more officers from the army rolls.\textsuperscript{172} Furthermore, an Act of Parliament in 1831-1832 reduced the pay of all serving lieutenant generals dropping it to that of a major general as the government continued its quest to cut military budgets. Career officers, however, clung to the belief that officers serving in the colonies received substantial salaries and could improve their economic situation. In 1819, Stapleton Cotton Lord Combermere wrote to the Duke of Wellington that his probable appointment to the governorship of Ceylon would net him £12,000 a year, which is considerably more than he had earned at his present post. Combermere felt that he could not refuse the present offer unless he received a

\textsuperscript{169} Michael Edwardes, Glorious Sahibs: The Romantic as Empire Builder, 1799-1838 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1968), 110.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., June 17, 1833, 1827.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., June 17, 1833, 2026
more attractive colonial position, “but would always give it up if there was a prospect of active military service.”\(^{173}\)

One of the great myths of colonial service, then and now, was that governors and their subordinates became wealthy serving overseas. Evidence presented by high-ranking military officers during the 1833 Parliamentary Select Hearings on Army and Navy Appointments dispels this notion. For high ranking administrators, specifically governors, lieutenant governors, and commandants, out of pocket expenses were considerably higher than anticipated because these administrators were expected to pay the expense of entertaining both civilian authorities and members of his military staff.\(^{174}\) During subsequent hearings, Lord Viscount Ebrington wondered if the increased costs and the reductions in salaries might consequently limit the Government in obtaining the best men to administer overseas posts.\(^{175}\) Lord FitzRoy Somerset indicated that a considerable number of qualified and deserving officers “will not be induced to go to these foreign commands …” as they would find it difficult “in keeping up the sort of establishment that they must have to maintain their situation with the means at present afforded them.”\(^{176}\) Somerset cited the example of a “very capable,” but unnamed officer who declined the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies because of salary. Furthermore, it was reported to him that Sir Matthew Whitworth, Lord Aylmer, governor of Lower Canada, Sir Frederick Adam, commander of forces on the Ionian Islands, Lieutenant General Sir George Murray, commander of British forces in Ireland, and an unidentified Governor of Nova Scotia (probably Sir Peregrine Maitland), lost considerable amounts of personal cash while employed as

\(^{173}\) WP 1/628/15 Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about his appointment to the governorship and command of the army in Ceylon, 24 July 1819  

\(^{174}\) House of Commons, “Report from the Select Committee on Army and Navy Appointments with Minutes of Evidence,” British Parliamentary Papers, June 12, 1833, 1684..  

\(^{175}\) Ibid., June 17, 1833, 1973.  

\(^{176}\) Ibid., June 17, 1833, 1685-1686.
administrators. Somerset noted that military governors often incurred considerably greater expenses than their civilian counterparts.

Despite the increased expenses, some enterprising administrators were able to make their overseas duty profitable. Most often governors, administrators, and their subordinates speculated in land as an easy opportunity to alleviate their financial burdens and put away substantial amounts of cash for retirement. Cape Colony’s governor D’Urban awarded Colonel Harry Smith large tracts of land along the Buffalo River that was rich in timber and granite. Smith assured his wife Juana that he planned to sell the land as soon as settlers began to move into the province observing “Money is the word.” However, evidence indicates that many colonial administrators were careful not to appear as land speculators, carefully masking their financial dealings to avoid any hint of scandal. Stapleton Cotton Lord Combermere wrote to the Wellington in 1821 requesting that he use his influence to secure for him a colonial appointment. Combermere “assures Wellington that he has never speculated in the West Indies. The property he has in Nevis and Saint Kitts was left to him and his son by his first wife…. Combermere, however, was concerned that this situation hinted of a scandal and that it would keep him from obtaining future colonial postings.

Conclusion

In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain’s small Colonial Office bureaucracy was woefully unprepared to manage its newly acquired and vast global empire. In need of an immediate solution, Colonial Office Secretary Lord Bathurst turned to a remedy that

178 Ibid., 174.
had served empires for millennia, proconsular despotism. The practice of proconsular despotism was familiar to British elites in that the state had employed it in governing selected colonies before American Revolution. After 1815, this form of governance became the norm throughout the empire. The Colonial Office with Parliament’s approval determined that serving military officers be employed as administrators all across the globe. Parliament believed that bestowing colonial posts on senior officers would be a means of rewarding these military men for distinguished service they had rendered during the nearly quarter of a century of war with France.

The employment of military officers in administrative colonial posts appeared to be the ideal answer in that it engaged the services of officers that otherwise would have been demobilized during the reduction of the army following the Napoleonic Wars. Furthermore, the placement of military officers in the colonies was a fiscally sound policy during a period of Parliamentary economic retrenchment. Military proconsuls fulfilled a dual role both as civil administrators and as regimental officers with military commands in colonies that had restive populations, hostile neighbors, or both.

The first generation of post-Napoleonic War colonial proconsuls were primarily chosen from general officers who had commanded divisions or brigades in Wellington’s Peninsular Army. Frequently, these officers came from the ranks of Britain’s aristocracy or landed gentry. As these men retired or died, younger subordinates who had served in field grade or staff positions replaced them. The proconsuls who followed, however, rarely came from the aristocracy or gentry. Instead, these officers frequently were members of a rising British middle class who had received extensive staff training during the Napoleonic Wars.
CHAPTER FIVE: A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE POST-NAPOLEONIC BRITISH MILITARY OFFICER

In September 1913, Captain Acland Anderson, of the 3rd Dragoon Guards and a former colonel commandant of His Majesty’s Military Forces in Victoria, Australia, and son of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Anderson, published his father’s memoirs. During his lifetime, the elder Anderson was commissioned at the outset of the Napoleonic Wars, served in the Peninsula, and then in the post-Waterloo army occupied a number of regimental and staff positions in the West Indies, New South Wales, and India. He ended his long and distinguished career by retiring in September 1848 in Australia as a lieutenant colonel. Originally, this memoir, like many others of its kind, was not intended for popular distribution and was written only for the family. Renewed interest on the occasion of the centenary of the Napoleonic Wars prompted many publishing houses to collect and produce Napoleonic era reminisces. Commercial demand for such books was high. Ronald J. Caldwell’s bibliographical research notes that between 1908 and 1914 at least seventy-two book-length memoirs and wartime letters by Peninsular War veterans had been published.¹

Personal memoirs, while valuable, must be carefully scrutinized. Charles Oman warned that great care should be exercised when weighing the evidence presented in these memoirs. He claimed that these remembrances fall into three categories of decreasing value.² The first, where memory is vivid, consists of diaries and letters written while on campaign. These documents frequently followed events as they occurred.³ The second group, was also based on letters and

³ Four memoirs were published in London in 1809, one year after the Peninsular War began. These works were Rev. James Wilmot Ormsby’s, An Account of the Operations of the British army, and of the state and sentiments of the people of Portugal and Spain, during the campaigns of the years 1808 & 1809: in a series of letters,
diaries, but they were written long after the events took place. Here memories have faded and the sequence of events and specific details are imprecise. Oman characterized these works as charming romantic tales whose value is diminished by the author’s desire to be dramatic rather than accurate. The final group comprises those books written by well-known authors interested in a good story rather than an accurate depiction of the events. Even for the most meticulous observer, what was once a vivid memory becomes blurred over time. Keeping in mind these limitations, memoirs provide an important insight into the life and personality of the author/soldier. Anderson’s memoir, like many of those published by his comrades, continued his story past his Napoleonic service, offering a career-long study of his life. Many of these officers served in the post-Waterloo British Army in colonial positions. The value of Anderson’s memoir is that it is an excellent case study of the military’s involvement in the colonial empire. Others in this genre and equally important to this study include Joseph Gubbin’s New Brunswick Journals of 1811 & 1813, George Bell’s Rough Notes by an Old Soldier During Fifty Years Service, Robert C. Wallace’s Forty Years in the World; or Sketches and Tales of a Soldier’s Life, and Walter Henry’s Surgeon Henry’s Trifles: Events of a Military Life. In addition, memoirs provide a basis for recreating service records for British officers during the Napoleonic Wars and the Regency periods. Recreating service records during these times is problematic for the historian in that the War Office did not develop a single comprehensive service record until the mid-1830s. Prior to that time, there were no records in the British Army comparable to the

French Army’s *contrôle de troupes* that contained information on the provincial origin and social background of its soldiers.⁴

Beside the numerous memoirs available, a wealth of information can be gathered from the many available regimental histories. These histories fall into two categories: those that were compiled under War Office direction by Richard Cannon, Adjutant General’s Office, and published in the 1830s and 1840s; and those created outside official circles at a later date. Unfortunately, the Cannon series suffers from numerous historiographical flaws that include unsubstantiated research, too few regimental statistics, and an arid and lackluster writing style. All of the contributions in the series exhibit a dull sameness and hasty construction that does little to commend itself to the 1836 Horse Guard directive that inaugurated the series.⁵ However, the later regimental histories are valuable tools in tracing officers’ careers as many of them

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⁵ A January 1836 Horse Guard General Order specified:

“His Majesty has been pleased to command that, with a view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of the Adjutant General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.:--

---The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations in which it has been engaged, particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have captured from the Enemy.

---The Names of the Officers and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates Killed or Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the Place and Date of the Action.

---The Names of those Officers who, in consideration of the Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in Engagements with the Enemy, have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty’s gracious favour.

---The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, as may have specially signalized themselves in Action.

And,

---The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted.

By Command of the Right Honourable

GENERAL LORD HILL

*Commanding-in-Chief*

John MacDonald,

*Adjutant-General*
exhibit a high standard of accuracy relying on the Public Record Office, regimental archival materials, veteran interviews, and unpublished papers from former officers. As Oman observed, regimental histories written after 1860s are superior in that they display solid historiographical methodology and offer subsequent generations of researchers statistical and personnel data unavailable from existent War Office documents. The sheer volume of unofficial regimental histories makes these works indispensable when recreating Regency period military personnel records. In 1965, War Office librarian Arthur White, working in conjunction with The Society for Army Historical Research, compiled a bibliography of British Army regimental histories. White’s research uncovered hundreds of published regimental histories for Guards, Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Engineer formations. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain fielded six regiments of Guards, thirty-two cavalry regiments, one hundred and four regiments of infantry, ten regiments of the King’s German Legion, seven foreign regiments, and approximately sixty-one regiments in the East India Company’s army. Fortescue reports that in 1819, a much-reduced British Army comprised some ninety-three regiments of infantry and seventeen of cavalry remained. Using these numbers as a guide and calculating conservatively an average of three studies per regiment yields nearly four hundred regimental histories. In addition to data supplied in the text, many of these histories have exhaustive appendices supplying officers’ service records and vital personal information. Among the best are R.P. Dunn-Pattison’s, History of the 91st Argyllshire Highlanders, W. F. Butler’s, Narrative of the Historical Events Connected with the Sixty-Ninth Regiment, G. L. Goff’s Historical Records of

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the 91st Argyllshire Highlanders, and Neil McMicking’s, Officers of the Black Watch, 1725-1937.

Official and semi-official publications and documents such as Hart’s annual List of All the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on Full and Half Pay, the War Office’s Return of the Names of the Officers in the Army, who receive Pensions for the loss of Limbs, or for wounds, the incomplete 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers, the Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, and the East India Company’s Alphabetical List of the Officers of the Indian Army contribute important information that assists the historian in constructing a social profile of the British officers who administered the empire. None of these official and semi/official papers present a complete picture of an officer’s military career. Hart’s list is nothing more than an annual register of general and field officers, their regimental affiliation, if they were subject to full pay, half-pay, or retired, the date of their commission (in both the army and the regiment), and honorary distinctions or medals received. The War Office’s pension returns were a periodic listing of all officers who received emoluments for wounds or loss of limbs while in service. The pension roll is limited to listing the officer’s name, his regiment, the military rank held when wounded, the officer’s present rank, the nature of the wound, the place and year when the wound occurred, the amount of the pension, and the date in which the pension began. The 1818 Pension rolls are useful in that the lists can confirm an officer’s regimental affiliation, especially in an army in which officers frequently moved from regiment to regiment.

For the researcher, the 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers yields the single most comprehensive accumulation of data in one record. See Appendix II for a copy of the form retired officers were to complete and return to the War Office.
who retired from military service before 1829. There is considerable biographical information for the names contained in this list. Information most commonly found in this report include the officer’s date and place of birth, his commission dates, a summary of his military record, his present pay category (if he is receiving full pay, half-pay, or is retired), marriage and family data, and if the officer is available for further service. However, even this significant document has its limitations. The Statement of Service was a voluntary submission of personal and service information tendered to the War Office. The document was a blank form sent to retired officers who then were to fill it out and forward it to the Horse Guards. Because it was voluntary, many officers failed to supply critical information rendering the record incomplete. The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, first published in 1821, contains similar information found in the 1829 Statements of Service. This document also has some significant limitations. The list, consisting of five volumes, contains detailed information on the careers of hundreds of officers, but the listing only includes those officers who held the rank of major or higher in 1820. In 1820, a substantial number of company-grade officers would not have yet attained their majority because of the army’s recent rapid reduction slowed promotions. The Duke of York’s December 1809 regulations that stipulated that no captain could have advanced in rank until he had served at least six years in that rank. While the service records of high-ranking British officers are described in detail, the Military Calendar offers few demographic details. For example, the record does not give either the officer’s date or place of birth, nor does it yield any supplemental information such as if the officer were married or had any offspring. Moreover, the Military Calendar was privately published in 1820 and no additional volumes were issued after that date.

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Another valuable tool in recreating the social profile of British officers who served in colonial administration are records from the East India Company. Two important documents available are the Alphabetical List of the Officers of the Indian Army published in 1838, and Vernon C. P. Hobson’s List of the officers of the Bengal Army, 1758-1832 compiled between 1927 and 1947. While the East India Company’s military service was a separate entity and not a part of the British Army, it was by its composition and structure intimately connected with the Crown and the Horse Guards. A significant number of officers who served during the Napoleonic Wars and the Regency periods came from military families who had intimate ties with the East India Company’s Army. For example, Philip VanCortlandt, an American loyalist who settled in Halisham, Sussex, sired a number of children who served as officers in either the regular army or in the East India Company Army.  

Each of the three Indian Presidencies—Bombay, Madras, and Bengal—retained military forces for both internal and external defense. British officers commanded these forces, composed of native Indian soldiers, or sepoys, and Indian non-commissioned officers. In addition to these forces, there were in each presidency a small number of exclusively European regiments officered and manned by Europeans. British regular regiments also served in India as separate and distinct units. Contemporaries argued that these European regiments, paid and maintained with Company funds, stiffened the fighting spirit of native troops.

The multiplicity and complexity of the forces in the Company’s Army fostered confusion and jealousy among its officers. Questions concerning honor, precedence, and chains of command continually plagued the army’s ability to function effectively. Advantages enjoyed

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10 For a more detailed examination of the VanCortlandt family and their military service see Chapter Six.
by the King’s regiments irked officers who served in the either the Company’s native regiments or the European regiments that did not possess such advantages. For example, a King’s officer had the power to issue orders to a Company officer of equal rank.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, officer’s pay in a King’s regiment was often higher than that of a Company officer. Nonetheless, officers who served in the Company Army were vital in assisting Crown and Company with administrative duties in India, Ceylon, and throughout the East Indies. Arthur N. Gilbert notes that despite the criticisms leveled at the Company Army by the regular Army and lawmakers in London, the Company Army was remarkably successful during its existence in exerting the authority of the East India Company and Britain on the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{13}

Sociological research by carried out by scholars such as P. E. Razzell on the Indian Army and J. A. Houlding on the eighteenth century British Army are useful in providing the researcher with significant preliminary data on the social composition of the post-Napoleonic British Army.\textsuperscript{14} Razzell, who primarily focuses his study on the social composition of officers in the Indian Army, provides valuable data templates on which to construct a social profile of a contemporaneous group. Likewise, Houlding’s authoritative study of officers offers significant research on the ancestors of the men examined in this study. Work by both these scholars provide this study with points of comparison and divergence in creating a social profile of early nineteenth century British officers as each historian examines the social origin, birthplace, rank, length of service, and social status of the officers.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{12} Cyril Henry Philips, \textit{The East India Company , 1784-1834} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961), 54.
\end{thebibliography}
Important information in reconstructing a social profile can also be gleaned from a number of secondary sources. Three significant works, all published in the early twentieth century, contribute essential information in reconstructing the lives and careers of these individuals. Charles Dalton’s *Waterloo Roll Call* (1904) is a valuable compilation of data from the relatives of officers who served at Waterloo. Dalton combined the information he had gathered with the obituary notices collected by J. W. O’Brien, formerly of the 4th Dragoon Guards.15 His work, the collection of nearly 1800 biographies, lists only those officers who participated in the Battle of Waterloo. A second work published just four years after Dalton’s study, L. Homfray Irving’s *British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812-15*, records the biographies of British and Canadian officers who served in Canada during the American War of 1812. This work, nearly identical in form and structure to Dalton’s study, was compiled from information found in Upper and Lower Canada land grant records, pay lists, appointments, promotions, militia rolls, Army Lists, petitions, returns, correspondence, military magazines, and obituaries in local newspapers.16 The third source is Colonel Robert Holden Mackenzie’s *The Trafalgar Roll Call* published in 1913. On first sight, the *Trafalgar Roll Call*, a naval action in 1805, may not appear to be relevant or connected to a study of British proconsuls, however, a small number of naval officers served in colonial administrative capacities. Moreover, a number of British Army regiments such as the 30th, 51st, 69th, and the 12th Light Dragoon regiments served as marines aboard Royal Navy ships during the Napoleonic Wars, and the biographies of these officers have been included in the roll.17 The *Trafalgar Roll* is an accurate career record of

the officers and men who participated in this seminal battle.\textsuperscript{18} The roll is invaluable in that it yields information on the birthdates, promotions, actions, and dates of death for nearly all of the officers present at the battle.

Research conducted by British antiquarian Lionel Challis is also beneficial in uncovering personal records of Napoleonic and Regency era British military officers. As British Army historian John Hall observes, Challis devoted nearly forty years of his life, from before the First World War until shortly after the Second World War, sifting through War Office records located in the Public Record Office, Kew. In 1948, Challis had compiled on note cards the service records of nearly ten thousand officers who had served in the British Army during the Peninsular War. Unfortunately, much of the card file so meticulously created by Challis was lost when the collection was moved from the Royal United Services Institution. It is unknown if most of the collection was destroyed or just mislaid. The surviving cards are now in the possession of the National Army Museum, Chelsea, and form the basis of John Hall’s \textit{History of the Peninsular War, Volume VIII: the Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808-1814} that lists the careers of officers who were killed or sustained wounds in Iberia. Hall and Challis’ work utilize a multiplicity of sources, including articles and promotion notices in \textit{The Gentleman’s Magazine} and \textit{The London Gazette}, and the already mentioned \textit{1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers}.

By employing these sources, a military record can be recreated contributing to a comprehensive social portrait of British officers. This new data pool focuses on the wider sample considering all British officers who served during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. All colonial officers originated from this pool, including chief administrative officers

and all other officers who functioned in subordinate and minor positions in both the civilian and military capacities. A random sample of 236 British officers out of a total 10,590, or 2 percent of all officers who served in the Peninsular War contribute to this survey. Officers were chosen on the basis of supplying fairly complete military records in their 1829 Statement of Retired Officers. Data parameters include all individuals who have known birthdates and birthplaces, their age when they began their military careers, wartime career information, post 1815 overseas service, and their place of residence upon retirement.

The average age of 346 surveyed officers when they entered military service was seventeen and a half years old. However, the ages of officers when they received their first commissions varied considerably. Henry Gillman was commissioned into the 27th Foot at the tender age of one year, and Andrew Brown became an officer in 1795 at 29 years when he joined the 79th Foot. The majority of these young men, 48.3 percent, were born in the period 1780-1789, while 43.1 percent were born a decade later. Officers born between 1760 and 1769 amounted to .03 percent, 7.8 percent were born in the 1770s, and .06 percent of the sample reported that their birthdates were unknown. The bulk of the surveyed officers received their first officer commissions during their late teens or early twenties. Nevertheless, on closer examination, many of these officers entered the service during a time of extraordinary national consciousness and popular patriotism. George Cruikshank, a witness to the popular spirit

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19 This data on serving British officers of the Napoleonic period comes from the Army Records Society. The society, founded in 1984 with the intent of publishing original records that describe the “development, organization, administration, and activities of the British Army.” Roger Norman Buckley cites this information in the preface of his edition of Thomas Henry Browne, The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne, 1807-1816, ed. Roger Norman Buckley (London: The Bodley Head, 1987), 3.

20 Surveyed individuals were selected randomly from among those officers who supplied the most complete Statement of Retired Officers. Information supplied was voluntary and officers who completed the form often left entire sections blank. See appendices for complete form.

21 Andrew Creach and William Farmer supplied to the Horse Guards detailed statements of service but indicated that they knew neither the place of their birth, the date of their birth, nor their age when they received their first commission.
evident during the French Revolutionary Wars and the subsequent invasion scares that threatened Britain in the first years of the nineteenth century, argues that this was a period of patriotic enthusiasm and martial volunteerism. Cruickshank notes that in 1804, that volunteers, militia, and yeomanry regiments numbered more than 300,000 infantry; 33,000 cavalry; and 8,000 artillerymen. It is during this time of popular passion that a significant number of the surveyed officers joined their regiments for the first time. Returning to the 346 officers listed in the 1829 survey eighty-four, or 24.3 percent, of the total began their military careers between 1794 and 1805. Moreover, the survey indicates that fourteen of these eighty-four noted in their service record that they joined local militia and yeomanry units before joining a regular regiment.

More than half of 236 surveyed officers who knew the place of birth were born in either in Ireland, which constituted 39 percent; or Scotland, the remaining 20 percent. Historically, the Irish and the Scots were martial races and contributed, in relationship to their population, a disproportionate number of soldiers to the British Army. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Scottish contributed a greater number of recruits. However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ireland became the primary recruiting ground for the British Army. Colley attributes Scotland’s higher proportion of military commitment to the traditional relationship that existed between the landlord and tenant. Heads of clans were frequently instrumental in raising units for defense of the realm. During the Revolutionary and the early Napoleonic period, Scots were expected to own land in order to qualify for a commission. Frequently, landlords recruited a company of men to insure a captaincy, without purchase, in the regiment. Scottish regiments

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such as the 42nd, the 73rd, the 78th, the 79th, the 91st, the 92nd, the 93rd, the 97th, the 98th, the 100th, the 109th, the 116th, the 132nd, and 133rd were recruited from ancestral lands that comprised the holdings of clan families. Diana M. Henderson in her social study of the Highland Regiments notes that among Scots there was a strong inclination to serve with men of similar background and origins.25 Nevertheless, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars attrition, retirement, and purchase erased much of regimental regional identity, particularly in Scottish regiments. A notable example was the 2nd Battalion of the 73rd (Highland) Regiment that had a complement of thirty-two officers in 1815.26 Among the twenty-three officers of the regiment who have known birthplaces, eleven of the officers were English; seven Irish; and the remaining five Scots.

Throughout the Regency period, the distinctive Highland Scottish regimental identity continued to diminish. Archivist for the National Army Museum, Stephen Wood reports, that in 1828, the 26th (1st Cameronians) about to embark for India recruited heavily in Ireland and accepted drafts from other regiments, none of them were Scots.27

Among the regiments that originated in Ireland, officer recruitment remained brisk throughout the Napoleonic and Regency periods. Peter Karsten observes that pay and adventure were the principle motivators among the Irish in joining the British military.28 Among the less affluent Irish Catholic gentry there was an additional incentive in joining the military. Acquiring an officer’s commission not only assured an Irish gentleman social acceptance, but also guaranteed a “pleasant and sensible” career that often meant food, shelter, and pay.29 For many

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29 Ibid.
Irishmen, entrance in a local militia unit paved the way for a commission in one of the many locally raised Irish regiments. For example, the 87th or the Prince of Wales’ Own Irish Regiment recruited its men and officers from the counties of Tipperary, Galway, and Clare. Among the ten officers who were included in the survey that served in the 27th or Enniskillen Regiment between 1808 and 1814, five were natives of Ireland, three—Scotland, and two—England. Donald Huffer’s research indicates that in 1829 the number of Irish officers in the 28th Regiment numbered twenty out of a total of thirty-four. The remaining nineteen came from England; two were native to Canada; and one from the island of Guernsey.  

The Midland Counties of England accounted for 9.5 percent, while 8 percent of the surveyed officers were born in the southern and Channel counties, 8.5 percent came from north Britain, and 1 percent from the Channel Islands. As noted in the previous chapter, the coastal counties of Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Sussex and Kent were exceptionally strong recruiting districts as they were most vulnerable to French attack. The recruiting strength of these counties is evidenced by an 1804 abstract of volunteers mobilized during the invasion alarm reveals that Gloucestershire contributed more than 7,256 troops, Somerset 9,291, Devon 16,395, Wiltshire 5,324, Hampshire 9,252, Sussex 7,775, and Kent 10,617. Devonshire and Kent were among the six countrywide localities that returned the highest number of volunteers. Nearly 7 percent of the surveyed officers were born in London. London, because of its size, was another significant recruiting site. In 1804, London supplied a substantial 12,460 militiamen. Of the remaining officers, 2.5 percent came from Wales and

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31 Wellington Gazette, “Abstract of the Return of All the Volunteer and Yeomanry Corps, Whose Services Were Accepted in 1804,” quoted in George Cruikshank, Pop-Gun Fired Off By George Cruikshank, 7-8.
nearly 4.5 percent were born overseas in locations as varied as Bermuda, Gibraltar, Antigua, Calcutta, and Berlin.

Forty-nine of the officers, or nearly 21 percent, of the sample were born in cities. These cities included London, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dublin, Belfast, Londonderry, Coventry, Nottingham, Chester, and Worcester. An 1801 estimate revealed that London’s population numbered 1,088,000, Liverpool’s 82,000, Manchester’s 75,000, Edinburgh’s 83,000, Glasgow’s 77,000, Coventry’s 16,000, Nottingham’s 29,000, Chester’s 15,000, and Worcester’s 11,000.32 The populations of Dublin, Belfast, and Londonderry were not collected until 1821, and then both city and county were combined into one total. Dublin reported a population 336,000, Londonderry 194,000, and Belfast 37,000.33 However, the sample numbers gathered from the 1829 retirement reports are inconsistent with those of P. E. Razzell’s study of British officers who served in the Indian Army during the same period. Razzell’s research indicates that 47 percent of the officers who went to India to serve in the East India Company’s armed forces were born in urban localities.34 Razzell observes that this overrepresentation of urban areas reveals an early nineteenth century trend of rural flight into cities because of industrialization. It may also be inferred that officers who chose military careers in the Company Army came from less prosperous urban households than those who normally sought commissions in the regular army, largely because initial costs commensurate with a Company commission were cheaper. Razzell furthermore notes that the cities in which significant officer recruitment took place were traditionally those localities that had a long

33 Ibid., 21 and 24.
history of producing officers. It is on this point that both Razzell’s study and the 1829 Statement of Retired Officer’s survey concur as the cities of London, Dublin, and Edinburgh contributed the majority of urban officers. Indeed, the Royal Barracks in Dublin was the oldest billet in Europe.\textsuperscript{35} Dublin was the birthplace of fifteen, or 6 percent, of the surveyed officers; while London supplied thirteen, or 5.5 percent. The cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow contributed five and two respectively, or 2 percent and nearly 1 percent of all city born officers.

A sizeable portion of the officers who received commissions during the Napoleonic Era came from military families who had siblings or a father who were also serving in the military. J. A. Houlding’s study of the eighteenth-century British Army observes that a significant portion, estimated at between 12-15 percent of the regimental officers, were made up of “army families,” families whose sons traditionally served in the army and possessed little wealth.\textsuperscript{36} This trend continued during and after the Napoleonic period with a substantial number of “army families” serving. Dalton lists that over one hundred of the 1,795 officers, or 5.5 percent of all of the officers at the Battle of Waterloo were the sons of military men. As previously noted, Colonel Patrick Doherty commanded the 13\textsuperscript{th} Regiment of Light Dragoons; among the regiment’s complement of junior officers were his two sons, Joseph and George. The Doherty family had long standing ties with the military and governmental service. Patrick Doherty’s uncle, John Doherty of Dublin was Chief Justice of Ireland; and another relative, H. Doherty, commanded a troop of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Hussars.\textsuperscript{37} An extreme example was that of the seven Coane brothers who all served as officers in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Four of the brothers served in the

same regiment, 73rd Regiment, while the others served in the 7th, the 19th, and the 95th regiments. Unfortunately, five of the brothers died within a ten-year span from 1809 to 1819 in conflicts around the globe. Family tradition and kinship ties encouraged the development of a patronage network within the officer corps that aided many career officers who entered the army without the benefit of birth and income up the ladder of promotion.

The British officer corps of the Napoleonic era was a social mélange that encompassed a variety of classes. One of the great stereotypes of this period is that a substantial portion of the British officer corps came from the ranks of the nobility. Many scholars believe that titled aristocrats were over-represented in the Napoleonic British Army. Historians Michael Glover and Philip Haythornthwaite mention that this misconception is still widely held by many reputable intellectuals. Glover even quotes an unnamed twentieth-century American historian who referred to the Napoleonic British Army as “aristocratic and coming almost entirely from the landed gentry.”

Even the respected Napoleonic historian Gunther Rothenberg subscribed to this notion commenting that “the British army … essentially retained its eighteenth century character. Officers were neither skilled professionals nor, with rare exceptions, dedicated idealists; they were representatives of the English upper classes ….” However, the British Army of the Napoleonic period contained relatively few aristocrats. Unlike contemporary continental states, very few peers or sons of peers served as officers in the British army during

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38 Lieutenant Montgomery Coane, 19th Regiment, died of fatigue during the Mahrattas Campaign in 1806; Lieutenant James Coane, 7th Regiment, died in 1809; Lieutenant Alexander Coane of the 95th Regiment died in 1812 during the Peninsular Campaign; Ensign William Conyngham Coane, 73rd Regiment; drowned in Colombo harbor, January 1817; and Major Anthony Coane was killed in 1819 during the Sinhalese Kandyan War. See Alan Lagden and John Sly, 2/73rd At Waterloo (Brightlingsea, Essex: n.p., 1998), 38-9; and Charles Dalton, The Waterloo Roll Call, 185-88.


the Georgian and Regency periods. Richard Holmes observes that the reason that aristocrats never dominated Britain’s army was that there were relatively few peers in the kingdom. Holmes notes that there were fewer than 500 British peers in the kingdom. Dividing the junior sons of these peers equally among the army, navy, government, and church would leave a relatively small number of each in any one group. A Guards Regiment, the elite of the British Army, in both recruits and officers would theoretically have a high proportion of men of birth as officers. An 1812 survey of officers of the Coldstream Guards, one of the three guard infantry regiments of the British Army, revealed that only five out of a muster roll of forty-seven officers, or 11 percent, were either titled or the sons of titled fathers.41 The 1st Division of Wellington’s Peninsular Army was given the sobriquet “the Gentleman’s Sons” by the enlisted men because this division contained a majority of Foot Guards regiments. However, in all of the guards there were few aristocratic officers. Dalton reports that at Waterloo, the 1st and 2nd Life Guard Regiments contained only two titled peers or the sons of peers, the Hon. Edward P. Lygon, fourth son of Edward Lygon, Baron and Earl of Beauchamp; and the Hon. Henry Edward Irby, the second son of Baron Boston.42 Even in the exclusive Royal Regiment of Horse Guards (the Blues) the number of peers is astoundingly small. Three of the twenty-five officers, or 12 percent of the regiment’s officers were titled peers.43

Charles Oman, the famed chronicler of Wellington’s Peninsular Army, may be responsible for the widespread belief that the British Army of the period contained a disproportionate number of aristocrats. Oman’s Liberal Party views on the practice of purchasing officers’ commissions significantly influenced his seminal study of the early

43 Ibid., 51.
nineteenth-century British Army. In his 1902 study, *Wellington's Army*, he insinuated that the wealthy and influential had unscrupulously acquired a majority of officer commissions at the expense of more qualified but socially inferior candidates. Oman’s suppositions concerning the perceived unfairness of the purchase system were grounded in two erroneous assumptions: that the purchase system was inherently evil and subject to manipulation, and that the social makeup of the late Victorian and early Edwardian office corps of Oman’s time was similar to that of Wellington’s day. Oman misrepresented the purchase process, ignoring the fact that the British Army operated on a seniority system and overemphasized the importance of patronage among company grade officers. Recent historical analysis of the system by J. H. Bassett, Richard Holmes, and Richard Blanco has proven Oman’s assertion to be simplistic and misleading.

The purchase system usually served the British Army well during its almost 300 years of existence. The practice was beneficial to both the army and the state because it fostered regimental corporateness, and it relieved the state from having to apportion large sums of money for officers’ retirement pensions. From their inception, British regiments were the property of the commanding colonel, and by association, subordinate officers also shared in that ownership. In many ways, British regiments of the Stuart and early Georgian periods were similar to a medieval guild, in that officers became members of an elite and restricted brotherhood that took great pride in their trade and were loyal to their leader. The British state accepted the system because of Parliament’s historical proclivity to inadequately fund the army. The funds secured through the process of purchase provided retired officers pensions, thus relieving the state of the

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need to apportion substantial sums of money for that purpose. Furthermore, a portion of officers purchase fees supplied the state with the money required for the maintenance of the army’s hospital in Chelsea. Parliament also saw the system as a means for limiting the army’s size to a small collection of regiments that were incapable of threatening the civil power.\(^{47}\) By its nature, purchase severely limited the number of eligible officers and ensured an elite corps based on wealth. Parliament, through the adoption of the purchase system acquired a method of supplying officers to the army that was both inexpensive and politically reliable.

The process of purchase is also beneficial for modern scholars in ascertaining the financial well being of these officers, thereby adding another dimension to their social profile. As Hew Strachan observed, “it was not birth that dictated the grant of commissions, so much as the wealth to purchase (a commission) and to provide an income (while serving in the military).”\(^{48}\) Judging the economic condition of these Napoleonic era officers is extremely difficult given the lack of hard data available. However, important and significant clues are accessible in determining if the officer candidate, or his family, had sufficient cash necessary to acquire a commission. Regulated commission purchase prices in the British Army were established during the reign of George II by the Royal Warrant of 1719-20.\(^{49}\) Commission prices were considerable, with cavalry and guards commissions fetching substantial amounts more than line infantry regiments. Artillery and engineer commissions were considered technical services and not subject to purchase. Fixed commission prices prior to 1821 stipulated that, in the infantry, an ensign paid £400, a lieutenant £550, a captain £1,500, a major £2,600, and a

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 2.


lieutenant colonel £3,500 for their commission.\textsuperscript{50} In the cavalry a cornet was expected to pay £735, a lieutenant £997 10s., a captain £2,782 10s., a major £3,882 10s., and a lieutenant colonel £4,982 10s.\textsuperscript{51} These were substantial amounts and officers frequently requested and received more than the stipulated price for the more senior and prestigious regiments despite laws that prohibited “cashiering” or selling commissions above the regulation price.\textsuperscript{52} Scrupulous officers, however, followed regulations as evidenced by a July 1807 letter from Lieutenant Alexander Bruce to Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley requesting permission to sell his commission in the 33\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment notes that “Should the King be pleased to permit the sale…upon the word and honour of an officer and a gentleman, that he has not and will not demand or accept, at any time, or in any manner whatever, more than the sum of five hundred and fifty pounds, this being the price fixed by the King’s regulation as the full value of the commission.”\textsuperscript{53}

The mechanics of purchase were simple. Each regiment required a fixed number of officers. A young man who desired to become an officer would deposit a fixed sum of money with an agent with which to buy his commission. The agency would then hold the money until a regimental vacancy was found in either a regiment of cavalry or infantry. Vacancies in regiments followed a strict seniority system. When an officer retired, resigned, or died, that regimental slot would become vacant. Officers within the regiment, according to their seniority, would then be permitted, if they could afford it, to purchase the next vacant slot above their rank while selling their former rank to the individual immediately below them. If the officer could not afford the purchase price of the next highest rank, then the officer immediately below in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{50} Donald B. M. Huffer, “The Infantry Officers of the Line of the British Army, 1815-1868,” 34.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{53} WP1/173/78 Letter from Lieutenant A. Bruce to Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, applying for permission to sell his commission in the Thirty Third Regiment of Foot, 18 Jul 1807.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
seniority would be given the opportunity to purchase it. In theory every officer in the regiment below the departing officer would move up a notch.

During the late Georgian and Regency periods, the principle agency for securing commissions was Greenwood and Cox. However, other agencies existed, such as the firms of Ross and Olgivie, and the Dublin based Borough, Armit, and Co. These agencies fulfilled a number of essential functions for both the commissioned officers and the government.

According to a 1798 report by the Deputy Secretary at War to a Parliamentary Committee of Finance, the duties of an accredited agent were:

To apply for, receive, disburse, and account for public money advanced to him under general regulations or by particular orders. He is the ordinary channel of communications between the Regiment and the Public Departments and is resorted to not only providing and forwarding of arms, clothing, and other regimental supplies but also in the business, public or private, of the individual officers.\(^{54}\)

The agencies acted as the regiment’s accountant and saw to it that each officer received his pay. Most importantly, these firms acted in a fashion similar to that of a modern business “headhunter” that searches for and secures qualified candidates for employment in large corporations. The Barrett Group, a leading Internet “headhunting” service advertises that it is a career management firm assisting the professional in finding the ideal job that maximizes career potential.\(^{55}\) Similarly, these regimental agencies received a purchase deposit and then searched a variety of infantry and cavalry regiments for vacancies. For example, in December 1813, Lieutenant George Hennell, an officer in the 43\(^{rd}\) Regiment, wrote to his brothers asking them to inquire at the agency of Greenwood and Cox into the possibility of exchanging his commission for a commission in a more senior regiment. In the letter, Hennell explained:

I will now state my principle reasons for intending to come home. As our

\(^{54}\) PRO, W.O. 12/4036.

1st batt. is only 650 or 700 strong and 2nd batt. only about 200, the oldest & most experienced officers say that there is no doubt that, in case of a peace, the officers of the 2nd batt., would have to go on half-pay & it was thought by most [that] I might get an exchange into another regiment for £100 or £150 or I might get into a single batt. regiment & then I should not go on half-pay. There are some powerful reasons why an exchange would be desirable. If we go home the principal is that in England we should be obliged to live at great expense. Think over the exchange & if you approve of it, go to Greenwood and Cox & see who wish to get into the 43rd & leave your address to receive proposals for an exchange, advising me of what you are doing.56

In addition to the cash payment, the prospective officer candidate needed to furnish a letter of recommendation to the War Office from a serving military officer at the rank of major or above confirming that the petitioning aspirant was of a good character.57 Sir William M. Gomm observes that he received an ensigncy in the 6th Regiment through the “zealous intervention” of Colonel Fisher shortly after his father’s demise in combat at Pont-à-l’être, Guadeloupe.58 Recommendations by senior officers ensured that officers entrusted with command of the military remained politically reliable, as it limited entry to those who benefited by the status quo. As Wellington noted, “It brings into service men of fortune and education—men who have some connection with the interests and fortune of the country …”59 Additionally, commissioned officers were required to prove that they were literate; a determinant that the applicant was a “gentleman.” This condition was the great dividing line before the advent of widespread education. Education was the determinant, although the extent and quality of the officer applicant’s education would vary considerably. Gentlemen fortunate enough to possess a thorough education tended to advance through the ranks more rapidly.60 Officer candidates who

60 Men of high birth or destined for business or university received an education grounded in the
came from Scotland, where the public education system was more advanced than the rest of
Britain, found it easier to rise in the ranks than officers from other ethnic groups.

Beside purchase, young men could acquire a commission by other means. Britain’s
nearly twenty-five year conflict with France during Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods
required the British War Office to offer to all qualified takers subaltern commissions without the
benefit of purchase. Glover estimated that during the Peninsular War manpower demands were
responsible for the fact that 80.5 percent of all British Army first commissions were non-
purchased.61 Wartime attrition caused the normally prestigious Guards and cavalry regiments to
even offer non-purchased commissions to acceptable applicants.62 Figures culled from the
promotion lists published in the London Gazette between 1810 and 1813 indicated that in the
cavalry 54.9 percent of the commissions were acquired without purchase. In the infantry the
percentage was a striking 82.3 percent. Hart’s Army List for 1810 revealed that of the fifty
officers on active service with the 16th Regiment of Dragoons, non-purchase officers held eleven

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61 Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army in the Peninsula, 1808-1814 (New York: Hippocrene Books Inc.,
1977), 44.

62 Glover, citing promotion figures for the entire army between 1810-1813, found that only two
commissions in ten were purchased. See Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army in the Peninsula, 1808-1814 (New
commissions. Three years later, in 1813, during the height of the British involvement in the Peninsular War, all sixteen ensigns of the 43rd Light Infantry Regiment held non-purchased commissions. Moreover, in the same regiment, seven lieutenants received promotions to the rank of captain without purchase. At the Battle of Waterloo, of the twenty-eight officers serving in the 2nd Battalion of the 73rd Regiment, nine of the officers received commissions without purchase, while four others apparently became officers by means other than purchase.

Young men wishing to become officers but unable to come up with the price of purchase could turn to other means to acquire a military commission. One method was to become a “volunteer” in a regiment. While there was no apparent regulation concerning volunteers, Oman notes that in addition to the regiment’s regular composition of officers, each battalion frequently had one or two “volunteers” who served with the unit. These men, probationers, were allowed to serve with an active service battalion on the chance of being gazetted to it without purchase. While in service, these men carried muskets and served in the ranks but wore uniforms of superior quality and messed with the officers. Moreover, volunteers drew no pay and were required to contribute the mandatory sixpence for their mess rations. Glover estimates that during the Peninsular War period 4.5 percent of all serving British officers gained their first commissions as volunteers. George Hennell, the son of a Coventry ribbon manufacturer of moderate means, began his military career as a volunteer in the 94th Regiment. During the storming of Badajoz, his gallantry brought him to the attention of Major-General Thomas Picton, who appointed him ensign in the 43rd Light Infantry, one of the more illustrious units in the British Army. In addition, Joseph Dowling’s military record reveals that his father, “a

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64 Charles Oman, Wellington’s Army, 1809-1814 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 196.
impecunious Latin teacher” could not afford to purchase his son a commission, embarked for Portugal as a volunteer in the 42nd Regiment.66

Aspiring officers could also obtain a non-purchased commission if they could recruit a significant number of enlisted men. An 1804 directive stipulated that twenty-one recruits were required to gain an ensigncy, twelve to gain a promotion from ensign to lieutenant, forty-five from lieutenant to captain, ninety from captain to major, and eighty-two from major to lieutenant colonel.67 In this case, directives stipulated that men recruited were to be mustered into a new battalion within an existing regiment. Moreover, recruiting officers could only recruit for the regiment in which they served and they could only gain one step in promotion no matter how many soldiers they enlisted. Personal records for Lieutenant John Acres and Lieutenant Richard Leyne of the 73rd Regiment revealed that they both procured commissions in this fashion.

Richard Leyne, born in 1790, was the eldest of son of Dr. Maurice Leyne of Tralee, Co. Kerry. He was unable to purchase a commission but recruited a number of troops from the militia thus acquiring a lieutenancy.68 Dalton notes that Leyne encouraged 400 Kerry Co. militiamen to enlist in the regulars but this number appears suspect and the actual figure was probably closer to forty as suggested by his rewarded commission.69 Leyne fought at Waterloo before transferring to the 58th Regiment and serving a number of years in New South Wales.

In 1814, the British Army contained 10,590 officers on full pay. Extant records also indicate that a significant majority of these officers came from middle class families. Scott Hughes Myerly observes that many of these officers were men without the benefit of family or income. Aristocratic elites who held senior commands in the military feared that a change in the

66 Alan Lagden and John Sly, The 2/73 At Waterloo, 58.
68 Alan Lagden and John Sly, The 2/73 At Waterloo, 125.
perceived social balance within the military command structure would have far-reaching consequences for the state. A March 31, 1820 letter from the Duke of Cumberland to King George IV expressed a fear that a substantial number of officers in positions of command were no longer members of the aristocracy. Cumberland wrote, “Many of the generals and principal officers with whom I am in daily habits agree with me, that was good and necessary in 1813 to 1815 ought to have ceased after the War, as it was only calculated for the necessity of the times, but this was not done & under false pretences that formation (the army) was made subservient to the worst of objects namely making the army useless, and employing a class of men for officers, who were never intended for such a profession….” Writing more than forty years later, Charles Clode argued that the traditional makeup of the army consisted of two distinct social classes, the rank and file recruited from the lower classes, and the men who command them “intrusted to the higher class.” Clode further notes that only during the Commonwealth period did this separation blur with disastrous consequences for both the army and the state. Many influential Britons found the idea of placing middle class individuals into positions of command unsettling. There were inherent dangers in granting the privilege of military command to members of an inferior social class. Political stability required that military officers be drawn from members of a sound and reliable social stratum who had more to lose than gain from domestic turmoil. Memories of the Cromwell’s Commonwealth offered reliable proof that the military’s involvement in the state’s politics was to be avoided. Few Britons wished to repeat the Cromwellian experience of rule by a military elite that could contain social inferiors. However, a nearly twenty-five year global war against France upset the perceived status quo within the

army. By experiencing a national emergency of unprecedented scale, the British Army commissioned an unprecedented number of middle class officers.

The social makeup of the army had changed dramatically during the late Georgian and Regency periods. Employing status group categories established by Burke’s Peerage, and Ian Worthington’s research, the officer corps of the British Army in the first decades of the nineteenth century comprised three distinct groups: the aristocracy, the landed gentry, and a residual collection encompassing members of the middle class. Between the years of 1805 to 1835, the aristocracy comprised 5 percent of the officer corps, while 19 percent descend from the landed gentry, and the remaining 76 percent came from the middle class. Furthermore, Holding notes that this shift in social composition of the army was already occurring during the eighteenth century. He observes that after 1715, British officers came from four specific groups: the nobility and landed gentry, lesser gentry and professional men, foreigners, mainly Huguenots, and non-commissioned officers who because of age or ability were awarded commissions. Of the second category, Houlding notes that a great majority of the regimental officers were men drawn from the ranks of the lesser gentry, professional men, successful tradesmen, the minor clergy, and yeoman farmers. Their distinctive characteristics were lack of birth, money, and influential patrons, or as an officer of this class described himself as “a private Gentleman without the advantage of Birth and friends.” Nonetheless, this group was able to accumulate through association powerful patrons who readily assisted them in rising socially.

The term “middle class” is problematic when discussing Georgian and Regency British society. Scholars of British social history rarely agree on a single comprehensive definition. E.

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73 J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service, 104.
P. Thompson divided eighteenth-century British society into patricians and plebeians.\textsuperscript{74} Frank O’Gorman refers to the British middle class as “the middling orders” and claimed that this group consisted of professional men, merchants, and tradesman.\textsuperscript{75} O’Gorman, however found this classification inclusive as it embraced and extremely broad range of British society. Another difficulty O’Gorman discovered in trying to fit the middle class in a specific category was the failure of this group to realize that they did indeed comprise a class. Individually they were aware of their social status and proud of their independence, but collectively they were unaware of their class identity. Elizabeth Marshall preferred to use the term “middling sort” rather than middle class, as there was no clear consensus of how to define this group. According to her, this assembly consisted of those families whose income came from a non-manual occupation “who by way of life or attitude had no claims to ranked with the gentry.”\textsuperscript{76} Eighteenth-century statistician, Joseph Massie calculated social status by estimated annual income.\textsuperscript{77} Massie’s calculations yielded the following income ranges for members of the British middle class.

Among the upper-middle class there were an estimated 52,000 families, who had annual incomes of between £60 and £600. The middle or core group consisted of 317,500 families. This assemblage had an income of between £40 and £400 per annum. An additional 246,000 families comprised the lower-middle class. These families had yearly incomes of between £60 and £22 6s. Samuel Boswell’s 1760 treatise “Scheme of Living” noted that a person could live comfortably in London on a yearly income of £157. Therefore, upper and middle-income families of the “middling sort” who had incomes of £100 or more per annum lived well.

\textsuperscript{75} Frank O’Gorman, \textit{The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History, 1688-1832} (London: Arnold, 1997), 16.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
However, those who had incomes in the lower income bracket were unable to purchase many incidental items, but they were able to exist being able to afford the necessities of life such as food and shelter.

Nevertheless, it is important to determine specific identifiers that describe the middle class during the late Georgian and Regency periods. Even the term “middle class” may not be fitting for our subjects. The term “middling sort” may be more suitable then the label “middle class,” as this term invokes connotations more appropriate for the mid-nineteenth century. Eric Hobsbawm writes that the middle class was a product of the time between the “dual revolutions” of 1789 and 1848. If this were the case, then those members of British society who displayed middle class characteristics during the time period in question would be in the developmental stage. This assessment concurs with the viewpoint of Paul Deschamps, who argues that the British middle-class of the late eighteenth century consisted of those families in the process of rising socially. Subscribing to this argument, it can be claimed that British “middling sort” families were on the cusp of this transition, but had not yet achieved their goal until the mid-decades of the nineteenth century. It is therefore, premature to refer to this amorphous class as a “middle class,” and I choose instead to refer to this social group as a nascent middle class or, a more preferred term, “the middling sort.”

What then did make a Briton a member of the “middling sort?” What characteristics differentiated this group from both the aristocracy and the common laborer? Two criteria define the “middling sort” as a distinct and separate social group. First, members of this order needed to be literate. Literacy was the determinate for an officer’s commission. It also signified that the

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individual came from social fabric superior to that of a common laborer. Thompson notes that it was not until decades after the Napoleonic Wars that the lower orders of British society began to receive some rudimentary instruction in “the Three R’s.” Linda Colley estimates that in 1830 some 6,000 charities and Sunday schools provided instructions for 1,400,000 children of the poor.\(^80\) During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a significant number of company grade officers received their first commissions. These officers came from families with enough income and status to privately educate their children in the fundamentals of reading and writing. Sir Harry Smith begins his autobiography by observing that he received his education from the Rev. George Burgess, the curate of St. Mary’s Whittlesey. Smith notes that he was one of eleven children and that his father took great pains to see that he [Harry] was educated in natural philosophy, the classics, algebra, and music.\(^81\) If these families did not have the necessary income to send their children to school, they frequently had sufficient learning to educate them themselves. Indeed, there exist a number of examples where the fathers of these officer aspirants had sufficient education to educate their offspring. Returning to the available personnel records of officers of the 2\(^{nd}\) Battalion of the 73\(^{rd}\) Regiment, six of the twenty-five, or 24 percent of the company grade officers had fathers who were professional men. Two such officers, Captain Alexander Robertson and Lieutenant Joseph Dowling had fathers who were teachers.

Second, members of the “middling sort” required a sufficient amount of money to outfit themselves in a manner appropriate as officers. Enough cash was necessary so that a new officer could purchase the necessary uniform and equipment commensurate to his rank. Furthermore, all officers during this period were required to pay for their mess expenses, which depending on

\(^80\) Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 226.
the regiment could be somewhat expensive. Table A.15 details the estimated expenses of John Patterson of the 50th Regiment. As Scott Hughes Myerly observed, an officer’s uniform and kit could well absorb the first year’s pay. Scott Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle, 2.

Charles Booth of the 52nd Regiment wrote that his uniform and kit, including a sword cost £57 18s. 6d. Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army, 43.

Additionally, Robert Knowles upon entering the Royal Fusiliers reportedly paid £ 45 15s. 0d. for his uniform.

A profile of the typical company grade officer who entered British service during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and then continued their army career after the conclusion of the wars in 1815 can now be pieced together. These officers were young, with a substantial majority of them entering service in their late teens, their median age being seventeen and a half years when they received their first commission. More than half of these men were either Irish or Scots. However, by 1815, officers born in Ireland outstripped all other ethnicities entering the British Army. Furthermore, the typical company grade officer came from rural areas; although officers from urban areas were making significant inroads as London, Dublin, and Edinburgh all contributed a substantial number of officer candidates. The characteristic officer most likely had blood relations serving in the military. Holding’s research and data from British regimental indicate that at least one quarter of all officers had kin serving in the military. Family kinship ties were a factor in the development of a sophisticated patronage system within the army that assisted junior officers up the promotion ladder. Our archetypical officer was born into a “middling sort” family, whose father was either professional man, clergyman, or a merchant engaged in trade. All of these families were able to provide their children with a rudimentary education. While being self sufficient, these families had little additional funds in which to buy first-time commissions for their sons. In the case of a significant number of Irish

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82 Scott Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle, 2.
83 Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army, 43.
officers, a military career meant food, shelter, and continuous pay. Glover’s research reveals that during the Peninsular War purchase accounted for one in five first commissions. With this being the case, the average company grade officer received his first-commission without purchase, either by direct appointment to a regiment, as a volunteer, or as a result of recruiting a prescribed number of enlisted men. Additionally, wartime attrition necessitated a constant demand for officers. Commissioned military service was a means to advance socially. Middle class families sought commissions for their children in the hope that distinguished military service would allow them entrance into the ranks of the gentry and the nobility. The company grade officers who fought for Britain during the Napoleonic Wars and then went on to serve the empire in either a military or civilian capacity were, in essence, a very young Irishman or Scotsman raised in rural areas by a family of professionals who has little financial wealth. A military career appeared to be a sterling opportunity for rising socially and becoming financially secure.

Another aspect in reconstructing these officers’ careers is tracing their military service. Wartime service and the personal relationships they established with their superiors and brother officers significantly influenced the course of their careers. In many instances, the Peninsular War and its concurrent conflicts provided these young men with an opportunity to achieve social status. These conflicts also joined company grade officers into a bond of brotherhood that was forged through the rigors of campaign and combat. Evidence indicates that these wartime relationships would prove highly beneficial in providing these officers with postwar employment.

84 Ibid., 44.
85 The Wars of Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars were truly global conflicts. Fighting occurred not only in Europe but also in Asia (India), Africa, (the Cape Colony), South America (Buenos Aires), and North America (Canada and the continental United States). For an overview of these far-flung theaters of war see Paul Fergosi, Dreams of Empire: Napoleon and the First World War, 1792-1815 (New York: A Birch Lane Press Book, 1990).
opportunities in the colonies in either a combat or administrative capacity. Relationships forged during the wars with France significantly benefited these officers. All of the 236 officers in our sample served at one time or another in the Peninsula. This is not unusual as some 10,000 British officers served in Portugal, Spain and southern France between 1808-1814.86

British Army regimental records indicate that almost every regiment in the army served at one time or another, in this theater of operations, David Gates notes that between 1808 and 1814 the War Office sent to Iberia fifty-one regiments of line infantry, three regiments of guards, fifteen regiments of cavalry, the Life Guard and Household cavalry.87 Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver’s extensive research reveals further that eighty-six battalions from these fifty-four infantry regiments served in the Peninsula.88 In normal wartime circumstances the War Office would assign one battalion of a regiment to overseas service while keeping a second battalion in Britain for home defense or as a depot unit accepting replacements. However, as the demand for manpower grew the second battalion would be sent out subsequently creating the need for a third and fourth battalion. Frequently, the same regiment might have a number of battalions serving in many far-flung theaters. An extreme example of this was case of the 60th Loyal American Regiment that during the period 1808 to 1809 had its 1st battalion posted to the West Indies, the 2nd battalion deployed in the Peninsula, the 3rd battalion also in the West Indies,

86 This number is based on John Hall’s extensive research of the surviving Lionel Challis data. See John Hall, A History of the Peninsular War: the Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808-1814, Vol. 8 (London: Greenhill, 1998), 7-8.
88 During the late Georgian period, nearly all peacetime British infantry regiments consisted of only one battalion. The only exception was the 60th Royal American Regiment that fielded eight battalions (the 9th and 10th battalions were planned but were only cadres when the Napoleonic Wars ended). However, when Britain went to war with France in 1803 infantry regiments increased their complements by two, three, and even four battalions. For example, the 95th Regiment (the Rifles) consisted of three battalions, the 1st Regiment contained four battalions, while the 2nd, 20th, 29th, 33rd, 46th, 49th, 51st, 65th 68th, 70th, 85th, 94th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, and 105th comprised only a single battalion. See Richard Partidge and Michael Oliver, The Napoleonic Army Handbook: the British Army and her Allies (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1999), 55-85.
its 4th battalion posted to the Cape Colony, the 5th served in North America, and the 6th battalion garrisoned Jamaica. Furthermore, a number of these regiments also saw active service in many other important subsidiary theaters such as India, the West Indies, and Canada. The wartime career of Sir Harry Smith provides an excellent example as he saw combat with the 95th Regiment in three different theaters of war: South America, Europe, and North America.89

It is evident from Table A.16 that a significant portion of the British Army saw periodic service in the Peninsula, especially during the period of 1808-1814. Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and the subsequent popular insurrection offered the British an excellent opportunity to strike directly at the French by sending an army to Iberia. As Charles Esdaile notes in his excellent history of the Peninsular War, Britain, because of the smallness of its army, was initially confined to a wartime policy of striking at France through blockade, colonial aggrandizement, and financial and material subsidies to their allies.90 By committing an army in Spain in 1808, Britain accomplished a twofold course of action that confronted French armies directly and also allayed any suspicions Britain’s allies may have had concerning its commitment to its coalition partners. The charts also reveal that in the early years of the Napoleonic Wars, the focus of British strategic policy remained fixed on concentrating a substantial numbers of troops in specific global areas, particularly India, the West Indies, and the Mediterranean. As war progressed Britain’s strategic focus evolved from colonial cherry picking expeditions to that of confronting France, her allies, and cobelligerents in Spain, the Low Countries, North America, and the West Indies. The charts, however, do not reveal that because of its limited manpower, Britain was forced to move regiments and battalions from theater to theater, especially during the

period 1812-1815. For example, the 77th Foot served from 1813 to 1814 in the Peninsula, and then transferred to North America in 1814 to 1815. Likewise, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Foot was posted in the Mediterranean from 1806 to 1814 and then moved west to North America in 1814-1815.

What is less evident is how particular wartime service in major theaters of operations affected officers in their ability in securing postwar careers in a much-reduced army. Did the officers who served in other subsidiary and less notable theaters have the similar career prospects and opportunities as those who served in the primary theater with Wellington in Spain? Examining the postwar careers among both general and company grade officers who served in Iberia provide some clues. Moreover, further claims are possible when comparing the postwar service careers of Peninsular officers with those officers who were posted in other theaters. Did the postwar careers of officers suffer because they were posted on the peripheries of the empire such as North America, the West Indies, or India? Did those officers who served with Wellington in the Peninsula receive preferential treatment when seeking postwar colonial appointments?

Between 1808 and 1814, more than one hundred general officers and colonels served as brigade and divisional commanders in Wellington’s Peninsular Army. Postwar correspondence by many of these officers indicates that a number of them solicited Wellington’s assistance in securing overseas colonial employment.91 It appears that among these gentlemen that patronage was an important factor, but was only one facet in securing a colonial position. Wellington’s influence and patronage frequently assisted officers in their careers but the Duke’s ire could also derail a promising career. For example, Sir William Houstoun, who commanded the 7th Division

91 Letters soliciting employment in the colonies can be found in a significant amount of Wellington’s correspondence. See University of Southampton, Wellington Papers.
at Fuentes D’Onoro, ran afoul of Wellington. Houstoun saw his post war career seriously hampered, settling for a post as lieutenant governor of Gibraltar in 1831. Perhaps the most convincing evidence concerning Wellington’s use of patronage and influence in securing postwar colonial appointments for his Peninsular companions is found in Lieutenant General John Wood’s correspondence to Lord Glenelg. In an October 6, 1835, letter, Wood complains that despite honorable service his posting on the peripheries and absence in the Peninsula and at Waterloo kept him outside of Wellington’s network and deprived him of a postwar civil governorship.\footnote{Public Record Office, C.O. 201/251 f. 529 Lieutenant General John Sullivan Wood to Lord Glenelg. Moreover, examination of Wood’s military service indicates that he served primarily in secondary theaters of war. In the 1790s, he served in Ireland and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, his unit, the Eighth Light Dragoons, spent twelve years posted in India. At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Wood fought with distinction in the Nepalese War (1814-16). See Frederic Boase, Modern English Biography, containing many thousand concise memoirs of persons who have died between the years 1851-1900 with an index of the most interesting matter, Vol. III, R-Z. (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1965), 1471; and United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book (London: A.J. Valpy, 1820), 14.}

Despite these instances some inferences can be offered concerning the post-war careers of these officers. Of the ninety-seven divisional and brigade officers surveyed, (Table A.17) 10 percent, were either Hanoverian or Portuguese officers and therefore not subject to post-war employment in colonial service.\footnote{During the Napoleonic Wars, French forces occupied the Kingdom of Hanover. Hanoverian officers and troops in exile were formed into units called the King’s German Legion or KGL. These capable forces fought primarily in Spain, often being brigaded with regular British Forces under the command of either British general officers or German officers.} Furthermore, seventeen or 17.5 percent, died during the Napoleonic Wars, victims of either combat or disease. There were also six obscure individuals, whose careers could not be fully reconstructed, constituting 6 percent of the group. The careers of eighty-one officers remained to be examined for evidence that Peninsular War service proved beneficial in helping them secure post-war overseas colonial employment.

Two revealing and striking characteristics emerge from this surveyed group. Of the eighty-one, the overwhelming majority, sixty-nine or 85 percent of them, held combat
commands as evidenced by their service and wound pension records. Indeed, a striking thirty-one, or 32 percent, of these brigade or divisional commanders were wounded in action. If this total is added to those nineteen who were killed, the total casualty number rises to nearly 53 percent loss rate among Wellington’s divisional and brigade commanders. As Rory Muir observes, senior commanders of the Napoleonic period led from the front, as personal bravery under fire was a required prerequisite for instilling faith and trust among their subordinates and soldiers. Many of the officers who held combat commands also served at one time or another in staff positions. These positions included staff officers in the adjutant or quartermaster general’s office, barrack masters, storekeepers department, aides de camp, or as instructors of military theory and tactics. Staff duties included administrative or logistical duties such as enforcing army discipline, managing requests for leave and promotion, planning march routes, securing quarters, handling pay and rations, dealing with civilian authorities, and collecting intelligence. Twenty-four, or nearly one third, of Wellington’s senior officers served in this capacity. When a British officer attained general rank, it was assumed by both society and the state that he should be well versed in staff duties commensurate with administrative tasks. Charles Clode, in his study of the army, noted that officers must be qualified by education, prudence, and other (unspecified) qualities to perform administrative duties. As he observed,

\textsuperscript{94} Some of the individuals, such as Major General Samuel Venables Hinde and Major General Alexander Campbell witnessed naval combat as they both served in regiments attached to the Royal Navy acting as marines. See United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Containing the Services and Progress of Promotion of the Generals, Lieutenant-Generals, Major-Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Majors of the Army, According to Seniority; with Details of the Principal Military Events of the Last Century in five volumes. London: A.J. Valpy, 1820., Vol. III, no. 518, 336; and Vol. II, no. 272, 406-10.

\textsuperscript{95} Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1998), 153.


\textsuperscript{97} Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, 158.
“When he [the general officer] attains the rank of General Officer he must be qualified to fill the post of a Governor of a Province. He must manage a Legislature; he must perform the most difficult and arduous functions of Government which can be entrusted to any Subject, if he means to be a candidate for the situation of Colonel of a Regiment.”

Colonel Harry Smith who served in a staff capacity in the Peninsula, North America, and Waterloo, reported that a staff officer assigned to an army, division, or a brigade performed a number of logistical, administrative, organizational, and command duties. During the 1815 Waterloo Campaign, Smith, the Assistant Quartermaster General for the 6th Division, wrote that he “reconnoitered the country and prepared to conduct the troops” for his commander, Major-General Sir John Lambert, just prior to the battle.

Therefore, officers who occupied staff positions during the Napoleonic Wars and its concurrent conflicts were well qualified to perform those civilian duties that corresponded to that of a magistrate or lord-lieutenant of a colony or county.

Evidence gathered from the above survey suggests that there is a direct correlation between prior staff experience and postwar colonial administrative positions. Nearly 83 percent of all officers who held divisional or brigade commands in the Peninsula had some familiarity with staff duties such as aides-de-camp, brigade-majors, adjutant, and quartermaster officers. Among these officers who functioned in a staff capacity, thirty-five, or 36 percent went on to hold either colonial administrative positions or colonial military commands.

Many senior staff officers who did not pursue a postwar colonial career entered politics. Eight Peninsular division

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101 For the purpose of this study I have included military and administrative positions in Ireland as colonial positions. While not technically a colony, contemporary correspondence indicates that job seekers viewed Ireland in the same light as positions in the colonies.
and brigade officers became members of Parliament after leaving active military service.

However, staff experience, while important, was not the only critical qualification necessary in securing a post-war colonial administrative position. Birth and political predilection also played a significant role in securing these coveted positions.

The importance of birth among senior British commanders cannot be overemphasized. As Colley notes, Britain’s twenty-five year struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was primarily an ideological struggle between England’s traditional societal status quo and the threat of French style egalitarianism. Britain’s established social order encouraged domestic stability and promoted economic growth. Key to this order was the ownership of land, which conveyed both prestige and political rights. Social and propertied elites of Britain considered it necessary to retain power and maintain social order in the face of French inspired revolutionary social engineering. Because of this perceived threat, senior military officers were selected from members of a responsible and politically reliable social class who had more to lose than gain from domestic turmoil. In 1869, Clode echoed this same sentiment, an opinion voiced on previous occasions by members of Parliament that included Sir Robert Walpole, Lord Holland, Charles J. Fox, Lord Folkstone, and Lord Palmerston. Consequently, appointments to colonial administrative posts rewarded senior officers from landed elites for prior distinguished service and also assured that overseas possessions remained loyal and secure. As David Cannadine argues, post-Napoleonic colonial administrators sought to create full-scale replicas of a graded social hierarchy they had left behind at home. European elites who administered

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102 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 150.
colonies frequently collaborated with likeminded local native elites in perpetuating graded societies. Parliament found that providing overseas administrative positions to members of their own social standing was an expedient and relatively cost effective means of rewarding them for distinguished service. As Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, revealed in 1833 Parliamentary hearings, senior officers who provided distinguished service during the Peninsular War were entitled to some reward by the state.106 However, as revealed in Parliamentary testimony it was the duty of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, who then made the official appointment.

In the decade that followed Waterloo, a striking 54.5 of those who held postwar governorships or military commands came from either the aristocracy or gentry. While only 24 percent of the Napoleonic British officer corps were born into these backgrounds, more than half of all postwar senior appointments came from this minority group validating the sentiments of Walpole, Holland, Fox, Folkstone, Palmerston, Clode, and Cannadine. Myerly observes that the inclusion of the British middle class into the ranks of officers was a necessary expedient during the Napoleonic Wars. However, in the post-Waterloo period, Parliament and senior staff members at the Horse Guards concluded that the state would best be preserved if the army culled members of the middle class as they would be more likely to embrace mercenary or revolutionary sentiments.107

Family connections, working relationships, influential friends, and distinguished past service were critical in securing these coveted positions. As Charles Oman noted, Parliamentary

107 Scott Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle: From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Crimea, 45.
influence played a significant role in securing coveted military positions for those who possessed “gentle blood.”

Frequently, British patricians reaped rewards bestowed on them by members of their own class. As Colley points out, elites of the early nineteenth century were expected to work for their rewards, but they were to be rewarded nonetheless. In 1813, Lord William Bentinck, who was both a military officer and colonial administrator, wrote in 1813, “The true reward of public service was the public respect which you will enjoy if you deserve it … this depends … upon my own conduct. But the Government can give me what the public cannot, which is income and comfort.”

A fine example of elites rewarding their own is evidenced in the records of the 1833 Parliamentary hearings on Garrison Pay and Emoluments. Lord Somerset testified that many worthy senior officers deserved rewards because of their long-standing and distinguished military careers. Using Lord Rowland Hill as an example, Somerset said that Hill, because of the laws of primogeniture (Hill was a younger brother with “no private fortune”), deserved some remuneration by the state for his Peninsular service that caused him “considerable [personal] expense.” This compensation could come in form of “a government, a regiment, a staff appointment either at home or abroad, or a government in the colonies.”

Wellington noted that officers who had served him well in the Peninsular War or during the Waterloo Campaign deserved rewards from the state for past service. In his voluminous correspondence, the Duke often used his substantial influence and power to assist officers who had served him well. One example occurred in April 1819 when the Duke assisted Colonel Ralph Gore of the York Fusiliers, helping him obtain land in Canada as a settler. In his letter of recommendation to Lord Bathurst, Wellington noted that Gore was both a fine man and a good

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108 C. W. C. Oman, Wellington’s Army, 1809-1814, 201.
109 Lord William Bentinck quoted in Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 188.
officer and would be grateful if Bathurst could assist him. The Duke ended his note by remarking that Gore would be useful in Canada.111 On another occasion, Major General Sir John Cameron solicited Wellington’s assistance in securing him the position as Governor of Grenada. In a subsequent letter in July 1823, Wellington recommends Cameron “as an excellent officer deserving the favour of the government.”112

Political and ideological affiliation also contributed significantly in securing positions. During the periods of the French Revolution and the 1st Empire, Tories dominated Parliamentary politics.113 The Whigs normally associated with political and social reform lost favor as proposed measures of change became associated with events occurring in Revolutionary France. Britain, standing alone against French republicanism and Napoleonic domination, determined that the survival of state required political stability rather than change in these uncertain times.114 Within five years of the end of the Napoleonic Wars, reform was once on the minds of the British populace. However, the general domestic dislocation in Britain that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars only strengthened Tory views that Britain not succumb to the French experience. Wellington, a national hero for defeating the “Corsican Ogre” at Waterloo, believed firmly that the British aristocratic system could meet any revolutionary challenge as long as it


remained resolute. As both Wellington and Bathurst were staunch supporters of the Party of Cottage, Throne and Altar, it appears that their political views played a significant role in the selection process of colonial administrators.

The survey of divisional and brigade commanders suggests that officers who expressed known Whig sentiments received less than favorable consideration in seeking colonial positions. For example, Sir Rufane Shaw Donkin, an experienced staff officer during the Napoleonic Wars, received in 1815 the command of the Madras Army. In 1820, Donkin, while convalescing in South Africa, suggested to Bathurst that he assume the government of the Cape Colony during Lord Somerset’s absence. It appears that Donkin was intent on reforming what he perceived was the corrupt, irresponsible, and immoral Somerset Administration. What specifically disturbed Donkin was Somerset’s benign attitude toward slave-owners in the colony; he believed that the governor failed to enforce the directives dictated by Parliament mandating humane treatment for the colony’s slaves. Bathurst, however, rejected the request even though Donkin appeared to be both a popular and capable administrator. As a result, Somerset and the entire Beaufort family instituted a highly public vendetta against Donkins. While the evidence proving that Donkin’s reformist tendencies kept him from assuming the post of Cape Colony governor is circumstantial, it is acknowledged that both Bathurst and Wellington held strong Tory anti-reformist views. By 1818, when Wellington returned to Britain from the Continent, he was now a hero whose views were highly respected. It is therefore possible, that given Wellington’s influence, he may have been instrumental in seeing that only Tories be appointed to govern

Britain’s vast empire as he believed Toryism to be the safest political creed. Donkin, subsequently returned to England and entered politics as a Whig Member of Parliament in 1831.

Lord William Henry Cavendish Bentinck was also politically and ideologically at odds with Wellington. Relations between the two men had been strained since 1813, when they clashed over the employment of Bentinck’s military forces in eastern Spain. Bentinck’s colonial appointment to the Governorship of India did not occur until 1828, when the Tory party began to fracture and the Whig opposition was once again given a new lease on life. While the Tories remained strong, both Bathurst and Wellington appear to have awarded honors and appointments to those attuned to their own political views. This pattern of political patronage is most evident in a series of letters exchanged between Wellington, Bathurst, and Lord Liverpool in the fall of 1825. It appeared that William Pitt Amherst, who was already under scrutiny for his role in the Barrackpore Mutiny, was planning to vacate the governorship of India. In an October 6, 1825 letter, Liverpool confided to Wellington that the appointment of Bentinck would be awkward for his administration, noting, “I think it highly probable that the party [the Whigs] of opposition to the government would bring forward Lord William Bentinck again who is a popular candidate. I need not add that a majority of the court being in his favour would be a mortifying result to the Duke of Buckingham and a very embarrassing one for the government.”

In response, Wellington urged Liverpool to consider candidates other than Buckingham more suited for the position. The Duke, however, warns the Prime Minister “If Lord William Bentinck should be chosen by the Court of Directors [East India Company], he must be rejected by the government

\[118\] Walter L. Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1996), 10.
\[119\] WP 1/829/5 Letter from Lord Liverpool to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, asking the Duke’s opinion on the question of maintaining Lord Amherst as Governor General in India or recalling him and choosing a successor, October 6, 1825.
at all events.” Two weeks later, Bathurst wrote Wellington, commenting that it may be difficult to prevent the appointment of Bentinck given the mood of the country and East India Company’s Board of Directors. Bathurst sarcastically notes that “If Lord William Bentinck is to be the Governor … I hope that there will be some explanation with him on the rights of the free press and other Whiggish questions.” In this instance, the East India Board of Directors determined not to appoint Bentinck as Governor General of India, and chose instead Major General Sir Thomas Munro, a veteran India officer.

Officers who received preferential treatment in securing colonial positions in the decade following Waterloo were those men who had both staff and combat experience, prominent social status, influential friends, and strong Tory sentiments. However, there were exceptions. Men such as Archibald Campbell and Sir George Townsend Walker obtained colonial administrative positions largely through competent, efficient, and loyal service. Campbell had served in India and had established relationships with influential patrons such as Governor Lord Cornwallis. He also gained valuable combat experience taking part in the siege of Seringapatam, the reduction of Cochin, and the 1796 expedition to Ceylon. When he returned to Europe just after the Peace of Amiens, he acquired important staff experience serving in Ireland, Scotland, and England.

Campbell came to the attention of Wellington while serving in the Peninsula training and commanding Britain’s Portuguese allies.

Sir George Townsend Walker was the son of Major Nathaniel Walker, a military officer who served in the corps of rangers during the American War of Independence. Because of

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120 WP 1/830/10 Draft of a letter from Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, to Lord Liverpool discussing Lord Amherst’s conduct with relation to the Barrackpore mutiny in India, the question of his removal by the East India Company, and the best person to succeed him, October 10, 1825.

121 WP/831/9 Letter from Lord Bathurst to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, on the Duke’s report defending the action of Lord Amherst and Sir Edward Paget during and after the mutiny at Barrackpore in India, November 14, 1825.
distant family connections, he received his first commission as an ensign through the influence of Queen Charlotte. He served in India on staff as quartermaster-general for four years. Invalided home in 1787, Walker served in a variety of staff positions in the Low Countries, the Black Forest, Switzerland, Portugal, Egypt, and Malta for the next decade and a half. In 1808 he joined Wellesley in the Peninsula taking part in the Battle of Vimiero. Sent home with dispatches, Walker returned to the Peninsula in 1810 as a brigadier general tasked with aiding Spanish authorities in Galicia and Asturias. One year later, Walker became a brigade commander and served with Wellington’s Peninsular Army for the remainder of the war.

These two officers did not possess the advantage of birth and high social station but they were capable combat officers who had proved their ability under fire. Furthermore, each of them received staff instruction and functioned in this capacity for a number of years. Campbell for nearly ten years held staff positions in the British Isles. Similarly, Walker served as quartermaster-general in India, and functioned as an inspector general of émigré and foreign troops in British service. Moreover, both of these officers had powerful and influential patrons who assisted them up the career ladder. Campbell enjoyed the patronage of Cornwallis and Wellington, and Walker began his military career supported by Queen Charlotte and later by the Duke of Wellington.

Officers who became colonial officials a decade and a half after the Battle of Waterloo replaced many of the aging senior officers of the Napoleonic Era. This group constituted a second generation of military/colonial administrators. Although these officers displayed many of the characteristics of their predecessors, they also exhibited some marked differences. Like those who came before them, a significant number of them became officers in the last years of the eighteenth century, served in the Napoleonic Wars, and then endured the postwar reduction
of the army. Many barely survived on half pay or, if fortunate, were retained on active service at a reduced rank without much promise of swift promotion. Colonial Office appointment books for the 1830s reveal that twenty-six separate colonies required not only the office of governor but a host of subordinate administrative positions such as secretaries, judges, registrars, assessors, and clerks.\(^\text{122}\) Assisting the governors’ colonial administrative apparatus was a parallel military administration consisting of adjutant generals, quartermaster generals, and inspectors of militia. In many of the colonies there was little delineation between civil and military functions. For example, John Pitt Kennedy, an Inspector of Militia in the Ionian Islands, worked primarily as the Director of Public Works; and William Stavely, Deputy Quartermaster on Mauritius functioned as the Director of Roads and Bridges on that island. In addition to the colonies the empire also encompassed the three presidencies of India, Bombay, Madras, and Bengal. Moreover, officer applicants came to view Ireland’s civil administration as a part of their empire’s colonial administrative structure, while technically it was not. A survey of senior colonial officers in 1830 indicates that governorships remained firmly in the hands of the army. Table A.18 indicates that of the sixty-two senior colonial positions, military men held fifty-five of them.\(^\text{123}\) The armed forces of Britain held an astonishing 89 percent of the senior positions, the army occupying fifty-two positions and the Royal Navy retained the remaining four. Civilians accounted for only six positions, with their affiliations limited to the East Indies Company or the sugar islands in the West Indies. In 1830, senior civilian administrative colonial /imperial officials were Robert Fullerton, Governor of the Straits Settlements; Stephen Lushington, Governor of the Madras Presidency; John Malcolm, Governor of the Bombay Presidency;

\(^{122}\) PRO, C.O. 325/ 20, Colonial Appointments.

\(^{123}\) The colonial positions considered for this survey consisted of governors, lieutenant governors, adjutant generals, quartermaster generals, and inspecting field officers of militia. All of these positions combined both military and civilian duties.
George Fitzgerald Hill, Governor of St. Vincent; and Somerset Lowry-Corry of Governor of Jamaica, who was an influential and well-connected Irish politician.

A principal characteristic of this second generation of military/colonial administrators was their previous staff experience. As evidenced by the 1830 roll of imperial/colonial officials, 60 percent of them had prior staff experience, which they had received while serving in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts. Of the twenty-six men who occupied governorships between 1815-1819, seventeen were military men and of these eight, or 47 percent, had some staff experience. Consequently, for the next fifteen years, during the period 1820 to 1835, military staff officers who occupied colonial governorships numbered thirteen in 1820, or 56 percent, of the governorships, twelve of twenty-four, or 50 percent in 1825, sixteen of twenty-six, or 61.5 percent, in 1830, and eleven of twenty-eight, or 39 percent in 1835. Evidence for the period 1815 to 1830 indicate that a significant number of second generation officers received their appointments largely because of their organizational and managerial skills. As the empire grew larger, an expanded bureaucracy became more complex and necessitated the services and obligations of technocrats. As Peter Burroughs noted, by the 1830s, the Colonial Office realized that the implementation of good government in each colony necessitated that administrators be cognizant of the multiplicity of obligations and responsibilities owed to their subjects. These included the control of tariffs and currency, fiscal and monetary policies, intervention in creating infrastructures, the creation of lines of communication, the management of land and labor, and the management of internal and external security

The career of Colonel Octavius Temple provides an excellent example of a second-generation military colonial administrator. Temple was born in 1784 in Cornwall, the youngest son of the Rev. William Temple and Anne Stow. He acquired his first commission as an ensign
in the 4th Regiment on October 28, 1799, at the age of fifteen. Temple rose in rank during the Napoleonic Wars, becoming a lieutenant in 1801, a captain in 1804, and a brevet major in 1814. He periodically exchanged regiments while moving up the promotional ladder, serving in the 48th Regiment, the 38th Regiment, 34th Regiment, and the 14th Regiment. Hart’s Army list notes that Temple served at the Battle of Waterloo and was awarded a medal for participation in the action. However, examination of the Fourteenth’s activities during June 1815 reveal that the 3rd Battalion was indeed on the field of Waterloo, while Temple was with the 2nd Battalion posted to Marseilles during this climatic campaign. In 1819, Temple became a Sub-Inspector of Ionian Militia, a post he remained at for six years. His next assignment came in 1828, when he transferred to the island of Corfu as Administrator of ecclesiastical and municipal revenues. It was during this period that Temple received the administrative experience that enabled him to assume the lieutenant governorship of Sierra Leone in November 1833. Unfortunately, disease ended Temple’s life less than a year after he had taken office.

The survey also indicates that “middling sort” individuals were beginning to make inroads in what was previously the domain of the gentry and aristocrats. Table A.17 reveals that twelve of these gentlemen came from non-gentry/aristocratic backgrounds. Both James Carmichael Smyth and Harry George Wakelyn Smith were the sons of doctors. Charles Napier’s father was a career military officer, and John Malcolm’s career with the East India Company was due largely due to the influence and money of his maternal uncle, John Pasley, a wealthy London merchant. Also noticeable in the 1830 survey is the weakening of Torism among colonial/imperial positions as evidenced by the appointment of prominent Whigs William

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Bentinck and Charles Napier. The change is even more noteworthy in 1835, when Whigs continue to supplant the remaining Tories. Archibald Acheson, lieutenant governor of Lower Canada and brother in law to William Bentinck; Robert Grant, administrator of Bombay; Somerset Lorry-Corry, governor of Jamaica; and Richard Bourke, governor of New South Wales, all prominent Whigs, received colonial appointments in the period 1830-1835. However, this trend is not unexpected, as the fall of Wellington’s Administration in December 1830 heralded the decline of the Tories and the beginning of Whig ascendancy. Indeed, the Whig’s return to power in December 1830 resulted in a reformist shift within the Colonial Office that included the gradual replacement of military men with civilians with organizational and administrative abilities. As the survey indicates, in 1835 civilian governors were making significant inroads in what was traditionally a military activity. In that year, civilians held nine of the twenty-nine senior colonial administrative and governing positions, a clear departure from previous years when civilians held only a handful of these positions. In the years that followed civilian technocrats would gradually replace the military proconsuls so prevalent in the decades following Waterloo. Among the civilians, Evan Nepean and Robert Wilmot-Horton worked in the Colonial Office before their appointment as governor. Nepean served as Colonial Under-Secretary from July 1794 to March 1795; Wilmot-Horton worked as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State during Lord Liverpool’s administration, December 1821 to January 1828.


127 By mid-century Under Secretary of the Colonial Office Earl Grey consistently recruited from the ranks of MPs and railway company directors for individuals to serve as senior colonial administrators. See Peter Burroughs, “Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, 177.

Conclusion

The military records for officers who served during the Napoleonic Wars and in its immediate aftermath are frequently incomplete. Nevertheless, substantial information can be pieced together to construct a social profile of officers who served in the Napoleonic Wars and who formed the foundation of the post-Napoleonic colonial administrators. As noted in the previous chapter colonial administrators were frequently drawn from a force pool of military men who had proven their leadership abilities in the Peninsula. It is therefore necessary to step back and examine the social backgrounds and wartime careers of officers who comprised this group.

The typical British officer who served in the Napoleonic Wars was a young man between the ages of 17 and 22 years. Socially, he was either a member of the emerging middle class or from the lesser gentry. The young officer’s parents usually possessed enough income to provide for their children an education. Literacy practically guaranteed a young man’s entry into the British officer corps. Officers’ commissions were acquired either through purchase, or non-purchase means that could be obtained through a variety of methods. A substantial number of these officers entered the army in the first years of the nineteenth century when the threat of French invasion was the greatest and patriotic feelings ran high. Nearly three quarters of all company and field grade officers who entered the army served some time campaigning in the Peninsula. Officers who served in this theater of operations appear to have an advantage in securing postwar employment in overseas administrations.

Officers who benefited from the patronage of either Wellington or his cadre of senior division and brigade commanders enjoyed a distinct advantage in securing the coveted subordinate positions in the postwar colonies. Furthermore, senior officers who were appointed
to colonial governments frequently employed subordinates who had served them in similar capacities during wartime. Although these subordinates were talented staff officers, employment was frequently secured through the process of networking. Networking was accomplished in a variety of ways that included comradeship, combat solidarity, regimental ties, familial relationships, patron-client associations, and religious affiliation. As noted in the next two chapters, the relationships that were cultivated by subordinates with their senior officers through the process of networking frequently paid handsome dividends.
Networking is as old as civilization; recently the corporate world has rediscovered the phenomenon. Corporations believe that a successful business depends on building successful employee teams. “A great team multiplies your prospects for success by enabling you to form relationships with powerful people…”¹ For the post-Napoleonic British Army, networking was a natural process and not a product of the self-help books found in the business world today. Relationships forged in the military were the product of many types of bonds: comradeship, combat solidarity, regimental ties, familial relationships, patron-client associations, religious affiliation, and administrative experience. The post-Napoleonic British Army was small by continental standards and fostered a close-knit society. It was within this community that networking between individuals occurred along a complex and interweaving path.

Military leaders have long recognized the importance of solidarity and comradeship among soldiers. The rigors of campaign and the terror of combat create a profound bond of brotherhood. Military psychologists note that this relationship is often the result of the personal sufferings soldiers endure and the fears they encounter while exposed to constant danger. J. G. Fuller, in his study of troop morale among British and Dominion forces during the First World War, noted that troop solidarity developed mainly in the primary group, at the platoon or section level. Soldiers who had experienced frontline combat together developed “a fierce loyalty” to their mates and “an almost religious sense of comradeship.”² Along with this sense of loyalty came the associated fear that soldiers could break this bond of trust by letting their comrades down in combat. This viewpoint was confirmed in a 1943 Yale University study of 300 combat

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soldiers; research discovered that one of the principle anxieties among front line soldiers was the fear that they would let their friends down in combat. The overwhelming majority (94 percent) of the men stated, “they were better soldiers because of the fear that if they showed weakness they would endanger the lives of their friends.” Moreover, John Ellis, who studied the World War II foot soldier, discovered that troops who experienced constant danger, privation, and suffering often subordinated their personal anguish by focusing their attention on the welfare and care of their comrades. Ellis notes, “Out of their sufferings there emerged a real sense of selflessness and equality and it is these that ultimately characterize this exclusive fraternity.”

Egalitarianism exists because all combat soldiers recognize that they share a common identity with their fellow soldiers. They must work together doing everything possible to ensure that each of their comrades survive the ordeal. Soldiers are often willing to sacrifice themselves to see that their comrades survive.

Both ancient and modern historians are quick to point out that field commanders in antiquity realized that fusing small groups of soldiers into comrades was integral to unit morale, army cohesion, and battlefield success. The ancient bard, Homer, noted in the *Iliad* that related clans and tribes brigaded together fought effectively as cohesive units. Homer also recounted

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3 John Dollard and Donald Horton, *Fear In Battle* (New Haven, CT: the Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, 1943), 60.
5 Homer, *Iliad* 2,
Set your men in order by tribes, by clans, 
Agamemnon, 
and let clan go in support of clan, let tribe 
support tribe. 
If you do it this way, and the Achaians obey you, 
you will see which of your leaders is bad, and 
which of your people, 
and which also is brave, since they will fight
the deep relationship that existed between comrades-in-arms as exemplified by the bond shared by the Greek hero, Achilleus, and his friend and chariot driver, Patroklos. When Nestor, King of Pylos, informed Achilleus of Patroklos’ death at the hands of Hektor:

….the black cloud of sorrow closed on Achilleus.
In both hands he caught up the grimy dust and poured it.
over his head and face, and fouled his handsome countenance
and the black ashes were scattered over his immortal tunic.
And he himself mightily in his might in the dust lay
at length and took and tore at his hair with his hands and defiled it.6

Achilleus’ grief stemmed not only from the loss of his close friend but that he had abandoned his comrade by not being at his side during combat.

The ancient writers Thucydides, Xenophon, Onasander, Caesar, and Plutarch recognized the close relationship between battlefield comrades. Like their modern counterparts, ancient fighting men fought to protect their comrades at their side. To do otherwise would risk shame and ostracization by their fellow soldiers. The Greek Onasander noted that Hoplites fought well when placed “in rank beside brother, friend beside friend, lover beside lover.”7 Combat soldiers receive comfort from the knowledge that their fellow soldiers, in turn, will support them. In a post-World War II study commissioned by the United States Army World War II, S. L. A. Marshall acknowledged the importance of unity on battlefield morale.8 The study revealed that even a crowded battlefield can be a lonely place for the solitary soldier and that a comrade’s voice or even touch will dispel some of a soldier’s fear during combat. Victor Davis Hanson

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6 Homer, Iliad 18, 128.
7 Osander as quoted in Christon I. Archer et al., World History of Warfare (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 70.
notes that ancient weaponry fulfilled a two-fold function that contributed to a soldier’s
dependence on his comrades, thus encouraging bonding. The large Hoplite shield carried by the
Classical Greek armies protected both the bearer and his comrade’s right arm and side. Hanson
observes that the Greek phalanx was a closely packed formation and that the armament and
tactics employed by the Greeks encouraged dependence on the man to the right of the file. The
close proximity of Greek warriors in file incessantly bumping and touching each other produced
a tactile sensation that constantly reinforced the notion that each soldier supported his comrades
and was not alone.

The role of officers and commanders is another key component in maintaining morale.
Successful military commanders improved morale and army esprit de corps by sharing the lot of
the common soldiers and by experiencing their hardships and dangers. There are many accounts
of commanders who, in sharing the rigors of combat, win the admiration and respect of their
troops. Early in his career, Napoleon solidified his reputation as a leader when he personally
sited twenty-four guns of the Army of Italy during the Battle of Lodi. During World War II,
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. landed with the first wave of assault troops at Utah Beach armed with
only a walking cane and his Army Colt containing six rounds of ammunition. Even the
ancients were quick to grasp the importance of officers in providing an example to their men by
sharing the rigors and dangers of frontline combat. Xenophon observed that an effective
commander was one that soldiers both feared and respected. Writing about his commander’s
severity, Xenophon noted Clearchus’ strict demeanor revealed a resolve that “in the midst of
dangers … troops were ready to obey him implicitly and would choose no other to command

9 Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York: Alfred
2002),
them.”\(^{12}\) Plutarch commented that the late Republican military commander Gaius Marius achieved great popularity among his troops because he ate, slept, marched, labored, and fought alongside his men.\(^{13}\) Marius, in sharing the rigors and dangers of combat, won the respect and loyalty of his army.\(^{14}\) On many occasions, Julius Caesar emulated the example of Marius in perpetuating the perception that their commander was one with his soldiers. Caesar noted in his commentaries on the Gallic War that when the Nervii attacked he dismounted, took up a legionary’s shield, and fought in the front line with his troops. In seeing their leader enter the fray, “the legionaries were given new heart and were anxious to do his utmost when his general [Caesar] was looking on”\(^{15}\) Caesar’s legionaries were neither willing to disappoint their commander nor let their comrades down.

Military commanders appreciate the powerful bond that exists between men who face combat together. In pre-industrialized warfare, assured, confident, and seasoned armies could easily panic and rout on the field of battle for no apparent reason. Steady leadership provided the enlisted men with tangible proof that their officers would lead them through the chaos and suffering of combat. Soldiers relied greatly on their fellow comrades, but they also depended and trusted that their officers to see them through. In a significant number of battles, officer

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\(^{13}\) Marius lacked the pedigree that most Late Roman Republic leaders possessed. He was born in Arpinum, a small backwater town three days journey south from Rome, that Tom Holland observes was noteworthy for its poverty and remoteness. Marius, crude and uncultured, gained power, and acclaim by Romans through ambition, military ability, and sheer bravado. Unlike the old established families who ruled before him, Marius was unafraid to assume the role of a plebians. At the Battle Aquea Sextiae in 102 B.C. “he was himself visible in the front rank, putting into practice the advice which he had given his soldiers, for he was in as good training as anyone and in daring, he far surpassed them all. See Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army At War 100 B.C. – A.D. 200* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 154, Plutarch, *The Fall of the Roman Republic: Six Lives by Plutarch*, translated by Rex Warner (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1958), 11-56, and Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 54-86.


casualty rates often determined the balance between victory and defeat. Even the morale of vaunted and renowned units could break when faced with catastrophic officer losses. Napoleon’s 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers of the Guard were routed at the conclusion of the Battle of Waterloo when twenty-three officers and 200 men fell to the withering fire administered by 2,700 muskets from British guardsmen and infantry. Officers often provided the necessary stiffening of the ranks. In a period when victory was determined not by destruction of the enemy’s army, but by destroying the enemy’s will to resist, the role of a strong inspiring leader was paramount to not only army and unit morale, but to its survivability. There were many examples of officers who displayed battlefield courage that inspired and encouraged their men to accomplish amazing feats of bravery. At the Battle of Albuera in the spring of 1811, Lieutenant Colonel John Colborne’s British Brigade suffered an astounding 64 percent casualty rate and yet these troops remained on the field as a viable combat unit. Philip Haythornthwaite attributes the brigade’s survivability in one of the most sanguinary battles of the Peninsular War, to the exemplary leadership of the unit’s officers.

It is an officer’s duty to provide leadership and motivation in battle to the troops under his command. However, in pre-industrialized warfare the notion of honor was the central rationale of officers in carrying out their obligations with courage. Honor is a difficult term to define as the concept can differ between nationalities, ethnicity, social class, race, and time. The Classical Greeks gauged honor by a warrior’s ability to engage in single combat with the enemy. The individual combats by Greek and Trojan heroes in the Homeric epics provided

16 Napoleon’s Old Guard was confident of victory at Waterloo. Just before their assault, the grognards of the Guard remarked “Bah! Victory is a trollop we’ve taken more than once.” See Henry Lachouque, The Anatomy of Glory: Napoleon and His Guard, A Study in Leadership (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 487-88.
18 Christon I. Archer et al., World History of Warfare, 72.
templates for the later Greeks to emulate. Scholars of ancient history have observed that the Romans developed killing to an efficient and deadly art. Yet, these same historians have largely ignored the notion of honor among Roman officers. Adrian Keith Goldsworthy argues that in battle Roman officers consciously displayed battlefield courage or personal virtus that often inspired the men under their command.\(^{19}\) In battle, the Roman high command expected their subordinate officers to urge the men forward and actively engage in the fighting along with their men.

Officers began to adhere to an unwritten “cult of honor” in the early eighteenth century.\(^{20}\) This code, along with the associated “civilized warfare” practiced by the armies of the Enlightenment, resulted from a widespread rejection by military men of the depredations attributed to soldiers during the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years’ War. Officers, like their enlisted comrades, were most concerned with how they appeared in the eyes of their peers. During this period, officers began to establish professional relationships with their peers, a tradition that continued into the nineteenth century. John Keegan, in his groundbreaking work, The Face of Battle, observed, “honor [among early nineteenth-century British officers] was paramount, it was by establishing one’s honourableness with one’s fellows that leadership was exerted indirectly over the common soldier.”\(^{21}\) Christopher Duffy comments that eighteenth-century officers would often take the initiative of expelling from its ranks those who did not measure up to an accepted standard of battlefield courage. He notes that in 1748 captains and lieutenants of the Médoc Regiment turned on one of their own after they perceived that the


officer skulked during a recent combat. The offending officer had his coat and sword destroyed, the symbols of command, before his fellow soldiers drove him from the camp with sticks and stones.  

Physical courage was the essential component to this “cult of honor.” Society expected officers to exhibit valor because of their social station. Duffy notes that writers like Turpin de Crissé equated courage with virtues that characterized nobility. Robert R. Palmer, in his assessment of Frederick the Great and his Prussian Army, observed that the King of Prussia’s Army reflected the spirit of the state; its officers mirrored aristocratic attributes of honor, class consciousness, glory, and ambition. Other important elements figured into an officer’s concept of honor. These included an individual’s self-perception as a gentleman. A gentleman traditionally was a man entitled to bear arms. Throughout the seventeenth century royal heralds continually made visitations throughout England to determine who was fit and who was not fit to bear arms. During the next century, this definition expanded to include any person who dressed and comported the manners of a gentleman. Guy Miège, a Swiss visitor to London, observed in 1703 that anyone who “has either a liberal or genteel education, that looks gentleman-like (whether he be so or not) and has the wherewithal to live freely and handsomely, is by the courtesy of England usually called a gentleman.” As the eighteenth century progressed, the

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22 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 76.
23 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 6.
definition of a “gentleman” became less precise. The title, no longer based exclusively on family background, became loosely associated with money and behavior.27

Military officers repeatedly found that adherence to the code of honor often collided with the accepted laws of the state in which they served. Moreover, the honor code was frequently a source of friction among the officer corps fraternity. Duffy observes that officers, when they interacted among themselves, were often victims to their own sense of insecurity.28 Duffy contends this insecurity was a product of the lawlessness and indiscipline of the age coupled with the vague code of honor officers followed.29 The brotherhood forged on the battlefield often crumbled in the mess or in cantonments. Officers consistently believed that their peers were constantly testing their sense of honor. Perceived slights and unintended acts of disrespect were numerous, frequently prompting quarrels that demanded satisfaction. In a significant number of instances, the question of money, women, or behavior figured prominently in such disputes. Dueling provided the means for settling disputes and restoring lost honor to the injured party.

Dueling was a common practice in eighteenth and nineteenth century British society, especially among military officers. Charles Oman commented that dueling among military officers, while prevalent in England reached epidemic proportions in Ireland and India. During the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington specifically forbade dueling among his officers. He could ill afford to lose good officers to personal conflicts. British Army court martial records for the period 1809 to 1814 reported that only four fatal duels took place while the army campaigned

29 Ibid.
in Spain. Oman’s research indicates that there were numerous instances of dueling, but regimental authorities hushed them up.\textsuperscript{30}

It is apparent that dueling took place in Spain among British officers, but few acknowledged it openly. It is only from memoirs and extant correspondence by the participants that researchers are aware of its pervasiveness within the officer community. In his memoirs, Joseph Anderson wrote of a duel that occurred in Portugal between two surgeons who fought over the question of a woman’s honor. On this occasion, the duel ended without bloodshed. Anderson ended his account by observing that during his posting in the Peninsula, duels were frequent and “considered by many [officers] to be both necessary and unavoidable.”\textsuperscript{31} The practice of dueling among officers presented a particularly awkward and embarrassing situation for the British high command. Dueling caused officers to choose between their adherence to army regulations and their observance of the code of honor. In all cases, a gentleman’s sense of honor caused the duel, but the notion of honor also prevented the participants from divulging the details of the duel to higher military authorities. Moreover, all involved with the duel were obliged to keep silent. There was often little doubt as to who was involved, but the code of honor ensured silence that consistently prevented army authorities from conclusively determining culpability and punishing the guilty parties. As a result, among official army circles the matter of dueling became a solemn farce that the high command often ignored and even grudgingly tolerated.\textsuperscript{32}

The majority of officers who had shared the rigors and dangers of combat were part of a select fraternity. Their friendship and loyalty to one another remained firm throughout their

\textsuperscript{31} Joseph Anderson, Recollections of a Peninsula Veteran (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), 111.
\textsuperscript{32} William Thornton Keep, In the Service of the King: The Letters of William Thornton Keep, at Home, Walcheren, and in the Peninsula, 1808-1814 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1997), 93.
lives. Memoirs and reminisces by Peninsular War veterans attest to the deep bond they shared. William Thornton Keep became friends with Henry Alexander while both men were young officers in the 28th Regiment in the Peninsula.33 The close relationship between the two men lasted until Alexander’s death in 1847. Neighbors of Keep noted that for many years the two old men would re-fight Peninsular War battles sitting outside of Keep’s Camden Garden home.

Another friendship that lasted for decades was that between Colonel Charles Nicol, the commander of the 68th Regiment and the unit’s regimental surgeon, Walter Henry.34 Nicol and Henry remained together as friends in the same regiment for twenty-five years until Nicol’s retirement in 1837. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith carried on a affectionate correspondence with Lieutenant General Sir Benjamin D’Urban for decades. Both Smith and D’Urban had served in Wellington’s Peninsula Army.35 From 1828 to 1837, Smith served as deputy quartermaster general in Governor D’Urban’s Cape Colony administration. When Smith transferred India, he continued to correspond with his friend and mentor, D’Urban closing his...

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33 In August 1811, the War Office reduced the 28th Regiment’s 2nd battalion to the size of a cadre. All available fit men transferred into the first battalion bringing that unit nearer to its reported strength. Ensign Keep retained his regimental rank receiving the battalion service number 657, while his friend Alexander received number 658. See William Thorton Keep, In the Service of the King, 77n.


letters with phrase “My ever dear friend and tutor as a soldier. Gratefully for all your kindness, your devoted old servant.”

The most fitting example of the enduring fellowship between Peninsular officers was the celebratory meals held by British officers to observe notable victories. None of these dinners was more famous then the Waterloo Banquets held annually at Wellington’s Apsley House. The tradition in the British Army of holding memorial dinners gained prominence in the Napoleonic period. During the Peninsular War, Wellington hosted dinners on the anniversaries of important actions. For example, in 1813, Wellington held a series of feasts for officers who had participated in the battles of Busaco, Badajoz, Fuentes de Oñoro, and Salamanca. Because of its great significance, the Waterloo Banquets attracted widespread attention in the press and among the public. Interest was so great that the citizens could obtain special passes to view the table settings before the gala. Guests, often four score and more, included command, staff, and company grade officers who had participated in the battle. Guest lists for some of the years have survived as well as William Salter’s massive painting depicting those in attendance at 1836 banquet. Attendees of this dinner included many officers who had become colonial administrators including Sir Frederick Adam, governor of Madras; Sir Edward Barnes, on the staff of Governor Sir Robert Brownrigg, Ceylon; John William Fremantle, deputy adjutant general in Jamaica; John Gurwood, deputy adjutant general, West Indies; and Francis Dawkins, deputy quartermaster of the Ionian Islands. Another celebratory dinner that brought together old Peninsular warriors acting in a civil administrative and military capacity was the March 1846

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36 Public Record Office, W. O. 135/2, Correspondence miscellaneous and private, Sir Harry G. Smith.
37 Anthony Brett James, Life in Wellington’s Army (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), 123.
38 Times (London), June 19, 1836.
victory banquet held in Lahore celebrating the conclusion of the First Sikh War. Seated at the head table were four former Peninsular War officers, Sir Hugh Gough, Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir Charles Napier, and Sir Harry Smith.  

Combat was not the only tie that bound Peninsular officers. Regimental spirit also played a significant role in fostering solidarity among soldiers. Regiments provided soldier and officer alike a sense of belonging in a normally impersonal army. Within a regiment, a soldier found comradeship, loyalty, and a deep-seated primal sense of belonging to an elite, all-male community. Baynes, in his study of the 2nd Scottish Rifles in World War I, observes that once an officer joined a regiment he subordinated all of life’s priorities to the demands of the regiment. Wife, family, and social station all became secondary. F. M. Richardson suggests that the inherent tribalism of regimental constancy may have its origins in seventeenth and eighteenth century recruiting practices that often resulted in enlisting soldiers from specific regions or villages. A young soldier knew that if he did not measure up on the battlefield, he faced the displeasure of his officers and comrades and the scorn from his own family and village. In the 1830s, general orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, General Rowland Lord Hill, at the behest of His Majesty William IV, directed the adjutant general, John MacDonald, to engage Mr. Richard Cannon, “Principal Clerk,” at the Horse Guards, in preparing historical records for every regiment in the British Army. The Cannon series of regimental histories pays particular attention to the initial recruiting areas of regiments. For example, recruits for the 8th, or King’s Regiment came from the area of Hertfordshire, Derbyshire, and the

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40 Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman, 267.
42 Ibid, 121.
environson outside of London. A similar example is the historical record of the 9th, or the East Norfolk Regiment that in 1685 “a regiment of foot was raised in Gloucestershire” under the command of Captain Henry Cornwall of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards. Initially, British regiments took the name of their colonel. As the army grew the colonel’s name disappeared as regiments identified themselves by numbers that indicated their seniority within the army. In 1782, infantry regiments acquired county or region appellation in an effort to spur local interest in recruiting. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, this regional affiliation with their named counties had all but ceased to exist. A History of the Service of the 41st (the Welch) Regiment reports that in 1844 the unit consisted of five hundred and forty-eight English, twenty-one Scots, and two hundred and twenty-two Irish.

Regiments, by their composition and structure, promote bonding. Keegan points out that the creation of regiments fulfilled a need by early modern European monarchs to bind the army to the interests of the state. By marginalizing the influence of the landed nobility who throughout the Middle Ages had supplied the manpower to the monarchies, proprietary regimental colonels now owed loyalty and allegiance to their state paymaster in the person of the

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44 Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the Eighth or, The King’s Regiment of Foot: Containing An Account of the Formation of the Regiment in 1685, and of Its Subsequent Services to 1844 (London: Parker, Furnivall, and Parker, 1844), 9-10.
45 Richard Cannon, Historical Record of the Ninth or, East Norfolk Regiment of Foot: Containing An Account of the Formation of the Regiment in 1685, and of Its Subsequent Services to 1844 (London: Parker, Furnivall, and Parker, 1844),
47 Ibid.
48 D.A.N. Lomax, A History of the Services of the 41st (the Welch) Regiment, From its Formation in 1719, to 1895 (Devonport: Hiorns & Miller, Army Printers and Stationers. 1899), 197.
king. Keegan notes that unlike the mercenaries of the Renaissance, regimental soldiers were regularly paid thus ensuring permanence.\(^{50}\)

As an organizational and tactical unit, regiments began to appear in European armies at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Keegan’s argument is that initially most regiments were a collection of companies, as the company was too small of a unit to count on the battlefield.\(^{51}\) Other scholars, such as Trevor Dupuy, contend that the regiment was a conscious attempt to maximize maneuverability, firepower, and shock on the battlefield by combining both pike and firearm. In the late sixteenth century, Maurice of Nassau, smarting from defeats by the Spanish, reorganized his armies along Roman lines receiving inspiration from Vegetius, Frontinus and Aelian.\(^{52}\) Maurice recreated the approximate size of the Roman cohort, combining about 500 men on a front of 250 meters.\(^{53}\) Placing pikemen in the center and musketeers on the flanks increased Maurice’s regiments man-for-man capability in a linear formation, effectively countering the phalangeal configuration of the tercio. Maurice’s revolutionary contribution to warfare was that he had succeeded in creating a compact maneuverable military unit. Within the next half century, every army in Europe had adopted the regimental system. England’s New Model Army of the 1640s embraced the regimental system consisting of a battalion made up of ten companies commanded by a colonel and assisted by a lieutenant colonel, major, and seven captains, each leading a company.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the basic administrative unit of European armies was the regiment. Battalions further subdivided the regiment and many European states

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 14.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.


adopted a multi-battalion regimental structure. Most states retained a two-battalion organization but there were instances of regiments consisting of three, and even, four battalions. It was comparatively rare for British regiments to have more than one battalion. Historian David Chandler notes that a one-battalion infantry regiment on full establishment in the wartime armies of William III, Marlborough, Cumberland, and George II numbered between 780 to 930 rank and file soldiers commanded by forty to sixty officers. British infantry regiments numbered between 600 and 1000 soldiers by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Only during wartime, were British regiments expanded to include multiple battalion regiments. During the Napoleonic Wars, the 95th Regiment of Foot (the Rifles) raised in 1801, received a second battalion in 1805 and a third in 1810. When the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, massive demobilization of the British Army mandated the reduction of all regiments to one battalion. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British regiments remained relatively small entities when compared to their Continental counterparts.

The established complement of officers for a British regiment in the post-Napoleonic period numbered between forty and one hundred officers, depending on the number of companies the regiment fielded. As previously noted, regiments that were on campaign frequently fielded more companies than regiments on peacetime duty. Moreover, Guard

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55 Ibid.
56 Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver observed that regimental strength varied greatly throughout the Napoleonic period. This fluctuation of unit strength depended on a number of factors including attrition, station, and regimental seniority. During the Napoleonic period, major theaters of war received priority in replacements. Wellington’s Peninsular Army, located in a major theater of war, obtained the lion’s shares of replacements thus this army’s regiments remained somewhat close to their established strength. Regiments stationed further from Europe were often well below authorized strength. For example, in 1809, the strength of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment of Foot in the Peninsula numbered 943 officers and men; the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment of Foot stationed in Upper Canada reported a strength of 571 officers and men. See Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver, The Napoleonic Army Handbook: The British Army and Her Allies, 31-32.
regiments because of their status, seniority, and proximity to the monarch fielded more companies than regular line regiments necessitating more officers. In 1815, the combined 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the First Foot Guards listed ninety officers in its complement.\textsuperscript{58} Peacetime line infantry regiments fielded considerably fewer officers. For example, in 1817, the 19th Regiment reported a complement of fifty-five officers.\textsuperscript{59} In 1819, the same regiment had thirty-eight officers.\textsuperscript{60} During peacetime, officer establishments remained small Hart’s Army List of 1837 lists sixty-seven officers serving with Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards.\textsuperscript{61} The 1840 administrative document “Officer Paysheets” reveal that forty-one officers served with the 27th Fusiliers.\textsuperscript{62}

The British officer class was a relatively tight knit social group.\textsuperscript{63} Sylvia Frey suggests that the smallness of the corps and their social isolation encouraged bonding.\textsuperscript{64} Because of the small size of their unit, regimental officers knew their fellow officers intimately through daily interaction. Major General F. M. Richardson likened a regiment to a substitute home and family that the officer embraces in place of his real home and family.\textsuperscript{65} In March 1807 Captain John Colborne wrote to his stepfather, Reverend Thomas Bargus, acknowledging that his regiment had become “another home.”\textsuperscript{66} Young officers tended to shift their feelings of family loyalty and

\textsuperscript{59} Hart’s Army List [1817], 142-43.
\textsuperscript{60} Hart’s Army List [1819], 237-38.
\textsuperscript{61} Hart’s Army List [1837], 142-43.
\textsuperscript{62} Regimental Historical Records Committee, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers: Being the History of the Regiment from December 1688 to July 1914 (London: Constable & Company Ltd., 1934), 640-41
\textsuperscript{63} Mark Danley, “Military Writings and the Theory and Practice of Strategy in the Eighteenth Century British Army” (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 2001), 140.
\textsuperscript{64} Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary Period (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), 133.
\textsuperscript{65} Richardson, Fighting Spirit, 46.
\textsuperscript{66} G.C. Moore Smith, The Life of John Colborne, Field Marshal Lord Seaton, Compiled from His Letters, Records of His Conversations, and Other Sources (London: John Murray, 1903), 73.
affection to their regimental peers. In a letter written while campaigning in the Peninsula, William Thorton Keep admitted to his brother Samuel the special relationship that existed between regimental officers. Keep wrote, “among the family of officers united as we have become by association in our daily amusements and pursuits, engaged in the same glorious cause, of the same Regiment and age, dining at one board, and partaking equally in all the vicissitudes incidental to such a precarious life, and changes are severely felt, at least by me, and I look with surprise at my companions who can bear with such a stoical indifference their frequent separations from each other.” In most cases, regimental officers treated their fellow officers as not only comrades in arms, but also as adopted brothers within the regiment. Indeed, throughout the eighteenth century the phrase “brother officer” became commonplace by a number of military writers. Adam Williamson, in Military Memoirs and Maxims of Marshal Turenne, employed the term in 1740. The phrase again appears in Samuel Bever’s 1756 tract, The Cadet: A Military Treatise, Thomas Simes 1768 work, The Military Medley: Containing the Most Necessary Rules and Directions for Attaining a Competent Knowledge of the Art, and by Robert Donkins’ 1777 treatise, Military Collections and Remarks.

The regimental experience inculcated group values and forged among the officers a conscious notion of group identity. The regiment encouraged its members to take familial pride in the customs, traditions, and history of their unit. Visual reminders constantly recalled the regiment’s great deeds and inspired its members to uphold the honor of the regiment. What may have appeared as an eccentric practice to an outsider evoked pride among its members. A few examples illustrate the point; two red feathers in the shakos or campaign hats of the 46th Regiment recalled the spirited defense conducted by the unit in 1777 at the Battle of Brandywine.

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Creek. Officers and men of the 95th Regiment took particular pride in their “Green Jackets” and spirit of discipline that denoted their elite status.68 Every March 1st, since 1777, on St. David’s Day, the officers of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, eat leeks in the regimental mess while the band plays the regimental tune “The Noble Race of Shenkin” as a drum boy leads a goat three times around the table.69 Likewise, battle honors embroidered on the regimental colors provided a constant reminder to all members of the regiment that their predecessors accomplished great feats of valor. Officers who threatened the harmony within the regimental fraternity faced ostracization or expulsion by their fellow officers. Charles Oman, in his study of Wellington’s Peninsular Army, observes that “young Irish squireens with bullying and dueling habits, as well as the hard-drinking, which were notoriously prevalent among the less civilized strata of society beyond St. George’s Channel” were often expelled from the “genteel” company of the regiment.70

The regimental mess best elucidates the exclusivity and camaraderie that existed among officers. Throughout history, the fellowship meal has exemplified a sacred bond. In the Judeo-Christian western tradition, the Passover Seder and the Eucharistic meal signified unity and solidarity for a select group. The first century Jewish sect, Essenes, ritualized the act of eating believing that God participated in every meal.71 In the early Church, Christians accorded the Eucharistic rite special importance as only the initiated shared in the sacramental meal.72 Among British officers, the regimental mess contained elements of both the sacred and the profane. A

71 John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed, Excavating Jesus: Beneath the Stones, Behind the Text, the Key Discoveries for Understanding Jesus in His World (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2001), 157-58.
religious-like experience coexisted with riotous behavior. During the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic periods, the regimental mess contained elements of religious solemnity and intemperate camaraderie. Lieutenant Robert Blakeney’s account of the 28th Regiment’s mess aptly demonstrates this blending:

…We sat down to table, and eating seemed but a work of necessity, which passed in mute action. The cloth being removed, a bumper was proposed to the memory of the immortal Moore. It was drunk in perfect silence and, as it were, with religious solemnity…. Our next bumper was to the memory of our late gallant comrades, who gloriously fell since our last march from Lisbon, gallantly maintaining the honour of their country and corps. This toast was also drunk in solemn silence, while many an eye swam at the recollection of scenes and friends gone forever…. Our third and last bumper was ‘To our happy meeting; and whosoever’s lot it be fall may the regiment soon and often be placed in a situation to maintain the glory of their country, and may they never forget the bravery and discipline which won the ‘back plates.’ This sentiment was received with wild enthusiasm, and so loudly cheered by all that gloom and melancholy were frightened out of the room. The festive board gradually resumed its wonted cheerful tone; the merry song went round drowning the doleful funeral dirge; past misfortunes and useless regrets were forgotten.

In a dual effort to curb ungentlemanly conduct and to control exorbitant mess, expenses regimental commanding officers instituted “Rules of the Mess.” In April 1784, Major General Richard Grenville, who held the colonelcy of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, laid down a set of rules intended to curb excessive drinking and limit expense. Every member of the officers’ mess would be charged ½ d. daily for “dinner and small beer” while “It is expected that no member of the Mess drinks more than one glass of wine during dinner.” Although, minor idiosyncrasies existed, all regimental messes operated under similar strictures.

Comradeship and regimental affiliation made for strong ties but they were not the only bonds that united officers. Family connections were equally strong and many within the officer

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73 General Sir John Moore, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces operating in Spain, 1808-1809, killed at the Battle of Corunna, January 16, 1809.
75 Senior officers realized there was a need to protect younger officers against dissipation from drink and excessive expense that impoverished many less well-to-do subalterns.
76 Michael Glover, That Astonishing Infantry, 34.
corps belonged to military dynasties that for generations held commissions. Houlding observes that, in the eighteenth century, at least one quarter of serving officers in the British Army came from “army families” made up of commissioned fathers and their sons. 77 Many of the original military families could claim Huguenot ancestry. One of the notable examples of this tradition was the De Lancey family who in the span of sixty years produced three celebrated soldiers. General Oliver De Lancey served in the American War for Independence; Colonel William De Lancey Wellington’s deputy quartermaster general killed at Waterloo; and Oliver De Lancey who died while participating at the siege of San Sebastian in 1837. The small size of the eighteenth-century British peacetime army and the laws of primogeniture fostered generations of military men. Frequently, second or third sons from the minor gentry chose a military career as their life’s vocation. Their concentration of numbers created an accumulation of influence and power that, in time, produced a sizeable number of distinguished officers. An examination of Peninsular and Waterloo officers who achieved field marshal rank in the 1850s and 1860s indicates that seven of the fourteen officers had military fathers. 78 Two of these seven same officers sired sons who went on to become officers. Charles Dalton’s extensive Waterloo research reveals that over one hundred officers who fought in that celebrated battle were the sons of military officers. 79 The number of father-son combinations within individual regiments in 1815 is truly remarkable. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Doherty commanded the 13th Regiment of Light Dragoons. Among his officers were two of his sons, Captain Joseph Doherty

77 J. W. Houlding, Fit For Service, 105.
78 For full biographies of the list of Field Marshals’ seniority list numbers thirty-eight to fifty-one see T.A. Heathcote, The British Field Marshals, 1763-1997: A Biographical Dictionary (London: Leo Cooper, 1999).
79 Charles Dalton’s Waterloo Roll Call is still the definitive biographical of British Officers who served in the Waterloo Campaign. Dalton’s groundbreaking work fostered a number of other important works such as Irving L. Homfray’s Officers of the British Forces in Canada During the War of 1812-15 (Toronto: Welland Tribune Print, 1908) and Robert Holden MaCkenzie’s The Trafalgar Roll: The Ships and the Officers (London: George Allen & Company Ltd., 1913)
and Lieutenant George Doherty. Harry Smith writes that he and his two brothers, Thomas and Charles, all served at Waterloo in the 95th Regiment. In his autobiography, Smith relates an incident in which his father said to the trio sorrowfully, “Napoleon and Wellington will meet, a battle will ensue of a kind never before heard of, and I cannot expect to see you all again.”

Remarkably, all three survived the battle. Harry remained on active service with the army. Charles returned home later becoming colonel of the Whittlesea Yeomanry, and Thomas went on half-pay in 1819 but returned to the service serving as principal barrack master at Aldershot. The Smith family contributed additional members to the army, as evidenced by a letter Harry sent to his sister Alice during the Maharajpore Campaign, where he was delighted that his nephews Hugh and Harry were regimental officers serving with him.

Among the Highland regiments family connections were even stronger than in the English or Irish regiments. As Diana Henderson points out in her study of Highland regiments, a significant number of officers in the kilted regiments had pre-regimental associations of some kind with the regiment that they eventually entered. These associations frequently took the form of family ties or regional affiliation with noble or landed families. Moreover, Highland regiments in the early decades of the nineteenth century were able to maintain a preponderance of Scots that indicate family ties remained strong in these regiments. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the five kilted regiments could, on average, claim that 61.8 percent of its officers were Scots. On the other hand, Henderson notes that among trews and line regiments

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83 Ibid., 91.
Scots dominance diminished significantly.\textsuperscript{84} Scottish participation in these regiments averaged 30 percent with the English contribution at 47.5 percent and the Irish 22 percent. However, finding close blood relationships in Highland regiments is more difficult because of the commonality of surnames. Hart’s 1815 edition of the Army List for the 92nd Regiment (Highland kilted) indicates that of the forty-one officers on the regimental roster contained three Macdonalds, three MacPhersons, three Gordons, and two Campbells.

As unusual as it may appear, wartime encouraged family members to congregate in the same regiments or serve in the same theaters. Peacetime, however, frequently forced families apart as competition for the limited number of available postings increased dramatically. After 1818, a significant number of family combinations split up as officers desiring to stay in the military accepted assignments that spanned the globe. One such military dynasty was the VanCortlandt-Anderson families. The head of this military dynasty was Philip VanCortlandt, a wealthy American whose great grandfather was mayor of New York City. Born in 1739, VanCortlandt received a commission as a major in the loyalist forces and fought with the British until Cornwallis’ surrender in 1781. At the conclusion of the war, VanCortlandt, penniless, sailed to Britain with his wife, Catherine Ogden VanCortlandt, and their thirteen children. In Britain, he established himself at Hailsham, Sussex and petitioned the government for reimbursement of his losses. Eventually the government gave him £1,500 and an additional £2,000 from the sale of land in America. In 1804, VanCordlandt received an appointment as barrack master for Halisham and command of all soldiers garrisoned in the town. He retained this post until his death on May 1, 1814.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{84} The 72nd, 74\textsuperscript{th}, 75th, and 91\textsuperscript{st} Regiments.
\textsuperscript{85} National Army Museum Library, Chelsea, Van Cortlandt Papers, Vol. 1, Mary Lucy Courtlandt and Anderson Mulcaster.
Evidence indicates that Philip VanCortland’s son Philip fought with loyalist forces from New Jersey during the American Revolution. He eventually immigrated to Canada where he served as deputy barrack master general for Lower Canada during the War of 1812. A daughter, Mary Ricketts VanCortlandt, married John Mackeil Anderson and gave birth to three males and four females. Of their seven children, two of the males received commissions and two of the females married officers. The eldest son, John Mackeil Anderson born in 1791, entered the army in 1810 receiving a commission as a lieutenant in the 17th Dragoons. In January 1812, he succumbed to disease in Bombay. The next son, Philip Cortlandt Anderson was born in 1793 and received an appointment in 1811 as an ensign in the 6th Bengal Native Infantry. He saw action in the Gurkha War of 1814 and the Maharatta Wars in 1817-1819. In 1822-1823, illness forced him to take leave and in 1824, he traveled to the Cape Colony where his sister Catherine Anderson joined him. Accompanying Catherine was her friend, Lucy Young, who had relatives living at Cape Town. Later that year Philip Anderson married Lucy Young, and they along with Catherine, returned to India. Catherine subsequently married Frederick Angelo of the Honourable East India Company one year later. Family records indicate that Philip Anderson remained in India for the rest of his military career. During Brigadier Morrison’s Arakan Campaign, he served with the pioneer and sapper corps and reportedly made contact with Clinton VanCortlandt, a relative posted with the 31st Regiment and his future brother in law Lieutenant Frederick Angelo of the 7th Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry. In the late 1820s,

87 NAM, Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 88.
88 NAM, Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 87.
89 J. W. Fortescue notes that Brigadier-General Morrison’s British expeditionary force in the Arakan consisted of:

| 2nd Local Horse | 621 |
| Artillery       | 667 |
Philip participated in the siege of Bharatpore under the command of Major General Sir Jasper Nichols, but was relieved of command because of an accusation of dereliction of duty. Appealing to authorities, he cleared his name and rejoined his unit, remaining with the pioneers for the next three years.

In 1828, Anderson became a captain and received the appointment as second-in-command to the Mhaierwarra Battalion. He served in this capacity until 1831, when Anderson accepted duty as depot commander at Landour. Official reports cited his record of service at Landour emphasizing his “efficiency and honesty in maintaining order” in the district. For the next few years, Anderson remained on duty, posted with the Meerut Division commanded by Sir Samuel Ford Whittingham. While stationed at the post, Anderson embarked on an ambitious program of renovating the public buildings and bazaars of the region that gained him official praise from his superiors. The East India Company officials especially noted that the renovations came in under budget at a time when they had demanded economy. In February

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Regiments</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Brigade</td>
<td>H.M. 44th, det 26th. B.N.I., 49th B.N.I.</td>
<td>1809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Brigade</td>
<td>H.M. 54th, 42nd, and 62nd B.N.I.</td>
<td>2416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Brigade</td>
<td>10th, 16th M.N.I.</td>
<td>1062</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd L. I. Bn.</td>
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<td>1033</td>
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<tr>
<td>Native levy</td>
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<td>553</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pioneers</td>
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<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th, 14th, 39th,</td>
<td>44th, 45th, 52nd B.N.L.</td>
<td>2399</td>
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<td>11,209</td>
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According to this order of battle, the 31st Foot was not allocated to this particular campaign. Moreover, Hart’s Army List does not list a Clinton Van Cortlandt in any of the British regiments that served in this campaign. Apparently, Lucy Van Cortlandt Anderson Mulcaster’s recollection is in error. It is possible that Clinton Van Cortlandt served in one of the native regiments during this campaign. Interestingly, Hart’s Army List for the 45th (Nottinghamshire) Regiment of Foot, a unit that did serve in the Arakan Campaign does list a Captain Arthur Abraham Van Cortlandt commissioned in the regiment March 26, 1825. See J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XI, 1815-1838 (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1923), 308 and A List of the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on Full, Retired, and Half Pay with An Index 1826 [Hart’s Army List], (London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1826), 208-209.

90 NAM, Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 103.

91 Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. XIII, 1839-1852, 1. See also Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 103-104.
1835, Anderson received command of the Mhaierwarra Battalion after its commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Hale returned home on leave. Also during this time, Anderson became political officer of the district as the East India Company joined civil and military duties under the same officer.\textsuperscript{92} Anderson received the rank of major commensurate with his new position later that same year. He held this assignment until 1837 when he transferred as brigade major to Aleyshur. Within a year, Anderson, in early 1839, became a commander of the Delhi palace guard, a position he held until ordered to proceed to Ferozepore in preparation of the Afghan Campaign.\textsuperscript{93} Posted in the 64\textsuperscript{th} Native Infantry, Madras Army, he participated in Elphinstone and later Pollack’s operations in Afghanistan. In April 1842, Anderson died while his unit engaged Ali Masjid’s Afghans outside of Jalalabad.

Another of Philip Anderson’s siblings, Margaret Maria Douglas Anderson, contributed to the family’s military tradition by leaving England in 1820 to live with her uncle Philip VanCortlandt, the previously mentioned deputy barrack master general for Lower Canada. Four years later, she married Captain Noah Freer in Quebec. Freer began his military career in 1810 as an ensign in the Nova Scotia Fencibles. At the outbreak of War of 1812, he transferred to the Canadian Fencibles but remained only briefly with the regiment as he accepted promotion as a captain in the New Brunswick Fencibles in 1813.\textsuperscript{94} Freer, who before the war had been military secretary to Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost in Nova Scotia, served his friend and superior during the war in that capacity. Wesley B. Turner in his study of British high command in Canada observes that Freer never intended to be a combat officer, preferring to serve

\textsuperscript{92} NAM, Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 109.
\textsuperscript{93} While in Delhi at the Mogul court, Anderson witnessed the political situation developing in Afghanistan and was aware of the impending crisis between the British and the Afghans.
\textsuperscript{94} L. Homfrey Irving, \textit{British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812-15}, 2.
throughout the war as an aide to Prevost. Apparently, Freer did see some combat, receiving the “Chateauguay” medal. After the war, he went on half-pay, eventually finding a career as a cashier in a Quebec bank.

The next generation of the VanCortlandt-Anderson family continued their military tradition by contributing three of their five sons to the army. Although their military careers lay outside the scope of this study, it is important to note that Van Cortlandt-Anderson military connection continued well into the twentieth century. Philip VanCortlandt’s eldest son, Harry Cortlandt Anderson married the daughter of a military officer and retired in England with the rank of general and as a Companion of the Bath. Moreover, his brothers, Frederick Cortlandt Anderson and Arthur Cortlandt Anderson achieved the ranks of major general respectively. Additional generations kept up the military tradition by serving in the military during World War I.

As evidenced by the VanCortlandt-Anderson family, military folk traveled in the same circles interacting, establishing relationships, and frequently intermarrying; creating ever-widening spheres of networks and family connections. The Brownrigg family offers additional insights on this phenomenon. The Brownriggs, an impoverished Irish gentry family, owed their spectacular career success to marrying wealth and attaching themselves to powerful and influential patrons.

Sir Robert Brownrigg was one of four sons of Henry Brownrigg and Mary Alcock of Rockingham, County Wicklow. Of the four sons, three achieved high military rank during the

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96 The Anderson/VanCortlandt family tree notes that Philip Cortlandt Anderson’s great-great grandson, Acting Captain Harry Frederick Cortlandt Anderson was killed while leading his company on an attack on Turkish positions in Mesopotamia in February 1917. See NAM, Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1 insert.
Napoleonic Wars, two attained general rank, and the third retired as a lieutenant colonel. Additionally, Henry served as an officer in the 52nd Regiment, where he eventually achieved the rank of major. The regimental history of the 52nd reveals that between 1755 and 1765 the unit remained in England and Ireland. In 1765, the regiment left Cork for Canada, and remained there until its transfer to Boston where the unit reinforced General Thomas Gage’s troops just before the outbreak of the American War of Independence. Unfortunately, neither regimental records nor the Brownrigg family history indicates whether Brownrigg traveled with his regiment to these overseas stations or participated in the American war. Furthermore, editions of Hart’s Army List, while indicating an officer’s affiliation with a specific unit, does not specify if an officer was present with the regiment at its duty station.

The military tradition was also strong on his mother’s side of the family. Robert Brownrigg’s grandfather, Michael Alcock, and his uncle, Hugh Alcock, served as military officers. Robert was a captain in the Right Honourable Earl of Effingham’s Regiment when posted in Gibraltar in 1759. Hugh served in the Honourable East India Company’s Madras Army as a captain in 1762 and a lieutenant colonel in May 1783. Indian Office records indicate that Captain Hugh Alcock commanded the East India Company’s Tanjore garrison during Hyder Ali’s First Mysore War.

Robert Brownrigg entered military service receiving a commission in the 14th Regiment in November 1775. He served with his regiment at Halifax, Nova Scotia and participated in the New York Campaign in 1776. Brownrigg returned to Britain and remained there until promoted to lieutenant and adjutant of the 6th Regiment in June 1778. Two years later, the regiment served

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*99* Indian Office Records, IOR/H/276.
as marines in the Royal Navy’s Channel Fleet. At the conclusion of the American War for Independence, the regiment sailed to Jamaica where Brownrigg remained until the beginning of 1784.\textsuperscript{100} While posted in Jamaica, he married Elizabeth Catherine, the fifth daughter of William Lewis of Cornwall, who may have commanded the 2\textsuperscript{nd} battalion of the Jamaica Rangers. Lewis’ wealth and authority may have assisted Brownrigg’s career by providing him the money necessary to purchase commissions in prestigious and senior regiments of the army.\textsuperscript{101} In March 1784, Brownrigg purchased a captaincy in the 100\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, subsequently exchanging to the 35\textsuperscript{th} Regiment and then moving to the 52\textsuperscript{nd} Regiment.

In the 1790s, Captain Brownrigg held a number of important and significant military posts such as deputy adjutant general for a campaign against the Spanish in South America. He then accepted the assignment as commandant and paymaster to the detachments of regiments on foreign service. In 1794, he received an appointment as deputy quartermaster general of the army serving in Flanders. In the fall of that year, Brownrigg became lieutenant colonel of the 88\textsuperscript{th} Regiment and took part in all actions including the retreat through Holland and Westphalia. The next year he returned to England and received an appointment as military secretary to the Duke of York, a position he held until March 1803 when promoted to quartermaster general of British Forces. During Brownrigg’s tenure as military secretary to the Duke of York, he was instrumental along with Quartermaster General Sir David Dundas in supporting Col. J. G. Le Marchant’s plan for the establishment of a “course of instruction for officers intended to serve on


the General Staff.” 102 Under the aegis of Dundas and Brownrigg, Marchant received permission to establish two schools, one housing a Junior Department and the other a Senior Department, the former at Marlow, and the latter at High Wycombe, to train British quartermaster generals.103 Furthermore, it was during his tenure as Quartermaster General that Brownrigg established a number of close personal ties with talented officers who exercised commands during the Napoleonic Wars such as Sir John Moore and Sir David Dundas.

Promotions came quickly during the early years of the Napoleonic Wars with Brownrigg achieving the rank of major general in 1805, and lieutenant general in 1808. Brownrigg’s career, however, suffered a setback in 1809 when he served as quartermaster general in the ill-fated Walcheren Expedition.104 He was recalled briefly to his previous London assignment at the Horse Guards and helped complete the reforms initiated by his patron the Duke of York. In 1813, Brownrigg received an appointment as governor and commander-in-chief in Ceylon. He held this post until 1820 when Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton, former governor and commander-in-chief of Barbados, succeeded him. Brownrigg returned to England and ended his military career by accepting the post of governor of Landguard Fort located near his home, Helston House, Monmouth.

Thomas Brownrigg, Robert’s brother, also attained general rank in the army. Like his sibling, Thomas entered the army at an early age commissioned as an ensign in the 36th Regiment. He remained with this regiment for ten years making little progress up the promotion

103 Ibid., 24-25.
104 Brownrigg served as chief of staff to Sir Eyre Coote, second-in-command to the expedition. Fortescue believes that Brownrigg was chosen because he was one of the few officers at the Horse Guards who argued that a surprise capture of Antwerp was possible. See Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. VII, 1809-1810, 49-56.
ladder. In 1793, however, the younger brother purchased a lieutenant colonelcy in the 3rd Regiment and began to be posted to prominent staff positions, no doubt because of his brother’s influential position as quartermaster general.\textsuperscript{105} Records indicated that the younger Brownrigg spent a considerable amount of time working at the Horse Guards, the same agency as his brother. For the rest of his military career Brigadier General Thomas Brownrigg served as Chief Comptroller of Army accounts in Ireland, a position he held for nearly thirty years.\textsuperscript{106} In May 1824, Thomas Brownrigg, appealed to the Duke of Wellington for assistance in securing a pension for his wife “who will be left unprovided for in the event of his death.”\textsuperscript{107} Although Thomas Brownrigg was not a close associate of Wellington, he nevertheless applied to the Duke for a pension: “As [Wellington] the Lord Lieutenant [of Ireland] has a fund of one thousand two hundred pounds from which he can grant pensions to worthy individuals. Brownrigg hopes that forty three years of service, thirty of which have been in Ireland will be sufficient, with the Duke’s recommendation to secure him a pension.”\textsuperscript{108} Brownrigg, however, did not secure a recommendation or a pension from Wellington.

Robert James Brownrigg, the eldest son of Robert Brownrigg senior, also chose a military career.\textsuperscript{109} Commissioned a lieutenant in the 52nd Regiment in 1806, he rose rapidly in the ranks receiving his captaincy in 1807, his majority in 1814, and a lieutenant colonelcy in 1816.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{105} Voluminous correspondence exists of officers writing to the Quartermaster General’s office requesting specific postings. See University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, WP1/171/21, University of Southampton Copy of a letter from Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley to Colonel Robert Anstruther, concerning Colonel Browne's suitability as inspecting field officer of the Irish yeomanry, June 8, 1807; and WP1/194/76 Letter from Lord Clarina to Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley soliciting military employment, March 31, 1808.

\textsuperscript{106} WP1/179/62 Letter from D.Spencer to Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, requesting that his only brother be given a temporary clerkship in the Irish Army Account Office, December 17, 1807.

\textsuperscript{107} WP1/792/29 Letter from Brigadier General T.Brownrigg to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, requesting the Duke to ask Marquis Wellesley for a pension for his wife, Lady Brownrigg, May 31, 1824.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.

Robert served in Spain during the initial campaigns of the Peninsular War as aide de camp and deputy assistant quartermaster general to General Sir Brent Spencer, who was Wellington’s second in command. Wellington disliked Spencer believing that his second-in-command was instrumental in undermining Robert Jenkinson Lord Liverpool, the Secretary of War’s confidence in Wellington’s ability to command. During Wellington’s retreat to the Lines of the Torres in late 1810, Spencer wrote disparaging letters home criticizing his commander’s actions. William Napier, in his multi-volume History of the Peninsular War, observed that Wellington believed that Spencer was “more noted for intrepidity than for military quickness.” Other high ranking Peninsular officers were less kind to Spencer with Edward Pankenham commenting “Sir Brent Spencer has charge of this Corps, and is as good a fellow as possible to meet at a Country Club, but as to succeeding Wellington it is quite Damnation to him…” Spencer’s departure from the Peninsula was probably awkward for the junior Brownrigg, as aide de camp assignments were often the product of personal friendships. Soon after Spencer’s departure, Brownrigg also returned to England, and in 1813, transferred becoming aide de camp and military secretary to his father in Ceylon. While attached to his father’s staff, Robert Brownrigg married Emma Nisbit, the daughter of Major General Colebrooke Nisbit.

Robert James Brownrigg’s posting as aide de camp to Sir Brent Spencer illustrates another avenue of networking that prevailed within the British military. As noted, general

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111 Spencer was a great favorite of King George III and it was reputed that he was secretly married to the king’s daughter, Princess Augusta, who was nicknamed “Puss.” See Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), 218.

112 Ibid.

113 Pakenham Letters April 11, 1811 as quoted in Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword, 250.

114 S. G. P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters, 36.
officers chose aides as a means to repay past favors or to strengthen relationships between friends. Only general officers received aides and within the British Army, aides de camp and brigade majors were members of that general officer’s personal staff. Every general officer had at least one aide de camp. Lieutenant generals received two and the Commander of Forces had as many as he could afford.\textsuperscript{115} Wellington, as commander of Forces in both the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns, had an enormous staff of aides de camp seldom employing less than six young officers. As was general practice in European armies of the period, the expenses for the upkeep of an aide de camp was the responsibility of the general officer. However, British officers of the Peninsular War period received a daily allowance from the Treasury of 9s. 6d. a day for aides.\textsuperscript{116} Additionally, British general officers were required to feed their aides daily and many found this to be an added benefit.

Most often brigade majors and aides de camp were young men who were just beginning their military careers apprenticed to older, senior military commanders who acted as patrons and mentors. Aide de camp and brigade major appointments were personal. However, the King’s Regulations were clear in delineating their specific duties.\textsuperscript{117} While aides de camp frequently came from well-connected families, brigade-majors tended to come from a different class of soldier who had some sort of administrative experience serving as regimental adjutants. Their regimental brother officers viewed them as pedestrian paper shufflers and often looked down upon them. Brigade majors served an important administrative function, as they were the

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{117} Both offices received the same rate of pay. Ward notes that a September 19, 1808 entry in the diary of Sir William Gomm “The pay and rank are the same as those of an aide-de-camp: the officer has the rank of major during the time he holds the appointment, and he is not considered as generally belonging to the general’s family so much as the aide-de-camp. The situation is more independent.” Francis Culling Carr-Gomm, \textit{Letters and Journals of Field Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm} (London: , 1881), 105.
\end{itemize}
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channel in which orders were communicated between the brigade commander and his troops.\textsuperscript{118} Essentially, brigade majors were responsible for the units’ roster, keeping an account of their duties that included maintaining picquets, posting guards manning outposts, and determining the brigade’s order and route of march.\textsuperscript{119} Harry Smith during his service in the Peninsula served as both an aide de camp and a brigade major noted, that in 1811, as a brigade major for the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Light Brigade, he was rebuked by his commanding officer Colonel Edward Drummond for requesting orders for placing picquets. “I said to my Brigadier, ‘Have you any orders for the picquets, sir? Pray Mr. Smith, are you my Brigade Major? I believe so, sir. Then let me tell you, it is your duty to post the picquets, and mine to have a damn good dinner for you every day.’ We soon understood each other. He cooked the dinner often himself, and I command the brigade.”\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, it was the duty of the brigade major to act as a conduit between the staff of the commanding officer and the brigade.

Regulations specifically defined the duties of an aide de camp. Aides were general officer’s messengers. “All orders sent by an Aide de Camp are to be delivered in the plainest terms and are to be obeyed with the same readiness as if delivered personally by the General Officers to whom such Aides de Camp are attached.”\textsuperscript{121} One of the few qualifications for an aide de camp was that the officer be a competent horseman.\textsuperscript{122} Once again, Sir Harry Smith vividly illustrates this point. When Brigadier General Sir Sydney Beckwith asked Smith if he could

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\item \textsuperscript{118} United Kingdom, \textit{The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1837}, (London: The Horse Guards, 1837), 38.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 38-39.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Harry G. Smith \textit{The Autobiography of Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith} Vol. I.,ed. G.C. Moore Smith, 45.
\item \textsuperscript{121} United Kingdom, \textit{The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1837}, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{122} One other regulation governing the employment of Aides-de-Camp stipulated that the chosen officer was required to serve at least one year in his regiment. See Michael Glover, \textit{Wellington’s Army In the Peninsula} (New York: Hipocrene Books Inc., 1977), 143.
\end{itemize}
serve as his aide de camp, Smith replied, “Yes, I can ride and eat.”

Although the position required few skills, general’s aides who consistently braved shot and shell on the battlefield delivering messages needed some small measure of courage. A general’s decision to appoint an aide de camp was a personal one and lasted only as long as the commander wished. Commanders exercised some discretion in choosing their aides, frequently selecting an officer who showed particular promise. Wellington commented that he paid particular care in recommending an aide to a general as he would “in recommending a girl for a man to marry.”

Beside the duty of messenger, the aide de camp frequently acted as the commander’s personal secretary, writing letters, issuing invitations, doing errands, and generally making himself useful. Frequently these relationships fostered lifelong friendships between the patron and their younger client. In 1796, Brigadier-General John Moore choose his friend Captain Paul Anderson to be his brigade major while Moore served as second in command to General Sir Ralph Abercromby’s expedition to the West Indies. After serving in the West Indies, Anderson became Moore’s aide de camp and eventually his assistant adjutant general. The two men remained close life-long friends with Anderson remaining with Moore until Moore’s death at Corunna in 1809.

Other aides de camp were less loyal to one specific commander. As a

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125 Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army In the Peninsula, 143.
127 Paul Anderson became an ensign in the 51st Foot in 1781 and saw action with his regiment in the Mediterranean. In July of 1795, he became a captain in the 4th West Indian Regiment and became Brigade-Major to Brigadier-General Sir John Moore. Anderson remained with Moore as an aide during Moore’s employment in Ireland, Holland, and Egypt. Anderson received his majority in 1805 and became Assistant Adjutant General to Moore’s expedition to Sicily in 1806. One year later, Anderson, now promoted to Lieut. Colonel, assisted Moore on a military-diplomatic mission to Sweden and acted as Assistant Adjutant-General for Moore’s British expedition to Spain in late 1808. Close friends, Anderson often nursed the wound prone Moore back to health. Anderson was with Moore after he was mortally wounded at the Battle of Corunna. Anderson wrote an account of Moore’s last
young captain, Sir Rowland Hill, served as an aide de camp to a succession of general officers that included Lord Mulgrave, General O’Hara, and Sir David Dundas.\textsuperscript{128} Lieutenant General Hill, however, reverted to tradition by selecting his brother as his principal aide de camp during the Waterloo Campaign.

Relationships established between general officers and aides de camp were often permanent and lasted lifetimes. Generals displayed a patriarchal affection towards their charges that served as their aides. This was hardly surprising; as aides were frequently members of the general officer’s immediate family, close friends, or the siblings of a close friend or benefactor. Of the eight aides de camp who served Wellington at Waterloo: Lord George Lennox was the son of his friend, the fourth Duke of Richmond; Col. C. F. Canning was the brother of the diplomatist Viscount Stratford Canning who personally requested that the Duke take his brother on staff; Major Henry Percy, a friend of the Duke; Lieutenant Arthur Hill, a relation from his mother’s side of the family;\textsuperscript{129} Lieutenant George Cathcart, the son of Wellington’s former commander during the Danish Campaign of 1807; Lieutenant Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon, Sir David Baird’s favorite aide and nephew who Wellington inherited when he assumed command in the Peninsula; Lieutenant Colonel Fremantle became an aide to Wellington in 1813 and was one of two aides who accompanied him at the Congress of Vienna; the Prince of Nassau-

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  \item\textsuperscript{128} Edwin Sidney, The Life of Lord Hill, Late Commander of the Forces (London: John Murray, 1845), 16.
  \item\textsuperscript{129} Six years after Waterloo, Lord Arthur Hill used his connections with Wellington requesting that the Duke write a letter of recommendation to Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Campbell, Commander of East India Company forces for the Madras Presidency, on behalf of his friend Mr. John Alexander, who had been appointed to the Medical Department at Madras. Wellington assented to the request and had the letter of recommendation sent. See University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, WP 1/661/1 Letter from Lord Arthur Hill to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, requesting a letter of recommendation to Sir Alexander Campbell for a friend who has been appointed to the Medical Department at Madras, 7 February 1821.
\end{itemize}
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Usingen, son of Duke Bernard of Nassau, a German nobleman and therefore outside the purview of this study. Examination of the forty-four British aides de camp who served general officers at Waterloo reinforces the notion that aides were chosen because of familial or personal ties. For example, Lieutenant General Lord Rowland Hill, who commanded the II Corps, employed five aides-de-camp: consisting of his younger brother, Lieutenant Colonel Clement Hill; Major R. Egerton, “a companion, secretary, confidant, and friend.” Major Chatham Horace Churchill, son of Major General Horace Churchill and great nephew of Horace Walpole, initially served as aide de camp to Major General Robert Crauford before transferring to staff of Hill’s staff in 1810; Captain Digby Mackworth, aide de camp to Hill in 1814 remaining with him through Waterloo; and Captain Orlando Bridgeman, the third son of Orlando Bridgeman, 2nd Baron Bradford who went on half-pay in 1819 and subsequently quitted the service.

Religious ties frequently served as a conduit through which strong relationships were forged and sustained by like-minded individuals. The officers of the British Army of the Napoleonic Wars were rarely known for being either religious or devout. However, some notable individuals promoted the Gospel and gathered around them officers and men devoted to the faith. During the Peninsular Campaign, Wellington mistrusted the evangelical enthusiasm of

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130 Edwin Sidney, The Life of Lord Hill, 233.
131 Churchill must have exhibited some talent for staff matters as he was promoted in 1812 to the post of deputy assistant adjutant general and in 1813 advanced to the post of assistant adjutant general in the Peninsula. In 1815, Churchill returned to Hill’s staff to again serve as an Aide-de-camp. See Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters, Appendix I, 171 and United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar, or Army Service Commission Book, Containing the Services and Progress of Promotion of the Generals, Lieutenant-Generals, Major Generals, Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Majors of the Army, According to Seniority: with Details of the Principal Military Events of the Last Century, Third Edition, Vol. V, 100.
132 Mackworth’s use of patron-client relationships provides an indication of the scope of networking that went on in the Post-Napoleonic British Army. In 1828, the French Ambassador to London, Auguste Jules Armand Marie, Prince de Polignac petitioned Wellington on the behalf of a British officer, Captain Landeg, who served in India during the same time as Wellington. Digby Mackworth, who knew Landeg’s father, a colonel in the East India Service, could “vouch for the details of Landeg’s service.” Moreover, Mackworth believed that “Landeg has not made his destitute situation known to the government and it would be an act of charity to assist him.” See University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, WP1/949/12 Letter from the Prince de Polignac to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, asking for assistance for Captain Landeg and deploring certain articles which have appeared in the Journal des Debats, 26 August 1828.
Methodism, but conceded that religion provided a necessary moral underpinning for both officers and men. The Reverend Edwin Sidney echoed these sentiments concerning lack of religious piety in the early nineteenth century British Army when he wrote, “The Gospel is the only genuine source of virtue in the many, and the only check to the unblushing demonstration of the hideous qualities of the base minority, by whom in all great collections of men barbarous crimes are committed, out of which arises the ill report of the whole.”

To remedy this situation, Wellington believed that official circles, in this case general officers, were best suited to control the practice of religion within the army. The Duke outlined his views in a February 6, 1811 letter to the adjutant general of the army at the Horse Guards, “The army should have the advantage of religious instruction, from knowledge that it is the greatest support and aid to military discipline and order.”

Thomas Browne observed that, in order to set an example, Wellington ordered that all of the officers and their staffs attend Sunday Divine services while the army was in winter quarters at St. Jean de Luz. Even though official measures were put in place to encourage religious practices, a great body of evidence suggests that the only a small devout portion of the army actively participated in the prescribed Sunday services.

Despite the lack of religious fervor among significant numbers of officers, believers tended to gather in small groups. Throughout the empire, groups of officers and soldiers expressed their faith in small but noteworthy measures. In 1808, the 93rd Regiment, the Sutherland Highlanders, while garrisoned at the Cape Colony decided to augment their regimental Divine service by forming a church “based agreeably on the tenets of Scottish

133 Edwin Sidney, The Life of Lord Hill, 226.
134 Charles Oman, Wellington’s Army, 1809-1814 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 326.
National Church.” The regiment appointed elders and other office holders, found and paid a clergyman from the Church of Scotland, regularly scheduled services, and purchased communion plate. Throughout the empire many other pious officers and men congregated under the aegis of the Naval and Military Bible Society, founded in 1780 for the express purpose of “diffusing the Holy Scriptures to the British troops in France, to our naval and military forces in West Indies, Canada, &c.” In 1818, this organization chaired by the Duke of York and supported by important political and religious figures that included the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of London, York, and Gloucester, the Reverend Connyham of the Kirk of Scotland, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and members of Parliament Lord Gambier, Lord Harrowby, and William Wilberforce. The 1824 annual report of the society revealed that a number of senior military and colonial officers were members of the association. Members included Major General Lachlan Macquarie governor of New South Wales, the officers and soldiers of the 48th Regiment garrisoning New South Wales, John Marshall of the Cape Colony, and Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez.

In 1824, a significant number of the society’s members were located in Halifax, Nova Scotia administered at that time by Lieutenant Governor Sir James Kempt. It appears that Reverend J. T. Twining, chaplain to the garrison, led the group that included a sizeable portion of the 74th and 34th Regiments, the Royal Artillery, as well as J. Strachan M.D., the deputy medical inspector stationed there. Moreover, a membership list reports that Kempt was a subscribing member of the chapter. It appears that Kempt, during his wartime years, kept his religious

136 Roderick Hamilton Burgoyne, comp. and ed., Historical Records of the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders, Now the 2nd Battalion Princess Louise’s Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1883), 18-19.
137 Times (London), May 13, 1818.
139 Ibid.
views to himself. However, some insight into his religious beliefs can be determined from his actions and observations on matters of faith during his tenure as lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia. As administrator of Nova Scotia, and later, as Governor General of Canada, Kempt’s tolerant and liberal views on religion often brought him into conflict with stated colonial policy on religion.\textsuperscript{140} Nevertheless, Kempt agreed with his superiors in the Colonial Office who viewed religion as necessary in reinforcing the moral values among the population.

Sir James Kempt, like many of his fellow military administrators, climbed the ladder of success through a network of patronage and clientage he had established. Kempt’s early life remains a mystery, however, he was the son of Gavin Kempt of Batley Hall, Hants, and his wife, the daughter of Alexander Walker of Edinburgh. Kempt joined the army in March 1783 as an ensign in the 101\textsuperscript{st} Regiment.\textsuperscript{141} The young officer’s early career was unremarkable as he was placed on half pay almost immediately after he had joined when his regiment was reduced at the conclusion of war in America. He remained on half pay for almost ten years until 1794 when Kempt received a captaincy in 113\textsuperscript{th} Foot, a regiment he helped to recruit. In June 1796, Kempt became inspecting field officer of the recruiting service in Scotland, a position he held for three years. While working in this capacity, he came to the attention of General Sir Ralph Abercromby, commander of forces in Scotland, who in 1799, appointed Kempt to be his aide de camp. Kempt remained with Abercromby acting as aide and personal secretary to the general during campaigns in Holland and Egypt.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{140} Kempt was often at odds with stated colonial policy instructing him to support only recognized churches and faiths. For more details on colonial Canadian religious policies during the Colborne and Kempt Administrations see Mark Francis, Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-60 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1992), 122-25.


\textsuperscript{142} Fortescue observes that while acting as aide-de-camp to Abercromby in Holland, Kempt became acquainted with the Duke of York, once even being invited to dine with the Duke. See Fortescue, A History of the
aide de camp to Lord John Hely-Hutchinson and General Sir David Dundas. In 1807, Kempt received an appointment as quartermaster general to British forces in North America, a position he retained until 1809, when he returned to Britain to serve as aide de camp to King George III. Promoted major general in 1812, Kempt went to Spain and participated in the siege of Badajoz and the Battles of Vittoria, Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, and Toulouse. At the conclusion of the war in the Peninsula, Kempt again transferred to America where he commanded a brigade under General Sir George Prevost. He returned to Europe in time to see action at Waterloo, as a commander of a brigade.

At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Kempt, like many other British officers, embarked on a career as a colonial administrator. He first served as lieutenant governor of Portsmouth, Hampshire, but upon hearing of the death of the Governor General of Canada, Charles Lennox, 4th Duke of Richmond, he petitioned his former commander, the Duke of Wellington, for the governorship of Nova Scotia, then rumored to be vacated by his friend Lieutenant General Sir George Ramsay, the 9th Earl of Dalhousie. In a series of letters exchanged between Kempt, Wellington, and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Henry Lord Bathurst, it was decided that Dalhousie would relinquish his governorship of Nova Scotia accepting the post of Governor General of Canada; Kempt would then accept the lieutenant governorship of Nova Scotia with the approbation of Wellington. In a supplemental

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144 Kempt’s brigade remained in reserve during the 1814 upper New York Campaign. However there is some discrepancy among historians as to where Kempt’s brigade was stationed. Fortescue maintains that Prevost ordered Kempt to Kingston preparing for an attack on the Americans at Sacket’s while Wesley Turner argues that Kempt’s forces remained in Montreal. See J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. X, 126 and Wesley B. Turner, British Generals in the War of 1812 High Command in the Canadas (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 46-47. It is also significant to note that the other brigade commanders in Prevost’s 1814 advance on Plattsburgh, New York included Kempt’s Peninsular War comrades Generals Thomas Brisbane, Manley Power, and Frederick Robinson.
letter by Bathurst, the Duke of Richmond’s family would be taken care of by the posting the
Richmond’s two sons, William and Frederick, “on the American staff.” Bathurst continues by
making provisions for the rest of the family noting that Richmond’s daughters would receive
assistance in the form of lifetime pensions.146

Kempt arrived in Nova Scotia in June 1820. Aspects of his colonial service in Nova
Scotia and Canada have already received some attention in this work. It is however, important at
this point to examine the interwoven connections that existed between Kempt’s military
relationships and his religious views. Unofficial correspondence in early 1825 between
Lieutenant Governor Kempt; the Duke of Wellington; Reverend J. C. Cochran, a missionary in
Nova Scotia; and Dr. John Inglis, the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia illustrates the networking
that took place between religious and military/imperial administrators. In January 1825,
Wellington received a request for his patronage in assisting the Rev. Cochran in the building of a
church in Wellington, Nova Scotia. Cochran observes that the settlement is “inhabited
predominantly by Peninsular War veterans” who have become farmers but are too poor to
construct a church.147 Wellington responds to the request by directing his military secretary,
Lieutenant Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset to make inquiries to Kempt concerning this project.
As previously, noted, Kempt served under Wellington in both the Peninsular War and the
Waterloo Campaign and they knew each other well. Wellington and Kempt were also members
of the Naval and Military Bible Society evidencing their interest in propagating Christianity
among the military, and in this case a group of former soldiers. Kempt, unaware of the activities

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146 WP1/632/15, Letter from Lord Bathurst to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about the
provision to be made for the children of the Late Duke of Richmond, 10 October 10, 1819.
147 WP1/810/13, Letter from Reverend J.C. Cochran to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, asking
for money to build a church in the settlement of Wellington in Canada, January 12, 1825.
of the Anglican missionary Cochran responded by informing Somerset that he had requested information concerning the missionary from Bishop Inglis.\textsuperscript{148} The last extant letter in the series is a note from Somerset reporting that Wellington is grateful to Kempt for the effort he has in investigating Cochran’s application. “Kempt should deal with the matter as he thinks proper. If necessary, the Duke is prepared to subscribe to the cost of building a church in Wellington.”\textsuperscript{149} Unfortunately, the resolution of this issue is unknown as further correspondence concerning the matter is unavailable.

Military officers occupied the top administrative positions in Britain’s global empire for almost three decades following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All of these officers retained their military rank and pay while engaging in a combination of military and civilian capacities. The British Army Lists for the period 1815 to 1837 delineate a specific hierarchy of military officers who accompanied governors assisting them with their duties. A number of military officers who fulfilled the roles of adjutant general, quartermaster general, judge advocate, and barracks master normally assisted governors. The King’s Regulations outline their duties and responsibilities. Moreover, governors supervised a myriad of bureaucratic offices occupied by either civilian or military personnel. Table A.19 illustrates the 1834 colonial administrative structure in the Cape Colony.

In addition, Governor Benjamin D’Urban had the services of two additional military officers who could, and did, serve in civilian capacities: Deputy Adjutant General Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Francis Wade, a Peninsular officer who served with Lieutenant General Sir

\textsuperscript{148} WP1/812/15, Letter from Sir James Kempt to Lord Fitzroy Somerset respecting the application of Reverend J. C. Cochran for money to build a church in the settlement of Wellington, Canada, February 18, 1825.

\textsuperscript{149} WP 1/813/21, Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Sir James Kempt about an application by Reverend Cochran for money to build a church in the settlement of Wellington in Canada, February 28, 1825.
Lowery Cole; and deputy quartermaster General Lieutenant Colonel Henry George Smith.\textsuperscript{150} Now, it is only necessary to point out that Smith, under D’Urban’s direction, frequently combined military and civilian administrative duties within the office of deputy quartermaster general. For example, in a June 1835 directive D’Urban appointed Smith to the civil and military command of the District of Queen Adelaide’s Province.\textsuperscript{151} With this directive in hand, Smith immediately set up a judicial and bureaucratic structure to govern the new province. In a confidential letter of July 13, 1838, Smith wrote to Governor D’Urban that Colonial Secretary Lord Charles Glenelg praised him “not only for his Military Services, but for his gracious, humble, and enlightened administration of the Civil Government of the province under his control and the adjacent District.”\textsuperscript{152} Upon examination of this listing, it is evident that there was a mixture of military and civilian civil servants who reported to the military governor. Civil and military jurisdictions overlapped and jurisdictional turf wars ensued, threatening organizational chaos.

The War Office recognized the inherent dangers of such a system existing in the colonies and attempted to establish systematic guidelines to prevent administrative anarchy. Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, realizing “the anomalous position” the present situation placed on military governors instructed the Adjutant Generals Office to formulate an unambiguous policy for military governors to follow.\textsuperscript{153} A November 20, 1824 circular letter issued by Bathurst provided specific guidelines for military governors throughout the empire. Specifically, “The King having taken into His Consideration the necessity of laying

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{150} United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. V, 99 and 1835 Hart’s Army List.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} PRO, WO 135/2,
  \item \textsuperscript{153} PRO, W. O. 43/244 Copy [additional notes to] submitted to His Majesty.
\end{itemize}
down some definite Regulations by which Governors or Officers administering the Government of His Colonies and Settlements abroad, and the Officers in command of Military Forces in those Colonies and Settlements, may more clearly understand the relative duties and authority. I have received His Majesty’s Commands to communicate to you, for the guidance of yourself and your successors in the Government of the Colony of the following instructions.”

The letter issued to all colonies administered by military governors proved to be such a success that it became incorporated into the King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837 and the subsequent Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1844.

The instructions consisted of ten articles:

1⁰. Whenever it may seem fit to His Majesty to entrust the Civil Government of the Colony of ____________ to an Officer, holding a Commission in His Majesty’s Land Forces, of the Rank of Colonel, or of any superior Rank, and whenever in pursuance of His Majesty’s standing Instructions the Civil Government may devolve upon any such Officers, he will consider himself as invested by virtue of that appointment with the Military Authority and Command over His Majesty’s Forces within the Colony, unless His Majesty should specially appoint some other Military Officer of higher Rank, or of the same Rank, or, of the same Rank, but bearing a Commission of earlier date, to take the Command of those Forces.

2⁰. But when His Majesty shall see fit to confide the Civil Government of the Colony to a person who does not hold any Commission in his Land forces, or who holds a Commission of inferior rank to that of a Colonel, and whenever, in pursuance of His Majesty’s standing Instructions, the Civil Government may devolve upon any such person, the following Rules are to be observed, for preventing any conflict of authority between any such Civil Governor and the Military Officer who may be appointed to the Command of His Majesty’s Land Forces in the Colony.

3⁰. It will be the duty of any such Civil Governor, or person administering the Civil Government, to issue to the Officer having the Command of His Majesty’s forces within the Colony, such Orders respecting the marching of the Troops, or the distribution of them, or the making and marching Detachments and Escorts, or respecting any other military service, as the safety or welfare of the Colony may render necessary. It will be the duty of the Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Forces to carry all such Orders into execution, and he alone will be responsible to His Majesty for the prompt and efficient performance of any such service in all its details.

4⁰. If, however, the Colony should be invaded, or assailed by a Foreign Enemy, and become the scene of active military operations, the power of the Civil Governor, or

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154 PRO, W.O.43/244, Circular to Governors of Colonies as to the Limits of their Military Authority.
the person administering the Civil government, to issue any such orders, will be suspended, and during any such emergency, the Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Land Forces will, upon his own responsibility, and with reference to the Orders of the Civil Governor, or Person administering the Civil government act in such manner as he may consider necessary for the defence and security of the Colony.

5th. It will be the Duty of the Governor, or Person administering the Civil Government of the Colony, as representing His Majesty, to give the word in all places within his Government, except only during the continuance of such active military operations as are noticed in the preceding paragraph.

6th. The Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Land ** will make to the Governor, or Person administering the Civil government of the Colony, returns of the state and condition of the Troops under his Command, of the Military Departments and of the Stores, magazines, and Fortifications within the Colony.

7th The Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Forces will consider himself as charged with the single exclusive superintendence of all details connected with the Military Department, with the Regimental Duty and the Discipline of the Troops, with the Inspections, and with summoning and holding Courts Martial, Garrison, or Regimental.

8th The Sentences of Courts-Martial will be carried into execution without the previous sanction of the Civil Governor, or Person administering the Civil Government, except only in cases where Sentence of Death may be pronounced in which case, execution of the sentence will be suspended, until the sentence shall have been approved on His Majesty’s behalf, by such Civil Governor, or other Person or Persons administering the Civil Government.

9th The Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Forces will render to the Civil government of the Colony, a Duplicate of such Returns as he may, from time to time, make either to the Commander-in-Chief at Home, or to any Military Officer, upon whose more general Command his own local Command may be dependent, so far as such Returns relate to the detail of the Military Department, the Regimental Duty the Discipline of the Troops, the Inspections, or Courts-Martial, General, Garrison, or Regimental.

10th. The preceding Instructions will form the Rules for your guidance upon this subject in the performance of your duties as Civil Governor of His Majesty’s Colony of ____________.

The Commander-in-Chief will issue, as occasion may require, corresponding Instructions for their guidance, the Military Officers in Command of His Majesty’s Forces within your Government.155

Shortly after the issuance of this circular letter, Bathurst issued a second supplemental circular letter. This letter, specifically addressed to military officers who held civil appointments

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155 Ibid.
in the smaller colonies Bermuda, Tobago, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, Honduras, Bahamas, St. Christopher’s, Prince Edward’s Islands, and Van Diemen’s Land informed them that they were also subject to the instructions of the initial circular letter of November 1824. Bathurst points out that while the governors of these colonies were military men, they were to concern themselves with civil matters only and not interfere with the duties and regulations of officers placed in those colonies by the staff (Horse Guards). Five specific points are enumerated in the instructions: the military authority of the civil governor shall remain strictly local and will not extend beyond the limits of the colony; the exercise of the civil authority will not interfere with the “General Officers employed generally upon the Staff of the station” even if that officer is of inferior rank or resides in the same local as the governor, furthermore the civil governor will not hinder or obstruct Half Yearly Inspections of Troops, Confidential Reports, the Reports of Vacancies, or an recommendations concerning the change or relief of regiments or detachments; that the addition of the governor to the staff will not infringe on the general officers ability to command the troops even if that officer is of inferior rank; that the civil governor is only allowed horses and rations for servants allotted to a major general even though he may be of higher rank; civil governors appointed to the staff will not be reimbursed (by the Horse Guards) for aide de camps or any other person assisting him while on the staff. Bathurst concludes the document by observing that the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Mauritius, New South Wales, the Western Coast of Africa, and the principal Governments in British North America were exempt from the supplemental letter.

It is necessary at this point to briefly examine the duties of a number of military staff appointments available to officers in the colonies. While these positions were specifically

156 PRO, W. O. 43/244, Circular letter to the Remaining Military Officers who hold Civil Governments.
administrative in function, many times these offices acquired civil and judicial roles as well. The use of the military in colonial civilian administrative posts proved attractive to the Secretary at War and Parliament for the simple reason it was cheaper to employ military men rather than civilians. Michael Fisher points out that seconded army officers could be had at cheaper salaries than civilian civil servants.\textsuperscript{157} With British garrisons spread across the globe, it made fiscal and psychological sense to employ these troops in a highly visible capacity that implied both efficiency and power. As D.A. Washbrook has ably pointed out in his study of early nineteenth-century British India, a powerful military presence asserted itself as the dominant institution within the state, subsuming all other institutions.\textsuperscript{158} Washbrook observes that the army’s strength was apparent by its high visibility throughout India with deputations of soldiers carrying out routine civil activities such as revenue collection and judicial functions.\textsuperscript{159} Within the colonies, Britain’s army was not merely an instrument of defense, but also a means for the structuring and staffing all other administrative posts. Moreover, British staff positions were principally administrative in nature making the transition to civil administration relatively easy. In a December 21, 1832 letter to Charles Grant, Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General of India, observed that military officers were not only cheaper, but were “generally of a mature age, … more docile, more active and more accustomed to the management of natives, and can be sent back to his regiment in case of misconduct or inefficiency.”\textsuperscript{160} The military offices of deputy adjutant general, deputy quartermaster general, judge advocate, and barrack master were all positions that were easily adaptable to carry out civilian tasks.


\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.

The Adjutant General of the Forces was one of the two principal staff officers of the kingdom. Along with the quartermaster general, these two officers worked in conjunction with the king, the titular commander-in-chief of all British forces. It was the adjutant general’s duty to see that the commander’s orders were carried out. Even the quartermaster general vetted orders through the adjutant general’s office, making this position the more powerful of the two officers. The adjutant general was responsible for issuing all orders, making up daily, weekly, and monthly returns, determining the state of troops, and keeping rosters of duty.161 Additional duties of the adjutant general included overseeing discipline and punishment within the army, the drilling of regiments, and the clothing and equipping of troops. The King’s Regulations of 1837 state, “the General Officer Commanding is to report to the Adjutant-General, as soon as possible after its March, the State and Condition, with respect to Arms, Ammunition, and General Equipment, in which it marched to its new destination.”162 However, regimental staff officers handled many of these responsibilities relegating the adjutant general’s duty to one of administrative oversight.

In field armies and in the colonies, the position of deputy adjutant general fulfilled many similar duties of the adjutant general’s office but on a smaller scale. Regulations stipulated out that the deputy adjutant general and the assistant adjutant general should be well acquainted with all army regulations. On campaign and in the colonies, the deputy adjutant general frequently acted as his commander’s chief of staff and charged with such duties relevant to unit strength, parade states, casualty returns for both men and horses, drill, matters of discipline, and prisoners.163 An examination of the deputy adjutant generals who served on foreign stations

161 S. G. P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters, 11.
162 Adjutant General’s Office, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837, 30.
between 1815 and 1837 reveal that of the forty-eight officers who served in this position, thirty had previous staff experience during the Napoleonic Wars.

Quartermaster general’s duties included the quartering, marching, and encamping of troops. S. G. P. Ward notes that in 1792, the Quartermaster’s Department was a sleepy little office inhabited by only three officers: the quartermaster general, a deputy quartermaster general, and an assistant quartermaster general. The duties of the department were almost non-existent consisting only of determining march routes for troops from place to place. However, the incessant warfare of the Napoleonic Era caused the Quartermaster’s Department to take on additional duties and expand beyond recognition. Prompted by the British Army’s debacle in the Dutch Campaign of 1798, the department sponsored a school that would train future quartermasters in supply and equipage of forces in the “French mode” of rapid warfare. Additional lessons learned in Spain and Portugal prompted the branch to include topographical studies that prepared surveys on terrain through which an army may have to pass. Oman notes that in early 1810 the department issued a small manual, The Instructions for the officers in the department of the Quartermaster-General, to all departmental staffs. The manual contained instructions and sample forms on all of the possible duties the quartermaster department encountered. In the book, officers received instructions on noting terrain and features of importance including positions, valleys, the size of villages, the character of the roads, the location and the depth of rivers, and the accessibility of fords. The King’s Regulations of 1837

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164 S. G. P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters, 11.
165 Ibid., 24.
166 C. W. C. Oman, Wellington’s Army, 155.
directed assistant quartermaster generals to have a comprehensive knowledge of the roads, the terrain, and the principal rivers in the army’s theater of operations.167

Quartermaster generals who served in a colonial administrative capacity carried out many additional duties beside those outlined in the regulations. The career of Lieutenant Colonel Francis Cockburn, deputy quartermaster of Canada who served on the staff of Governor General, Charles Lennox, 4th Duke of Richmond, offers insights into the additional duties and obligations quartermasters at foreign stations encountered. Cockburn entered the military by purchasing a cornet’s commission in the 7th Dragoon Guards in 1800. His entrance into one of the army’s more prestigious cavalry regiments indicates that Cockburn’s family had both money and connections.168 The young officer participated in the 1807 Buenos Aires South American Expedition and served from 1809-1810 in the Peninsula. While in the Peninsula, Cockburn was a member of Wellington’s staff serving as deputy assistant adjutant general and occasionally as a deputy judge advocate. In 1811, he secured a commission as a major in the Canadian Fencibles displaying gallantry in actions at Red Mills and Salmon River, New York. Cockburn’s plan for establishing a naval base at Penetanguishene attracted the attention of Sir Thomas Sydney Beckwith, quartermaster general for Upper and Lower Canada.169

By the end of the American War, Cockburn had transferred to the quartermaster general’s department for Upper Canada. While serving in this capacity, he received a promotion to lieutenant colonel in the New Brunswick Fencibles and rose to the post of assistant quartermaster general for Upper Canada, whose duties included the settling and supplying the initial groups of

167 United Kingdom, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1st June 1837, 38.

168 Francis Cockburn was born November 10, 1780, the fifth son of Sir James Cockburn, 6th Baron of Langton, and his second wife, Augusta Anne Ayscough. The purchase price of a cornetency in the Dragoon Guards and Dragoon regiments amounted to £840, a considerable expense in the early nineteenth century. See Ed McKenna, The Dictionary of Canadian Biography, “Francis Cockburn; and Adjutant General’s Office; and The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837 44.

169 Ed McKenna, The Dictionary of Canadian Biography, “Francis Cockburn,”
immigrants and soldiers under Bathurst’s plan of assisted immigration. In 1818, Cockburn moved to Quebec where he became deputy quartermaster general for Upper and Lower Canada. Ed McKenna notes that during this period as the senior officer in the department, Cockburn was accountable for the military settlements in Upper Canada at Perth [established in 1816], Richmond [1818], Lanark [1820], and the Bay of Quinte area and Glengarry County [1815], and in Lower Canada on Rivière Saint-François [1816]. Because of the increased activity in placing and maintaining these new settlements, Cockburn expanded his office to deal not only with military and topographical matters, but also with settlers’ petitions and town planning. The quartermaster’s office worked closely with the Duke of Richmond, accompanying the governor in his ill-fated inspection tour of military and civil settlements throughout Upper Canada.

Cockburn remained in Canada serving in the quartermaster’s office during the early period of Dalhousie’s governorship, leaving the department for Britain in mid-1823. He returned to Canada a year and a half later as one of five commissioners studying a plan by the Canada Company to stimulate further emigration to the colony. Cockburn made several additional trips to North America all concerned with opening new lands for settlement. In 1829, the veteran quartermaster general became governor of British Honduras, a position he held for seven years. Cockburn ended his military career as the governor of Bahamas in 1837.

The judge advocate and his office provided interpretation and enforcement of the British Army’s Articles of War. A civilian political appointee, the judge advocate general headed a department that was the principal advisor to the king and commander in chief on the administration of law within the military. As the army’s chief prosecutor the judge advocate

170 Ibid.
had the authority to conduct trials, but frequently delegated these duties to subordinates preferring instead to interpret and advise on points of law. Because the adjutant general’s department was responsible for matters of discipline, it worked closely with officials in the judge advocates department. In field armies that operated outside of Britain, representatives of the judge advocate’s department enforced military law. Overseas branches normally consisted of a colonel with several assistants with the rank of major working under him. Wellington’s judge advocate during the Peninsula War, Colonel Francis Seymour Larpent kept a journal of his experiences with the army. His journal offers a fascinating insight to the workings of the department. Larpent noted that his duties consisted primarily of oversight; reviewing court-martial verdicts, correcting legal procedural errors, and providing Wellington advice on the legal confirmation of sentences handed down. Larpent’s journal reinforces the notion that there was within the judge advocate’s office a serious shortage of legally trained personnel in the British Army. The serious lack of legal personnel forced commanders in the field to frequently rely on a small cadre of lawyer/officers whose duty was to oversee judicial matters. On the divisional and regimental level, assistant adjutant generals, or regimental adjutants frequently adjudicated legal cases. Military governors coped with similar situations in colonies that lacked sufficient numbers of civil judicial authorities versed in English law. These situations were most evident in the Cape Colony where Dutch law prevailed and in India, which lacked trained Company judges, attorneys, and law clerks. Military authorities in Bengal, at the beginning of the First Burma War, complained that the forces earmarked for the campaign “were seriously hampered by the

172 Adjutant General’s Office, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837, 10.
173 Richard Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, 314.
number of its officers seconded to the ‘civil’ service as de facto [tax] Collectors and Magistrates.\(^\text{174}\)

The duties of the barrack master were defined in an 1820, publication, The Instructions to Assistant Inspectors General of Barracks. Barrack masters’ responsibilities included reporting on such issues as to the condition of the existing barracks, the efficiency of his assistants, the nature of leases and the amount of rent paid on privately owned buildings used by the military, plans to build new structures, and the state and cleanliness of the privies. Remarkably, the instructions allowed the barrack master to engage in a civilian trade as long as the occupation does not interfere with the executions of his duties.\(^\text{175}\) The instructions also indicate that the barrack master is an integral member of the civilian community enjoining him to make available for civilian use military buildings. The document also advised the barrack master to make his fire engine and fire fighting equipment available for public use.\(^\text{176}\)

Many colonial garrisons employed a barrack master general. Hart’s Army Lists for the years 1815-1837 reveal that barrack master generals were posted in Ireland, Gibraltar, Malta, Bahamas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. John’s Newfoundland, and Portugal. According to the King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837, officers who held the post of barrack master were under the direction and authority of the Civil Branch of the Ordinance Department.\(^\text{177}\) Ward and Haythornthwaite note that the Secretary at War set up a separate department, the Barrackmaster General’s Office, without parliamentary sanction in the late


\(^{175}\) Instructions to Assistant Inspectors General of Barracks (London: C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Temple Bar, 1820), 7.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., 11 and 17.

\(^{177}\) S. G. P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters, 11.
eighteenth century. The department enjoyed unusual status in that all expenditures came before Parliament after the fact thus encouraging profligate spending. The estimate of expenditures by the department in 1796 amounted to £10 million when total spending on barracks for period 1792 to 1804 amounted to only £9 million. After the resignation of the first barrack master general, Colonel Oliver De Lancey in 1804, and the prosecution and imprisonment of the department’s agent, Alexander Davison, the Secretary at War more closely monitored the office.

There were three specific grades to this duty with a commensurate rank requirement for command. Officers holding the rank of major or higher were entitled to be barrack masters first class; captains; barrack masters second class, and lieutenants; barrack masters third class. It appears from extant biographies of officers who served as barrack masters that the position was frequently assigned to long serving soldiers who had rendered faithful staff service, but were no longer fit for active duty. Deputy barrack master of Ireland General Quin John Freeman is a good example of this type of soldier. Freeman joined the military as an ensign in July 1775. He was educated for the Engineer Department but initially served as an infantry officer. In 1777, while serving in America, Freeman became brigade major to Brigadier General Simon Fraser and served in that capacity until Fraser’s death later that same year. His next posting was as aide de camp to Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Haldimand. Freeman, promoted to captain in the 24th Regiment in 1786, served with his regiment in Canada from 1787 to 1793. Recalled to Britain, Freeman acted as first aide de camp to Lieutenant General R. Cunningham, commander in chief in Ireland where he remained until 1796. Later that same year, he was appointed

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180 Ibid.
assistant adjutant general, a position that Freeman held until May 1799 when he received the assignment of deputy barrack master general of the forces in Ireland. The Army List notes that Freeman held the post of Deputy Barrack Master General of Ireland until 1822. In 1823, Freeman’s name and post he supervised disappear from the list.

**Conclusion**

British military officers found the process of networking critical in securing coveted positions in colonial service. Individual officers established networking bonds on many levels. Among the relationships that fostered bond were wartime comradeship, regimental ties, familial links, patron-client associations, religious affiliations, and occupational ties. Nevertheless, among British officers, the common denominator in bonding was that all had endured the rigors of combat and the privation of campaign. The wartime hardships that they had experienced frequently created a relationship of mutual respect, trust, and assistance. The wartime relationships forged during the Napoleonic Wars frequently lasted a lifetime as comrades-in-arms consistently remained in contact with one another even after their military careers ended and they had left the service.

In the wake of the British Army’s massive demobilization that followed in immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, a substantial number of officers consistently relied on networks they had established with senior officers in securing needed employment. In the next chapter, the career of Henry George Wakelyn Smith provides an illustration of how these post-Napoleonic British officers consistently and repeatedly employed the intricate web of networking in securing overseas colonial employment.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: HARRY SMITH, A CASE STUDY OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
BY MILITARY MEN

On April 9, 1836, the Times of London reported that, some weeks earlier, a great meeting had occurred at King William’s Town in the Cape Colonies between the Xhosa people who inhabited the land between the Buffalo and the Kei Rivers and British authorities. An official delegation, led by Colonel Henry G. W. Smith, deputy quartermaster general to Cape Colony Governor General Sir Benjamin D’Urban, had called the principal tribes of the region together for the purpose of administering the oath of allegiance to the population and magistrates who had become “voluntary subjects” to King William IV.¹ This new land, designated by Smith as Queen Adelaide’s Land, won by British arms the previous year, was neither ordered, sanctioned, nor accepted by Lord Gleneg’s Colonial Office.² Smith, however, with D’Urban’s approval governed the conquered land for months as a virtual dictator appointing “magistrates,” administering British law, and constructing missionary schools in an effort to turn the Xhosa territory into a slice of “little England.”³

On January 7, 1836, Xhosa people, including their principal chiefs Macomo and Tyalie, assembled before Smith. He appeared before them in a full dress uniform of gold and scarlet, accompanied by his wife and military staff to formally accept the annexation of the Xhosa territories into the British Empire. The elaborate ceremony began with an “impressive prayer” in

¹ Times (London), April 9, 1836
² This war was one of a series of eight desultory combats of increasing severity between the Anglo-Boers and the Xhosa that spanned nearly a century. The war that Smith prosecuted, known as the Sixth Frontier War, lasted almost a year, concluding in late 1835 with the Xhosa being pushed beyond the Fish River to the Keiskamma River. See J. B. Peires, “The British and the Cape 1814-1834,” in Richard Elphick and Hermann Gilioorid, eds., The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1979), 489.
³ Smith, however, would dispute the term dictator frequently referring to himself in private correspondence as governor. Furthermore, Smith noted that the Xhosa people required the stern hand of a father-like figure referring to the subject people as “my children.” See “The Address of Colonel Smith to the Xhosa Chiefs, 7th January 1836,” in G. C. Moore Smith, ed., The Autobiography of Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith ...(New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1902).
the Xhosa language by the Reverend Mr. Chalmers followed by a signal gun. Smith then arose from his chair, took off his cocked hat requested a cheer for King William IV, and then began an hour-long speech which, was translated in Xhosa language by Mr. Theophilius Shepstone, the son of a missionary. In the address, Smith noted that the subjects of the newly annexed territory desired to become sovereign subjects of the British Empire. However, these new subjects must renounce their old way of life and become like the English who educate their children, practice industry, engage in trade, and embrace Christianity. Smith observed, that if they followed his guidance, they would become part of the great British Empire as “real Christians and Englishmen.”

To do otherwise would lead to degradation, evil, and their eventual destruction by the British. He reminded the assembled Xhosa of their recent past when they broke the peace with English. Smith intoned, “You were almost destroyed, soon would have been annihilated, and driven from your native country; your women and children were starving, almost the prey of wild beasts, and the widows of 4000 of your warriors lament their husbands slain during the war; the greater part of your cattle starved or taken; your plunder so treacherously seized from the Colony, lost to you from the robberies of others; you were in a lamentable, nay, a deplorable plight….”

The theatrics ended with Tyalie speaking for all of the Xhosa gathered. The chief thanked Colonel Smith for all he had done for him and his people noting, “They [the Xhosa] do not see the King, nor the Governor, but only Colonel Smith, who is here for the King.”

Moreover, the influential Tyalie reiterated that the tribes appreciate Smith’s goodness and will

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4 “Address of Colonel Smith to the Caffer (sic) Chiefs, 7th January, 1836
5 Ibid.
6 Times (London), April 9, 1836
try to be good subjects and remain peaceable. With this statement all of the tribes present quietly dispersed to their own allotted territories.

This brief example of Colonel Smith’s style of governing the Xhosa reveals many salient features evident in proconsular colonial administration. British proconsuls were career military men, who for the most part, were strong willed self-assured individuals willing to make independent decisions in keeping with the perceived goals of the metropole without supervision. Because of the constraints of time and distance within Britain’s global empire, Colonial Office authority tended to be reactive thereby increasing their dependence on dynamic individuals who were thought to be in a better position to assess conditions in their colony. The Napoleonic Wars served as the incubator for these individuals because the conflict provided them the necessary command, organizational, and administrative skills necessary in governing distant provinces. J. E. Edmonds notes that despite Wellington’s famous observation “I have got an infamous Army… and an inexperienced staff,” his staff officers were, on the whole, an experienced capable lot. Military historian, Philip Haythornthwaite concurs with Edmond commenting that during the Napoleonic period, Wellington was fortunate in that he possessed a number of reliable deputies on which he could depend. Late in his life, even Wellington acknowledged that his officers were well qualified in managing overseas governments and staunchly defended the practice of awarding them governorships. In a lengthy March 7, 1833 communication between the Duke and Lord Hill, entitled “Memorandum upon Military Governments,” Wellington wrote that a grateful nation must not forget the sacrifices these officers made during the war and that

these men should receive compensation either commanding a regiment or administering a civil government.\(^9\)

In addition to possessing competent command and organizational skills, Peninsular officers, especially those who exercised high command, were also an indisputable and visible symbol of the authority of the British state. Zoë Laidlaw notes that in the colonies where British troops were posted, commanding authorities at the Horse Guards were insistent in exercising the greatest amount of influence abroad.\(^10\) A military governor or principal administrator was an unmistakable emblem of Britain’s authority, not only protecting the colony from outside threats, but also monitoring its internal security through both overt and covert means.\(^11\) Moreover, the

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\(^9\) Surely men with such qualities and so employed cannot be allowed to believe that the Legislature is unmindful of their services, and that their Sovereign is at this moment to be deprived of the means of rewarding those services, which His Majesty and his Predecessors have so long enjoyed.

There is nothing so easy as to give any institution an unpopular name, and then to run it down, and abolish it. Accordingly the Military Governments are called sinecures. The fact is, that there are many of them essentially necessary to the Service; and this if these situations were abolished to-morrow, and the obnoxious individuals who now enjoy the advantage of the income allotted to these situations were deprived of that income, it would be found necessary to appoint others to perform the same duties, probably at an increased expense . . . .

It may be contended, and it is true, that the Officers of the Army have shared in booty and prizes, and that there have been other rewards for distinguished services, beside the Commissions of Colonels of Regiments and the conferring of Governments . . . .

During the late war many Officers of the Army, as well as of the Navy, having performed distinguished services, and having been raised by the King to the Peerage, His Majesty was enabled by Parliament to provide for them, so as that they might support that dignity; and it is beyond a doubt that Parliament will never fail to consider of the faithful and zealous services of those against the enemy of their country, whom His Majesty may think proper thus to reward.

But these men are extraordinary instances of great services performed during a long series of years in a most arduous war


\(^11\) One example of measuring the internal security of a province was a method employed by Sir John Colborne, Governor General of Canada and Commander-in-Chief of Military Forces in the colony. In 1838, Colborne was instrumental in the establishment of a military intelligence service composed of regular officers to observe both disaffected elements of the local populations and the newly established police forces. These
monarchy of George IV along with the Tory ministries of Liverpool, Canning, Goderich, and Wellington, championed policies that insured security and loyalty both at home and abroad. As such, the Parliamentary majority in conjunction with the Colonial Office chose administrators who embodied a force of will and personality that could check internal subversion and disorder while cultivating the acquiescence and continued loyalty of subject populations.¹²

In addition to men chosen for their leadership abilities and force of character, many British proconsuls embodied a paternalist attitude toward their colonial populations. Coupled with this attitude was a genuine sense of trusteeship that their administration would result in good humanitarian government. The proconsul’s sense of paternalism and trusteeship was born from the aristocratic and autocratic values possessed by officers within the army. Governors consistently complained that existing local institutions, customs, and influential colonial inhabitants stood in the way of implementing responsible, equitable, and humanitarian government. James Kempt, lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, grumbled, “The truth is that I have no Patronage Whatever. When a Judges [sic] appointment becomes vacant it is given as a matter of course to one of the senior members of the Provincial Bar, and I have only one other situation of £100!! a year to give away in the 5 years I have administered the Government.”¹³

Lord Dalhousie also faced difficulties in his attempt to implement responsible government commenting “in this Province I am convinced that much of the mischief arises from the really


state of contempt to which the King’s representative is lowered, without a house to live in respectably, or any patronage to distinguish merit or public services.”

Coupled with these sentiments was the proconsul’s close affiliation with the Anglican Church. It appears that a significant number of the proconsuls were devout Anglicans. Sir John Colborne, Sir Peregrine Maitland, Sir George Arthur, and Sir Stapleton Cotton were known to be religious men. The notable exceptions to the majority of administrators’ religious sentiments were Mountstuart Elphinstone, a deist, and Thomas Maitland, a professed skeptic.

Rowan Strong argues that high officials in the Colonial Office and their overseas administrators believed that the Church of England was valuable to the colonization effort, because it fostered identity and loyalty to the metropole. As such, it was to be promoted and supported wholeheartedly by the state and its colonial agents. Smith’s address to the Xhosa enthusiastically exhibited these sentiments, despite the fact that he had married a Roman Catholic. The ceremony began with a prayer intoned by an Anglican divine and Smith’s subsequent speech extolled the virtues of Christianity while admonishing the gathered tribes to forsake the animist ways of their ancestors. Fully one half of Smith’s address deals with religion, espousing a Hebraic view of history. Accordingly, the history of humankind is a continuous development that enlightens and molds God’s chosen people and through them, the

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14 Dalhousie to Kempt, October 29, 1821 as quoted in Phillip Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government, 55.


17 Harry Smith, aged 24 years, wed Juana Maria de Los Dolores de Leon, aged 14 years, in a Catholic ceremony in 1812. It is known that in the 1830s, Juana conformed to the Church of England, much to the distress of her Spanish relatives. As a result, her Spanish family disowned her. See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, Vol. I, 72-73.
rest of humanity. Smith draws an analogy by noting that once the English were as uncivilized as the Xhosa:

Years ago the English were as naked as you, and ignorant as you, as cruel as you were in the late war; but the bright day which has opened upon you, dawned upon them; they first learnt to believe in the omnipotent power of Almighty God, who judges every many according to his actions; worshipped, honoured, and obeyed Him; they loved their neighbours as themselves, and respecting their property, ceased to be thieves; they believed all that the ministers of God told them. Smith continues by saying that missionary clergymen will teach the people “what God expects from them” and if they heed the missionary’s message they, like the English, will become the favored of God. Smith concludes his message “the great English nation now regard you as British subjects and brothers, love your neighbours as yourself, fear God, honour your King, and the Governor, his representative.”

Henry George Wakelyn Smith’s military career provides useful insights into the personalities and motivations of the typical post-Napoleonic British proconsul. His life was, for the most part, typical of the officers of the period who moved between military and civilian spheres consistently performing within each the tasks at hand. This ability can be attributed to two general trends at work in the British Army in the post-Waterloo period. For a significant number of officers, the Napoleonic Wars had been the incubator for turning out trained staff officers proficient in the three basic elements of war fighting: that of operations, personnel, and supplies. For much of the British Army’s history before the Napoleonic Wars, these services operated at the most simple level, necessary only during wartime and frequently organized on an ad hoc basis. Not until 1803, with reforms instituted by the Duke of York, were staff positions

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19 “Address of Colonel Smith to the Caffer (sic) Chiefs, 7th January, 1836
20 Ibid.
and their subsequent duties operated on reasonably efficient lines. During this period, the seconding of regimental officers into staff positions in the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, or the military secretary departments enabled these men to gain experience in the organization and administration. Duties in these areas included that of discipline, training, accounting for unit strengths, quartering troops, arranging camps, determining march routes, intelligence, mapping, and the sending and receiving of correspondence. Wellington’s nearly six years of campaigning in the Peninsula not only refined, but also expanded on these duties by adding those of reconnaissance, the planning and issuance of operational orders, and the administration of civil affairs in occupied localities. Officers who received training in these departments were well qualified to work in the spheres of either civilian or military administration.

The second trend that prepared these officers well for work in administrative tasks was the level of their education. Military historian Hew Strachan observes that the rising professionalism of British officers was due largely to the fact that commissioning in the officer corps during the Napoleonic period was based on education. Strachan notes that literacy was the leveling agent that enabled landed and royal connections to mix with the “middling sort” on an equitable basis. To have an education was the mark of a gentleman. In a December 8, 1845 letter from Wellington to Fitzroy Somerset, the Duke observed, “There is no greater mistake than to suppose the Service performed by the British Army could be carried on by any other description of Man excepting one educated as is an English Gentleman!” Indeed, it was during the French Revolutionary Wars that Britain established at High Wycombe a Military College that

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22 Ibid., 252.
24 Herbert Papers, Wellington to Fitzroy Somerset, December 8, 1845 as quoted in Hew Strachan, Wellington’s Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 111.
trained staff officers. Smith, however, did not attend the Military College, but received practical experience in staff work early in his military career serving in that capacity in South America, the Peninsula, and in North America.

Henry George Wakelyn Smith was born into a family that was neither aristocracy nor landed gentry. His father, John Smith was a surgeon in the Cambridgeshire village of Whittlesey, while his mother, Eleanor Moore, was the daughter of the local vicar. However, his mother’s family was slightly more illustrious than his father’s as it was said that her family descended from the line of Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII’s martyred Chancellor and canonized saint in the Catholic Church.

Harry was one of fourteen children, eleven of which survived to adulthood. In his autobiography, Smith writes that he received a most excellent education from the curate of St. Mary’s Church, Reverend George Burgess, learning subjects such as natural philosophy, the classics, algebra, and music. Moreover, it appears that Harry’s father enjoyed a comfortable living as evidenced by his ability to provide education for his many children, two of which followed in his footsteps as surgeons. Additional information concerning the family’s finances can be gathered from the amount of money Dr. John Smith spent on outfitting Harry for the army. When Harry received his commission, the elder Smith spent most of his available money on the purchase of horses for his son borrowing, an additional £100 to pay for the purchase of uniforms and accoutrements.

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26 Ibid., 1.
Harry Smith’s family background fits many of the parameters that characterized British officers who entered the army at the end of the eighteenth century and then became colonial administrators. Referring to the social profile outlined in a previous chapter, Smith nearly fits all the principal categories. Smith, born in June 1787, entered the army’s 95th Regiment in May of 1805, aged seventeen years. The archetypical company grade British officer of the Napoleonic Wars entered the army in his teens with the median age being seventeen and a half years. Smith’s father was a professional man employed in a trade that placed him firmly in the ranks of the “middling sort.” Moreover, his maternal grandfather, a clergyman, occupied a similar position on the social scale. Recent comparable research by Zoë Laidlaw concurs by observing, “many of those who proceeded to significant colonial careers came from the middle-class professional backgrounds, rather from the landed gentry, they were the sons of career soldiers, clergymen, and doctors.”

Continuing the representative profile. Smith’s birthplace of Cambridgeshire was a rural location, which also fits our typical officer of the period. However, the county was not a primary military recruiting area during the “Invasion Panic of 1803-05” that prompted a substantial increase in men answering the call to the colors. In his autobiography, however, Smith recounts that he succumbed to the patriotic fervor of the time noting “In 1804, the whole country was en masse [author’s italics] collected in arms as volunteers from the expected invasion of the French, and being now sixteen years of age, I was received into the Whittlesea troop of Yeomanry Cavalry commanded by Captain Johnson.”

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Smith entered the regular army in the spring of 1805 when General, Sir William Stewart secured him a lieutenancy in the newly formed 95th Regiment. He was fortunate in that the regiment had received authorization to raise an additional 2nd Battalion and had not yet fulfilled its complement of officers. As this unit was a newly formed regiment with little in the way of line seniority, it had a low purchase price. As a result, Smith’s father was able to purchase a lieutenancy for the relatively inexpensive price of £100, a real bargain since the set fee for established regiments was established at £500. Harry now began a life-long career in military service.

Almost immediately, the new 2nd lieutenant saw action as a detachment of three companies of the 95th participated in Sir Samuel Auchmuty’s expedition to Montevideo, South America. While on duty in South America, Smith was appointed adjutant that, he noted, was “a great honour for so young an officer.” The adjutant was selected by the commander from the available regimental subalterns to fulfill duties similar to those of the army’s adjutant general.

30 The 95th Regiment was an experimental corps of infantry trained in the use of the rifle rather than the smoothbore musket. In addition to the employment of a specialized weapon, the regiment was to be instructed in the special tactics and drill of the riflemen. Proponents, Colonel Coote Manningham and (then) Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. William Stewart, mindful of the success of open order skirmish tactics employed during the War of American Independence recommended that a unit be trained in this method. In January 1800, Crown consent was obtained in a Royal Circular that authorized the formation of such a corps. In part the order read:

CIRCULAR

Address to Officers Commanding the 2nd Battalion Royals, the 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 29th, 49th, 55th, 69th, 71st, 72nd, 79th, 85th, and 92nd Regiments.

Horse Guards,
17 January 1800

Sir—I have the honour to inform you that it is His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief’s intention to form a corps of detachments from the different regiments of the line for the purpose of its being instructed in the use of the rifle and in the system of exercise adopted by soldiers so armed …. See; Willoughby Verner, History & Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, 2 Vols., (London: John Bale, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd., 1912), 19.

31 Horse Guards, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army, “Established Price of Commissions,” (London: The Horse Guards, 1837), 44.


33 H. L. Scott, Military Dictionary: Comprising Technical Definitions; on Raising and Keeping Troops;
As Philip J. Haythornthwaite observed these duties included much tiresome clerical work such as keeping accurate regimental returns, compiling inventories and inspection reports, keeping the letter book, advising the commander on the correct customs of service, communicating in a clear and concise manner the orders of the commander, and issuing a myriad of reports concerning the health and physical well-being of the unit. In short, the adjutant must be a competent manager of nearly every regimental affair and work in conjunction with the other members of the command staff. This relatively minor staff position prepared Smith for future organizational and managerial roles in both military and civil affairs.

For nearly seven years, Smith served as both a combat and staff officer in the Peninsula, North America, and Belgium. He is most unusual among British officers of the period in that he participated in all of the significant actions of the Napoleonic Wars including Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Bladensburg, Washington, New Orleans, and Waterloo. During this time, Smith made acquaintances and established friendships among influential and powerful individuals enabling him to create a valuable network that would prove most useful later in his career. Among his friends and acquaintances was the Duke of Wellington, who thought so highly of the young captain that he gave the bride away at Smith’s 1812 wedding. Later, Smith would renew the Duke’s acquaintance hunting with him in France during Wellington’s tenure as commander of the Army of Occupation in 1816-1818. The relationship that Smith forged with Wellington paid dividends. In 1824, the Duke recommended him to Major General Sir Herbert Taylor, Military Secretary at the Horse Guards, for employment nothing that Smith was a proven

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35 Wellington’s indulgence went so far as to give permission for Smith to be married by a Roman Catholic chaplain from the Connaught Rangers. See Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 32-33.
and efficient officer who was competent handling any task assigned. Officers who had a personal association with Wellington discovered that his patronage was invaluable when searching for employment or requesting promotion. As Smith discovered, the networking conduit that traveled through Wellington expanded throughout the entire British Empire, with important links between and within the colonies, as well as connections back to the metropole especially at the Horse Guards.

The process of networking through patronage was not limited to Wellington alone. Indeed, there were many general grade officers at home and abroad that could assist in securing the much-coveted overseas positions. While campaigning in the Peninsula, Smith forged lifelong bonds with Fitzroy Somerset, Henry Hardinge, Lowry Cole, James Kempt, Benjamin D’Urban, and the Napier brothers, many of whom played significant and influential roles in post 1815 colonial/imperial administration. As Hew Strachen has observed, the “Peninsular Network” was particularly strong and beneficial to young promising officers in that it connected them to many of the principal military leaders of the age including powerful individuals in successive governments, parliaments, the aristocracy, and the royal court. Throughout his military and colonial career, Smith frequently called on these individuals to help him further his advancement. For example, in 1826, while posted in Nova Scotia, Smith was placed unattached on half-pay, a position that proved to be financially difficult. In an October 16, 1826 letter to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Smith notes, “he would be ruined if he were retired on half-pay without [benefit of] a swift appointment.”

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36 University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, W.P. 1/797/13 Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Sir Herbert Taylor, recommending Lieutenant Colonel H.G. Smith of the Rifle Brigade to the Commander in Chief, 12 July 1824


39 W.P. 1/863/19 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel H.G. Smith to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, asking for his
Nova Scotia and “my dear and valued friend” from the Peninsular War, came to Smith’s assistance by appointing him his temporary aide-de-camp.\textsuperscript{40} It was under Kemp’s guidance that Smith gained valuable experience in learning how to carry out administrative duties “which [Smith noted] was afterwards of the greatest possible use to me when administering a Government myself.”\textsuperscript{41}

Throughout his life, Smith continually made use of various networks and frequently called on patrons for assistance in moving up the military and colonial hierarchy. Within weeks of receiving Kemp’s assignment, Smith accepted a non-regimental staff position as deputy quartermaster general in Jamaica. For Smith, leaving the regiment was bittersweet, writing; “I had served twenty-five [records indicate that at this time, he had served only twenty-one] years in this Corps during the most eventful periods. I had never been on service but I was fighting with some portion of it. No officer had ever posted it so often on outlying picquet, and I had fought where it had not been; thus were severed on ordinary or transient ties.”\textsuperscript{42} Despite regrets in leaving his regiment, the Jamaican position was a posting that Smith had actively sought. Letters exchanged in the summer and fall of 1826 between Somerset and Smith reveal the intricate, complex, and personal nature of the active network system active within military and colonial circles.

In July 1826, Smith, posted in Nova Scotia, learned that Colonels James Mitchell and Samuel Fullarton of the Rifle Brigade intended to retire. Additionally, Major William Eeles,

\textsuperscript{40} Kempt was indeed a friend and sympathetic to the young officers hardships. When Smith sailed from Nova Scotia to Jamaica, Kempt drew his A.D.C aside, generously giving him three times the amount of money necessary to pay his passage. See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Vol. 2., 340; and Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 129.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 341.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 342-3
also of the Rifle Brigade, expected to be promoted to a staff position thus opening up a majority in the Rifle Brigade that “should allow Smith to enter the corps as a major.” At the same time, Major General Sir John Keane, military commander in Jamaica, and his deputy adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel Henry George McLeod arrived in Nova Scotia with the news that McLeod would soon resign his post and that the position of deputy quartermaster general would also soon be vacant. The deputy quartermaster general’s post paid a handsome income of £1000 annually and Smith’s promotion to major would make him eligible to apply for the post. Almost immediately, Smith began networking to secure this available colonial position. He immediately wrote Somerset applying for the post, sending along a letter of recommendation from Kempt, and an extract from a letter from Major General Herbert Taylor, Military Secretary, Horse Guards, recommending him for a position in either the West Indies or Jamaica. Furthermore, Taylor’s letter noted that Colonel Charles Gore, the present deputy quartermaster in Jamaica and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Cockburn, deputy quartermaster in Canada intended to exchange their colonial positions. Cockburn, however, did not accept the Jamaican assignment, which instead went to Smith. Within the span of a few months, Smith succeeded in receiving the colonial appointment.

The methods employed by Harry Smith are not unlike typical contemporary networking and hiring practices. He sought the desired employment by making application, soliciting, and receiving the all-important letters of recommendation. Wisely, he chose key influential patrons to write on his behalf. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, letters of recommendation were powerful mechanisms in allowing the candidate access to exclusive networks.

43 W.P. 1/859/9 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Smith to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, seeking promotion or a new post, 19 July 1826 [docketed 18 July 1826].
44 Ibid.
45 Pamela Walker Laird, Pull: Networking and Success Since Benjamin Franklin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
introductions, similar to spoken ones, requested that friends and associates admit the bearer into their network with “access to the privileges, trust and opportunities” associated with that group.  

Letters not only vouched for the candidates’ ability to perform the tasks required for the prospective position, but also guaranteed that their character and social standing warranted membership in that network. In Smith’s case, he possessed the added advantage of access to two distinct yet intertwined networks available to British officers: the metropolitan network centered around Wellington and Taylor at the Horse Guards, and the colonial network consisting of overseas administrators, Kempt and Keane.  

The common connection that linked these two networks together was the Peninsular brotherhood.

All of the participants in Smith’s 1826 employment search had significant Peninsular connections. Furthermore, Smith by possessing these contacts was privy to inside information that worked to his advantage in discovering employment opportunities. Smith’s association with Wellington is well known and needs no further explanation. Lord Fitzroy Somerset served as aide de camp to Wellington throughout the Peninsular War and Waterloo campaign. Smith had known Somerset during his service in Spain as Somerset was once quartered in the home of his wife’s parents. Smith was also well acquainted with Sir John Keane, serving with him in both the Peninsula and the New Orleans campaign. Keane, a colonel during the Peninsular War, served on Wellington’s staff and was present at the battles of Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Nive and Toulouse. Promoted to a major general, Keane served as deputy to Sir Edward M.

University Press, 2006), 22.

Ibid., 23.

Laidlaw that there existed two distinct spheres of influence among military administrators in networking the British Empire, one centered on Wellington and the Horse Guards in London, and the much vaster network of military men in command situations posted throughout the colonies. See Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 21-27.

Ibid., 25.

United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. III
Packenham, the commander of the New Orleans expedition. Smith, who also served in this campaign as assistant adjutant general, worked closely with Keane. Indeed, Smith, in his memoirs, described Keane “as noble a soldier as our country ever produced.” Besides his association with Sir James Kempt in Nova Scotia, Smith had a close and cordial relationship with him in the Peninsula. Kempt had commanded a brigade at the Siege and Storming of Badajoz in the spring 1812, an action in which Smith’s 95th Regiment took a leading role. One year later, at the Battle of Vittoria, Kempt was Smith’s brigade commander. At the Battle of Waterloo, Smith, attached to Wellington’s staff as assistant quartermaster general of the 6th Division, was again reunited with Kempt who commanded the 8th Brigade. In the evening, after the battle, Smith recounts in his autobiography that he made some tea for Sir James Kempt, Sir John Lambert [commander of 10th Brigade, which comprised part of the 6th Division], and himself while they discussed the battle.

It was within this matrix of personal relationships and acquaintances that Harry Smith was able to secure employment. Officers who knew Smith were well acquainted with his character and were willing to make him a part of their exclusive circle. Nonetheless, there was another factor that figured prominently in influencing those who were instrumental in making military and colonial appointments. Smith, as a young officer, associated with important patrons adopting them as his mentors. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, mentors were the social capital that provided opportunities for career advancement. Pamela Walker Laird observes that many successful individuals “required the pull from above” in determining who

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succeeded. Consequently, his acquaintances with many influential and powerful individuals caused Smith to consciously or unconsciously emulate them later in life. However, while it is not certain, a good case can be made that Smith’s method of command and governance were modeled after that of the Duke of Wellington. Smith greatly admired his Peninsular Commander-in-Chief remarking, “[he was] one of the greatest men England or the world ever produced…I love Wellington with a fervour which cannot be exceeded.”

Wellington’s biographers have much to say concerning his style of command and drawing comparisons between the two men is not difficult. Nineteenth century historian, Charles Oman, noted that Wellington was a supremely able military man despite the fact that he had risen in rank because of birth and political connections. His officers and men alike trusted him, but few loved him. In battle he was always confident of victory. Historian Roy Muir observes, “Wellington was a carefully calculating general … He did not fight unless he thought he could win, and that he would gain from the victory.” Coupled with this apparent self-confidence was a notion that Providence was with him in his endeavors. Frequently, he would remark to acquaintances that the “finger of Providence” was with him in explaining extraordinary pieces of good fortune. On the evening following the

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54 In his autobiography, Smith writes of a private conversation he had with Wellington while both were stationed in France with the Army of Occupation. The substance of the conversation centered around the Battle of New Orleans, an action that Smith had participated in, sharing with the Duke his observations on the nature of the battle. At the end of Smith’s description, the Duke said, “I am glad I have had this conversation with you. It agrees as nearly as may be with the opinion I had previously formed.” See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Vol. I, 304-5.
56 Charles W. C. Oman, Welllington’s Army, 1809-1814 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 41.
Battle of Waterloo, the Duke said at dinner to the surviving members of his staff, “The hand of Almighty God has been upon me this day.”\textsuperscript{59} However, historians have discovered that under this veneer of confidence was an aristocratic arrogance manifested by a cold impersonal nature. Charles Esdaile, noteworthy historian of the Peninsular War, characterized Wellington’s style of command as that of “intellectual arrogance and aristocratic hauteur [that] produced a demeanor that was at best curt and distant, and at worst intolerant of human frailty and capable of great injustice.”\textsuperscript{60} Likewise Wellington biographer Elizabeth Longford noted that the Duke had a reputation for caustic repartee with little patience for fools.\textsuperscript{61} Throughout his military career Wellington repeatedly criticized his officers and scorned his troops. At one point during the Peninsular War, Wellington remarked that “these [officers] were the persons on whom [he was] to rely to lead columns against French Generals, and who [were] to carry [his] instructions into execution made him tremble.”\textsuperscript{62} His soldiers fared no better with the Duke revealing, “I have no idea of any great effect being produced on British soldiers by anything but fear of immediate corporal punishment.”\textsuperscript{63}

Smith similarly imitated not only to Wellington's manner of command but his lifestyle as well. He was neither a wealthy man, nor could his family guarantee him a steady income yet he still adopted the habits of one. While posted to the Army of Occupation in France, Smith kept a pack of hounds and a stable of fine horses. In his autobiography, Smith wrote, “Our life in Cambray (France) was one excess of gaiety… We were both young; my wife was beautiful. We

\textsuperscript{59} Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 181.
\textsuperscript{60} Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 96.
\textsuperscript{61} Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword, 352.
\textsuperscript{62} Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History, 97.
\textsuperscript{63} The Duke of Wellington as quoted in Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 111.
were fêted and petted by every one. I was a huntsman of a magnificent pack of hounds, steward of races, riding steeplechase, etc…. We were surrounded by the best society.”64 Unfortunately, his lifestyle frequently caused him to have serious financial problems and forced him to constantly find a means of supplementing his army income. On leaving France in 1818, a worried Smith noted that he fallen behind in paying his bills discovering that “my money was far exceeded by my debts.”65 However, this was not to be the only time Smith faced financial difficulties. Nearly ten years later when posted in the Cape Colony he noted to Juana, his wife, that their financial security would be assured “to grow rich in our old days’ by receiving a post in India.”66 Nevertheless, Smith’s appointment as Adjutant General of British Military Forces in India did not immediately alleviate his fiscal burdens. Just after his arrival on the subcontinent he wrote, “For the present, I am more of a beggar than ever.”67 At that time, Smith continued to repay his substantial debts, which included 11 percent interest and £100 a month on the principal.68 Furthermore, Smith also assumed the financial burden of educating his widowed sister’s two children.

Smith’s command style was similar to that of Wellington’s in many aspects. He was a strict disciplinarian, an excellent tactician, and a confident and decisive battlefield leader. However, unlike his mentor, Smith genuinely sympathized with the hard lot of the enlisted soldier. Apparently, his “middling sort” background caused him to understand and appreciate the common soldier’s plight more than his aristocratic brother officers, who frequently bypassed


65 Ibid., 311.


68 Ibid.
company grade commands by purchasing senior commissions at a young age. For nearly ten years, he had campaigned as a company grade officer and dealt intimately with his troops. During the assault on Badajoz, he accompanied the storming party by scaling the walls characterizing the men under his command, as “every soldier was a hero.” Many years later, in 1819, during a demobilizing ceremony at Shorncliffe in which 300 of his oldest and best soldiers were discharged, Smith recounted that “there was not one who could not relate some act of mutual kindness and reciprocity of feeling in connexion with the many memorable events in which they had taken part.” However, Smith was also a harsh disciplinarian. He could punish as well as praise. In correspondence with Benjamin D’Urban, Smith noted that as commandant of the 75th Regiment he tried a soldier “for the intention to commit a flagrant breach of discipline” sentencing him to transport to Botany Bay. With some disgust, Smith observes that the soldier in question was “liberated by Lord Hill” and had his sentence commuted. Smith, while serving as adjutant general in India refused a request by Colonel Anderson of the 50th Regiment to transfer two of his officers rather than subject the unit to the scandal of a court-martial. In a stern letter to Anderson, Smith noted, “if the officers named were not fit to serve in the 50th Regiment, they were not fit to serve in any other.”

Smith’s command style was authoritarian and imperious. To his superior officers, his brusque manner and quick temper were frequently construed as insubordinate. This behavior

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71 Ibid., 321.

72 PRO, W. O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (marked Field Letter Book, No. 3) Sir Harry Smith.

was most apparent during Smith’s police and peacekeeping duties in Scotland in the turbulent years following Waterloo. Smith described the period as *Bellum in Pace* where “great judgment and patience were required” by his officers and men tasked with maintaining public calm in the midst of significant economic distress. In 1820, while commanding a detachment of the 7th Hussars in Glasgow, Smith received orders to escort a group of radicals to be tried by the civilian authorities. In the process of moving them, a mob formed and began to shower them with stones, brickbats, and all sorts of refuse. Smith refused to fire on the mob preventing another “Peterloo” like incident. Instead, he ordered his troopers to use the flat of their swords to clear the way. When he returned to headquarters, his superior General Sir Thomas Bradford soundly criticized him for his “timid” action. Smith responded to Bradford’s tirade by replying in what he described as a “dictatorial” manner:

> Because, my lord, I was acting under the officers of the law, the magistrates, of whom you are the Commander-in-Chief. They would not act, and I did not desire to bring upon my head either the blood of my foolish and misguided countrymen, or the odium of the Manchester magistrates. I brought off every prisoner; but, my lord, since that is your feeling, give me a written order to march through Glasgow with the same party of soldiers and my prisoners. A mob will soon attempt the rescue, and d----- me, my lord, but I will shoot all Glasgow to please you.\(^74\)

Later in life, as a general officer, Smith adopted self-confidence in his martial ability much like his mentor, Wellington. Longford relates that during the Peninsular War, Wellington counseled General William Carr Beresford on independent command, “Remember that you are a commander in chief and must not be beaten; therefore do not undertake anything with your troops unless you have some strong hope of success.”\(^75\) Apparently, Smith became a disciple of Wellington’s dictum. The Battle of Ferozeshah, fought on December 21-22, 1845, was won

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largely through Smith’s timely effort of personally leading the 50th Regiment forward thereby carrying the right flank of the Sikhs.\textsuperscript{76} One month later, at the Battle of Aliwal, Smith, exercising an independent command, executed a masterful plan and won a stunning victory. Writing to D’Urban just after the battle, Smith remarked, “My Battle [Aliwal] brings me to the exact conclusion that I could not have altered anything or done anything by which I could have achieved the Victory with Less Loss, or more rapidly and decisively. I fell on all hands Cavalry Artillery and Infantry each in support of the other yet each in operation—a mass of irresistible Soldiers.”\textsuperscript{77} Smith concludes the lengthy letter by noting his gratitude to both the Duke of Wellington and to his friend, Durban, who he calls “my Dear Master, in having taught me a great deal.”\textsuperscript{78} In a similar letter written to his sister Alice, Smith comments, “Never was a victory more complete and never was one fought under more happy circumstances, literally with the pomp of a field-day; and right well did all behave. I brought well into action each arm as auxiliary to the other….”\textsuperscript{79} 

Like many proconsuls, Smith’s post-Waterloo career consisted of a combination of military, military/civilian, and civilian positions. While it has been pointed out that he received his initial training in administrative duties as a staff officer during the Napoleonic Wars, it was only after the conclusion of these wars that he actively engaged as a military officer in civilian administrative affairs. During the occupation of France, following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, Smith served as both an officer in the 95th Regiment and as a garrison officer as \textit{Major} 

\textsuperscript{76} Ferozeshah was an unusual battle in that British Governor General and Commander of British and Sepoy, military forces, Sir Henry Hardinge, volunteered to serve as second-in-command to Sir Hugh Gough. Gough, however, failed to inform all of his subordinate generals of the plan of attack. See R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, \textit{The Encyclopedia, from 3500 B.C. to the present} (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), 787. 
\textsuperscript{77} PRO, W.O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (Record of Henry George Smith service). 
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. 
de Place of Cambray (sic). There, he along with an officer of engineers were to “take over Cambray (sic), its guns, stores, etc., from the French Commander and Engineers.” Additional duties included receiving complaints from the inhabitants, acting on them, and making certain general peace was maintained between the citizens and the occupying forces. Wellington, not wishing to precipitate a guerilla insurrection, insisted that British forces “pride themselves on our deportment, and that pride shall not be injured in my keeping.” As Thomas Dwight Veve has observed in his study of the occupation of France following Waterloo, Wellington was cognizant that “if the occupation army acted improperly, the repercussions would threaten the European peace settlement.” Moreover, in the wake of the 1814 and 1815 campaign, Napoleon had intended to launch a guerilla movement similar to the situation his troops had faced in Spain. However, by 1815, war weariness on the part of the French population and the lack of popular support caused this plan to be stillborn. Nevertheless, British troops were aware that any serious incident could lead to instability in that region or even open rebellion. It was for this very reason that Wellington carefully chose capable officers with administrative experience to oversee their areas of occupation. Smith’s fellow officers, however, envied his promotion with one brother

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80 PRO, W. O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (Record of Henry George Smith service).
84 French historian Henry Houssaye notes that barbarous behavior of the Allied Armies in the occupation of France in 1814 had “reconciled the most hostile to Napoleon, and roused the most peaceful to resistance. . . The peasants who were so cruelly disabused of their trust . . . were ready to hunt the enemy like wild beasts, and this was no vain threat. See Henry Houssaye, Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814, France (Felling, England: Worley Publications, 1994; published from the 1914 edition), 44-45.
officer remarking, “Now, how will Harry Smith, after such extended authority, like to come back to the command of a Company.”

Upon the conclusion of the British occupation of France, Harry Smith’s next assignment was similar but far more delicate and hazardous. Smith writes that, in October 1819, his regiment was ordered to maintain security and domestic tranquility during “the Radical Period” in the city of Glasgow and other large manufacturing towns of northern England. His duties included pacifying the local population burdened with problems of large-scale unemployment, an unstable currency, and widespread starvation. Smith noted that many of the disaffected were either demobilized veterans or “misguided and half starved weavers.” The soldiers found the duty thoroughly irksome although the soldiers carried out their task professionally with Smith noting that the “deportment [of the troops] was so mild that we soon gained rather the respect” of the mobs that they faced. In addition to enforcing the peace, the young officer was also tasked with inspecting the Corps of Yeomanry raised to counter the dissatisfaction. Smith thoroughly enjoyed this duty as the local Scottish aristocrats such as the Duke of Montrose, Lord Glasgow, and Lord Balantyre treated him like visiting nobility. Near the end of his posting in Scotland, Smith carried out the logistical and security arrangements for King George IV’s visit to Scotland. For his services, he received the personal thanks and approbation of the king.

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86 PRO, W. O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (Record of Henry George Smith’s service).
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 330.
90 PRO, W. O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (Record of Henry George Smith’s service).
Smith’s first experience with colonial administration came in the early fall of 1825 when he accompanied his regiment to Nova Scotia. At that time, the lieutenant governor of the colony was Major General Sir James Kempt, who Smith had known during the Napoleonic Wars. Kempt, was one of the first generation of post-Waterloo proconsuls who, like Smith, had neither the benefit of birth nor income. Kempt, born in 1764, was the son of Gavin Kempt of Botley Hill, Southampton, and of Edinburgh, and Miss Walker, the daughter of Alexander Walker of Edinburgh. Little is known of his early life, but in March 1783, he was gazetted ensign in the 101st Regiment, a unit slated for duty in India. It appears that Kempt had little income as joining a newly formed regiment with little seniority destined for foreign service rarely required purchase. Because of the significant reduction in the army following the American War for Independence, the 101st Regiment was disbanded before it sailed for India. Kempt was placed on half-pay and forced to find work in the civilian sector. Nearly ten years later, he was able to secure a captaincy in 113th Regiment largely because of his ability in raising recruits for the newly formed unit. It appears that Kempt again gained this commission without purchase.

During the French Revolutionary Wars, Kempt served as aide de camp and military secretary to General Sir Ralph Abercromby until the general’s death in 1801. For the next few years, Kempt continued to act as aide and military secretary to a number of British commanders in the Mediterranean theater that included General John Hely-Hutchinson and General Sir David Dundas. Like Smith, Kempt received a considerable amount of experience in administrative and organizational duties while acting in this staff capacity. In 1805, Kempt received a combat command with General Sir James Henry Craig’s expedition to Sicily and Naples. At the Battle

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92 Peter Burroughs, “Kempt, Sir James,” in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2000) available online at www.biographi.ca.
of Maida, Kempt’s Light Brigade bore the brunt of the fighting. After serving a short stint as quartermaster general in North America, the young brevet colonel was assigned to the staff of Wellington’s Peninsular Army. Beginning in 1809 and for the next seven years, Kempt served with Wellington in the Peninsula and in the Low Countries campaign of 1815. It was during the storming of Badajoz in 1812, that Kempt became acquainted with Captain Harry Smith.93 Kempt and Smith again served together at the Battle of Waterloo.

At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Kempt found employment as a colonial administrator. In October 1819, Kempt wrote Wellington requesting assistance in securing the vacant command of British forces in Nova Scotia.94 Without hesitation, Wellington recommended Kempt for a position of authority. As early as 1812, the Duke had remarked that regarded highly Kempt’s ability as a commander.95 Instead of receiving the command position, Kempt, as an alternative, was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia. Kempt’s nine-year tenure as chief administrator was remembered as a time of peace and growth for the colony that included the construction of a new university, the expansion of the road network, and improvement and organization of the militia. His formula for successful governance was summed up in a letter to his predecessor Lord Dalhousie observing “make it a rule to be universally civil to all Parties, without paying particular attention to one person more than


another. Kempt’s successful governance, however, was assisted by a strong Tory presence in the colony’s assembly. Smith notes while he was stationed in the colony, “even the Whig opposition, admired his talent and never opposed any of his great acts, while by his amiable manners and kind, though unostentatious, hospitality, society was cemented, and indeed, what the word implies, *social.* (Smith’s italics)

As previously noted, it was during Kempt’s term at Nova Scotia that Smith, acting as his aide-de-camp, recollected that he learned the mechanics of colonial administration. However, it was at Smith’s next posting, in Jamaica, that he was able to put his administrative and organizational training into practice. In 1826, Smith received a military appointment as deputy quartermaster general of British forces in Jamaica. In that capacity, with Governor Keane’s wholehearted approval, Smith embarked on a program to improve the living conditions of the troops on the island. Unsanitary living conditions were a significant contributory reason in facilitating the spread of yellow fever. Among overseas garrisons, Jamaica was one of the unhealthiest postings within the empire. In the years 1825-1836, the mortality rate of British soldiers in Jamaica was an astounding 130 per thousand. The only British posting that had a higher death rate was the small garrison stationed on Africa’s Gold Coast. During Smith’s posting, Jamaica was considered by the British military high command to be of significant strategic value. A large garrison was necessary to support Prime Minister Canning’s policy of

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thwarting Spain’s attempts to restore hegemony over rebellious American colonies. Moreover, troops were necessary to insure order in a colony with a significant slave population that was becoming increasingly restless as Parliament debated emancipation.

Soon after taking the post, Smith presented to Keane a barracks inspection report that revealed that most of the soldiers’ accommodations were “execrable.” Keane immediately gave Smith “carte blanche” to do what he thought was best to remedy the situation. Smith’s solution was to move the regiments out of their existing barracks and construct new facilities at healthier locations. Moreover, Smith established convalescent hospitals for soldiers who had recently recovered from the disease. Smith noted that despite the “various difficulties … the success of the institution was an ample reward for labour, and established a precedent since equally advantageously acted on.” Indeed, inspection reports from the 84th Regiment submitted after Smith’s improvements reveal that only one man was absent from the ranks, and this was because of a fractured leg. Prior to this inspection the 22nd and the 84th Regiments reported that twenty-one officers and 668 succumbed to the disease. For his efforts, Smith received the personal approbation for his exertions from the Duke of Wellington. Apparently Wellington, at the time Chief of the Ordnance Department and arbiter of spending for colonial and military buildings, was aware of Smith’s work. However, there is little apparent evidence that the barrack construction costs ever went through the mandated government channels.
Like the biblical servant in the Parable of the Talents, Smith believed that the work accomplished on Jamaica paved the way for larger responsibilities.106 In the autumn of 1828, he was removed from his position in Jamaica and appointed as deputy quartermaster general in the Cape Colony under Governor Sir Lowry Cole, the former commander of Wellington’s 4th Division in the Peninsula. Cole was just another in a long line of military men who governed the colony that included Lord Charles Somerset, Sir Rufane Donkin, Major General Richard Bourke, and Sir Benjamin D’Urban. The Colonial Office had enjoined all of these administrators to pursue a policy of retrenchment of military expenditures and the cultivation of friendship among the indigenous tribes.107

Cole, a lively Irish aristocrat, began his military career in 1787 when he obtained his cornetcy with the 12th Light Dragoons. He served as aide-de-camp and military secretary for commanders such as Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Hely-Hutchinson.108 Cole, as a Brigadier General, served as second-in-command at the Battle of Maida where his actions earned him the thanks of Parliament. In 1809, he was attached to the staff of Wellington’s Peninsular Army commanding the 4th Division, an assignment he held throughout the length of the war. Charles Oman, considered Cole one of Wellington’s best division commanders especially for his actions at the Battle of Albuera noting that his timely advance with the Fusilier Brigade and Harvey’s Portuguese brought the British victory.109 J. W. Fortescue notes that of all of Wellington’s

106 Matt. 25: 21. “His master said to him, “Well done, good and faithful servant; you have been faithful over a little, I will set you over much; enter into the joy of your master.”
109 Charles W. C. Oman, Wellington’s Army, 1809-1814, 150.
division commanders, Cole was one of the few that the Duke regarded highly and could bring him into his confidence.\textsuperscript{110} Cole returned the complement to his commander by writing in February 1810 to his sister:

I never served under any Chief I liked so much, Sir J. [John] Moore always excepted, as Lord W. [Wellesley] He has treated me with much more confidence than I had a right to or could be expected from anyone. Few, I believe, possess a firmer mind or has, as far as I have heard, more the confidence of the Army.\textsuperscript{111}

Cole was unavailable for command at the Battle of Waterloo, even though Wellington specifically recommended him for a divisional command.\textsuperscript{112} However, he served with the Army of Occupation in France and remained in this post until November 1818. In 1823, he received the governorship of the island of Mauritius and continued in that capacity for five years. While governing this strategic waypoint to India, Cole was able to maintain amicability and stability among a diverse population that included European colonists, freed blacks, and slaves.\textsuperscript{113} In addition to his administrative duties, Cole was also tasked with overseeing the military defenses of the colony, which consisted of a garrison of two regiments of line infantry, a company of artillery, a company of engineers, and a company of the staff corps.\textsuperscript{114} Largely because of his success in Mauritius, Cole was promoted to the governorship of the Cape Colony in 1828. However, even this position was not profitable enough to support his expenses. Just after receiving the position, Cole wrote to Wellington requesting his assistance in securing a non-

\textsuperscript{110}Elizabeth Longford in her biography of Wellington relates that Cole was the unsuccessful suitor to Kitty Packenham. Kitty, instead, chose to marry Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington. See Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword, 116-18.

\textsuperscript{111}Galbraith Lowry Cole as quoted in Philip Guedalla, Wellington (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1931), 196

\textsuperscript{112}Cole was unable to command a division at Waterloo because he had recently married and was on his honeymoon. See Leslie Stephen, and Sidney Lee, eds, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. IV (London: Oxford University Press, 1921-22), 722.

\textsuperscript{113}W .P. 1/908/9/3 Copy of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel G. L’Estrange to Sir Herbert Taylor, sending a memorandum on the defences of Mauritius, November 7, 1823: copy c. 1827.

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.
resident sinecure as governor of Guernsey or Portsmouth to help supplement his colonial income. As governor of the Cape Colony, Cole proved extremely popular with the British and Boer populations. He encouraged the growth and expansion of trade by repealing previous legislation that limited trading operations beyond the borders of the colony and championed laws that encouraged blacks “to more industry, befitting them for Christian society and inducing them to become field labourers.” Also, Cole favored punitive action against the Xhosa who engaged in predatory border raids. Indeed, an 1833 ordinance was passed that provided for military organization of the local burghers and settlers in case of danger. However, the Colonial Office vetoed the ordinance leaving the issue of border security to be resolved by the next governor Benjamin D’Urban and his subordinate Harry Smith.

It was during the latter part of Cole’s tenure in South Africa that Harry Smith arrived to take over the military position of deputy quartermaster general of British colonial forces. Smith knew Cole well, as he had served as Smith’s divisional commander during the Peninsular War. Smith in his autobiography relates the story of their first meeting. It was an inauspicious beginning to a long and friendly relationship. Smith, as a young subaltern, was sent to act as a guide for Cole, the new division commander. During the course of introductions Smith smugly informed the general he was well acquainted with the road and would guide him and the division to the proper rendezvous point. Smith then promptly became lost and led the general officer and his regiments on a long circuitous night march until the correct road was found. Smith notes that the “hot Irishman Cole” was suitably disturbed by his conduct, but that he later served to that

115 W. P. 1/924/10 Letter from Sir G. L. Cole to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, outlining his case for royal favour to enable him to make provision for his family, March 31, 1828.
officer’s satisfaction as his assistant quartermaster general during the Occupation of France and Commandant of the Cape Castle in South Africa. Smith on arrival at the Cape Colony noted that Cole in a private conversation delegated him to be “ex officio, as second in command to me [Cole], the senior Member of Council, and, if any accident happened to me, the administration of the government would devolve on you.” Nevertheless, Smith was unable to exercise any influence or command as Benjamin D’Urban replaced Cole a few months after Smith’s arrival in South Africa.

Benjamin D’Urban, another of Wellington’s Peninsular cadre and colonial proconsul, was born in 1777, the son of a surgeon. He entered the army in 1793 as a cornet in the 2nd Dragoon Guards. Joining a senior guard cavalry regiment indicates that his family was of substance. During the French Revolutionary Wars, he served in Germany and the West Indies. In early 1798, he became aide de camp to Major General George Augustus Lord Pembroke. Nearly a year and a half later, D’Urban embarked for Jamaica serving as aide de camp to Major General Frederick St. John. With the reduction of the army in 1800, D’Urban was placed on half-pay but received an appointment as a student at the Royal Military College, High Wycombe. While at High Wycombe, D’Urban trained under French émigré officer General François Jarry de Brigny de la Vallette, who with Marshal Louis Berthier, was the most significant and valued staff officer in the French Revolutionary armies. In 1801, D’Urban received a majority in the 25th Light Dragoons. However, he did not serve with the unit for upon

119 Ibid., Vol. II, 3.
121 United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. IV, 30.
122 Ibid.
the conclusion of his studies he became Superintendent of Instruction for the junior department Royal Military College, Marlow. As superintendent, he trained a small select group of officers in staff work that paid significant dividends for Wellington’s Army in the Peninsula. D’Urban served in this position for four years, resigning his post to participate in foreign service.

In 1807, General Charles the Earl of Harrington, Commander of British Forces in Ireland requested that D’Urban establish stations for a telegraph system to be set up between Dublin and the seaports in the South and Southwestern Districts of Ireland. In November of that same year, D’Urban received an appointment as assistant quartermaster general for the Limerick District. By the time D’Urban left Ireland in 1808 for staff duty in Spain, he had accumulated considerable staff experience. Wellington utilized this experience by placing D’Urban under the command of Major General William Beresford who was then rebuilding, reorganizing, and training the allied Portuguese Army. Beresford, with the assistance of a few British staff officers, set about converting what was little more than a rabble into a capable and dependable fighting force. D’Urban remained in Portugal after the war continuing to upgrade the effectiveness of their army. Oman quoting an unpublished D’Urban memorandum on the Portuguese Army:

The Portuguese captains are piqued into activity and attention when they see their companies excelled in efficiency by those under English, and do from emulation what a sense of duty would never, perhaps bring them to. There are a variety of oblique means and by-paths by which the parts of a Portuguese corps are constantly, and almost insensibly, tending to return to their old habits, to which they are so much attached. To nip this tendency, from time to time, in the bud, it is necessary to be aware of it: without the constant surveillance of English subordinate officers (who ever mingling with the mass of the men cannot but be aware of what is going on) the commanding officer can rarely be warned in time.

D’Urban returned to Britain in the winter of 1816 receiving an appointment as colonel of the Royal Staff Corps and deputy quartermaster general at the Horse Guards.\textsuperscript{127} He was promoted to major general in 1819 and one year later assumed the governorship of Antigua. Proving himself an able administrator, D’Urban was transferred in 1824 to the possessions of Demerara and Essequibo combined with Berbice to form the colony of British Guiana. In 1831, he succeeded Galbraith Lowry Cole as governor and military commander of the Cape Colony. Upon his arrival in South Africa, the new governor brought with him instructions from the Colonial Office to prevent military ventures with the indigenous border tribes by promoting good relations with them. Colonial officials in London suggested that he should station resident agents among them and offer small annual gifts to keep them satisfied and restrain their followers from stealing cattle from the European settlers.\textsuperscript{128} However, the proffered policy yielded disappointing results.

In his memoirs, Smith notes that shortly after D’Urban’s arrival at the Cape Colony, he was dispatched to the frontier to deal with the cross border raids. Smith wrote that the governor immediately dispatched him to the frontier with full civil and military powers and empowered him to take any measures necessary to ensure peace.\textsuperscript{129} However, this was not the case. Fortescue observes that the new governor found too much business at Capetown to concern himself with the situation at the frontier. Furthermore, D’Urban intended to initiate friendly relations with the Xhosa and forbade his officers from using force against them.\textsuperscript{130} Smith was dispatched to the frontier, some months later, after the Xhosa crossed the frontier in force. In a

\textsuperscript{130} J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XI, 1815-1838, 400.
whirlwind campaign that lasted a few months, Smith was chiefly responsible for devising a campaign that defeated the Xhosa and impelled D’Urban to move the eastern boundary of the Cape Colony to the Kei River. This new land, known as the Province of Queen Adelaide, was to be administered by Smith. A June 11, 1835 General Order issued by D’Urban read:

> It diminishes the regret of the Commander-in-Chief at quitting this personal command, that he leaves them in charge of Colonel Smith, an officer in whom they must all have the fullest confidence as well on account of those high military qualities which they have witnessed, and which have made him a main cause of the recent successes, as because they know from experience he is a soldier, and will always have a watchful care of all that can contribute to their health, comfort, and convenience.

> Colonel Smith, C. B. is appointed to the command of the District of the Province of Queen Adelaide and all the troops therein, until his Majesty pleasure be known.”

Smith immediately began a vigorous administrative policy. His first tasks were of a military nature such as improving the road network, establishing fords, and compelling the Xhosa to withdraw beyond the Kei River. Smith next inaugurated a census, established magistrates, instituted a monetary system, created a local police force, set in place a postal system, and encouraged the development of trade and agriculture. Smith was also the first European administrator to attempt to codify African law. However, he was well aware that he must proceed cautiously in introducing new institutions on the locals. In his autobiography he noted:

> I found I had upwards of 100,000 barbarians to reclaim who had no knowledge of right or wrong beyond arbitrary power, desire, and self will. To attach the people to the new order of things was of vast importance; to lessen the power of the chiefs equally so; but this had to be gradual, for if I removed the hereditary restraint of the chiefs, I should open the gates to an anarchy which I might not be able to quell.

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133 Ibid., 77.
Smith also encouraged the return of missionaries who had left because of the war. The new governor of Queen Adelaide Province believed, like many other proconsuls, that Christianity would reinforce Imperial authority and encourage social order.\textsuperscript{134} Smith was especially anxious to break the power of the witch doctors that he believed challenged his authority noting, “the witch-doctors and the rain-makers are in the confidence of their respective chiefs.”\textsuperscript{135}

Smith’s administration with its intended reforms, however, was short lived. When news of D’Urban’s annexation reached London, the Colonial Office under the direction of Charles Grant Lord Glenelg ordered the province to be abandoned. John S. Galbraith observed that for both humanitarian and financial reasons, Britain did not think very highly of ruling large numbers of Xhosa.\textsuperscript{136} Furthermore, Glenelg worried that significant military forces would be needed for many years to pacify the region. Both Galbraith and Smith biographer, Joseph Lehmann believe that James Stephen, Permanent Under Secretary in the Colonial Office, also played a significant role in checking any further expansion in South Africa.\textsuperscript{137} D’Urban, already criticized by Dr. John Philip and the London Missionary Society for his policies in South Africa, acquiesced and ordered Smith to relinquish control over the recently annexed province. Smith, disappointed, wrote that Lord Glenelg, a worthy and honorable man was “led by a vile party, under the cloak of sanctity and philanthropy, directed the Province of Queen Adelaide to be

\textsuperscript{134} Andrew Porter, “Religion, Missionary Enthusiasm, and Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, 222.


\textsuperscript{137} Both historians suggest that Stephen, the \textit{eminence grise} of the Colonial Office, exerted a significant amount of influence over Lord Glenelg. Glenelg dispatch ordering D’Urban to abandon Queen Adelaide’s Province was a joint effort of Glenelg, Parliamentary Under Secretary Sir George Grey, and James Stephen. See John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 128-29 and Joseph H. Lehmann, \textit{Remember You Are An Englishman}, A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 197.
restored to barbarism, the allegiance the Kafirs had sworn to be shaken off, and the full plentitude of their barbarity re-established.”138 Rebuffed by London and isolated by his patron D’Urban, Smith believed his career was at an end. Indeed, the Queen Adelaide fiasco was instrumental in the Colonial Office’s decision to replace D’Urban with a new proconsul, Major General George Thomas Napier. Smith was fortunate in that soon after Napier’s arrival in Capetown, he was ordered to India to become Adjutant General of British Forces with the local rank of major general.

George Napier was just one of a clan of illustrious Army officers and proconsuls of the post-Waterloo period. Galbraith observes that Napier was a member of a family that dominated the British military and naval establishment for more than four decades.139 George Napier, the second son of Colonel George Napier, was born at Whitehall, London, on June 30, 1784. As a youth, he had little scholastic ability.140 Because of his inability or unwillingness to learn, his father sought for him a career in the army. As a youth of fifteen, he entered the army as a cornet in the 24 Light Dragoons but his family quickly secured a transfer to a foot regiment as he all too quickly learned “habits of dissipation” in the cavalry.141 In June 1800, Napier received a commission as a lieutenant in the 6th Regiment. As a young officer, he served under Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe, Sicily, Sweden, and Portugal. Moore liked the lad and Napier became his most reliable aide-de-camp during the 1808-09 campaigns in Spain.142 After Moore’s death at Corunna, Napier served for a short time in the West Indies before he returned to Spain and

139 John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 144.
Wellington’s Peninsular Army. In Spain, Napier performed as both a combat and staff officer. As an officer in the 52nd Regiment, he participated in the Battle of Busaco and the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, where he lost his right arm. For a short period in 1814, Napier was placed on Wellington’s staff as assistant adjutant general. Upon conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, he was appointed to the command of a variety of regiments.

In 1837, Napier received an appointment as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony. Smith was well acquainted with Napier, having served with him in the same division during the Peninsular War. Smith thought Napier a good soldier, but not a particularly bright individual. Galbraith, notes that George Napier was safe and sane, honest but never brilliant unlike his brother, Charles, the conqueror of Sind, who “would have been certified for a mental institution had he lived in the less tolerant twentieth century.” However, Napier as governor relied on able assistants such as John Bell, his colonial secretary, for advice and direction. During his seven-year tenure, Napier abolished slavery in the colony, reformed the tax system enabling the territory to exist on revenues it generated, and kept the peace on the frontier with the Bantu tribes. Napier was also responsible for the expansion of British rule in the Cape Colony by annexing the territory of Natal in 1843 thereby curtailing Boer influence and securing for Britain the strategic port of Durban on the Indian Ocean. Despite his successful and relatively uneventful governorship, Napier never held any other civil administration preferring instead to retire to Nice.

Smith’s service in India was exclusively military in nature. Appointed adjutant general of the Queen’s forces in India, Smith believed that his present posting was a mere stepping stone

144 John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 144.
to future command of British troops in the event of a Burmese invasion.\footnote{146} Much to his disgust, but probably his good fortune, he remained in India during Major General William G. K. Elphinstone’s disastrous Afghan 1841-1842 campaign.\footnote{147} However, Smith was summoned for combat duty during the Sikh War that followed just three years after the Afghan debacle. Smith performed admirably as a subordinate to Major General Sir Hugh Gough at the Battle of Ferozeshah and later brilliantly commanded British and native troops at the Battle of Aliwal. Military historians have characterized the Battle of Aliwal as “the battle without a mistake” in that Smith utterly destroyed the Ranjur Singh’s army.\footnote{148} Wellington admired Aliwal as an admirable utilization of all three [combat] arms to the greatest possible advantage of each.\footnote{149} For the British forces in India, the battle was a decisive victory for what had been a lackluster campaign against the Sikhs. For the British public, Aliwal was a reaffirmation of British arms after an earlier embarrassment in Afghanistan and a near stalemate with the Sikhs. William Thackeray wrote of the battle in his essay, “On Military Snobs,” “a noble deed was never told in nobler language.”\footnote{150} For Smith, Aliwal, brought the recognition he craved from his peers. In his memoirs he wrote, “I steered the course invariably pursued by my great master the Duke [Wellington], never needlessly to risk your troops or fight a battle without an object. Hence the


\footnote{147} In his papers and autobiography Smith writes that he continually maneuvered for a combat command on the Sikh or Afghan frontier. In his memoirs Smith wrote, “Poor Elphinstone and I had been friends for years, [Smith became acquainted with Elphinstone when he commanded the 33rd Regiment during the Occupation of France] and I had frequently impressed upon him the difficulty of his position . . . The energy of a Wellington or a Napoleon would have saved the destruction of that force. . . .” See \footnote{147} Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Vol. II, 115.


\footnote{149} J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XII, 1839-1852, 381.

\footnote{150} William Makepeace Thackeray, The Book of Snobs; ed. John Sutherland (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978), 43-44.
decisive victory of Aliwal…”

For his victory he received the thanks of Parliament. In the House of Lords, Wellington praised him:

Then my Lords I will say with regard to the movements of Sir H. Smith, that I have read the accounts of many Battles, but I have never read of an affair in which more ability, energy, and discretion were manifested than in this case, or in which an officer has ever shewn himself more capable than this officer in of Commanding Troops in the field or in which every description of Troops has been brought to bear with its arm in position in which it was most capable of rendering Service; or in which every thing was [illegible] or more perfectly, the nicest maneuvers being performed under the enemy’s fire with the utmost precision: nor my Lords have I read of any Battle in any part of the World in which at the same time energy and gallantry on the part of the Troops were displayed to a degree that surpasses that in this engagement. I must say of this Officer that I never saw any case of ability manifested more clearly than in this case; it has been shewn that Sir H. Smith is an Officer capable of rendering the most important Services, and ultimately being an honor to his Country.

At the same session, both Frederick John Robinson Lord Ripon and the Prime Minister Robert Peel spoke in the most flattering terms. Peel said, “What a series of gallant Services—How rejoiced am I that there should be an opportunity through his signal successes of bring before the view of a grateful Country a long life of Military exertion and an unbroken series of Military honours.” Queen Victoria requested that she meet the “Hero of Aliwal” writing in her journal after meeting Smith:

Sir Harry, a fine old man, was presented to me. He seemed so pleased at my praises, saying he would ever serve me in the same way, & hoped all my subjects would do so. He was so glad to see Albert, who asked him to come in the morning.

Smith, now a hero, began to make inquiries about an available governorship. Among those whom he discreetly contacted were Lord Henry Grey, the Secretary of State for War and

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152 PRO, W.O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (Record of Henry George Smith service).
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
the Colonies. Grey believed that Smith would be an ideal administrator for the Cape Colonies.\(^{156}\) By having prior experience in South Africa, Smith understood the indigenous tribes. He was also a successful campaigner on the Indian frontier with a proven military record. A seasoned soldier who understood the region would be valuable in controlling the restive African border regions. Galbraith argues that both of these assumptions were false noting, “the qualifications that Grey considered impressive were in fact no qualifications at all. Smith was the most dangerous of men; an expert on the last war, he had formed his opinions of the basis of observations that were now obsolete, if they had ever been correct.”\(^{157}\) Smith was, indeed, an anachronism as civilian diplomats were now replacing most of the military proconsuls throughout the empire. The case of South Africa was unusual, as Smith replaced the short-lived regime of Sir Henry Pottinger, a civilian administrator of the East India Company who had made a name for himself in India and China. After his tenure in South Africa, Pottinger served as Governor of Madras but his government there was not a success.\(^{158}\)

Smith’s annexation of African territory put him in conflict with the Peel Ministry, and Lord Grey in particular, at a time when they were opposed to any further increase in the British Empire. Peel recognized that fiscal responsibility was necessary in order to overcome successive Whig deficits and enlarging the empire further would only add to the state’s budgetary woes.\(^{159}\) Despite the best intentions of the Whigs it was politically and financially impossible to secure enough money to garrison, administer, and provide for the inhabitants of the empire. For example, just after the emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies, the British Parliament

\(^{156}\) John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 220.
\(^{157}\) Ibid.
granted aid for the building of schoolhouses that equaled the domestic education subsidy.\textsuperscript{160} In 1841, Secretary of State Lord John Russell reduced the subsidy from a previous £30,000 to £6000 before eliminating it altogether. Even colonial military men realized that there was a limit to the empire’s expansion. Major General Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, observed in 1843 “he [Napier] was averse to any extension of territory.”\textsuperscript{161}

Within weeks of becoming governor of the Cape Colonies, Smith annexed significant tracts of land including Kaffirland to the east, and the country between the Orange and Vaal Rivers in the north.\textsuperscript{162} Grey reluctantly approved the extension of territory deferring to Smith’s “man on the spot” reasoning. Christopher Saunders and Iain B. Smith have argued that Smith received approval for his land acquisitions only after he had convinced London that the annexations would prevent future wars on the frontier and that the new territory would be financially self-supporting.\textsuperscript{163} At the same time he was acquiring land, Smith unwisely reduced the size of the colony’s military contingent of British regulars by two thirds. Sir Henry Pottinger, Smith’s predecessor, had around 5,500 regular troops stationed in the colony under the command of Lieutenant General Sir George Berkley. Of these, more than 3,000 troops were posted on the frontier.\textsuperscript{164} Smith proposed to defend the frontier with 2,000 troops that included colonial levies as well as an augmentation to the local constabulary.\textsuperscript{165} By 1850, two years after his appointment, Smith sent back to England a battalion of the Rifle Brigade.\textsuperscript{166} Moreover, in the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{161} William Napier Bruce, \textit{Life of General Sir Charles Napier} (London: John Murray, 1885), 324.
\bibitem{162} Smith’s annexations added approximately 50,000 square miles of new territory to the colony was added to the already vast South African colony. See John H. Galbraith, \textit{Reluctant Empire}, 226.
\bibitem{166} J. W. Fortescue, \textit{A History of the British Army}, Vol. XII, 1839-1852, 520.
\end{thebibliography}
place of the departing regular troops, Smith established a four hundred strong native police force and a small cadre of magistrates to enforce European laws. In addition to these steps, the new governor established in “Kaffraria”* a series of military settlements populated by old soldiers that were willing to settle in the colony in exchange for grants of land.\textsuperscript{167} Lastly, Smith installed a loyal chief by the name of Hermanus in a buffer zone with the frontier.

Smith was frequently preoccupied with problems on the eastern frontier. However, Dutch speaking Boer settlers in the interior also caused the new governor frequent difficulties. Smith’s acquisition of the highveldt between the Orange and Vaal Rivers offended Boers who had settled the region. By taking control of this territory, Smith sought to stabilize his northern frontier by establishing order between the feuding Boers and the native Griquas and Basuto populations. From lessons he had learned in India, Smith was convinced that British administration in the form of a resident, civil commissioners, and magistrates would establish stability while also bringing peace to his northern border.\textsuperscript{168} Unfortunately, South Africa was not India and the few officials were unable to pacify a restive population who neither wanted nor cared for British occupation. Ultimately, Smith’s only option for imposing order was to send in British regular troops tasked with the dual role of protecting its officials while imposing peace among the warring factions. In the end, Smith’s northern experiment failed miserably in that he was faced with a Boer insurrection that required a considerable amount of military force to quell.\textsuperscript{169} Furthermore, his arbitrary annexation alienated both the Griquas and the Boers, two groups that were to cause him future troubles.

\textsuperscript{*}The territory once known as Queen Adelaide’s Province.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid. 521.
\textsuperscript{169} Fortescue notes that a significant portion of military forces in the colony was required to end the Boer rebellion. Forces included 2 companies of the 45\textsuperscript{th} Infantry, 2 companies of the 91\textsuperscript{st} Infantry, 2 companies of the Rifle Brigade, 4 companies of the Cape Mounted Rifles, a detachment of Royal Engineers, and Royal Artillery with
Smith’s final failing in administering South Africa was his vacillating policy concerning the transportation and settlement of Irish insurrectionists. In 1849, Lord Grey informed Smith that the H.M.S. *Neptune* was to sail from Bermuda to South Africa carrying a cargo of Irish peasants who had rebelled during the time of famine.\(^{170}\) When news of the ship and its cargo reached Capetown a panic ensued among the inhabitants. Locals widely believed that this ship was only the first of many that the colony would receive and soon flood the territory with criminals. Residents petitioned Smith to refuse to allow the ship to land as he shared the colonists’ objections. In the late spring 1849, Smith wrote Grey begging the Colonial Secretary to revoke his decision while forwarding to him the petitions he received.\(^{171}\) To strengthen their hand, opponents of the *Neptune* venture formed an Anti-convict Association, an organization to prevent the colonial administration from allowing the convicts to land even threatening to stop all supplies to the government. The Anti-convict Association backed up their threats by employing intimidation and violence against those who disagreed. Within weeks, Smith reported to Grey that all but one member of his unofficial Legislative Council had resigned. Despite his private sentiments, Smith was required to follow colonial office directives, as he had no legal power to send them elsewhere.\(^{172}\) Furthermore, his sense of duty to his sovereign proven by his long years of service would not allow him to do otherwise. On June 18, 1849, Smith informed the Anti-convict Association:

> This is the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo— for four and forty years I served my sovereign—I say it with pride, — and I would rather that God

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\(^{3}\) six-pounder guns. The Boers employed hit and run tactics similar to those they would employ fighting the British during the Boer War of the early twentieth century. See J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. XII, 1839-1852, 519.


\(^{171}\) Ibid.

Almighty strike me dead, than disobey the orders of Her Majesty’s Government; and thereby commit an act of open rebellion.\textsuperscript{173}

His only option was to deny permission for the convicts to land. By upholding the dictates of the Colonial Office, Smith lost the support of the majority of colonists. Within three years, Smith had alienated the colony’s three major groups, the colonists, the Boers, and the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{174} In London, the governor’s handling of the affair caused some consternation. With the colony in near rebellion, Grey began to question Smith’s abilities. Galbraith notes that as the convict crisis developed the Colonial Secretary began to have serious doubts about Smith’s physical and mental well-being.\textsuperscript{175}

The convict controversy brought to the forefront the long simmering issue of South African representative government. As early as 1841, the inhabitants of Capetown had petitioned Her Majesty’s government to entertain the notion of establishing a constitution modeled on that of the mother country. The proposed plan of administration would consist of a Governor and executive council both appointed by the Crown, and a popularly elected Legislature.\textsuperscript{176} Smith’s predecessor, Sir Henry Pottinger received permission from Lord Grey to explore the possibility of implementing the proposed plan. Little was done during Pottinger’s short tenure. Smith was sympathetic to the colonists’ desire for limited self-government and actively worked toward this end. However, the agitation caused by the convict crisis encouraged the more radical members of the colony to demand even greater autonomy with Great Britain.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{173} Harry Smith as quoted in Joseph H. Lehman, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith 1787-1860, 311.
\item\textsuperscript{174} To add insult to injury, the subscription raised for the erection of Smith’s statue in Capetown was diverted into the Anti-convicts Association’s coffers. See Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith 1787-1860, 312.
\item\textsuperscript{175} Galbraith comments that in April and May 1849, Smith was confined to bed seriously ill with a serious inflammation at the back of his head. See John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 236.
\end{itemize}
Smith diffused the crisis by adroitly working a fine balance between the extremists and the moderates and appointed members of both groups to the newly formed Legislative Council.

Even though Smith overcame a series of serious threats to his administration, Grey had lost confidence in his governor. Furthermore, the Colonial Secretary believed that Smith’s adventurous policies were becoming too expensive for the British taxpayer.\(^{177}\) Grey in a dispatch of February 14, 1851 strongly criticized Smith’s performance noting:

> It is very natural that having spent so large a part of your life in the Field...you should not have accurate knowledge of matters of this kind which is necessary for your guidance in critical times, but I cannot but think that if you had consulted Mr. Porter [Attorney General of South Africa] and Mr. Montague [his civil secretary] they would have prevented you from falling into some of the mistakes which I have been compelled very unwillingly to animadvert on.\(^{178}\)

Smith, deeply offended by the reprimand, fired off an impassioned defense of his administration commenting, “I will be censured by no man, but I will endeavor to obey when I can. Within months of receiving Grey’s censure, Sir George Cathcart replaced Harry Smith as governor of South Africa. For the rest of his life, Smith’s declining health prevented him from accepting any further senior military or administrative appointments.\(^{179}\)

Smith returned to Britain in the late spring of 185. For the rest of his life, he held no significant field command, although, he was considered for the command of British forces in the Crimea succeeding Fitzroy Somerset Lord Raglan who had died while on campaign. Lord Panmure noted that Smith was passed over for command because of “the circumstances of


\(^{179}\) For the rest of his life Smith remained in Great Britain. In 1852, Smith was offered command of the army at Madras but declined it because of poor health. When the Crimean War began in March 1854, Smith was considered for command but was passed over because of age and health. Smith retired from the army in September 1859. His letters from this period reflect that of an aged man re-fighting the battles of his prime. See PRO, W. O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (marked Field Letter Book, No. 3). Sir Harry Smith.
In his remaining years Smith relived old campaigns with a steadily dwindling number of wartime companions. On October 12, 1860 Harry Smith died at his home, 1 Eaton Place, West, London.

In light of the numerous difficulties he faced, it is not easy to characterize Smith’s administration as an abject failure. Much was accomplished during his tenure and until the anti-convict crisis he was extremely popular with the colonists. Even the formidable Xhosa Chief Macomo and the great Basuto leader Moshesh respected Smith’s abilities. During his tenure as governor, Smith successfully fought two difficult frontier wars. Moreover, Smith, with the assistance of his colonial secretary John Montagu, increased revenue that they pumped back into the province improving roads, harbors, and public works. However, Smith did have his flaws. He was impulsive, rarely having the patience to reflect and let situations develop. Smith believed that the force of his personality could overcome even the most insurmountable of obstacles. His military successes during the Sixth Frontier War, at Ferozeshah and Aliwal, reinforced his belief that he could accomplish the near impossible. To many of his critics, his excessive confidence bordered on arrogance and his dramatic conduct in dealing with the indigenous people revealed traces of madness. Mark Francis defends Smith’s apparent predilection for the dramatic as necessary components of effective governance as it accomplished its desired effect of imposing fear and awe on subject peoples. To his superiors in London, he was consistently over optimistic offering them reports that frequently did not reflect the true situation.

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181 Smith and his staff would often appear before native populations carrying a halberd and a staff surmounted by a brass bed knob. Smith would then force the gathered chiefs to swear allegiance to either the “staff of war” or the “staff of peace.” See Mark Francis, Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-60 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1992), 68.
Imperial scholars such as John Galbraith, Ronald Hyam, and Mark Francis along with biographer Joseph Lehmann argue that Smith, like many of his fellow proconsuls, subscribed to a number of early nineteenth century attitudes regarding the governance of overseas non-white colonies. Smith was a product of an officer corps that participated in defeating Napoleon and as such exuded an apparent self-confidence that their beliefs and methods of governance would benefit all whom they ruled. David Cannadine notes that British administrators desired to replicate British exceptionalism to all that they governed. Smith was a creature of this environment thoroughly subscribing to the notion that God ordained Britain’s preeminent position in the world. Smith supported fully the notion echoed by clergyman John. H. Newman, who in mid-century said of western civilization, “has a claim to be considered as the perfect representative society and civilization of the human race, as its perfect result and limit.”

Conclusion

Throughout his military career, Harry Smith utilized network connections to his advantage in securing military and colonial employment. He accomplished this on many levels employing the ties he had established through patron-client associations, regimentoal ties, and wartime relationships. Furthermore, the organizational and administrative experience Smith received during his service in the Napoleonic Wars made him a valuable commodity at a time when military colonial governments were in need of capable subordinate administrators. His apprenticeship in Jamaica and later work as D’Urban’s assistant in the Cape Colony established his reputation as a capable manager. Smith was also an accomplished military commander who had demonstrated his ability in the Cape Colony and in India. In theory, this was an ideal combination and paved the way for his appointment as governor of the Cape Colony in 1848.

182 Ibid., 50.
Smith’s tenure as governor of the Cape Colony was not entirely successful. Many of the characteristics that had made proconsular rule appealing to the Colonial Officer in the immediate period following Waterloo were, by the late 1840s, obsolete. Smith’s greatest failing was that he was unable to adjust to the changing nature of British colonial policy. By the 1840s, the Colonial Office had become more proactive in directing the actions of its governors. Increasingly, Parliament and the Colonial Office were subjected to domestic political pressures. Most importantly, the Colonial Office objected to unbridled annexations that required the garrison of more British troops and increased expenses for the treasury. The trend toward responsible government for territories within the empire was driven by the Crown’s desire to extricate itself from divisive local politics and to rationalize reductions in Imperial expenditures while still exerting indirect control of its strategic interests. Smith while seemingly agreeing in principle with the mechanics of responsible government was still very much the autocrat as evidenced by his handling of the Boer and Anti-convict crisis. In short, Smith the proconsul of an earlier period was either unable or unwilling to adjust to the evolving British Empire.

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CONCLUSIONS

It had rained all evening and into the early morning hours but the dawn of November 18, 1852 revealed a bright fall day. The Duke of Wellington’s funeral was to be a glorious affair as befitting his stature in the kingdom and the empire. Although he had died some two months before, on September 14, his state funeral required the meticulous planning that would be suitable for a military campaign. Nearly £30,000 was spent on the arrangements that included four coffins, one of mahogany and the others of pine, oak, and lead.¹ The funeral car that snaked its way past the estimated half a million mourners who lined the streets of London was pulled by twelve draft horses appropriately caparisoned in black. The car itself was 21 feet long by 12 feet wide, and weighed 18 tons.² Wellington’s final entourage comprised all the kingdom’s dignitaries from both the Anglican Church and the state. Escorting the coffin were 3,000 infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, the Chelsea pensioners, and a representative private from each regiment in the British Army.³ The eight pallbearers were carefully chosen from the Duke’s military acquaintances. Of the seven who can be identified were Sir John Colborne Baron Seaton, General Sir Peregrine Maitland, and Sir Alexander Woodford had served with Wellington at Waterloo; Sir Henry Hardinge at Quatre Bras; General Charles Napier, General Hugh Gough, and General Sir Stapleton Cotton Lord Combermere who were with him in the Peninsula.

Seaton, Maitland, Woodford, Hardinge, Napier, Gough and Combermere had served in the colonies as military administrators. Seaton served as lieutenant governor of Upper Canada

1 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 400.
3 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History, 401-02.
and as High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. Maitland was also lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, commander in chief of the Madras army, and governor and commander in chief of the Cape Colony. Woodford commanded British forces in Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands, and for a time served as high commissioner for the islands. Hardinge, considered a competent staff officer and well respected by Wellington, served as governor general of India. Napier, one of a quartet of noteworthy brothers in the British Army, acted as an Inspector General of Militia in the Ionian Islands and as the military commander of the Bombay Presidency, acquiring the Indian territory of Sind during his tenure. Gough served as commander in chief of the army of the Madras Presidency and later as commander of all British and Company forces in India. Cotton occupied a variety of colonial posts that included the governorship of Barbados, commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands, commander-in-chief in Ireland, and the commander-in-chief in India.

Proconsular despotism—the political practice of governing and administering colonies and provinces by selected elites, frequently military men, who were sensitive to the strategic aims of the state was a long accepted method of colonial governance. Indeed, the custom is as old as recorded history. The New Kingdom Egyptians, the Romans, the Ghaznavids, the Mughals, and the Spanish all employed this system long before British dominance of the globe. Britain saw its colonial empire grow substantially in the first decades of the nineteenth century, largely because of conquests and acquisitions it made during the Napoleonic wars. In addition to its prewar overseas possessions in North America, the West Indies, South America and portions of the Indian Subcontinent, Britain added large swaths of territory in Asia and Africa that included the economically significant colonies of Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Cape of Good

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Hope. In total, the British governed some 200 million souls, comprising more than one quarter of the earth’s total population.

In order to govern and manage this immense territory, the British state required the services of capable senior bureaucrats who were experienced in running large administrative institutions. At the close of the Napoleonic Wars the most readily apparent way was to fill these roles was to tap into the significant cadre of military officers who had command and staff experience. The Colonial Office, acting in concert with the Horse Guards and Parliament devised a system of offering high-level colonial administrative positions to general officers with distinguished wartime careers. The rapid postwar demobilizations that took place in the army had caused financial hardships for many of these officers. Their employment as administrators helped them alleviate their economic distress and gave the Colonial Office experienced technocrats who capably staffed the British global empire. Furthermore, the Colonial Office selected senior officers who came from or identified closely with the social status quo, thereby assuring that those chosen were sympathetic to the strategic aims of the mother country making them politically reliable. Military officers chosen for administrative posts had experience in exercising independent military commands and were comfortable interpreting their government’s strategic aims. Administrators were given wide latitude to govern with the home government allowing them to make “on the spot” decisions that fit each of their colony’s particular circumstances.

The Colonial Office welcomed this arrangement of employing serving military officers as colonial administrators. During the post-Napoleonic era, the Colonial Office was much too small and provided only sporadic assistance to on-site colonial officials. The office’s miniscule staff of never more than a few dozen bureaucrats, as mandated by Parliament’s fiscal austerity,
was often overwhelmed by the administrative duties requisite for an empire the size of Britain’s. Furthermore, the Colonial Office’s leading bureaucrat, James Stephen, spent most of his almost three decades in the office concentrating on the eradication of slavery in the West Indies, often ignoring other areas of the empire. Stephen, an evangelical and a member of the Clapham Sect, worked tirelessly to “rid the British Empire of the blot of slavery and sought to bring the Christian evangal of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man to the farthest corners of the earth.” As such, the Colonial Office relied on the military to govern and protect the rest of the empire.

The British military embraced the opportunity to govern large areas of the empire. The situation provided the British military with a definite mission in a postwar world that enabled the army to employ a significant number of officers that it would have otherwise furloughed. Furthermore, the practice of using military men satisfied the practical necessity of ensuring colonial security both internally and externally, as many of the colonies had restive populations or were located near hostile neighbors. Senior military officers with command and staff experience were invaluable as they combined combat leadership with administrative ability.

Parliament and the Crown also benefited from the employment of military officers in the colonies. Parliament viewed the appointment of officers to colonial administrative positions as a reward for long and distinguished service during the Napoleonic Wars. During testimony to Parliament, Lord FitzRoy Somerset noted that the appointment of high-ranking officers not only honored the chosen individual but bestowed credit and honor on the king himself. As a means of recompense, Parliament, along with the Colonial Office, the Horse Guards, and the Crown,

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continued the practice of selecting senior officers for administrative positions throughout the empire for nearly three decades after Waterloo. It was not until mid-nineteenth century, during the tenure of Lord Glenelg that colonial posts began to go to professionally trained and educated civilian administrators.

Officers chosen in the immediate post-Waterloo era of proconsular administration came initially from the ranks of the social elite. Of these first generation proconsuls, more than half came from the ranks of the aristocrats. Besides the importance of birth, political connections played a vitally important role in securing coveted senior colonial positions. A substantial number of those senior colonial officials had strong Tory sympathies that put them in good stead with the Liverpool ministry during its heyday of conservatism from 1812 to 1822.\(^7\) Personal acquaintance with the Duke of Wellington also significantly enhanced an officer’s probability of receiving a position. Moreover, all of these officers held divisional or brigade commands during the Peninsular War and had significant experience in combat field commands. Nearly 83 percent of all of these proconsular officers who held colonial administrative or military commands had some familiarity with staff duties having served as aide de camps, brigade majors, adjutants, and quarter master officers.

The second generation of colonial officials were men who succeeded those officers who began their colonial careers in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. This group exhibited a number of similar characteristics as their predecessors, but they also displayed some striking differences. Officers who inherited the senior offices of colonial administration in the 1830s and 40s were the product of a substantially enlarged British Army. Many officers who first entered the army in the last years of the eighteenth century or in the first decade of the

nineteenth century often did so without having to purchase their commissions. Britain’s critical wartime need for wartime officers enabled thousands of “middling sort” men to enter the army as junior officers. In 1814, near the end of the Napoleonic Wars the British Army was comprised of more than a quarter of a million men, of which 10,590 were officers on full pay. Existent records reveal that 76 percent of these officers came from middling sort families. As the first generation of colonial administrators aged, retired, and died, officers with middling sort social backgrounds replaced their aristocratic seniors. Moreover, more than 60 percent of the second generation of colonial officials had previous military staff experience. As local colonial bureaucracies increased in size and sophistication, men with administrative and organizational staff experience were ideally suited for these situations. As Peter Burroughs noted, by the 1830s the implementation of good government in the colonies necessitated that administrators recognize the need for the many obligations and responsibilities they owed to their subjects. Local issues included control of tariffs and currency, fiscal and monetary policies, intervention in creating infrastructure, creation of lines of communication, management of land and labor, and management of internal and external security.

Bonds between the first-generation aristocrats and the second-generation middling sort were, however, strong. A man became an officer and a gentleman once he received a commission in the British Army, and that effectively erased the boundaries between the two societal groups. Officers who had experienced the rigors, hardships, and dangers of combat developed a fraternal relationship. J. G. Fuller observed that humans who share the dangers and hardships of combat with their fellow soldiers become “fiercely loyal to their mates developing an almost religious sense of comradeship.”

This friendship and loyalty to one another remained

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8 J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in British and Dominion Armies, 1914-1918, 22.
firm throughout their lives. However, combat was not the only tie that linked officers together. Pride in one’s regiment ran high among officers. For many, the regiment became the soldier’s surrogate home in that it provided a sense of belonging. Frequently, regimental bonds became so strong that it often transcended other human relationships such as marriage, family, and social station.

It was within this environment of shared bonds that officers engaged in a complex matrix of networking. Through personal relationships and acquaintances, officers were able to solicit employment. This intricate dance between powerful and influential patrons and their clients became vitally important in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars when the rapid demobilization caused significant numbers of officers to go on half-pay. Employment in the colonies as administrative officials was the preferred method of alleviating their financial hardships. Competition was intense for the jobs available as each officer worked his own particular network. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith’s example of securing employment was just one example of the many similar situations that occurred during the 1820s and 1830s.

In the decades following Waterloo, the decision to employ military officers as colonial officials was the best option available to a miniscule Colonial Office and a parsimonious Parliament. Senior military officers, who had exercised independent command during Napoleonic Wars, were the obvious choice because these men could interpret and act upon the perceived strategic interests of the home country. The men chosen for colonial proconsul duties were politically reliable and sympathetic to the home country’s status quo. Moreover, a substantial number of these men had previous staff training that enabled them, for the most part, to capably run large administrative organizations. No doubt, many were eccentrics who believed they were bestowed with a divine mission of improving humankind by perpetuating English
values and civilization around the globe. However, senior officials such as James Kempt were successful in establishing the framework of good government in Nova Scotia and Canada. Kempt’s quiet diplomacy and unassuming manners won him respect from even his staunchest critics helping him to set the stage for responsible representative government. Others, like Harry Smith, a fine military leader, were unable to adjust to the changing nature of colonial policy. As the Colonial Office became more proactive in directing the actions of the governors, men who enjoyed independent command chafed at following directives issued by civilian bureaucrats.

The practice served the empire well, even through the record of its administrators was uneven. However, proconsular despotism bought the British state some respite until a permanent corps of well-trained civilian bureaucrats could be emplaced. The first half of the nineteenth century was the heyday of the empire’s proconsular colonial governance. The Colonial Office employed the system well into the twentieth century. Capable and competent military/colonial administrators continued to be employed especially in strategically valuable territories that had not adopted self-government. Territories such as the Cape Colony, India, West and East Africa, and the Fiji Islands continued to make use of proconsular governance. Frederick Dealty Lugard, governor of Nigeria during the early twentieth century, followed a career path identical to his fellow proconsuls who had governed the empire fifty years earlier. Similarly, the last two viceroyos of India, Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell and Lord Louis Mountbatten, were military administrators who governed India at a time when the British Raj was ending.

The proconsular system ceased to exist shortly after the end of the Second World War with the decolonization of the globe. Britain’s retreat from the world stage as a preeminent colonial power and the recent collapse of the Soviet Union has dictated massive reductions in the
British Army that was once the model for the world. The British Army of the Napoleonic era was the largest ever fielded and it size was not eclipsed until the First World War. It was this instrument that defeated Napoleon, one of the world’s greatest captains. This same army also contributed a significant number of talented professional military officers who assisted Britain in establishing and governing a massive global empire in the decades that followed the Battle of Waterloo. The proconsular system was a significant institutional dynamic utilized by Parliament and the Colonial Office in those critical early years following the Napoleonic Wars. Proconsular rule permitted the world’s greatest empire to not only survive but to expand and thrive. Perhaps the best indication of the importance of proconsular rule to the British state was that the practice existed as long as the empire.

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Table A.1
Distribution and Location of British Troops 1792-1817

Source: Data supplied by Castlereagh to Parliament during the 1817 debates on Army estimates as reported in the *Times* (London), March 7, 1817.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of troops “rank and file”</th>
<th>1792</th>
<th>1817</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain, Jersey, and Guernsey (not including Ireland)</td>
<td>13,092</td>
<td>26,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrisons and Colonies including Gibraltar, Canada, Jamaica, &amp;c. but not including India</td>
<td>13,618</td>
<td>32,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,710</strong></td>
<td><strong>58,670</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of “Establishment” numbers that include officers and non-commissioned officers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain, Jersey, and Guernsey (not including Ireland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stations abroad, excepting India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India establishment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.2
Great Britain’s Total Gross Income and Expenditure on the Army and Ordnance, 1815-1831

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Great Britain Total Gross Income (in £ millions)</th>
<th>Army and Ordnance Expenditure (in £ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.3
Regimental Strength of the 91st Regiment of Foot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sergeants</th>
<th>Drummers</th>
<th>Rank and File</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sergeants</th>
<th>Drummers</th>
<th>Rank and File</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>1827</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: While on occupation duty in France the battalion’s numbers remained close to its wartime strength. When the Allied occupation of France ended in late 1818, the War Office ordered the regiment to Ireland where it remained in garrison for nearly two years. In 1822, the Ninety-first garrisoned Jamaica and remained at this posting until 1831 when it then returned to England. Although tropical disease was responsible for some of the unit’s attrition while stationed in the West Indies the number of deaths because of disease, for the most part, were within acceptable attrition limits. As the 91st’s official history attests, “Yellow fever played havoc with the young soldiers, and no less 152 deaths were recorded in the first year…. In the following two years the losses of the 91st were respectively forty-nine and sixty-nine; but in 1825 the casualties reached 150—after that the only severe year was 1829, when the deaths numbered seventy-seven…During its nine years’ of service on the island, the regiment lost twenty officers, thirty sergeants, ten drummers, and 576 rank and file.” The history of the unit notes that the regimental strength varied significantly as drafts to fill the ranks varied greatly and intermittently with only 299 men reaching the unit in February 1827.
### Table A. 4
Annual Colonial Salaries for chief administrators, 1828-1831.

Source: PRO, C.O. 325/20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1828-1829</th>
<th>1830-1831</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£4600</td>
<td>£3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£3866</td>
<td>£4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£2400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Christopher</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£3490</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£3522</td>
<td>£1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarara</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£3502</td>
<td>£950 plus staff pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£4000</td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£2800</td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£2000</td>
<td>£2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cape of Good Hope</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£7000</td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Canada</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£3000</td>
<td>£3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Canada</td>
<td>Governor in Chief</td>
<td>£4500</td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Canada</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£1500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£3700</td>
<td>£4100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£1500</td>
<td>£1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward’s Island</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£1000</td>
<td>£1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£3000</td>
<td>£3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£3035</td>
<td>£2835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>£8000 to £10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>£1200</td>
<td>£1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>£1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>Governor in Chief</td>
<td>£4200</td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Diemen’s Land</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td>£2500</td>
<td>£2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£10000</td>
<td>£8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>£8000</td>
<td>£7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobago</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>£1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>President</td>
<td></td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>£1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ionian Islands</td>
<td>Lord High</td>
<td></td>
<td>£5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Civil Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td>£800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.5
World Wide Royal Navy Fleet Distribution (number of ships)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1795</th>
<th>1808</th>
<th>1848</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Islands</td>
<td>137 ships</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>35 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>31 ships</td>
<td>84 ships</td>
<td>31 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indies (Jamaica and Leeward Islands)</td>
<td>46 ships</td>
<td>106 ships</td>
<td>10 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American (Nova Scotia and Newfoundland)</td>
<td>14 ships</td>
<td>41 ships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>14 ships</td>
<td>27 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape of Good Hope</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>14 ships</td>
<td>10 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Indies and China</td>
<td>12 ships</td>
<td>32 ships</td>
<td>25 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>13 ships</td>
<td>14 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>12 ships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A. 6
Number of British troops stationed in the colonies and foreign stations, exclusive of India, 1827.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony or Foreign Station</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Total Number of Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>5 battalions at 516 each</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeward Islands</td>
<td>8 battalions at 516 each</td>
<td>(one battalion proposed to be withdrawn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West India Regiment 647 men</td>
<td>4776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>5 battalions at 516 each</td>
<td>(one battalion proposed to be withdrawn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas and Honduras</td>
<td>2nd west India Regiment</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5 battalions at 516 each</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>4 battalions at 516 each</td>
<td>2,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>3 veteran companies</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>1 battalion at 516</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>2 battalions at 516</td>
<td>1192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 veteran companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ionian Islands</td>
<td>6 battalions at 516</td>
<td>3096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>3 battalions at 516</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maltese Fencibles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone, Cape of Good Hope, and dependencies</td>
<td>3 battalions at 516</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 companies of the Cape Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3 battalions at 516</td>
<td>(one battalion proposed to be withdrawn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1548</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>4 battalions at 516</td>
<td>(one battalion proposed to be withdrawn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ceylon Corps</td>
<td>3334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of troops on station</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“The force in New South Wales had generally consisted of 2 ½ battalions, 1 battalion being on passage as escorts to convicts and it being understood that no relief shall go from New South Wales to India until half of that battalion should have arrived, but the battalion which had been ordered to New South Wales was directed to Portugal and General Darling has detained half of the Buffs which ought to have gone to India. In fact there ought to be constantly 3 battalions in New South Wales besides the three companies of veterans which are for police duties.”
Table A. 7
Population and wealth of British Colonies c.1812 (in £ sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Value of products raised annually</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada, Upper and Lower</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>£7,302,827</td>
<td>£302,827</td>
<td>£1,180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>£1,915,987</td>
<td>£713,987</td>
<td>£579,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>£2,607,330</td>
<td>£607,330</td>
<td>£492,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint John’s, or Prince Edward’s Island</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>£216,434</td>
<td>£116,464</td>
<td>£94,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>£1,065,594</td>
<td>£705,594</td>
<td>£572,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>£11,169,339</td>
<td>£7,269,661</td>
<td>£4,577,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>77,506</td>
<td>£1,270,863</td>
<td>£548,803</td>
<td>£1,148,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>40,600</td>
<td>£898,220</td>
<td>£492,220</td>
<td>£384,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Christopher</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>£753,528</td>
<td>£436,538</td>
<td>£215,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevis</td>
<td>15,750</td>
<td>£375,182</td>
<td>£217,682</td>
<td>£94,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>10,644</td>
<td>£211,160</td>
<td>£104,720</td>
<td>£71,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgin Islands</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>£201,122</td>
<td>£94,122</td>
<td>£77,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>35,003</td>
<td>£935,782</td>
<td>£565,782</td>
<td>£375,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>29,608</td>
<td>£812,081</td>
<td>£515,999</td>
<td>£159,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>£561,858</td>
<td>£258,858</td>
<td>£97,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>£735,017</td>
<td>£384,117</td>
<td>£647,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>£269,806</td>
<td>£100,806</td>
<td>£155,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>£175,560</td>
<td>£73,560</td>
<td>£18,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>£146,700</td>
<td>£125,000</td>
<td>£34,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>24,850</td>
<td>£595,610</td>
<td>£285,222</td>
<td>£100,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobago</td>
<td>17,720</td>
<td>£516,532</td>
<td>£326,188</td>
<td>£136,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demarara and Essequibo</td>
<td>76,500</td>
<td>£2,238,529</td>
<td>£1,189,042</td>
<td>£416,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbice</td>
<td>26,600</td>
<td>£629,461</td>
<td>£270,440</td>
<td>£128,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>806,000</td>
<td>£2,306,000</td>
<td>£1,500,000</td>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>£905,000</td>
<td>£450,090</td>
<td>£260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>11,950</td>
<td>£169,500</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
<td>£119,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cape of Good Hope</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>£584,800</td>
<td>£334,800</td>
<td>£453,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A. 8
1840-1850 population and yearly average of exports of British Colonies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Yearly Average 1840-44 Exports</th>
<th>Yearly Average 1845-49 Exports</th>
<th>Yearly Average 1850-54 Exports</th>
<th>Population 1850</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North American Colonies</td>
<td>£2,595,000</td>
<td>£2,872,000</td>
<td>£4,200,000</td>
<td>2,471,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>£1,246,000</td>
<td>£1,566,000</td>
<td>£7,215,000</td>
<td>546,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Colony and Natal</td>
<td>£419,000</td>
<td>£597,000</td>
<td>£949,000</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indies</td>
<td>£2,536,000</td>
<td>£2,027,000</td>
<td>£1,962,000</td>
<td>921,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>£285,000</td>
<td>£256,000</td>
<td>£320,000</td>
<td>180,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>£184,000</td>
<td>£204,000</td>
<td>£254,000</td>
<td>180,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A.9
Colonial Appointments in the British Empire 1815-1820

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name of Officer</th>
<th>Military Service</th>
<th>Administrative Experience</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>George W. Ramsay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Superintendent Royal Military College</td>
<td>1816-1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Benjamin D’Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff officer in Portuguese Army under Beresford</td>
<td>1820-1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1824 Demerara and Essequibo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir James Leith</td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff officer in Ireland</td>
<td>1814-1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Stapleton Cotton</td>
<td>Northern France</td>
<td></td>
<td>1817-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cape Colony</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peninsula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Charles W. Maxwell</td>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Deputy assistant quartermaster-general of the force, under Brigadier-General</td>
<td>1816-1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Samuel F. Whittingham</td>
<td>Cape Colony</td>
<td>Robert Craufurd</td>
<td>1819-1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peninsula</td>
<td>liaison to Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anglo-Sicilian</td>
<td>Deputy quartermaster India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exp.-Spain</td>
<td>Governor, Windward and Leeward Is., Commander-in-Chief Madras Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Christopher</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Charles W. Maxwell</td>
<td>Sea duty during</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Charles Brisbane R.N.</td>
<td>French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Ralph James Woodford</td>
<td>1800 Anglo-Austrian Italian Expedition Peninsula</td>
<td>Acting-adjutant-general Wellington’s Peninsular Army</td>
<td>1819-1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbice</td>
<td>Colony - Secretary</td>
<td>Stephen Arthur Goodman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

351
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name of Officer</th>
<th>Military Service</th>
<th>Administrative Experience</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demarara</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. B. D’Urban</td>
<td>Netherlands, West Indies, Peninsula War</td>
<td>“Showed some administrative ability”</td>
<td>1808-1811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>William Montague</td>
<td>Military, but no overseas service.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1813-1827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Robert Douglas</td>
<td>Gibraltar, Holland, West Indies</td>
<td>Military record shows no staff experience</td>
<td>1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Augustus Seymour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Edward O’Hara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1816-1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>John Keane</td>
<td>Egypt, Malta, West Indies, Peninsula, New Orleans, Commander-in-chief Bombay, Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1817-1818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>John Joseph Winkler</td>
<td>Charles Cameron</td>
<td></td>
<td>1818-1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Phineas Riall</td>
<td>West Indies, Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>1804-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta/Ionia</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Maitland</td>
<td>India, Commander-in-chief Bombay, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Governor Ceylon 1805-1811 capable administrator Benevolent despot in Malta “King Tom”</td>
<td>1813-1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Sir Charles McCarthy</td>
<td>West Indies, Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>1814-1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape of Good Hope</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Lord Charles Henry Somerset</td>
<td>Military but no overseas service</td>
<td>Paymaster-general of British forces (autocrat) “doctrinaire Anglican”</td>
<td>1814-1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Name of Officer</td>
<td>Military Service</td>
<td>Administrative Experience</td>
<td>Term of Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Gordon Drummond</td>
<td>West Indies, Netherlands, Egypt, Canada</td>
<td>Administrative experience: Second in Command in Canada under Prevost 1813-1815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir George Murray</td>
<td>Netherlands, Egypt, Sweden, Peninsula</td>
<td>Military service during the American Revolution: 1804-1812 quartermaster-general for Ireland</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Frederick P. Robinson</td>
<td>Loyal American, Regt.-American Revolution, West Indies, Peninsula, Canada</td>
<td>Administrative experience: Second in Command in Canada under Prevost 1813-1815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Francis Gore</td>
<td>Flanders (after Amiens, no further military service)</td>
<td>Administrative experience: Aide-de-camp to the Lord lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl Camden: 1815-1817</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Samuel Smith</td>
<td>Military service during the American Revolution</td>
<td>Administrative experience: Member of Upper Canadian Executive Council: 1817-1818</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir Peregrine Maitland</td>
<td>Flanders, 1794, Ostend, 1798, Vigo and Corunna 1809 (Walcheren, Cadiz, Bidasoa, Nivelle, Nive Bayonne, Bidart, Quatre Bras and Waterloo)</td>
<td>Administrative experience: Acting Governor 1818-1828</td>
<td>1818-1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Name of Officer</td>
<td>Military Service</td>
<td>Administrative Experience</td>
<td>Term of Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Canada</td>
<td>Governor in Chief</td>
<td>Sir Gordon Drummond</td>
<td>West Indies, Netherlands, Egypt, Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>1815-1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sir John C. Sherbrooke</td>
<td>India Peninsula</td>
<td>Governor of Nova Scotia 1816-1817</td>
<td>1816-1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Lennox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1818-1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Sir John C. Sherbrooke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1819-1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>George Ramsay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1811-1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Sir James Kempt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1816-1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Carleton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1819-1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Sir Charles Hamilton</td>
<td>American Revolution</td>
<td>Appointed because of brother’s influence with Lord Bathurst</td>
<td>1817-1823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>George S. Smyth (brother of William Sydney Smith)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1812-1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Charles Hamilton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1818-1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Sir Tomkyns Hilgrove Turner *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Diemens Land</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geylon</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Robert Brownrigg</td>
<td>Netherlands Walcheren</td>
<td>On staff of Frederick Duke of York, Netherlands Quartermaster-general Horse Gds.</td>
<td>1811-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Robert T. Farquhar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1811-1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ralph Darling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1819-1820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.10
Colonial Appointments in the British Empire, c.1829.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name of Officer</th>
<th>Military Service</th>
<th>Administrative Experience</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Patrick Ross</td>
<td>West Indies, Egypt, Peninsular War, Germany, Waterloo</td>
<td>Combat commander Promised Governorship at Gibraltar but did not receive it.</td>
<td>1826-1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir James Lyon</td>
<td>West Indies, Egypt, Peninsular War, Germany, Waterloo</td>
<td></td>
<td>1828-1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Nicolay</td>
<td>India, Waterloo</td>
<td>Served on Royal Staff Corps (Served as Governor of Mauritius 1832-1840)</td>
<td>1824-1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Christopher</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>C.W. Maxwell</td>
<td>Mediterranean, West Indies Station</td>
<td>Governor of Dominica 1816-1819</td>
<td>1808–1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Charles Brisbane R.N. *</td>
<td>Mediterranean, West Indies Station</td>
<td>Sea duty during French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars.</td>
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<td>Trinidad</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen. Grant*</td>
<td>Gibraltar, Cape of Good Hope, East Indies, Canada, West Indies, Peninsula</td>
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<td>1829–1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobago</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Shepherd Blackwell</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berbice</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Henry Beard</td>
<td>Netherlands, West Indies, Peninsular War</td>
<td>Superintendent Royal Military College Staff officer in Portuguese Army under Beresford</td>
<td>1825-1831</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demarara</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. B. D’Urban*</td>
<td>Netherlands, West Indies, Peninsular War</td>
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<td>Somerset Lowry-Corry 2nd Earl of Belmore</td>
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<td>St. Lucia</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen. D. Stewart*</td>
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<td>Combat commander</td>
<td>1825</td>
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<td>Assistant adjutant general</td>
<td>1825-1835</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Walcheren Campaign</td>
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<td>Lt. Colonel Sir Howard Douglas</td>
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<td>1828-1838</td>
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<td>Aide-de-camp to R. Abercromby, J. Hely-Hutchinson, and David</td>
<td>1828-1830</td>
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<td>Lt. Gen. Sir J. Kempt</td>
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<td>Aide-de-camp to R. Abercromby, J. Hely-Hutchinson, and David</td>
<td>1828-1830</td>
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<td>Governor of Cape Colony 1844-1847</td>
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Table A. 11
Colonial Appointments in the British Empire c.1835.
Source: PRO, C.O. 325/20 Colonial Appointments

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<th>Location</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name of Officer</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Lieutenant General John Pitt, The Earl of Chatham</td>
<td>29 Jan. 1820</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Sir William Houshouan</td>
<td>10 May 1831</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Frederick Cavendish Ponsonby</td>
<td>1826-1835</td>
</tr>
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<td>Malta</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>John Ponsonby</td>
<td>Dec. 1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ionian Islands</td>
<td>Lord High Commissioner</td>
<td>George Nugent Grenville, Lord Nugent</td>
<td>18 Aug. 1832</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ionian Islands</td>
<td>Second in Command</td>
<td>Major General Woodford</td>
<td>15 Feb. 1827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape of Good Hope</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Major General Sir B. D’Urban</td>
<td>1833-1838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Alexander Findlay</td>
<td>1830-1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Octavius Temple</td>
<td>1833-1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Major Campbell</td>
<td>4 Nov. 1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Sir Charles Colville</td>
<td>1828-1832</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Sir William Nicolay</td>
<td>1833-1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sir Robert John Wilmont Horton</td>
<td>Feb.4, 1831-1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second in Command</td>
<td>Sir John Wilson</td>
<td>4 Feb. 1831</td>
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<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
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<td>Major General Sir Richard Bourke</td>
<td>June 25, 1831-1837</td>
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<td>Van Diemens Land</td>
<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Sir Daniel Arthur</td>
<td>14 May 1824</td>
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<td>Governor in Chief</td>
<td>Matthew Whitworth, fifth baron Aylmer</td>
<td>1830-1835</td>
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<td>Aug.22, 1828-1836</td>
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<td>Feb.4, 1834-1840</td>
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<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Major General Sir Archibald Campbell</td>
<td>Mar.22, 1831-1837</td>
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<tr>
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<td>July 25, 1831-1835</td>
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<td>24 Sept. 1834</td>
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<td>Colonel Sir Stephen Remnant Chapman</td>
<td>12 Aug. 1831</td>
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<td>Howe Peter Brown, second marquis of Slego</td>
<td>1834-1836</td>
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<td>Col. Cockburn</td>
<td>29 July 1829</td>
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<td>Sept.9, 1834-1837</td>
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<td>17 Feb. 1833</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Vincent</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>George Fitzgerald Hill</td>
<td>1831-1833</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Captain Tyler R.N.</td>
<td>4 Feb. 1823</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Lt. Governor</td>
<td>Major General Henry Charles Darling (nephew to Ralph Darling)</td>
<td>13 Mar. 1833</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Major General James Carmichael Smyth</td>
<td>1833-1838</td>
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Table A. 12
Birthdates of Military Colonial Administrators
Source: PRO, W.O. 25 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers.

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### Table A. 13
Social Profile of Subordinate British Colonial Administrators 1820-1830s


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth/Death</th>
<th>Commission Date</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Campaign Record</th>
<th>Prior Staff Service</th>
<th>Colonial Service</th>
<th>1816</th>
<th>1821</th>
<th>1825</th>
<th>1830</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airey, Geo.</td>
<td>1761-1833</td>
<td>91st Ft. 1779</td>
<td>Col.</td>
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<td>ADC Abercromb</td>
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<td>DQMG</td>
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<td>1821</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walker, Geo, Warren</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>8th Drag. 1799</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1829 Statement of Service</td>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warre, Wm.</td>
<td>1784-1853 Oporto, Port. son of James Warre Educated at Harrow</td>
<td>52nd Ft. 1803</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Pen.</td>
<td>Beresford’s Staff ADC 1826 AQMG Staff capacity Port. 1826.</td>
<td>Cape Colony</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Birth/Death</td>
<td>Commission Date</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Campaign Record</td>
<td>Prior Staff Service</td>
<td>Colonial Service</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>1830</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whittingham Samuel Ford</td>
<td>1772-1841</td>
<td>1st Life Gds. 1803</td>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Pen.</td>
<td>DAQMG Pen.</td>
<td>Spain and Port.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>son of William Whittingham—wealthy Bristol merchant education: Royal Mil. College</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaica East Indies</td>
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<td>59. Willemin, Wm.</td>
<td>1st Ceylon Regt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>x</td>
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*Charles Augustus FitzRoy left the army in 1833. Four years later was made a KH and lieutenant governor of Prince Edward Island. He served there until 1841 when he obtained a similar position in the Leeward Islands. His capacities as a sound, conciliatory administrator impressed the colonial secretary, Lord Stanley, who in 1845 appointed him to succeed the unpopular Sir George Gipps as governor of New South Wales.*

**Abbreviations used in table:**
- AAG-Assistant Adjutant General
- ADC-Aide-de-camp
- AQMG-Assistant Quartermaster General
- DAG-Deputy Adjutant General
- DQMG-Deputy Quartermaster General
- Drag.-Dragoons
- JAG-Judge Advocate General
- Mil. Sec.-Military Secretary
- QMG-Quartermaster General
Table A. 14
Officers’ Incidental Expenses

Dinner at the mess 2s0d  Nett \textit{sic} pay per 4s6d day
Wine at ditto 1s0d
Servant and Sundries 0s6d
Breakfast 0s6d
Washing and mending 0s6d

Balance left for pocket money & dress, £0 0s 0d

Table A. 15
Worldwide Distribution of British Forces 1803-1815 (in battalions)
Table A. 15 (cont.)
Worldwide Distribution of British Forces 1803-1815 (in battalions)

### 1812-1814

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<td>Home Service</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Colony</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy/Naples/Gibraltar</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indies</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. America</td>
<td>48.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peninsula</td>
<td>92.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>N. S.W.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadiz</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Coast of Spain</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>25</td>
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### 1815

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<td>India</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Colony</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Waterloo</td>
<td>53.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Baltic</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Italy/Naples</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Indies</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. America</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
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Table A. 16  
Careers of Peninsular Divisional and Brigade Commanders


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Combat Experience</th>
<th>Staff Experience</th>
<th>Wounds/ KIA</th>
<th>Colonial Administration before 1815</th>
<th>Colonial Administration after 1815</th>
<th>Post 1815 Career</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acland, Sir Wroth Palmer</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Ill health prevented him from serving at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alten, Charles</td>
<td>Hanoverian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Inspector General of Hanoverian Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anson, George</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—ADC to George III</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Colonel of 23rd Dragoon Guards until reduction. Governor, Chelsea Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anstruther, Robert</td>
<td>Hanoverian (KGL)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ashworth, Sir Charles</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Further service unknown.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbacena, Viscount, Luiz Antonio Furtado de Castra de Rio de Mendonca e Faro</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor of Elvas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barclay, Robert</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wound</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnard, Sir Andrew</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded—received multiple wounds</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor of Chelsea Hospital</td>
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<td>Barnes, Edward</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor of Dominica, 1808. App. Lieutenant. Gov. of Antigua 1813*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Beckwith, Sir Thomas Sydney</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Quartermaster Canada</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Bombay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blantyre, Lieutenant Colonel Robert</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wounded/ Died from wounds</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bock, Otto George von</td>
<td>Hanoverian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Drowned in 1814</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bowes, Bernard Foord</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>KIA 1812</td>
<td>No—but on staff in Northern Britain</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bradford, Thomas</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded, Bayonne, 1814</td>
<td>No—but promoted Assistant Adjutant General Ireland, 1801.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Bombay, 1825</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brisbane, Sir Thomas MacDougal</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp</td>
<td>Wounded, Flanders</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, New South Wales, 1821.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burne, Robert</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No—but commanded Northern District</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unknown—passed over for honors upon conclusion of the war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Byng, Sir John</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp General Vyse, 1797</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Command of Northern District</td>
<td>Governor, Londonderry 1828</td>
<td>M. P. for Poole, 1831 (supported Reform Bill)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cadogan, Henry</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp</td>
<td>KIA, 1813</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameron, Sir Alan</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No—but poor health during Peninsula</td>
<td>Retired because of health</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Rangoon Expedition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campbell, Sir Archibald</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Rangoon Expedition</td>
<td>Lieutenante  Governor, New Brunswick</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campbell, Alexander</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Commanded British forces in Mauritius</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Commanded British forces in Mauritius until 1816.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campbell, Sir James</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, Grenada, 1831</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>(Scot)</td>
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<td>Cole, Sir Galbraith</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Cotton, Sir Stapleton</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
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<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Brigade Major Aide-de-camp, General Musgrave</td>
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<td>No—but commanded Essex District, 1811</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, 1806</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Wounded/Died of fever, 1811</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Scot)</td>
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<td>Dunlop, James</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—on staff with Wellington</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>M.P. for Kirkcubright.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Scot)</td>
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<td>D’Urban, Sir Benjamin</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Instructor of officers in staff duties.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yea</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor, Antigua, 1820</td>
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<td>Governor, Demerara and Esquibo, 1824</td>
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<td>Enskin, Sir William</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Died insane, 1813</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomatic posts in Naples and Berlin</td>
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<td>(English)</td>
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<td>Fane, Henry</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commanded troops in Midlands to put down riots, 1815</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Commander in Chief, India, 1835</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferguson, Sir Ronald</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No—but administered York District</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>M.P. for Kirkcaldy — liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craufurd</td>
<td>(Scot)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graham, Sir Thomas</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp to General John Moore</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor of Dumbarton Castle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grant, Colquhoun</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Wounded, Cape of Good Hope, 1806</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assisted quelling Luddite disturbances M.P. for Queensborough</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halkett, Sir Colin</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not-known, possibly served on staff, Ireland, 1806</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor Jersey, 1830 Commander in Chief, Bombay, 1831 Lieutenant Governor, Chelsea Hospital, 1848</td>
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<td>Hay, Andrew</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded/KIA, 1814</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hill, Sir Rowland</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Second in Command, Army of Occupation, 1815 Command of the Army, 1828 Wounds from Peninsula rendered him incapable of further service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinde, Samuel Venables</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinuber, Col. Aldophus</td>
<td>Hanoverian (King’s German Legion)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Houstoun, Sir William</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Brigade Commander, Malta Commanded Southwest District</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor, Gibraltar, 1831</td>
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<td>Howard, Kenneth</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor, Portsmouth Commanded Southwest District, 1814 M.P. House of Lords (Whig)</td>
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<td>Inglis, Sir William</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor, Kinsale, 1829 Governor, Cork, 1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keane, Sir John</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, St. Lucia, 1818 Governor, Jamaica, 1823 Commander in Chief, Bombay, 1834 Commanded troops, Afghan Expedition, 1838</td>
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<td>Kemmis, James</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Staff position, Tullamore, Ireland, 1820</td>
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<td>Kempt, Sir James</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—many staff appointments</td>
<td>No—believed to have clerked for Horse Guards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor, Portsmouth, 1819 Governor, Nova Scotia, 1819 Governor General, Canada, 1828 Master General of Ordnance, 1834</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lambert, Sir John</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Langwerth, Ernst Eberhard Kuno von</td>
<td>Hanoverian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>KIA, Talavera, 1809</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Le Cor, Carlos Frederic</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Leith, Sir James</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Commanded expedition to Barbados, 1815 Governor, Leeward Islands, 1816</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Marchant, John Gaspard</td>
<td>British (Isle of Guernsey)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Lieutenant Governor of Military School, High Wycombe, 1801-1809</td>
<td>KIA, Salamanca, 1812</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Lightburne, Stafford</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Served one campaign with Wellington</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No record of further service after receiving rank of Lieutenant General, 1813</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long, Robert Ballard</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Called home, 1811 Declined command in Scotland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<td>Low, Sigismund</td>
<td>Hanoverian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor, Bermuda, 1819 Groom of Bedchamber for Queen Victoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lumley, Sir William</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Invalided home from Spain, 1811</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mackinnon, Henry</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Brigade Major, Ireland</td>
<td>KIA, 1812</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>Mackenzie, Alexander</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>KIA, Talavera, 1812</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Madden, Sir George Allan</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Retired after Peninsula War</td>
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<td>McMahon, Sir Thomas</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Adjutant General, India Commander in Chief, Bombay</td>
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<td>Murray, Sir George</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp to a number of Generals</td>
<td>Chief of Staff for Wellington’s Peninsular Army Adjutant General, Ireland, 1814</td>
<td>Yes Provisional Governor, Upper Canada, 1814</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Ireland, 1825 Secretary of State for Colonies, 1828 M.P. for Perth Master General of Ordnance, 1834</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murray, Sir John</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Commissioner in Aden</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Dismal career after court martial.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oswald, Sir John</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>Yes—administered captured Illyrian Islands, 1809</td>
<td>Yo</td>
<td>Wound received at San Sebastian forced him home, 1814</td>
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<tr>
<td>O’Callaghan, Sir Robert William</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, North Britain, 1822 Commander in Chief, Madras Army</td>
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<td>Pack, Denis</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>KIA, New Orleans, 1815</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paget, Sir Edward</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded, lost right arm</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, Ceylon, 1820 Commander in Chief, Burmese Campaign</td>
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<td>Payne, Sir William</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—served on staff, Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Colonel 3rd Dragoons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<tr>
<td>Picton, Sir Thomas</td>
<td>British (Welsh)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Wounded, Quatre Bras/KIA, Waterloo</td>
<td>Yes—Military Governor, Trinidad, 1797</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ponsonby, Sir Frederic Cavendish</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inspecting Field Officer, Ionian Islands, 1824 Governor, Malta, 1826</td>
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<td>Power, Sir Manley</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>On staff, Canada Governor, Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramsay, George</td>
<td>British (Scot)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes-on staff in Scotland, 1803 On staff, England, 1809</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor, Nova Scotia, 1816 Governor, Canada, 1820 Commander in Chief, India, 1829</td>
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<td>Robinson, Sir Frederick Philipse</td>
<td>British (American)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Inspecting Officer, Bedford, 1796</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Acting, Lieutenant Governor, Upper Canada, 1815 Commanded troops, Leeward Islands, 1816 Governor, Tobago, 1821</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ross, Robert</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Wounded, 1814 KIA, 1815</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Sherbrooke, Sir John Coape</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—known to have abused his commissary officers (indicates staff position)</td>
<td>Yes—Appointed Governor, Nova Scotia, 1811</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Captain General and Governor, Canada, 1816 Retired because of health (stroke)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silvera, Francisco da</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Skerret, John</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No—Commanded a Brigade with Graham, Netherlands, 1814</td>
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<td>Out of service Not listed in 1820 Royal Military Calendar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slade, Sir John</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Employed on staff, England, 1809</td>
<td>No—Employed one year in Ireland in a staff capacity</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lackluster performance in 1812 sent him home in retirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somerset, Lord</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp to Duke of York</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Inspector of Cavalry, 1818 Lieutenant General of Ordnance, 1829 M. P., Monmouth M. P., Gloucestershire</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Edward Henry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sontag, John</td>
<td>Hanoverian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Sousa, Jose Lopes de</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spencer, Sir Brent</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp to King George III Served on staff, Sussex</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Retired in 1811 Passed rest of his life in retirement</td>
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<td>Sterling, James</td>
<td>British (Scott)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lieutenant Governor, Cork, 1818</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stewart, Charles</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp to Lord Camden</td>
<td>Yes—Under Secretary, Ireland, 1803 Under Secretary of War, 1807 Governor, Fort Charles, Jamaica</td>
<td>No—Diplomatic Corps</td>
<td>Traveled with Allied Armies, 1813 Served Congresses of Vienna, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona Ambassador to Russia, 1835 Governor, Derry, 1823 Governor, Down, 1824 Lord Lieutenant, Durham, 1842</td>
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<tr>
<td>William</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Stubbs, George</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Stopford, Edward</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wounded, Bayonne, 1813</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Colonel of the African Corps</td>
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<td>Tilson, Christopher</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—On Staff in Peninsula</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(late Chowne)</td>
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<td>Trant, Sir Nicholas</td>
<td>British (Irish, originally Danish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Commissioned in Royal Staff Corps, 1803</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Transferred to Portuguese service, 1814 Left army because of financial difficulties, 1825</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Wounds/ KIA</td>
<td>Colonial Administration before 1815</td>
<td>Colonial Administration after 1815</td>
<td>Post 1815 Career</td>
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<td>Vandeleur, Sir John Ormsby</td>
<td>British (Irish)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—On staff in Belgium</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Colonel 16th Dragoons</td>
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<td>Vivian, Sir Richard Hussey</td>
<td>British (Wales)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Aide-de-camp to Prince Regent</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Army of Occupation, 1815 Quelled disturbances, New Castle on Tyne, 1819 and Glasgow, 1820 Inspector General of Cavalry M.P. Truro, 1820 Commander in Chief, Scotland, 1831</td>
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<td>Walker, Sir George Townsend</td>
<td>British (English)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Quartermaster General’s Dept., India, 1786 Staff, Ireland, 1788 Inspector, Foreign Corps, 1794</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Governor, Grenada, 1815 Commander in Chief, Madras, 1825 Lieutenant Governor, Chelsea Hospital, 1837</td>
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<td>Wilson, Sir John</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Governor, Minho, 1811</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commanded troops, Ceylon, 1830</td>
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Table A. 17
Careers of Senior Military/Colonial Administrators c. 1830


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Entered Service</th>
<th>Combat Experience</th>
<th>Staff Experience</th>
<th>Service Record</th>
<th>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</th>
<th>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</th>
<th>Colonial Posting in 1830</th>
<th>Later Career and Death</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnes, Edward, (b.) 1776 near Beech-hill Park near Barnet.</td>
<td>Ensign in 47th Ft., Nov. 1792</td>
<td>Peninsula; Battles of Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Nive, and Orthes, Netherlands, Waterloo, 1815</td>
<td>Served on staff in Peninsula, Ceylon, 1812</td>
<td>Lt. , May 1793 Capt. 99th Ft., 1793 Maj. 79th Ft., 1800 Lt. Col. 46th Ft. April 1807 Col. 1810 M. G. 1813</td>
<td>Appointed. Governor of Antigua, 1813 (refused the appointment) Governor Ceylon, 1824</td>
<td>Governor Ceylon</td>
<td>G.C.B., Feb. 1831 C in C, India, 1831 Colonel 34th Ft., 1834 M. P. Sudbury, (Conservative), 1834 M.P. Sudbury, 1837 Died, Picadilly, 19 Mar. 1838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beckwith, Thomas Sidney, (b.) 1772, son of Maj.-Gen. John Beckwith</td>
<td>Lt. 71st Ft., 1791</td>
<td>India, Seringapatam, Pondicherry, Ceylon, Copenhagen, Hanover, Denmark, 1806 Portugal, 1808 Battle of Vimiero Corunna, 1809 Peninsula, 1809-1811</td>
<td>DAOG. 1810- Spain AQG 1812—Spain</td>
<td>Capt. in Army, 1794 Capt. Maningham’s Corps of Rifleman, Aug. 1800 Maj. 1802 Maj. Maningham’s Corps, April 1802 Lt. Col. 95th Ft. 1803</td>
<td>Quartermaster General Canada—1812 Commander of Rifle Brigade, 1829</td>
<td>Governor Bombay</td>
<td>M.G. 1814 L. G. 1830 Died, Mahabaleshwar of fever 15 Jan. 1831</td>
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<tr>
<td>Campbell, James, (b.) 1773</td>
<td>Ensign in the 1st Royals, Lt., March 1794</td>
<td>Capture of Minorca Ireland, 1799 Madras, 1802 Mahratta War Battles of Argaum, Siege of Gauil Ghur Portugal, 1810 Brigade Commander, Peninsula 1810-1813</td>
<td>Commanded Garrison Cadiz.</td>
<td>Capt. 42nd Highlanders., 1794 Maj. Argyle Fenc., 1799 Capt. 94th Ft. , 1802 Maj. 94th Ft., 1803 Lt. Col., 1804</td>
<td>No active service in Post-Waterloo period.</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>K.C.B. Dec. 1822 M.G., August 1819 Colonel, 94th Ft., August 1819 Colonel, 94th Ft. 1834 Colonel, 74th Ft. 1834 Died, Paris 6 May 1835</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Colborne, John, (b) 16 Feb. 1778, Only son of Samuel Colborne of Lyndhurst, Hampshire</td>
<td>Ensign, 20th Ft., July 1794</td>
<td>Egypt, 1801 Malta, Sicily, Battle of Maida Coruna Peninsula 1809-1814</td>
<td>Military Secretary to Sir John Moore</td>
<td>Lt. Governor of Guernsey</td>
<td>Lt. Governor Upper Canada</td>
<td>High Commissioner of Ionian Islands, 1843</td>
<td>C in C, Ireland, 1855</td>
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<td>Colthurst, James Robert</td>
<td>13 Oct. 1809</td>
<td>32nd Regiment at Waterloo</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Lt. 32nd Regt Oct. 1809</td>
<td>Sub inspector of Militia North America</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Ionian Islands</td>
<td>Retired on H.p., Capt., 1830, Battalion –Maj., July 1854 Out of Army 1855, General, 1837 Died, March 27, 1843 Rosslyn House, Hampstead</td>
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<td>Dickson, Jermiah,</td>
<td>Cornet 2nd Dragoon Gds., 1798</td>
<td>Assistant Quartermaster General in Peninsula</td>
<td>Col., May 1825</td>
<td>Quartermaster General, India appointment began 1827</td>
<td>Quartermaster General</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>M. G., 1837</td>
<td>Colonel, 61st Ft., 1844 Died, March, 1848</td>
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<td>Gosport 1776, son of 3rd Baronet of Carr, Perthshire, Sir Charles Douglas</td>
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<td>(b.) 14 Jan. 1785</td>
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<td>Elder son of Maj. James Sholto Douglas, who was first cousin of the 5th and 6th Marquisess of Queensberry</td>
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<td>South America 1806</td>
<td>Peninsula, 1808-1814</td>
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<td>Drake, Thomas</td>
<td>Lt. 1800</td>
<td>Served in Spain and Portugal</td>
<td>ADC to General Spencer Dep. Asst. Quartermaster General 1812</td>
<td>2nd Lt. 95th Ft., April 1805 1st Lt., May 1806 Capt. Canadian Fencibles, May 1807 Capt. 95th 1808 Bvt. Maj. April 1813</td>
<td>AQG, Ireland</td>
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<td>Augustus, (b.)</td>
<td>10 June 1796, only son of General Charles Fitzroy</td>
<td>Capt. Royal Horse Gds., 1820 H.p. June 1825</td>
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<td>Fullerton, Robert, (b.)</td>
<td>1773, Scot</td>
<td>Service in Kandyian War</td>
<td>Robert Brownrigg’s ADC, Gov. of Ceylon 1811-1818 Capt. 1st Ceylon Regiment 28th January 1813; Bvt. Maj. October 1818. Lt. Col. in 1831</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dep. Quartermaster General</td>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Governor Straits Settlements Died, 1831</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3rd Ft. 1791</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>Service in Low Countries</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Dep. Adj. Gen.</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1830-1841</td>
<td>Colonel 61st Ft. 1840</td>
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<td>Son of John Gardiner 3rd Ft.</td>
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<td>with Lord Moira</td>
<td>West Indies, Staff Asst.</td>
<td>Low Countries West Indies, 1795</td>
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<td>Colonel 50th Ft. 1844</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Duke of York</td>
<td>Quartermaster General and</td>
<td>Walcheren, 1809</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Colonel 6th Ft. 1849</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>West Indies with</td>
<td>Brigade Maj. Asst. Adj.</td>
<td>Spain, 1813-1814</td>
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<td>L. G., Nov. 1841</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Storming of</td>
<td>Gen. Horse Gds.</td>
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<td>Died, Eaton Place, London, 6</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Grenada Walcheren</td>
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<td>Gore, Charles Stephen, (b.)</td>
<td>Comet 16th Lt. Drag.</td>
<td>Went to Peninsula</td>
<td>Peninsula, North America,</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Dep. Qua...</td>
<td>Canada, 1830</td>
<td>Col. 91st Ft., Aug 1855</td>
<td>Col. 6th Ft., 9 March 1861</td>
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<td>1793 Son of Arthur Gore, 2nd</td>
<td>Oct. 1808</td>
<td>1811 Participated</td>
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<td>1863</td>
<td>Gov. of Chelsea Hospital, 1868</td>
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<td>Earl of Arran</td>
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<td>in storming of</td>
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<td>Fort San Francisco</td>
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<td>Ciudad Rodrigo,</td>
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<td>Salamanca, Vittoria,</td>
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<td>Died, Chelsea Hospital, Sept.</td>
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<td>(b.) 1799</td>
<td>Aug 1804</td>
<td>Ft., 1804 Capt.</td>
<td>Lt. Col. 1818</td>
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<td>Kennedy, John Pitt, (b.) 8 May</td>
<td>2⁰th Lt. Royal</td>
<td>Secret to Sir Charles</td>
<td>Cephalonia</td>
<td>Ionian Islands</td>
<td>Inspect General National Education Dept. Ireland, 1837 Agent to Lord Devon’s estates,</td>
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<td>1796, 4⁰ son of Rev. John Pitt</td>
<td>Lt. Royal</td>
<td>Napier</td>
<td>On H.p. May 1822</td>
<td></td>
<td>1843 Sec. to Irish Famine Relief, 1845, Sec. to Sir Charles Napier, India, 1849</td>
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<td>Kennedy, co. Donegal</td>
<td>Engineers,</td>
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<td>1⁰th Lt. R.E., 1825</td>
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<td>Engineer Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway, 1853 Author Died, St. George’s Sq.</td>
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<td>Served in Spain and Portugal, and at the Battle of Albuhera</td>
<td>Capt. 60th Ft. 13Mar.1802, Capt. 73rd Ft. 26May1803, Maj. bvt. 22May1804, Maj.31st Ft. 21April1808, Lt.Col. bvt. 30May1811, Lt. Col 26th Ft. 10Dec1812, Lt. Col 31st Ft. by exchange, 8June1815</td>
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<tr>
<td>Love, James Frederick</td>
<td>Ensign 52nd Ft. 1804</td>
<td>Served in Sweden and Portugal, 1808 Peninsula New Orleans, 1815 (wounded)</td>
<td>ADC John Lambert</td>
<td>New Brunswick Zante</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b.) London, 1789, son of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inspecting Field Officer of Militia, New Brunswick, 1825 Resident of Zante, 1835 73rd Ft. Canada, 1838 Gov. of Jersey, 1852</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Love</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowry-Corry, Somerset</td>
<td>No military service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor Jamaica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b.) 11 July 1774</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Died, 1841 Son became 1st Lord of the Admiralty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial/Political prior to 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Posting in 1830</td>
<td>Later Career and Death</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macleod, Henry George (b. ?)</td>
<td>Served in Flanders and Waterloo Campaign (w.)</td>
<td>Capt. 29 September 1813, Capt. 35th Ft. 9December 1814, bvt. Maj. 21 June 1815</td>
<td>ADC to Duke of Richmond in Canada</td>
<td>Dep. Adj. Gen. 1826-1835</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Knighted by William IV on being appt. Lt. Governor, St. Christopher’s Colonel, H.p. 1838 Died, near Windsor, August 20, 1847</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Posting in 1830</td>
<td>Later Career and Death</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maxwell, Charles William</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>St. Kitts Nevis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

390
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date Entered Service</th>
<th>Combat Experience</th>
<th>Staff Experience</th>
<th>Service Record</th>
<th>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</th>
<th>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</th>
<th>Colonial Posting in 1830</th>
<th>Later Career and Death</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
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<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
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<td>Date Entered Service</td>
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<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, Patrick</td>
<td>Ensign, Capt. Short’s Ind. Co. 1793</td>
<td>Ireland, 1794-96</td>
<td>ADC M. G. Adeane, 1794 Trichinopoly, East Indies, 1797 Mysore Campaign Mahatta Campaign with Wellington 1801</td>
<td>Lt. 100th Ft. 1793 Capt. 100th Ft. 1794 91st Ft. 1795 25/22nd Lt. Drag. 1798 Bvt. Maj./Maj. 26th Ft. – 23 Dragoons. 1807 as Lt. Col. 1807 10th Ft. 1809 Lt. Col. 75th Ft. 1815</td>
<td>Served in Ionian Islands.</td>
<td>Governor Antigua, Barbuda, and Montesurt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Posting in 1830</td>
<td>Later Career and Death</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewell, William Henry</td>
<td>Cornet March 1806</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cornet 16th Dragoons 1806</td>
<td>Dep. Quartermaster General Feb 1828 to 1841</td>
<td>East Indies</td>
<td>Commandant of Central Division, Madras, 1849</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. 1807 Capt. 60th Ft. 1812</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commanded Mysore Division 1851</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bvt. Maj. 1814 Lt. Col. 1817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel, 26th Ft. 1852</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H.p. 1821 Capt. 49th Ft. 1828</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel, 79th Ft. 1854</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maj. 31st Ft. 1829 Lt. Col. 6th Ft. 1839</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C.B. 19 July 1838</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Col. 94th Ft. March 1841</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>K.C.B. 28 June 1861</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grant distinguished service award, April 1848</td>
<td></td>
<td>Died, Florence, March 13, 1862</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b.) 1787—one of thirteen children</td>
<td></td>
<td>Corruna, 1808 Portugal, 1809 wounded 1809 Spain—1810-1814</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bvt. Maj. 1814</td>
<td>Dep. QM Gen., Cape Colony, 1828</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjutant General, India 1840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asst. Adj. Gen. under Pakenham, 1814 Mil. Sec. to Sir John Lambert—successor to Pakenham Asst. Q.M.Gen. 1815</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M. G., honorary rank, 1845</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1815</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor, Cape Colony, 1847-1852</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Governor, Plymouth, 1853</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L.G., 1854</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Command of Northern Military District, 1854</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Died, 1860</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Posting in 1830</td>
<td>Later Career and Death</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyth, James Carmichael, (b.) 1770 eldest of five sons (doctor)</td>
<td>Educated at Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Mar. 1795</td>
<td>One of chief engineers, South Africa 1795-1808 Spain, with Moore, 1808-09 Low Countries, 1813-1815</td>
<td>Gained experience as a colonial official</td>
<td>Lt. Col. 1813 Bvt. Col. 1815 M. G. 1825</td>
<td>Board of Ordnance, 1818 Engineer inspector Low Countries &amp; West Indies, 1823 Engineer inspector, North America, 1825 — involved in Rideau Canal project Engineer, Ireland, 1829</td>
<td>Governor Bahamas 1829-1833</td>
<td>Governor, British Guiana 1833-38 published eight volumes on military engineering, defense, and slavery</td>
<td>Died, 1838 after short illness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial/Political prior to 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Position and Rank in 1830</td>
<td>Colonial Posting in 1830</td>
<td>Later Career and Death</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirling, James, (b.) 1791, Drumpellier, Lanarkshire, 5th son of Andrew Stirling m. 3 Sept. 1823, Ellen (16), 3rd daughter of James Mangles M.P. for Guilford,</td>
<td>Entered Navy, Aug. 1803 West Indies aboard, <em>Hercules</em> (74) flagship of Sir John Duckworth.</td>
<td>1805 Cape Finisterre, <em>Glory</em>, under the command of R.A. Charles Stirling, River Plate, 1807 Lt. Aug. 1809 Flag Lt. 1811 Command of sloop <em>Brazen</em> 1812, mouth of Mississippi Hudson Bay, North Sea, coast of Ireland, Gulf of Mexico West Indies station, 1818</td>
<td>1826, form a settlement in Raffles Bay, Torres Strait. Explorations 1827 form new settlement Western Australia to forestall French designs. Oct. 1828, appt. by Sir George Murray, (old family friend) to command party of settlers. Spring 1829, Fremantle and Perth founded</td>
<td>1830 Governor Western Australia</td>
<td>Resigned govt. 1839 lack of progress in colony and imminent war with France returned to active service. 1840-44 commanded <em>Indus</em> (78) Mediterranean <em>Howe</em> (120) Mediterranean. R.A. 1851 Lord of Admiralty, 1852 C in C, China Squadron, 1854-56 Vice Admiral. 1857 Admiral, 1862 Died Woodbridge, Guilford, Surrey. April 22, 1865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Entered Service</td>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Colonial /Political prior to 1830</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations used in table:**
- ADC: aide de camp
- Bvt.: Brevet
- Capt.: Captain
- DAG: Deputy Adjutant General
- DQG: Deputy Quartermaster General
- K.C.B.: Companion of the Order of the Bath
- K.C.H.: Knight Commander of the Hanoverian Order
- L. G.: Lieutenant General
- M.: Member of Parliament
- M.S.: Military Secretary
- R.A.: Royal Artillery
- R.H.A.: Royal Horse Artillery
- R.H.M.: Royal Horse Artillery
- Lt.: Lieutenant
- Maj.: Major
- Capt.: Captain
- Ft.: Fort
- AAG: Assistant Adjutant General
- AQM: Assistant Quartermaster General
- C in C: Commander in Chief
- DQG: Deputy Adjutant General
- K. C. B.: Knight Commander of the Bath
- Lt. Col.: Lieutenant Colonel
- M.G.: Major General
Table A.18
Number of Colonial Military Administrators, Colonial Military Administrators with Staff Experience, and Civilian Administrators, 1815-1835.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Military Administrators</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Military Administrators with Staff Experience</th>
<th>Number of Civilian Administrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Denotes that biographical information for one administrator not obtained.

Table A.19
Colonial Administrative Structure and Salaries, Cape Colony 1834

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name of Officer</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Salary £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Major General B. D'Urban</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Justice of the Supreme Court</td>
<td>Sir I. Wylde Hnt.</td>
<td>1 Jan. 1828</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Puisne Judge</td>
<td>W. Menzies Esq.</td>
<td>1 Jan. 1828</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puisne Judge</td>
<td>G. Kekewich Esq.</td>
<td>28 July 1827</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master of Supreme Court</td>
<td>Clere Burton Esq.</td>
<td>21 April 1828</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registrar of Supreme Court</td>
<td>Thomas Bowles Esq.</td>
<td>21 Aug. 1827</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary to Govt.</td>
<td>Lieut. Colonel J. Bell</td>
<td>1 Jan. 1828</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer/Acct. Genl./Registrar of Deeds</td>
<td>J. Harvey Esq</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditor General</td>
<td>P. G. Brink Esq.</td>
<td>29 Nov. 1828</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge of Police</td>
<td>P. B. Boreherds Esq.</td>
<td>14 June 1827</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintndt of Police</td>
<td>C. de Lorentz Esq.</td>
<td>1 Dec. 1825</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>A. Olliphant Esq.</td>
<td>10 June 1827</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Sheriff</td>
<td>J. Steuart</td>
<td>29 Nov. 1828</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of Lombard Bank</td>
<td>J. Marshall Esq.</td>
<td>7 Dec. 1816</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner of Stamps</td>
<td>J. Carey Esq.</td>
<td>17 May 1829</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Master General</td>
<td>R. Crozier Esq</td>
<td>21 Nov. 1815</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Captain</td>
<td>J. Bance Esq.</td>
<td>30 Nov. 1825</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer</td>
<td>Maj. Michell</td>
<td>9 June 1828</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector of Taxes</td>
<td>R. Rogerson Esq.</td>
<td>14 June 1827</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table B.1 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian and Surname of the Officer</th>
<th>Age on first Appointment to His Majesty's Service</th>
<th>Dates of first Appointment and of each subsequent Promotion, Removal, or Exchange whether to Full-Pay or Half-Pay</th>
<th>Regiments to which the several Commissions have been obtained, or upon the Half-Pay or which the Officer may have retired.</th>
<th>FULL-PAY</th>
<th>HALF-PAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service on Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Each successive Rank held by the Officer while on Full-Pay How obtained; whether by purchase or without purchase and if by purchase; and if by restoration, whether by paying the difference, or without</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-Pay..........................</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Each successive Rank held by the Officer while on Half-Pay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-Pay..........................</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Whether placed thereon by reduction; by the purchase of a Half-Pay Commission; by exchange receiving the difference by Exchange, without the difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total........</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Officer is here required to state whether he is desirous of service</strong></td>
<td><strong>MARRIED OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td><strong>WOUNDED OFFICERS</strong></td>
<td><strong>OFFICERS HOLDING CIVIL SITUATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the Officer is Married, he is required to state, underneath, when and where the marriage took place</td>
<td>If the Officer has any Children, their Names and Dates of Birth are to be stated underneath.</td>
<td>If the Officer is in the Receipt of a Pension for Wound; the Amount of that Pension; the Station where the Officer was serving when Wounded; and the Date of the Commencement of the Grant is to be stated.</td>
<td>If the Officer is employed in any Civil Office under His Majesty, or in the service of any other Government, the Title and Nature of that Employment and the Annual Amount of Emoluments and Salary attached thereto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Marriage</td>
<td>Place of Marriage</td>
<td>Names of Children</td>
<td>Dates of their birth</td>
<td>Amount of Pension</td>
<td>Where serving when wounded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Signature in the Officers own handwriting*
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Public Record Office, Kew
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C. O. 54 Correspondence with the colonies, entry books and registers of correspondence.
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C. O. 234/105 Book of Circular Letters, 1826-1840
C.O. 325/20 Colonial Office Appointment Books

W.O. 135/1 Lieutenant General Sir Harry G W Smith, Adjutant General in India and Governor of Cape Colony: papers
W.O. 135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (marked Field Letter Book, No. 3) Sir Harry Smith.
W.O. 135/3 Lieutenant General Sir Harry G W Smith, Adjutant General in India and Governor of Cape Colony: papers
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