A BURKEIAN ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATIVE ORATORY
IN THE LANDON LECTURE SERIES 1966-70

by

William J. Hamlin
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Approved by:

[Signature]
Major Professor
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 1966, "The Alfred M. Landon Lecture Series On Public Issues" was inaugurated with an address by former Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas. Since his address on international relations, sixteen other prominent political figures and theorists have spoken before an audience at Kansas State University. Subsequent speeches have been delivered by the late publisher, Ralph McGill; Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen; former Secretary of the Interior, Walter J. Hickel; President Richard M. Nixon; former Chief Justice Earl Warren of the Supreme Court; General W. C. Westmoreland of the United States Army; professors Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and John Kenneth Galbraith; United States Senators Mike Mansfield, Edward W. Brooke, Hubert H. Humphrey, Hugh Scott and the late Robert F. Kennedy; and Governors Ronald Reagan, Nelson Rockefeller, and George Romney.

Description of the Series

Organized in 1966 and continuing today, the series was originally conceived to discuss important political issues of a contemporary character by prominent public figures. Thus, the principal objectives of the series were fourfold: 1) to invite qualified people to speak on the campus on national and international issues, 2) to generate information on public issues, 3) to create student interest and discussion on public issues, and 4) to pay tribute to Governor Alfred M. Landon.
The speakers were contacted and invited to appear before the campus in Ahearn Field House largely through the efforts of Governor Landon, President James A. McCain and Dr. William W. Boyer of the department of Political Science. After Dr. Boyer left the campus in 1968, Dr. Joseph Hajda of the international office filled Dr. Boyer's place in helping to obtain speakers for the Series. The Series was initiated with the originally agreed-upon speakers of Landon, McGill, Reagan, Romney, Kennedy, and Schlesinger. Both Romney and Kennedy launched their presidential campaigns at the Landon Lecture Series. Only in the case of Reagan did the committee request a speaker to select a particular topic. In a letter to the author, Dr. Boyer gave his reasons for this request.

Some weeks before Governor Reagan delivered his address on October 26, 1967, he stopped at Manhattan Airport enroute to a speaking engagement in Louisville, Kentucky. I met him at the airport and at that time he asked me directly what I would like him to speak on. I told him that I wanted him to speak on the contemporary role of higher education in the United States, and to include within his remarks his perception of the role of academic freedom among faculty in our universities. He agreed to do so. Later, both President McCain and Governor Landon expressed some disappointment to me that I had not requested Governor Reagan to speak on Vietnam. The reason that I did not was because I thought other speakers would want to address themselves to that topic which was very current in much of the news, and certainly Governor Reagan's difficulties with regard to dissent at the University of California at Berkeley appeared to me to have major implications of a political character throughout the United States. I might add that later, after national publicity highlighted Governor Reagan's comments on higher education at his Landon Lecture, both Governor Landon and President McCain commended me on the choice of the topic.

In choosing speakers that had some association with Governor Landon throughout his political career, President McCain stated that an effort was made to achieve a balance among liberals and conservatives,
Republicans and Democrats. The author knows of only two speakers who elected not to come to the campus to deliver an address. They were John Tower of Texas and President Johnson.

The materials for investigation will be largely taken from Kansas State University's publications of the speeches. Tapes of each of the original speeches were made, but, because of a fire only the addresses of Kennedy, Brooke, Humphrey, Nixon, Warren, Galbraith, Sheen and Scott remain. As a result the texts of the speeches given by Landon, McGill, Reagan, Romney, Hickel, Schlesinger, Mansfield, and Westmoreland may not be identical to the speeches as presented, since they were revised prior to the University's publication. In the case of Rockefeller, the University neither had a tape nor a publication. The author will then use an excerpt of this speech obtained from the office of Governor Rockefeller in Albany, New York. In the case of the speeches for which tapes remain, the original manuscripts will be used in this study.

To date, there have been no complete studies made of the Series. There have been some rhetorical analyses of individual speeches, but these deal only with one man, rather than with the whole body of speeches. The present study will attempt a descriptive and critical assessment of those speeches concerning statements of policy given by politicians in the series, that is, by those people who have the most direct influence on matters of public policy and whose adaptation to the audience is most critical. The speeches to be studied will be those of Landon, Reagan, Hickel, Nixon, Warren, Mansfield, Brooke, Humphrey, Kennedy, Rockefeller, and Romney. Although Scott would be considered a politician, he did not address
himself to matters of policy and, therefore, will be omitted from this study. The analyses of the speeches will be specifically concerned with relating an individual's political position on a given issue at a given time to the nature of the speaker's appeals.

Suitability of using Kenneth Burke

The tools for investigation are borrowed from the critic, Kenneth Burke. Burke's tools for analysis combine a critical approach that uncovers both substance and rhetorical pattern through what he calls "dramatism." Burke has stated that man reacts symbolically to his environment, he emits "verbal strategies" which directly reflect his attitudes. Burke's system of rhetoric, then, has provided the critic with tools for making a textual analysis of a speech; the Burkean system is concerned only with the analysis of the textual aspects of the speech itself. For Burke, the origin of rhetoric "is not rooted in any past condition of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."6

It has been for these reasons that Burke's system of rhetorical analysis was chosen over the other systems. That is, Burke's system of rhetoric seems to be particularly well suited for ascertaining the political position used in a speech, for it uncovers the substance of the speech as well as its rhetorical characteristics. Continuing this line of thinking, Bernard Lee Brock in his doctoral dissertation at Northwestern University, A Description of Four Political
Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics, has suggested reasons why other systems have not been as well suited for this kind of analysis.

There are three systems or methods of analysis that are generally accepted as guides in arriving at these principles. First, Aristotle's *Rhetoric and Topics* lists over 200 topics or places of argument which are rhetorical strategies that can be used in argumentation. It also indicates that a speaker may use either inductive or deductive form of organization for his speech. However, Aristotle does not provide a means for correlating his substantive topics with rhetorical strategies. A second method of analysis is provided by John Dewey in his book, *How We Think*. In describing the five steps in reflective thinking, Dewey sets forth a system for analyzing the substance of a problem. This same method is recommended as a framework for organizing a speech. But Dewey's method deals only with principles of structuring a problem. It does not provide any suggestions in the area of rhetorical strategies. Most debate textbooks discuss a third approach to analysis, namely, stock issues. Once again, however, this system fails to coordinate the substance of a speech with rhetorical strategies.7

Thus, in order to uncover a political position in a speech, the rhetorical critic is in need of a method which will describe the speaker's strategies in both form and substance. Burke provides for just this in his method.

The Argument of the Study

Kenneth Burke has classed political rhetoric as a variant form of "secular prayer." That is, politicians design their addresses in a form of a "prayer" to the public in order to sway them on matters of public policy.8 They seek to commune with their audience to take a particular course of action or to change their attitudes. It should be of some value to take cognizance of their appeals in a period of time, as is ours, when the society seems to be losing its permanence under the vast amount of change from year to year. During
these periods, people search for over-all appeals that will bring men together and create order out of disorder and disrelationship. The task of the rhetorical critic should be to determine which appeals seem most effective. The Landon Lecture Series affords some opportunity for examining the nature of appeals used by prominent politicians during a time when these appeals become so urgently important to study.

The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the appeals addressed before the Landon Lecture Series, through a description of a politician's liberal or conservative orientation. A method of analysis will be constructed for ascertaining the liberal or conservative status of the political speeches by relating political strategies to political positions. This paper intends to use a similarly constructed measure, although modified in some respects. The measure and its modifications will be more fully discussed in the second and third chapters of this thesis.

Precis of Each Chapter

This paper will begin its investigation by defining Burke's rhetorical point of view and his methodology. Beginning with a description of his philosophy of man through his definitions of man, the second chapter will then describe Burke's rhetorical structure. In conjunction with Burke's rhetorical structure, Lee Hultzen's method for analyzing deliberative rhetoric will be combined with Burke's system. Brock has suggested the combination of both in order to provide more structuring for the analysis of the speeches.

The second step of the investigation will include a description of the political positions of liberalism and conservatism. Focusing
on the substantive aspects of the political positions, this dis-
cussion will provide the most basic alteration in Brock's methodology. 
Following this, the political positions of liberalism and conserva-
tism will be linked with the Burkean methodology in order to produce 
a measure for ascertaining the political position used in a speech.

The concluding phase of the study will lie in chapters IV and V. 
Chapter IV will deal with the analysis of the political positions of 
the speakers concerned with domestic issues and chapter V with 
international issues. The chapters will begin with a historical 
background of the problem, and then, an analysis of the individual 
speeches.
FOOTNOTES


2Dr. William W. Boyer, personal communication, February 24, 1971.

3Dr. William W. Boyer, personal communication, February 24, 1971.


5The major works used for this study are, Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969) and Kenneth Burke (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969).

6Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 43.

7Bernard Lee Brock, "A Description of Four Political Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics," dissertation Northwestern University 1965, pp. 4-5.

8Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 393.
CHAPTER 2

THE BURKEAN POINT OF VIEW AND METHODOLOGY

Prior to defining the two political positions of liberalism and conservatism, a method of textual analysis will be established in this chapter. The tools for investigation have been basically borrowed from the critic, Kenneth Burke; whose rhetorical system largely consists of a discussion of identification, the pentad, and substance. In addition, Lee S. Hultzen's framework for deliberative analysis will be combined with Burke's rhetorical method. Since this paper will basically use Bernard Brock's methodology for ascertaining a speaker's political position, this chapter will be similarly constructed to Brock's chapter on Burke.

Burke's Definitions of Man

The foundation of Burke's rhetorical system has stemmed from his philosophy of man. For this reason, one must first begin with his philosophy of man prior to effectively understanding his tools for textual analysis. One way of entering this realm would be through his definitions of man. Burke has suggested that a definition should "so sum things up that all the properties attributed to the thing defined can be 'derived' from the definition."¹ Therefore, his tools for textual analysis can be derived from his view of man. Burke's definitions of man are largely concerned with "symbolic action" and the "dramatistic" nature of society, both of these terms
being interrelated in his theory. So in order to discuss Burke's definitions of man, one must first attempt to describe what Burke has meant by the terms rhetoric, "symbolic action," and "dramatism."

Communication is considered by Burke to be a purposeful act. He has pointed out that the nature of "communication involves the use of verbal symbols for the purposes of appeal."\(^2\) Since Burke would regard rhetoric as the mode of appeal, he would contend that it will grow out of division.

For if union is complete, what incentive can there be for appeal? Rhetorically, there can be courtship only insofar as there is division.\(^3\)

Thus, without division among groups in society, there could be no rhetoric. From this Burke has derived the function of rhetoric by asserting that it has resided in "the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or, to induce actions in other human agents... ."\(^4\)

For Burke the understanding of the function of rhetoric would depend upon the understanding of the use of language as "symbolic action."

For rhetoric as such is not rooted in any past condition of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function anew; the use of language as symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.

As a result, Burke is concerned with symbols and the prompting of human cooperation through "symbolic action." In _The Philosophy of Literary Form_, Burke has said that "any verbal act" can be pointed to as "symbolic action."\(^6\) That is, words can be explained as symbols which stand for things or ideas (acts), and these verbalizations can be interpreted as symbols in action.
When Burke discussed the "dramatistic" nature of society, he based his model of society on "symbolic action." The symbols which man emits are grounded in his social, physical and psychological needs. To uncover how these symbols will operate in a society, one must, according to Burke, look at society as "dramatistic" in nature.

Human conduct being in the realm of action and end (as contrasted with the physicist's realm of motion and position) is most directly discussible in dramatic terms. By 'dramatic' terms are meant those that begin in action rather than in theories of knowledge.

The terms of rhetoric, "symbolic action" and "dramatism" have reflected Burke's emphasis upon man's symbolic behavior. It has been from these concepts that Burke's main coordinates of "dramatism" develop. He has regarded these to be language, the negative and hierarchy which are housed in his definitions of man. From this point, we shall proceed into Burke's definitions of man. His definitions have taken this form:

Man is
the symbol using animal
inventor of the negative
separated from his natural conditions by instruments of his own making
goaded by the spirit of hierarchy.

Man as "Symbol-Using Animal"

Symbols can be discussed in terms of representations of things, events, and ideas. They are interpreted as meaningful acts which refer to or stand for something else. Man has the capacity to communicate and participate with others through the use of these symbolic acts. According to Hugh Duncan, a Burkean sociologist, "Society arises in, and continues to exist through the communication
of significant symbols." By significant symbols, Duncan has meant that the symbol is only "significant" when it arouses similar internal meaning responses in the speaker and those spoken to.

Burke has pointed out that in any discussion of social behavior, one must "stress symbolism as a motive, if maximum scope and relevancy is required of the terminology." He has contended that motives can be derived from communication situations, for when questions are formulated about situations, the answers take the form of "strategic answers" or "stylized answers." That is, both motives and attitudes are locked into our communication by the selection of symbols for particular answers. Motives thus constitute the foundation or substance of a speech, while our attitudes are determined by our reaction to the situation. Thus, our answers to particular situations would form "symbolic strategies." These would be the ways in which we handle, through communication, a particular situation. Burke has explained this point of view in The Philosophy of Literary Form when he discussed "Situations and Strategies."

So I would propose an initial working distinction between 'strategies' and 'situations,' whereby we think of poetry (I here use the term to include any work of critical or imaginative cast) as the adopting of various strategies for encompassing of situations, name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that contains an attitude toward them.

For Burke the ultimate nature of man has resided in his symbol-using capacity. The study of language and its various functions has been, for Burke, the study of human relations and human realities. The remaining clauses in Burke's definitions of man have focused upon his language oriented system and the implication of that system for the study of the drama of human relations.
Man as "Inventor of the Negative"

One of the distinguishing characteristics of man, according to Burke, has been the principle of the negative. He has pointed out that the negative is non-existent in nature for "everything simply is what it is as it is." Burke is not particularly satisfied with the term "inventor" used in the clause of his definition of man for he has suggested that "it might be more accurate to say that language and the negative 'invented' man." For Burke, man became a moral and ethical organism with the introduction of the principle of the negative because it gave man the choice of accepting or rejecting the human situation. As a result, such things as law, justice, moral, and social conduct were instilled into man's behavior.

In other words, if our character is built of our responses (positive or negative) to the thou-shalt-not's of morality, and if we necessarily approach life from the standpoint of our personalities, will not all experience reflect the genius of this negatability? Laws are essentially negative; 'mine' equals 'not thine'; insofar as property is not protected by the thou-shalt-not's of either moral or civil law, it is not protected at all.

To be considered "dramatically," the principle of the negative must be thought of in the imperative sense of "THOU SHALT NOT" as used in the Decalogue. Burke has contended that "a Dramatistic approach would look for the 'essential' instance of an admonitory or pedagogical negative - and it would find this to perfection in the negatives of the Ten Commandments." Laws must be considered in terms of commandments, otherwise, the "sacred" sense of social order would become trivialized.

In its application to social order or hierarchy, the principle of the negative has given man the possibilities of accepting or rejecting
a position on the hierarchy or even the whole social order. Since hierarchies are constructed on the basis of some value-system, the terms of acceptance and rejection become very important if that society will maintain a social order. Acceptance of the hierarchy will result in unity, while rejection will result in division among those in the society.

**Man as "Separated from His Natural Condition by Instruments of His Own Making"**

Within this clause of Burke's definition, he has not only tried to encompass those definitions that would explain man as a "tool-using" animal, but he has also used this clause to cover a broader gamut of meaning. Burke has considered language to be an "act" which has separated man from his physical environment. "Language," Burke has said, "is a species of action, symbolic action – and its nature is such that it can be used as a tool." 16

Because of language's abstractive nature (separation of word and object), it has been an instrument which has permitted man to pool information for the purposes of cooperation and, hence, survival. Language, along with the communicative aspect, has been the essential element for establishing social bonds between people. Without language there would be no transmission of information, no action, no knowledge, no social organization.

However, Burke has not considered language to be just a tool or instrument.

Those who begin with stress upon tools proceed to define language itself as a species of tool. But though instrumentality is an important aspect of language, we could not properly treat it as the essence of language. 17
Burke has pointed out that language can be explained very much like a hierarchy in a social order for it has terms which can be considered to be transcending in nature. That is, it has terms which ascend and descend. Thus, man's language has allowed him to divide his society into classes, ranks and roles which have formed the hierarchical nature of society.

In any case the tool making propensities envisioned in our third clause result in the complex network of material operations and properties, public or private, that arise through men's ways of livelihood, with the different classes of society that arise through the division of labor and the varying relationships to property structure.  

This, then, has brought Burke to his fourth and final clause in his definitions of man.

Man as "Goaded by the Spirit of Hierarchy"

Man, according to Burke, is "moved by a sense of order" which is expressed through a hierarchy of inferiors, superiors and equals. Hierarchies differentiate a man's position in a social ladder on the basis of authority, status and rank. Within a society each person will play a particular role governed by his position in the social order. Roles are played in communication in such a way that superiors must "court" their inferiors in order to accept the superior's rule. On the other hand, inferiors must "court" their superiors in order to be accepted as part of the loyal citizenry within a particular social order. As long as both superiors and inferiors have accepted their positions on the hierarchy and there has been the allowance for movement up and down the social ladder, the rulers are said to be "legitimate" and "a sense of order" has resulted in the society.
In Burke's terminology a sense of social order is achieved through "Mystery." Mystery has arisen from the social hierarchy when people have transcended class differences in order to attain a cohesive social bond. It has been at this point that people have been able to commune and identify with one another. Mystery is housed in a deep rapport between the leader and his followers. To Burke, the concept of mystery has been the ultimate social motive by which a society has maintained its social order for men have been "goaded by the spirit of hierarchy."

However, there have been moments in any society when people have rejected or negated the principles of social order, which have caused division and social disrelationship. In effect, a sense of guilt has arisen within the social framework. Guilt, as commentator William Rueckett has explained it, has been Burke's all-purpose term for "all kinds of tension and any uneasiness from whatever cause" that has originated in the social system. Thus, Mystery and guilt have operated as unifying and divisive acts in a social system.

To complete Burke's "dramatistic" framework, the terms "Guilt," "Redemption" and "Purification" must be discussed. When guilt has originated in a society, a means for the expiration of the guilt must be made clear. Burke has contended that the cleansing of guilt in a society must move through a process of redemption in order for the society to purify itself from the violation of the social order. The cleansing of guilt in a society is redeemed through either "victimage" or "mortification," according to Burke. Victimage is defined as the purging of guilt through a scapegoat which symbolizes the society's guilt. On the other hand, mortification is defined
as the act of self-sacrifice in order to relieve a man of his guilt. The overall act of redemption, whether it has been through victimage or mortification, can take place in two forms, that of tragedy or comedy. The tragic form of victimage is based upon "the kill," while the comic form is based upon ridicule. Duncan in his book, Communication and Social Order, has made a particularly important point concerning the tragic and comic forms of redemption. He has suggested that when the expulsion of evil via a comic form has not expiated the guilt arising from disobedience in a society, then only one dramatic form has been left, and that would be the tragic.

Kenneth Burke's theories on "symbolic action" and "dramatism," and their interrelationships in society have provided the principles that underlie the rhetorical system. In the succeeding pages his tools will be explored.

Burke's Rhetorical Tools

Kenneth Burke has derived a number of rhetorical tools by which his theories on "symbolic action" and "dramatism" may be analyzed. His methodology has enabled the critic to discover and describe the speaker's strategies of form and substance in a speech. In conjunction with Burke's rhetorical tools, identification, the pentad and substance, Bernard Brock has used Lee S. Hultzen's "stock issue" approach to deliberative rhetoric in order to ascertain the structure of political speeches. Hultzen used four frames for establishing the deliberative process: Ill, Blame, Cure and Cost. All of these tools will be discussed in the succeeding pages.
Identification

For Burke, identification has been the central concept in the function of rhetoric. It can be defined as the condition of being essentially the same in substance with something described or asserted. Identification is described by Burke as "consubstantiality." It meant that people have had something in common in the way of interests, concepts, images, meanings, and as a result, they have been able to "act together." It is "hardly other than a name for the functioning of sociality." 23

A doctrine of consubstantiality, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial. 24

The source of persuasion, for Burke, lies within identification. "Men use rhetoric, Burke argues, to persuade others (and themselves) through address, to identify." 25 That is, men have formulated "symbolic strategies" for the purposes of persuasion. They have found ways to transcend their individuality by becoming part of the group through some common factor. Thus, if one is to influence those spoken to, one must appeal to his audience in such a way that he is saying "I am one with you" or that "my motivations are the same as yours." As a result, the aspects of persuasion lay in "courtship" and "mystification." Identification has involved the "use of suasive devices for the transcending of social estrangements." 26 Mystery would, then, be perfected identification. In sum: identification can be defined as the process whereby one tries to establish a relationship with a group. Persuasion has taken form when the group has believed their interests are joined with
the speaker. The key to identification lay in the strategic naming of situations and things in order to achieve a relationship with the group.

Thus, all striking and colorful names for acts, attitudes, ideas, images, and all the nuances of hierarchial relationships, must be watched carefully, for they are clues to the social values that individuals use to identify with each other in the process of transformation from one condition to another in society.27

Paradoxically, identification has dealt not only with unity, but, also with division. "Rhetoric," to Burke, "is concerned with the State of Babel after the Fall."28 It has been through division that rhetoric has arisen and identification has become a human need. Thus, identification is concerned with the persuasion of an audience to the speaker's point of view when individuals or groups have differed with one another.

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.29

As a rhetorical tool, identification has become important in determining the acceptance or rejection of institutions, ideas, concepts, images by the speaker. Through the concept of identification, the critic can determine the speaker's attitude toward the social order and his relationship toward the "dramatistic" process of guilt, purification and redemption.30

Pentad

In a Grammar of Motives, Burke has proposed a dramatic method for analyzing symbolic action. The structure of the act is illuminated through the use of five motivational terms. The pentad is a dramatic
model of action designed to uncover the problem of human motivation.

We shall use five terms as generating principle of our investigation. They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another than names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments be used (agency), and the purpose.31

For Burke, motives have been a "matter of appeal," and have depended upon one's orientation. "A motive is not some fixed thing, like a table, which one can go and look at. It is a term of interpretation, and being such it will naturally take its place within the framework of our Weltanschauung as a whole."32 Motives are housed in our vocabulary and depend upon our orientation in a particular social context. "Motives are shorthand terms for situations."33 Thus, the function of the pentad lay in charting the motives or causes of action in human conduct in a particular situation. Each term is represented as a motive or cause in human behavior. In the following paragraphs, the terms will be described along with their corresponding motives.

The term act is described as the form, pattern, or "whatness" of the thing done or deed. The act has signified the thought or deed which promotes social interaction. In Symbols in Society, Duncan has specified eleven acts which constitute the contents of social experiences. These acts have been "(1) the family; (2) ruling, being ruled, and reaching common agreement, as in political modes of action; (3) economics, or the provision of goods and services; (4) defense, or the means ranging from force to the apologetics and propaganda we use to defend ourselves from enemies within and without the community; (5) education, or the
creation and transmission of culture; (6) sociability, or the purely social forms we use to court each other as superiors, inferiors, and equals; (7) play, games, entertainments and festivals, in which we learn to act together under rules, and in job so that our social bonds will be strengthened in the euphoria of 'togetherness;' (8) health and welfare; (9) religion; (10) art; and (11) science." 34 From the standpoint of motivation, one act may have caused the carrying out of another act. Thus, the act of war may have led to other acts of aggression, particularly if the preceding act was successful.

The scene has denoted the situation or environment of man. It has consisted of the background against which the act has been committed. The term scene has stressed the time and place "which create the conditions of social action." 35 If the scene is emphasized, everything will become explainable in terms of matter in motion. In this sense, a system of thought will become mechanistic as opposed to teleological when the internal is explained by external conditions. Thus, human actions may be motivated by the situation or environment. For instance, the conditions of poverty have created social upheaval by the poor.

The third term in the discussion of the pentad will be agent. The term agent has focused upon the actor committing an act within a scene. When the act is stressed, this circumference will reduce all existence to thought, and, hence, will emphasize the mind. Thus, when one has stressed man as the ultimate purpose on earth the result will be that all motivations will dwell within him. The causes or motives of things will have been due to his actions. Thus, the poor are impoverished because they have been lazy. This would be an example of stress placed upon the term agent.
The fourth term to be discussed will be agency. The term has denoted the means, instruments, or operations which have permitted the agent to function. Agency has been the means to an end. When the term agency is stressed, the meaning of a human act lay in its consequences. Thus, in a statement of motivation, man's acts would be determined by the means employed in a particular situation. How something is done determines what is done. Duncan has given this example, "Manners determine society, for the ways we meet, greet, and talk create and sustain social graces."^36

The fifth and final term in the discussion will be purpose. The term has referred to why a particular act was done or to the goals or ends assumed in a man's acts. The term ideal can be linked with purpose in this discussion. For the ultimate object or endeavor in a man's act would be contained in both his view of purpose and ideals. As an example, Duncan has given, "If we educate more people and intensify the education of our elites, America will survive . . . .^37

It should be important to note that the terms in the pentad "seldom stand alone in symbolic phases of the act. Relationships between two, or stress on various combinations of two or more elements, are common."^38 Burke has distinguished ten "ratios" of terms that tend to stand out in the act. They have consisted of (1) scene-act, (2) scene-agent, (3) scene-agency, (4) scene-purpose, (5) act-purpose, (6) act-agent, (7) act-agency, (8) agent-purpose, (9) agent-agency, and (10) agency-purpose. The purpose in combining these ratios of terms has been to reduce the ambiguity involved in attributing motives or causes to human action.
To Burke, the subject of motivation is linked with the problem of substance. "Men's conception of motive, we have said, is integrally related to their conception of substance. Hence, to deal with problems of motives is to deal with problems of substance." 39 Through the use of Webster's dictionary, Burke has defined substance as "the most important element in any existence; the characteristic and essential components of anything; the main part; essential import; purport." 40 The word substance has referred to the ground on which it stands or its context. Burke has found that the word substance has been paradoxical for it has contained both an intrinsic and extrinsic relationship. He has confronted this paradox by a pun-analysis.

But returning to the pun as it figures in the citation from Locke, we might point up the pattern as sharply as possible by observing that the word 'substance', used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word designating something that a thing is not. That is, though used to designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, the word etymologically refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it. 41

The concept of substance has been meaningful for it has established the context of the speech, and is, thus, related to the speaker's attitudes and his strategies. Burke has described four types of substance. They have been familial, directional, geometric, and dialectic. These types of substance will be explained in the following paragraphs.

The first type of substance to be discussed is familial. This substance has emphasized ancestry. "In its purity, this concept stresses common ancestry in the strictly biological sense, as literal descent from maternal or paternal sources." 42 Burke has also pointed out that the stress need not always be placed on the biological, for it may be "spiritualized" to include social groups from the same nationality or
beliefs. If one has described himself as an American or as an aristocrat, he has located himself in terms of a "familial" substance.

The second type of substance to be described is directional. The directional substance has been "doubtless biologically derived from the experience of free motion, since man is an organism that lives by locomotion." This substance has emphasized motivation from within, particularly with metaphors of "the way." Such a substance would stress the "tendency" or "trend" to do or not to do something. All metaphors such as "life a pilgrimage" or "economic man" emphasize a directional substance.

The third substance in this discussion will be geometric. This substance has placed an object in its location as "existing both in itself and as a part of the background." It has emphasized "participation on context," and has led to "materialistic notions of determinism." If a person can identify himself with a statue, then, he has emphasized the geometric substance.

The final type of substance to be discussed with be dialectical. Dialectic substance must not only be considered as a "merely external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents. Its motivational properties characterize both 'the human situation' and what men are 'in themselves.' Burke has states that dialectic substance has been the over-all category of dramatism, which has treated human motives, as a point of departure, in terms of verbal action. "The human purpose, for instance, may be derived from God as a 'super-person.' Or human purpose may be derived from an All Purpose, or Cosmic Purpose, or Universal Purpose, or Inner Purpose, etc." Thus, dialectial substance
has emphasized the purpose in man's acts which are characterized by verbal naming of situations or things.

In the article "Political Speaking: A Burkean Approach," Bernard Brock has linked Burke's terms for substance with the pentad in order to ascertain which type of substance the speaker will be using in a speech. This can be done since it has been indicated that the subject of motivation is integrally related to the problem of substance. The linkage between these two concepts may be expressed as (1) the familial substance features the term agent, (2) the directional substance features the term agency, (3) the geometric substance features the term scene, and (4) the dialectical substance features the term purpose.  

Thus far, it has been demonstrated that Burke's rhetorical tools; identification, the pentad, and substance; are integrally related with one another. Both identification and the pentad, the speaker's attitudes and motivations have grown out of the concept of substance. "Identification is necessary in order to decide which of the pentadic terms is highlighted, while the highlighting of a term from the pentad suggests to the critic the type of substance established by the speaker. Just as simultaneous unity and division are essential to Burke's concept of identification, so unity and division exist among all of Burke's rhetorical principles."

The last stage involved in the analysis of political speaking will be to trace the stages the speaker must take in order to persuade his audience to accept a particular course of action. Bernard Brock has accomplished this task by combining Lee S. Hultzen's approach to deliberative rhetoric and Burke's concept of the "dramatistic" stages, which have been guilt, redemption and purification.
Hultzen has analyzed the deliberative process in terms of four frames. They have been Ill, Blame, Cure, and Cost. Along with each frame, Hultzen has proposed a question which can be employed in the analysis of political speaking.

For convenience in talking about them, we may label the frames MALUM or ILL, SANABILATAS or REFORMABILITY, REMEDIUM or REMEDY, PRETIUM or COST. The question 'Is there this ill in the present state of affairs?' is in the frame malum. When the question shifts to 'Is this ill curable, caused by a reformable condition?' or something of the sort, it is in the frame sanabilitas. 'Will the proposed remedy actually cure us of this ill?' is the question in the frame remedium. And 'Will the cure cost too much?' is in the pretium.

Hultzen's approach to the deliberative process is based upon questions dealing with policy, and is constructed in such a way that each question must be answered affirmatively before proceeding to the next frame. It should be noted, at this time, that only speeches dealing with questions of policy will be used in this paper. That is, a definite stand must be taken on a question of policy before the political position can be analyzed. "In this approach 'issues' become areas of consideration within a question of policy." 50

Brock has combined both Hultzen's "stock issue" approach with Burke's concept of the "dramatistic" process in such a way that (1) the stage of Ill is linked with guilt, (2) the stage of Cure is linked with purification, (3) the stage of Cost is linked with redemption which results from purification, and (4) the stage of blame is linked with Burke's concept of substance. 51 Thus, the critic of political speaking has the tools to analyze and evaluate the politician's performance. Brock has suggested that the use of these tools should fulfill four purposes.
"First, identification should be useful for determining his strategies of acceptance and rejection. Second, the pentad should be helpful as he describes man's responses to the world. Third, the concept of substance should be employed in evaluating the politicians' consistency. And fourth, the 'stock issue' frames and the 'dramatistic' stages should provide a structure for the total analysis."

A system of textual analysis has now been described using a combination of Burke's system of rhetorical analysis and Hultzen's framework for deliberative analysis. Chapter III will discuss the definitions of liberalism and conservatism, and then, link those definitions with the system of textual analysis in order to produce a measure for ascertaining a speaker's political position.
FOOTNOTES


3 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 271.

4 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 41.

5 Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 43.


8 Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 16.


10 Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 275.

11 Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 1.

12 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 9.

13 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 9.

14 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 11.

15 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 422.

16 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 15.

17 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 15.

18 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 15.


22 Duncan, *Communication and Social Order*, p. 130.


30 Bernard Lee Brock, "A Description of Four Political Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics," Dissertation Northwestern University, 1965, p. 61-62.


33 Burke, *Permanence and Change*, p. 29.


36 Duncan, *Communication and Social Order*, p. 434.

37 Duncan, *Communication and Social Order*, p. 434.

38 Duncan, *Communication and Social Order*, p. 434.


46 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 35.


50 Brock, "A Description of Four Polititical Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics," p. 80.


CHAPTER 3

THE POLITICAL POSITIONS AND THE METHOD OF TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Before attempting to describe a method for linking rhetorical strategies with political positions, one must construct a set of definitions for the political positions. For this reason, this chapter intends to formulate a series of definitions which characterize the political positions of liberalism and conservatism. The chapter also intends to devise a method for ascertaining political positions on the basis of their rhetorical strategies. As stated earlier, this method has been modified from a procedure formulated by Bernard Lee Brock.

Political Positions

Some of the most frequently heard labels in contemporary American politics have been the terms "liberal" and "conservative." The two labels have been used to describe differences in political views concerning issues of public policy. However, some confusion has arisen as to what the labels mean. As a result, some people have had a difficult time trying to identify the basic disagreements between liberals and conservatives. Mulford Q. Sibley has pointed out one reason why this confusion exists. He has suggested that "neither is what might be called a tight political doctrine. By this we mean that each is more or less a tendency rather than a series of closely knit propositions which, taken together, exclude others."
On the basis of this statement it would seem that the labels constitute a collection of attitudes or a set of perceptions which guide public policy. The terms liberalism and conservatism express themselves more as a collection of attitudes partly because they did not evolve from a single theorist, but rather from a number of sources. Since there have been a number of sources contributing to the political positions, they have encompassed a variety of viewpoints. As a result, the terms often have seemed vague and eclectic.

Since the political positions have been comprised of a whole host of thoughts, it would seem that certain requirements must be met if an adequate definition is to be constructed. First, the definitions must be broad enough to explain a wide range of issues. And, second, the definitions must be relevant to contemporary American politics since we will be dealing with the Landon Lecture Series. The first part of this chapter intends to describe a series of definitions that will meet these requirements.

**Liberalism**

In *Political Ideas and Ideologies*, Mulford Q. Sibley has argued that there has been both a spirit of liberalism and a series of propositions covering the nature of liberalism. Liberalism has combined attitudes which have pervaded its thought as well as a number of propositions defining the viewpoint in more substantive terms. Considering his attitude toward society, the liberal has tended to view man as a rational animal, has been open to innovation with existing social conditions, has valued liberty, and has tended to abhor the use of tyranny and coercion. In terms of a substantive
proposition, the liberal has tended to support political equality as his pre-eminent principle. This section will address itself first to the spirit of liberalism, then to its substantive viewpoint.

In spirit liberals have tended to hold a more optimistic view of human nature than conservatives. Generally they have conceived man as a rational, moral agent, who has been capable of participating in public affairs independent of an authoritarian source. However, liberals have never lacked the sophistication to believe that social constraints would not have to exist for the individual. Limits should be placed upon human behavior and those limitations should be governed "by the constraints of civility - those traits of character that make possible stability, mutual trust, collective regard for human welfare, and justice in the organization of society." 4 To the liberal this simply has suggested that man has the right to formulate his own choices and to determine for himself his future destiny. Yet, at the same time, the individual has the responsibility to develop his intellectual and moral capacities. The liberal has assumed, then, that every person must judge for himself what has been offered to him as a citizen, and that he has the capability of judging a situation with reference to broader considerations than his own immediate or even long-range selfish interests. As a result, the liberal's confidence in the individual's capacity for reason has required only a cautious and limited optimism about human nature.

Liberal political thought has often been marked by an innovative and experimental attitude toward existing social conditions. Thus, one function the liberal has played has been that of a reformer. However,
in his attitude toward reform, the liberal has been less concerned with the changing of whole systems and as a result has concentrated on particulars. As William J. Newman has suggested in his book, *Liberalism and the Retreat from Politics*, the liberal has been "a man with a particular grievance or a particular interest."⁵ The liberal's method of reform has involved an examination of "each age or situation as it is, that is to say, as it differs from other ages and situations; and they wish to prescribe for the age and situation by the light of what they understand for themselves, by acts of reason, rather than by the light of other men's agreement as to the good."⁶ Thus, the world to the liberal has not been without its flaws and shortcomings and, hence, it has been in need of improvement.

Liberals have also tended to stress the value of liberty. Liberty, for the liberal, has been thought of in terms of self-protection. That is, law and social constraints would be set up to help the individual suppress his lower elements and release his higher self. The concept of liberty has stressed that men have been endowed with certain natural rights, however, a measure of universal restraint has been necessary to keep one individual from suppressing another individual's rights. For the liberal, these rights have included freedom from an arbitrary or despotic government and the four bedrock freedoms of speech, conscience, writing, and assembly. L. T. Hobhouse, a liberal, has distinguished these liberties into nine categories, that of civil liberty; fiscal liberty; personal liberty; social liberty; economic liberty; domestic liberty; local, racial, and national liberty; international liberty; political liberty and popular sovereignty.
According to Hobhouse, law and social constraints would be set up in order to protect these liberties by suppressing the individual’s passions and releasing the higher, rational self. The individual would, thus, be allowed to perfect his condition by protecting each individual’s equal opportunity for advancement.

The first condition of universal freedom is a measure of universal restraint. Without such restraint some men may be free but others will be unfree. One man may be able to do all his will, but the rest will have no will except that which he sees fit to allow them. To put the same point from another side, the first condition of free government is government not by the arbitrary determination of the rule, but by fixed rules of law, to which the ruler himself is subject. We draw the important inference that there is no essential antithesis between liberty and law. On the contrary, law is essential to liberty. Law, of course, restrains the individual; it is therefore opposed to his liberty at a given moment and in a given direction. But, equally, law restrains others from doing with him as they will. It liberates him from the fear of arbitrary aggression or coercion, and this is the only way, indeed, the only sense, in which liberty for an entire community is attainable.  

Finally, as an attitude, liberals have tended to abhor the use of tyranny or coercion of any kind. "The liberal view is that man's nature prepares him to live uncoerced in society." 8 The use of force or any element which may lead to the use of force has not been considered to be a rational justification for solving problems or knitting society together. The consequences of this attitude can be treated both in domestic or international policy. Considered domestically, human rights, for the liberal, have been superior to property rights since property has contributed to competitiveness and invidiousness. "The wicked love of possession lies near the root of coercion, inequality, and invidiousness, respectively the negations of that liberty, equality, and fraternity directly supported by nature." 9 Considered internationally, liberals
have tended to focus their attention beyond national patriotism to an interest in all of humanity. "Liberalism certainly looks beyond the love of country to the love of mankind."\textsuperscript{10} As a result, they have been inclined to support the United Nations and have shown great concern for the "uncommitted" nations of the world.\textsuperscript{11}

In terms of a substantive proposition, liberals have tended to hold the pre-eminent principle of political equality. "All liberals share the belief that the ultimate aim of public policy is the protection and promotion of each person's equal opportunity to develop his potentialities as fully as possible."\textsuperscript{12} As a result, liberals have been inclined to make sustained drives toward equalitarianism. Their objective has been to effectuate greater equality for all citizens. That is, they have been in search of ways to provide the individual with greater freedom and equality of opportunity. The principal agency through which the liberal has sought his goal of equality has been the national government.

The only agency available for the purpose - failing revolution - is the power of the central government. For the government, in contradistinction to any other institution, has as its object service to the whole nation in the interests of equalitarianism within the limits of its constitution, and those prescribed by a desire for efficiency.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, in terms of policy, the liberal would tend to support welfare programs, fair employment practices, an end to discrimination in public and private housing, and integration in public schools through the use of national government.\textsuperscript{14} For the liberal, the national government has been the only institution capable of handling these issues in order to bring about equality.
Conservatism

Like liberalism, conservatism encompasses both a collection of attitudes and a number of substantive propositions which guide public policy. Considering the conservative's attitude toward society, he has tended to view man as asocial; has contended that society acts as a meaningful and productive unit when the need for community, tradition and order have been fulfilled; has usually defended the right of private property; and has tended to be highly patriotic and loyal to the national government. In terms of a substantive proposition, conservatives have tended to believe that the individual in society should be allowed to expand his own potentialities without a great deal of interference from the national government.

In spirit, conservatives have been far less optimistic in their view of human nature than liberals. While liberals have tended to envision a natural fraternity of mankind, the conservative has considered man to be more asocial in nature. Conservatives have, thus, believed that liberals have overestimated the power of reason and unselfishness and have underestimated the human tendency toward self-interest and passion. The conservative has regarded man as being in a state of conflict between his capacity for reason and his proclivities toward self-interest and passion. In this state of conflict, man's natural vices may prevail. As a result, restraints must be formulated so as to control these evils. Thus, the conservative has tended to assume that "there are objective standards for human conduct and criteria for the judgement of theories and institutions, which it is the duty of human beings to understand as thoroughly as
they are able and to which it is their duty to approximate their actions.\textsuperscript{16} For the conservative, this standard is meant to provide a form of restraint for the individual in order to control the evil in people. For the conservative, it has been a matter of controlling the liberal's effort to create unlimited liberty. The conservative has believed that if restraints were not constructed, unlimited liberty would produce a tyranny that would eliminate all liberty. Most of the conservative's attitudes have reflected the emphasis on the necessity of government as a device for controlling man's inclination toward passion and self-interest. Thus, government would be set up to provide the necessary restraints to control the evil in people.

In spirit the conservative would contend that society acts as a meaningful and productive unit when the need for community, tradition and order have been fulfilled. He has believed that the liberal goal of equality brought about through the agency of change and experimentation would undermine society at its foundation. In the final analysis, then, the conservative would contend, the tensions, frustrations, and anxieties of life in mass society have been produced by the inadequacy of the liberal theory. Thus, life matters when these three needs have been emphasized in the society.

Community would begin, to the conservative, when man has been allowed to voluntarily associate himself with the group. Thus, a sense of community is found in cooperative action among men which should take place in voluntary associations or local governments.\textsuperscript{17} The destruction of the sense of community would begin when people were forced into associations largely on the part of the federal
government. For instance, the liberal program of social security has helped to create a weakening in our sense of community because the program is centralized in the federal government and has been compulsory rather than voluntary. In order to give a sense of purpose to people and their institutions, emotional satisfactions must be derived from the community whose social bonds have been full of spiritual and moral meaning. A sense of community is created through shared values and common purposes. Russel Kirk in his book _A Program for Conservatives_ has made several suggestions for the re-establishment of a strong sense of community. His suggestions are as follows:

1. They will endeavor to make family function as a device for love and education and economic advantage, not simply an instrument of the feeding-and-housing-and-procreating process.

2. They will seek to make their church and parish the means of a communion between divine love and human, and among the generations that are gone, and the generations that are yet to be; and they will express this communion in acts of charity and good fellowship.

3. They will try to make their profession, or trade, or craft, an instrument not merely for private profit, but for satisfying their own desire to feel that somehow they matter.

4. They will search for ways to turn the amorphous modern city into a series of neighborhoods, with common interests, amenities, and economic functions.

5. They will stand for variety and independence in our schools, colleges, and universities; unlike Dr. Conant, they will detest the notion of a monotonously uniform system of public instruction, designed to propagate approved 'social attitudes.'

6. They will defend the institutions of local government against a state consolidation of power, and the rights of states against the encroachments of the federal government.
Most conservatives have placed emphasis on tradition as a framework or guide by which the functions of the community could be more fully exercised. To the conservative each generation has been guided by what it has received from the preceding generation. Without some regard for the past, the individual in society would have little in the way of a standard for human conduct.

... in passage after passage, with his prophetic gift, Burke touches upon the terrible question of how men ignorant of tradition, impatient of any restraint upon appetite, and stripped of true community, may be kept from releasing that congenital violence in fallen human nature which could reduce to ashes the venerable edifice of civil social state. 20

However, the conservative also has realized the certainty of change and that tradition as the only guide has not always been advantageous. Change could be a way of renewing society, but change must not be so severe as to demolish the continuity and permanence of the society. Russel Kirk has expressed his viewpoint on change in society in the following quotation.

Yet I do not say that tradition ought to be our only guide, nor that tradition is always beneficent. There have been ages and societies in which tradition, stifling the creative faculty among men, put an end to variety and change, and so oppressed mankind with the boredom of everlasting worship of the past. In a healthy nation, tradition must be balanced by some element of curiosity and individual dissent. 21

Order, to the conservative, signified "the harmonious arrangement of classes and functions which guards justice and gives willing consent to law and ensures that we will be all safe together." 23 When the ideal of an ordered, stratified society has been replaced by the liberal ideal of equality, the sense of community would be undermined at its foundations. Thus, the conservative has believed that society thrives
on order and hierarchy for in every society there have been those who were more well equipped to rule and those who must be ruled. Without this sense of order the community would decay for there would be little in the way of values or standards to govern individual conduct.

When no man feels settled into an order, then the individual has no dread of censure, but is restrained in his appetites only by the threat of force: the policeman supplants, so far as he is able, the old influence of emulation and the soft but effectual control of good repute. Almost no one is afraid of 'public disapproval' in the abstract; what we fear is the loss of good repute within the little platoon we belong to in society, the reproaches of our parish, our club, our neighborhood, our partners, our guild or union. The proletarian, the man who belongs to nothing, has lost the very concept of order, as he has lost community; he is a social atom, and thus, often, he is shameless; and force is employed to make him conform reluctantly to the conventions which once men obeyed out of a longing for good repute. 23

Also, in spirit, conservatism has usually been linked with the defense of private property. This defense has partly rested on the ground that "conservatism supposes that there is a development from man's asociality to his property; liberalism believes that the development is from his property to his asociality." 24 The conservative has argued that when man has been deprived of his property, then, he has been deprived of his political power. Thus, without his property, the individual would stand alone against the impersonal entity known as the state. The conservative again has argued that liberty cannot be discussed in the abstract, but must be linked with private property and material power. "Eliminate these institutions and, whatever the abstract doctrine may be, liberty as against the state will become precarious." 25 Quintin Hogg, a conservative, has defended
private property on four grounds. His case is as follows:

First, property is, he maintains, essential for the development of personality. Second, it helps safeguard the family, which is the natural unit of society. Thirdly, it helps the community in that it provides an incentive for labor of those who might not respond to nonmaterial incentives. Finally, it provides a guarantee that economic power will be somewhat dispersed and will thus ensure that all power will not devolve on the state.26

Finally, as an attitude, conservatives have tended to be highly patriotic and loyal to the national government. "The conservative certainly tends to be more nationalistic than the liberal, which is to say, he does not hesitate to put the United States and its interests first in all foreign-policy equations."27 Because of their patriotism, conservatives generally have placed the wisdom of the state on a higher plane than the individual. That is, the state would be far more likely to be right than the individual. Conservatives would, then, tend to distrust the individual's wisdom over that of the state.28 Thus, the conservative has tended to focus his attention on his own national government, rather than on the interest of all humanity as does the liberal. As a result, the conservative has often taken a "hard line" on communism, which has led to a policy of containment.

In their devotion to Western civilization and their unashamed and unself-conscious American patriotism, conservatives see Communism as an armed and messianic threat to the very existence of Western civilization and the United States. They believe that our entire foreign and military policy must be based upon recognition of this reality.29

In terms of a substantive proposition, conservatives have tended to view politics as a relatively limited part of human activities. On the whole, conservatives would rather emphasize cooperative action through
voluntary association or through local governments. Thus, the conservative has believed that the individual should be allowed to expand his own potentialities without the interference of a national state government.

Conservatives may vary on the degree to which the power of the state should be limited, but they are agreed upon the principle of limitation and upon the firmest opposition to the Liberal concept of the state as the engine for the fixing of ideological blueprints upon the citizenry. There is much difference among them on the manner and mode in which the state should be limited, but in opposition to the prevailing Liberal tendency to call upon it to act in every area of human life, from automation to social relations, they are firmly united upon the principle of limitation.

As a result, conservatives have tended to uphold the principles of free enterprise and capitalism for it has allowed men to express themselves freely. The conservative has basically seen man as one who has been motivated by self-interest. In this light, a free enterprise system has been necessary to satiate the needs and desires for self-interest. According to Paul A. Sexson and Stephen B. Miles in their book, The Challenge of Conservatism, there have been three other economic principles along with self-interest which the conservative will accept. They have been profit, competition, and implicit ground rules. Altogether they have suggested that these principles have provided the core for conservative economic thought. Their discussion is as follows:

The next observation the candid conservative makes is that an individual is a bundle of energy that strives. (The liberal blinds himself here too, because he sees man, not as energy, but as brain). And what does the individual strive against? Two things: nature and his fellow man. His strife against nature can be called order (even though
it does seem occasionally to result in increased disorder). In economics this creation of order is the production of goods and services, which, to the extent that the individual himself benefits from his own creation, can be called "profits." And strife against his fellow man can be called "competition." Finally, to accomplish anything at all, the conservative knows there must be certain ground rules. \(^{31}\)

Thus, in terms of policy, the conservative would tend to take a stand against welfare programs which, through the agency of the national government, forced all men to participate. They would, also, tend to insist that problems of integration and enfranchisement of Negroes should be handled through the community or local governments. \(^{32}\)

**Methodology**

This section of the chapter intends to construct a measure for ascertaining the political position of a man on a particular issue at a given time. The methodology will combine Burke's rhetorical strategies with the political positions. Bernard Lee Brock in his doctoral dissertation at Northwestern University has appeared to have provided a method in which political strategies were related to political positions. First, Brock constructed a set of operational definitions for the four political positions of reactionary, conservative, liberal, and radical. His definitions were based upon the speaker's strategies in both form and substance. The basis of his analysis was a combination of Burke's tools for textual analysis and Lee Hultzen's essay, "Status of Deliberative Rhetoric." Finally, he correlated the political positions with the strategies in order to produce a measure for ascertaining the political position used in a speech. For the purposes of this thesis a similar tool will be
constructed based upon Brock's findings. However, some modifications have been made in the methodology. Those modifications will be explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

First, only two political positions, liberal and conservative, will be used as contrasted with Brock's use of the four political positions of reactionary, conservative, liberal, and radical. The reason for this change is based upon the fact that the speeches in the Landon Lecture Series will fit into the political classifications of liberal and conservative. The second modification could be considered to be more basic to the methodology. Brock based his definitions on Clinton Rossiter's explanation of the liberal-conservative split. Rossiter accounted for the differences on their attitude toward change. That is, a conservative would tend to justify the established order and, as a result, would be less likely to change social institutions. The liberal, on the other hand, has been more optimistic about reform and, as a result, would be more likely to change social institutions. However, some problems arise if the definitions have been based upon change. The issue of change has not been sufficient enough to explain the differences between liberals and conservatives in the contemporary American political scene. Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey in their book, Liberalism Versus Conservatism, has given an explanation for the faultiness of this approach.

The objection to Rossiter's explanation can be easily seen in the following terms: suppose there were 100 Barry Goldwaters in the Senate, 435 in the House, nine on the Supreme Court, and one in the White House. Would we, under these circumstances, see much in the way of changes? If we
are to take former Senator Goldwater at his word, there would be substantial and drastic alterations in the status quo, and they would be made rather rapidly. We could expect them in any number of areas: federal-state relations, welfare spending, farm policy, taxation policy, and, among others, labor policy. Again, even a cursory reading of National Review would serve to confirm the belief that it is not simply change that is the issue at stake in the liberal-conservative controversies. Here, too, we would find pleas for changing the face of contemporary reality by adopting radically new policies. In fact, it is safe to say that among those who call themselves conservatives and are acknowledged in most quarters to be genuine conservatives, there is a high degree of discontent with 'things as they are.'

For this reason, the definitions that were set up in the preceding section have been oriented toward a wide range of issues which focus on the liberal-conservative split. The definitions have also been set up to explain contemporary American political debates. These have been the only modifications made in Brock's methodology. The next series of paragraphs intend to describe that methodology with its modifications.

In chapter two, a series of four rhetorical tools were described as the method of textual analysis. Those tools were the concepts of identification, the pentad, substance, the "dramatistic" stages and Hultzen's "stock issue" frames. In the first section of chapter three, a set of definitions were described for the liberal and conservative positions. By combining by rhetorical tools with the definitions of the political positions, a methodology will be constructed for evaluating political speaking.

As a rhetorical tool, the concept of identification has become important in determining the speaker's acceptance or rejection of ideas,
In the "dramatistic" process the liberal is apt to recommend mortification rather than victimage in the frame of Cure, and he normally gives a more complete plan than the reactionary or the conservative for Cure. 37

This completes the methodology for evaluating political speeches. In addition Brock has suggested the use of a format for analyzing individual political speeches. For the purposes of this study, a modified form will be used. This form is as follows:

I. Title of the problem area
   A. Historical background of the problem
   B. Analysis of the speeches
      1. Title of the speech
      2. Speaker
      3. Political classification
      4. Analysis of the speeches using the "dramatistic" approach
         a. Opening strategies
         b. Four frames of Policy in the deliberative process: Ill, Reformability, Remedy, Cost
         c. Closing strategies
         d. Major strategies38

In this chapter, following the description of the political positions of liberalism and conservatism, a measure was constructed for ascertaining the political position of a speech based upon the kind of appeals made by a speaker on a particular occasion. In the concluding phase of the study, the speeches given by politicians in the Landon Lecture Series will be described by analyzing their appeals. Prior to the analysis of the speech, a brief history of the problem area in the speech will be presented by giving a description and general trends of the area. Chapter IV will handle the domestic issues and chapter V the international issues.
concepts, images. In the case of political speaking, a speaker will either accept or reject one of the political positions. That is, a man will identify with at least one of the definitions of liberalism or conservatism.

The concept of the pentad will be useful for determining the strategy employed by the political speaker for his argument. Brock found that the conservative tended to employ the argument from the standpoint of agent, while the liberal tended to support the argument from the standpoint of scene.34

The concept of substance should be employed to establish the context of the speech and is, thus, related to the speaker's attitudes and strategies. Brock found that since the liberal argues from the standpoint of scene the geometric substance will characterize his position. The familial substance will characterize the conservative position because he argues from the standpoint of agent.35

The last concept to be discussed concerns Hultzen's "stock issue" approach to deliberative rhetoric and Burke's "dramatistic" stages. These concepts provide the form or structure for the analysis. In the case of the conservative, Brock described several characteristics handled by this political position in the deliberative process.

His handling of the frame of ill usually takes the form of describing a series of acts taken by agents, and the Cure is normally stated as a series of principles. Also, the Cost is generally dismissed with a general statement or developed as another aspect of the ill.36

Brock has also described several characteristics which relate to the liberal position in the deliberative process. His description is as follows:
FOOTNOTES


8 Cropsey, "Conservatism and Liberalism," p. 49.


10 Cropsey, "Conservatism and Liberalism," p. 53.


15 Cropsey, "Conservatism and Liberalism," p. 49.


36. Brock, "A Description of Four Political Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics," p. 348.

37. Brock, "A Description of Four Political Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics," p. 349.

38. Brock, "A Description of Four Political Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics," p. 83.
CHAPTER IV
DOMESTIC ISSUES

The sixties was a period when intense strain was placed on our social order and some, as a result, expressed misgivings about the future. America underwent a number of crises derived from many sources. The relations between the races were growing worse rather than better, law and order were breaking down, urban life was becoming intolerable, students were rebelling against established authority, our economy was inflated, resources were becoming depleted, and confidence in our authorities and institutions began to wane. As a result, doubt was expressed as to whether America could endure these ills.

During this period of time, politicians were called upon to justify or change their policies with respect to social issues. The Landon Lecture Series, then, has afforded an opportunity to examine the nature of appeals used by prominent politicians on various social ills. This chapter will be specifically concerned with domestic issues in the Landon Lecture Series. The issues will be classified according to problems confronting the national government and people, problems confronting education, domestic issues caused by the war in Vietnam, and environmental problems. The speeches of Humphrey, Warren, Reagan, Nixon, Rockefeller and Hickel will be analyzed in this chapter. Prior to the analysis of each of the speeches, a general history on the background of the problem will be given illustrating the trends of the issue.
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE

At the beginning of the 1960's the role of the national government began to change through the development of new legislation directed toward the fields of social welfare, civil rights, and education. President John F. Kennedy introduced the new tone in the nation's government, while President Lyndon B. Johnson later expanded it. Kennedy searched for the men who would study the problems confronting the country and recommended the necessary courses of action, while Johnson was able to push the reforms through Congress. Even more than the proponents of new legislative reforms, the United States Supreme Court emerged in the early sixties as the conscience of the nation. The Supreme Court justices grew more aggressive in their defense of civil and minority rights. First, we will briefly examine the Kennedy and Johnson administrations with respect to domestic policy and, then, the Warren Court.

Kennedy did not occupy the White House in a time of crisis, but in a time of change. He sought to understand that change and adjust the nation's policy to it. In his inaugural address, Kennedy said he was prepared to meet these new challenges with reforms, called the "New Frontier," which were to affect both domestic and foreign policy. With regard to Humphrey's and Warren's speeches, we will be concerned with policy changes in the area of domestic issues.

In the area of domestic policy, Kennedy argued for the development of a housing and urban department, stimulation of slum clearance, appropriations for education, health care for the aged, a reduction of taxes, and more legislation in the area of civil rights. Although such programs might have slipped through Congress rapidly due to a
Democratic majority in both the House and Senate, many of Kennedy's reform programs were frustrated by a bloc of conservative Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats. Some of Kennedy's programs were granted, however, by the Congress. These were described by Richard N. Current in *American History: A Survey*.

An improvement in the minimum-wage law failed in its first version. The final bill provided considerably less coverage than the President had wished, but it did bring an additional 3,624,000 workers under the law. It raised the minimum hourly pay rate, effective in several steps over two to four years, from $1.00 to $1.25. Another measure increased social security benefits substantially along the lines of the President's recommendations. The Housing Act of 1961 fully embodied his proposals, authorizing $4,900,000,000 in federal grants or loans over a four-year period for the preservation of open spaces in cities, the development of local mass transit systems, and the construction of middle-income housing.²

By the time Lyndon Johnson was elected to the Presidency in 1964, the state of the country had reached crisis proportions as a result of protest marches by Negroes for civil rights; urban riots by Negroes against discrimination in employment, housing, and education; and student revolts against academic authority and the unresponsiveness of the government to social change. Johnson was prepared to meet these problems with specific legislative objectives in what he termed "the Great Society." Harvey Wish explained his attitude toward the "New Frontier" programs. "By the time he began his second term in January, 1965, Johnson had made it clear that he intended to expand the full program of the New Frontier into a most ambitious crusade for welfarism--the Great Society."³ Backed by a commanding majority in both houses of Congress and a strong consensus on the part of the people, the President was able to push through a series of broad
measures in the fields of social welfare to promote what he called a "war on poverty." In his chapter "From the New Frontier to the Great Society: Welfarism," Harvey Wish summarized the legislation that was passed during the Johnson administration. His description is as follows:

Always persuasive, he pushed through most of the Kennedy education bills except for direct aid to the elementary and high schools. He pushed through a sweeping tax cut program and witnessed the anticipated upward thrust of the economy. His strongly Democratic Congress seemed ready to adopt his controversial Medicare bill which offered retired people hospital and nursing home care financed through Social Security payments. And the Job Corps and his sustained War on Poverty went beyond Kennedy precedents. Critics admitted his impressive success in overcoming stiff Southern resistance to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. It was recalled that as a Senate leader, he had enabled Eisenhower to pass the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction and had told a Gettysburg audience in May, 1963: 'To ask for patience from the Negro is to ask him to give more of what he has already given enough.'

In spite of these changes initiated by the executive and legislative branches of government, the Supreme Court became the strongest champion of civil and minority rights with Chief Justice Earl Warren and justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas sitting on the bench. Not only had the Court reactivated the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection of the laws," but it also insisted that the same protections against the federal government guaranteed to the individual by the first nine amendments of the Bill of Rights also applied to the states. In the succeeding paragraphs, a number of court cases are discussed in the areas of religion, voting redistricting, civil rights, and criminal procedures.
In the cases of Engel v. Vitale, Abington School District v. Schempp, and Murray v. Curlett, the Supreme Court rejected the practice of bible or prayer reading in public schools. These decisions heightened the wall of separation between Church and State implied in the First Amendment. The Court based its decisions on the view that government is to be neutral regarding religious matters.\(^5\)

In the area of voting redistricting, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the principle of "one man, one vote." The decision in Baker v. Carr (1962) asserted that the federal courts had the right to review the fairness of legislative districting. Then in Gray v. Sanders (1963), the Court said that every voter was equal to every other voter in state elections. Later, in 1966, the Supreme Court, in Harper v. Virginia State Board Elections and in South Carolina v. Katzenbach held that the poll tax and literacy tests violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^6\)

After the 1954 school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court began to take up the civil rights problem in the 1961-1962 session. In the NAACP vs. Button, the court overturned a Virginia law denying minority groups the right to institute integration cases when those instituting the suit had no direct interest or liability.\(^7\)

For many years Justice Black had argued that the rights granted a defendant in a federal criminal court applied to state courts. In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that every person accused of a crime was entitled to counsel of his
own choice or a lawyer provided by the state. In Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), the Court decided that counsel must be present at any criminal investigation designed to obtain a confession.8

Thus, the period of the 1960's became a time when the national government took a far more aggressive role in instituting reforms for the country than it had in the past. The executive and legislative branches of government began to take new courses of action to meet the problems of education, poverty, and civil rights. The Supreme Court began to effectuate greater individual freedom and equality of opportunity.

**HOW WE CAN MAKE OUR GOVERNMENT WORK**

On January 9, 1970, Hubert H. Humphrey delivered an address entitled "How We Can Make Our Government Work." In his speech, Humphrey credited two Democrats, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, with having created the concept of a federal government dedicated to solving the problems of Americans. Humphrey stated that both Presidents had set the tone of the Democratic concept when they used the phrase "Creative Federalism" to describe the new federal responsibility to the people of this country. Humphrey pointed out the legislation enacted under Kennedy and Johnson had the objective of paying out federal funds in order to achieve national goals and purposes.

**Liberal Position:** Based on the definitions of the political positions, Humphrey's speech represented the liberal position. He accepted the attempt on the part of the national government to enter and rescue the community from its social ills. In reference to the racial problem, this point became evident in his speech:
There was recognition of the inability of minority groups to achieve first-class citizen-ship after a century of struggle. There was clear need for a legal statement of national conscience, and federal enforcement of national standards. (Humphrey, 322-25)

Humphrey also tended to hold the liberal's pre-eminent principle of political equality. The objective of the national government, according to him, should be to effectuate greater equality for all citizens. This point became evident in his discussion of the new federal programs that were legislated during the sixties.

The new federal programs were really like a basketful of categories, the federal government made clear its determination to improve the conditions and opportunities of life for all citizens in our society. This new federalism emphasizes one vital point: the citizen is not only a citizen of the state or locality, he is above all a citizen of the United States of America and therefore is entitled to every protection. (Humphrey, 286-92)

His speech finally tended to mark his own experimental attitude toward existing social conditions. Thus, Humphrey accepted the role of reformer with respect to social conditions.

So, therefore, with a sense of urgency, I suggest that we ventilate the clogged channels of political participation and social opportunity. These refreshing winds of change, which are everywhere about us, must be directed to constructive purposes—but not through violence, not through hate, not through bitterness, not through ugly passion, but through responsible debate and dissent, through reason and discussion, until decision and direction are clear. (Humphrey, 491-8)

By pointing out the need for participation on the part of the national government in social problems, the pre-eminent principle of political equality, and the need for change, Humphrey accepted the liberal position as his strategy in his speech.
Hubert H. Humphrey's Strategies: In the deliberative process, Humphrey treated the frames of Ill and Remedy. His speech provided a "geometric" substance and featured the term "scene" as a major strategy. These strategies will be described in more detail in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.

**Opening strategies** - After a conventional introduction Humphrey began by announcing the topic to be covered in his address. "I've said that the topic would be 'How We Can Make Our Government Work'-or perhaps I should say work better." (Humphrey, 40-2) His opening statement represented a strategy which took the form of unifying "agent" and "agency." However, this strategy of identification was not developed throughout the preliminary section of his speech. Humphrey later switched his strategy to the form of unifying "scene" and "agent" in which "scene" became the dominant strategy. In developing this new strategy, he described the "scene" of the sixties as the period of dissent and discovery.

> It was a period in history, in this dynamic nation of ours, in which we - in a sense - discovered ourselves. Everybody is trying to do that these days. And when you try to discover yourself - your individual identity or your national identity - you have to be prepared to discover some things you may not like. (Humphray, 50-4)

He then blamed his generation for over-emphasizing the quantity of material progress rather than the quality of social interactions. However, he was quick to point out that his generation was reacting from the impact of a depression and that "our major objectives were to see, number one that never again would a depression level this
nation and this world." (Humphrey, 67-8) As a result, the "scene" of the sixties became a time when social relationships were neglected over material goods. But the sixties, according to Humphrey, uncovered many ills which this society needed to confront if it was to maintain itself as a strong nation. He then appealed to his audience to approach social problems directly and to become issue oriented. In his opening remarks, Humphrey's strategy of identification, thus, took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Scene" became the primary strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. His symbolic action remained on a personal level, as it did throughout the rest of the speech.

**Deliberative process** - In treating Hultzen's deliberative frames, Humphrey did not handle them in the systematic manner of Ill, Reformability, Remedy, and Cost. Instead, Humphrey's strategy was to examine the "scene" of the sixties with respect to its various ills, and then discuss several remedies to those problems. The frame of Reformability was covered as an aspect of Remedy. Second, he examined the "scene" of the seventies with respect to its ills, however, no cures were proposed for these problems. The frame of Cost was omitted in both sections of his speech. These strategies will be more fully developed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Humphrey began the deliberative process by briefly considering four ills which plagued our society during the sixties (scene). Each of these ills was simply outlined and tended to show his eclectic approach to invention. First, he pointed out the problem of poverty. He highlighted the experience of poverty as being not merely a lack
of means, but a paralysis of spirit leading to despair. Here he emphasized that the condition of poverty could not be solved by a simple exchange of money to the poor. He asserted that mechanical answers were not applicable to the social ill of poverty. Second, Humphrey underscored the urgency of the urban problems. "And all at once, the problems of noise, of congestion, of slums, of overlapping governmental jurisdiction, of the inadequacy of social services and resources was right on our doorstep." (Humphrey, 128-30) The third ill, that Humphrey touched upon, was polluters and pollution. For the fourth ill, he turned from pollution to the war in Vietnam, and asserted that this society could not become "the world's policeman." Rather, its "purpose" was to play the role "of a good neighbor." In Humphrey's treatment of the frame of Ill, he emphasized a "scene-agent" ratio, in which all of the other terms were reduced to this ratio.

In the frame of Remedy, Humphrey uncovered three cures for these problems. However, he never explicitly argued that these remedies would cure the ills in our society. Instead, it was implied that these remedies would treat these specific ills. As for the remedies, Humphrey, first, pointed to the Constitution as a contemporary document which has allowed change to occur in order to meet present day problems. However, he stressed the point that, if solutions were to take place, a partnership must be created between all levels of government and the private sectors in order to involve more people in problem solving. This was to become his second remedy for solving society's ills. He then exposed three "agents," Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, as having discussed this partnership. Kennedy
brought this new partnership to light in what he called the "New Frontier," Johnson re-emphasized it in his program of the "Great Society," and, finally Nixon called it to attention in his program "the New Federalism." Humphrey simply relabeled the partnership as "Creative Federalism" and defined it as follows:

Creative federalism, in other words, is a phrase used to describe the whole array of cooperative relationships between federal government, state governments, city, county, and other local government units; between universities and governments; universities and hospitals, and voluntary agencies, professional and trade associations, labor associations, and the whole wide spectrum of the private sector. (Humphrey, 215-20)

Humphrey went on to support the concept of "Creative Federalism" by asserting that new programs were needed in order to involve more people in meeting the ills of our society. Through a description of "scene" and "agent," Humphrey pointed out the necessity of involving more people in various programs.

Rural families, once isolated from the general culture, were able to see New York, and Chicago, and New Orleans and Los Angeles and Philadelphia and St. Louis and other areas on their television screen. There was no place to hide. Hills and valleys flattened out and there we were, we Americans. This looked awfully good to many Americans, and many migrated before there were services to meet their needs. The poorly schooled boy from South Carolina in that school that was separate, segregated, began showing up as a welfare statistic in New York City. The malnourished child from Appalachia showed up in a hospital in Detroit.

This mobility among our people made health and welfare, the physical environment, education and economic development matters of national, rather than just a lone local, concern. There was recognition that no city can protect itself from pollution by itself. (Humphrey, 308-310)
Humphrey then proceeded to name four ways in which American politics had been revolutionized during the sixties. There programs became the "agency" by which people were allowed to become more involved in government. He mentioned the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Economic Opportunity Act of 1954, Community Action Program and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

As the third remedy to the society's ills, Humphrey proposed a "Domestic Policy Council to coordinate every domestic program just as the President has a National Security Council to coordinate issues of national security." (Humphrey, 287-9) The primary "purpose" of this "agency" would be to coordinate domestic policy in order to achieve "some of our goals . . . ." (Humphrey, 397)

After his sketch of the "scene" of the sixties, Humphrey turned as promised to the "scene" of the seventies. In this section of the speech, he again stressed a number of ills which confront this society. In this treatment of the frame of Ill, Humphrey did not develop a series of cures for the problems. Instead, he appealed to his audience to list these problems as our highest priorities to overcome in the seventies. Highest on his list of priorities was the war in Vietnam. He concluded that peace was our first priority. He then introduced racism as "our number one problem in this country." (Humphrey, 424) And finally Humphrey claimed that "surely if there is one focus for the seventies, it must be survival and the protection of our physical resources and environment." (Humphrey, 443-4) Initially maintaining that peace was our first order of business, Humphrey shifted to racism and finally to ecology.
Major strategies - In Humphrey's speech "How We Can Make Our Government Work," which developed the liberal position, he employed the following rhetorical strategies:

1. Humphrey treated the deliberative process in terms of two frames. The two frames were Ill and Remedy. The frame of Remedy was more fully developed than the frame of Ill.
2. He featured the argument from "scene" and "agent" in his speech. The term "agency" was identifiable, but was reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio. "Scene" became the dominant term, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.
3. Humphrey's appeal from context or conditions throughout his speech suggested an emphasis upon "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all the elements of a situation grew out of the environment.
4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal strategy and a rejection of the conservative position by appealing for greater involvement on the part of the national government.

Closing strategies - Humphrey closed by linking the political wisdom of Adlai Stevenson to his own view that radical excesses have been detrimental to the government and counter-productive in terms of meaningful reforms. He then linked his topic statement, "How We Can Make Our Government Work," with an emphasis on change. He introduced the idea that "in order to make it work we have to understand it," (Humphrey, 487-8) and that change must be constructive. He ended his speech by re-affirming the idea of "Creative Federalism." In the closing strategies, Humphrey clearly employed "agent" as a
strategy of identification. His "co-agents" became those people who align themselves with political wisdom and respect for others, while his "counter-agents" became those people who have become excessive in their radicalism. "Agency" was retained as a secondary strategy in his closing statements. Although, the terms "scene" and "act" were identifiable "purpose" was omitted as a strategy. Thus, Humphrey's strategy of identification took the form of an "agent-agency" ratio, with "agent" becoming the dominant term.

Humphrey's overall strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-agent" ratio. As a result, the terms "act," "agency," and "purpose" were reduced to the ratio of "scene-agent." Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order described the "scene-agent" ratio in the following terms:

Social conditions here are said to call for actors in keeping with the scene, and the scene, in turn, is depicted as keeping with the actor.9

Humphrey has apparently seen the context or conditions of the times as the principle which motivates men. The audience must decide, as a result of this strategy, if the conditions will force men to become "prisoners of the situation" or if the conditions will motivate men to action. The audience must also decide if Humphrey is capable of motivating men to action.

**THE ALTERNATIVE IS CHAOS**

On October 21, 1970, former Chief Justice Earl Warren of the Supreme Court delivered a speech entitled "The Alternative Is Chaos." In his address, Warren stated that the nation was plagued by the problem of the inferior citizenship of some thirty million Americans,
including Negroes, Indians, Asiatics, and Latin Americans. In the course of his speech, he asserted that the United States faced chaos unless discrimination is removed from these "second-class" citizens. Warren said that the basis of the national problem was bitterness and that the solution to the problem was impossible until bitterness has been removed.

**Liberal Position:** Warren accepted the liberal position by upholding the pre-eminent principle of political equality. Thus, the objective for this country should be to effectuate greater equality for all citizens.

> It, therefore, seems clear to me that if we are ever to have a placid Nation against at least during the lifetimes of our children and their children, it will be necessary for us to set aside our prejudices on account for race or color, and be willing to live in a plural society where American citizenship means, in fact as well as precept, that all men are created equal, and as such are entitled to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. (Warren, 347-53)

Warren also accepted the liberal concept of liberty, which has stressed that men have been endowed with certain natural rights. This point became evident when he discussed the struggle of the Negro for "first-class" citizenship.

> They are, for the first time in our history, demanding en mass the rights and privileges of citizenship which have been denied them for so many years - the right to live wherever they desire; the right to a decent education without discrimination; the right to vote; the right to participate freely in their government, with human dignity. (Warren, 216-21)

Finally Warren assumed the liberal position of abhorring the use of tyranny or coercion of any kind. This became apparent when he deplored
the use of violence by people on both sides of the racial problem.

The violence implicitly in these denials as exemplified by lynchings and other unlawful injuries to them, has provoked counter violence in many quarters, and the time has come when the Nation must restore good will and cooperation regardless of race or color if we are to be a healthy nation. (Warren, 221-25)

Warren committed himself to the liberal position by emphasizing political equality, the natural rights of man, and his abhorrence of violence.

**Earl Warren's strategies** - In former Chief Justice Earl Warren's speech, he treated the frames of Ill and Reformability in which the frame of Ill was more fully emphasized over the frame of Reformability. His speech provided a "geometric" substance and featured "scene" as the primary strategy. These strategies will be described in more detail in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies, and (4) closing strategies.

**Opening strategies** - After a conventional introduction, Warren began by stating that the "act" of politics was an inexact science and what was true of politics applied to the judicial system. "Neither politics nor the judicial process are or can become an exact science because they deal with the vagaries of human nature and the actions of human beings." (Warren, 51-3) Proceeding to define politics as "the art of the possible," (Warren, 54) Warren linked this definition with the "purpose" of politics, which he considered to be responsibility. He illustrated the point of political responsibility by relating to the audience a story in which responsibility was avoided in a political "scene."
The story centered around the "act" of building a church in which all of the people in town, except for one, were split into two factions; one opposed to the construction of the church and the other for its construction. The one man who avoided conflict was on the Board of Deacons and finally retired leaving his position to his son. After a period of time had elapsed, the son became embroiled in the issue and finally asked his father's advice on how to keep out of the controversy. The father replied by saying, "Whenever there is a proposal to build a new church, you vote for the new church but whenever a site is proposed, no matter where it is, you vote against the site." (Warren, 93-5) Through this example, Warren implied that this position avoided the issue and was, therefore, irresponsible.

Now the story ended there, but I suppose that one might add that the young man followed his father's advice, and lived happily with his family without assuming responsibility either for building or not building the new church. (Warren, 96-99)

Warren's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "act" and "purpose." "Act" became the dominant term, while "purpose" was retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "scene," "agent" and "agency" were identifiable, but they were reduced to an "act-purpose" ratio. This ratio, however, was not developed throughout the rest of his speech. Warren's level of symbolic action remained throughout his speech, as it did in his opening strategies, on a personal plane.

Deliberative process - In handling Hultzen's deliberative frames, Warren treated the stages of Ill and Reformability. The frames of Remedy and Cost were excluded from his discussion. In his speech,
Warren's strategy was to take a particular ill and show how the condition was reformable.

In the frame of Ill, Warren pointed to six problems facing this country, domestically and internationally. The six ills comprised the war in Vietnam, the failure to rehabilitate our resources, the failure to protect the health of our people, problems in education, poverty, and the failure of the American people "to live together in harmony and mutual respect." (Warren, 187) Warren stated that many of the ills had been developing over a long period of time, but "because our advances of recent years in science and technology have been so rapid ... all of them are surfacing at about the same time." (Warren, 123-25) In his discussion of the first five ills, Warren's strategy was to suggest that each was reformable, given enough time and energy. However, in the last ill, his strategy was to point out that this ill, the ability of people to live together, may not be solvable. Each of the ills was presented as a series of "acts" set in a "scene." The ills will be more fully discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

First, the former Chief Justice stated that the war in Vietnam would end within a short period of time. He claimed that, since most people desired its conclusion, it would end, and, as a result, we would be able "to focus our attention, our money, and our energy on taking care of the many domestic needs which have been starved during the 25 years we have been almost constantly engaged in warfare." (Warren, 134-7) Next, he approached the problem of conservation. Warren stated that we have allowed the environment to deteriorate over a period of years to the point of endangering life on this planet.
However, he was confident that a solution would be found, "provided there is a national commitment to that objective and a dedication of the forces of science to it comparable to that which took us to the moon." (Warren, 150-2) Thirdly, he called attention to the decline in health care in this country, but again, he believed that this problem would be resolved through the efforts of the medical profession. The fourth problem covered was the crisis in American education. Yet, he believed that, since many people are dedicated to the cause of education, the problem would be resolved so that "truth can be freely pursued in peaceful surroundings with the cooperation of all who have a thirst for knowledge." (Warren, 173-5) Fifth, Warren dealt with the problem of poverty. Once again he believed that this problem could be resolved since the country has the ability to produce the food and since the government has the ability to distribute it to those who are hungry.

However, in his discussion of the last ill, Warren declared that this problem may not be so easily resolved as the previous five ills. He stated that it was questionable whether this society could maintain its permanence when we have been unable to live in "harmony and mutual respect." He explained the beginnings of the problem through the use of the "scene-act" ratio:

We have boasted for almost 200 years that we are a plural society wherein we achieve unity through diversity and accommodate diversity through unity.

But again the sins of former years are upon us, and it is my belief that the question of whether we can permanently have such a society is the greatest problem before the American people today. We started
wrong, of course, by tolerating the cruel institution of human slavery which was in direct contradiction of the noble phrase in our Declaration of Independence...
(Warren, 188-96)

Through the "scene-act" ratio, Warren described the problem confronting this society today.

We have in the Nation today about twenty-two million Negroes who still bear vestiges of that badge of slavery, and they are still struggling to be out of the class of inferior citizenship. The emotions engendered by hundreds of years of discrimination and cruelties have been welled up in them to the point of deep bitterness. (Warren, 211-5)

In his discussion of the problem, Warren included the American Indians, nationalized Asiatics, and Latin Americans, all of whom have been demanding the rights and privileges of citizenship denied them for so many years.

Warren went on to explain that the problem has not been just discrimination, but has been confounded by the lack of technical skills which made these people less employable.

Without skills or education to learn them speedily, and without hospitable treatment in their newly found home, they drift into the already congested slums where unemployment is out of all proportion, where housing is deplorable, and where degradation of every kind is rampant. There they stay as if they were imprisoned. With rare exceptions, there is no place for them to go except from one slum to another. They wait from month to month, therefore, for a relief check, completely frustrated and eventually become embittered. (Warren 258-65)

In his discussion of the problem, Warren included some of the outstanding effects of the problem, citing the ghetto as a "diseased heart" of a city and stating that the cities will die unless something is done to relieve the poverty and degradation.
Warren turned to the frame of Reformability by concluding that the only answer to the problem was to wipe out discrimination.

There can be no other answer to our problem than to wipe out the discrimination for which we have become so notorious, and to treat everyone in the nation with the consideration that we have always demanded and received for the majority of our people. Nothing else, it seems to me, will restore amity to our country; nothing else will bring harmony to our educational system, to our cities and to the political life of the Nation. (Warren, 318-24)

The frame of Reformability was not as fully emphasized as the frame of Ill. In his development of both of these frames, the "scene-act" ratio became the strategy of identificaiton.

Major strategies - In Warren's speech "The Alternative Is Chaos," which constructed the liberal position, he employed the following strategies:

1. Warren treated his subject in terms of two frames of the deliberative process. The two frames were Ill and Reformability. The frame of Ill was more fully emphasized than the frame of Reformability.

2. He featured the argument from "scene and act" as an overall strategy. The term "scene" became the dominant strategy, while "act" was retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "agency," "agent" and "purpose" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-act" ratio.

3. Warren's appeal from context or conditions throughout his speech suggested an emphasis upon "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all of the elements grew out of a situation.
4. He indicated acceptance of the liberal position and a rejection of the conservative strategy by appealing for a condition of greater equality.

Closing strategies - Warren closed his speech through a description of "scene," in which people would ask him if he thought this society was moving too fast in their treatment of the Negro concerning the abolishment of discrimination. Warren answered in the following manner:

However, the question assumed that the Supreme Court had the right to ration freedoms, and that it should go slow enough so as not to offend anyone in doing so. Of course, no such power exists for the courts either in law or morals. (Warren, 335-8)

Warren then proceeded to explain that racial discrimination could only be eliminated when the "act" of bitterness was removed from the situation (scene).

When the basis of problems is bitterness, the solution is impossible until the bitterness is removed. The bitterness in this situation is born of the discrimination of centuries, and can only be removed by elimination of the cause. (Warren, 343-6)

He concluded his speech by asserting that if racial discrimination was not eliminated our only "alternative is -- chaos." In his closing strategies, Warren took the form of unifying "act" and "scene," which became his strategy of identification with his audience. The terms "agent" and "purpose" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-act" ratio. In the closing, "scene" became the dominant strategy, while "act" was retained as a secondary strategy.

Warren's strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-act" ratio. Thus the terms "agent," "agency"
and "purpose" were reduced to this ratio. Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order described the "scene-act" ratio in the following terms:

All statements which ground social motives in conditions, backgrounds, environments, natural laws, objective situations, existential conditions, historical necessity, equilibrium, time, the body, etc. 10

Warren has apparently seen the "course of destiny" in terms of context and conditions. As a result of this strategy the audience must decide if the trends of time and space can be reversed in order to remove the problem. The audience must also decide whether the situations presented by Warren were inevitable.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING EDUCATION

Since World War II, Americans have been particularly interested in education as a means for solving man's social problems. Education promised higher incomes, social progress, and the "good life." As a result, the number of students enrolled in the nation's schools has rapidly expanded. Even so, the nation is faced with serious problems in maintaining those educational aspirations, particularly in the area of higher education. Some of the most pressing problems which have confronted higher education have been, on the one hand, finance and, on the other, student unrest.

Clark Kerr in his article, "New Challenges to the College and University," has described the recent growth of higher education as follows:

The number of students has doubled in the past decade from 3 to 6 million; the increase equals the total growth the previous three centuries, from the founding of Harvard to 1958. The
portion of GNP spent by institution of higher education has more than doubled from 1 percent to over 2 percent. This decade has seen the most dramatic increase in higher education of any past decade or any decade now in prospect.  

With the increased enrollments of students, Americans began to spend much larger sums of money on education. In 1965-66, fifteen billion dollars was spent on higher education alone. In 1966-67, the cost of education for elementary and secondary schools was $39.9 billion. To meet the financial demands for education, the Congress began to provide more financial support to education. In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act. The NDEA provided loans for college students and money for graduate fellowships; authorized programs to improve the teaching of science, mathematics and foreign languages; and supported guidance and counseling programs. In 1963, Congress granted funds for the construction of higher educational facilities in the Higher Education Facilities Act. In the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Congress authorized $1 billion of federal funds for educating disadvantaged children. Yet, with the increasing enrollment in the nation's schools and the need for more personnel and facilities, the cost of education has been rapidly increasing. Ralph W. Tyler in his article, "Investing in Better Schools" has suggested that federal aid to education will probably "increase from less than 8 percent of the total cost to more than 25 percent within the next ten years in order to meet the financial needs of our educational system. Thus, there has been a trend of greater reliance on programs of federal aid to education to maintain the quality of education."
Another problem that our educational system has been forced to cope with has been student unrest as college students began to challenge academic authority by participating in demonstrations. At the University of California in Berkeley, a Free Speech Movement, sparked in the fall of 1964 by regulations that forbade on-campus political fund-raising, kept the campus in a turmoil for the remainder of the academic year. The ferment spread quickly to other institutions, with every aspect of the educational process coming under attack. Students claimed that classes were too large, access to teachers difficult, courses irrelevant to modern problems, and rules too puerile for young adults to tolerate. In addition, organized protest against the war in Vietnam became frequent and often violent. As the decade progressed, the character of student protests began to change. In a speech presented in 1968, "Student Protests: From Dissent to Defiance?" Terry F. Lunsford has described that change as follows:

They (protestors) are more militant, more frequent, occur on more campuses, cover more issues, and involve more students directly than they did several years ago. There is more threatened or actual disruption of classes and administration. More incidents of property damage occur in the course of protests. More officials of college, of Dow Chemical Company, and of the armed forces have been detained by crowds, and for longer periods. More public invective has been hurled. More conviction is expressed that the student's causes are just, more 'moral statements' of draft refusal, and of complicity with civil disobedients, have been registered. More flashes of violence have occurred, started by student protestors, by anti-protestors, or by police. Outside police have more frequently and more quickly have been called into campuses. Arrests and indictments have increased. And the punitive use of force by police, to dispense crowds and 'teach lessons' to protestors, has risen sharply.
With the rising tide of protests on the campus, Americans began to have an acute awareness of the growing dangers to the social fabric. Many Americans sought to align themselves with the student protestors, while others felt that law and order had broken down. Nevertheless, student unrest created substantial problems to the normal functioning of the college campuses.

**HIGHER EDUCATION: ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA**

On October 26, 1967, Governor Ronald Reagan spoke on the role of higher education in America. In his address, Reagan called for the establishment of a "Creative Society," in which the independent sectors of businessmen and other "qualified" citizens of American life would find and solve problems in the society before government bureaus were brought into play. In the "Creative Society," Reagan urged faculty members to instill in students a sense of discipline and responsibility which would enable them to make contributions to society's problems.

**Conservative Position:** Reagan placed himself in the conservative position by rejecting the attempts of the national government to solve society's ills. In the place of governmental problem solving, Reagan proposed an endeavor to solicit responsible people outside of public office to work on solutions to society's problems. He pointed out that there was a limit to what government can do efficiently and, as a result, the individual must be given the freedom to act on problems in a responsible manner. Thus, Reagan indicated that the individual should be allowed to expand his own potentialities without the interference of a national state government.
By every rule of reason, government 'of' and
'by' the people must be superior to any other
kind. No government could possibly muster a
group capable of making the multitudinous
decisions that must be made every day to keep
a society like ours moving. (Reagan, 249-53)

Reagan also believed that society thrives on order and hierarchy
and maintained that in every society there have been some "agents" who
are capable of achieving more than others.

But let there by no misunderstanding about
the right of man to achieve above the capac-
y of his fellows. The world is richer
because of a Shakespeare and a Tennyson, a
Beethoven and a Brahms. Certainly major
league baseball would not be improved by
letting every citizen who wanted to, have
a turn at playing Willie Mays' position.
(Reagan, 189-94)

Finally, Reagan pin-pointed himself as a conservative by placing
more emphasis on traditional values than on change.

You should also inquire of those who would
replace the system have anything to offer
in exchange other than untried theory pack-
age as Utopia. It sometimes seems strange
that what is so often described as the brave
new world of the future must be upheld by the
collectivist philosophy of nineteenth century
theorists like Rousseau, Fourier, and Marx.
(Reagan, 214-19)

Thus, to Reagan, the community becomes a meaningful unit when the
need for tradition and order has been fulfilled by the people in a
society.

Ronald Reagan's Strategies: In Reagan's speech on higher education,
he treated the frames of Ill, Reformability and Remedy. Also, his
speech provided a "familial" substance and featured the term "agent."
These strategies will be described in more detail in the following
steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative
process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.
Opening Strategies: Reagan opened his speech by pointing out his concern for the role of higher education in America. He then asserted that the problems involved in education were easy to locate, but the answers to those problems were more difficult to provide. Reagan began to define the role or "purpose" of higher education in a negative sense by suggesting that some of the answers to problems in education were not in accordance with his convictions.

Nor do I think that university president has the answer who stated bluntly that the academic community's only responsibility was to tell government its needs, and government's obligation was not to question but to simply come up with the money. (Reagan, 10-13)

Reagan was against this role for higher education because there was a limit to what the government could extract from the people and, as a result, there were never sufficient funds for all of the programs carried on by the government. However, he did not wish to diminish the role of education. "Indeed, a vast network of institutions of higher learning, both public and private, is essential if we are to maintain our nation as the world's leader in science and technology." (Reagan, 38-41) He went on to assert that more money as an answer to the problems of higher education is vastly limited in its "purpose." This strategy allowed Reagan to relate "purpose" to the problems in education. Reagan's "purpose" was to create a condition in which man (agent) has more control over his problems. His strategy of identification has taken the form of unifying "purpose" and "agent." Reagan's level of symbolic action remained on a personal plane throughout his speech as it did in his opening strategies.
Deliberative process: In handling Hultzen's "stock issues," Reagan did not deal with the frames in the systematic manner of Ill, Reformability, Remedy, and Cost. Instead, his strategy was to combine the frames of Ill and Remedy in the first part of his speech when he was specifically concerned with the problems of higher education. Later, he widened the scope of his speech by relating the problems of higher education to the problems of the society. In this section of the speech, he treated the frames of Reformability, Remedy and Cost. The frames of Remedy and Cost were, however, discussed as one frame. These strategies will be further dealt with in the following paragraphs.

In the case of Ill, Reagan pointed to four problems that higher education was facing in this society and gave remedies for them. First, there was the problem of financing higher education. "It is also true that the cost of education is increasing faster than the increase in public funds." (Reagan, 49-50) In California, the problem was remedied by having students pay for tuition. "I suggested a partial answer in California based on the theory that good tax policy involves assessing at least a part of the charge for a service against those receiving the service." (Reagan, 53-5) Second, the university must contend with a high drop out rate. He tried to solve the problem by calling for a plan which combined grants and loans for needy students.

Our plan called for 75% loan and 25% grant the first year, 50-50 the second year, 75% grant and only 25% loan the third year, and 100% grant the fourth year. The loans, of course, would be repaid after graduation. (Reagan, 71-5)
Another problem in the university that Reagan pointed out was the lack of contact between students and professors. This situation was met in California by spending part of the student's tuition for more faculty and facilities. Finally, Reagan began to explore the last problem facing the academic community, the problem of defining academic freedom. In his speech, he implied that this was the most important problem confronting the university.

But if all the problems of finance could be solved tomorrow, there would still be cause for concern about the place of higher education. (Reagan, 93-5)

He began by listing several definitions of academic freedom offered by faculty members, students, administrators and those holding public office. Later, he gave his own definition of academic freedom by relating it to academic responsibility.

And that educator is wrong who denies there are any absolutes- who sees no black and white of right and wrong, but just shades of gray in a world where discipline of any kind is an intolerable interference with the right of the individual. He rebels at the oldfashioned idea of 'loco-parentis' and claims he is there to impart knowledge, not to substitute for absentee parents. But he can not escape a responsibility for the student's development of character and maturity. (Reagan, 125-131)

By relating those concerned with education to academic responsibility, Reagan emphasized the "agent-purpose" ratio as the remedy to the problem. "Our nation is founded on a concern for the individual and his right to fulfillment, and this could be the preoccupation of our schools and colleges." (Reagan, 160-3) This particular strategy allowed Reagan to relate the problem of academic responsibility to a wider range of issues confronting the society. He began with this strategy in his treatment of the frame of Reformability.
In the frame of Reformability, Reagan asserted that problems in education as well as in the society could be corrected by "unleashing individual genuins." (Reagan, 205) In history, he said, advances were made not so much by mass movements but by individual genuins. As a result, students have the responsibility to reform the system's failures. "As students, you have a duty to research to find if the failure is one of system - or is it the inadequacy of human nature." (Reagan, 212-3) If the individual is to reform the problems facing the society, then, his individual freedom cannot be tampered with by the government. He went on to point out that the trend of government has been "for" the people, however, there has not been enough government "of" and "by" the people. By emphasizing "agent" as the primary strategy, Reagan proposed that problems could be reformed in our society. The secondary strategy of "purpose" was retained in order to suggest that it would take responsible people fulfilling certain roles in order to meet the problems.

Finally, Reagan touched upon the frame of Remedy. He proposed a solution to society's problems by allowing the individual to achieve commensurate with his own abilities. The "Creative Society," as Reagan called it, would permit more government "of" and "by" the people, rather than "for the people"(agents).

We have embarked on something we call the 'Creative Society.' It is nothing more than a full-time effort to involve the independent sector in finding and solving problems before government comes rushing in with bureaus that always seem to multiply like coat hangers in a closet. (Reagan, 295-5)
Reagan justified the "Creative Society" through a program he instituted in California. He recruited businessmen and other "successful" citizens (agents) from the independent sector and asked them to make recommendations on how government could operate more efficiently. Based on their reports, he began to put their recommendations which ranged "from methods of buying supplies to data-processing, from rotating department heads to consolidating files" (Reagan, 278-80) into operation and thereby made government more efficient and economical. Reagan's strategy for justifying the plan was based upon a linkeage of "agent" and "purpose" in which "agent" was the dominant term.

**Major strategies:** In Reagan's speech, "Higher Education Its Role in Contemporary America," which constructed the conservative position, he employed the following rhetorical strategies:

1. Reagan treated his subject in terms of three frames of the deliberative process, Ill, Reformability, and Remedy, with the frames of Ill and Reformability being heavily emphasized.
2. He featured the argument from "agent" and "purpose" throughout the speech. "Agent" became the dominant strategy, while "purpose" was retained as a secondary strategy.
3. Reagan maintained a personal appeal throughout his speech to the audience (agents). He established a "familial" substance from which all of his strategies were derived.
4. Reagan indicated an acceptance of the conservative positions and a rejection of the liberal strategy by permitting greater individual effort outside of the range of government.

**Closing strategies:** Reagan closed with the same strategy of identification that he developed in his opening strategies.
Higher education in contemporary American has a social obligation to instill attitudes toward growth and learning that will in turn shape society. You are here to find yourselves as individuals, to at least have a chance to realize your potential. (Reagan, 320-3)

Reagan concluded by appealing to his audience to search for answers to problems which have been troubling this society. He stated that answers to the problems of welfare and crime have needed more sophistication than just allowing more money to flow into government programs. The purpose of the university has been to educate individuals who have possessed the ability to solve our problems. He closed his speech by appealing to his audience to solve problems before they become insoluble.

For one tick of history's clock we gave the world a shining golden hope. Mankind looked to us. Now the door is closing on that hope and it could be your destiny to keep it open. (Reagan, 332-4)

At this point, Reagan employed the term "agent" as a dominant strategy but retained "purpose" as a secondary strategy. Thus, Reagan's strategy of identification took the form of an "agent-purpose" ratio in which "agent" was featured as the dominant term.

In his speech, Reagan's strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with an "agent-purpose" ratio. The terms "scene," "act" and "agency" were reduced to an "agent-purpose" ratio. Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order stated that the "agent-purpose" ratio appeared "when the act of the leader becomes the purpose of the academic community." That is, acceptance or rejection of his policy must be based solely upon his philosophical position. Each person must decide if Reagan would be capable of controlling the variables so that his "purpose" is attained in the academic community.
IT'S TIME TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED

On September 16, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon gave an address in which he announced that the quality of education was being threatened by activists bent upon destruction. Declaring that no cause justified violent "acts" in the pursuit of change and that it was time for responsible members of the academic community "to stand up and be counted," Nixon went on to say that the government could not rescue the university. This task must be assumed by responsible leaders of the academic community.

Conservative Position: Nixon represented the conservative position by rejecting any attempt on the part of the national government to enter and rescue the university from activists bent upon its destruction. Instead, by appealing to responsible leaders of the academic community to resolve their own problems, he tended to emphasize cooperative action through voluntary association, rather than action taken on the part of a national state government.

If we turn only to Government to save it, then Government will move in a run the colleges and universities, and so the place to save it is here among the faculty, the administrators, the student leaders. (Nixon, 187-90)

To Nixon, community would become a more meaningful unit when the need for order has been fulfilled by members of that community. He asserted that people must give willing consent to law if individual freedom is to be preserved in the society.

I cite these examples not only to suggest that we here today have something in common—but also because this pattern of playing by the rules, of losing some and winning some, of accepting the verdict and having another chance, is fundamental to the whole structure on which our liberty rests. (Nixon, 62-66)
Finally, Nixon placed himself in the conservative position by emphasizing a standard for human conduct that is meant to provide a form of restraint for the individual and thereby control the evil in people and preserve individual freedom in this society.

Those decencies, those self-restraints, those patterns of mutual respect for the rights and the feelings of one another, the willingness to listen to somebody without trying to shout him down, are what we must preserve if freedom itself is to be preserved. (Nixon, 132-5)

By accentuating action based upon voluntary association and the need for order and restraint on human conduct, Nixon has committed himself in this speech to the conservative position.

Richard M. Nixon's Strategies: In President Nixon's speech, he handled the frames of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. His speech provided a familial substance and featured the term "agent" as a primary strategy. These strategies will be described in more detail in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.

Opening Strategies: After a conventional introduction, Nixon opened his speech by comparing the "won-lose" records of Alfred Landon, the Kansas State football team, and himself. He pointed out that in all of the above cases, each party knew what it was like to win and lose. After citing these examples, Nixon drew the conclusion that there was a "pattern of playing by the rules, of losing some and winning some, of accepting the verdict and having another chance . . . ." (Nixon, 64-5) He then asserted that this pattern was "fundamental to the whole structure on which our liberty rests." (Nixon, 65-6)
After losing, our "purpose" would be to question why, not to commit "acts" of violence or blame the system. This strategy allowed Nixon to relate "purpose" with the act of losing. Nixon's "purpose" then was to create a condition in which man (agent) would have more control over his own behavior, particularly during times of defeat. His "co-agents," those who support him, would align themselves with his "purpose," while his "counter-agents," those who do not support him, would be opposed to his "purpose." Nixon's strategy of identification has taken the form of unifying "agent" and "purpose." Although, the terms "act" and "scene" could be identified in his speech, they were reduced to an "agent-purpose" ratio. Nixon's level of symbolic action remained on a personal plane throughout the speech as it did in his opening strategies.

**Deliberative Process** - In treating Hultzen's deliberative frames, Nixon did not handle them in the systematic manner of Ill, Reformability, Remedy and Cost. Instead, Nixon's strategy took the form of combining the frames of Ill and Remedy, and then proceeding to the frame of Reformability. The frame of Cost was excluded from his discussion. After presenting a particular problem confronting the university or the society at large, Nixon derived a remedy which was normally stated as a series of principles which were to guide the audience in coming to terms with the particular problem. As a result, the frame of Ill was more fully emphasized than the frame of Reformability. These strategies will be more fully discussed in the succeeding pages.

In the case of Ill, Nixon pointed to four problems facing the university and the society. The four ills included the increase in
violence, the threatened quality of education, the war in Vietnam and the detrioriation of the environment. In each case, he implied that the ills could be cured if we followed the rule of reason and pursued truth in a manner which would respect the rights of other people.

First, Nixon condemned those who would use violent "acts" as a political tactic for handling problems. He began by listing a series of violent "acts" perpetuated by "agents" in our society in the last few weeks and then went on to assert that violence cannot be tolerated as a method for dealing with society's ills.

The time has come for us to recognize that violence and terror have no place in a free society, whatever the purported cause or perpetrators may be. This is the fundamental lesson for those to remember. In a system, like ours, which provides the means for peaceful change, no cause justifies violence in the name of change. (Nixon, 122-6)

While rejecting the use of violence as a political tactic, Nixon accepted the principle of the rule of reason as the most advantageous method for pursuing change in the society. "It is the rule of reason that is most important." (Nixon, 158-9)

Second, Nixon blamed the perpetrators of violent "acts" for endangering the quality of education. This particular ill was also a result of the increase in violence in the society. Nixon placed the burden of rescuing the university from activists, who seek to destroy it, on the responsible members of the academic community because he asserted, government cannot assume this function; only the responsible leaders of the university could fulfill this role. However, Nixon condemned "automatic conformity" to any generation, declaring instead
that our "purpose" was to pursue truth and to change the shortcomings which beset the society. This became his cure for guiding the audience through a particular problem.

I do not call for a conformity in which the young simply ape the old or in which we freeze the faults that we have. We must be honest enough to find what is right and to change what is wrong in America. (Nixon, 217-20)

Another difficulty troubling the society, according to Nixon was the war in Vietnam. At this point the scope of Nixon's speech was widened from issues dealing with the university to the society at large. However, he maintained the same strategy of arguing from an "agent-purpose" ratio. Nixon began by asserting that the problem with the war was not a question of whether it should end, but of how it should end. He focused on a principle which has guided his administration in answering that question.

The whole thrust, the whole purpose of this administration's foreign policy - whether it is Vietnam or in the Middle East, or in Europe, or in our relations with the developing countries or with the Communist powers - is to meet our responsibilities in such a way that at least we can have what we have not had in this country: a full generation of peace. (Nixon, 250-5)

The last ill that Nixon dealt with was the deterioration of the environment, which he blamed on the "misuses of technology." (Nixon, 272) However, he felt that "technology gives us the ability to clean up that environment, to restore the clean air, the clean-water, the open spaces, that are our rightful heritage." (Nixon, 273-5) Thus, he rejected the claim that material progress was at the root of our problems. Instead, Nixon accepted the point of view that material progress has allowed us to "do things for ourselves
and for others that need to be done, and we must see it that way." (Nixon, 280)

By attaching certain principles to the ills of our society, Nixon was able to emphasize "purpose" as a guide for those "agents" involved in the problem. Thus, Nixon developed an "agent-purpose" ratio in the frame of Ill. However, "agent" became the dominant term, while "purpose" was retained as a secondary strategy. Although the terms "act" and "scene" were discussed, they were reduced to an "agent-purpose" ratio.

In the frame of Reformability, Nixon asserted that the nation has the capacity to reform its ills.

We see that because of our wealth, because of our freedom, because of our system, we can go on to develop those great qualities of the spirit that only decades ago were still buried by the weight of drudgery . . . . (Nixon, 286-8)

However, he maintained that our "purpose" was to create a condition of reason and courtesy so that this society would be able to realize the reforms to its ills. In handling the frame of Reformability, Nixon again developed the "agent-purpose" ratio in which "agent" became the dominant term.

**Major Strategies** - In Nixon's speech "It's Time to Stand Up and Be Counted," which constructed the conservative position, he employed the following rhetorical strategies:

1. Nixon treated his subject in terms of three frames of the deliberative process, Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. The frame of Ill was more fully emphasized than the other frames.

2. He featured the argument from "agent" and "purpose" throughout his speech. "Agent" became the dominant strategy while "purpose" became the secondary strategy.
3. Nixon's personal appeal to "man" throughout his speech suggested an emphasis upon a "familiar" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all of the elements of the situation were under his control.

4. He indicated an acceptance of the conservative position and a rejection of the liberal strategy by appealing for greater responsibility of the individual outside of the range of government.

Closing Strategies - Nixon concluded his speech by developing the same strategy of identification as developed throughout the rest of his speech. He closed by appealing to his audience to defend "the free pursuit of truth" (Nixon, 303) against those who would endanger that ideal. Thus, Nixon's co-agents would defend that ideal, which his "counter-agents" would be opposed to it from his standpoint. He then called upon the audience to pursue truth in a manner that would respect the rights of others. Nixon ended his speech by calling upon the "heartland" of American to fulfill the American dream. In his closing strategies, Nixon employed the term "agent" as a dominant strategy while "purpose" was retained as a secondary strategy. Thus, his strategy of identification took the form of an "agent-purpose" ratio in which "agent" was the featured term.

Nixon's strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "agent-purpose" ratio. Thus, the terms "scene," "act" and "agency" were reduced to this ratio. Hugh Duncan stated that the "agent-purpose" ratio appeared "when the act of the leader becomes the purpose of the community."20 Nixon has apparently seen
his policy as the "purpose" of the community. Acceptance or rejection of his policy must then be based solely on his philosophical position. The audience must decide, as a result of this strategy, if Nixon is capable of controlling the variables so that his "purpose" is attained in the community.

**DOMESTIC ISSUES RAISED BY THE WAR IN VIETNAM**

The issue of the war in Vietnam has provoked a number of domestic problems to which Governor Rockefeller addressed himself. During the war, there has been chronic resentment against the draft among young Americans. After the war is completed, the change from a war-time economy to one of peace-time will create cause for concern.

Campus protests, during the sixties, regularly made an issue of the draft. Along with the protests, conscientious objectors multiplied and many prospective draftees went into exile. Much of the reaction against the draft centered around what was thought to be an unfair method for conscripting men. Harvey Wish in *Contemporary America* has explained the pre-1970 Selective Service Act:

All youths between eighteen and a half and twenty-six were declared liable at once for training and service during a period of twenty-four months; each would be obligated to remain thereafter in the Reserve up to a maximum of six years. High-school students with satisfactory grades were deferred until graduation or until they reached the age of twenty. College youths were also granted deferments subject to certain restrictions. As for the Universal Military Training provisions, these were administered by a five-man National Security Training Commission appointed by the President; they would draw up details of the UMT program for youths of eighteen and nineteen.  

The draft was marked by protestors as an inequitable method for conscripting men for two reasons. First, it held men liable for eight
years, which was considered unduly long. Second, since more white males went to college than did Negro males, the college deferment gave white males a greater chance of not being conscripted for military service. Thus, the proportion of Negro males to the population was greater than white males in the services.

With the approach of the war's end the conversion from a wartime economy to a peace-time economy has raised some questions as to what economic policies would be best to fill the needs of the American people. How could the changeover from the production of war supplies to civilian goods be carried out most efficiently? How could unemployment be avoided? How could inflation be curbed? Some people, such as Rockefeller, have suggested that we need to reorder our priorities to meet such domestic needs as education and urban renewal. In reordering our priorities, it was felt that this procedure would attend to the problem of reconversion.

**NEEDED CHANGES IN THE PRESENT DRAFT LAW**

On May 9, 1968, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller gave an address entitled "Needed Changes in the Present Draft Law," which charged that the present draft system was unfair to American youth. In place of the old system, Rockefeller proposed a draft lottery. Furthermore, he urged giving the vote to eighteen year olds and called for the immediate establishment of a national committee charged with planning the postwar development of the nation.

**LIBERAL POSITION:** Based on the definitions of the political positions, Rockefeller represented the liberal position. He accepted the attempt on the part of the national government to enter and rescue the
community from its ills. This point became evident when Rockefeller proposed a national committee to help with the reconversion of the economy from war to peace-time purposes. Rockefeller also tended to hold the liberal principle of political equality. This point became apparent when he proposed a change in the present draft law (1968) to a lottery, because a lottery system would be more fair and equitable than the old system. Finally, Rockefeller accepted the liberal strategy by exhibiting an experimental attitude toward existing social conditions. In the case of the draft system and the twenty-one year old voting requirement, Rockefeller proposed changes in the present situation. By accentuating the participation of the national government in social problems, the pre-eminent Liberal principle of political equality, and the need for change, Rockefeller accepted the liberal position as his strategy in his speech.

Nelson A. Rockefeller's Strategies - In the deliberative process, Rockefeller handled the frames of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. His speech provided for a "geometric" substance and featured the term "scene" as a major strategy. These strategies will be more fully described in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) the deliberative process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.

Opening Strategies - After a conventional introduction, Rockefeller opened with a description of "agent" by asserting that young people have been essential in the re-examining of our society.

But your generation has identified itself as a generation that truly cares. You enjoy and you exercise the freedom of protest. This is essential, as necessary as the need for reappraisal, for re-examination of our society. (Rockefeller, 9-12)
Rockefeller then linked this with the "scene" of home and Vietnam.

I think that people of American want more positive action and less anguished oratory: action, above all, to achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam and also to achieve more meaningful progress at home. (Rockefeller, 16-19)

Thus, Rockefeller's strategy of identification has taken the form of unifying "agent" and "scene." "Agent" became the dominant term while "scene" was retained as a secondary strategy. His level of symbolic action remained on a personal plane as it did throughout his speech.

**Deliberative Process** - In treating Hultzen's "stock issues," Rockefeller's strategy attempted to lead his audience through the stages of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. He spoke of three ills, the unfairness of the draft, the present voting age of twenty-one, and postwar conversion problems. In the case of Ill, Rockefeller led the audience through the stages of Reformability and Remedy before proceeding on to the next ill, the unfairness of the present voting age of twenty-one, and postwar conversion problems. With the frame of Remedy being more fully developed than the other two frames. This strategy allowed Rockefeller to assume that changes must occur with respect to the ills.

In the first frame of Ill, Rockefeller blamed the present draft law (1968) for being an inequitable system of conscripting men. Through a description of the "scene-agent" ratio, Rockefeller claimed that the present draft system kept a man "in a state of needless uncertainty over an eight-year period - from the man's 18th birthday to his 26th birthday." (Rockefeller, 33-4) In the frame of Reformability, he suggested that the present draft law be "changed
to reduce needless uncertainty and to end the present built-in discrimination. (Rockefeller; 38-39) Moving on to the frame of Remedy, Rockefeller proposed a new system based on a lottery.

Every young man as he reached the age of 19 would have a choice as to whether his name would be subject to a draft lottery - either before or after four years of college.

If the youth put his name into the lottery and wasn't drafted in a year, he would be passed by and would be clear of the draft unless war needs worsened.

If he took a student deferment, he would be allowed to continue his education up to and including his bachelor's degree but on graduation would go into the lottery pool for one year. If after this year he was not drafted he would consider himself free of the draft unless war needs increased. (Rockefeller, 40-51)

In Rockefeller's description of the present draft system, he did present a fairly balanced view of the pentad, however, all terms were reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio, in which "scene" became the dominant strategy.

In the second frame of Ill, Rockefeller questioned the present (1968) voting age requirement of twenty-one. "If you're old enough to fight, why aren't you old enough to vote." (Rockefeller, 54-5)

In the frame of Reformability, Rockefeller felt that young people were old enough to vote at eighteen. And in the frame of Remedy, he proposed changing the voting requirement of twenty-one to eighteen.

In the last frame of Ill, Rockefeller believed that after the war in Vietnam has ended, there would be serious problems in converting the economy from war to peaceful purposes. Through a description of "act," Rockefeller pointed out that Communist ideology
has maintained that American economic prosperity depended on war. However, he refuted this claim in the frame of Reformability.

This is absolutely untrue. True prosperity can only be achieved in peace. But to take advantage of the opportunities of a lasting peace will require effective planning and cooperation between government and the private segments of our society. (Rockefeller, 81-4)

As a remedy, Rockefeller proposed "a 25-member Post-Vietnam Planning Committee of leading representatives of government, business, labor, and the academic world and civic groups." (Rockefeller, 85-7) Through a description of "purpose," he explained the goals of the committee (agency).

1. To see that young people coming back from Vietnam have every opportunity to go on with their education, to get good jobs, to establish themselves on a basis of full equality in civilian life;

2. To smooth the transition of industry from war to full peacetime production; and

3. To channel wartime production capacity to meeting social needs. (Rockefeller, 88-94)

The "purpose" of the committee (agency) was to rebuild and modernize the "scene," such as city slums and inadequate housing. Rockefeller then appealed for the establishment of such a committee "to assure the creation of 8 million new jobs that will be needed in the country by 1970." "Scene" became the dominant strategy, for it was the situation that needed to be changed for "agents."

**Major Strategies** - Rockefeller in his speech "Needed Changes in the Present Draft Law," which constructed the liberal position, employed the following strategies:
1. He treated the deliberative process in terms of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. The frame of Remedy was more fully developed than the other two frames.

2. He featured the argument from "scene" and "agent" in his speech. Rockefeller presented a fairly balanced picture of the pentad, but the terms "purpose," "agency" and "act" were reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio.

3. Rockefeller's appeal from context or situations suggested an emphasis on a "geometric" substance.

4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal strategy by appealing for greater involvement on the part of the national government, for equality and for change.

Closing Strategies - Rockefeller concluded his speech through an argument from "agent" by stating that the idealism of the young has challenged all of us for the future (scene). He went on to imply that the problems of America and the world could be resolved.

We can restore hope, develop confidence, and build faith in America and among the peoples of all the world. For in the wise words of Emerson, 'This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it.' (Rockefeller, 121-4)

His strategy of identification took the form of unifying "agent" and "scene," with the "scene" becoming the dominant strategy.

Rockefeller's over-all strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-agent" ratio. As a result, the terms "act," "agency" and "purpose" were reduced to the ratio of "scene-agent." Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order described the "scene-agent" ratio in the following terms:
Social conditions here are said to call for actors in keeping with the scene, and the scene, in turn, is depicted as in keeping with the actor. 22

Rockefeller has apparently seen the context or conditions of the times as the principle which motivates men. The audience must decide, as a result of the strategy, if the conditions will force men to become "prisoners of the stitution" or if the conditions will motivate men to action. The audience must also decide if Rockefeller is capable of motivating men.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Prior to the sixties, there has been no clear concept of public responsibility for the environment. However, during the decade of the sixties, the issue on the quality of the environment became a new factor in public policy. In fact, there has been a great stimulation of interest in environmental responsibility.

Since World War II, an especially heavy drain on U. S. resources has occurred, particularly because the American population has increased so rapidly. Presidential commissions have reported that the situation is serious and that drastic action is necessary to halt pollution of streams, water shortages, air pollution, depletion of irreplaceable resources, careless farming practices and other threats to the nation's resources. Roger Revelle and Hans Landsberg in America's Changing Environment explain the problem.

But we have learned during the last few decades that we must think not only about natural resources as material utilities, but also about the whole environment as a resource that can be depleted or worsened by misuse. Our happiness and our health are jeopardized, and our fulfillment as human beings limited, by destructive changes
in our environment. Unless we can find remedies, the quality of life for our own and future generations will be dulled and diminished. 23

At the early part of the sixties, the environmental problem began to receive some attention from President Kennedy after a long drought since New Deal legislation in the area of conservation. Kennedy began to propose programs for the conservation of resources, however, Congress did not take significant action on the proposals. Harvey Wish has put it this way.

Like Theodore Roosevelt and other easterners, Kennedy drew up enthusiastic and sweeping plans for the conservation and development of natural resources to which he devoted a special message on February 23, 1961. But congressmen in key committees responded tepidly to many of these proposals - for the protection of water and wilderness resources, the need for a national program of oceanography, a federal air pollution program, and basic nuclear and electric power experiments. 24

By the end of the decade, however, the issue of the environment had become a national responsibility. As a result, Congress began to take action on the environmental issue. By January 1, 1970, President Nixon had signed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which summoned a halt to environmental deterioration and provided for the restoration of damaged areas. 25 However, there is still no general body of environmental policy to guide public decision makers on environmental questions. As a result, the general trend for treating environmental problems has been to deal with them "segmentally, through specialists whose frequently conflicting judgements require compromise or arbitration ...." according to Lynton K. Caldwell in Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society.
BE PART OF THE SOLUTION; NOT PART OF THE PROBLEM

On April 6, 1970, former Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel gave an address calling for the creation of a crusade to save the earth from pollution. Hickel appealed to all segments of the society, including students and businessmen, to join in attacking the problem. He said his concern for pollution of the environment has led him to form a new program called S.C.O.P.E., Student Councils on Pollution and Environment. In addition he announced that he was going to create a group known as the Environmental Control Organization, which would mobilize various segments of society to lend their skills to fighting pollution.

Liberal Position: Hickel represented the liberal position by accepting the attempt on the part of the national government to help control environmental problems. This point became evident when he was enlisting support on the part of students for federal agencies involved in pollution control.

We look forward to combining the enthusiasm and the fresh ideas of youth with the technical competence and the enforcement capacity of the federal government. (Hickel, 115-7)

Walter J. Hickel's Strategies - In the former Secretary of the Interior's speech he treated the frames of I11, Reformability, Remedy and Cost. His address developed a "geometric" substance and featured the term "scene" as a primary strategy. This strategy will be described in more detail in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies, and (4) closing strategies.
Opening Strategies - Hickel opened his speech by surveying his childhood experiences in Kansas with a "clean" environment. Through a description of "scene," he related an account of that environment.

Even on the hottest summer day you could look up at those skies, breathe deeply and just be refreshed in the beauty and the cleanliness of the country. (Hickel, 4-6)

Hickel then turned to the "scene" of today and focused his attention on the audience (agents) and said, "But you know in a few years you may not be able to enjoy these same carefree resources." (Hickel, 9-10)

In his opening strategies, he introduced the problem of environmental degradation. His strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent," with "scene" becoming the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. Hickel's level of symbolic action remained on a personal plane as it did throughout his speech.

Deliberative Process - In handling Hultzen's deliberative frames, Hickel systematically treated the frames of Ill, Reformability, Remedy, and Cost. This strategy will be more fully described in the succeeding paragraphs.

In the frame of Ill, Hickel began by pointing out that the destruction of the environment has developed into a real threat to mankind. Through a description of "scene," he established his position.

Talk of permanent destruction of the environment - that really isn't an idle threat of some alarmist. It is a fact. And somehow it is frightening. Smog is no longer a phenomenon peculiar to California. Polluted water is no longer just a hazard of the Potomac or Lake Erie or the Hudson or any other place. (Hickel, 11-6)
Hickel then discussed the degree to which the "scene" has been deteriorating.

You know, there is toxic air floating around the world and those dangerous elements in that air are really invisible and yet they've been found by scientists, around the South Pole and in the snow layers of Antarctica.

Our rivers, the life system of our land, are becoming the death system for the oceans. Millions of tons of pollutants and pesticides are being poured into the sea, threatening to destroy man's greatest source for future food and oxygen. (Hickel, 31-9)

In the frame of Reformability, Hickel asked this question: "Can we remodel our mental attitudes and retool our industry fast enough to do something about it." (Hickel, 49-50) He answered the question affirmatively, but placed some reservations on his answer by asserting that it was "a statement of faith, not of fact." (Hickel 52) Hickel then linked his answer to the young people (agents) in this country. He said that young people have been asking questions about whether we can afford to use up our resources within such a small span of time.

What right have we - in the time-space of a few generations - to use up a majority of the irreplaceable resources which took millions of years to produce. (Hickel, 61-3)

Hickel, in this frame, has developed the strategy of arguing from the "scene-agent" ratio. The "scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.

In the frame of Remedy, Hickel became concerned with how young people could influence the government on matters of the environment. He pointed to two programs (agencies) in which young people (agents)
could have access on matters dealing with the environmental situation (scene). The first newly formed program is called S.C.O.P.E., Student Council on Pollution and Environment. According to Hickel, S.C.O.P.E. will function as a channel through which information on environmental problems can be transferred by students to various agencies in the government.

> Already the S.C.O.P.E. representatives are serving as a part of a highly motivated, public 'early warning system.' When pollution is spotted--or major projects are launched without regard for the environment, SCOPE is notifying the authorities. (Hickel, 104-7)

Hickel has formed another program called ECO--Environmental Control Organization, which has as its task the mobilization of various segments of the society in order to lend their skills to fighting pollution.

> The scientists, the lawyers, and the social scientists - those who participate could lend their skills to community leaders in any given region to evaluate, plan and coordinate, and above all, execute new approaches to ecological problems. (Hickel, 141-4)

In the case of both of these organizations, Hickel's development of the "agencies" was reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio, for they became ways in which young people could involve themselves in environmental problems.

> In the frame of Cost, Hickel asserted that both of the programs represented an opportunity and an obligation for the administration. As an opportunity, the Administration could acquire aid from these individuals. As an obligation, Hickel claimed that this was a way "to bring significant numbers of potential future leaders back into
the political process." (Hickel, 161-2) He then reported that he did not believe that the environmental problem would be in conflict with man's struggle for equal rights.

I think it is complementary to any attempt to improve the quality of an individual's life. It is forcing us to realize that there really is just one race and you know that is the human race. (Hickel, 194-6)

At this point, "scene" was reduced to an argument from "agent." This form of argument was then extended to the environmental problems when he said:

The enemy is becoming very clear to the people . . . it is those who foul the nation's air and water . . . and those who stand in a position of authority to do something about the destruction of our resources--but who do nothing. (Hickel, 195-8)

In this strategy Hickel's co-agents became those people who stood for a clean environment, while his counter-agents became those people who fouled the environment or did nothing about the environment.

**Major Strategies** - In Hickel's speech "Be Part of the Solution; Not Part of the Problem," which constructed the liberal position, he employed the following strategies:

1. Hickel handled his subject in terms of four frames of the deliberative process; Ill, Reformability, Remedy and Cost. The frame of Remedy was more fully developed than the other frames.

2. Hickel featured the argument from "scene" and "agent." As an over-all strategy, "scene" became the dominant term, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.
3. He appealed from conditions or situations throughout his speech. This suggested an emphasis upon "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all the elements of a situation grew out of the environment.

4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal position by appealing for greater involvement on the part of government.

**Closing Strategies** - Hickel closed his speech by appealing to the audience (agent) "to respond to environmental needs." (Hickel, 200)

> My challenge to you is to crusade not only against the sins of the past, which you can blame on the older generation, but to also crusade to safeguard the future by changing our priorities and even our life-styles. (Hickel, 206-9)

The challenge was to save the deteriorating environment (scene).

> At stake are the most precious ingredients for sustaining life. --Air that you breathe without seeing or choking but which really refreshes you and invigorates you. --Clean water to drink and swim in. (Hickel, 222-5)

Hickel concluded his speech by pointing out that the task of cleaning up the environment would take a commitment on the part of everyone. Hickel's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Agent" became the dominant term, while "scene" was retained as a secondary strategy.

Hickel's overall strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-agent" ratio. As a result, the terms "act," "agency," and "purpose were reduced to the ratio of "scene-agent." Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order described the "scene-agent" ratio in the following terms:

> Social conditions here are said to call for actors in keeping with the scene, and the scene, in turn, is depicted as in keeping with the actor.
Hickel has apparently seen the context or conditions of the times as the principle which motivates men. The audience must decide, as a result of this strategy, if the conditions will force men to become "prisoners of the situation" or if the conditions will motivate men to action. The audience must also decide if Hickel is capable of motivating men to action.
FOOTNOTES


2 Current, American History: A Survey, p. 918.


4 Wish, Contemporary America, p. 777-8.


6 Abraham, Freedom and the Court, p. 287-92.

7 Abraham, Freedom and the Court, p. 306.

8 Abraham, Freedom and the Court, p. 117.


10 Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.


12 Clark Kerr, "New Challenges to College and University," p. 248.


16 Tyler, "Investing in Better Schools," p. 236.


22. Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.
24. Wish, Contemporary America, p. 752.
27. Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.
CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

As America developed into a world power, her survival as a nation began to depend in a large measure upon whether or not international problems were brought to satisfactory solutions. World affairs then became of vital importance to everyone. As the United States entered into the sixties, she experienced a number of problems of which there were many sources. Americans began to feel the inevitability of change as far as policies and relations with other countries were concerned. Many Americans became disillusioned with the war in Vietnam. National security became more unstable with new developments in weapons technology. China began playing a major role in world affairs. The Soviets challenged the Americans for world domination. As a result of these problems, the world challenge today has been the most serious one Americans have ever faced.

During this period of time, solutions to problems have been demanded in order to determine the "right" course to follow. Politicians were then called upon to defend or change policies within the international scene. The Landon Lecture Series has afforded some opportunity to examine the nature of appeals used by prominent politicians on various international problems. This chapter will be specifically concerned with speeches on international policy given in the Landon Lecture Series. The issues will be
classified according to the new nationalism, foreign aid, arms control, the far east and the Vietnam war. The speeches of Landon, Romney, Brooke, Mansfield, and Kennedy will be analyzed in this chapter. Prior to the analysis of each speech, a general history on the background of the problem will be presented with respect to the trends of the particular issue.

**NEW NATIONALISM**

The world has changed and the basic factors shaping American foreign policy have changed with it. These changes have been generally rooted in weapon and technological development, which have had widespread political consequences. Changes in weapon systems in the Western world have altered political patterns and organizations and thereby have threatened to cause changes in political life. As a result, the nations of the world have become increasingly concerned with methods of influencing the behavior of others to obtain cooperation, consent, or, at least, acquiescence.

In his article, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," Henry A. Kissinger has discussed some of the changes in American foreign policy.

For the first time, foreign policy has become global. In the past, the various continents conducted their foreign policy essentially in isolation. Throughout much of history, the foreign policy of Europe was scarcely affected by events in Asia. When, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the European powers were extending their influence throughout the world, the effective decisions continued to be made in only a few great European capitals. Today, statesmen face the unprecedented problem of formulating policy for well over a hundred
countries. Every nation, no matter how insignificant, participates in international affairs. Ideas are transmitted almost instantaneously. What used to be considered domestic events can now have world-wide consequences.¹

In the area of nuclear weapons, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have extended their power to the point of creating a stalemate. As a result, much of the power has been neutralized since each nation has hesitated to use its nonnuclear power for fear of causing nuclear conflict. Carrol Quigley in his book *The World Since 1939: A History* has explained the consequences of this neutralization.

In this way the Superpower neutralization (and the included nuclear stalemate) will continue into the future. From this flow three consequences:

1. Movement of Soviet-Western rivalry down to lower, less violent, levels of conflict and competition.

2. Continued desintegration of the two Superblocs, from the inability of the Chief Power in each to bring force against its allies because of the need to accept growing diversity within each bloc in order to retain as much as possible the appearance of unity within the bloc. This process is well illustrated by Moscow's difficulties with China, Albania, and now Romania, or by Washington's troubles with De Gaulle or with its Latin American allies.

3. A growing independence of neutrals and uncommitted nations because of their ability to act freely in the troubled waters stirred up by the Soviet-American confrontation.²

So, new nations have felt protected by the rivalry of the superpowers, and their nationalism has led to a growth of independence and self-determination. Hence, traditional uses of power have become less feasible and new forms of political policy must be developed for dealing with situations.
NEW CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL REALTIONS

On December 13, 1966, former Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas delivered an address entitled "New Challenges in International Relations." In his speech, Governor Landon proposed a complete review of the United States foreign policy. He stated that the world was in a era of great change and that the time has come for China, the Soviet Union, and the United States to reassess their foreign policy in the interest of world peace and stability.

**Liberal Position:** Based on the definitions of the political positions, Landon's speech represented the liberal position. He tended to hold the principle of equality among nations in the world. The point became evident when Landon discussed the "new nationalism." "Paradoxically, by reducing ideological barrier, this new nationalism in another sense permits greater international cooperation based on the principle of equality." (Landon, 57-60)

Landon's speech tended to mark an experimental attitude toward foreign policy to meet the problems of the "new nationalism." Landon finally demonstrated the liberal positions by displaying a willingness to negotiate with the Communists in order to achieve peace and stability. "World peace and stability depend upon harmonious relations between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States." (Landon, 113-5)

**Alfred M. Landon's Strategies** - In the deliberative process, Landon handled the frames of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. His speech provided a "gemoetric" substance and featured the term "scene" as his major strategy. These strategies will be more fully
described in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.

Opening Strategies - Landon opened his address by asserting that the United States must develop new policies to meet the "new realities" of international relations. He then began to define the world (scene) as an armed camp (act). "An uneasy peace is maintained, while a power struggle continues to build up between the Soviet Union and China, with the United States natural between them." (Landon, 3-5) By this means Landon set forth a series of challenges, ills, facing the world today. He mentioned that India was undergoing internal as well as external problems; China was facing an internal revolution; the Vietnam war was continuing; and questions concerning the use of nuclear weapons and military use of space were not being answered. Landon then moved on to point out that a "new nationalism" (act) has appeared within the world situation (scene).

Everywhere, a new nationalism - having recently vanquished European empires - is now transcending ideologies and old alliances, and is paradoxically supporting world peace, based on fear - not trust. World Communism, the United Nations, NATO, and the Atlantic Alliance are fragmenting on the rocks of this new nationalism. (Landon, 14-8)

In his introduction, Landon noted a series of ills or challenges facing the world in international affairs. His strategy of identification took the form of unifying "act" and "scene." "Scene" became the dominant term in the ratio, while "act" was retained as a secondary strategy. Landon's level of symbolic action remained through-
out his speech, as it did in his opening strategies, on an abstract plane.

**Deliberative Process** - In handling Hultzen's deliberative frames, Landon treated the stages of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. The frame of Reformability was, however, treated as an aspect of Remedy. Cost was excluded in his discussion. These strategies will be more fully developed in the succeeding pages.

In the frame of Ill, Landon began the deliberative process by defining the "new nationalism" in a negative sense, pointing out that it was not "the aggressive nationalism with its ancestral roots in medieval feudalism." He also stated that it was not "the aggressive nationalism of modern dictators built on the doctrine of force." (Landon, 21-22) Instead, the new nationalism (act) has transcended ideologies and has brought about changes in the world (scene). The new nationalism has been "one of independence and self-determination." (Landon 19) By creating independence, Landon stated that national barriers have been set up and international cooperation has been obstructed. As a result, smaller countries have been moving away from the control of larger countries.

The heretofore captive East European satellites are no longer captive nor satellites. They are pushing away from economies and political control and domination by Moscow. And it must be admitted that - by the same token - Western Europe is also pushing away from economic and political domination by the United States of America. (Landon, 48-53)

The "new nationalism" not only has obstructed international cooperation, but, paradoxically, has allowed for more cooperation "based on the principle of equality of nations." (Landon, 60) In
the frame of Ill, Landon provided for a concise statement of the problems concerning the "new nationalism." His strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "act," with "scene" remaining the dominant strategy.

Next, Landon discussed six solutions for remedying the problems brought about by the new nationalism. The solutions involved international trade, Sino-Soviet-American relations, our China policy, German Reunification, the Manila Conference, and African embargoes. These solutions will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

First, Landon saw international trade (agency) as a means for improving relations with other countries in the world (scene).

Freer trade, on the other hand, enables the peoples of different nations to become better acquainted with the customs, beliefs, ways of life, and government policies of one another. With greater expansion and ease of communication today, freer trade induces mutual international understanding. (Landon, 70-4)

Thus, through the use of international markets (agency), the "act" of peace could be attained in the international "scene." As a result the United States must adopt a new trade policy in the interest of economic and political stability, and world peace.

The American Congress has not learned a prime lesson of history - that economic isolationism leads to political isolationism as well as the converse, and that either is counterproductive in this day and age, as even the Soviet Union is reluctantly learning. (Landon, 109-13)

Second, Landon believed that world peace (act), depended upon good relations between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States (scene). Landon pointed out that there exist "new realities" which the United States must face if we are to attain world peace. He considered those new realities to be the Soviet modernizing of
Communist dogma, Sino-Soviet split, European independence from the Soviet Union as well as the United States, Chinese nuclear power, the growing non-alignment of developing nations, recession of the Communist tide, and world-wide acceptance of the welfare state. Within this "scene," the "act" of peace could be attained if the United States took the initiative "to reduce tensions, violence, war, and threats of war, in other words - to normalize international relations." (Landon, 164-6)

Third, if the "act" of peace is to occur, the United States must reappraise her China policy, according to Landon. Landon cited both Humphrey and Johnson (agents) as saying that the United States must offer some reconciliation with China. That is, the "scene" between the United States and China must change before the "act" of peace can take place.

As a fourth solution, Landon brought up the question of German reunification. Landon first cited President Johnson (agent) as having said that German reunification has been the "hoped for result of close East-West ties." (Landon, 219-20) Through a description of "scene," Landon related two recent development in Germany.

Two recent developments in Germany might possibly be related. They are: (1) the downfall of the Erhard government replaced by an uncertain coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats; and (2) a resurgence of German nationalism as evidenced in two legislative elections. (Landon, 221-5)

Landon then developed the claim, through a description of "scene," that the Soviet Union would gain by the reunification of Germany.

The Soviet Union would have much to gain. She would be free of a threat on her Western front
which would allow her to concentrate on the growing Chinese military threat on her long Eastern front. (Landon, 233-5)

The fifth solution to the problems concerned with the "new nationalism" involved a rejection of President Johnson's Asian Manifesto (act) which took place during the Manila Conference. Through a description of "scene," Landon asserted his rejection of Johnson's proposal.

One result of the Manila Conference was the dramatic pronouncement by our President that the United States is a major Asian power and is assuming guardianship in its name over all of Asia. This appears to be an assertion of national responsibility of appalling proportions. Should Congress implement Johnson's Asian manifesto, it would seem that America would become permanently and deeply involved - politically, militarily, economically - in all of Asia. (Landon, 284-90)

Landon then urged Congress to look deeply into Johnson's Asian Manifesto, because it should be of vital interest to the American people. He largely considered the Manifesto (act) to be unworkable in Asia (scene) because the United States does not have the money or means (agency) to carry out such a program. "Finally, there is the question - if President Johnson meant what he seemed to say at Manila - where is he going to get the money to bring his Great Society to all of Asia." (Landon, 228-30)

Finally, Landon turned to the "scene" of Africa where there have been "growing pressures to impose economic embargoes through the United Nations on Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa." (Landon, 370-1) Through an "agent," John Knight, Landon cautioned his audience not to become involved with the embargo of Rhodesia
and South Africa. To Landon, the problem of becoming entangled in the embargo was that the United States does not have the means to support one.

How can we support the solvency of the British pound and yet enforce such economic embargoes on Rhodesia or South Africa, of both, and yet fight a major war in South Vietnam, not to mention all the other American commitments at home and abroad? (Landon, 412-5)

In other words, the United States does not have the "agency" to support that "act" within that "scene."

Major Strategies - In Landon's speech "New Challenges in International Relations," which constructed the liberal position, he employed the following strategies:

1. Landon handled his subject in terms of three frames of the deliberative process. The three frames were Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. The frame of Reformability was treated as an aspect of Remedy. The frame of Remedy was more fully emphasized than the frame of Ill.

2. Landon featured the argument from "scene" and "act" as an overall strategy. The term "scene" became the dominant strategy, while "act" was retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "purpose," "agent" and "agency" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-act" ratio.

3. His appeal from context or periods of time suggested an emphasis upon a "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all of the elements grew out of a situation.

4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal position by appealing for greater equality among nations.
**Closing Strategies** - Landon concluded his address by appealing for a reassessment of our foreign policy (act) by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (agency). He then linked our new challenges in foreign policy with peace (purpose) in the world (scene). If world peace is to come about, the United States must develop a more responsible dialogue with China and the Soviet Union.

Should China recover from her present insanity and join the responsible interaction with the Soviet Union and the United States - a new era in international relations would commence that would shape the destiny of this world by creating stability on which peace with security is ultimately based. This must be our hope. This must be our aim. (Landon, 450-5)

In his closing strategies, Landon used the "scene-act" ratio as his strategy of identification. "Scene" was the dominant term, while "act" was again retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "agent," "agency," and "purpose" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-act" ratio.

Landon's strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-act" ratio. Hugh Duncan in *Communication and Social Order* described the "scene-act" ratio in the following terms:

All statements which ground social motives in conditions, backgrounds, environments, natural laws, objective situations, existential conditions, historical necessity, equilibrium, time, the body, etc.  

Landon apparently has seen the "course of destiny" in terms of conditions and situations. As a result of this strategy, the audience must decide if trends of time and space can be reversed in order to remove the problem. The audience must also decide if the situation presented by him was inevitable.
FOREIGN AID

Economic assistance to friendly countries has been a major nonmilitary channel for American foreign policy. It has drawn its inspiration from the fact that discontent and stagnation in a country have provided fertile ground for a Communist threat, and, on the other hand, a health economy has been a strong barrier against Communist penetration.

In his article "The United States and Low Income Countries," Max F. Millikan has described the United States' foreign policy program.

Before the Second World War, our concern with these countries was marginal. In the fifties and early sixties, we focused our attention on the underdeveloped world, partly because most of the postwar international crises has their proximate origins there - from Korea, Suez, Cuba, and the Congo to the Dominican Republic, Rhodesia, and Vietnam - and partly because we viewed the underdeveloped world as a principal arena of the cold war. We developed a new range of foreign policy instruments including technical assistance, capital grants and loans, food for peace, cultural exchange programs, and the Peace Corps and new forms and emphasis for the more traditional instruments of diplomacy and military assistance to deal with this essentially new dimension of our foreign policy concerns.4

The major thrust of United States foreign policy has been to provide economic, social and civic development in low income countries. The total cost of economic assistance between 1945 and 1962 came to approximately 97.2 billion dollars.5 The assistance has been generally in the form of economic aid from the United States Government.
On December 6, 1967, Governor George Romney delivered an address entitled "The Challenge of International Development." In his address Romney appealed for a change of policy toward the underdeveloped nations of the world as far as economic assistance is concerned. He stated that the growing "gap" between developed and underdeveloped nations of the world represented a greater threat to world peace than Communist aggression and that the United States must act to ease the threat.

**LIBERAL POSITION:** Based on the definitions of the political positions, Romney's speech represented the liberal position. Romney accepted the attempt on the part of the national government to play a stronger role in supporting private investment abroad.

> In the Congress, I would recommend the establishment of a joint Congressional Committee on Private Initiative in International Development. Such an agency could enable the Congress to play a stronger and less parochial role in supporting the involvement of private enterprise in meeting the world-wide challenge, and would lend more prestige to the effort as a whole. (Romney, 471-7)

Romney also tended to hold the principle of equality among nations when he proposed developing a program to narrow the "gap" between the underdeveloped and developed nations.

> The continued growth of private economies depends on the expansion of international trade and markets. Prospering nations make better customers and markets than poor ones. And among prospering nations political and social problems generally have a better chance of being resolved before they develop into military problems. (Romney, 92-7)
Finally, Romney advocated a change in present policy in the foreign aid program.

It is critical that change occur, radical change, and quickly. But supporting change does not mean fomenting violence. We must guide change into constructive rather than destructive channels. (Romney, 81-4)

By pointing out the need for participation on the part of the national government in private investment abroad, the principle of equality, and the need for change in present policy, Romney accepted the liberal position as his strategy in his speech.

George Romney's Strategies - In the deliberative process, Romney covered the frames of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. His speech provided a "geometric" substance and featured the term "scene" as a major strategy. These strategies will be described in more detail in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies, and (4) closing strategies.

Opening Strategies - Through a description of "scene," Romney opened his speech by asserting that one of the international challenges confronting the United States today has involved the difference in living standards between the rich and poor nations of the world.

One of the greatest international challenges facing us today is the huge difference in living standards between the rich, industrialized northern nations and the poor, underdeveloped southern peoples. (Romney, 1-4)

He then went on to state that Americans (agents) had tended not to clearly perceive the "dangerous" proportions of the situation (scene).

Our natural confidence about the future obscures awareness of how fragile it is. In this sense, we are isolating and alienating ourselves from the rest of the world as it really is. (Romney, 15-8)
Finally, Romney concluded his introduction by describing to his audience the topics to be covered in his speech. The topics included the scope of the problem (Ill) and the means or "agencies" by which the problem could be solved between the rich and underdeveloped nations. Romney's overall strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. His level of symbolic action remained on a personal plane as it did throughout the rest of his speech.

**Deliberative Process** - Romney treated the "stock issue" frames in the systematic manner of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. Cost was excluded as a strategy. In the frame of Ill, Romney surveyed the dimensions of the problem and in the frame of Remedy he suggested several courses of action.

In the frame of Ill, Romney laid out the dimensions of the problem between developed and underdeveloped nations. His description heavily emphasized the term "scene."

The per capita gross national product of the United States is $3,240, its population 200 million. Mainland China's per capita gross national produce is $85, its population 700 million. The per capita gross national product of West Germany is $1,620 and Nigeria $80 - both have a population around 60 million. (Romney, 26-30)

In terms of "act," Romney described underdevelopment as "illiteracy, poverty, hunger, disease, human misery." (Romney, 44-5) Romney next pointed out that if the United States did not come to the aid of the underdeveloped nations then widespread violence would be the result. He then linked development in other countries with peace
as the "purpose" of the foreign aid program (agency). In the frame of Ill, Romney's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "purpose." The terms "act" and "agency" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-purpose" ratio.

In the frame of Reformability, Romney indicated that our foreign aid program (agency) was inadequate to meet the needs of the underdeveloped nations.

At present, our national response is characterized by lower levels of foreign economic assistance, heightened threats of protectionism, and insignificant private enterprise involvement in the business of development. (Romney, 103-6)

Through a description of "scene," he appealed for greater economic assistance in order to prevent violence between the "have" and "have not" nations.

We must find a way to avert this potential disaster for all the world. We must concentrate new energies to use the tremendous wealth and technological expertise of the affluent Northern nations to help develop the poverty-stricken southern peoples. (Romney, 124-7)

Romney went on to say that the condition was reformable if the Northern nations (scene) cooperated in a program (agency) for the underdeveloped nations. He also pointed out that the United States "must be the leader largely through example." (Romney, 139-40)

In the frame of Remedy, Romney proposed a greater involvement of private enterprise in investing in the underdeveloped countries and more foreign aid on the part of the government. Romney also argued for more trade between nations and governmental tax incentives for private investment. All of these proposals were treated as means (agencies) by which the situation (scene) could be changed.
First, Romney suggested that private enterprise could play
an expanded role in investing in underdeveloped countries.

Private enterprise embodies the very genius of
the American economy and carries the contagious
germ of freedom. The underdeveloped world must
be exposed to the dynamic private enterprise
systems of the Northern hemisphere, and a sub-
stantial inflow of private investment must be
made available. (Romney, 158-62)

Second, Romney asserted that government aid to underdeveloped
countries had its place in helping to solve the problem of inter-
national development.

... it is difficult to argue that government
aid is not needed, given the development needs
only it can fulfill, given the effect it can
have on improving the environment for the in-
flow of private capital, and given the import-
ant ways in which it can complement the desirable
effect of trade in development progress. (Romney,
182-6)

However, Romney held 'that we must put more stress on trade and
private investment than on aid.' (Romney, 255-6) Thus, he believed
that trade and private investment as "agencies" would be more
effective in alleviating the situation (scene).

So it is vital for the underdeveloped nations to
trade more if they are to develop. And it is
vital for the international community to create
a trade environment that would foster rather
than frustrate the growth of developing countries.
(Romney, 386-9)

Romney however pointed out in congress that there has been an upsurge
of trade protectionism against imports coming into this country.
His answer to this movement involved opposing the protectionist's
policy because it would "cast new doubts on the basic underpinning
of our international economic relationships." (Romney, 321-3) Through
the "act-agency" ratio, Romney described his opposition to the
protectionist movement.
Now, the only answer to all this can be retaliation. According to the international system of trade rules under which we operate—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—for every restriction we impose on imports, an equivalent restriction on our exports abroad can be imposed by other countries on U.S. industry. (Romney, 329-33)

Through a description of "scene," Romney summarized present American investment in the underdeveloped nations.

The present low rate of American investment represents a crippling failure of our own response to the development challenge. The private flow has been decreasing both in terms of gross national product and overall investment by other northern industrialized nations. The total accumulated American private capital in less developed countries today is only about $15 billion, over half of which is in extractive industries like mining and petroleum. (Romney, 375-83)

Romney then re-emphasized that the United States must present an example for other nations to follow and pointed to private investment as the principal "agency" by which the gap can be closed between the developed and underdeveloped nations.

Governments must cooperate on efforts to improve the private enterprise climate in the underdeveloped countries to attract both foreign and domestic development. (Romney, 394-6)

**Major Strategies** - In Romney's speech "The Challenge of International Development," which constructed the liberal position, he emphasized the following strategies.

1. Romney handled the deliberative frames of Ill, Reformability, and Remedy. He excluded the frame of Cost in his address. The frame of Remedy was more fully developed than the other frames.
2. He featured the argument from "scene" and "agency" as an overall strategy. "Scene" became the dominant term, while "agency" was reduced to a secondary strategy. The terms "agent," "act," and "purpose" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-agency" ratio.

3. Romney's appeal from context or conditions throughout his speech suggested an emphasis upon a "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all the elements of a situation grew out of the environment.

4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal strategy by appealing for greater equality among nations as far as international development is concerned.

Closing Strategies - In his closing strategies, Romney suggested reforms evolving from the Executive and Congressional branches of government and from the private sector in the area of foreign aid. Basically, Romney's recommendations involved either the development or expansion of "agencies" (programs) for the "act" of foreign aid. In the Executive branch, Romney advised liberalising Southern trade, increasing tax incentives for foreign investment, inlarging of AID, and greater cooperation among Northern industrialized nations in the area of foreign aid. As for the Congress, Romney recommended "the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Private Initiative in International Development." (Romney, 472-4) The Committee, according to Romney, would allow for greater involvement of private investment in foreign countries. And in the private sector, Romney called for an "International Development Coalition," (Romney, 470) which would make recommendations to both business and the federal
government concerning the best methods for international development. In his conclusion, Romney developed the "act-agency" ratio. "Agency" became the dominant term, while "act" was retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "agent" and "scene" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "act-agency" ratio.

Romney's overall strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-agency" ratio. Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order described the "scene-agency" ratio in the following terms:

Whenever ways of doing something are considered necessary conditions of social action, as when we tell a child that 'our family doesn't do that sort of thing.'

Romney stated that private investment in foreign countries, foreign aid and trade should be the means by which underdeveloped nations can upgrade their economic status along with the developed countries. From this, the audience must decide of these means will be feasible for alleviating the condition of underdevelopment.

**ARMS CONTROL**

Since the Soviet Union has been motivated to become a thermonuclear power, the United States has felt the necessity to develop a thermonuclear capability for a deterring attack from the Soviet Union. The objective of deterrence provided for either the containment of Communism or the avoidance of a world war. It, therefore, became critical for both countries to develop a balance of power so that neither side would have its national security undermined by the other side.
However, the present defense situation of trying to maintain a balance of power has presented a problem for the United States. William C. Foster in his article "National Strategy, Security, and Arms Control" has discussed this problem.

This central fact of the present military environment colors the entire spectrum of international relations. It constitutes the basic strategic dilemma of our time. In coping with this dilemma the United States is following two parallel and complementary roads.

The first is an effort to make deterrence work. In traveling this road our attention must be given to a strong and flexible defense posture and to such appropriate adjustments in the spectrum of military and political affairs as will foster greater international stability in an inherently unstable world.

The second is the effort to reduce our dependence on force for the settlement of international disputes. This road is almost unused. But since deterrence or the balance of terror does not provide a satisfactory long-term solution, we must work toward the development of international machinery which gradually but ultimately can replace national military forces as guarantors of security.

The central problem, then, has been that when one nation develops a more advanced thermonuclear weapon, the other nation must follow course or national security will be at risk. The United States, as a result, can either construct the military weapon or negotiate with the Soviet Union for arms control. In the past, the United States has tended to maintain a strong military posture by increasing national arsenals.

NATIONAL SECURITY: DOLLARS, DEMANDS, AND DILEMMAS

On October 6, 1969, Edward W. Brooke delivered an address entitled "National Security: Dollars, Demands, and Dilemmas."
In his speech, Brooke stated that arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union must begin in order to end multiple-warhead nuclear device testing. He stated that arms control was urgent because the only alternative to successful arms negotiation could be the possible destruction of human society.

**LIBERAL POSITION:** Brooke accepted the liberal position by upholding the tendency to believe that man is a rational, moral agent.

None of us can claim the mantle of divinity when it comes to the great decisions of national security and public welfare. But God has equipped us with intelligence and compassion which, coupled with determined effort on our part, can lead to more humane a progressive policies. And those policies will be a living testament on the peace and justice America seeks for herself and for all nations. (Brooke, 411-7)

He also tended to focus his attention on an interest in all of humanity rather than just in national patriotism. This point became evident when he called for a re-allocation of military funds to such expenditures on programs for people around the world.

If we can liberate even a small fraction of that sum, by reducing the necessity for such expenditures, think what it would mean for the prosperity, for the health and for the sanity of this globe. Programs to speed development of the improverished lands, to relieve the blight infecting urban communities in every country, to feed and clothe and heal those in need--even a diversion of but 10% of the world's military budgets would be a boon to mankind. (Brooke, 38-6)

Brooke's speech tended to mark a more experimental attitude toward international policy, particularly when he advocated arms negotiation on MIRV testing.
The need for strategic arms talks should be evident. It was in 1945 that we exploded the first atomic device, and shocked the world and ourselves with the awesome power of this new technology. (Brooke, 81-4).

Brooke committed himself to the liberal strategy by emphasizing man's rational capacities, by focusing his interest on all of humanity and by calling for a change in traditional policy.

Edward W. Brooke's Strategies - In Senator Brooke's speech, he treated the frames of Ill, Reformability, Remedy, and Cost. The frame of Ill was more fully developed than the other frames. His speech provided a "geometric" substance and featured "scene" as the primary strategy. These strategies will be more fully described in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames of the deliberative process, (3) major strategies, and (4) closing strategies.

Opening Strategies - After a conventional introduction, Senator Brooke related an anecdote to the audience concerning military problems during the Civil War. The story was presented through a description of "agent."

Some of you no doubt recall the famous Civil War general, Joseph Hooker, whom Abraham Lincoln appointed to replace the slow-moving General McClellan. General Hooker made a special effort to demonstrate that he was a true man of action, and in his first days in command sent to the president a dispatch headed, 'Headquarters in the Saddle.' Mr. Lincoln was not exactly impressed. 'The trouble with Hooker,' he remarked, 'is that he's got his headquarters where his hindquarters ought to be.' (Brooke, 33-40)

Brooke then linked this story with criticism by Americans (agents), of our national defense policy.
We are witnessing an unprecedented display of citizen's ire against the military establishment. Not only the uniformed military, but civilian leaders and private contractors engaged in defense activities are bearing the brunt of unusual public criticism. (Brooke, 44-8)

He pointed out that much of the criticism has stemmed from the "scene" in Vietnam. As a result of the criticism, Congressmen (agents) have commenced to investigate defense policy (act) and, hence, the situation (scene) has begun to change.

The small group of dedicated congressional investigators who have plowed these fields for many years--these have been joined by a large number of allies, including several on the senate armed services committee. Individual members of the house and senate have struck out on their own to uncover dubious contract practices, to highlight the dangers of certain weapon systems, to press the case for non-military approaches to security such as the pending strategic arms negotiation with the Soviet Union. (Brooke, 73-80)

Through a description of "scene," Brooke then spoke of the necessity for strategic arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The need for strategic arms talks should be evident. It was in 1945 that we exploded the first atomic device, and shocked the world and ourselves with the awesome power of this new technology. In 1949 the Soviet Union detonated a similar weapon. For the past quarter century, the two most powerful nations in the world have held each other a bay. Changes have occurred within both blocs; allies have challenged the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union alike; but the nuclear stalemate goes on. (Brooke, 81-8)

The need for strategic arms talks became more clear when he stated the "purpose" of our defense policy (act).
The American people have become increasingly aware over the years that the great power of nuclear weapons is sufficient only to insure mutual deterrence; it does not and cannot provide meaningful military superiority against a nation also armed with thermonuclear weapons and superiority. (Brooke, 89-95)

The point to be made by Brooke is that the United States and the Soviet Union (scene) must maintain a balance of power (purpose) in nuclear weapons, and this can be ensured through strategic arms talks (agency).

In his introduction, Brooke's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent" as an overall strategy. "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. However, a fairly balanced view of the pentad was included in his discussion with the terms "act," "agency" and "purpose." Brooke's level of symbolic action was on an abstract plane, as it was throughout the rest of his speech.

Deliberative Process - In handling, Hultzen's deliberative frames, Brooke's strategy systematically treated the frames of Ill, Reformability, Remedy, and Cost. These strategies will be more fully developed in the succeeding paragraphs.

In the frame of Ill, Brooke asserted that MIRV--Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles--(agency) was upsetting the "act" of national security by threatening the balance of power (purpose) between the United States and the Soviet Union (scene).

Now, however, we are faced with a new technology which threatens to disrupt this carefully maintained balance of power. I refer specifically to MIRV, the innocent-sounding acronym for Multiple Independently Targetable
Re-entry Vehicles. MIRV's are Multiple Warheads, placed on a single missile.
(Brooke, 122-30)

As a result of this change in "scene," Brooke and other Congressmen (agents) have called "for a joint moratorium on flight tests of the so-called MIRV systems." The reason he gave for calling for a moratorium on MIRV testing involved the impossibility of regulating the system for maintaining a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

By contrast the insidious quality of MIRV technology lies in the fact that we are very near the stage at which these systems will no longer be controllable by technically practical and politically feasible means. Once an intercontinental missile is resting in its silo, we may no longer be sure whether it has one or several warheads, or whether it is capable of striking one or several targets.
(Brooke, 148-53)

Brooke then suggested that MIRV could be controlled by "agents" within the "scene" of the United States and the Soviet Union if programs (agency) were established to prohibit the testing of MIRV.

By banning MIRV test flights, which can be observed by both sides, it may be possible to forestall actual deployment of these weapons by preventing the achievement of the reliability and accuracy that would be required.
(Brooke, 158-61)

Through a description of "scene," he explained the imperative nature of calling for a moratorium on MIRV.

And time has become the most precious commodity where MIRV's are concerned. The United States is nearly half-way through the test series that may lead to initial deployment of the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV systems late next year. While the Soviet Union appears to be working on a less flexible system, it also has conducted a number of tests
of a large weapon capable of striking more than one target. If these tests continue unabated, each nation will have to assume that the other has actually deployed MIRV. (Brooke, 165-73).

He then explained that MIRV as an "agency" would upset the "act" of national security between the United States and the Soviet Union (scene).

MIRV threatens to erode one of the basic barriers to nuclear war, namely, the utter certainty that neither the Soviets nor the Americans could carry out a nuclear attack without suffering devastating retaliation. (Brooke, 175-9)

As a result, a world (scene) without MIRV (agency) would be improved over one with the "agency."

When the risks are so grave, the disaster of war so total, we cannot afford to tempt fate. It may be possible to survive in a world populated by MIRVs, but it would be far preferable to live in a world free of them. (Brooke, 186-9)

Up to this point, Brooke's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agency." However, a fairly balanced view of the pentad was presented with emphasis on the terms "act," "purpose" and "agent." In the remaining portion of Brooke's speech, his strategy was altered to a form of "scene-agent" ratio.

Beginning with the "scene-agent" ratio, Brooke suggested that President Nixon has been hedging with negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on a test moratorium.

President Nixon indicated four months ago that the United States was prepared to proceed with these vital negotiations. But the clock has been ticking and the Soviets seem to have grown even more wary of these talks. (Brooke, 206-9)
Brooke then appealed for the commencement of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union because the "negotiations are nothing less than the security of mankind." (Brooke, 117-8) Through a description of "agent," Brooke related, however, that President Nixon realized the importance of negotiating with the Soviet Union, because the "act" of national security could be jeopardized if a balance of power (purpose) was not maintained between the two nations (scene).

He made clear his understanding that the United States and the Soviet Union should forego certain weapons not only because they are costly but because they jeopardize strategic stability. For example, the President rejected a heavy city-oriented AMB system and a massive expansion of our offensive forces precisely because they would threaten the Soviet Union's capacity to retaliate. Such deployments would force them to take countermeasures of a very dangerous character. (Brooke, 228-35)

Brooke's argument then has been that the MIRV system (agency) would upset the balance of power (purpose) between the two nations. Through a description of "scene," Brooke focused on the necessity of dealing with the Ill.

These are not easy or comfortable questions. An ideal world would not have to contend with them, for it would have no nuclear weapons, no intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, for that matter, no wars. But in the world as it is, those concerned about the well-being of life on this planet must come to grips with these problems in a realistic and constructive way. The salt talks offer a precious opportunity to do so. That opportunity must not be squandered. (Brooke, 252-60)

Brooke turned from the frame of Ill to the frame of Reformability by reminding students (agents) that the "scene" of modern life can be remedied if we are able to control ourselves.
To cope with the challenge of controlling nuclear weapons, we cannot afford to wallow in a mood of hopelessness and helplessness. We need clear heads to identify and isolate the special problems of nuclear arms control, and this mammoth task is not made easier by chaining ourselves in interesting but irrelevant speculations. (Brooke, 295-9)

Brooke went on to assert that peace (act) is possible as long as we remain rational. Through a description of "scene," he established that hope exists for the "act" of peace.

The record is by no means entirely bleak. For several years the United States had a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons and could have exploited to rule the world. Yet there was never any real likelihood that it would do so. Having the power to dominate, America made clear its goals of a just world order by declining to use power. (Brooke, 307-12)

Brooke then brought to light four accomplishments of the United States and the Soviet Union which seemed to have increased the chances for peace in the world (scene). First, the United States and the Soviet Union reached, through negotiation, an arms control agreement. "The nuclear test ban treaty, concluded in 1963, not only inhibited nuclear fall-out from the atmosphere; it also curtailed further development of even more refined and destructive devices." (Brooke, 324-7) Second, an agreement prevented the use of nuclear weapons in outer space. Thirdly, a "hot line" was established between the Soviet Union and the United States. "A 'hot line' has been installed to maintain emergency communications between Moscow and Washington, and to reduce the dangers of accidental conflict." (Brooke, 334-6) Finally, both nations have unilaterally set up "observation systems which provide vital infor-
mation about the number and kinds of weapons available to the two countries." (Brooke, 343-3) Thus, through these agencies, the United States and the Soviet Union (scene) have been able to maintain a balance of power (purpose).

In the frame of Remedy, Brooke concluded by stating that "agents" within the "scene" of the Soviet Union and United States would be in a more advantageous position if they achieved arms control.

It would be naive to conclude that these halting beginnings are a guarantee of major future successes at the conference table. But it would be equally naive and far more dangerous to the values we hold most dear if we fell prey to the misconception that attempts to achieve arms control are condemned to failure. Anxious concern is fully warranted; a pervasive sense of futility is not. (Brooke, 369-74)

In the frame of Cost, Brooke pointed out that arms control would not only increase the chances for national security, but it would allow us to re-allocate resources spent presently on the military to expenditures on programs for the well-being of humanity.

At present some $200 billion a year is spent on national security programs throughout the world. If we can liberate even a small fraction of that sum, by reducing the necessity for such expenditures, think what it would mean for the prosperity, for the health and for the sanity of the globe. Programs to speech development of the impoverished lands, to relieve the blight infecting urban communities in every country, to feed and clothe and heal those in need—even a diversion of but 10% of the world's military budgets would be a boon to mankind. (Brooke, 378-86)

**Major Strategies** - In Brooke's speech "National Security: Dollars, Demands, and Dilemmas, which constructed the liberal position, he employed the following strategies.
1. Brooke treated his subject in terms of four frames of the deliberative process. In his discussion of the four frames, he emphasized the frame of Ill more than the three frames of Reformability, Remedy, and Cost.

2. As an over-all strategy he featured the argument from "scene" and "agent," although terms "act," "purpose," and "agency" were well emphasized causing his speech to have a fairly balanced view of the pentad. The terms, however, were reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio. "Scene" became the dominant terms, while "agent" was reduced to a secondary strategy.

3. Brooke's appeal from context or conditions throughout his speech suggested an emphasis upon a "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all the elements grew out of the situation.

**Closing Strategies** - In his closing strategies, Brooke primarily related that it was possible to mutually limit arms between the Soviet Union and the United States. Through a description of "scene," he said that the United States has been finding ways to control defense spending.

A year ago those of us advocating adjustments in U.S. defense spending discussed the possibility of a $5 billion reduction on the budget; no one really expected that to occur. But in a period since January of that year, executive and legislative action has in fact trimmed defense spending by very nearly that amount. The budget for 1970 will be in the $77 billion range, as opposed to the more than $81 billion recommended by the previous administration.

(Brooke, 390-7)
Moving on, through a description of "agent," Brooke recounted an
anecdote which focused on the problems dealing with national security.

In wrestling with them (these problems) I
often recall the encounter a century ago
between the Archbishop of Canterbury and
Cardinal Hensley. Leaving a meeting at
which he had been with the Cardinal, the
Archbishop offered him a ride. 'After
all,' he said, 'we're both engaged in God's
work.' To which the Cardinal replied, 'Yes,
you in your way, and I in His.' (Brooke,
405-10)

Brooke concluded by suggesting that man (agent) has the rational
capacities which "can lead to more humane and progressive policies."
(Brooke, 413-3) Brooke's strategy of identification in his con-
clusion took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Agent"
became the dominant strategy, while "scene" was retained as a
secondary strategy. The terms "act" and "agency" were identifiable,
but were reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio.

Brooke's overall strategy to gain acceptance from his audience
was to identify with the "scene-agent" ratio. As a result the
terms "act," "purpose," and "agency" were reduced to the ratio of
"scene-agent." Hugh Duncan in Communication and Social Order de-
scribed the "scene-agent" ratio in the following terms:

Social conditions here are said to call for
actors in keeping with the scene, and the
scene in turn is depicted as in keeping with
the actor.8

Brooke has apparently seen the context or conditions of the times
as the principle which motivates men. The audience must decide,
as a result, of the strategy, if the conditions will force men to
become "prisoners of the situation" or if the conditions will
motivate men to action. The audience must also decide if Brooke is
capable of motivating men to action.
THE FAR EAST

The emphasis by the United States on nuclear retaliation as a chief response to Communist aggression anywhere in the world made it necessary to draw a defense perimeter around the aggressor. Because of the Communist victory in China, the United States constructed a defense perimeter around China which included Japan, the Philippines, the Ryukyu archipelago, Korea, and Formosa. By setting up this perimeter in the Far East, the United States became a strong power in the Pacific.

Edwin O. Reischauer in his article "Transpacific Relations" has described our major interests in the Pacific.

Americans have come to assume that, as a nation, we have immediate, vital interests in the transpacific area, and in the past three decades we have fought three major wars in defense of these interests as we saw them. It is accepted as a truism that we are a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power.9

However, our whole conceptual basis for working in the Pacific has been in serious doubt. We have probably adopted methods of control that we can not possibly maintain in the Pacific. The suppression of internal subversion has been uncontrollable on our part in Asia and our military bases have not been well supported by the governments of Asian countries such as Japan. Reischauer, thus, summed up our problems in Asia in the following paragraph:

The old imperialism is dead, and there is no room for new forms of imperialism. Asian countries cannot be controlled from abroad, even through Communism or any other ideology. The postwar history of Asia, particularly the determined stand of communist Asians--Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese--against any foreign domination, shows that nationalism runs much
deeper than political ideologies. There is no reason to believe that neo-imperialists, whether they be international communists or Chinese, can dominate other Asian nations any more successfully than we, the Japanese, or the French. 10

A PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE

On March 10, 1969, Senator Mike Mansfield delivered an address entitled "A Pacific Perspective." The speech was given in Ahearn Field House. Mansfield stated that in trying to build a worthwhile future in the Pacific, the United States had mistakenly cast itself in the role of an Asian power through the deployment of military forces. Instead, our future Pacific policy must be one of sensitivity and mutual respect for all concerned.

LIBERAL POSITION: Based on the definitions of the political positions, Mansfield's speech represented the liberal position. He accepted the liberal principle of equality among nations. This point became evident when Mansfield pointed out that our policies in the Pacific must be ones of mutual respect, rather than ones of domination.

For us there is no choice. We must make the effort to put our policies into that perspective. We will not only continue to live in the Pacific, we will also have to learn to live with the Pacific and the nations of its western reaches, basing our relations with its peoples--with the Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, Indonesians, and others--henceforth, on a profound respect for the equal dignity and worth of all. (Mansfield, 439-45)

His speech also tended to mark the necessity for change of policies with other countries in the Pacific.
Whatever else may prove true of our role in Asian affairs, I am persuaded that it will differ from the role we have played in the past. (Mansfield, 80-3)

By emphasizing the need for a change in policies in the Pacific and the need for equality among nations, Mansfield accepted the liberal position as his strategy of identification.

**Senator Mike Mansfield's Strategies** - In the deliberative process, he treated the frames of Ill and Reformability. His speech provided for a "geometric" substance and featured "scene" as a major strategy. These strategies will be described in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.

**Opening Strategies** - Senator Mansfield opened his address by affirming the point that the United States has been an "Atlantic-minded nation." He explained that most of our ancestry (agents) reached the United States (scene) by way of the Atlantic (agency). Through a description of "act" and "scene," Mansfield explained our close cultural-ties to the Atlantic.

Fashions, architecture, routines of living in this nation all show strong influences from the opposite side of the ocean. We are, in short, preponderantly 'Atlantic' by heredity, tradition, and proclivity. (Mansfield, 7-10)

However, Mansfield began to advance the view that unlike its Atlantic border, America has gone beyond its Pacific border and outposts to become an Asian power. Through a description of "scene," he described our relationship in the Pacific.

The Atlantic has been a kind of sea barrier for us in the sense that the Pacific has not been. In the Pacific, not only do five states
reach the ocean, but one of them - Hawaii - literally emerges from it. In addition, we have territories of various sizes, shapes, and legal relationships spread through its distant reaches. The Aleutian Islands which projects towards the Soviet Union and Japan are part of the State of Alaska. American Samoa, Guam, Wake, Johnston, Midway, and the Howland, Baker, and Farvis Islands are far-flung dependencies. The Canton and Enderbury Islands are an American-British condominium. (Mansfield, 12-21)

After explaining our situation in Asia (scene), Mansfield said that "we (agents) have cast ourselves in the role of an Asian power (scene)." (Mansfield, 42-3) In his opening remarks, he has recognized that we have a role to play in Asia and that this role will change in the future.

Whatever else may prove true of our future role in Asian affairs, I am persuaded that it will differ from the role we have played in the past. The postwar World War II era has ended, whether or not we recognize it. Whether or not we realize it, we are in a period of transition in our relations with the nations of the Western Pacific. (Mansfield, 80-6)

In his opening remarks, Senator Mansfield's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "act" and "agency" were identifiable, but we reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio. His level of symbolic action remained on an abstract plane as it did throughout the rest of his speech.

Deliberative Process - In treating Hultzen's deliberative process, Senator Mansfield covered the frames of Ill and Reformability, while excluding the frames of Remedy and Cost from his discussion. Mansfield's strategy was to take a particular ill and
demonstrate how the condition was reformable. The ills developed
in his speech dealt with our relations with Japan, China, the
Philippines and Indonesia.

Mansfield began the deliberative process with a discussion
of our relations with Japan. He stated that our relations with
Japan have been quiet until recent changes have brought us just
short of crisis. The difficulty lay within the terms of our treaty
(act) with Japan (scene) which terminates in 1970 (scene). Debate
between the two nations has focused on two military questions. Through
a description of "scene," Mansfield discussed the first problem.

The first is the question of American bases
in Japan--number, location and use. Among
the Japanese, there has been a growing
resentment of these bases. They are not
uniformly regarded as sources of benevolent
American protection. Often they are seen
as symbols of excessive foreign influence
as well as hazardous nuisances. (Mansfield,
95-100)

Again through a description of "scene," Mansfield described the
second problem in our relations with Japan.

The second specific issue around which the
debate has centered in Japan is the question
of the Ryukyu Islands (notably Okinawa),
which were an integral part of Japan before
World War II. At the end of the conflict,
the United States occupied these islands
and has since administered them through the
Defense Department. The Japanese peace
treaty of 1951, however, left dangling, so
to speak, certain matters pertaining to
their final disposition. (Mansfield, 106-13)

The major problem which Senator Mansfield posed was that if we
continued our occupation of Japan, then we must also continue
being the primary defender for Japan and the Western Pacific.
In the frame of Reformability, Mansfield used an argument by "agent" to support the contention that this ill is curable.

If the Japanese do not assume the military burdens which the U.S. would relinquish when the bases in Japan are reduced in number and those on Okinawa are restricted in use, some will ask: who will defend the Pacific? Presumably, it is fear of China which gives rise to this question. It does not follow, however, if the Chinese are bound on expansion, that they are capable of trans-Pacific aggression. Indeed, President Nixon has made it clear that he does not buy the contention of some defense advisors that a 'thin' anti-ballistics system is needed because of the Chinese threat. (Mansfield, 226-35)

Mansfield, at this point, was trying to point out that the United States has no choice as to whether we should be a Pacific power, however, he has suggested that we need not become an Asian power. In the remaining sections of his speech, Mansfield's "purpose" was to define an ill in terms of the situation (scene) and show how we as "agents" can guide policy (acts) in the Pacific.

After a discussion of Japan as his first ill, Mansfield embarked on his second ill, which dealt with the mainland of China. Mansfield pointed out that China was not of the Pacific but of Asia. However, its vastness projected to the Pacific (scene) and its influence has been felt around the world (scene). He indicated that China will not remain in political isolation forever and that Japan has been trying to bridge the gap with China by recognizing the mainland of China. Through a description of "agent," Mansfield saw no particular reason why we should not place restrictions on travel to China. This was presented in the frame of Reformability.
THIS BOOK WAS BOUND WITH TWO PAGES NUMBERED 147. THESE PAGES ARE THE SAME.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.
For our part, and for much the same reasons, I see no purpose in imposing restrictions on the travel of Americans to China. Nor do I see any reason not to place trade with China in non-strategic goods on the same basis as trade with the Soviet Union, Poland, and other Communist countries. (Mansfield, 296-300)

In concluding his second problem dealing with China, Mansfield presented the fundamental ill of U.S.-China relations which concerned the status of Taiwan. Through a description of "scene," Mansfield not only explained the problem, but also said that it was not reformable.

The fundamental problem of U.S.-Chinese relations is the status of Taiwan. It is a problem which is complex as it is crucial. It is not an either-or issue. It is not really soluble, in an enduring sense, in terms of two Chinas as has been suggested in recent years because there are not two Chinas and the attempt to delineate them is synthetic. The fact is that China is a part of Taiwan and Taiwan is a part of China. (Mansfield, 325-31)

The third problem the Senator posed as facing the United States in the Pacific was that of the Philippines and Indonesia. In regard to the Philippines, we believe that country has deteriorated, because the Filipinos (agents) have made some attempt to be in contact with the Communist countries. Through a description of "scene," Mansfield gave the following explanation.

Similarly in the field of foreign relations there is an inclination to expect that policy of the Philippines government, inevitably, will mirror our own attitudes. Therefore, such departures as the recent Philippine initiation of contact with Communist countries seems somehow inimical to continued warm U.S.-Philippines relations. (Mansfield, 353-8)
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However, through an argument by "agent," Mansfield, in the frame of Reformability, does not see any reason why our relationship with the Philippines should be sacrificed since we have relations with the Communist countries.

A half century of familiarity which was crowned with common sacrifices of World War II laid the basis not for a mutual contempt but for an enduring friendship between the Filipino and American people. It seems to me that we need to bestir ourselves now if this mutually valuable tie is not to be lost. (Mansfield, 360-4)

In the case of Indonesia, Mansfield simply stated that our relationship with them has deteriorated to "the point of outright mutual hostility." (Mansfield, 380) However, in the frame of Reformability, he pointed out that the "pendulum apparently is now swinging and hope exists once again for a more agreeable situation." (Mansfield, 381-2)

**Major Strategies** - In Senator Mansfield's speech, "A Pacific Perspective," which constructed the liberal position, he employed the following strategies:

1. Mansfield treated his subject in terms of two frames of the deliberative process. The two frames were Ill and Reformability. The frame of Ill was more fully emphasized than the frame of Reformability. The frames of Remedy and Cost were excluded from his discussion.

2. He featured, as an overall strategy, the argument from "scene" and "agent." "Scene" became the dominant strategy of identification, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.
4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal position by appealing for greater equality among nations in their relationships.

**Closing Strategies** - In his closing paragraphs, Mansfield indicated that he had described the problems (ills) which confront the United States in the Pacific. In further development of his conclusion, he stated that he has come to recognize the general absence of finality in the disposition of major international problems. Through the "scene-agent" ratio, he explained his recognition of this factor.

The most fundamental new factor in the situation, as I see it, is the appearance of at least one new generation since my generation began to grapple with the post-World War II Asian situation and, in particular and with a singular lack of effectiveness, with the monumental upheaval of the Chinese revolution. This new generation is a source of hope for the future. It is a hope which derives largely from the interest of young people now take in the affairs of the other side of the Pacific. That interest is more profound and far better informed than was the case two decades or more ago. (Mansfield, 412-20)

Mansfield went on to say that the policies (acts) of the Pacific area (scene) in the future (scene) will be left up to the young (agents). He also pointed out that the policies must involve cooperation and mutual respect among all involved in the situation. In other words, the "agents" must cooperate within the context of the "scene." As a result, Senator Mansfield's conclusion took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.
Mansfield's overall strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." The "scene-agent" ratio became his strategy to gain acceptance of his speech from his audience. High Duncan in Communication and Social Order described the "scene-agent" ratio in the following terms:

Social conditions here are said to call for actors in keeping with the scene, and the scene, in turn, is depicted as in keeping with the actor.]

Mansfield has apparently seen the context or conditions of the time in the Pacific area as a place which should motivate men. The audience must decide, as a result of this strategy, if the conditions will force men to become "prisoners of the situation" or if the conditions will motivate men to action. The audience must also decide if Mansfield is capable of motivating men to action.

THE VIETNAM WAR

The Vietnam war was beyond doubt the most unpopular foreign conflict in American history. But whatever the nation's preferences, United States policy makers pursued one clear objective--the protection of the Saigon regime against the Communist-led detractors. The sixties then became a time when American forces became more involved in Southeast Asia.

Prior to 1964, the extent of American military forces in South Vietnam was in the form of military advisers. They directed Vietnamese defense of remote villages and military outposts. By 1964 the policy of limited involvement was abandoned and the Americans increasingly assumed the burden of struggle against the Viet Cong. Thomas A. Bailey in A Diplomatic History of the American People has explained the reason for extending American responsibility in Viet Nam.
The successive regimes in Saigon that followed the murder of President Diem, in November 1963, proved to be weak, inefficient, corruption-riddled, and beset by factions (Buddhists versus Catholics). The Viet Cong rebels, whose political aim was the National Liberation Front, were gaining strength. Generously supplied with additional arms from North Vietnam, China, and Russia, they were clearly winning the upper hand and endangering the elaborate bases being constructed by the Americans.

Justification for more vigorous action came on February 7, 1965, when a Viet Cong force staged a night raid on the American barracks at Pleiku, South Viet Nam, killing eight men and wounding over 100, while destroying several aircraft. In retaliation, President Johnson ordered a number of increasingly destructive bombing raids on military targets in North Viet Nam. Gradually stepped up, these forays caused heavy incidental damage to non-military structures and considerable loss of civilian life, including residents of the capital, Hanoi.12

In an effort to counterbalance the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and to bolster up the fighting force of the South Vietnamese, the United States increased its fighting forces in the Vietnam area to 381,000 by the end of 1966 and to 525,000 by the spring of 1968.

As the war steadily escalated, Americans became more critical of the war effort. At one extreme were the "doves" who charged that American involvement in Viet Nam was immoral and unjustified, according to Bailey.

The doves charged that the Viet Nam was illegal because Congress, required by the Constitution, had never formally declared it. It was immoral because it was a no-front, no-rear conflict which involved the indiscriminate killing of civilians, friendly or otherwise, with murderous new weapons, including 'improved' napalm. It has caused America to betray her own revolutionary traditions because she had become the aggressor in a civil war between a people who spoke the same language and who resented the interference of a foreign nation.13
At the other extreme were the "hawks" who demanded an even greater military effort, according to Bailey.

The hawks stated their rebuttal with vigor. The President could constitutionally send troops wherever he chose, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution provided clinching legal authority. If the members of Congress did not like it, they could repeal it and withdraw financial support from the boys in the jungles (something that would have been political suicide). The war was no more immoral than any other: in this jumbled-up type of fighting, civilians were found to be hurt. The onus of immorality was on the Viet Cong aggressors, who butchered and beheaded in barbaric fashion.14

As the tide of protest against the war rose, President Johnson in late 1968 unconditionally ended the bombing of all North Vietnam above the Seventeenth Parallel. Peace talks then began between the United States and North Vietnam in Paris. Fighting, however, continued in the longest war in which the United States has engaged thus far.

CONFLICT IN VIETNAM AND AT HOME

On March 18, 1968, the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy delivered an address entitled "Conflict in Vietnam and at Home." In his speech, Senator Kennedy warned against greater troop commitments in Vietnam and said that America was only losing prestige by prolonging the struggle. He called for immediate efforts to end the war in Vietnam through de-escalation of American troops and negotiation with the Viet Cong.

LIBERAL POSITION: Based on the definitions of the political positions, Kennedy's speech represented the liberal position. Senator Kennedy rejected the general drift of policy in Vietnam and advocated a change in policy.
But I also say that the only course of action that we take in Southeast Asia, that we can take in Vietnam, is not necessarily, and in my judgement, is not the action that we are taking at the moment under the leadership of President Johnson. (Kennedy, 123-6)

Kennedy also accepted the liberal concept of liberty, which has stressed that men have been endowed with certain natural rights. This point became evident when he pointed out that the South Vietnamese do not want to be dominated by an outside force.

I don't believe that the people of South Vietnam want domination and control by the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front or the Communists of North Vietnam, but, neither do I believe, that they want to be dominated by the United States of America or by any foreign power. What we must ask ourselves is whether we have the right to bring so much destruction to another land, without clear and convincing evidence that this is what its people want. (Kennedy, 380-6)

Kennedy furthermore accepted the liberal position of abhorring the use of violence or coercion of any kind. This became apparent when he deplored the use of violence by people on both sides of the problem.

I am concerned that at the end of it all there will be only more Americans killed, more treasure spent, and because of the bitterness, and because of the war, more hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese slaughtered; so that they may say; as Tacitus said to Rome: 'They made a desert, and they called it peace.' (Kennedy, 34-40)

Finally, Kennedy committed himself to the liberal position by showing a marked preference for negotiating with the Communists. This point was brought out in his program for withdrawing from Vietnam.
We can - as I have urged for two years, but as we have never done - negotiate with the National Liberation Front. We can - as we have never done - assure the Front a genuine place in the political life of South Vietnam. (Kennedy, 484-5)

Thus, Kennedy accepted the liberal position by emphasizing a change in policy in Vietnam, the natural rights of man, his abhorrence of violence and negotiation with the Communists.

Robert Kennedy's Strategies - In former Senator Kennedy's address, he treated the deliberative frames of Ill, Reformability, Remedy and Cost with the frame of Ill being more fully developed than the other frames. His speech provided a "geometric" substance and featured "scene" as the primary strategy. These strategies will be more fully described in the following steps: (1) opening strategies, (2) four frames in the deliberative process, (3) major strategies and (4) closing strategies.

Opening Strategies - After a conventional introduction Kennedy opened his speech through a description of "scene" and "agent."

He pointed out that 1968 was a presidential election year and he implied that new policies must be fashioned for the future.

For this is a year of choice - a year when we choose not simply who will lead us, but where we wish to be led; the country we want for ourselves - any kind that we want for our children. If in this year of choice we fashion new policies out of old illusions, we insure for ourselves nothing but a crisis for the future - and we bequeath to our children the bitter harvest of those crises. (Kennedy, 74-80)

Kennedy moved on to name three causes of unrest in America today. Instead of unifying "scene" and "agent," Kennedy's strategy took the form of unifying "scene" and "act." "Agent" was identifiable, but it was reduced to the "scene-act" ratio.
There are many causes. Some are in the failed promise of America itself: in the children that I have seen, starving in Mississippi; idling their lives away in the ghetto; committing suicide in the despair on our Indian reservations; or watching their proud fathers sit without work in the ravaged lands of Eastern Kentucky. Another cause of our inaction in the face of danger. We seem equally unable to control the violent disorder within our cities - or the pollution and the destruction of the country, of the water and land that we use and that our children must inherit. And a third great cause of discontent is the course that we are following in Southeast Asia in Vietnam: in a war that has divided Americans as they have not been divided since your state was called 'bloody Kansas.' (Kennedy, 91-103)

Kennedy chose as the subject of his speech the war in Vietnam. He stated that President Johnson's present course of action in Vietnam was unacceptable to him. In his opening remarks, Kennedy's overall strategy of identification took the form of unifying "scene" and "agent." "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. His symbolic action remained on a personal level, as it did throughout the rest of the speech.

**Deliberative Process** - In handling Hultzen's deliberative frames, Kennedy treated them in the systematic manner of Ill, Reformability, Remedy, and Cost. The frame of Ill was presented in terms of four "facts" covering the present situation (scene) in Vietnam and was more fully developed than the other frames. These strategies will be more fully elaborated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Kennedy began the deliberative process by admitting his involvement "in many of the early decisions in Vietnam, decisions which helped set us on our present path." (Kennedy, 145-6) However,
he conceded that he had been in error and that had the claims of the present administration (Johnson's) by asserting that troop escalations in Vietnam "have brought us no closer to success than we were before." (Kennedy, 175) In the preliminary section in the frame of Ill, Kennedy concentrated on a "scene-agent" ratio as his strategy of identification. "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.

Next, in the frame of Ill, Kennedy presented four problems concerning the "scene" in Vietnam. Each problem was developed in terms of a series of "facts" concerning the present "scene" in Vietnam. The four problems were our lack of control over the rural population, corruption in the Saigon government, the destruction of the nation of South Vietnam for our victory, and our loss of prestige in the international community.

First, Kennedy stated that the pacification of the rural populace was not working in South Vietnam. He reported that the South Vietnamese troops (agents) had a tendency to pull into their compounds at night without patrolling the rural areas (scene). This allowed the Viet Cong to attack the villages and, as a result, the pacification program was reduced in its effectiveness. Kennedy also claimed that this was the reason why American combat deaths were greater than those of the South Vietnamese.

Our combat deaths over the period of the last two weeks were over 1,000. The South Vietnamese, whose land it is, whose country it is, whose conflict it is, are less than half that much. I think that is an indication of the direction we are moving. That this has become an American war. That this is no longer the war of the South Vietnamese. (Kennedy, 204-9)
Kennedy went on to say that the pacification program (agency) had as its "purpose" the "winning" of the people (agents) to the government in South Vietnam (scene). However, he said that the situation (scene) has deteriorated to the point "that we cannot reassert control over those villages now in enemy hands without repeating the whole bloody process of destruction which has ravaged the countryside of South Vietnam throughout the last three years." (Kennedy, 234-7)

Kennedy's second problem dealt with the corruption in the Saigon government. He had heard from "agents" in our Administration that the Saigon government was working satisfactorily and that the government was "moving, they say, with 'great competence' . . . ." However, through a description of "scene," Kennedy refuted the position of the Administration.

I was in the Executive Branch of the government from 1961 to 1964. In all those years, we heard the same glowing promises about the South Vietnamese government: corruption would soon be eliminated, land reform would soon come, programs were being infused, for the first time, with new energy. But those statements, those claims, were not the facts. They were not the facts then, and when they are stated today, they are not the facts now. (Kennedy, 264-70)

Through a description of "act" and "agent" Kennedy related what he believed to be the "facts" concerning the Saigon government.

The facts are that there is still no total mobilization: no price or wage controls, no rationing, no overtime work. The facts are, as a Committee of the House of Representatives has told us, that land reform is moving backwards, with the government forces helping landlords to collect exorbitant back rent from the peasants, when they expect to fight this war. The facts - again the facts - are that eighteen-
year-old South Vietnamese are still not being drafted; though now, as many times in the past, we have been assured that that will soon happen. The facts are that thousands of young South Vietnamese buy their deferments from military service while American Marines die today at Khe Sahn. (Kennedy, 271-81)

From testimony supplied by Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, Kennedy documented the existence of corruption in the Saigon government. Food and contraband were being smuggled by high government officials (agents). "A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations has reported that the Vietnamese Collector of Customs had engaged in smuggling gold and opium - and that he was protected by figures even higher in the government." (Kennedy, 2966-99) Kennedy concluded that the corruption in the Saigon government had caused a significant prolongation of the war, continued American casualties, and alienation of the American people from the people of South Vietnam. Kennedy's strategy of identification took the form of unifying "agent" and "scene." "Scene" (South Vietnam) became the dominant strategy, while "agent" (South Vietnamese, American troops, and government officials) was retained as a secondary strategy.

The third Ill involved the cost of destruction for the nation of South Vietnam. "Even before this winter, Vietnam (scene) and its people (agent) were disintegrating under the blows of war." (Kennedy, 323-4) He stated that in order for us to recapture the cities of Hue and Ben Tre, we had to destroy them by air and artillery attacks. Kennedy then asked the audience if we had the "right" to destroy these towns.
Can we ordain to ourselves - can we ordain to ourselves - the awful majesty of God to decide what cities and what villages are to be destroyed, who will live and who will die and who will join refugees wandering in the desert of our own creation. If it is true that we have made a commitment to the South Vietnamese, we must ask - are they being consulted in Hue, Ben Tre, or in the villages from which the three million refugees have fled? (Kennedy, 354-361)

In this particular frame of Ill, Kennedy's strategy of identification again took the form of unifying "agent" and "scene." However, "agent" became the dominant strategy, while "scene" was retained as a secondary strategy.

The last Ill which Kennedy considered dealt with our weakened world position because of our engagement in Vietnam.

In purely military terms, the war has stripped us of our graduate - response capability that we have labored so hard to build over the period of the last seven years beginning in 1961. Surely the North Koreans were emboldened to seize the Pueblo because they knew that the United States simply cannot afford to fight another Asian war while we are so tied down in Vietnam. (Kennedy, 396-402)

Kennedy also pointed out that our allies have pulled "back to their own shores, leaving us alone to police all of Asia . . . ." (Kennedy, 7-8) This again has weakened our position in Asia (scene). Meanwhile, Kennedy indicated that the Red Chinese were hoping for a protracted war in Southeast Asia, which would further weaken our world position.

A most interesting and, in my judgement, significant response in view of the efforts and struggles that we are conducting in Southeast Asia. There they are - the Chinese, hoping that it will - the war in South Vietnam will further tie us down and perhaps in a protracted war in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand; confident, as it is reported from Hong Kong, that the war in Vietnam 'will increasingly'
and I quote, 'bog down the United States, sap its resources, discredit its power pretensions, alienate its allies and fray its ties with the Soviet Union, and at the same time, aggravating dissensions among Americans at home. (Kennedy, 415-25)

In the last frame of Ill, Kennedy unified "scene" and "agent" as his strategy of identification. "Scene" became the dominant strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.

Kennedy turned to the frame of Reformability by pointing out that our policy in Vietnam has been "bankrupt" from the start. He then asserted to the audience that the war can end in Vietnam.

It must be ended, and, in my judgement, it can be ended, in a peace of brave men who have fought each other with a terrible fury, each believing that he and he alone was in the right. We have prayed to different gods, and the prayers of neither have been answered fully. Now, while there is still time for some of them to be partially answered, now is the time to stop. (Kennedy, 475-81)

The frame of Reformability was not as fully emphasized as the frame of Ill. In his development of the frame of Reformability, the "scene-agent" ratio became the strategy of identification.

In the frame of Remedy, Kennedy outlined a four-step program for withdrawal from Vietnam. In the case of each of his solutions, Kennedy did not devote a great deal of time in developing the remedies in detail. As a result, the frame of Ill was more fully emphasized than the frame of Remedy. First, he proposed that we negotiate with the National Liberation Front. He then pointed out that we ought to ensure a meaningful place for the National Liberation Front in the political life of South Vietnam. Third, he stated that we must begin to desacate the war. And finally, he insisted that the
government of South Vietnam institute reform by broadening its base for the people of South Vietnam. Each of his solutions was stated as if it would come about through "agents" in either "scene" of South Vietnam or the United States.

In the frame of Cost, Senator Kennedy simply maintained that his policy was more advantageous than the policy pursued by the Johnson administration.

This program would be far more effective than the present course of this Administration - whose only response to failure is to repeat it on a larger scale. This program, with its more limited costs, would indeed be far more likely to accomplish our time objectives. (Kennedy, 504-7)

The frame of Cost was, then, less well developed than the frames of Ill and Remedy.

**Major Strategies** - In Kennedy's speech "Conflict in Vietnam and at Home," which constructed the liberal position, he employed the following rhetorical strategies:

1. Kennedy treated the entire deliberative process of Ill, Reformability, Remedy and Cost. The frame of Ill was more fully developed than the other frames.

2. He featured the argument from "scene" and "agent" in his speech. The terms "agency," "act" and "purpose" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio. "Scene" became the dominant term, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy.

3. Kennedy's appeal from context or conditions throughout his speech suggested an emphasis upon a "geometric" substance. This strategy made his speech seem as if all of the elements of a situation grew out of the environment.
4. He indicated an acceptance of the liberal strategy and a rejection of the conservative position by advocating a change in present policy, by rejecting violence as a means of fulfilling a goal, and by stressing the concept of liberty.

**Closing Strategies** – Kennedy closed by appealing to his audience (agents) to deal with the present situation (scene). He urged the audience to organize, to collect the facts, and to work for new policies.

I ask you, as tens of thousands of young men and women are doing all over this land, to organize yourselves and then go forth and work for new policies—not just in Southeast Asia, but here at home as well. In the state of Kansas, across the United States, in our cities, in our rural areas, in our towns; so that we have a new birth for this country. (Kennedy, 527-532)

He widened the scope of his speech to include not only the problem of Vietnam, but problems in this country. In the closing strategies, Kennedy employed the "scene-agent" ratio as his strategy of identification. "Scene" was the primary strategy, while "agent" was retained as a secondary strategy. The terms "act," "agency," and "purpose" were identifiable, but were reduced to the "scene-agent" ratio.

Kennedy's overall strategy to gain acceptance from his audience was to identify with the "scene-agent" ratio. As a result, the terms "act," "agency" and "purpose" were reduced to the ratio of "scene-agent." Hugh Duncan in *Communication and Social Order* described the "scene-agent" ratio in the following terms:

Social conditions here are said to call for actors in keeping with the scene, and the scene, in turn, is depicted as keeping with the actor.
Kennedy has apparently seen the context of the times as the principle which motivates men. The audience must decide, as a result of this strategy, whether the conditions will motivate men to action concerning policy in Vietnam or whether it will force men to become "prisoners of the situation." The audience must also decide whether Kennedy is capable of motivating men to action.
FOOTNOTES


6 Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.


8 Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.


11 Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.


13 Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 909.

14 Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 910.

15 Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 435.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To Kenneth Burke, communication is considered to be a purposeful act which exists within a human social setting and is largely shaped by that context. In a communication situation, we provide responses that are a direct consequence of symbols supplied by others. Most of the action that one takes in a social situation is controlled and directed by communication. The uses of the "right" verbal strategies are powerful agents of effective change in social interaction.

The verbal strategies that we emit in a communication situation are necessarily select in that our world view contains a specific scope and circumference. When we address ourselves to a specific topic, we fashion terms that enable us to talk about an object. However, the very use of those terms contains a certain perspective and size up our orientations, perceptions, attitudes, and motivations. Thus, a speaker emits a strategy in his verbalizations which encompasses his needs. To uncover how these symbols operate, according to Burke, one must look at them as "dramatistic" in nature.

The present study assessed the nature of appeals addressed before the Landon Lecture Series by politicians on matters of public policy. In each case, a speaker reacted symbolically to his environment by emitting "verbal strategies" which directly reflected his attitudes. The speakers attempted through public communication to identify with the audience by requesting them to accept or reject a particular course of action. From this information, the five terms which comprise Burke's dramatic forms could be arranged in the following manner:
However, this presentation of Burke's terms does not reveal motivational influences. Burke has derived a number of rhetorical tools by which "dramatism" may be analyzed. The central element involved in his concept of rhetoric is identification. Identification refers to the way in which men "act-together" or share common ideas, sensations, orientations, images, and attitudes.

In this thesis, a speaker's strategy of identification was determined through a description of his political classification, his emphasis on a particular deliberative frame, his substance, his major strategy, and his principal ratio.

First, in the Landon Lecture Series (see figure one in the back), more politicians identified with the liberal position than the conservative one. Considered domestically, there was more of a tendency to accept the attempt on the part of the national government to enter and rescue the community from its social ills rather than to solicit people outside of national public office to work on solutions to society's problems. As a result, more politicians in the series would prefer to see social, political and economic programs handled on a national scale rather than at the state or local level. A "big," centralized government has been seen to be more desirable for meeting community needs rather than programs
devised and administered on a lower level. The dominance of this position can be, in part, explained by the emergence of the belief by liberals that greater equality for all citizens can be effectuated through the "agency" of the national government. When the liberal position was considered on an international scale, there was a tendency on the part of the speakers to advocate negotiation with the Communist countries rather than combating communism through the use of military force. As a result, the speakers would rather support the use of "peaceful pressure" with the Communist countries in order to achieve our goals than favor a "tough line" against communism. Also, there was a tendency among the speakers to subordinate America's national interest in favor of more equality among the nations in the world. Their interest has tended to focus on humanity at large rather than on one's national interest.

The next evaluation of the speeches concerned the deliberative frame that was emphasized. Hultzen's "stock issue" approach to deliberative rhetoric provided the structure for analysis. In the Landon Lecture Series (see figure one), the speakers were fairly well split as far as emphasizing either Ill or Remedy. However, out of the nine speeches that covered the frame of Remedy (i.e. Humphrey, Rockefeller, Hickel, Kennedy, Brooke, Landon, Romney, Reagan, and Nixon), only the speeches of Hickel, Kennedy, and Brooke proceeded to discuss the frame of Cost. The question of the difficulty of putting a reform into effect arises when the frame of Cost is not taken under consideration. Without the frame of Cost being exposed in a speech that contains a Remedy, there is some trouble (obstacle) in recognizing the expediency of a particular course of action.
Another evaluation in the series concerned the substance of the speeches. The concept of substance establishes the context of the speech and is related to the speaker's attitudes and his strategies. Nine of the eleven speakers (see figure one in the back) employed a "geometric" substance, while Nixon and Reagan made use of a "familial" substance. The "geometric" substance places an object in its location as "existing both in itself and as a part of the background." Most speakers discussed an issue in terms of "what it is" (geometric) rather than in terms of "where it is from" (familial). Issues were explained in a time and place order in such a way that sequence of events led to some destined conclusion. That is, there was more of a tendency to identify with events in time and place, rather than with groups or classes of people, which would relate to a "familial" substance.

In the Landon Lecture Series, each speech was evaluated in terms of its dominant strategy or major term used in the pentad. Nine out of the eleven speakers (refer to figure one) emphasized the term "scene" as a dominant strategy. A reduction of scope to "scene" has meant that most of the speakers have stressed the background against which the "act" was committed. The action of the speeches was defined in terms of time and place or that which is extrinsic to man. Such terms referring to regions, physical conditions, areas, climatical conditions, periods of time, ranges of time, and physical surroundings appeared in the speeches. Thus, issues, in part, became explainable in terms of matter in motion. And, as a result, the dominant appeal in the speeches and the locus of the speaker's motives depended upon external conditions.
The dominance of this appeal can be partly explained by our pseudo-scientific emphasis on the reliability of knowledge taken through the senses. That is, the only trustworthy method for discovering something is through observation or sensory experience. Since the "scene" comprises external conditions which can be taken through the senses, then many speakers would tend to favor appeals which are grounded in the physical environment or material elements. As a result, those appeals which are based upon how a person should govern himself in a society (agent) or upon ideals, goals, and aims (purpose) may seem less meaningful than the appeal from the standpoint of "scene."

However, Burke has stated that these terms usually do not stand alone in an analysis of motives. He has pointed out that there may be a stress on various combinations of two or more elements. Within the Landon Lecture Series (see figure one in the back), the dominant ratio has been the "scene-agent" combination. Even in the speeches of Warren (scene-act), Landon (scene-act), and Romney (scene-agency), the term "agent" held a prominent position. Burke defined the "scene-agent" ratio as "the synecdochic relation . . . between person and place . . ."¹ Duncan further described the ratio in the following manner:

Social conditions here are said to call for actors in keeping with the scene, and the scene in turn, is depicted as in keeping with the actor.²

Most of the speakers developed arguments in which they discussed domestic and international situations faced by Americans. This raises the question of whether one term provided the context for
the other. In the evaluation of the speech's major strategy, the "scene" emerged as the dominant term. As a result, the "agents" as participants in a "scene" became confined to the situation. That is, the characteristics that suit "agents" to their surroundings were not the product of "purpose" and design. Most speakers abandoned teleological factors of thinking in favor of motivations derived from a "scenic" source or an "extrinsic" agency. In most cases, this tended to rule out a strong internal principle of motivation which would be covered by the term "agent." In the "scene-agent" ratio, Burke has improvised a solution when the nature of the language contains an emphasis on "scene" by reducing the term "agent" to "agent-minus." This point was revealed in Burke's discussion of Darwin's biology in A Grammar of Motives.

His biology, in brief, invited him to concern himself with families. Indeed, his concern even has an 'Adamic' pattern, as when he finds cause to assume 'that the innumerable species, genera and families, with which this world is peopled, are all descended, each within its own class or group, from common parents.' If these families were all families of people, they would be purely and simply agents. A biologist's families, however, are families of organisms—and organisms might be called a kind of 'agent-minus.' They might be classed under the term agent to the extent that their behavior has to be accounted for, at least in part, by some purely internal principle of motivation (even though it be but a 'tendency to ordinary variability,' or a mere power of self-movement on the part of animals). Our Grammar requires this distinction between a motive in some measure intrinsic to living things and the purely scenic explanation for the motions of a bubble rising to the surface. Yet such organisms reflect the same reduction of circumference. In fact, as per the scene-agent ratio, the turn from agent to organism corresponds to the turn from 'Creation' to 'Evolution.'
Most speakers spoke of "agents" particularly in the plural sense of Americans, Chinese, Japanese, etc., in terms of people caught up or conditioned by a "scene" rather than in terms of how "agents" should govern themselves. For instance, most speakers would tend to develop the argument that the poor (agents) are improverished because of the situation or environment in which they live, rather than due to their own action or inaction. However, in some cases such as in Brooke's, Landon's, or Kennedy's speech when they discussed the policies of President Nixon or Johnson, the term "agent," used in a singular sense, began to take on the characteristics of an actor committing an "act" within a "scene." That is, the causes or motives of their policy were due to their own actions.

Perhaps more important than the frequent use of the "scene-agent" ratio was the lack of a clearly defined statement of "purpose" in most of the speeches. Sometimes the term was identifiable, but usually only in a vague or ambiguous sense. "Purpose" may be described as the reason for which a thing is done. Without the clear featuring of the term, the speeches often lacked the element of unity. For instance, in Humphrey's speech, he briefly underscored four ills which have confronted American society. During the address, the term "purpose" was never very clearly delineated. As a result, his speech not only lacked depth and scope, but continuity as well, for there was no particular end or aim to be obtained by remedying these problems. Without a well-rounded statement of "purpose," the speeches tended to be poorly structured which weakened or disorganized the thought. The selection of materials, then, was vague in the way of a communicative end in view.
Although Nixon and Reagan emphasized "purpose," their speeches should not be considered model ones because they lacked a well developed consideration of means (Remedy) for further action. This actually becomes an extension of the meaning of "purpose," for if we assume that speeches must have an end or aim, then, there must be some statement of means for obtaining it. For, as Duncan has pointed out, pasts (Ills) are called up only to "press on into a future" (Remedy) with ends or "purposes" in mind. Thus, in the pattern of a speech the "purpose" and the means (agency) should emerge. As revealed from this analysis, the major failure of the speeches was a deficient "purpose" statement which caused an ineffective linkeage of "purpose" and means.
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4Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 434.
Address by Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minnesota)*

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

January 9, 1970

HOW WE CAN MAKE OUR GOVERNMENT WORK

Thank you very much Governor Docking, Governor Landon, President McCain, Robert Wilson, Professor Hajda, and students and faculty of Kansas State University and friends and neighbors. The first thing, that I would like to thank you for, is the sign which is behind me up there on the back gave me new feeling and vitality "Every Man A Wildcat!" At my age you appreciate this and I want you to know how much I do appreciate it. Secondly, I'd like to thank President McCain for his hospitality for the graciousness of Mrs. McCain. I've always wanted to stay in the President's house and it was so nice to be able to spend just one night there. President McCain you have done much better by me than President Nixon and I hope he gets the hint. I also would like to suggest that there has been a slight thing that has been overlooked and I don't want to complain, but I had heard that Kansas State University was a great educational, cultural center and I am terribly sorry that I haven't had the opportunity to visit the very center of your culture, Aggieville. I changed my uniform this morning. You know I found my timing off a little. I arrived in Kansas City last evening before I came to Manhattan and I was glad to see police with state troopers because I am a Viking fan and they take little exception to my exuberance over Purple People Eaters. But I am glad I came to the campus of the Purple People Eaters and I put on my wide tie this morning just for that purpose. I just hope that your Vikings are more successful in their Super Bowl than I was at mine in 1968. Governor Landon, I want a word with you because for a card-carrying full-time Democrat who participates on the Landon Lecture Series is rather ironical in one sense and yet it is a testimony to our country and what it stands for. I think you'd be interested to know a little story from our family. Like most young men on occasion you get a little sassy with your parents and my father always used to insist that his sons respect their mother. We were brought up that way and we were told on occasion if we didn't like it around home there was lots of space outside. But in 1936 I said to my father, "Dad, do you realize that your mother voted the Republican ticket"--because she did. He said, "Well, how do you know that?" I said, "I just happen to know. In fact, she told me." He said, "I want to tell you

*Taken from tape furnished by K.S.A.C.
something about your mother, son. She's a wonderful wife, she's a
wonderful mother and she is a wonderful woman and she is my sweet-
heart, but politically she is unreliable." She was definitely. But
after all we lived in South Dakota and it was almost immoral and illegal
to vote Democratic up there. I guess that is where I got my bad habits
early in life.

I want to talk today about our social order, our government, this
country, its role in the world. I've said that the topic would be "How
We Can Make Our Government Work"—or perhaps I should say work better.
I want to talk to you about the federal structure of our government. I
realize this isn't the most soul-gripping topic. It isn't politically
sexy, but it is terribly important.

Let us take a look at the 60's. I don't want to spend too much
time on them. I'm glad they are gone. That decade wasn't exactly the
best decade in many ways—but let's take a quick look and then we will
look ahead to the 1970's. The 1960's could well be described as the
decade of dissent and discovery...the decade of war and worry. It was
a period in history, in this dynamic nation of ours, in which we—in a
sense—discovered ourselves.

Everybody is trying to do that these days. And when you try to
discover yourself—your individual identity or your national identity—you
have to be prepared to discover some things you may not like.

The 1960's found us with unprecedented economic prosperity—and yet
with a kind of poverty of spiritual resources—with no real satisfaction
out of our affluence, even though that's what most of the people of my
generation thought was most important.

We were the sons and daughters of the depression, and to us economic
security was vital. We learned the hard way. There were no jobs; the
nation was prostrate. The leaders that were in power—in business, in
government, in labor, in every institution in our country at the beginning
of the 1960's with few exceptions—were men and women who had suffered
the anguish and the pain and the disaster of war—world war--, of depression—
worldwide depression.

Therefore, our major objectives were to see, number one, that never
again would a depression level this nation and this world. And we spent our
time trying to create the economic mechanism that would assure the production
of goods and services to guarantee economic health for the nation.

Perhaps we forgot that man does not live by bread alone.

But we did learn—also learned the hard way—that isolated as a
nation, there was no security. We learned it from Hitler and Tojo;
we learned it from the tragedy of World War II. We learned that iso-
lolation was dangerous and that aggression likewise was dangerous, and
therefore we bound together in many pacts and alliances called collec-
tive security.
I think maybe we failed to recognize that you can overdo that as well.

So the 1960's could be described as a time when we had too much confidence in our wealth, too much confidence in our power—thinking that wealth was goods and services and that power was military might and alliances. There was far too little emphasis, I suppose on real power, namely, reason and understanding, knowledge directed to action, a knowledge with commitment.

Let me say as I speak to you that knowledge without commitment may be wasteful, but commitment without knowledge is dangerous. So we were treading on wasteful and dangerous ground.

We had a little too much confidence in our science and technology. We were overwhelmed—awed—by computers, by electronics, by the Space Age—thinking that these things would somehow or other bring us the millennium. We failed to recognize that science must be a tool for man; that it must be his servant, not his master.

The 1960's taught us that we should make science and technology our servants and this requires that we have political conviction, political decision, and social decision.

What I am saying is that we have created the material means to do the great things that need to be done. The question is whether we, as individuals, have the willingness to do what the founders of this republic said we would have to do if we wanted life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; namely, to pledge our lives, our fourtunes, and our sacred honor to the achievement of these goals.

In the 1960's a great deal of self-analysis took place. For the first time, we began to appreciate the ugliness, the sin, the immorality, and the indecency of racism—and may I say to this campus that this is still a central problem in our society. But at least we have come to grips with it, at least we have faced it.

The first sign of health is recognizing your sickness. A strong nation and a great people do not run away from their problems, they confront them head on—and recognize that they can be solved.

We came face to face with the fact of hunger in our midst at a time of unbelievable production of foodstuffs. We came face to face with the fact of poverty in the richest nation on the face of the earth. I am not talking about people just being poor. To be poor is one thing; to be the victim of poverty is an entirely different thing.

People who are poor can have their troubles remedied by money; but the victims of poverty have suffered defeat and failure. They are hopeless and helpless. They have lost motivation and self-respect, and they are sick in a very serious and fundamental way—and it takes more than just income or income maintenance to bring them out of that sickness.
We are coming to grips for the first time with the hidden poor and with the victims of poverty.

And we found in the 1960's that we were a nation of cities. Demographers tell us that by the year 2,000, ninety percent of our people will live in cities of over 200,000 people each. As a matter of fact, seventy-five percent of our people already live in such cities. And all at once, the problems of noise, of congestion, of slums, of overlapping governmental jurisdiction, of the inadequacy of social services and resources was right on our doorstep.

And we began also to realize that our environment, our physical environment, was being destroyed. In fact, that environment was becoming more dangerous to our well-being than the weapons of our military arsenals. The young men and women of today understand that--at least they are beginning to understand it. Pollution--the polluters and pollution--came into focus.

And I believe, too, that out of the agony of a tragic and costly, painful, festering war we have begun to understand our role in the world--that we cannot be the world's policeman. We must act as a partner and as a scholar, as a doctor and a healer and a technician. The role I hope we will play is that of a good neighbor. We cannot decree that America must have its way and that other people must do our bidding.

I think one of the greatest statements made in the sixties was made by the late President Kennedy when he said that our purpose is to help make the world safe for diversity--for the right to be different--and he coupled that with the right to be different in peace, without violence.

There is no guarantee, you know, that democracy, this fragile strategy of human relations, can endure. It takes generations to understand it. That is why so many of the so-called democratic systems last such a short time. Because we have been led to believe, that all we need to do is legislate it, write, ordain it, and it happens.

We're privileged as a people to have grown in the traditions of Anglo-Saxon law. We are privileged as a people to have had forebears who were unique and scholarly students of social structure. They were the scholars of Locke, and they were the scholars of Rousseau. They were the scholars of the Greeks and the Romans and the great philosophers of the Middle Ages.

And at the time that our Constitution was written, it was written for all generations yet to come--and the key to the federal system in this country is that our Constitution is written in the present tense.

The preamble of the Constitution of the United States says "we the people of the United States do ordain and establish"--at this hour, today, here in Manhattan, Kansas--it did not say "did ordain and establish" in Philadelphia.
It is in the present tense. It is a contemporary document. It is a living instrument; and because it is that, it changes just like the human body and the human mind and the emotions of human beings, and all living organisms.

The government of the United States draws its powers from that Constitution and the Constitution draws its powers from the people--to that government must change and the social structure must also change.

And what we seek, and I am not sure that we can obtain it but I hope that we can, is change with order and order with change. It's a tremendous assignment. But it is vital that we understand the difference between dissent on the one hand and violence on the other; the difference between liberty and license; the difference between rights and privileges.

Now, we all know that in the early days of our country, communication didn't amount to much. And by the very nature of trying to keep responsive and responsible to the people was local government.

If I asked a student of mine at the University of Minnesota or Macalester College to write a paper on the government of the United States in the 1825 and he spent over one paragraph on the government in Washington, I would flunk him--because the government of the United States in 1825 was in the townships and in the villages and in the cities (and small cities they were) in courthouses and possibly working its way up to statehouses.

And when I hear people today talking about governments in other lands--whether it be a government in New Delhi or whether it be a government in Peking, or whether it be a government in Siagon or wherever else it may be--I think it is important that we remember that in developing countries or in agricultural countries, government that really affects people's lives is close, local.

But communication changed that in our country. And communication has brought us together as one people from many, a pluralistic society, a multi-racial society, seeking common purposes, and by the way, that's a big job. It is not too difficult to govern a homogeneous people, but remember that this is one of the few free countries in the world--one of the few countries with representative government--with free elections. This is one of the countries--and the only major one--that has a multi-racial base.

Our people are drawn from every area of the world. And the task of bringing about responsible, responsive, representative, broadly participating government in such a society is no small task--and there are no instant ways to achieve it. But we've had presidents who have been talking to us about three things. President Kennedy and President Johnson talked about what they called Creative Federalism. One of them talked about a new frontier, one of them about a great society. President Nixon has talked about the new federalism. What they are all saying is that
things have changed, and that federalism today is no longer just a
limitation on the powers of the federal government, but a positive
assertion of the cooperative relationships between the layers of
government. Creative federalism, in other words, is a phrase used
to describe the whole array of cooperative relationship between
federal government, state governments, city, county, and other local
government units; between universities and governments; universi-
ties and hospitals, and voluntary agencies, professional and trade
association, labor associations, and the whole wide spectrum of the
private sector.

Now why do I give you that broad description? Because today there
isn't a single problem that confronts this country that can be handled
successfully by any one of these governmental structures or any one
of these groups. No problem. Surely the problem of racism alone
cannot be handled by the trade unions or business or the churches or
the universities. It requires both legal sanctions and a change of
heart and attitude and prospective.

The problem of congestion of our cities, of our highways, of our
traffic lanes, cannot be handled by any one level of government.

So what we are talking about is a great new partnership. Possibly
the greatest contribution of the space program, into which we poured
great resources, is not that man set his foot on the moon and took
that great stride for mankind, but I think the greatest achievement of
the space program demonstrated that if you are going to do what some people
would call the impossible which is what we have to do in many areas of
our social culture. If we're going to do the big things, if we're going
to do the things that modern society requires us to do, if we are to
survive then we are going to have to have a partnership of the university,
the private economic community and the government and all other segments
of society or we shall fail.

And it requires a new management. The space program was more than
science and technology. It was a demonstration of the mobilization of
resources and of commitment to a goal—with the willingness to pursue
it relentlessly.

Ladies and gentlemen, while I know you cannot always translate the
facts of science and technology into the social sciences, you can con-
centrate the commitment, the national decision, the mobilization of
resources, the national goal, and in these ways, the space program told
us what we can do.

Any nation that can do what we did in less than a decade of science
and technology of space that put a man on the moon can surely, help
put a man on his feet right here on earth.

And that's exactly where the action needs to take place. We can't
escape this planet—this is our space—this is our space satellite.
We're on it together, and you can't stop the world and say "Let me off."
We are either going to keep it together and preserve it together, or we
will destroy it together.
I think the 1960's has opened up these possibilities. That's why I said it is a time of decision and dissent—there was dissent against the inadequacies of the moment, dissent against old practices which no longer are relevant; but there was also great discovery, discovery of what we could do, the possibilities that are ours.

This new federalism, therefore, wasn't so much a delineation of power between national and state government as it was a pattern or description or formula of cooperative partnership of all levels of government in concert with private resources, the partnership of creative federalism.

Your government—and that's what we're talking about—was designed to maximize and mobilize the nation's resources for the achievement of national goals and the solution of increasingly complex problems. This is the only modern industrial nation in the world that lacks a system to establish our priorities.

We do not have unlimited resources. We need to have goals, we need to set priorities. If I were to go through this audience and ask you to list our priorities according to what you believe their significance should be, there would be as many ideas about priorities and goals as there are people.

This is not the way you direct the energies of a nation. I am not talking by direction by edict but by consensuses where we hammer out the difficulties and the questions and come to some understanding. I had some awareness of and some participation in the new legislation of the fifties and sixties, particularly that of the sixties which carried broad statements of national purpose.

The new federal programs were really like a basketful of categories, the federal government made clear its determination to improve the conditions and opportunities of life for all the citizens in our society. This new federalism emphasizes one vital point: the citizen is not only a citizen of the state or locality, he is above all a citizen of the United States of America, and therefore is entitled to every protection and every guarantee of the Constitution.

The emphasis of the sixties—which will carry forward for the rest of the century—is upon that citizenship, that national citizenship, and the federal policy is to emphasize that United States Citizenship.

Congress once and for all has asserted the primacy of the national interest in a broad range of activities. There are reasons for this dramatic change. We've become a mobile nation, we are on the move. State loyalties are growing thinner. We are a nation where our ties are to country, to family, and to a job. Provincial local loyalties are vanishing. No longer do families remain in the towns of their forebears. No longer do children live in the cities where they were born or raised.
Migration to our cities—and particularly to the sea coasts and to the sunny states of Florida and California—aided by mobile transportation—are in large part the result of improved communication.

Rural families, once isolated from the general culture, were able to see New York, and Chicago and New Orleans and Los Angeles and Philadelphia and St. Louis and other areas on their television screen. There was no place to hide. Hills and valleys flattened out and there we were, we Americans. This looked awfully good to many Americans, and many migrated before there were services to meet their needs. The poorly schooled boy from South Carolina in that school that was separate, segregated, began showing up as a welfare statistic in New York City. The malnourished child from Appalachia showed up in a hospital in Detroit.

This mobility among our people made health and welfare, the physical environment, education and economic development matters of national, rather than just a lone, local concern. There was recognition that no city can protect itself from pollution by itself.

There was recognition of the inability of minority groups to achieve first-class citizenship after a century of struggle. There was a clear need for a legal statement of national conscience, and federal enforcement of national standards.

I think that you could say that there were at least four major pieces of legislation in the 1960's that have revolutionized American politics and the social order, and we are yet to really sense their impact.

The first is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which for the first time put the power of the Federal government on the side of the citizen. This did not eliminate prejudice, but it declared illegal acts which flow from prejudice. Our job for the future is to eliminate the residual prejudice that results from two centuries of depredation and segregation.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965—which for the first time said that the power of the federal government to protect the right to vote—and that local impediment, local canavery, local conspiracy would no longer be permitted. These will change the American political structure far beyond what we sense today.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 where for the first time said the government of the United States is going to wage war on man's most ancient enemy—poverty. And with the Economic Opportunity Act came the often criticized Community Action Committee which many of you don't like. A disgust in the media where people frequently seem to get out of hand, they don't seem to know how to run their affairs.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Community Action Program, the community council concept, is built around the premise that those who are to be affected by programs should have something to say about them. Maximum participation by the poor—we haven't done it yet—there is always shortcomings between man's pronouncements and his performance. But I can tell you that it has set a pattern, and the avenues of participation have been opened.

And the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which, for the first time, permitted the federal government to pump billions of dollars into the educational system of this country—not nearly as much as we need, but a beginning.

Now we are looking not only at the need for financial resources for education, but at the need for change in the methods and the technology of education.

These four legislative enactments represent a whole new revolution in the revolution of American democracy—a peaceful revolution, and a continuing revolution. And in this series of acts the federal government expressed its goals and committed federal funds to achieve them.

Now the central premise of all these new "people programs" is that they are designed to meet local needs, but local needs that are in the national interest.

No longer does the government just pump in money. It also establishes programs and standards to achieve what is established by statute as a national policy.

But it is in the country courthouse, the city hall, the state capitol, the thousands of town meetings across the country, that the success or failure of these programs will be determined.

You can't legislate good administration; and you can't legislate creative government. But you can help give the resources and the direction that make it possible. This is a complex subject, and our time is limited today.

I can only tell you that we must find ways to coordinate and to eliminate duplication of this huge and complicated government structure, so that we maximize the purpose of government as never before. With thousands of governmental units, with hundreds of federal grant programs, coordination is essential.

This is why in 1968 when I sought the highest office in this land I recommended that the next President of the United States have a Domestic Policy Council to coordinate every domestic program just as the President has a National Security Council to coordinate issues of national security.

I also suggested that there be at a regional level a presidential ambassador who would have the right to be the President's
personal representative to the multitude of federal agencies within that region--just exactly as an ambassador to a foreign country represents your nation in all of its aspects abroad. This kind of coordination in policy structure could help us to achieve some of our goals, for government is a tool to be used, not to be worshiped, not an enemy to be abused.

We can't afford to isolate any level of government if we are to succeed in our great national undertakings. In our growing and demanding United States, we need the wisdom to create, to control, and to support a government that is sufficiently strong to achieve its objectives and to protect our liberties, and a government that is sufficiently sensitive and concerned to meet the needs of all our citizens.

I see the decade of the seventies with optimism. For, just as war has its own built-in escalation, so does the process of peace have its built-in escalation, and the first priority of this nation must be the search, and not only the search, but the attainment, of peace.

It is my view and my conviction that until we are able to obtain peace and disengagement--obtain it not in a sporadic outburst of emotion, but with full consideration of our responsibilities--until then, many of our domestic priorities will be set aside.

Therefore, peace must be the first priority; and there is good reason to hope that this will be achieved in the early days of the seventies. But America must have a broader vision than that. If we were out of Viet Nam this afternoon, we would still face a great problem.

Let us not use Viet Nam to escape from the realities of our time. We need to build in America an open society in which people of every race, creed, and color can move freely without prejudice and without discrimination. We need to cleanse ourselves of every vestige of racism. That's our number one problem in this country, ladies and gentlemen.

We can't have two Americas. We need a positive program to set priorities for the development of human resources.

The strength of this nation is not in its arms or in its industry, it is in its people. And the wealth of this nation is not in its banks or its insurance companies, it is in its people. The people that feel a sense of commitment to this country. The people that are educated. The people that feel they are wanted, that have something to contribute. We must develop these human resources and set it as a high priority.
And we must conserve the physical resources we are abusing and ruining at an unprecedented rate, not only in our nation, but throughout the world. When six percent of the people of the world, which we represent, consume forty percent of the produce of the world, which we do--six percent of the people consume forty percent of all that the world produces--then I think the rest of the world might consider us overindulgent. Indulging ourselves in their goods. Using their resources as well as ours.

And surely if there is one focus for the seventies, it must be survival and the protection of our physical environment. And don't you underestimate it.

I'm not here to talk on ecological matters, per se, but, ladies and gentlemen, don't underestimate the danger that is before us. Our danger is not merely nuclear weapons and it's not merely the poor man's atom bomb--the bacteriological, biological, and chemical weapons--all of which should be abolished. The danger that faces us today comes right out of the exhaust pipe of our automobiles and our busses, and out of the water that flows from an industrial plant into the river, and out of the smoke stacks that spew their poisonous gases into the air and out of a jet engine.

And if young America will become as excited about this kind of contamination as it has been excited about violence abroad and about nuclear proliferation, maybe we can save ourselves.

There are the central problems. We must promote the conditions that are conducive to peace--and that includes curbing the arms race. We must halt the arms race before it halts the human race--and we can. We can do it with confidence.

It isn't a matter of whether we can trust the Russians, because we have developed alternatives for trust--sophisticated detection systems. So it is a question of whether we have the confidence and the will to understand that we are all together on this planet--and we're going to live or die here.

I recall Adlai Stevenson's words as I leave you today. Adlai Stevenson was defeated for the presidency twice. But he was, in a greater sense, a winner. There's a lot of difference between failure and defeat, you know.

Failure is when you are defeated and neither learn anything nor contribute anything.

Alfred Landon was defeated for the presidency, but he was not a failure. He has given a great deal to this country, even out of office. Adlai Stevenson was one of the noble men of our times, and like this good former governor of yours, Adlai Stevenson gave much to his nation without ever having the trappings of office. This noble man of the fifties—that great spirit—reminded us again and again that "Democracy is not
self-executing. We have to make it work. We have to understand it. Not only external vigilance but unending self-examination must be the perennial price of liberty because the work of self-government never ceases." Adlai Stevenson didn't want to destroy the system, he didn't want to tear it down.

He said, "unending self-examination is the perennial price of liberty." He said, "The work of self-government never ceases."

And he said we have to make this democracy of ours work—and that's where you come in. In order to make it work, we have to understand it. That's what I've been trying to say today—that we must understand our government, and we must not lose faith in it.

So, therefore, with a sense of urgency, I suggest that we ventilate the clogged channels of political participation and of social opportunity. These refreshing winds of change, which are everywhere about us, must be directed to constructive purposes—but not through violence, not through hate, not through bitterness, not through ugly passion, but through responsible debate and dissent, through reason and discussion, until decision and direction are clear.

This, my friends, is the meaning of government by the consent of the governed. This is what we mean when we say a wholesome and decent respect for the opinions of others. This is what we mean by social contract among equals.

And this is what, I think, creative federalism means—a government that never stands still, a society that sees change as a challenge not as an enemy, a social structure that constantly expands and opens its doors because we, the people, know that there are new people to be heard from, new ideas to be discovered, and new ways of life to be found.
Address by Honorable Earl Warren

Chief Justice of the United States, Retired

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

October 21, 1970

Thank you Judge Hill, President McCain, Governor Landon, Senator Carlson, other distinguished persons on the dais and ladies and gentlemen of Kansas State University.

This is a thrilling experience for me to be at your University for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that this Series of Lectures is named for and sponsored by my long-time friend, Governor Alf Landon, with whom I labored decades ago in the vineyards of politics. And yesterday afternoon and last night we indulged ourselves, as men of our age usually do, in reminiscing about those years when we had such pleasant association and I assure you that it was a thrilling experience for me. Our trails have not crossed often in recent years because I have been immured in the Supreme Court for the past seventeen years where constant attendance is a matter of necessity. But I have always retained my admiration for his integrity, his wisdom and down-to-earth philosophy of life and politics throughout the years. I am happy to be with him today in these inspirational surroundings. And then I am also happy to be here with my long-time friend Frank Carlson. He and I served as governors together. We served in Washington. He in the Senate and I in the Supreme Court for sixteen years and we were neighbors. We lived in the same place for all of those years and it is good to be back here in his home state and see him happy and contented as he is, and he is entitled to be from the great public service he has rendered to your state and to the nation.

I like universities, and I have always liked university life—in my own day in college, through the intervening years, and today, in spite of the vicissitudes of the moment. I am happy to be in this free market place of ideas. This forum appeals to me particularly because, in visiting with students, one is where the action is. It is where the criticism of my generation largely and properly I think, comes from. It is the proper place from which such criticism should emanate because these students and young people of our day are the residuary legatees of both the benefits and the burdens which are being left to them. They are the ones who are to live with both, and they must reappraise the values of life and reorder priorities for the society of their day.

*Taken from tape furnished by K.S.A.C.
In talking to them, I only wish I could approach my discussion with the same assurance of finality as a scientist or a technologist would approach subjects within his competence. However, neither my age, my temperament, nor my preoccupation in life would permit me to do so.

The older we become the less certain we are of our own conclusions. As has been so well stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas——" In my experience, I, too, have seen many fighting faiths upset and I also believe firmly in the free faith of our ideas.

My preoccupation throughout a long lifetime has been with pragmatic affairs which cannot be evaluated through scientific analysis or reduced to scientific conclusions. Thirty-six years of my adult life were devoted to the field of politics and governmental administration; the last sixteen years to the judicial process. Neither politics nor the judicial process are or can become an exact science because they deal with the vagaries of human nature and the actions of human beings.

Politics have been broadly defined as the art of the possible, and that is a fair description of it. The complexities of our society, and the cross currents of economic and social interests are involved in almost every political act. The ideal is rarely, if ever, achieved. Although sometimes proposed, the ideal gives way to practicality on the theory that a half loaf is better than none. In the last analysis, it becomes a matter of bargaining between competing interests until a consensus is achieved or the entire proposal is abandoned. Too often the latter is the result, and no progress is made. The effect of these eventualities is to bring into play a myriad of devices, either for advancing proposals or for stifling them. Some are helpful and some are destructive. Some are designed for the sole purpose of avoiding responsibility.

Illustrative of this point, I was told a story by an old time State Senator from one of your neighboring states concerning a little town in his district. He said that affairs in the town were so deadly that there was nothing to be discussed or argued about except one thing, namely, whether the town should or should not have a new church, there being only one there at the time. But whenever the proposal was made for a new church, the argument divided the town into warring factions, and the longer it continued the more bitter it became.

Customers boycotted business men; the children fought in school; and the women of the community ostracized each other from social gatherings.

The Board of Deacons of the church, of course, was in the very center of this storm, and all of the members, except one, suffered the afflictions of the rest of the community. The lone member of the
Board who was untouched by the controversy was a man of business, and had been on the Board for many years. Finally, he concluded that he would retire from his position, but he asked the Board to elect his son to succeed him. This was done.

However, in a very short time the younger man was in the center of the controversy. His children came home from school with black eyes; his was was not invited to church parties; and his business was boycotted. Finally, at the end of his wits, he went to his father and said, "Dad, I am in deep trouble. You got me into this trouble, and you must help me to get out of it." The old gentleman asked what the trouble was, and when the son told him, he said, "Oh, don't worry about that, my boy. I will tell you how you can avoid all those difficulties. Whenever there is a proposal to build a new church, you vote for the new church, but whenever a site is proposed, no matter where it is, you vote against the site. Then you will be out of trouble."

Now the story ended there, but I suppose that one might add that the young man followed his father's advice, and lived happily with his family ever after without assuming responsibility either for building or not building the new church. I add this because I have experienced the re-enactment of this story hundreds of times in politics. People will often say to controversial proposals they wish to avoid deciding, "Well, I agree with the principle, but I cannot agree to the proposed remedy."

We even encounter this in the judicial process. There, in interpreting the often ambiguous or even contradictory laws of the Legislative Brance of the government, the courts are required to divine from the legislative history, consisting of proposals, counter proposals, desultory argument, explanation of votes, etc., what judicial meaning should be given to the statute. Then, according to the meaning ascribed to it, it must be checked with some broad, general language in the Constitution to see if it conforms. When that has been done, the interpretation must be applied to the facts as developed in a court room, usually controverted and often not precise in order to arrive at a final decision. And, of course, in the process, the foibles of the judge must also be accommodated. Few solutions could be less scientific than this. But we in the judiciary can only do our best under the circumstances.

But most of our problems of today stem from human relationships, and their solution must be achieved through human reactions. In more than a half century of experience in dealing with such problems, I have naturally, and almost of necessity, formed some conclusions, both as to the importance of the major problems and of the priorities which should be accorded them.

Many of them have been developing since the birth of our Nation, and largely because our advances of recent years in science and technology have been so rapid that all of them are surfacing at about the same time. Certainly, they are all plaguing us today. It is not easy
to assign relative importance to them, but I suppose that most people would agree today—not a few years ago but only recently—that warfare and particularly the undeclared war in Indochina is one of the most pressing. However, being something of an optimist, I am persuaded that because most people are so minded our participation in the Asiatic war will end in the foreseeable future—not speedily enough to satisfy all of us, but that it will end. We will then be free to focus our attention, our money, and our energy on taking care of the many domestic needs which have been starved during the twenty-five years we have been almost constantly engaged in warfare.

In the rapid development of our country from ocean to ocean, and with the burgeoning of our population from four million to more than two hundred million, we have neglected to protect our national resources, until deterioration of the environment of land, sea and air is said to be approaching a question of the survival of plant, animal and even human life. But I believe that with the public realization of the danger involved, and particularly the realization on the part of the young people involved, we will have the capacity to turn the tide and rehabilitate our air, our water, and our soil. As a layman, and again as an optimist, I believe that the scientists who have made it possible for us to fly to the moon, to transplant human organs from one body to another, and to transmit vision as well as sound instantaneously throughout the world, will be able to find solutions, provided there is a national commitment to that objective and a dedication of the forces of science to it comparable to that which took us to the moon.

Also, during these same years of development, we have forgotten to preserve some of our human values, and have failed in our obligation to protect the health of our people until we now find, to our distress, that among the developed nations of the world we stand thirteenth in infant mortality; seventh in the percentage of mothers who die in childbirth; eighteenth in life expectancy for males; eleventh in life expectancy for females; and sixteenth in the death rate for middle-aged males.

Now again, believing in the ultimate efficiency of our institutions and the desire of all Americans for the good life, I feel confident that the scientists and the medical profession will be able to find the answers for any deficiencies we may have in the prevention and treatment of disease, and that the government will develop a program for the facilities and for the distribution of medical services so that every American, rich or poor, will have the opportunity to live a normal and healthful life.

Although we have developed a great system of both elementary and higher educational institutions, we are in trouble with the system at the present time. We do not appear to be satisfying the students, the faculties, the administrators, or the public. However, with as many people as we have dedicated to that cause, I have no doubt that it, too, will soon re-occupy its rightful place in the sun where truth can be freely pursued in peaceful surroundings with the cooperation of all who have a thirst for knowledge.
Poverty also can be wiped out in a country which is renowned for having the most affluent society in recorded history. It is difficult to believe that in a bountiful country such as ours, where the government pays farmers not to plant staples of life and where a portion of an over-abundant crop is required to be left on the tree, vine, or ground to rot, that one out of seven of our people, as has been widely reported should go to bed hungry every night. Certainly, if our agricultural scientists and the industry of our farmers can make our land that productive, our technologists and the government can distribute crops in a way to prevent hunger and avoid waste.

The one thing that has the badge of insolvency on it is the problem of how we are to live together in harmony and mutual respect. We have boasted for almost 200 years that we are a plural society where-in we achieve unity through diversity and accommodate diversity through unity.

But again the sins of former years are upon us, and it is my belief that the question of whether we can permanently have such a society is the greatest problem before the American people today. We started wrong, of course, by tolerating the cruel institution of human slavery which was in direct contradiction of the noble phrase in our Declaration of Independence to the effect -

"...that all Men are Created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness..."

It took almost 100 years for us to absolve ourselves from the curse of slavery through the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth Amendments to our Constitution after a bloody fratricidal war in which one out of every ten young Americans of military age gave their lives. And I believe that Kansans perhaps are, or at least should be, more aware of that than the people of any other state of the Union because during that Civil War, Kansas had the highest percentage of casualties of any state in the Union. That ultimately, however, was not the end of our problems, and today, after a hundred years of our national life, we are still paying the price for that slavery.

We have in the Nation today about twenty-two million Negroes who still bear vestiges of that badge of slavery, and they are still struggling to be out of the class of inferior citizenship. The emotions engendered by hundreds of years of discrimination and cruelties have welled up in them to the point of deep bitterness.

They are, for the first time in our history, demanding en mass the rights and privileges of citizenship which have been denied them for so many years—the right to live wherever they desire; the right to a decent education without discrimination; the right to vote; the right to participate freely in their government, and the right to be treated in accordance with human dignity. The violence implicit in these denials, as exemplified
by lynchings and other unlawful injuries to them, has provoked counter violence in many quarters, and the time has come when the nation must restore good will and cooperation regardless of race or color if we are to be a healthy nation.

Because of the indignities which have been showered on them like indignities, if not in degree, have been put on others within our borders who also do not have the same pigment in their skins as do the majority of us. There are a half million American Indians who also are chafing opening about their ill treatment through the centuries. We have a million and a half Asiatics and several millions of the ancestry of our Latin American neighbors living largely in the southwestern part of our nation, and they, too, have felt many of the indignities which were so prevalent against the Negroes because one indignity to one person brushes of to another as well. Together—possibly thirty million—they constitute a large percentage of our total population, and are becoming more divided from the vast majority day by day.

The results of these disaffections have come to plague us in a myriad of ways. Without education, without training in keeping with automation and advanced technology of all kinds, they have been deprived of a livelihood, and at the present time are largely mired down in the slums of our great cities. In the cotton industry in the Southern States alone, 900,000 illiterate cotton pickers have been displaced by recent cotton picking machines, and they, with their families aggregating between two and a half and three million people, were thrown out of their livelihood. This number does not take into consideration a similar loss of employment in the important cotton growing states of Arizona and California, nor does it take into consideration loss of employment in the Western states because of the mechanical fruit, nut and field crop pickers which work was done by these people, most of them illiterate.

Other millions of illiterate and untrained people, largely black, have lost their jobs through other kinds of automation, and are in a similar predicament. Together they constitute an enormous army of the unemployed. Without education or mechanical or technological skills, and there being no other employment in the rural areas where they have always lived, millions have moved to the cities in desperation to find places in the industrial world.

Without skills or the education to learn them speedily, and without even hospitable treatment in their newly found home, they drift into the already congested slums where unemployment is out of all proportion, where the housing is deplorable, and where degradation of every kind is rampant. There they stay as if they were imprisoned. With rare exceptions, there is no place for them to go except from one slum to another. They wait from month to month, therefore, for a relief check, completely frustrated and eventually become embittered.

They are looked down upon by people in affluent circumstances who flee from them to the suburbs and leave them a people apart from the mainstream of American life. These slums contaminate every city where they exist, and weaken them in the same manner as a diseased lung, heart, or liver weakens the human body. And cities can die
as do human beings. History is replete with examples, but as someone
has said our problem is that the only thing we learn from history is
that we do not learn. All of us must recognize the plight of our
great cities and the problems they have in maintaining a viable society.
Poverty, crime, degradation and complete frustration are the result
of these great mistakes of the past.

All of the slum dwellers, of course, are not black or yellow or
tan, but a fast growing majority of them are. About ten million of
our people born in a foreign country, and the vast majority of them
are white. On the other hand, millions of them were poor and often
landed in a slum when they arrived in this country. They, too,
suffered the indignities of slum life, but if they were literate and
white they could more easily work their way out of their sordid surround-
ings. However, many of them are still there under conditions that belie
the invitation of the Statue of Liberty at the entrance to the harbor
of New York were eighteen million immigrants have thrilled and even
cried in hope as they entered our country.

That invitation reads -

"...Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me.
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"

The hard core of all slums is made up of those unfortunates who
have been discriminated against all their lives. It is difficult for
those of us who have always been able to enjoy our freedoms to under-
stand the feelings of those who have never had them, but who are now
at long last determined to have them. Now this is not an unaccountable
phenomena. From 1941 to 1945, we fought a war, according to the solemn
promises of our government and her allies, to assure the four freedoms
for all people throughout the world. Americans white and black boys
fought and died, side by side, in that war, and in Korea, as they are
now doing in Vietnam.

Only a few weeks ago in one of our Southern states, a soldier who
was killed in action in Vietnam was denied the right of burial in a
cemetery with other soldiers who were killed in action merely because
he was black. And the tragedy of his death in greater intensity was
visited up his parents.

Only a few years before that a North American Indian was denied
burial in a Northern State for a similar reason even though he had
died in battle in Korea. And it just seems to me that those who
live together in life and certainly those who are joined together for
the preservation of our nation should at least be entitled to be
buried in the same burial ground regardless of color, or race, or
creed.
Is it, therefore, unrealistic or premature for them to now demand equal rights under law?

There can be no other answer to our problem than to wipe out the discrimination for which we have now become so notorious, and to treat everyone in the nation with the consideration that we have always demanded and received for the majority of our people. Nothing else, it seems to me, will restore amity to our country; nothing else will bring harmony to our education system, to our cities, and to the political life of the nation.

I suppose I am particularly sensitive to this situation because during the years when I was active on the Supreme Court, and when these minority groups were coming to us to achieve their constitutions' rights, many people would say to me, "I agree with you that there should be no discrimination and that everybody should be treated equally under the laws, but don't you think that we are moving too fast? The Negroes have improved their situation in the United States more in the last hundred years than they have in any other part of the world." Now this was said, not in anger, but as an escape from responsibility very much like the deacon and the building of the church.

However, the question assumed that the Supreme Court had the right to ration freedoms, and that it should go slow enough so as not to offend anyone in doing so. Of course, no such power exists for the courts either in law or morals.

Either all rights of citizenship belong to the minorities in our country or they are entitled to none, as was said of them in the Dred Scott decision which precipitated the Civil War. The plain words of the Constitution now answer that question.

When the basis of problems is bitterness, the solution is impossible until the bitterness is removed. The bitterness in this situation is born of the discrimination of centuries, and can only be removed by elimination of the cause.

It, therefore, seems clear to me that if we are ever to have a placid nation against at least during the lifetimes of our children and their children, it will be necessary for us to set aside our prejudices on account of race or color, and be willing to live in a plural society where American citizenship means, in fact as well as in precept, that all men are created equal, and as such are entitled to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.

There is only one other alternative and that alternative is—chaos.
Address by Governor Ronald Reagan (R-Cal.)*

Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas
October 26, 1967

HIGHER EDUCATION: ITS ROLE IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA

I am speaking here today neither as an academician nor as a politician. I do not have the training to be the first nor the aspiration to be the second. That leaves me the role of concerned citizen, and among my concerns is higher education and its place in contemporary America.

Listing the problems is easy—solutions are a little harder to come by. For example, there is the problem of financing the increasing cost of higher education. I have some first-hand experience with that one, but I cannot lay claim to having the answer. Nor do I think that university president has the answer who stated bluntly that the academic community's only responsibility was to tell government its needs, and government's obligation was not to question but to simply come up with the money. This was higher education and contemporary America meeting eyeball to eyeball.

Limits of Government

Strange as it may seem, there is a limit to what government can extract from the body of the citizenry—a limit fixed, not by pity or unwillingness to wield the scalpel, but by the hard fact that unless that body of citizenry is able to function on a 9-to-5 basis, the schoolhouse door will not open at all.

Government's share of the wealth has to stop short of interfering with the production of wealth. Higher education explains it as having to do with the law of diminishing returns.

Then, of course, having decided on and collected its share, government must allocate. So much for roads—so much for protection against the law breaker—for help to those who must depend on the rest of us for sustenance—for health—and, of course, for education, elementary through college and university.

*Taken from Kansas State University Publication.
Never, according to those engaged in these various facets of government, is there sufficient funding for all that needs to be done. But when government is taking all the economy will bear, choices must be made, and, if education demands an increase in funds greater than the normal workload increase occasioned by growth and higher prices, then it must be taken from some other program.

**Importance of Education**

Now this should not be interpreted as minimizing the importance of education. No one denies the value of a higher education nor all those able to assimilate one. Indeed, a vast network of institutions of higher learning, both public and private, is essential if we are to maintain our nation as the world's leader in science and technology. Nor does anyone deny the growing needs in our nation for teachers, for doctors, lawyers, economists and sociologists, and yes in these days, not only for a literate public, but also for a well-educated and knowledgeable populace.

Alfred Whitehead said, "In the conditions of modern life, the rule is absolute: The race which does not value trained intelligence is doomed."

There is no question but that Americans all over this land have assigned a high priority to education. It is also true that the cost of education is increasing faster than the increase in public funds. A more sophisticated answer is needed than just "come up with more money."

I suggested a partial answer in California based on the theory that good tax policy involves assessing at least a part of the charge for a service against those receiving the service. In a word, I proposed tuition at our State University and Colleges. The result was cataclysmic. I could not have branded myself as any more "anti-intellectual" if I had said, "Me Tarzan, you Jane."

Actually, there was much more to my proposal than just a method for collecting revenue.

The students enjoying the benefits of public higher education in California come from the same income levels as those attending the private or independent schools such as Stanford and U.S.C. Very few from low income families can take advantage of the educational opportunities made available by the taxpayers of California.

With this in mind, half of the funds from the proposed tuition would go for a combination of loans and grants-in-aid to needy students.

And since another problem in our University is an exceptionally high dropout rate, we tried to cope with that. Our plan called
for 75% loan and 25% grant the first year, 50-50 the second year, 
75% grant and only 25% loan the third year, and 100% grant 
the fourth year. The loans, of course, would be repaid after 
graduation.

Another problem at our University is the unhappiness of stu-
dents over lack of contact with professors engaged more in re-
search than in teaching. To help meet this problem, one-fourth 
of the tuition money would provide for 250 new teaching chairs 
at the University and the remaining fourth could be applied to 
capital construction of needed facilities.

Since all of this could be accomplished with a tuition that 
amounted to less than 10% of the cost of the education, we did 
not think the proposal was punitive.

May I add that, if we adhere to the idea that everything adds 
to the educational experience, I believe there is some merit in the 
student accepting responsibility for a portion of the cost of his 
education—as long as no qualified student is denied an education 
because of lack of funds.

There are benefits and burdens that accrue both to the indi-
vidual and to society, and the burdens, including the burden of 
cost, must be borne by both.

But if all the problems of finance could be solved tomorrow, 
there would still be cause for concern about the place of higher 
education in contemporary America.

Academic Freedom

What is our definition of academic freedom?

Those who teach, understandably enough, define it as the 
right to teach as they see fit without interference from adminis-
trators and certainly not from those who hold the public purse 
strings or who fill the public purse.

But those who pay for the education, students and taxpayers, 
also have a definition of academic freedom: their freedom to 
have some say in what they get for their money.

Those holding public office try to interpret the will of the 
people and pass it on to the university administration, conscious 
always that they must not appear to be exerting political control 
over education. Equally uncomfortable are the administrators 
who must interpret the educators' viewpoint to the crass politi-
cians and vice versa—they can be likened to a prisoner in front 
of a cellophane wall being shouted at by both sides.
And the truth is—all the claims are legitimate and must be reconciled within a framework of mutual understanding and compromise.

The dictionary defines education as "the impartation or acquisition of knowledge, skill, or the development of character as by study or discipline."

The taxpayer is wrong who ignores the great increase in things we know—knowledge acquired since he was in school—and who demands "no new-fangled courses. What was good enough then is good enough now."

But so is the student wrong who would eliminate all required courses and grades—who would make education a kind of four-year smorgasbord in which he would be the sole judge of how far and fast he ran in pursuit of knowledge.

And that educator is wrong who denies there are any absolutes—who sees no black and white of right or wrong, but just shades of gray in a world where discipline of any kind is an intolerable interference with the right of the individual. He rebels at the old-fashioned idea of "loco parentis" and claims he is there to impart knowledge, not to substitute for absentee parents. But he can not escape a responsibility for the students' development of character and maturity.

Strangely and illogically, this is very often the same educator who interprets his academic freedom as the right to indoctrinate students with his view of things. Woe to the student who challenges his interpretation of history, or who questions the economic theory given as proven formula in what is, at best, a very inexact science.

One thing we should all be agreed on is the university's obligation to teach, not indoctrinate.

Institutions of higher education are repositories of all the accumulated knowledge of man, but they must not be vending machines. Along with the dispensing of facts and figures must come the production of wisdom.

In our colleges today are undoubtedly more than one President of the United States, a number of Supreme Court Justices, Cabinet members and many Legislators.

The Role of Higher Education

And this brings me to the part higher education plays in contemporary America.

These institutions were created, and are presently maintained, to insure perpetuation of a social structure—a nation, if you will.
Now don't put a narrow interpretation on this as some will, and translate "social structure" into "status quo" or "social order" or "preserve the aristocracy; keep the little bananas from becoming top banana."

Our country, unfortunately, has a lot of people who would turn the country back to the dark ages, or ahead to 1984. Some have a concept of government more akin to Frederick the Great than Thomas Jefferson.

Our nation is founded on a concern for the individual and his right to fulfillment, and this should be the preoccupation of our schools and colleges.

The graduate should go forth, literally starting on a lifetime of learning and growing and creativity that will in turn bring growth and innovation to our society.

And the truth is--never in history has there been such a need for men and women of wisdom and courage--wisdom to absorb the knowledge of the past and plan its application to the present and future, and courage to make the hard decisions.

Unleashing Individual Genius

At Stanford University in 1906 William James said, "The wealth of a nation consists more than in anything else in the number of superior men that it harbors."

At the risk of great oversimplification may I suggest that the great ideological split dividing us on the world scene and here within our own borders has to do with the place of the individual.

Acceptance is given more and more to the concept of lifting men by mass movements and collective action, in spite of the fact that history is strangely barren of any record of advances made in this manner. By contrast, the road from the swamp to the stars is studded with the names of individuals who achieved fulfillment and lifted mankind another rung.

It is time we realized what we mean by "equality" and being "born equal."

We are equal before God and the law, and our society guarantees that no acquisition of property during our lifetime, nor achievement, no matter how exemplary, should give us more protection than those of less prestige, nor should it exempt us from any of the restrictions and punishments imposed by law.

But let there be no misunderstanding about the right of man to achieve above the capacity of his fellows. The world is richer--because of a Shakespeare and a Tennyson, a Beethoven and a Brahms. Certainly major league baseball would not be improved by letting
every citizen who wanted to, have a turn at playing Willie May's position.

We live (even many so-called poor) at a level above the wildest dreams of the kings of one hundred years ago—because some individual thought of a horseless carriage, an ice box, and later a refrigerator, or machinery that lifted burdens from our backs. (I would have thrown in television if I were still appearing on Death Valley Days.)

Why did so much of this develop so far and fast in America? Other countries are blessed with natural resources and equable climate—yes, and energetic and talented people.

But here, to a degree unequalled any place in the world, we unleashed the individual genius of man, recognized his inherent dignity, and rewarded him commensurate with his ability and achievement.

Responsibilities of Students

Your generation is being wooed by many who charge this way we have known is inadequate to meet the challenges of our times. They point to the unsolved problems of poverty and prejudice as proof of the system's failure.

As students, you have a duty to research to find if the failure is one of system—or is it the inadequacy of human nature?

You should also inquire if those who would replace the system have anything to offer in exchange other than untried theory packaged as Utopia. It sometimes seems strange that what is so often described as the brave new world of the future must be upheld by the collectivist philosophy of nineteenth century theorists like Rousseau, Fourier and Marx.

You have lived your entire lives in a governmental framework tending ever more toward the welfare state and centralism. We still have government of the people, by the people and for the people, but there seems to be a lot more of "for" the people and less "of" and "by." This is justified on the claim that society has grown so complex we can no longer afford too much individual freedom.

To invoke "states' rights" is to be suspect of wanting to deny "human rights," and similar charges of selfishness greet any attack on the tendency of government to grow, but more particularly when attention is called to failures by government in the field of human welfare.

But you are students and therefore engaged in a search for truth.
Has the idea of a federation of sovereign states been proven unworkable because here and there selfish individuals used state government to impose on the freedom of some? Isn't there something to be said for a system wherein people can vote with their feet if government becomes too oppressive? Let a state pile on taxes beyond a bearable limit and business and industry start moving out and the people follow.

Let us think very carefully before switching to a system in which these states become administrative districts enforcing uniform laws and regulations.

"The "Creative Society"

If I may personalize here, let me tell you some of what we have learned in California these past nine months.

California—that is where they give governors on-the-job training. Being totally inexperienced, I had not learned all the things you cannot do, so I set out to keep my campaign promises. And once the people got over their shock they sort of took to the idea.

By every rule of reason, government "of" and "by" the people must be superior to any other kind.

No government could possibly muster a group capable of making the multitudinous decisions that must be made every day to keep a society like ours moving.

If a state is to be great it must call upon the greatness of the people. And the people must be prepared to give a portion of their time to public affairs because government is their business.

The only alternative to the people running government is government running the people.

We put together a blue ribbon citizens committee to recruit personnel for the administrative posts that had to be filled by appointment. They did not just screen applicants for public jobs; they persuaded top level people in business and the professions to take jobs which represented tremendous personal sacrifice in salary in almost every case.

Then we invited the most successful citizens of our state to lunch and locked the doors. We outlined a plan for bringing their knowledge to bear on government. They were asked to give up their own careers for a period of from four to six months, to work full-time as members of task forces going into every agency and department of government to see how government could be made more efficient and economical by the use of modern business practices.
And we asked them to put up the $250,000 it would take for administrative overhead in this undertaking. They volunteered to a man and they have just completed more than six months full-time away from their own pursuits and even their families.

We are correlating their reports and putting their recommendations into operation. They range from methods of buying supplies to data-processing, from rotating department heads to consolidating files.

By applying the floor space standards of private industry to our own office employees, we will reduce this year our need for office space by two million square feet. We have already cancelled construction of a four million dollar building.

On their recommendations our phone bill will be reduced by two million dollars a year. Our budget for out-of-state travel by state employees has been cut 78% and we have reduced the number of employees by 2 1/2% without a layoff or firing. We simply stopped hiring replacements for those who resigned or retired.

Until this year the number of state employees had gone up each of the last eight years anywhere from 4 to 5 1/2%.

We have embarked on something we call the "Creative Society". It is nothing more than a full-time effort to involve the independent sector in finding and solving problems before government comes rushing in with bureaus that always seem to multiply like wire coat hangers in a closet.

Already we have thousands of industries--2,600 in Los Angeles, 1,500 in San Francisco and so on throughout the state--organized and working in cooperation with our state employment service to match the hard-core unemployed in our poverty-pockets with jobs they can do or can be trained to do. The man in charge is working for no salary and the cost of the program is borne by the industries.

Contrast this with the proposed poverty program I vetoed several weeks ago. It, too, was aimed at the hard-core unemployed.

It was going to put seventeen of them to work clearing park land, but half the funds went for seven administrators to oversee the seventeen unemployed.

Answers Needed

We need you--but we need you not just with a head full of packaged information marching in the ranks.

We need you asking why, if we are so prosperous, should the numbers of those on welfare increase each year? Shouldn't welfare, if it is successful, be reducing the need for itself? Will we
consider it a success when all of us are on public subsistence or should we judge it success on how many people it rescues from the dole?

We need answers to crime and why it has reached a critical point. Just blaming it on poverty will not do, because in the poverty of the great depression crime was at its lowest level and now in prosperity it has reached its peak.

Higher education in contemporary America has a sacred obligation to instill attitudes toward growth and learning that will in turn shape society. You are here to find yourselves as individuals, to at least have a chance to realize your potential.

The world is full of people who believe men need masters. Our society was founded on a different premise, but continuation of this way of ours is not inevitable. It will persist only if we care enough. We must care too much to settle for a non-competitive mediocrity. Only the best that is in each of us will do.

If it has seemed that we have left your generation with no cause to believe in, no banner to follow— you do have a cause here in this land.

For one tick of history's clock we gave the world a shining golden hope. Mankind looked to us. Now the door is closing on that hope and it could be your destiny to keep it open.
Address by President Richard M. Nixon (R-Calif)*

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

September 16, 1970

IT'S TIME TO STAND UP
AND BE COUNTED

Governor Landon, Governor Docking, President McCain, Senator Pearson, Senator Dole, all the distinguished guests on the platform and all the distinguished guests in this audience for this Landon Lecture Series: I want to express at first on behalf of both Mrs. Nixon and myself, our warm appreciation for your welcome. It is good to be on one of America's great universities. And for the benefit of our television audience I should explain this tie. As we were pulling out to Kansas on the Airforce One, Senator Pearson and Senator Dole and other members of the congressional delegation and others presented this tie to me and said, "You must wear it when you speak at Kansas State." So I put it on and then the television director for today's telecast said, "You can't wear that tie." I said, "Why not?" and he said, "Purple doesn't go with a blue suit." All that I can say is, I am proud to wear the purple at Kansas State. And incidentally, I also want to thank those who made the arrangements for this meeting for having as the waiting room before we came into the auditorium here, the dressing room for the Kansas State basketball team. It is nice to be in the room with a winner, believe me.

At this great university, in this distinguished company, I cannot help think about the twists of fate—and of how we learn from them.

I think of the fans of Wildcat football here today who have known what it is to lose—and then who have known what it is to win.

I think back to 1936, you were not born then, but I think then when Governor Landon—who already knew what it was to win—the only winner among governors on the Republican side in 1934. A man who knew what it was to win up until that time—learned what it was like to lose.

And I think too of some of the moments in my own career: as a football player who spent most of my time on the bench; as a candidate who knew the great satisfaction, of winning—and then as a candidate who learned what it meant to lose.

*Taken from tape furnished by K.S.A.C.
Having won some and lost some, I know—as you know—that winning is a lot more fun.

But I also know that defeat or adversity can react on a person in different ways.

He can give up; he can complain about "a world he never made;" or he can search the lessons of defeat and find the inspiration for another try, or a new career, or a richer understanding of the world and of life itself.

When Alf Landon lost his race to Franklin Roosevelt, he was not a man to waste his life in brooding over might-have-beens. In the 34 years since then, the world has been transformed. Enriched by his experience, Alf Landon has continued to grow with the world—until now he is one of the great elder statesmen of America, a man whose wisdom and common sense, and whose outspoken concern for the welfare of this nation, have inspired and aided generations that have come after. We applaud him and commend him today for that distinguished career.

Or, in a completely different field but related, take Kansas State football team. As some of you may have noted, I am somewhat of a football buff.

Just three years ago the Wildcats had a dismal seven-year record of eight wins and sixty losses. But there was a dogged spirit here, a determination, a readiness to learn new ways—and when Vince Gibson came to the campus it was that spirit, that determination, that "Purple Pride" that he helped translate into the "Purple Power" of today.

As for myself, I doubt that I would be President today if I had not learned from the lessons of defeat in 1960 and 1962—and I hope that I can be a better President because of those lessons.

I cite these examples not only to suggest that we here today have something in common—but also because this pattern of playing by the rules, of losing some and winning some, of accepting the verdict and having another chance, is fundamental to the whole structure on which our liberty rests.

There are those who protest that if the verdict of democracy goes against them democracy itself is at fault, the system is at fault—who say that if they don't get their own way, the answer is to burn a bus or bomb a building.

Yet we can maintain a free society only if we recognize that in a free society no one can win all the time; no one can have his own way all the time; and no one is right all the time. Whether in a campaign or a football game, or in debate on the great issues of the day, the answer to "losing one" is not a rush to the barricades but a study of why, and then a careful rebuilding—or perhaps a careful re-examination of whether the other fellow may have been right after all.
When Palestinian guerrillas hijacked four airliners in flight, they brought to 250 the number of aircraft seized since the skyjacking era began in 1961. And as they held their hundreds of passengers hostage under threat of murder, they sent shock-waves of alarm around the world at the spreading disease of violence and terror and its use as a political tactic.

That same cancerous disease has been spreading all over the world and here in the United States.

We saw it three weeks ago in the vicious bombing at the University of Wisconsin, one man lost his life, four were injured and years of painstaking research by a score of others destroyed.

We have seen it in other bombings and burnings on our campuses, and in our cities; in the wanton shootings of policemen; in the attacks on school buses; in the destruction of offices, the seizure and harassment of college officials, the use of force and coercion to bar students and teachers from classrooms and even to close down whole campuses.

Consider just a few items in the news:

--- A courtroom spectator pulls out a gun, he halts the trial, gives arms to the defendants, takes the judge and four other hostages, moves to a waiting getaway van—and in the gunfight that follows four die, including the judge.

--- A man walks into the guardhouse of a city park and pumps five bullets into a police sergeant sitting quietly at his desk.

--- A Nobel Prize winner working on a cancer cure returns to the cages of his experimental rats and mice to find them vandalized, with some of the animals running loose, some thrown out of the window into the sea, and hundreds missing. Just think, years of research which could after some progress bring a cure to this dread disease, destroyed without reason.

--- A police patrolman responds to an anonymous emergency call that reported a woman screaming, arrives at the address, finds the house deserted but a suitcase left behind; as he bends over to examine it, it explodes, blowing off his head and wounding seven others.

These acts of viciousness all took place in the United States—all in the past five weeks.

America at its best has stood steadfastly for the rule of law among nations. But we cannot stand successfully for the rule of law abroad unless we respect the rule of law at home. A nation that condones blackmail and terror at home can hardly stand as the example in putting an end to international piracies or tensions that could explode into war abroad.
The time has come for us to recognize that violence and terror have no place in a free society, whatever the perpetrated cause or perpetrators may be. This is the fundamental lesson for those to remember. In a system, like ours, which provides the means for peaceful change, no cause justifies violence in the name of change.

Those who bomb universities, who ambush policemen, who hijack airplanes and hold their passengers hostage, all share in common not only a contempt for human life but also a contempt for those elemental decencies on which a free society rests—and they deserve the contempt of every American who values those decencies.

Those decencies, those self-restraints, those patterns of mutual respect for the rights and the feelings of one another, the willingness to listen to somebody without trying to shout him down, are what we must preserve if freedom itself is to be preserved.

There always have been those among us who chose violence or intimidation to get what they wanted. Their existence is not new. What is new is their numbers, and the extent of the passive acquiescence, or even fawning approval, that in some fashionable circles has become the mark of being "with it."

Commenting on the bombing three weeks ago at the University of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin State Journal recently said:

...it isn't just the radicals who set the bomb in a lighted, occupied building who are guilty. The blood is on the hands of anyone who has encouraged them, anyone who has talked recklessly of "revolution," anyone who has chided with mild disparagement the violence of extremists while hinting that the cause is right all the same.

And I would add that what corrodes a society even more deeply than violence itself is the acceptance of violence, the condoning of terror, the excusing of inhuman acts in a misguided effort to accommodate the community's standards to those of the violent few.

For when this happens, the community sacrifices more than its calm, and more even than its safety. It loses its integrity and corrupts its soul.

Nowhere should the rule of reason be more respected, or more jealously guarded, than in the halls of our great universities. It is the rule of reason that is so important.

Yet, as we know, at some of our great universities small bands of destructionists have been allowed to impose their own rule of arbitrary force.

Because of this, we face the greatest crisis in the history of American education.
In times past we have had crisis in education, I remember then, we faced shortages of classrooms, shortages of teachers, shortages that could be made up, however, by appropriating more money.

These material shortages are nothing compared to the crisis of the spirit which rocks hundreds of campuses across the country today. And because of this, to put it bluntly, today higher education in America risks losing that essential support it has had since the beginning of this country—the support of the American people.

America and Americans since the time of our foundations, particularly those who do not have the opportunity to go to a great college or university, have been proud in the past of its enormous strides in higher education and have supported it. The number of students in college today has doubled in the past ten years. But at a time when the quantity of education is going dramatically up its quality is massively threatened by assaults which terrorize faculty, students and university and college administrators alike.

It is time for responsible university and college administrators, faculty and student leaders to stand up and be counted. Only they can save higher education in America. It cannot be saved by government. If we turn only to government to save it, then government will move in and run the colleges and universities. And so the place to save it is here among the faculty, the administrators, the student leaders. To attempt to blame government for all the woes of the universities which is the fashion these days, is to seek an excuse, not a reason, for their troubles. Listen to this. If the war were ended today, if the environment were cleaned up tomorrow morning and all the other problems for which government has the responsibility were solved tomorrow afternoon—the moral and spiritual crisis in the universities would still exist.

The destructive activists at our colleges and universities are a small minority. My text at this point reads, "But their voices have been allowed to drown out the responsible majority." That may be true in some places, but not at Kansas State. But their voices have been allowed to drown out the responsible majority. As a result, there is a growing, dangerous attitude among millions of people that all youth are like those few who appear night after night on the television screen shouting obscenities, making threats or engaging in destructive and illegal acts.

One of the greatest disservices the disrupters have done, in fact, is precisely that: to reflect unfairly on those millions of students like those in this room, who do go to college for an education, who do study, who do respect the rules and who go on to make constructive contributions to peaceful change and progress in this country.
Let us understand exactly where we are. I would not for one moment call for a dull, passive conformity on the part of our university and college students, or for an acceptance of the world as it is. The great strength of this nation is that our young people, the young people like those in this room, in generation after generation, give the nation new ideas, new directions, new energy. I do not call for a conformity in which the young simply ape the old or in which we freeze the faults that we have. We must be honest enough to find what is right and to change what is wrong in America. But at the same time we must take an uncompromising stand against those who reject the rules of civilized conduct and of respect for others—those who would destroy what is right in our society and whose actions would do nothing to right what is wrong.

Automatic conformity with the older generation—and I say this as one of the older generation—is wrong. At the same time, it is just as wrong to fall into a slavish conformity with those who falsely claim to be the leaders of the new generation, out of fear that it would be unpopular—or considered square—not to follow their lead. It would be a tragedy for our young generation to become simply parrots for the slogans of protest, uniformly chanting the same few phrases—often with the same four-letter words.

Let us take one example that deeply troubles, and I understand why it deeply troubles, many of our young people today: the war in Vietnam.

Many of the slogans, I've heard them often, simply say we should end the war. There is no difference among Americans on that. All of us want to end the war.

We are ending the war. Ending the war is not the issue. We have been in four wars in this century. We ended World War One. We ended World War Two. We ended Korea. The great question is how we end it, and what kind of peace we achieve.

A "peace now" would encourage those that would engage in aggression and that would lead to a bigger and more terrible war later would be too great a price.

As we look back over the 20th Century, and as we look at that whole record of this century only seventy years, we see that not yet in this century has America been able to enjoy even one full generation of peace.

The whole thrust, the whole purpose, of this Administration's foreign policy—whether in Vietnam, or the Middle East, or in Europe, or in our relations with the developing countries or the Communist powers—is to meet our responsibilities in such a way that at last we can have what we have not had in this century: a full generation of peace. I believe we can have it. I believe you're going to have it.
That is why, in Vietnam, we are carrying out a policy that will end the war, and that will do it in a way that contributes to a just and lasting peace in the Pacific, in Vietnam, and, we trust, in the world.

There are those who say that this is the worst of times to be alive. What self-pitying nonsense that is. I am perhaps more aware of the problems this nation has abroad than most of you.

But we in America have a great deal to be proud of—and a great deal to be hopeful about for the future.

Let us open our eyes, let's look around us. We see, as we look at the whole sweep of history, that for the first time in the whole history of man, it has become possible here in American to do things that nobody even dreamed could be done even fifty years ago.

We see a natural environment. True, it has been damaged by the careless misuses of technology, but we also see that the same technology gives us the ability to clean up that environment and restore the clean water, the clean air, the open spaces, that are our rightful heritage. And I pledge we can do that and shall do it in America.

We see a nation now rich enough so that everyone willing and able to work can earn a decent living, and so that we can care for those who are not able to do so.

We see a nation that now has the capacity to make enormous strides in these years just ahead in health care, in education, in the creative use of our increasing leisure time.

We see a nation poised to progress more in the next five years, in a material sense, than it did in fifty only a short time ago.

We see that because of our wealth, because of our freedom, because of our system, we can go on to develop those great qualities of the spirit that only decades ago were still buried by the weight of drudgery—and in 75% of the world today still buried we see we can in America lift that weight of drudgery, allow the development of the age of prosperity that we can do this not just for an elite, not just for the few, but for the many. All this can happen in America.

The question is: How shall we use our great opportunity?

Shall we toss it away in mindless disruption and terror? Shall we let it wither away in despair? Or shall we prepare ourselves as you are preparing yourselves, and so conduct ourselves, that we will be looked back upon as the beginning of the brightest chapter ever in the unfolding of the American dream?
Making its promise real requires an atmosphere of reason, of tolerance, and of common courtesy—with that basic regard for the rights and feelings of others that is the mark of a civilized society.

It requires that the members of the academic community rise firmly in defense of the free pursuit of truth—that they defend it as zealously today against threats from within as they have in the past against threats from without.

It requires that the idealism of the young—and indeed, the idealism of all ages—be focused on what can be done within the framework of a free society, recognizing that its structure of rights and responsibilities is complex and fragile and as precious as freedom itself.

The true idealist pursues what his heart says is right in a way that the head says will work. But the final test of his idealism lies in the respect each shows for the rights of others.

Despite all the difficulties, all the divisions, all the troubles that we have had, we can look to the future, I believe, with pride and with confidence.

As I speak here today on the campus of this great university, I recall one of the great sons of Kansas, Dwight David Eisenhower. And I recall the eloquent address he made in London's historic Guildhall he made directly after the victory in Europe. On that day, to the huge assemblage of all the leading dignitaries of Britain that had gathered there to honor him, in his remarks, one of the most eloquent speeches in the history of English eloquence, he said very simply: "I come for the heart of America."

Now, twenty-five years later, as I speak in the heart of America, I can truly say to you here today that you are the heart of America—and the heart of America is strong. It is sound. It is good. It will give us—you will give us—the sound and responsible leadership that the great promise of America calls for—and in doing so you will give my generation what it most fervently hopes for: the knowledge that your generation will see that promise of the American dream fulfilled.
Address by Governor Nelson Rockefeller (R-N.Y.)*

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

May 9, 1968 (Excerpts)

Since another politician passed this way a couple of months ago, a lot has happened: Lyndon Johnson bowed out; Hubert Humphrey bowed in; Bobby Kennedy got his hair cut; and I finally decided to go all the way myself.

I am happy and rather encouraged to be here in the great state that gave us a great Republican President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. And I am delighted to be visiting with you young men and women, for the campus is an exciting place these days. Some campuses, in fact, are a little too exciting. But your generation has identified itself as a generation that truly cares. You enjoy and you exercise the freedom to protest. This is essential, as necessary as the need for reappraisal, for re-examination of our society.

Important as the politics of protest may be, I am convinced that you and all of us must get to the policies of action. You've heard enough about the size of our problems. I think you would like to take part in some practical solutions. I think the people of America want more positive action and less anguished oratory: action, above all, to achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam and also to achieve more meaningful progress at home.

For a long time, I've been convinced that the way to know what people are really concerned about is to pay close attention to what they are joking about. Like the man telling me the other day about his son, who will graduate from college next month. The father asked this young man what he would like as a graduation present. His son replied: "Well, dad, how about an apartment in Montreal?"

Then there was the slogan on a blackboard at New York State University. Someone had written: "Draft graduate students-care enough to send the very best."

This wry humor tells us a lot about the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam and the present draft law—and that law is, indeed, serious cause for concern.

*Taken from office of Governor Rockefeller.
Under the present law, millions of young men and their families are kept in a state of needless uncertainty over an eight-year period—from the young man's 18th birthday to his 26th birthday. Thus, the workings of the draft law today are arbitrary and inequitable. The youth of America is not getting fair treatment under an outdated law that in effect favors the well-to-do and drafts the poor.

The present draft law should be changed to reduce the needless uncertainty and to end the present built-in discrimination. This could be accomplished by a draft system based on a lottery. Every young man as he reached the age of 19 would have a choice as to whether his name would be subject to a draft lottery—either before or after four years of college.

If the youth put his name into the lottery and wasn't drafted in a year, he would be passed by and would be clear of the draft unless war needs worsened.

If he took a student deferment, he would be allowed to continue his education up to and including his bachelor's degree but on graduation he would go into the lottery pool for one year. If after this year he was not drafted, he would consider himself free of the draft unless war needs increased.

This plan is not only completely fair—it's practical.

There's another question that always comes up in connection with military service: "If you're old enough to fight, why aren't you old enough to vote?" I say you are.

I vigorously support giving the vote to 18-year-olds.

As a public official, I have no fear of exposing my ideas to the judgment of voters under 21. In fact, a good gauge of a man's actions as a leader is how well they appeal to the high ideals of youth.

Idealism alone, however, is not enough. The ability to translate ideals into action is the key to leadership; leadership that understands the true nature of the problems we face; leadership able to plan for the future; leadership that can act wisely to solve problems and shape events so they may serve our purposes and not overwhelm us in the form of crises.

This has been the great quality and capacity of the American people. We have no reason to lose confidence in ourselves and our institutions. Complex and overwhelming as our problems at home and abroad may seem, we have no reason to be discouraged. These problems can be solved. They can be handled. The necessary actions are doable.

This war in Vietnam supplies a perfect example of what I mean in this respect. The basic problem there can be solved by negotiation of an honorable peace—not further escalation of military action.
But out of this peace will come not only serious postwar conversion problems but also unique opportunities to build a more just society at home and a better framework for lasting peace and progress in the world.

Communist ideology and communist propaganda maintain that the economic strength and vitality of our society in America depends on war. This is absolutely untrue. True prosperity can only be achieved in peace. But to take advantage of the opportunities of lasting peace will require effective planning and cooperating between government and the private segments of our society.

In New York State, I've already appointed a 25-member Post-Vietnam Planning Committee of leading representatives of government, business, labor, the academic world and civic groups.

The purposes of this committee are:

1. To see that young people coming back from Vietnam have every opportunity to go on with their education, to get good jobs, to establish themselves on a basis of full equality in civilian life;

2. To smooth the transition of industry from war to full peacetime production; and

3. To channel wartime production capacity to meeting social needs.

Here I refer to such vital tasks as rebuilding city slums, expanding education, modernizing transportation, tackling the problems of air and water pollution, and making a major assault on the pent-up needs for adequate housing.

In New York we already have the program and we will be ready to go with the plans for conversion when the time comes. And this, in my opinion, is the kind of approach to problems that we must take on a national basis. These aren't pipe dreams. These things can be done. I know because we are doing them in New York State—and on a sound basis.

I propose that a National Post-Vietnam Planning Committee be established now. Such a comprehensive planning effort between government, business and labor is essential to assure the creation of the 8 million new jobs that will be needed in this country by 1970. Only in this way can we be certain to have good jobs available for all our returning veterans; for new entrants into the labor force; for the hard core unemployed.

Not only New York but the nation as a whole needs more hospitals and nursing homes, more highways, parks and schools, new commuter facilities and airports, decent housing to replace crumbling slum tenements, sewage treatment plants to end water pollution, and many other public facilities.
The idealism of you young men and women of America inspires us and demands of us that we respond to the challenge of the exciting future before us.

We can meet America's needs.

We can restore hope, develop confidence, and build faith in America, and among the peoples of all the world. For in the wise words of Emerson, "This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it."
Address by Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel (R-Alaska)*

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

April 6, 1970

BE PART OF THE SOLUTION:
NOT PART OF THE PROBLEM

I never would have dreamed, as the son of a western Kansas tenant farmer, that these wonderful clear skies and sparkling waters and streams of Kansas would be in danger in my whole lifetime.

Even on the hottest summer day you could look up at those skies, breathe deeply and just be refreshed in the beauty and the cleanliness of the country.

...Or you could go down by a little creek by our place called Cow Creek and you could just scoop up a safe, clean, pure drink of water.

But you know in a few years you may not be able to enjoy these same carefree resources.

An Environmental Emergency

Talk of permanent destruction of the environment—that really isn't an idle threat of some alarmist.

It is a fact. And somehow it is frightening.

Smog is no longer a phenomenon peculiar to California.

Polluted water is no longer just a hazard of the Potomac or Lake Erie or the Hudson or any other place.

In my opinion, all of mankind is just plunging headlong into an environmental emergency.

And yet many people still refuse to face it.

It is not always an easy sign to find out and recognize the warning signals.

They are pretty subtle. They are something like the symptoms of cancer—you don't find them right away but believe me they are just as deadly.
It's a terrible paradox--air and water and land--the very elements which attracted those early settlers out to our country--are being threatened by our efforts to build a good and vigorous society.

We are beginning to realize that the best things in life are not free. If we don't pay the cost to protect them, believe me we shall lose them.

You know, there is toxic air floating around the world and those dangerous elements in that air are really invisible and yet they've been found by scientists, around the South Pole and in the snow layers of Antarctica.

Our rivers, the life system of our land, are becoming the death system for the oceans.

Millions of tons of pollutants and pesticides are being poured into the sea, threatening to destroy man's greatest source for future food and oxygen.

...But even here, we must become aware and become more concerned about the quality of this essential element of our total life system.

You know, when I was a kid my mother would say "Walter, Kansans are realists. They are like our neighbors in Missouri, the 'show me' state."

Pollution Is A Reality

I hope that if you remember nothing else from my remarks today, you will remember my warning that pollution is just not something politically popular to talk about.

It is a worldwide threat of the greatest magnitude.

The question before us is this: "Can we remodel our mental attitudes and retool our industry fast enough to do something about it?"

I believe we can.

My belief--and it is mainly a statement of faith, not of fact--is based on faith in the heart of the future--the great university campuses such as this.

The young people of this country have risen to the moment.

They have challenged the very foundations of our value system.

They ask, "Can we afford to consume everything that we can afford to buy?"

I have met with hundreds of students in recent months, and these young people want to know:
"What right have we--in the time-span of a few generations--
to use up a majority of the irreplaceable natural resources which
it took millions of years to produce?"

They ask, "What will be left for our children? And their children
in turn?"

They talk about the "environmental ethics"--the rights of plants
and animals to continue to exist in an ecological balance.

These are serious questions. And I am serious about trying to
answer them.

**Government Impact**

What concerns me as an official responsible to you and all
Americans, is how the input from the concerned young people can
have a meaningful impact on the centers of governmental activity.

Life is changing so fast nowadays and especially in the seventies
that we can no longer tolerate the old pace of a good idea fighting
its way through established bureaucracy.

A good idea today can be out of date in a year, or even in
matter of months.

To fight this "bureaucratic breakdown" in the Department of
the Interior, we have taken several steps.

Last month I set up in my office a "Task Force on Environmental
Education and Youth Activities." This coordinating body will serve
as a clearinghouse and a creative center for a number of functions.

**Scope**

It will give us immediate access to a new program called "SCOPE"--
Student Councils on Pollution and Environment.

SCOPE is a unique experiment in government--student relationships.

Students are being invited to participate directly with the
government on emerging national issues of immense proportions.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration in the Depart-
ment of Interior has established SCOPE committees in each of the nine
regions across the nation.

These committees will serve as a channel through which students
can contact federal authorities, and secure technical information
developed by various federal agencies.

Through SCOPE we are showing government that it really pays
to listen--as well as talk!
We are developing methods to insure that student suggestions, and their views on environmental problems—and program priorities—can reach us directly—and by us I mean the Secretary of the Interior.

Since meeting with representatives from each of the nine regions, I have decided to expand this program from FWPCA, into a wider framework.

We are exploring the possibilities of expanding it to an interdepartmental organization. In this way it could have an impact on all the federal agencies working on pollution problems.

"Early Warning System"

Already the SCOPE representatives are serving as part of a highly motivated, public "early warning system."

When pollution is spotted—or major projects are launched without regard for the environment, SCOPE is notifying the authorities.

And now, as I travel around the country, I will be meeting with the regional SCOPE groups to discuss regional concerns.

Today will see the first of those meetings, with the SCOPE group here at Kansas State.

Pollution will only be eradicated when the government and the public work together on it as a team.

I am encouraged that the student community is responding.

We look forward to combining the enthusiasm and the fresh ideas of youth with the technical competence and the enforcement capacity of the federal government.

We also have many young people who want to take a full time role in the environment battle.

Because the crisis we face is much deeper than just pollution. It has to do with the entire way men and women live.

For this reason, I have called for creation of a National Environmental Service Force, patterned somewhat after the Peace Corps.

"Environmental Peace Corps"

...In fact, a few editors around the nation have already called this proposed organization the "Environmental Peace Corps."

We have received hundreds of letters from young doctors, undergraduates, engineers, high school students, biologists, and architects.

These are young people who are eager and have a desire to participate.
We are going to suggest that this group take the formal name of environmental control organization, or "ECO" (E-CO).

The idea is to place young talent in those areas of the nation needing study and help the most.

Spontaneous groups on the grass roots level have already sprung up across the country.

And I believe that ECO members can provide leadership for those willing to really bring forth the effort and give it the direction that is needed.

An example--at the secondary education level, ECO could help fill the gap in schools which do not have the trained personnel to meet the mushrooming demands of the environmental education.

The scientists, the lawyers, and the social scientists--those who participate could lend their skills to the community leaders in any given region to evaluate, plan and coordinate, and above all, execute new approaches to ecological problems.

Educated, and educating others in environmental problems, these Americans are determined to find solutions--and believe me, with or without governmental help.

An Opportunity And An Obligation

This makes the situation both an opportunity--and an obligation--for this Administration.

The opportunity:

At a time when we are beginning to realize the deteriorating condition of our environment, the Administration can acquire invaluable aid--in terms of a commitment, knowledge, and sheer manpower--to bring about a reversal in ecological trends. Some are highly skilled and others are only beginning. But the task at hand has a broad range of needs.

The obligation:

Most of these individuals are generally "apolitical," or even "anti-political."

The environmental crisis may well present our last chance to bring significant numbers of potential future leaders back into the political process.

Government Must Respond

Government can and must prove that it can respond, and encourage youth involvement.
We are finding that a highly developed society such as ours demands a whole new breed of professional--people who can study both ecology and economics--and biology and philosophy.

We need people who are broad enough in their exposure to have a good balanced judgment.

These must be people who are ready to do exhaustive research and wide field work--men and women who are fascinated by nature and the needs of man and how we live totally.

There must be people who are ready to do exhaustive research and wide field work--men and women who are fascinated by nature and the needs of man and how we live totally.

There has been a lot of talk--you hear it today and throughout the nation--about students and the environmental movement.... In fact, you can get into an argument from some who call it the "Environment Bag"...as some of my young staff people sometimes refer to it--you know, is a "sellout."

...A sellout of the issues of the day.

For example, you may have heard that a group of students demonstrated against me when I spoke at a great university a few weeks ago at Princeton--Although more than a thousand students signed a petition that following week to apologize for their action.

During my speech, I would like to mention that I was interrupted with shouts like,

"What about racism and black liberation?"

My attitude about these protests, and others, is this:

A Clean Environment For All Americans

As Secretary of the Interior, a clean environment for all Americans out of the ghettos...that they have somewhere worth getting into.

By no measure does the environmental crusade conflict with man's struggle for equal treatment and justice.

I think it is complementary to any attempt to improve the quality of an individual's life. It is forcing us to realize that there really is just one race and you know that is the human race.

America for many, many years since its birth has been a crusading nation.

Recently I addressed the American Petroleum Institute and this is what I told them:
"The oil industry--like much of today's industry--stands in danger of becoming the monster of American society."

"This is a crusading nation...and the crusaders are up in arms."

The enemy is becoming very clear to the people...it is those who foul the nation's air and water...and those who stand in a position of authority to do something about the destruction of our resources --but who do nothing.

The Challenge

I challenge you--as you are challenging government--to respond to national and world needs.

Industry does not produce just for its own good. They don't make cars just because they enjoy making cars...nor does any manufacturer produce a product without knowing that he has a market for it. They produce because you, we, we all want--and often need--the things they produce.

You are challenging government to regulate broadly and prosecute those who pollute--and I am moving to meet that challenge, as you can see in our recent request for a Grand Jury investigation into oil pollution in the Gulf of Mexico.

My challenge to you is to crusade not only against the sins of the past, which you can blame on the older generation, but to also crusade to safeguard the future by changing our priorities and even our life-styles.

I say this--Please do not fall for the temptation to write-off government or industry. There are elements in both groups who are determined to find new ways of doing things and to solve these problems.

Many of us--I know many of our Cabinetmen --are searching for how to streamline clumsy bureaucracy. We are fighting daily to create a country in which man's surroundings are not sacrificed by his technological advance.

Air--Water--Land

At stake are the most precious ingredients for sustaining life.

--Air that you can not only breathe without seeing or choking but which really refreshes you and invigorates you.

--Clean water to drink and swim in. Well you know that many of these things we still have--but it is time to beware.

--We want to look at land that is not only the producer of our food and energy, but which restores the soul of man through its beauty and through its very basic contact with nature.
Make No Mistake

But make no mistake about this--if the people leave the job just to government--and if they do nothing but protest--it will not be done.

It will take positive achievement and a commitment on the part of every American.

My deepest wish is that my native State of Kansas--you people right here--lead the way in producing a new generation with a new set of values--

A generation that really wants to be part of the solution and not of the problem.

A generation dedicated to caring for the Earth and all the people that live on it.

And I know just by looking in your faces the kind of people you are, that you will respond to this challenge and you will win!

Thank you.
Address by Former Governor Alfred M. Landon (R-Kan.)*
Kansas State University
December 13, 1966

NEW CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

We must face the challenges of new realities of international life today.

The world is an armed camp. An uneasy peace is maintained, while a power struggle continues to build up between the Soviet Union and China, with the United States neutral between them. On the other hand, we support South Vietnam's opposition to Communist aggression.

India, the second largest nation, wrecked by Socialistic leadership, is racked by internal dissension and menaced by external threats.

The potential colossus of China—the world's most populous nation—is experiencing a severe internal revolution.

The end of the Vietnam war is not in sight. And the vital questions of barring the use and spread of nuclear weapons and the military use of space remain unanswered.

Everywhere, a new nationalism—having recently vanquished European empires—is now transcending ideologies and old alliances, and is paradoxically supporting world peace, based on fear—not trust. World Communism, the United Nations, NATO, and the Atlantic Alliance are fragmenting on the rocks of this new nationalism.

The New Nationalism

This new nationalism is one of independence and self-determination. It is not the old dynasty nationalism with its ancestral roots in medieval feudalism. Nor is it the aggressive nationalism of modern dictators built on the doctrine of force.

World War One wiped out the last of the monarchs representing the centuries-old dynasty nationalism. And World War Two eliminated two megalomaniac dictators—Hitler and Mussolini—and their Japanese brethren. The policies of two more aggressors—Stalin and Sukarno—have been thrown by their people on the scrap heap of history. Only one of the five megalomaniacs of our time is left—China's troubled Mao. The ruthless Red Guards turned loose by him on his unhappy countrymen are a sad recreation of Hitler's Jackboots and Mussolini's Blackshirts.

*Taken from Kansas State University Publications.
Meanwhile, China's world influence has suffered severe reversals—
in Latin America, Africa, India, and Indonesia—and also in the United
Nations which, by the greatest majority vote in some years, recently
refused to seat Communist China.

This new nationalism is transcending Communism. Both outside-
as well as inside China—the theories of Marx and Lenin for the establish-
ment and maintenance of worldwide Communism are being revised. The
turmoil in China is essentially concerned with a struggle between the
fundamentalists and revisionists.

The Soviet Union is departing so far from the original concepts
of Marx and Lenin as to render them almost unrecognizable. Soviet
Communism is moving slowly and subtly, but surely, toward incorporation
of certain capitalistic principles of reward for individual talent and
incentive.

Behind the thinning and now porous Iron Curtain, Communism has failed
to meet the hopes and aspirations of its people. Its hierarchy is changed.
Developing public opinion has eroded and loosened its monolithic structure.

The heretofore captive East European satellites are no longer captive
nor satellites. They are pushing away from economics and political con-
trol and domination by Moscow. And it must be admitted that—by the same
token—Western Europe is also pushing away from economic and political
domination by the United States of America.

This new nationalism has wrought momentous changes. It is changing
the post-war alliances within both the Communist and non-Communist world.
It presents great difficulties for the United Nations and the ideas of
world federation, or Atlantic union.

By fostering national barriers, the new nationalism in one sense
obstructs international cooperation. Paradoxically, by reducing ideo-
logical barriers, this new nationalism in another sense permits greater
international cooperation based on the principle of equality of nations.

International Trade

In October, 1961, when the White House was divided on whether to
support the fledgling European Economic Community, or whether to request
a year's extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, I urged
support of the E.E.C. as the most realistic step toward economic and
political stability, and hence world peace. Why? Because the E.E.C.
was founded on the simple principle of removing nationalist barriers to
international trade.

The principle of a high protective tariff is basic to a govern-
ment-protected, or owned, or managed economy. High tariffs inhibit
cross-cultural relations. Freer trade, on the other hand, enables the
peoples of different nations to become better acquainted with the customs,
beliefs, ways of life, and government policies of one another. With the
greater expansion and ease of communication today, freer trade induces
mutual international understanding.
When international understanding is thus achieved, political tensions are reduced and voices of reason are easier heard and understood. The way is then prepared to move toward world stability, increased prosperity, higher standards of living and education, and peaceful competitive existence in international markets. These conditions, in turn, form the foundation for cooperative political policies among nations.

Two and one-half years of bargaining within the European Economic Community are coming to a close with expectation of the most substantial tariff reductions in history. The effects of the action will spread all over the world—from Europe to Latin America, Africa and Asia. I quote from a recent statement by the Japanese Ambassador:

We Japanese believe that contacts through trade tend to facilitate mutual understanding among nations of differing ideologies and social structures.

This development is not as dramatic and grandiose as a League of Nations, a United Nations, or world law based on a world court. However, international trade is the only proven method for initiating a workable peace with international security and understanding security and understanding that might save the United Nations organization which is now bankrupt financially, politically, and structurally. The world needs the United Nations as a forum to discuss and expose international grievances and concerns.

Early this year, our President requested Congress to repeal legislation obstructing United States trade with Communist countries. Congress adjourned without acting on the President's trade recommendations. Meanwhile, the English, French, West Germans, and Japanese are filling the orders of China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Our allies are trading with Communist countries. We are not.

The defensive "white elephant" military structures of SEATO and CENTO existed only on paper. Despite our rebuilding efforts, NATO's days are numbered. These alliances were not designed to provide the common ground for better acquaintance with, and understanding of, the Communist world. Nevertheless, our own nationalism persists to inhibit the expansion of America's world trade. The American Congress has learned a prime lesson of history—that economic isolationism leads to political isolationism as well as the converse, and that either is counter-productive in this day and age, as even the Soviet Union is reluctantly learning.

Sino-Soviet-American Relations

The world is truly in an era of greatest change. World peace and stability depend on harmonious relations between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The time has come for each to completely reappraise its foreign policies. Each major power must ask itself whether it correctly perceives new realities, whether momentous world changes have
evoked commensurate policy responses. Specifically, each must introspectively assess whether continuing confrontation with its military strength is the most effective means to assure world peace and stability and hence its own security.

What are these new realities? They include: the Soviet modernizing of Communist dogma, the Sino-Soviet split, European self-determination and independence from Soviet and American domination, the advent of Chinese nuclear power, the growing non-alignment of developing nations, the recession of the Communist tide, and worldwide acceptance of the concept of the welfare state. In a nutshell, these are the new challenges wrought by the new nationalism.

The potential colossus of China, weakened internally and externally by Mao's unrealistic fanatic militancy, bitterly attacks both the Soviet Union and the United States. The irony is that these attacks help to induce better relations between these super powers—exactly what China fears.

The Soviet Union faces hostility from China on her Eastern front—the closest and most obvious mark for its new nuclear bomb—with the longest border line in the world, and territorial disputes and memories of bloody invasions centuries old. The passage of time has not eliminated from the folklore of Russian memories the ravages of Genghis Khan's hordes, or Napoleon's French, of German armies twice in the last fifty years. It was Mao's leadership that chased Russia out of Manchuria.

On her Western front, the Soviet Union fears a united Germany as the devil fears holy water. In all of Russian history, there has been one basic foreign policy and that is to avoid facing a war at the same time on two fronts.

By the same token, China—without a navy—faces the United States of America on her Pacific front and the Soviet Union on her land front.

Both the Soviet Union and China face the United States of America uncertain as to the international policies of the greatest economic power, welfare state, and military power in the world. The Soviet lately links together both China and the United States of American in formal public attacks. The corollary of such attacks is what the Soviet fears.

We have this definite situation that the Soviet Union needs the pressure of America on China in the Pacific, despite Premier Kosygin's continued assertions that "...if the war (in Vietnam) were ended, relations (with America) would certainly improve." China, in turn, needs the pressure of America in Europe on the Soviet Union, despite Mao's attacks on both. The peace of the world is in suspense while this jockeying goes on.

Hence, America is presented with an unusual opportunity to initiate a "live-and-let-live" policy of competitive economic existence with the Soviet Union, or China, or preferably both. Such American
initiatives are necessary to reduce tensions, violence, war, and threats of war, in other words-to normalize international relations. Encouragingly, these policies seem to be developing.

In recent months, President Johnson has made three highly significant foreign policy moves that have generally escaped the public attention and discussion they deserve, and have yet to be explained to the American people. Foremost among the foreign policies of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations were the reunification of Germany and the political and economic isolation of Communist China. These two policies, together with the implications of the President's commitments at the Manila Conference, signify possibly momentous changes in our foreign policy.

Reappraising Our China Policy

The first of these three significant moves by President Johnson occurred in July, 1966, when he proposed at least a tentative reappraisal of our China policy with his offer of reconciliation with China. I quote President Johnson:

Lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.

We persist (in efforts to improve relations) because we believe that cooperation, not hostility, is the way of the future. That day is not here yet. It may be long in coming, but it is clearly on the way, and come it must.

In September, 1966, Vice President Humphrey followed President Johnson's incipient design by speaking of "building bridges to China." I have been urging such a policy for a long time, but without success. Recently, spokesmen for the United States Chamber of Commerce are on record as stating that increased communication with the Peking government is in order. And, according to a recent report of the American Friends Service Committee, our policy of non-intercourse with China is leading to disaster. Said the Committee, and I quote:

Two of the largest and most powerful nations in the world have since 1950 lived largely in isolated ignorance of one another and in an atmosphere of mutual fear and hate.... Some attempt to break the present deadlock is long and dangerously overdue.

The point to be emphasized here is not that our China policy is soon to be reversed. China has replied to the President with more lies and abuse. Rather, the question of great interest to both the United States and the Soviet Union is--After Mao, what? It is in anticipation of answering this important question that the pending reappraisal of our China policy acquires added significance.
Abandoning German Reunification

The second of the three meaningful moves was inherent in Mr. Johnson's assertion of last August that better relations with the Soviet Union "must be our first concern." By implication, the President thereby signaled our intention to abandon the priority of the reunification of Germany. I quote from Joseph C. Harsch in the Christian Science Monitor:

...the President has formally stated that reunification of Germany can come about only within the reunification of Europe. Germany's cause is no longer Step One in healing the split in Europe caused by the cold war. The unity of Germany is a hoped-for result of closer East-West ties. It is no longer the precondition.

Two recent developments in Germany might possibly be related. They are: (1) the downfall of the Erhard government replaced by an uncertain coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats; and (2) a resurgence of German nationalism as evidenced in two state legislative elections.

A quid pro quo for this momentous change in our European policy could be for the Soviet Union to use its good offices in bringing about a settlement in Vietnam that would be worthy of our sacrifice of blood and money. An end to the Vietnam war, according to Premier Kosygin, would pave the way to improved relations. Recently he said, "We want a relaxation of tension; we want an understanding with the United States."

The Soviet Union would have much to gain. She would be free of a threat on her Western front which would allow her to concentrate on the growing Chinese military threat on her long Eastern front.

The Manila Conference

The third and last move fraught with momentous consequences for all the world concerns President Johnson's pre-election Manila Conference. I quote from a recent report by the Research Institute:

First the Conference left untouched the one crucial issue: Where does the Vietcong figure in the war's final settlement? South Viet Premier Ky made clear where he figures the Vietcong: destroyed as an organization, its members "abiding by the law"--the South Vietnam law as enforced by the government headed by Ky.

It is inconceivable that Hanoi or the Vietcong will negotiate on any such terms, unless Ky should retract his words publicly. It is equally inconceivable that he will yield on any of them.
The stage is set, hence for a long drawn-out tug-of-war among the Manila conference—with no end to the fighting itself. The allied stalemate may be harder to break than the field impasse.

And concluding from this report:

If Ky were alone, he might be brought to heel fairly soon. But he has real support from the South Koreans, Thais and Australians. They do not want to see the Vietcong in a peacetime Saigon government either; they are in this to stop Red expansion, no matter what it takes.

This is different from what the Filipinos, New Zealand—and the United States—are ready to accept: Let the Vietcong into the government. Philippine President Marcos is ambitious to become Asia's peacemaker even at the cost of including the V.C.

This is the United States position, as well, although President Johnson did not press it openly at Manila.

The Manila Conference was a complete failure as far as agreement on any Vietnam peace settlement is concerned. Before the ink was dry, Premier Ky of South Vietnam emphatically dissented from President Johnson's interpretation of the Manila Conference proceedings, just as he did with President Johnson's interpretation of the so-called Honolulu Pact. Again I quote from the Research Institute report:

After Manila . . . Ky has only one clear course left: Keep the U.S. fighting until the Vietcong has totally been smashed. This means more men and arms, more escalation, a much wider war.

It should also be noted that the much heralded free election law in that unhappy country gives Premier Ky and his military junta a veto over any measure the civilian assembly adopts.

One result of the Manila Conference was the dramatic pronouncement by our President that the United States is a major Asian power and is assuming guardianship in its name over all of Asia. This appears to be an assertion of national responsibility of appalling proportions. Should Congress implement Johnson's Asian manifesto, it would seem that America would become permanently and deeply involved—politically, militarily, economically—in all Asia.

Nearly two months have passed without any explanation by our President of his sweeping pronouncement. Why is the President silent? Americans are kept in the dark as to just what was said at Manila by our President—and what his intentions are.
Of equal present and future importance is how other governments interpret President Johnson's Manila manifesto. Do they consider it as a definite projection of U.S. foreign policy? Or do they consider his expansive statement as merely a gesture of good intentions designed to obscure the utter failure of the Conference to agree on peace in Vietnam? Have they learned that American presidents' words do not "always weigh a ton"—as Mr. Coolidge said?

Perhaps, when interpreting our President's Manila statement, other governments might recall previous American international commitments which we did not honor as, for example, the Open Door for China which we ignored when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. Or they might recall the Buffalo speech of John Foster Dulles during the 1952 presidential election campaign pledging the new administration—if elected—to liberation of the captive nations of Eastern Europe—a pledge that was to contribute to the Hungarian revolt of 1956 in expectation of American support that was never forthcoming.

Or, our President's Manila pronouncement might be explained as "speaking softly but carrying a big stick." If this is the correct interpretation, then the question must be asked—just how big a stick does America intend to carry in Asia in the light of spreading nuclear power. Do we really need such paramountcy in Asia?

In October, 1964, China formally proposed a conference of the five nuclear powers preliminary to a conference of all nations to abolish nuclear weapons. I immediately urged American acceptance at least for the purpose of discussion. Secretary General U Thant somewhat unprecedentedly publicly endorsed my statement the next morning. But the Johnson administration dismissed off-hand China's overture, on the ground that it was mere propaganda, that China's nuclear bomb was obsolete, and that is would be twenty or more years before China would perfect the means of delivering it. But, in less than two years, China has demonstrated that it has already achieved the capacity to develop an on-target missile delivery system and a bomb with thermonuclear characteristics.

Finally, there is the question—if President Johnson meant what he seemed to say at Manila—where is he going to get the money to bring his Great Society to all of Asia. And this in addition to the pressing question of where is he going to get the money to finance both a big war and yet continue his Great Society for the home folks.

If our President's new Asian policy is undertaken, the greater question must be asked: What responsibility—moral or otherwise—do we Americans actually have to bankrupt ourselves for President Johnson's unrealistic policy for world salvation?

If this policy is described as part of the program to contain Communism, let us observe how Communism is containing itself by its unworkable theories, as can be seen in Communist dominated countries everywhere. Indonesia is the latest example, plus a number of African states that have kicked out both Chinese and Russian attempts at Communist domination.
It will be the responsibility of our Congress to implement President Johnson's Manila manifesto, or to refuse to assume its frightful consequences, when and if the President requests the necessary appropriations to implement it. Even a token Congressional appropriation would be tantamount to the assumption of responsibility that would lead to various future complications.

While the President's astounding Manila manifesto does not require treaty ratification by the United States Senate, it is so vital to American interests that I believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ought to probe all its facets and to expose all its implications, and our obligations under it, for the attention of the American people as well as peoples elsewhere.

These must be a clear and complete understanding not only between American people and their government, but also among the governments that participated at Manila as to what exactly are we Americans expected to do for our Asian wards, what specific commitments and limitations were made by President Johnson, and how lasting will they be. For some unknown reason, President Johnson has chosen not to discuss these great concerns with the American people. Meanwhile, other governments should clearly understand that President Johnson's exuberant Asian commitments require Congressional action under our system to become operative.

The simplest way to clear this all up is to get the complete transcript of the Manila Conference before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for introduction in the Congressional Record.

**African Embargoes**

There remains one other critical development that threatens to enlarge even further the stretching world commitments of the United States. I speak of the growing pressures to impose economic embargoes through the United Nations on Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa. To enforce its decision to end the South African mandate over Southwest Africa, the United Nations may soon impose economic sanctions on South Africa, as well as Rhodesia.

When Britain attempted to bring Rhodesia to heel by imposing sanctions, President Johnson promptly concurred. But these sanctions have failed. Now Prime Minister Wilson is apparently caught bluffing again. When his bold words in his report to the British Parliament of his conference with the Prime Minister of Rhodesia are boiled down, they are nothing but the same old appeal for "special sanctions" by the United Nations on purchases of key Rhodesian products.

From the beginning, it has been evident that Prime Minister Wilson is trying to bluff Rhodesia back into line by threats.

If the United Nations adopts a more forcible policy, who is going to enforce it?
I quote from John Knight's "Editor's Scrapbook:"

Mr. Wilson would like nothing more than to have the United States pull his chestnuts out of the fire. As the Economist of London has said: "To pretend that Britain alone can resolve this problem is just as stupid as to think it can be handed over to the U.N. That duty (sanctions) does not rest with the British government alone. That cloud in Mr. Ian Smith's sky may seem no bigger than a man's hand; but the real question is whether the had is President Johnson's.

And the London Sunday Observer comments that it must be up to the United States to make effective the sanctions on Rhodesia, the Republic of South Africa and Southwest Africa.

The only effective means of enforcing economic embargoes is by naval blockade, not to mention air cover. To effectively blockade the coast of South and Southwest Africa would be prodigious and very expensive undertaking. Our navy is already fully committed. Our First Fleet is patrolling the California coast, and the Second Fleet the Atlantic coast. Our Sixth Fleet operates in the Mediterranean area, and our Seventh Fleet in the straits between Taiwan and China and the rest of the Pacific area, including South Vietnam.

Any effective embargo of Rhodesia would require a blockade of South Africa. The volume of South African trade alone with Great Britain might well involve the solvency of the British pound.

How can we support the solvency of the British pound and yet enforce such economic embargoes on Rhodesia or South Africa, or both, and yet fight a major war in South Vietnam, not to mention all the other American commitments at home and abroad?

This African affair will not be settled in one week or one month. It can be as long as the engagement in Vietnam.

Conclusion

From every side, then, there is a pressing need for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to review and assess the position America occupies as the result of its exuberant evangelical world leadership in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in this hemisphere.

While I staunchly believe in and support President Johnson's policies of new contacts with both the Soviet Union and China as the basis for better international understanding, I believe Senator Fulbright's announced plan for a full and comprehensive review by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in both public and closed hearings is both timely and essential.
Long ago, I said the United Nations could not succeed in its objectives if it left out Communist China.

President Johnson has taken the first steps with both China and the Soviet Union. There has been no commensurate response for either.

Our President is leading from strength, both economically and militarily. There is as much need—perhaps more—for our national administration's intelligent concentration on strengthening our economic foundations and backlogs as its concentrations on strengthening our military.

It is not up to the Soviet Union to demonstrate the change of front—that Premier Kosygin desires—by performance rather than by words. After all, credibility is as essential in political relations as it is in trade.

Let me conclude by saying simply this: We should respond to the new nationalism and other new challenges in international relations in our continuing search for world peace. I believe we are on the threshold of abandoning our foolish and unrealistic China policy. At the same time, we are hopefully making progress toward improving relations with East European nations.

Now, at last, a realistic basis exists for discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States of a new policy for both countries.

Should China recover from her present insanity and join in responsible interaction with the Soviet Union and the United States—a new era in international relations would commence that would shape the destiny of this world by creating stability on which peace with security is ultimately based. This must be our hope. This must be our aim.
Address by Governor George Romney (R - Mich)*

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

December 6, 1967

THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

One of the greatest international challenges facing us today is the huge difference in living standards between the rich, industrialized northern nations and the poor, underdeveloped southern peoples.

Barbara Ward has written:

The gap between the rich and the poor has become inevitably the most tragic and urgent problem of our day.

The "development gap", as it is called, is widening. The "have" nations have failed to adequately commit their vision, their will, and their resources to the task, and the "have not" people are losing ground.

Most Americans perceive neither the proportions of this problem nor the dangers it presents to our own interests. What we take for granted in our own society pre-empts our consciousness of human deprivation elsewhere. Our natural confidence about the future obscures awareness of how fragile it is. In this sense, we are isolating and alienating ourselves from the rest of the world as it really is.

In my talk today, I first want to take a quick look at the development problem—in terms of its size and national interest, and in terms of what needs to be done about it.

Then, in more detail, I will discuss U. S. aid, trade and private resources policies as they relate to development and suggest certain courses of action in these areas.

* Taken from Kansas State University Publication.
Dimensions of the Challenge

What are the dimensions of the development challenge?

The per capita gross national product of the United States is $3,240, its population 200 million. Mainland China's per capita gross national product is $85, its population 700 million. The per capita gross national product of West Germany is $1,620 and of Nigeria $80--both have a population of around 60 million. Japan and Indonesia are at roughly the same population level, but Japan is nine times better in productivity. Canada has one quarter the population and almost ten times the per citizen productive capacity of Brazil.

By the end of this century, on the present basis, the per capita income of Americans will have risen by thirty times as much as the increase in most underdeveloped countries.

The world's population may jump to well over six billion by the end of this century, with nearly five billion living in the world's impoverished regions. The annual birth rate per 1,000 people in the industrialized nations is 20. But in those countries which are already unable to feed their populations adequately it is 40 per thousand.

Underdevelopment is a single word that sums up illiteracy, poverty, hunger, disease, human misery. It breeds violence and anarchy. It presents a vacuum.

Underdevelopment is a greater danger than Communist aggression. The Communists exploit underdevelopment to spread their power and influence. They have carefully prepared for this by spreading the falsehood that the prosperity of the "have" nations resulted from their exploitation of the "have not" nations. Furthermore, they have erected a barrier to effective development by misleading "have not" nations into believing imperialism through private economic investment is as threatening to their independence as imperialism through political domination.

We must successfully attack the basic economic development problems now, or face more Vietnams later. And the dollar cost of the investment for peace is nowhere near the dollar cost for war.

If we remain an affluent island surrounded by a sea of poverty, our whole way of life will be threatened.

If the lot of the deprived peoples does not improve, and if their hopes for a better life wither, widespread violence directly affecting life in the United States would be increased.
If we—and I include our industrialized colleagues on this continent, in Europe, and the few in Asia—become the exclusive rich minority we will be dangerously vulnerable to the massive majority of the poor.

Because, generally speaking, the color line matches the division between the rich nations and the poor nations, the possibilities are frighteningly explosive.

This huge underdeveloped majority would have practically nothing to lose in the struggle.

Development is necessary for peace and peace is necessary for development. Turmoil defeats progress abroad, as well as at home. Violence perpetuates human misery by discouraging the systematic organization of resources needed to raise living standards.

But fear of instability should not be an excuse to maintain the status quo, nor can or should the revolution of rising expectations be suppressed because of the danger of disorder. It is critical that change occur, radical change, and quickly. But supporting change does not mean fomenting violence. We must guide change into constructive rather than destructive channels.

The national self-interest of America is directly, irrevocably dependent on international development. Underdevelopment represents not only threat but opportunity.

As former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon said, "it is not missiles that have made neighbors of distant countries. It is the trading system of the modern world ... Today's less developed nations are tomorrow's richest economic and political asset."

The continued growth of private economies depends on the expansion of international trade and markets. Prospering nations make better customers and markets than poor ones. And among prospering nations political and social problems generally have a better chance of being resolved before they develop into military problems.

From an investment and enterprise standpoint, development of the underdeveloped can be more profitable than investing in activities in areas already developed.

Here then is opportunity.

United States Aid

What can be done about underdevelopment?

At present, our national response is characterized by lower levels of foreign economic assistance, heightened threats of pro-
tectionism, and insignificant private enterprise involvement in the business of development.

There is a general failure of vision, will and leadership.

The total gross national product of all the industrial nations is currently $1.5 trillion per year. Only 1 percent of that in economic aid—public and private—to the underdeveloped nations would amount to $15 billion annually. That would be double the present level.

The flow of long-term capital from the "haves" to the "have nots" has remained about the same since 1961 despite a rise in national income of the richer nations.

There is no question that the industrialized nations can afford to meet the current growth needs of the developing nations without hurting themselves—in fact they can benefit themselves. In the case of the United States, our gross national product for 200 million people has increased by more than $100 billion since 1960, as compared with less than $35 billion for the more than 2 billion people in the less-developed world.

We are slipping—the gap is growing—the danger is increasing.

We must find a way to avert this potential disaster for the world. We must concentrate new energies to use the tremendous wealth and technological expertise of the affluent Northern nations to help develop the poverty-stricken southern peoples.

Bringing sustained growth out of stagnation is a plodding process at best.

It can't happen overnight. It must be conceived in terms of a generation of sustained effort.

This is no Marshall Plan exercise, to rebuild highly sophisticated industrial economies. The underdeveloped nations are starting from scratch. They face economic handicaps not found by the now developed nations during their development.

Most "have not" nations have no political tradition and little sense of nationhood. They have little base to build on, no institutional infrastructure, no large body of educated or trained manpower.

We cannot succeed if we act alone. We must be the leader largely through example.

We must not be arbitrary or impatient in our approach to the problem. Nor can we be exclusive or paternalistic. The cooperative resources of the industrialized nations should be committed
to the task in a coordinated manner, and the recipient nations must effectively marshal their own resources and pull their own share from the beginning. Otherwise, there is no chance of success.

A Role for Private Enterprise

Progress-sharing partnerships between the affluent industrial countries and the underdeveloped areas should be a paramount objective of American foreign policy. This demands changes in our aid, trade and private resource policies, and needs a broad program of international cooperation.

The U. S. has not been responsive enough concerning measures to improve the terms of trade of the poorer nations. The industrial countries generally must be willing to allow the underdeveloped nations to strengthen their earnings from commercial exports.

Private enterprise embodies the very genius of the American economy and carries the contagious germ of freedom. The underdeveloped world must be exposed to the dynamic private enterprise systems of the Northern hemisphere, and a substantial inflow of private investment must be made available.

Even under the most optimistic predictions on trade reform and private resource inflow, it is unlikely that the underdeveloped nations can achieve their development goals without more foreign aid.

The foreign aid program has few friends. It has no political constituency in the United States. It has made some bad errors. It has been wasteful. It has not shown quick or certain progress. Many nations have received our aid and appeared ungrateful, and still, even oppose our position on major international issues.

Sometimes our aid appears to shore up dictators. At other times it fills the pockets of corrupt politicians. Our military assistance and arms sales sometimes seem to encourage recipient countries to war against one another.

It is easy to criticize our aid program. It needs reshaping and continuing vigilant examination. But it is very difficult to administer an aid program in this interdependent but anti-cooperative world of today. Even so, there are some "success" stories, such as Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea. There has been isolated progress.

And it is difficult to argue that government aid is not needed, given the development needs only it can fulfill, given the effect it can have on improving the environment for the inflow of private capital, and given the important ways in which it can complement the desirable effect of trade in development progress.
I believe that the private sector must supply the bulk of the resources needed to assist the underdeveloped countries in their growth. But I also believe that our foreign aid levels have been cut below the amounts required for the necessary input of public funds in meeting the development challenge.

As a percentage of our gross national product, American foreign aid has plummeted to a level about one-half that maintained during the last years of the Eisenhower Administration. The development loans requested by the Administration for the current fiscal year amount to only 78 percent of the $975 million appropriated in 1963.

The current Administration has shown little real leadership in international development, and the foreign aid program shows it. The complaints from the White House on Congressional cuts have usually come after the fact.

In competing with other budget priorities, foreign economic assistance gets lip service and little else. Thus it is unduly vulnerable to Congressional attack; and unreasonably becomes the butt of other frustrations. Overseas, it is looked upon as uncertain and dependable.

In 1957, John Foster Dulles testified for the establishment of the Development Loan Fund, stressing that is would be devoted to "the capital needed to create the economic environment in which private initiative can come into play." The next year, he supported the principle of development loans, technical assistance, and self-help as key parts of the mutual security program, asking: "Are we so poor that we cannot afford to pay for peace and security and to continue to cultivate in the world those concepts of national independence and human liberty for which our nation was founded?"

Public monies help to improve the climate, build the institutions, and train technicians necessary to permit private enterprise to function effectively. A private investor looks for a stable governmental system committed to private enterprise for an equitable tax structure, for a reasonable system of export controls, for an educational system that can produce skilled manpower, for an adequate and reasonably cheap power supply, for a reliable transportation system, and for wider markets. The aid program, directly and indirectly, can help provide these assets.

Government aid has other programs which encourage private investment in the underdeveloped areas. Among the most important are the Investment Survey, Investment Insurance, and Investment Loan programs. The extended risk guarantee program is particularly valuable, and Congress should authorize a higher ceiling on guarantees outstanding than now exists to help get it really moving.
Technical assistance in the foreign aid program is essential for development. Capital alone can't do the job if you don't have trained men to manage your projects. New machinery will gather rust if the people are starving and don't know how to raise or procure sufficient food to feed themselves. Our foreign aid program offers technical training in a host of fields and fights the war on hunger by encouraging both local food production and family planning efforts.

The U. S. foreign aid program channels money into international institutions such as the World Bank and various multilateral arrangements.

It encourages cooperative and coordinated development assistance from other industrialized nations through multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and its Development Advisory Committee.

Our foreign aid program needs reform, such as in the arms supply and sales field. It needs even more stress on certain basic principles, such as self-help, political development, and selective assistance to those nations most able and willing to make progress.

It must not be relied on too much. There are many problems and limitations in government-to-government aid; there is much that it should not and more that it cannot do.

Importance of Trade

I believe that we must put more stress on trade and private investment than on aid. But we need aid. One is not a substitute for another. All are closely inter-related; each can be complementary and catalytic.

The importance of trade policies and patterns to the development opportunity has been tragically under-rated.

The consumeristic private enterprise principles which our society has so effectively vitalized must be applied throughout the interdependent world.

The continued support of international trade and the liberalization of existing trade restrictions must be pursued with a dedication and a vigor which has been sadly lacking, particularly in the present Administration.

The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations achieved agreements affecting about $40 billion in world trade. We gave tariff cuts on $7.5 to $8 billion of our industrial and agricultural imports, and obtained tariff reductions on about the same amount of U. S. exports.
This was progress. Our general experience shows that reduced tariff barriers bring about increased export earnings. Trade restrictionism has been tried and found to be a failure.

But the Kennedy Round didn't really address the development challenge, and the Administration's position in the trade field as it pertains more directly to the poorer nations is uncertain and uncommitted.

The underdeveloped countries do not export many manufactured goods. Their raw material exports grow very slowly, whereas the demand for imported manufactured and industrial goods grows very quickly. There is a trade imbalance. In this situation, they lack the resources necessary to import the good required to bring them to a satisfactory rate of development.

So it is vital for the underdeveloped nations to trade more if they are to develop. And it is vital for the international community to create a trade environment that would foster rather than frustrate the growth of developing countries.

This is the basic aim of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which meets again in New Delhi, India, in February. UNCTAD, as it is called, recommended in 1963 that the industrial countries extend general tariff preferences to imports from the underdeveloped countries in order to create markets for their manufactured exports and to bring about gradually the diminution of the obstacles hindering the entry of these exports to the industrial countries.

This move would improve the deteriorating terms of trade of the underdeveloped nations that I have mentioned. Allowing the poor nations to export more would enable them to import more, thus adjusting their trade imbalance and allowing them to get investment capital and capital equipment--crucially needed to achieve growth and stimulate development.

This is a serious proposition, requiring careful study and consideration. In my view, given the priorities of the development challenge, America should support it. Instead, we have lacked the resolve.

At the 1963 UNCTAD session, the U. S. opposed the proposal. I hope that our Delegation to the next UNCTAD meeting will carry instructions allowing it to strongly support the general preference for the poorer nations in concert with a similar position by the other industrialized nations, as recently recommended by the OECD.

Extension of preferences by the U. S. to the underdeveloped nations would provide positive incentive to develop export trade. Preferences appear to be almost indispensible to the U. S. objective of increasing international trade and integrating the underdeveloped countries with the free economies of the North.
Threat of Protectionism

Recently, a huge upsurge of protectionist activity in the Congress—a retrogression into narrow economic nationalism—has raised the fears of many traders at home and abroad and cast new doubts on the basic underpinnings of our international economic relationships.

The new deadly serious protectionist drive could affect 80% of our dutiable imports.

At one point, pending quota bills in Congress would have resulted in the drastic cutting back or cutting out of U. S. imports conservatively valued at $3.6 billion.

Now, the only answer to all this can be retaliation. According to the international system of trade rules under which we operate—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—for every restriction we impose on imports, an equivalent restriction on our exports abroad can be imposed by other countries on U. S. industry.

And retaliation to trade protectionism can also take the form of investment protectionism. If we want to sell, we must buy. When we try to insulate some sector of our industry from international competition, some U. S. business must in turn pay for it. And our overall, long-term trade position is hurt.

Retaliation to threatened protectionist moves could affect nearly one-third of our exports which face duties overseas. In addition, the quotas recommended would result in higher prices for U. S. consumers, worsen our critical balance of payments position, and increase Government controls over our own economy.

The real problem is to correct the inflationary forces that are making us non-competitive and to encourage the forces that keep us ahead in productivity and technology.

The selfishness and short-sightedness of the protectionist movement is always beneath the surface. But I submit that a lack of dedication to the principles of international private enterprise and a lack of follow-up to the Kennedy Round achievements by the Johnson Administration actually encouraged this latest spate of restrictive threats.

The present Administration even at this date has failed to present a bill to the Congress which would fill crucial gaps in our national trade policy. This legislation is needed, among other things, to restore the U. S. Government's unused negotiating authority which ran out on June 30th, leaving us without the power to negotiate even minor tariff adjustments.

This new legislation must also liberalize the criteria for adjustment assistance under the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which have
proved in practice to be too tight and rigid for companies or industries in trouble.

This unworkability of the adjustment help theoretically available to U. S. firms and workers injured by imports resulting from tariff concessions became clear many months ago. But nothing has been done by the Administration to remedy the situation.

This inaction provided stimulus to the new protectionist wave. The Administration is tardy and unresolved in its trade policy and accordingly has courted confusion and reaction.

Narrowing the Gap

The greatest lack in the development effort today is the astounding absence of substantial participation by the private portion of our economy. Without the tremendous capital resources, the unparalleled know-how and the aggressive spirit of private enterprise, there is no possibility that the development gap can be effectively narrowed.

The present low rate of American investment represents a crippling failure of our own response to the development challenge. The private flow has been decreasing both in terms of gross national product and overall investment by the other northern industrialized nations. The total accumulated American private capital in the less developed countries today is only about $15 billion, over half of which is in extractive industries like mining and petroleum.

Given the great need of the poor nations for capital, the limitations on the amount and the efficiency of public funds, and the free enterprise traditions of this country, government aid should be a supplement to private involvement. At present the public commitment of funds is over four times the private commitment. The ratio is the opposite of what it should be. This is strange testimony to our own faith in private development.

What can be done about this private enterprise gap?

Ways must be found to diminish risk of loss and enhance the prospect of profit for the investor in the underdeveloped areas. Government policies should be revised to offer incentives to greater private involvement.

Governments must cooperate on efforts to improve the private enterprise climate in the underdeveloped countries to attract both foreign and domestic investment.

Private business must perceive its own interests in broader and longer-range terms. The ultimate threat and opportunity must be clearly understood and accepted as a basis for action.
The ingenuity of private enterprise must be devoted to applying the principles of progress-sharing and partnership in relations with foreign peoples, to put an end to fears of international economic imperialism and exploitation.

Private investment abroad must be viewed not just as a migration of capital but as a transfer of skills, know-how, and techniques. The whole infrastructure of the private sector--management, sales, research and development, production--must be injected into the process.

Universities, foundations, and voluntary organizations must be brought into participation in the international development challenge on a more intensive and less peripheral scale than at present.

Representatives of business, finance and industry from the various richer nations should consult and collaborate on private investments in the poorer countries.

There are instances of good recommendations and good innovations in the area of private resource participation abroad. Let me give some examples:

--The Report of the Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, submitted in 1965, and headed by Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of the IBM World Trade Corporation, contained some helpful suggestions, many of which have been put into practice.

Among other proposals, the Watson Committee recommended amendments in the tax law so that losses suffered by American-owned subsidiaries in developing countries could be offset against profits earned elsewhere. It also recommended the less cautious use of the Agency for International Development's extended risk guarantee program, the subsidization of technical assistance to institutions in the developing countries, and the expansion of institutions in the developing countries, and the expansion of AID's staff of private professionals in Washington and the field. It suggested that development be given priority over immediate balance of payments considerations and that special attention be given to the role of agriculture in less-developed countries.

--In activities abroad, U. S. firms have shown increasing interest in basic economic development projects, in joint venture arrangements which help to foster the concept of partnership, and in local management and transfer to majority ownership.

--The World Bank is investigating a multilateral investment guarantee formula which would expand the concept of risk-reducing insurance on vestments to a shared arrangement involving the participation of the recipient government. I have sug-
gested an International Partnership Investment Insurance plan which would provide a multilateral pool of private funds allowing a radical expansion of the insurance principle.

--Obstacle-free international trade bridges on a company-to- company or industry-to-industry basis have been constructed, such as in the agricultural implement and automotive industries of the United States and Canada.

--The ADELA Investment Company—a multinational private investment group representing over 130 banks and industrial corporations of Canada, Western Europe, the U.S. and Japan—is hard at work mobilizing equity capital, know-how, and services for promising local, development-oriented enterprises in Latin America.

These ideas and activities are heartening, but they should be vastly expanded and multiplied. Others should be encouraged.

Recommended Reforms

In the Executive Branch—I would recommend: reforms in the aid program and liberalization of Southern trade, as I have indicated; greater diplomatic efforts to create better climates for private investment and more co-participation of industrialized nations in the development effort; increased tax incentives for foreign investment in the underdeveloped areas; beefing-up of existing investment guarantee programs; the enlargement at home and at posts abroad of the excellent activities of AID's office of Private Resources; and stronger cross-governmental authority and action on policies affecting the less-developed areas such as the politics-ridden, bureaucracy-mired War on Hunger.

In the Congress, I would recommend the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Private Initiative in International Development. Such an agency could enable the Congress to play a stronger and less parochial role in supporting the involvement of private enterprise in meeting the worldwide challenge, and would lend more prestige to the effort as a whole.

In the private sector itself, I would recommend the establishment of an International Development Coalition made up of representatives of business, finance and industry, who would make continuing studies and recommendations to the private organizations on the one hand and to the Federal Government on the other concerning the best methods of private international investment and enterprise, and the best policies to facilitate such involvement.
Address by Senator Edward W. Brooke (D-Mass)*

Kansas State University

Manhattan, Kansas

October 6, 1969

NATIONAL SECURITY: DOLLARS, DEMANDS, AND DILEMMAS

Thank you Senator Pearson for your very kind and warm introduction. Let me just say that I have had the great privilege and great honor to serve with Jim Pearson in the United States Senate and though it may well be expected of me to say nice things about him in his own State of Kansas, I can assure you that I have the greatest respect, admiration, and yes, affection for your distinguished senior United States Senator from Kansas. He has done a magnificent job for you in Kansas and for the people of the nation. I was very pleased and honored when he invited me to come with him to Kansas and address this student body. Your excellency Governor Docking, let me express to you my appreciation for your presence here this morning and welcome me to your state. I am indeed privileged to visit with you on this occasion. To the esteemed Governor Landon, President McCain, to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hydja also my appreciation. Senator Pearson mentioned wine. I didn't know that I could mention that in Kansas. But you know as I came here, as I stood here receiving your applause I felt somewhat like the vicar, having been transferred to a new parish, received a gift consisting of a bowl of cherries preserved in alcohol. And the vicar thought it best to send a letter to the donor and he did saying, "My dear lady, I am most grateful to you for the gift of the bowl of cherries but more especially for the spirit in which it was given." And I want to thank your president and the members of your faculty, your student body, many friends in Kansas for inviting me to be with you this morning, but more respectfully for the spirit which I have received.

It is a great honor to be with you today and to have the opportunity to present the Landon lecture. Alf Landon brought great distinction to this state and to the nation. And the lectures which have borne his name have brought eminent men to this campus. I am very gratified that you have invited me to take part in this important series of programs.

*Taken from tape furnished by K.S.A.C.
Some of you no doubt recall the famous Civil War general, Joseph Hooker, whom Abraham Lincoln appointed to replace the slow-moving General McClellan. General Hooker made a special effort to demonstrate that he was a true man of action, and in his first days in command sent to the president a dispatch headed, "Headquarters in the Saddle." Mr. Lincoln was not exactly impressed. "The Trouble with Hooker," he remarked, "is that he's got his headquarters where his hindquarters ought to be."

A Time of Criticism

A lot of Americans are wondering in 1969 whether those responsible for the nation's defenses have their "headquarters" in the right place, namely on the job of meeting our national security needs economically and effectively. We are witnessing an unprecedented display of citizen's ire against the military establishment. Not only the uniformed military, but the civilian leaders and private contractors engaged in defense activities are bearing the brunt of unusual public criticism.

Part of this criticism stems, of course, from the frustration and bitterness engendered by the Vietnam War. However one assesses that conflict, it has triggered a major loss of confidence in the capacity of our government in general and of our military in particular. But the new and growing skepticism toward the military is compounded of other political and economic factors, as well.

There has long been a need for responsible criticism in the field of national security policy, but there are obvious reasons why it has been difficult to develop. Defense policy is intimidating. Replete with complicated technologies, awesome weapons, arcane strategies, and stratospheric budgets, it quite understandably has scared off many of those who might normally have contributed independent judgments. Furthermore, much relevant information has been classified and withheld from public debate, sometimes necessarily, often, one suspects, merely for convenience. And the horrors of the nuclear age numb the mind; many aspects of contemporary defense policy have seemed unthinkable to some of our citizens. Thus, the inclination to leave this vital field of policy to the experts has been a powerful one.

A Changing Situation

This context has altered rapidly, however, in recent months. In and out of congress, a swelling body of aroused individuals has begun to plunge into issues of national security with a vigor and determination rarely seen. A new breed of journalism has begun to flourish, exposing serious problems in defense procurement and management. The small group of dedicated congressional investigators who have plowed these fields for many years--these have been joined by a large number of allies, including several on the senate armed services committee. Individual members of the house and senate have struck out on their own to uncover dubious contract practices, to
highlight the dangers of certain weapon systems, to press the case for non-military approaches to security such as the pending strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Need Arms Talks Now

The need for strategic arms talks should be evident. It was in 1945 that we exploded the first atomic device, and shocked the world and ourselves with the awesome power of this new technology. In 1949 the Soviet Union detonated a similar weapon. For the past quarter century, the two most powerful nations in the world have held each other at bay. Changes have occurred within both blocs; allies have challenged the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union alike; but the nuclear stalemate goes on.

The American people have become increasingly aware over the years that the great power of nuclear weapons is sufficient only to insure mutual deterrence; it does not and cannot provide meaningful military superiority against a nation also armed with thermo-nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This view apparently has been accepted by the leaders of the Soviet Union also. At the present time neither side can hope to attain "superiority." Both the United States and the Soviet Union have over 1000 long-range missiles. These weapons, armed with nuclear warheads, can be either land or sea-based. In the case of the Soviet Union, nearly all are land-based. Nearly half of the U.S. missiles are based at sea on our Polaris submarine fleet.

In addition, the Soviet Union, has constructed a rudimentary anti-ballistic missile system around the major cities of Moscow and Leningrad. Some theorists have argued that an ABM system, by protecting the major population centers, could give the Soviet Union a "first strike capability." That is, in time of major international tension, the Soviets could conceivably launch what is known as a "pre-emptive" attack upon the United States, knowing that their initial attack would wipe out a portion of our offensive capability and that their ABM system could protect their administrative and population centers against the remainder of our missiles. It was this consideration which prompted many of our citizens to support the construction of a similar anti-ballistic system for the United States. However, the Soviet ABM system is not as technologically advanced as the one we are planning to construct, and the Soviets seem to have stopped deploying the original system because it will not work adequately against U.S. missiles.

Thus, for the time being, both sides are left with a rough comparability in strategic weapons. And confusing as it may be, offensive weapons—numerous and powerful enough to devastate an opponent even if we were to strike first—are our best insurance against the outbreak of war.
MIRV May Disrupt Balance of Power

Now, however, we are faced with a new technology which threatens to disrupt this carefully maintained balance of power. I refer specifically to MIRV, the innocent-sounding acronym for Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. MIRVs are Multiple Warheads, placed on a single missile. Instead of a single nuclear bomb in the tip of a missile, we and the Soviets are now developing the capability of placing three or more bombs in the nose of each rocket; and through complicated electronic engineering, each of these bombs can be guided to a separate target.

With this new generation of weapons about to sprout from the arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States, I have been joined by almost half the senate and a sizeable number of house members in calling for a joint moratorium on flight tests of the so-called MIRV systems. These weapons, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, are by far the most dangerous technology to be devised by man. MIRV would multiply the offensive forces of the two sides several-fold.

The significance of MIRV has tended to be lost in the intense controversy over the proposed ABM deployment. Many of us have opposed ABM deployment at this time, but even if the decision is made to proceed, it will be years before the system is operational. During that period we will have many opportunities to re-assess the need for such a defense. In other words, ABM deployment remains a controllable decision, in the sense that unilaterally or cooperatively with the Soviets we still have an opportunity to limit or terminate the program, if that promises greater mutual security.

By contrast the insidious quality of MIRV technology lies in the fact that we are very near the stage at which these systems will no longer be controllable by technically practical and politically feasible means. Once an intercontinental missile is resting in its silo, we may no longer be sure whether it has one or several warheads, or whether it is capable of striking one or several targets.

MIRV Tests Must Be Halted

It has become increasingly clear to close students that, short of a highly improbable system of on-site inspection of deployed missiles, the most promising approach to controlling MIRV is to prohibit the test programs which are necessary to perfect multiple warhead devices. By banning MIRV test flights, which can be observed with some confidence by both sides, it may be possible to forestall actual deployment of these weapons by preventing the achievement of the reliability and accuracy that would be required. At the least, a MIRV test moratorium should slow the development of this menacing weapon, allowing additional time to seek workable arms control agreements in this realm.
And time has become the most precious commodity where MIRVs are concerned. The United States is nearly half-way through the test series that may lead to initial deployment of the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV systems late next year. While the Soviet Union appears to be working on a less flexible system, it also has conducted a number of tests of a large weapon capable of striking more than one target. If these tests continue unabated, each nation will have to assume that the other has actually deployed MIRV.

A Critical Turning Point

This is likely to be a critical turning point in the history of the arms race and the reasons are many, but the fundamental points can be stated briefly. MIRV threatens to erode one of the basic barriers to nuclear war, namely, the utter certainty that neither the Soviets nor the American could carry out a nuclear attack without suffering devastating retaliation. But when a single missile becomes capable of destroying several other missiles, a nuclear war may become more likely. This is not to say that MIRV deployment condemns us to inevitable holocaust. But in moments of acute crisis, when each side knows that the other has the capacity to wipe out much of its retaliatory force, the tendency to strike first will probably grow.

When the risks are so grave, the disaster of war so total, we cannot afford to tempt fate. It may be possible to survive in a world populated by MIRVs, but it would be far preferable to live in a world free of them.

The uncertainties such a system would add to the present balance of terror would make a significant arms control agreement exceedingly difficult to achieve, and would lead us into a less stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. The likely result would be yet another offensive-defensive arms race, with ever-increasing burdens and ever-decreasing security on both sides. It is my profound hope that the president will accept the proposal to seek a joint MIRV test moratorium. Without it, I have grave doubts that the planned negotiations which can be successful in turning us away from the perilous path on which we have been proceeding will not fail.

There has been far too little sense of urgency in the nation and in the government regarding those negotiations, the so-called strategic arms limitation or salt talks. The Soviet Union initially accepted the American suggestion for such talks over a year ago, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the U.S. election campaign and other factors combined to delay them. President Nixon indicated four months ago that the United States was prepared to proceed with these vital negotiations. But the clock has been ticking and the Soviets seem to have grown even more wary of these talks.
At present it is clear that the issues for the salt talks have been vastly complicated by the rapid advance of technology on both sides during recent months, but the opportunity still exits for earnest and productive diplomacy to curb the arms race. MIRV tests continue, ABM deployments proceed, weapons decisions are made—but the cause of enlightened negotiation is stymied.

Security of Mankind at Stake

This is no time for considerations of national pride or calculations of narrow advantage to intrude. The stakes in these negotiations are nothing less than the security of mankind.

The salt talks, when and if they begin, will no doubt be prolonged and complex. Yet the fundamental questions they must address can be reduced to a single point: are the two powers prepared to build their future strategic relationships on the doctrine of mutual deterrence? That is in fact the question which President Nixon put to the Soviet Union in his notable speech of March 14. The President, for the first time, confirmed that the United States has adopted a policy of strategic sufficiency, and has concluded that neither side can successfully or safely pursue the elusive goal of military superiority. He made clear his understanding that the United States and the Soviet Union should forego certain weapons not only because they are costly but because they jeopardize strategic stability. For example, the President rejected a heavy city-oriented ABM system and a massive expansion of our offensive forces precisely because they would threaten the Soviet Union’s capacity to retaliate. Such deployments would force them to take countermeasures of a very dangerous character.

Security Depends Upon Vulnerability

President Nixon has expressed a vivid appreciation of the central paradox of our time, namely, that mutual security depends on mutual vulnerability.

If the Soviets respond affirmatively in the salt talks by agreeing that mutual deterrence must be the touchstone of future security arrangements, many specific consequences will follow. Agreement on a number of issues should become more feasible. For example, in agreeing that mutual deterrence should be a common goal, the two sides should also be able to agree that unlimited deployment of ABM systems would be incompatible with mutual deterrence. A freeze on the number of offensive delivery systems should also become more possible, since continued expansion of such forces undermines mutual deterrence, especially if MIRV technology is not inhibited. And even some limitation of anti-submarine warfare may become workable, since a breakthrough in ASH might erode the distinctive deterrent value of missile-launching submarines.
These are not easy or comfortable questions. An ideal world would not have to contend with them, for it would have no nuclear weapons, no intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, for that matter, no wars. But in the world as it is, those concerned about the well-being of life on this planet must come to grips with these problems in a realistic and constructive way. The salt talks offer a precious opportunity to do so. That opportunity must not be squandered.

As we confront these momentous issues, these paralyzing questions of life and death, it is easy to drown in self-pity and anxiety. Indeed some have ascribed much of the unrest among your generations to the overwhelming sense of impending doom which nuclear weapons have imposed on mankind. Professor George Wald of Harvard recently described today's youth as the generation without a future. He declared that this awful perception was at the root of campus tension.

Perhaps there is some truth in his view. The insight is plausible enough, and the spread of student disturbances to many countries cries out for explanation. But the distinctive feature of the recent waves of student activism is not that it occurs in the nuclear age. In truth the most notable point from our perspective is that the traditional outbursts which have so often occurred in European, Latin American and Asian universities have now been matched in the United States. For some reason American students have adopted some behavior patterns which have disrupted other countries' schools for centuries.

**Universal Student Involvement**

It is difficult to attribute this phenomenon to the fact that we have entered an age in which students everywhere are oppressed by angst, a terrible sense of dread about the fate of the world. Thoughtful students always and everywhere have been concerned about these great issues.

Most campus disputes have involved immediate issues, though some of those issues are common to many schools. The quality and relevance of education, the difficulties of personal learning in gigantic institutions, the demand for greater student freedom and greater student involvement, all these important questions would surely be with us whether or not we had ever heard of nuclear weapons.

In short, while the anxieties of the thermonuclear age are real and painful, while they no doubt compound the other stresses of modern life, it is unreasonable to blame all our troubles on the fact that we are fated to inhabit a world plagued with such absolute weapons. Apocalyptic visions tend more to numb the believer than to stimulate him to constructive action.

To cope with the challenge of controlling nuclear weapons, we cannot afford to wallow in a mood of hopelessness and helplessness. We need clear heads to identify and isolate the special problems of nuclear arms control, and this mammoth task is not made easier by chaining ourselves in interesting but irrelevant speculations.
Nuclear weapons worry young people; nuclear weapons also worry older people. We need to control nuclear weapons, not because they trouble our students, but because they threaten the well-being of all men.

Peace Still Possible

I make this point to anticipate another: the limitation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war are feasible. Rather than succumb to frustration and despair, we ought to take stock of what we have done and what we can do in this field. The record is by no means entirely bleak. For several years the United States had a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons and could have exploited them to rule the world. Yet there was never any real likelihood that it would do so. Having the power to dominate, America made clear its goal of a just world order by declining to use that power.

In later years, the Soviet Union has overtaken the United States' lead in nuclear weapons, and peace has come to rest on a balance of terror. The recognized fragility of that balance has been a powerful incentive to seek better and more dependable foundations for peace. The lesson has impressed itself on every informed mind:--national security is inseparable from international security--in the words of Maxim Litvinov: "Peace is indivisible."

The fruits of this lesson have ripened slowly, but they have begun to ripen. By the decade of the sixties it became possible for the Soviet Union and the United States, after arduous negotiations, to reach significant arms control agreements. The nuclear test ban treaty, concluded in 1963, not only inhibited nuclear fall-out from the atmosphere; it also curtailed further development of even more refined and destructive nuclear devices.

Another agreement sought to stop the threatened extension of such weapons into the untouched environment of outer space. Antarctica has been declared off limits to military installations.

Recognizing that the quest for a durable peace would be jeopardized by the continued spread of nuclear weapons, most members of the United Nations supported efforts to devise a nonproliferation treaty, which has now been concluded. A "hot line" has been installed to maintain emergency communications between Moscow and Washington, and to reduce the dangers of accidental conflict. At this stage prospects are hopeful for additional limitations on military uses of the ocean floor and on the horrendous chemical-biological weapons of which we have all read.

Limitation Through Observation

Perhaps more important than these formal arrangements to reinforce world stability have been the tacit and unilateral steps
taken by the great powers. Both sides have come to employ space-based observation systems which provide vital information about the number and kinds of weapons available to the two countries. In a sense technology has given us the "open skies" which President Eisenhower proposed over a decade ago. The contribution of such peacekeeping systems is immeasurable.

Furthermore both nations have learned that a stable balance of power cannot rely on vulnerable weapons which are only usable in a first strike. Hence, the Soviet Union has followed the American lead in deploying weapons suitable for a second strike but less vulnerable to an initial attack. And both Moscow and Washington have gone to great lengths—in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Berlin, in the Middle East—to avoid even minor clashes between Soviet and American military units. In some respects the fear of escalation has been enormously healthy; it has induced the kind of Soviet-American restraint that must prevail if crises are not to become calamities. It is this kind of mutual restraint which has allowed us time to explore non-military approaches to the problems of national security.

These promising measures are, of course, only half-steps toward the world we seek. But they are solid accomplishments which demonstrate that we begin to erect a peaceful order through cooperative undertakings. Given time and hard work, we and the Soviets can transform our realization of common peril into appreciation of common interests. And those common interests are the basis for fashioning meaningful limitations on the types and levels of weapons we maintain.

**Mutual Arms Control Possible**

It would be naive to conclude that these halting beginnings are a guarantee of major future successes at the conference table. But it would be equally naive and far more dangerous to the values we hold most dear if we fell prey to the misconception that attempts to achieve arms control are condemned to failure. Anxious concern is fully warranted; a pervasive sense of futility is not.

The rewards for progress on the arms limitation front are measured not only in increased security for all nations. They also appear in the vast opportunities to re-allocate resources now devoted to military expenditures. At present some $200 billion a year is spent on national security programs throughout the world. If we can liberate even a small fraction of that sum, by reducing the necessity for such expenditures, think what it could mean for the prosperity, for the health and for the sanity of this globe. Programs to speed development of the impoverished lands, to relieve the blight infecting urban communities in every country, to feed and clothe and heal those in need—even a diversion of but 10% of the world's military budgets would be a boon to mankind.
It Can Be Done

Again, my message is that it can be done. Already, on our own and without requiring parallel action by the Soviet Union, we are finding ways to shift resources away from some military programs and into other priority efforts. A year ago those of us advocating adjustments in U.S. defense spending discussed the possibility of a $5 billion reduction in the budget; no one really expected that to occur. But in the period since January of this year, executive and legislative action has in fact trimmed defense spending by very nearly that amount. The budget for 1970 will be in the $77 billion range, as opposed to the more than $81 billion recommended by the previous administration. It could be even less, in my opinion it should be considerably less, depending on how the $2 billion cut proposed by the Senate Armed Services Committee is finally resolved. Thus progress toward controlling the defense budget has been dramatic and substantial.

The dilemmas of national security are complex and must be aired widely, if the collective wisdom of the American people is to be informed enough to be effective. Problems like these defy dogmatic and ideological judgments. In wrestling with them I often recall the encounter a century ago between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Hensley. Leaving a meeting at which he had been with the Cardinal, the Archbishop offered him a ride. "After all," he said, "we are both engaged in God's work." To which the Cardinal replied, "Yes, you in your way and I in His." But none of us can claim the mantle of divinity when it comes to the great decisions of national security and public welfare. But God has equipped us with intelligence and compassion, which coupled with the determination on our part, can lead to more human and aggressive policies. Those policies will be a living testament to the peace and justice America seeks for herself and for all the nations.

I thank you.
Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D - Mont)*

Kansas State University

March 10, 1969

A PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE

We have been an Atlantic-minded nation and understandably so. Fourteen of the states border the Atlantic. The majority of our ancestors reached America via the Atlantic. Most of us follow religions of trans-Atlantic origin. The languages that are learned in our schools are primarily those of the nations across the Atlantic. Americans who travel abroad usually begin their journeys by crossing the Atlantic. Fashions, architecture, routines of living in this nation all show strong influences from the opposite side of the ocean. We are, in short, preponderantly "Atlantic" by heredity, tradition, and proclivity.

However, the authority as well as the territory of the United States stops at the western edges of the ocean. The Atlantic has been a kind of sea barrier for us in the sense that the Pacific has not been. In the Pacific, not only do five states reach the ocean, but one of them—Hawaii—literally emerges from it. In addition, we have territories of various sizes, shapes, and legal relationships spread through its distant reaches. The Aleutian Islands which project towards the Soviet Union and Japan are part of the State of Alaska. American Samoa, Guam, Wake, Johnston, Midway and the Howland, Baker and Jarvis Islands are far-flung dependencies. The Canton and Enderbury Islands are an American-British condominium. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands has been administered by the United States since the end of the Second World War; it comprises over 2,000 islands and atolls which together total only 678 square miles of land but which are dispersed over three million square miles of ocean. World War II left a provisional American administration in Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands; there it has remained for a quarter of a century, almost within sight of the Asian mainland. More than a frontier, more than an avenue of communication and trade, the Pacific is a vast marine-arena within which lie states, territories, and dependencies appertaining in large part to the United States.

I would like to make clear that in referring to the Pacific, I do not include the Asian mainland or the waters immediately adjacent.

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*Taken from Kansas State University Publications.
On that mainland, there are no American possessions but there are more American forces than anywhere else in the world outside the United States. Not only is there the immense consignment in Viet Nam but larger American military contingents are also stationed in Thailand and South Korea. For the first time in history, we have deployed military power in mass along the whole arc of the Asian mainland.

In this manner, almost without realizing it, we have cast ourselves in the role of Asian power. We have extended the outposts of our Pacific power to China's borders. We have done so on the assumption that China is bent on military expansion and that it is essential for the United States to contain that expansion. That we have erred in the form of our response, even if the assumptions are accurate, is illustrated, in my judgment, by the war in Viet Nam. The war has not contained China in any sense. Nor has it even decreased Chinese influence in Viet Nam. If anything, it may be having the opposite effect.

What needs most to be learned from the tragic experience in Viet Nam is that there is no national interest of the United States which requires us to perform the functions of an Asian power. On the contrary, it is as self-damaging as it is futile to presume that the role can be exercised by an outside power anywhere on the Asian land-mass. The fact is that the nations of Asia are going to develop along economic and political lines which are determined by themselves. The development will spring from their history, philosophy, and tradition. It will be based on their human and material resources. It will reflect the political realities of their surroundings.

Nations outside the region, perhaps, can participate economically in limited ways in this process, but they cannot control the social evolution of Asia. What applied to other outside nations applies to us. We have never been a part of the Asian continent. We are not now. We will not be in the future.

However, we are a part of the Pacific, as I have already observed, and we will continue to be. Whether we will remain a Pacific power is not in question; we have no choice. What is at issue is our future role with respect to Asia. On that score, it seems to me, the character of our commitment is largely a matter of our choice. We were not forced, for example, into the present involvement in Viet Nam. Largely by a pyramiding of successive unilateral declarations and acts, the commitment was built to its great dimensions. The choice was ours. By the same token, this nation, through the President, still retains, in my judgment, the capacity to increase, reduce, or even to dismantle that commitment by its own calculated decisions.

Whatever else may prove true of our future role in Asian affairs, I am persuaded that it will differ from the role we have played in the past. The postwar World War II era has ended, whether or not
we recognize it. Whether or not we realize it, we are in a period of transition in our relations with the nations of the Western Pacific.

II

That such is the case is best illustrated by reference to Japan. Our relations with that nation have been relatively quiescent for many years. Time has brought changes in Japan which have now reached a point just short of crisis.

The cloud on the horizon is the U. S.-Japan security treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, beginning in 1970 either party may announce an intent to amend or terminate the agreement. As this date has drawn closer, the political debate in Japan over the treaty has grown in intensity. It has centered on two specific points.

The first is the question of the American bases in Japan—number, location and use. Among the Japanese, there has been a growing resentment of these bases. They are not uniformly regarded as sources of a benevolent American protection. Often, they are seen as symbols of excessive foreign influence as well as hazardous nuisances. Furthermore, U. S. military airfields, on occasion, act to disturb the populace, not only because they occupy scarce land, but also because they pose dangers of accidental explosions and crashes. In the case of naval bases there is, in Hiroshima-conscious Japan, the additional concern with the assumed danger of radiation whenever nuclear-powered U. S. vessels call at these facilities.

The second specific issue around which the debate has centered in Japan is the question of the Ryukyu Islands (notably Okinawa), which were an integral part of Japan before World War II. At the end of that conflict the United States occupied these islands and has since administered them through the Defense Department. The Japanese peace treaty of 1951, however, left dangling, so to speak, certain matters pertaining to their final disposition. While the United States retained administrative control, Japan was not required to relinquish sovereignty. Moreover, this nation has since stated on more than one occasion that there is no question that Japan possesses "residual" sovereignty over the Ryukyus.

Nevertheless, the United States has converted Okinawa into a great military depot. Bases on the island are specifically exempted from certain restrictions which are in effect on similar U. S. installations in Japan proper. In 1960 the United States agreed that bases on the Japanese main islands cannot be used for "military combat operations" without the agreement of the Japanese government but by contrast the same inhibition is not in effect in Okinawa which has served as a staging area for the war in Viet Nam and for B-52 bomber operations. Finally, there is a most fundamental difference: we have agreed not to store nuclear weapons in Japan proper; there is no such agreement respecting Okinawa.
The military bases relate to the larger issue of Japan's future military role in the Pacific. What is involved in this question is the continuance of a situation in which the primary responsibility for defending Japan, and indeed the entire Western Pacific, falls to the United States. Over the years, this state of affairs has cost us untold billions of dollars. Its persistence is now beginning to appear somewhat anachronistic a quarter of a century after World War II and with a Japan that is the third greatest industrial power in the world.

Many Japanese are restless under U. S. military surveillance of their homeland and adjacent waters. On the other hand, there is also a conflicting factor of Japanese anxiety that American military protection may be withdrawn. Out of the dichotomy has come a view that Japan should rearm beyond the modest "self defense" forces which it possesses and assume a part of the defense functions which are now being discharged by this nation. The view has adherents not only in Japan but in certain quarters in the United States.

All of the issues which I have discussed so far have a significant characteristic in common: they are military matters. There are, of course, also non-military matters in dispute between Japan and the United States as, for example, certain barriers to trade and investment. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the main source of friction in U. S. - Japanese relations, today, is to be found in disagreement over military questions. I emphasize this point because there has been some tendency to avoid public consideration of these matters in connection with foreign policy. Yet, the questions are fundamental. The future of the U. S. - Japanese relationship will be very shaky, indeed, if we proceed to try to base it preponderantly on our military convenience in the Pacific, not withstanding the irritation and hostility which may be caused thereby in Japan.

It seems to me there is a need for great alertness to changing Japanese attitudes respecting our military activities. While some sentiment already exists in Japan for the removal of all U. S. military bases, I do not think that that is the dominant view. There is, rather, a general desire to see a reduction in the number of U. S. bases in Japan. A prompt response to this desire, I believe, not only would meet Japanese wishes but also correspond to the interests of this nation. Certainly, it would dovetail with our present effort to reduce federal expenditures and, in particular, expenditures abroad. In my judgment, it would also act, in timely fashion, to preserve an accommodating tone in U. S. - Japanese relations.

Indeed, I am persuaded that much of the growing controversy with Japan could be dispelled if it were simply stated that we are prepared to abide by Japanese desires respecting the bases. The installations are maintained at great cost to this nation on the grounds of the contribution which they make to Japanese security.
and, hence, indirectly to the security of the United States. If the
bases have now ceased to have that function in Japanese calcula-
tions, how can they possibly serve a useful purpose in ours? They
become, in fact, a growing liability if they cause mounting friction
between this nation and the Japanese populace.

Whatever the sentiments on the question of American bases in
Japan, Okinawa is the looming issue in Japanese-American rela-
tions. It is the lightning rod, so to speak, which has attracted most
of the arguments, most of the protests, and most of the attention.

There is strong and growing pressure within Japan and Okinawa
for the immediate repossession of full control over the Ryukyus.
It seems to me that we have delayed a long time—perhaps too long—
on this sensitive issue. Okinawa is Japanese; we have never claimed
otherwise. I see no just or rational alternative other than to try
to arrive at a fixed time-schedule for the progressive and prompt
return of administrative control over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan.
In restoring Japanese administrative control over Okinawa, moreover,
it seems to me that there are also strong arguments against insisting
on a "deal" which will permit the use of the military bases in ways
which are not acceptable to the Japanese people.

There will be, I am sure, cries of anguish in some quarters at
any significant modification of our right to unrestricted use of Okin-
awa. Nevertheless, entrenched parochial interests cannot be permitted
to prevail in this critical matter. Okinawa is undoubtedly a great
military convenience but it is by no means indispensable. The fact
is that there have been enormous technological developments in the
military field since World War II. We now have missiles which can
carry nuclear weapons into space. We have planes which can carry
them in the atmosphere over the ocean. We have ships which can
carry them on the ocean, and submarines which can carry them under
the ocean. We also have other bases in the Pacific—bases which
are under unchallenged American sovereignty—where nuclear weapons
can be stored and where Strategic Air Command planes with nuclear
weapons may be based without question or complaint.

As I have already noted, the issues of the bases and Okinawa
relate to the larger question of Japan's future military role. Here,
too, it seems to me, that a greater sensitivity to Japanese popular
sentiment is essential. It would appear particularly ill-advised for
the United States to try to push the Japanese towards a new and
expanded military role in the Western Pacific. To be sure, the
Japanese may one day raise the present level of their self-defense
forces. They may even, one day, amend their constitution in order
to possess other than self-defense forces. Any such decisions, how-
ever, should result from Japanese political processes which reflect
Japanese judgments of Japanese needs—judgments for which the
Japanese accept full responsibility. They should not result from
American pressures reflecting American judgments of American needs
and, for which, this nation in the end will have to bear responsi-
bility.
III

If the Japanese do not assume the military burdens which the U. S. would relinquish when the bases in Japan are reduced in number and those on Okinawa are restricted in use, some will ask: who will defend the Pacific? Presumably, it is fear of China which gives rise to this question. It does not follow, however, if the Chinese are bound on expansion, that they are capable of trans-Pacific aggression. Indeed, President Nixon has made it clear that he does not buy the contention of some defense advisors that a "thin" anti-ballistics missiles system is needed because of the Chinese threat.

A thrust of military power across the Pacific is quite a different matter from expansion on the Asian continent. Even in the latter case there is a difference of view as to the nature of Chinese continental pressure and what constitutes the principal danger to orderly progress in Asia. Among the nations of Southeast Asia, for example, it is commonplace to find that the threat of Chinese military aggression is rated a more remote menace than the immediate problems of economic underdevelopment and political instability which, in some cases, stem from internal economic disparities and in others from conflicts between two or more countries within the region.

These latter problems can hardly be met by U. S. defense outposts in the Western Pacific. Rather, their solution requires cooperation for constructive purposes among the Southeast Asian nations and with other nations outside the region. In fact, such cooperation has begun and it is taking two forms. First, there are groups of states within the region, such as the newly formed Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Second, there are regional organizations with outside members, such as the Asian Development Bank. The Bank includes European and North American subscribers whose modern resources can play an important, if peripheral, part in the progress of the Asian nations.

In this connection, there seems to me to be considerable merit in Japanese suggestions that the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan should form a "Pacific" community to help developing countries. I should add, that in a grouping of this kind, Japan can play a most significant part. Indeed, in my judgment, it is in the sphere of economic development wherein lies Japan's principal potential for a contribution to the peace and progress of the Western Pacific.

IV

I have talked of several facets of the situation in an effort to place the needs of our Asian policies in clearer perspective; of the distinction between a Pacific power which we have no choice but to be and an Asian power which we can and should choose not to be; of our military relations with Japan and the heat which is rising from the
issues of the bases, Okinawa, and the over-all Japanese role in the security of the Western Pacific; and, finally, of economic development in the Asian countries and the possibilities of cooperative aid. There are several other related questions which need to be touched on to complete this discussion. One concerns our relations with mainland China.

Strictly speaking, China is not of the Pacific but of Asia. Yet, the very vastness of China projects its relevance not only over the Asian mainland and the Pacific but, in fact, throughout the entire world. It is not possible to talk about the future of international peace, let alone about our future in the Pacific, without reference to the great nation which lies on its farther shore.

China will not remain forever, as is now the case, in substantial isolation. Its proper role is as leading nation in the councils of the world. Sooner or later China will assume that place. It seems to me the Japanese have long since come to recognize that prospect. And there are indications that they are seeking to bridge the gap with China. Even if we could there is no cause for this nation to impose obstacles of any kind—either spoken or unspoken—to increasing Japanese contacts with China. On the contrary, such efforts—whether in the economic, cultural, or political fields—might well be encouraged. They can serve not only Japan's needs for trade, they can contribute to clearing up a whole range of enigmas involving China and the security of the Western Pacific. In that fashion, they can be helpful in bringing about an enlightened approach to the building of a stable peace in that region.

For our part, and for much the same reasons, I see no purpose in imposing any special restrictions on the travel of Americans to China. Nor do I see any reason not to place trade with China in non-strategic goods on the same basis as trade with the Soviet Union, Poland, and other Communist countries. For a decade and a half we have sought to maintain a rigid primary and secondary boycott of Chinese goods. The effort is unique in our history and it finds no parallel among the present practices of other nations with respect to China. In my view, we would be well advised to abandon this antiquated pursuit of China's downfall by economic warfare and treat with the Chinese in matters of trade as we treat with European Communist countries—no better and no worse.

It seems to me, the Nixon Administration's announced intention to reopen previous offers to exchange journalists, scientists, and scholars with China is well founded. The cancellation of the meeting in Warsaw on February 20, at which these offers were to be reiterated, is regrettable. One can only hope that another opportunity will soon present itself and, hopefully, that the official offers will be made and accepted.

Trade, travel, and cultural and scientific exchanges are relatively tangible issues in our relationship with China. Hence, they seem to be more readily amenable to solution; perhaps, that is why current discussion on the relationship with China tends to concentrate on
them. Similarly, the present debate is intensive on the questions of Chinese admission to the United Nations and U. S. diplomatic recognition of Peking. These issues, too, seem susceptible to clear solution. They are not, however, at the root of the difficulties. To try to resolve them at this point may be a useful intellectual exercise but it also tends to put the cart of the difficulty before the horse.

The fundamental problem of U. S.-Chinese relations is the status of Taiwan. It is a problem which is as complex as it is crucial. It is not an either-or issue. It is not really soluble, in an enduring sense, in terms of two Chinas as has been suggested in recent years because there are two Chinas and the attempt to delineate them is synthetic. The fact is that China is a part of Taiwan and Taiwan is a part of China. Both Chinese governments which are agreed on little else are agreed on that score. The question is not whether the twain shall meet but when and in what circumstances. While we are not aloof from this question, the decisions which appertain thereto involve primarily the Chinese themselves—the Chinese of the mainland and the Chinese of Taiwan. Sooner or later the decisions will have to begin to be made. Only then will the other part of the Chinese puzzle—such questions as U. S. recognition and U. N. admission—fall into a rational place in our policies.

V

While I have spoken today principally about the United States, Japan, and China, two other major nations are of immediate concern. I refer to the Republic of the Philippines and to Indonesia.

There are signs of difficulties in our relations with the Philippines, principally in the field of trade and investment and with respect to U. S. military bases. In my judgment, however, none of the problems which confront us is of a nature as to be beyond reasonable solution in the light of the general cooperation which we have long enjoyed with the Philippines. Yet it is precisely this basic cooperation which seems to me now to be in jeopardy. It is adversely affected by a vestigial tendency—a hang-over from pre-independence days—to continue to think almost automatically in terms of special economic privileges and concessions. Similarly in the field of foreign relations there is an inclination to expect that the policy of the Philippines government, inevitably, will mirror our own attitudes. Therefore, such departures as the recent Philippine initiation of contact with Communist countries seems somehow inimical to continued war U. S.-Philippines relations. That is ironic inasmuch as we have long since had contact with most of these countries.

It is not a law of nature—it is an Aesopian fable—that familiarity must always breed contempt. A half century of familiarity which was crowned with the common sacrifices of World War II laid the basis not for a mutual contempt but for an enduring friendship between the Filipino and American people. It seems to me that we need to bestir ourselves now if this mutually valuable tie is not to be lost. Indeed, it would be my hope that the new Administration would give prompt attention to this matter.
To allow barriers of estrangement to be raised, by negligence or nonsense, is to admit a serious disability in our capacity to order our relations with other countries, notably those which have gained independence since World War II. After all, if we cannot hold the confidence, the friendship, and the respect of a people with whom we have been intimately associated for half-a-century, what can be expected with regard to other nations in Asia with which we have had little or no historic connection?

Indonesia is one such nation. Formerly the Dutch East Indies, this immense island chain was largely unknown to Americans during the colonial era. In the post-independence period, there has been a considerable contact but it has been uneven and unpredictable. In recent years, there has been a deterioration which, at times, has reached almost the point of outright mutual hostility. The pendulum apparently is now swinging and hope exists once again for a more agreeable situation.

It will take time, however, for us to form a balanced view of this enormous island-nation which in terms of population is the sixth largest in the world. It will take time, too, for Indonesia to emerge from its accumulated political and economic ills. The burden of the past is heavy and pervasive.

The United States can do little to speed up the development of a better association with Indonesia. Indeed in present circumstances the best policy is to accept our own limitations in this regard. To be sure, there are the gestures of goodwill which can be made in the form of technical, scientific, and educational cooperation. Moreover, through regional aid channels, such as I have already discussed, some assistance can be provided to Indonesia for economic development. That is a far cry, however, from self-delusive assumptions that by sending Americans to fight in Viet Nam we have somehow saved Indonesia from Communism or that the astute efforts of U. S. agencies and enough money in some miraculous fashion can act to delineate the emerging structure of the Indonesian nation.

VII

Having described the problems which confront the United States in the Pacific, I feel that I have an obligation to close with a few general words of prescription. Almost fifty years of association with the Pacific—as a student, Marine, teacher, and frequent visitor—prompt me to do so. A quarter of a century of political experience, on the other hand, impel me in the other direction. In these years of specializing in foreign relations both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate I have come to recognize the general absence of finality in the disposition of major international problems.

Nevertheless, I did remark at the outset that whatever our future in the Pacific, that future will be unlike the past. I am now under some compulsion to fill in details which sustain the general observation. The most fundamental new factor in the situation, as I see it, is the appearance of at least one new generation since my genera-
tion began to grapple with the post-World War II Asian situation and, in particular and with a singular lack of effectiveness, with the monumental upheaval of the Chinese revolution. This new generation is a source of hope for the future. It is a hope which derives largely from the interest young people now take in the affairs of the other side of the Pacific. That interest is more profound and far better informed than was the case two decades or more ago.

It used to be that in an "atlantic-minded" nation the consideration of Asian questions was left largely to a relative handful of Americans, to "old Asian" or "old China hands," whose attitudes were churned out of a mixture of 19th century religious altruism, political idealism, cold-cash imperialism, and unscrupulous adventurism. World War II altered this mixture; the Korean War modified it further; and now Viet Nam has changed it greatly. The attitudes which once held sway in this nation with respect to our relations with Asia and the Pacific have lost most of their relevance and much of their potency.

If there is to be a worthwhile future in the Pacific, it seems to me that U.S. policies for the problems of the Asian littoral will not be left in "old Asian hands." Rather they will take on the sense and sensitivity of "young American hands." The problems will be dealt with in a new spirit of cooperation and collaboration, free of attitudes of dominance or condescension. The keynote of a new policy for contemporary Asia, as I see it, is mutuality. Its characteristics will be mutual respect, mutual appreciation, and mutual forbearance.

For us there is no choice. We must make the effort to put our policies into that perspective. We will not only continue to live in the Pacific, we will also have to learn to live with the Pacific and the nations of its western reaches, basing our relations with its peoples—-with the Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, Indonesians, and other—-henceforth, on a profound respect for the equal dignity and worth of all.
Address by Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.)*
Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas
March 18, 1968

CONFLICT IN VIETNAM AND AT HOME

Governor Landon, Governor and Mrs. Docking, Senator and Mrs. Pearson, President McCain, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I appreciate the introduction by Senator Pearson, and if you examine his words carefully, I thought that it was an endorsement. I also look forward to serving with him because I think the President of the United States and the Senate of the United States must serve together in the interest of the United States. And I saw some signs from my other colleague--from Senator McCarthy. As you know, I promised to work in harmony with Senator McCarthy. Our slogan might be: "In your hearts you know each of them is half right." So I'm looking forward to this campaign.

I'm told that President Johnson told a friend that he was relieved that I was running for President of the United States because he said that it was my support--he said that it was Kennedy's support--that it was killing him.

I said last week that I was re-assessing my position after the New Hampshire Primary. I have a feeling that since that time that the use of that word might have been a mistake. Yesterday, there were three men from the Internal Revenue Department at my house re-assessing my home.

There has been a good deal written about the conversation with Secretary of Defense Clifford about setting up a commission to study the war. Really the only difference between all of us, was the makeup of that commission. I suggested and wanted Senator Mansfield, Senator Fulbright, Senator Morse; and the President, in his own inimitable way, wanted General Westmoreland, John Wayne, and Martha Raye.

*Taken from tape furnished by K.S.A.C.
But I am delighted to be here and very pleased because of Governor Landon, who President Kennedy had the greatest affection for, I think Governor Landon, I know, was at the White House and visited with President Kennedy. President Kennedy talked about it frequently afterwards and he told me after he visited with Governor Landon, that he asked the Governor, "Why aren't there more democrats in Kansas?" I don't think we ever got an answer to this day. But I know how highly he was regarded all across the United States—not just in the state of Kansas, but all across the country and I'm delighted and honored to be able to come here and speak in his name. I'm also pleased to be here with Governor Docking, for whom I have the greatest respect. Who, I think, is one of the great governors of the United States and who has contributed so much and his family has contributed so much to this state. And as for Senator Pearson— I'm pleased to be here again.

You see, I know colleagues go through the form of saying people are distinguished and they are worthy and all the rest of it, but the fact is that Senator Pearson has made an enviable record in the United States Senate. That he is highly regarded by his colleagues on the Republican side, but held in great respect and with great affection, by all of us on the Democratic side. And I'm delighted and pleased to be able to serve with him.

Actually, I feel I have a lot in common with all of you. The reason I'm here is that someone sent me a history of this city. And I found out that it was founded by people from Chicago who came to Kansas to found a town named Boston which they later changed to Manhattan. So I knew with all my problems, I'd be right at home. You changed your name and I changed my location. So I'm proud to be here and I'm proud to be with all of you.

I am also glad to come to the home of another Kansan who wrote,

If our colleges and universities do not breed men who riot, who rebel, who attack life with all the youthful vision and vigor, then there is something wrong with our colleges. The more riots that come on college campuses, the better the world for tomorrow.

That is what he said and the man who wrote these words was that notorious man William Allen White—the late editor of the Emporia Gazette. He is an honored man today; but when he lived and when he wrote, he was often reviled as an extremist—or worse—on your campus and across this nation. For he spoke as he believed. He did not conceal his concern in comforting words; he did not delude his readers or himself with false hopes and illusions. It is in this spirit that I wish to talk with you today.
For this is a year of choice—a year when we choose not simply who will lead us, but where we wish to be led; the country we want for ourselves—and the kind that we want for our children. If in this year of choice we fashion new policies out of old illusions, we insure for ourselves nothing but crisis for the future—and we bequeath to our children the bitter harvest of those crises.

For with all that we have done, with all of our immense power and with our immense richness, our problems seem to grow not less, but greater. We are in a time of unprecedented turbulence, of danger and of questioning. It is at its root really a question of the national soul of this country. The President calls it "restlessness;" while cabinet officers and commentators tell us that America is deep in a malaise of the spirit—discouraging initiative, paralyzing will and action, dividing Americans from one another by their age, by their views, and by the color of their skins.

There are many causes. Some are in the failed promise of America itself: in the children that I have seen, starving in Mississippi; idling their lives away in the ghetto; committing suicide in the despair on our Indian reservations; or watching their proud fathers sit without work in the ravaged lands of Eastern Kentucky. Another cause is in our inaction in the face of danger. We seem equally unable to control the violent disorder within our cities—or the pollution and the destruction of the country, of the water and land that we use and that our children must inherit. And a third great cause of discontent is the course that we are following today in Southeast Asia in Vietnam: in a war that has divided Americans as they have not been divided since your state was called "bloody Kansas."

All this—questioning and uncertainty at home, divisive war abroad—has led us into deep crisis of confidence: in our leadership, in each other, and in our very self and a nation.

Today I would speak to you of the third of those crises: I would speak to you of the war in Vietnam. I come here to this serious forum in the heart of the nation to discuss the war with you. Not on the basis of emotion, but on the basis of fact; not, I hope, in clichés—but with a clear and discriminating sense of where the national interest of this country really lies.

It may be that our views on this war will not be in agreement. But what is important is that we discuss our views, that we discuss the facts and then speak straight in the enduring impulses which have always united this nation. In the face that we as Americans together can master and bring to our service the enormous forces that range across the world in which we live.

I do not want—as I believe most Americans do not want—to sell out American interests, to simply withdraw to raise the white
flag of surrender. I am not suggesting that and I don't think any other reasonable and responsible American is suggesting that. But I also say that the only course of action that we can take in Southeast Asia, that we can take in Vietnam, is not necessarily, and in my judgment, is not the action that we are taking at the moment under the leadership of President Lyndon Johnson. That would be unacceptable to us as a country and as a people.

But I am concerned, as Senator Mansfield, and Senator Cooper, and Senator Fulbright are concerned, as General Shupe, and General Norstad and General Ridgeway are concerned and as Eugene McCarthy's brilliant New Hampshire Campaign and the work of those who are associated with him has shown, most Americans are concerned—that we are acting as if no other nations existed, against the judgment and the desires of neutrals and our historic allies alike. I am concerned that at the end of it all there will be only more Americans killed, more of our treasure spent, and because of the bitterness, and because of the hatred, on every side of this war, more hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese slaughtered; so that they may say; as Tacitus said of Rome: "They made a desert, and they called it peace." I don't think that that is satisfactory for the United States of America.

I do not think that that is what the American spirit is really about. I do not think that that is what this country stands for.

Let me begin this discussion with a note both personal and public. I was involved in many of the early decisions on Vietnam, decisions which helped set us on our present path. It may be that the effort was doomed from the start; that it was never really possible to bring all the people of South Vietnam under the rule of the successive governments we supported—governments, one after another, riddled with corruption, inefficiency, and greed: governments which did not and could not successfully capture and energize the national feeling of the people. If that is the case, as it may well be, than I am willing to bear my share of the responsibility, before history and before my fellow-citizens. But past error is no excuse for its own perpetuation. Tragedy is a tool for the living to gain wisdom, not a guide by which to live. Now as ever, we do ourselves best justice when we measure ourselves against ancient tests, as in Sophocles: "All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when he knows his course is wrong, and he repairs the evil. The only sins," he said, "is pride."

The reversals of the last several months have led our military to ask for 206,000 more troops. This weekend it was announced that some of them—a "moderate" increase, as it was described—would be sent. But isn't this exactly what we have always done in the past? If we examine the history of this conflict, we find the dismal story repeated time after time. Every time—at every crisis—we have first denied that anything was wrong and then we have sent more troops; and then we have issued more confident communiques. Every time, we have been assured that this one last
step—that this one last step—would bring victory. And every time, the predictions and the promises have failed and have been forgotten, and the demand has been made again for just one more step up the ladder.

But for all the escalations, all of the last steps, they have brought us no closer to success than we were before. At every occasion, at every time, we have responded to the crisis in Vietnam as just a military conflict. It is not just a military conflict, it is a political and a diplomatic conflict and we have ignored those two areas and that's why we're in the trouble we are today in March of 1968.

Rather as the scale of the fighting has increased, as we have sent more money, as we have escalated, South Vietnamese society has become less and less capable of organizing the defending itself, and we have more and more assumed the whole burden of the war. In just three years, we have gone from 16,000 advisers to over 500,000 troops; from no American bombing of the North or the South, to an air campaign against both, greater than that waged in all of the European theatre in World War II; from less than 300 American dead in all the years prior to 1965, to more than 500 dead in a single week of combat in 1968.

And once again—and once again—the President tells us, as we have been told for twenty years, that, and I quote, "we are going to win;" that "victory" is coming. But I ask you, what are the true facts? What is our present situation?

First, our control over the rural population—so long described as the key to our efforts—has evaporated. The Vice President tells us that the pacification program has "stopped." Reports from the field indicate that the South Vietnamese Army has greatly increased its tendency to "pull into its compounds in cities and towns, especially at night, reduce its patrolling, and leave the militia and revolutionary development cadres open to enemy, incursion and to enemy attack." Undoubtedly, this is one reason why, over the last two weeks our combat deaths were so much greater than those of the South Vietnamese. Our combat deaths over the period of the last two weeks were over 1,000. The South Vietnamese, who land it is, whose country it is, whose conflict it is, are less than half that much. I think that is an indication of the direction we are moving. That this has become an American War. That this is no longer a War of the South Vietnamese. The debate in the assembly of South Vietnamese Parliament, as a man got up and they discussed whether they should draft eighteen year olds or nineteen year olds. He said, "Why should we draft young men of eighteen years old and nineteen years old? Why should we draft them for the South Vietnamese Army? Why should they be sent to fight America's War for them?" I don't think that's satisfactory, and I think it should be changed.

Like it or not, the government of South Vietnam, is pursuing an enclave policy. Its writ runs where American arms protect it: that
far and no farther. To extend the power of the Saigon government over its own country, we now can see, will be in essence equivalent to the reconquest and the occupation of most of the entire nation.

Let us clearly understand the full implications of that fact. The point of our pacification operations was always described as "winning the hearts and the minds" of the people. We recognized that giving the country-side themselves came to identify their interests with ours, and to assist not the Viet Cong, but the Saigon government. For this we recognized that their minds had to be changed—that their natural inclination would be to support the Viet Cong, or at best to remain passive, rather than to sacrifice themselves for the foreign white men, or for the remote Saigon government.

It is this effort that has been most gravely set back over the period of the last month. We cannot change the minds of people in villages controlled by the enemy. The fact is, as we all recognize, that we cannot reassert control over those villages now in enemy hands without repeating the whole bloody process of destruction which has ravaged the countryside of South Vietnam throughout the last three years. Nor could we thus keep control without the presence of millions of millions of American troops. If, in the years those villages and hamlets were controlled by Saigon, in those years, the government had brought honesty and social reform and land reform—if that had happened, if the many promises of a new and better life for the people had been fulfilled—then, in the process of reconquest, we might come back as liberators: just as we did in Europe, despite the devastation of war, in 1944 and 1945. But the fact was, everybody knows—everybody who has been there, everybody who has examined the situation, the fact is that the promises of reform were not kept. Corruption and abuse of administrative power have continued even up to the present day. Land reform has never been more than an empty promise. Viewing the performance of the Saigon government over the period of the last three years, there is no reason for the South Vietnamese peasant to fight for the extension of its authority or to view the further devastation that effort will bring as anything but a calamity for them so that the political war, so long described as the only war that counts, has gone with the pacification program that was to win it. In a real sense, it may be lost and it may be gone forever.

The second evident fact of the last two months is that the Saigon government is no more or better an ally than it was before; that it may be even less; and that the war inexorably is growing more—not less—an American effort. American officials continue to talk about a government newly energized, moving, they say, with "great competence," taking—as they say and they describe it—hold "remarkably well," doing "a very, very good piece of work of recovery." I was in the Executive Branch of the government from 1961 to 1964. In all those years, we heard the same glowing promises about the South Vietnamese government: corruption would soon be
eliminated, land reform would soon come, programs were being infused, for the first time, with new energy. But those statements, those claims, were not the facts. They were not the facts then, and when they are stated today, they are not the facts now.

The facts are that there is still no total mobilization: no price or wage controls, no rationing, no overtime work. The facts are, as a Committee of the House of Representatives had told us, that land reform is moving backwards— with the government forces helping landlords to collect exorbitant back rent from the peasants, when they expect to fight this war. The facts—again the facts—are that eighteen-year-old South Vietnamese are still not being drafted; though now, as many times in the past, we have been assured that that will happen very soon. The facts are that thousands of young South Vietnamese buy their deferments from military service while American Marines die today at Khe Sanh. I don’t accept that as acceptable. If the South Vietnamese Government feels that Khe Sanh is so important, let them put South Vietnamese soldiers up there and take the marines out.

And the fact is further in the political field that the government has arrested monks and labor leaders, former Presidential candidates and government officials— including prominent members of the Committee for the Preservation of the Nation, in which American officials placed such high hopes just a few weeks ago.

Meanwhile, the government’s enormous corruption continues, debilitating South Vietnam and crippling our effort to help its people. Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives officially documented the existence, extent, and the results of that corruption: American AID money stolen, food diverted from refugees, government posts bought and sold while essential tasks remain undone. A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations has reported that the Vietnamese Collector of Customs had engaged in smuggling gold and opium—and that he was protected by figures even higher in the government. President Johnson—President Johnson—has responded to criticism of corruption in Vietnam by reminding us that there is stealing in Beaumont, Texas. I for one do not believe that Beaumont is so corrupt, and if President Johnson will not stick up for Beaumont, Texas, I am here to say that I’m going to stick up for Beaumont, Texas. I deeply resent the criticism of Beaumont. I do not believe that any public official, in any American city, is engaged, at the present time, in smuggling gold and dope; selling draft deferments, or pocketing millions of dollars in U.S. government funds. And if any official of the United States government has such information, I think he should turn it over to the Department of Justice and the Attorney General. But however corrupt any city in the United States may be, that corruption is not—is not—costing the lives of American soldiers; while the pervasive corruption of the Government in Vietnam, as an American official has told us—not what I am saying, but what an American official in Vietnam has said—is a significant cause of the prolongation of the war in Vietnam and the continued American casualties.
As this government continues on its present course, and our support for it continues, the effect can only be to leave us totally isolated from the people of Vietnam and I believe that our fighting men in South Vietnam deserve better than that.

Third, it is becoming more evident with every passing day that the victories we achieve will only come at the cost of the destruction for the nation we once hoped to help. Even before this winter, Vietnam and its people were disintegrating under the blows of war. Now hardly a city in Vietnam has been spared from the new ravages of the past two months. Saigon officials say that nearly three quarters of a million new refugees have been created, to add to the existing refugee population of two million or more. That would be equivalent here in the United States, if we had equivalent of 35-40 million people who were refugees and placed in refugee camps. No one really knows the number of civilian casualties. The city of Hue, with most of the country's cultural and artistic heritage, lies in ruins: of its population of 145,000 it has been reported that fully 113,000 are said to be homeless. There is not enough food, not enough shelter, and not enough medical care. There is only death, there is only misery, and there is only destruction.

An American commander said of the town of Ben Tre, "it became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it." That kind of salvation is not, in my judgement, an act that we here in the United States can presume to perform for them. For we must ask the government, we must ask ourselves, for we are responsible—not just those in Washington, not just those in the executive branch of the government—but all of us in this country. I'm responsible and you are responsible. Because this action is taking place in Vietnam in our name. In the name of the United States of America and we have the right to ask questions and we must ask questions of our own government and of ourselves. Where does this logic end? Where does it end? If it becomes necessary to destroy all of South Vietnam in order—to quote—"to save it," will we here in the United States, will we do that too? Is that what we want? Is that what we stand for? I can't believe that's true, and if we care so little about South Vietnam that we are willing to see the land destroyed and its people dead, then I ask: "Why are we there in the first place?" Can we ordain ourselves—can we ordain to ourselves—the awful majesty of God to decide what cities and what villages are to be destroyed, who will live and who will die and who will join the refugees wandering in the desert of our own creation. If it is true that we have made a commitment to the South Vietnamese people, we must ask—are they being consulted in Hue, Ben Tre, or in the villages from which the three million refugees have fled? If they believe that all of this death and all of this destruction are a lesser evil than the Viet Cong, why did they not warn us when the Viet Cong came into Hue, and the dozens of other cities, before the Tet Offensive? Any why, I ask you, did they not join the fight?
It is also said that we are protecting Thailand—that if we don't fight in Vietnam, if we don't make this effort in Vietnam, that we are going to have to fight in Thailand—or perhaps we are going to fight in Hawaii and we're going to have to oppose the legions of Communists in some of these other countries. Are we really protecting the rest of Southeast Asia by spreading this conflict? And in any case--again, in any case--let us ask ourselves: is the destruction of South Vietnam and its people a permissible means of defense?

Let us have no misunderstanding. The Viet Cong are a brutal enemy indeed. Time and time again, they have shown their willingness to sacrifice innocent civilians, to engage in torture and murder and despicable terror to achieve their ends. There can be no easy moral answer to this war, no one-sided condemnation of American actions. I don't believe that the people of South Vietnam want domination and control by the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front or the Communists of North Vietnam, but, neither do, I believe, that they want to be dominated by the United States of America or by any foreign power. What we must ask ourselves is whether we have a right to bring so much destruction to another land, without clear and convincing evidence that this is what its people want. But that is precisely the evidence that we do not have. What they want is peace, not domination by any outside force. And that is what we are really committed to help bring them, not in some indefinite future, but while some scraps of life remain still to be saved from the holocaust.

The fourth fact is that now more clear than ever is that the war in Vietnam, far from being the last critical test for the United States, is in fact weakening our position in Asia and around the world, and eroding the structure of international cooperation which has directly supported our security for the past three decades. In purely military terms, the war has already stripped us of our graduated-response capability that we have labored so hard to build over the period of the last seven years beginning in 1961. Surely the North Koreans were emboldened to seize the Pueblo because they knew that the United States simply cannot afford to fight another Asian war while we are so tied down in Vietnam. We set out to prove our willingness to keep our commitments everywhere in the world. What we are ensuring instead is that it is most unlikely that the American people would ever again be willing to again engage in this kind of a struggle. Meanwhile our oldest and our strongest allies pull back to their own shores, leaving us alone to police all of Asia; while Mao and his Chinese comrades sit patiently by, fighting us to the last Vietnamese: watching us weaken a nation which might have provided a stout barrier against Chinese expansion southward. As Secretary Rusk said just last week when someone asked one member of the foreign relation committee asked him, "What do you think about the Chinese coming in and helping the North Vietnamese?" He said the Chinese will never come into North Vietnam because the people and the government of North Vietnam don't want
the Chinese there. A most interesting and, in my judgement, significant response in view of the efforts and struggles that we are conducting in Southeast Asia. There they are—the Chinese, hoping that it will—the war in South Vietnam will further tie us down and perhaps in protracted war in Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand; confident, as it is reported from Hong Kong, that the war in Vietnam "will increasingly"—and I quote, "bog down the United States, sap its resources, discredit its power pretensions, alienate its allies and fray its ties with the Soviet Union, and at the same time, aggravating dissensions among Americans at home." As one American observer put it, truly "We seem to be playing the script the way Mao wrote it."

All this bears directly and heavily on whether more troops should now be sent to Vietnam—and, if more are sent, what their mission will be. We are entitled to ask—we are required to ask—how many more men, how many more lives, how much more destruction will be asked, to provide the military victory that is always just around the corner, to pour into this bottomless pit of our dreams?

But this question the Administration does not and it cannot answer. It has no answer—none but the ever-expanding use of military force and the lives of our brave soldiers, in a conflict where military force has failed to solve anything in the past. The President has offered to negotiate—yet this weekend he told us again that he seeks not compromise but victory, "at the negotiating table if possible,"—it said—"on the battlefield if necessary." But at a real negotiating table, there can be no "victory" for either side; only a painful and difficult compromise. To seek victory at the conference table is to ensure that you will never reach it. Instead the war will go on—year after terrible year—until those who sit in the seats of high policy are men who seek another path. And I believe that must be done this year. And it is for that reason—and it is for that reason—that I offer myself as a candidate for President of the United States of America.

For it is long past time to ask: what is this war doing to us? Of course it is costing us money—fully one-fourth of our federal budget—but that is the smallest price that we pay. The cost is our young men, the tens of thousands of their lives cut off and ended forever. The cost is our world position—in neutrals and allies alike, every day more baffled by and estranged from a policy they cannot understand.

Higher yet is the price that we pay in our own innermost lives, and in the spirit of our country and in the soil and heart of the United States. For the first time in our history, we have desertions from our army on political and moral grounds. The front pages of our newspapers show photographs of American soldiers torturing prisoners. Every night we watch horror on the evening news. Violence spreads inexorably across this nation, filling our streets and crippling our lives. And whatever the costs to us,
let us think of the young men we have sent there: not just the killed, but those who have to kill; not just the maimed, but all those who must look upon the results of what they are forced and have to do.

It may be asked, is not such degradation the cost of all wars? And of course it is. That is why war is not an enterprise lightly to be undertaken, nor prolonged one moment past its absolute necessity. All this—the destruction of South Vietnam, the destruction of the North, the cost to ourselves, the danger to the world—all this we would willingly stand if it seemed to serve some worthwhile end. But the costs of the war's present course far outweigh anything we can reasonably and responsibly hope to gain by it, for ourselves or for the people of Vietnam. It must be ended, and, in my judgement, it can be ended, in a peace of brave men who have fought each other with a terrible fury, each believing that he and he alone was in the right. We have prayed to different gods, and the prayers of neither have been answered fully. Now, while there is still time for some of them to be partially answered, now is the time to stop.

And the fact is that much can be done and it does not involve giving up, but it does involve not continuing to follow the bankrupt policy that we are following at the present time. We can—as I have urged for two years, but as we have never done—negotiate with the National Liberation Front. We can—as we have never done—assure the Front a genuine place in the political life of South Vietnam. We can—as we are refusing to do today—begin to deescalate the war, concentrate on protecting populated areas, and thus save American lives and slow down the destruction of the countryside.

We can stop the bombing and we can go to the negotiating table as the Vietnamese have said that they will do. And we can end the search and destroy missions. We can—as we have never done—insist that the Government of South Vietnam broaden its base, institute real reforms, and seek an honorable settlement with their fellow countrymen.

This is no radical program of surrender. This is no sell-out of American interests. This is a modest and a reasonable program—a program that I have been discussing over the period of the last two years which would have been easier two years ago than it is now; which would have been easier a year ago than it is now; which would have been easier three months ago, than it is now; but, which will be more difficult six months from now, than it is at the present time and I think we should move ahead now.

This program would be far more effective than the present course of this Administration—whose only response to failure is to repeat it on a larger scale. This program, with its more limited costs, would indeed be far more likely to accomplish our true objectives.

And therefore, even this modest and reasonable program is impossible while our present leadership, under the illusion that military victory is just ahead, plunges deeper into the swamp that is our present course.
So I come here today, to this great University, to ask for your help: not for me, but for your country and for the people of Vietnam and for the peace for all mankind. You are the people, as President Kennedy said, who have "the least ties to the present and the greatest stakes in the future." I urge you to learn the harsh facts that lurk behind the mask of official illusion with which we have concealed our true circumstances, even from ourselves. Our country is in danger: not just from foreign enemies; but from all, for our own misguided policies—and what they can do to the nation that Thomas Jefferson once told us was the last, best, hope of man. There is a contest on, not for the rule of America, but for the heart of America. In these next eight months, we are going to decide what this country will stand for—and what kind of men we are. So I ask for your help, in the cities and the homes of this state, in the towns and in its farms: contributing your concern and your action, warning of the danger of what we are doing—and the promise—and the promise—of what we can do in the future. I ask for your help. I ask you—I ask you—as tens of thousands of young men and women are doing all over this land, to organize yourselves, and then go forth and work for new policies—not just in Southeast Asia, but here at home as well. In the State of Kansas, across the United States, in our cities, in our rural areas, in our towns; so that we have a new birth for this country. That we have a new light to guide us and I pledge, if you give me your help, if you give me your hand, that I will work with you and we will have a new America.

Thank you very much.
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A BURKEIAN ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATIVE ORATORY
IN THE LANDON LECTURE SERIES 1966-70

by

William J. Hamlin
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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS
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Manhattan, Kansas

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On December 13, 1966, "The Alfred M. Landon Lecture Series On Public Issues" was organized on the Kansas State University campus for the purposes of discussing contemporary political issues by prominent public figures. The present study attempted a descriptive and critical assessment of those speeches concerning statements of policy given by politicians in the series. The speeches studied were those of Landon, Reagan, Hickel, Nixon, Warren, Mansfield, Brooke, Humphrey, Kennedy, Rockefeller, and Romney.

The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of the appeals addressed before the Landon Lecture Series, through a description of a politician's liberal or conservative orientation. A method of analysis was constructed for ascertaining the liberal or conservative status of the political speeches by relating rhetorical strategies to political positions. Although modified in some respects, this study used a similarly constructed measure based on the findings of Bernard Lee Brock in his doctoral dissertation at Northwestern University, A Description of Four Political Positions and a Description of Their Rhetorical Characteristics.

Borrowing Brock's method of analysis for deliberative discourse, the study began with a description of Kenneth Burke's rhetorical structure and Lee Hultzen's method for analyzing deliberative rhetoric. Brock suggested the combination of both Burke's and Hultzen's system in order to provide more structuring for the analysis of the speeches. The second step of the investigation included a description of the political positions of liberalism and conservatism. Focusing on the substantive aspects of the political positions, this discussion
constituted the most basic alteration in Brock's methodology. Following this, the political speeches in the Landon Lecture Series were analyzed in terms of their political positions and rhetorical strategies.

The results indicated that out of the eleven speeches studied, only Nixon and Reagan identified with the conservative position. As for the rhetorical strategies, most of the speakers tended to emphasize the background against which the act was committed. That is, the action of the speeches was constructed in terms of stressing time and place rather than stressing how a person ought to govern himself or stressing societal goals or purposes. Furthermore, many of the speakers were inclined to view the world in terms of people caught up or conditioned by a set of circumstances rather than in terms of a person committing a specific kind of action within a set of circumstances. Finally, most of the speeches lacked a clearly defined statement of purpose, and, as a result, the speeches were often deficient in unity, depth, and scope.