THE USES OF THE PAST IN MODERN INDIAN POLITICS

by

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I TRADITIONAL SOCIETY</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II THE PARTIES</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOLOGICAL DATA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III METHODOLOGY FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEASURING MODERNITY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAPHS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-1</td>
<td>Education of MLAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-2</td>
<td>Intergenerational Mobility of MLAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-3</td>
<td>General Social Mobility of MLAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-1</td>
<td>Factors Used to Rank Traditional Appeal of Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-2</td>
<td>Education of Party Supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-3</td>
<td>Social Class of Party Supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-4</td>
<td>Income (in Rupees per month) of Party Supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-5</td>
<td>Rural-Urban Distribution of Party Supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-6</td>
<td>Percentage of Party Supporters With Opinions on Public Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-7</td>
<td>Degree of the Opinionatedness of the Parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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THESE ARE THE BEST IMAGES AVAILABLE.
INTRODUCTION

Since history can enhance the self-respect of nationalistic leaders and of those whom they seek to recruit, it is an aid to establishing both a personal and a national identity at a time when the self is threatened by rapid and erratic pressures from alien sources.¹

The process of modernization is a source of tremendous pressure on individuals. Such pressure arises from separation from the traditional life and the exposure to new values and life-styles.² This thesis seeks to examine the role of political parties in India as sources of historical and traditional reference, thus serving as bases of security for the modernizing man. As society develops, history and tradition become national culture, and fill a need for modern society and modern man.

There is, however, some disagreement over the usefulness of traditional ideas in modernizing society. Some writers believe that all links with the past must be eradicated in order to make room for the new ideas and ways of life that come with technological development.³ Others believe that tradition either cannot be done away with, or can, in fact be beneficial to the modernizing process.

Among those who accept the necessity of cultural heritage in modern society, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have perhaps done the most to explain the changes undergone by old ideas in the modernization process. In The Modernity of Tradition, the Rudolphs examine traditions in India and the changes they have undergone as India modernized. Among these are a social structure, caste, and its adaptation to modern conditions and accompanying revitalization. Many hereditary caste groups in India have become politicized, and have taken the form of interest groups, lobbying for legislation.
advantageous for the group. These "caste associations" are, in effect, voluntary organizations, similar to their western counterparts, yet made up of ascriptive group membership. In the process, caste takes on a new political role and is revitalized.4

Traditional myths, legends, and history can be modernized also. The concept of swadesh, or self-reliance, is mentioned by modern politicians as a suitable guide for modernizing individuals and society.5 Ancient beliefs and folklore are revitalized, and made suitable for modern society's needs. It is apparent that these needs do not disappear with increased technology and urbanization.

The continuing transmission of beliefs rests on the need for order, not merely as a stable context for instrumental action, but as a transcendent realm of being, centered on the sacred.6

The problem faced by the political leaders of a modernizing society consists in discovering how primordial identities can be made to yield to a culturally viable national political style. They must find how this new style can be integrated into the community life-style as legitimate force of change. "Political culture is mainly the evolving style of meeting an historical challenge."7 The challenge of transforming traditional society and traditional man is a tremendous one, and reaches into every facet of life.

India is a particularly good case for the study of tradition for several reasons. The first is the long and rich history of the civilization. The traditions and myths of this history are recorded in the Indian classics and the extensive popular literature of the people. India is, in many ways, developed far beyond the levels of other Third World countries. The educational system, the communications systems and technological advancements
are, in some areas, fully modern. Most important, perhaps, is the democratic government which is highly sophisticated and well-developed. Since the first elections in 1952, the people have chosen their government through free elections, and have been represented in independent and responsible legislatures, at both the state and national levels.

In spite of India's very real achievements in modernizing, more than 80% of the Indian population lives in small villages scattered throughout the sub-continent, many without electricity or clean water supplies. Most of the population is still illiterate, and living in extremely backward conditions, generally unwilling to accept or participate in the changes of modernization. This paradox is evident to a greater or lesser extent in all developing nations.

The source of a great many pressures on the individual is the process of modernization; a concept central to the discussion of the Third World. Inherent in this concept is the expectation of extensive changes in society. That is, society's transformation from a "traditional" state to a more or less "modern" state. These changes must take place in many different dimensions: attitudes, social structure, economic structure, political process, communications, demographic change, and so on.

Early discussions of modernization tended to dichotomize or trichotomize the process, thus implying breaks, or sharp differences between "traditional" and "modern" or between "traditional," "transitional," and "modern." More recently, however, there has been a trend toward recognition of a more complex relationship between tradition and modernity. For instance, Clifford Geertz discusses the use of traditional ideas about the universe in the development of a "modern political culture in Indonesia."
As a result of these developments, the relationship between tradition and the process of modernization has been shown to be far more complex than previously assumed, and open to much more investigation.

Most writers have assumed a positive relationship between the various aspects of social change identified with modernization. Certain social or demographic changes (urbanization, increasing literacy, expansion of communications, and so on) are assumed to lead in turn to modernization of attitudes which then leads to support for further modernization. Perhaps the best known model of this type is that of Daniel Lerner in *The Passing of Traditional Society, Modernizing the Middle East*. Lerner sees modernization primarily in terms of attitudinal change. This change makes a person more "mobile" psychologically. He can accept and seek change and improvement while a traditional man cannot. A more complete explanation of Lerner's "psychic mobility" will be given below. The important point here is that Lerner sees a circle of development stemming from the introduction of mass media. That is, exposure to mass media encourages increased "psychic mobility" or attitude modernization which, in turn, stimulates further modernization in other areas.

That some millions of Turks now live in towns, work in shops, wear trousers and have opinions who, a generation ago, lived in the centuries-old 'sholvars' symbolizing the agrarian, illiterate, isolate life of the Anatolian village is what modernization has already done to some people. That other millions throughout the Middle East are yearning to trade in their old lives for such newer ways is what modernization promises to most people. The rapid spread of these new desires which provide the dynamic power of modernization, is most clearly perceived in the coming of the mass media.9

Lerner concludes, then, that "psychic mobility" is spread by physical travel or actual experience, and by the mass media, with mediated experience.
By either or both of these kinds of experience, a man is increasingly able to imagine himself in other situations or in the shoes of other people, and in Lerner's terms, he has achieved "empathy" and is now ready to accept the changes brought with modernity and indeed, to contribute to the process, to speed it along.

In general then, one would expect the most mobile (psychologically and physically) individuals to be the most modern in their orientations. One would also expect this somewhat "enlightened" orientation to be reflected in their political behavior, such as voting, as in their behavior in other spheres. In turn, it might be expected that political parties with greater support among these more "modern" voters to express themselves in more "modern" language than those parties with their greatest support among the less mobile, more traditional population. In other words, we should expect those political parties with more "modern" images to appeal most to the more mobile, better educated, more opinionated voters, and the more traditional parties to appeal more to the less mobile, less educated, and less opinionated voters.

The thesis of this study is directly opposed to the above expectation; that is, "modernity" of party image and the degree of modernity among voters are inversely related, rather than positively related as might be expected. This thesis will be supported, first, by a review of some of the rather extensive literature on Indian political parties, particularly as they relate to bases of party support, with some reference to ecological support for the thesis. Finally, several hypotheses, emerging from the general thesis, shall be tested, using content analysis of party manifestos to measure
"traditionality" of party image, and survey data from an Indian Institute of Political Opinion poll to measure some of the characteristics of voters.

Since this thesis is closer to that of the Rudolphs than to most other writings on modernization, and is contrary to what might conventionally be expected, the concluding chapter will attempt to interpret the empirical findings of this study in a manner consistent with our present theoretical knowledge. In general, it will be argued that party imagery, by appealing to traditional points of reference, serves an integrative function for individuals who have been uprooted from their traditional villages and ways of life in the changes that come with increasing modernity.
Chapter I

TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

In a traditional society, a man's world is encompassed in the cluster of homes and fields that are his village, his "native place." But the village is more than a residence, a place of work; it defines his entire relationship with society. His social and business contacts are stable, and his actions are in harmony with all around him. His relationships with his acquaintances are formal, and his rights and obligations are consistent with his position. A man knows his place in every situation, and the place of everyone he deals with.

The family provides further security and stability. In the joint family system, traditional in India, authority is vested in the oldest male, and sons bring their wives into the family. Each new member fits into a predetermined place in the hierarchy. The status of each family member is established by tradition. A man has his job to do and he receives his rewards according to his status and needs. Uncertainty in choosing a career is unknown, for a man's career is the same as his father's, and his fortunes depend on those of the whole family. There is security in the knowledge that all family resources are shared. A man is less likely to fail in this situation than if he were on his own, and at any rate, the responsibility is not his alone. Concomitantly, there is less incentive and eagerness for change and innovation.
Tradition plays a large part in regulating village society. Things are done in certain ways because "they have always been done that way," and no one can imagine a departure from the old ways. This phenomenon is discussed at some length by Malcolm Quint (in "The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village.") He states that the village "Umm al-Nahr, due to its relative isolation from outside influences, exists within a traditional framework."

The problems faced in the village are usually the same ones which have been faced and solved in the past. When they arise anew—whether in agriculture, child-rearing, marriage, relationship with constituted authority, or interpersonal relations—the villager has very little real deciding to do. His decision, unless he wishes to risk censure or even death in certain situations, must follow traditional patterns.2

Thus, innovation is not seen as a good thing as it is in modern societies, and in fact, in many cases in traditional society, it is impossible.

Much of the technique of farming is religiously based. Certain places are sacred, and shrines in the fields are worshipped.3 Planting and harvesting are timed by astrology, and new implements are sometimes rejected on religious grounds.4 Often, there is simply a fear of using unknown methods. Traditionally-minded people think it is better to be secure in the old methods than to risk new ones, even if there is a chance of greater profits. New ways of doing things are simply unthinkable. The peasant cannot imagine himself in any other situation; he cannot identify with others.5

Then, the coming of modernity disrupts the familiar patterns with far-reaching changes. Roads and busses connect the village with the city and with other villages. New styles of life are presented in movies; radios, newspapers and magazines bring news of people and places never
before imagined. For the first time, the government is present in the villagers' life as something more than a tax collector. In India, rural development is carried out through Block Development offices which serve as a base for village level workers. This system serves to disseminate knowledge about public health and nutrition, about agricultural methods, improved seeds, new implements and methods for dealing with unusual local conditions. It is similar to the county extension service in the United States. Furthermore, villages become politically important, and political parties and candidates come to solicit votes and allegiances. The villager becomes aware of an authority more powerful than the traditional "headman."

Schools are established in the village and children learn to read. The sons of the elite are sent to school and university in the city, and more often than not, stay there, returning to the village only occasionally for visits. Other villagers go to the city too, attracted by the promise of a better life of higher wages from the factories. In leaving the village and the extended family, they leave all of the familiar patterns of life associated with them. The fast-paced life of the city, and the impersonal conditions of living and working there are new and bewildering.

Technical change disrupts old habits. It "makes it difficult for individuals to pattern their lives as adults on the lives which, as children, they watched their parents live." Technical change involves new learning, in adulthood, and changing types of behavior which were heavily reinforced by childhood experiences. Wayne Cornelius emphasizes the anomic, disintegrative, disorientating, depersonalizing features of urban life and entry into the urban environment, manifested in psychological maladjustment, poorly
defined social roles, the breakdown of traditional value systems and controls on deviant behavior, the weakening of family and kinship ties and decline of religious life. The picture is one of disorganization, normlessness, anonymity, social isolation and insecurity. Robert Redfield and his associates also perceived personal and social disorganization as an inevitable concomitant of urbanization because it was believed that the strong ties that integrated the individual into the peasant community and traditional social controls on deviant behavior were invariably loosened or destroyed by the growth of urban society.

Cultural Patterns and Technical Change, edited by Margaret Mead for UNESCO, explores the consequences of technical change, particularly in terms of mental health and illness.

A significant change results in tension either because old behavior is found to be inadequate or by creating new situations for which new behavior must be required. The old responses—the way a man handled a tool, or led a work party, or called in a shaman to cure a sick child—have usually been an essential part of the individual's sense of his 'self;' now their inadequacy or uselessness may be felt as a threat to the whole hitherto prized way of life. Even if the individual is willing to give up his old responses for new ones, he will be in a state of tension while he unlearns the old responses. The consequences of such tension may result in undesirable behavior—apathy, violence, childishness, or the individual may combat tension by retaining some portions of his traditional background. "We should not overstate the unity of the modernizing process as some single unilinear evolutionary development taking place across all behavioral and attitudinal spheres." Modernism may advance unevenly; an individual may have a modern job, and behave there in a certain way, and yet live according to tradition at home.
Thus, an individual may use tradition as a link with his past, but he must also make psychological adjustments to modern society. From Daniel Lerner, in *The Passing of Traditional Society*, comes the definition of the modern society as one in which people become psychologically mobile—that is, able to accept and adapt to change. People actually begin to seek change in order to improve their lot in life.

The mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside his habitual experience.12

Lerner describes two mechanisms for "enlarging" a man's identity. "Projection" improves identification by assigning to others certain preferred attributes of the self. "Introjection" enlarges the identity by attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object. He uses the word "empathy" to include both of these mechanisms. In short, empathy is the ability to imagine oneself in other situations, and in another person's place. This skill enables a newly mobile person to operate efficiently in a changing world.

Ability to empathize may make all the difference, for example, when the newly mobile persons are villagers who grew up knowing all the extant individuals, roles, relationships in their environment. Outside his village or tribe, each must meet new individuals, recognize new roles, and learn new relationships involving himself.13

Lerner's contention is that empathetic capacities support the personal style predominant only in modern society, that which is industrial, urban, literate and participant. Traditional society is non-participant—people are isolated from each other and society has little need of economic interdependence. Without the bonds of interdependence, "people's horizons
are limited by locale and their decisions involve only other known people in familiar situations. Hence, there is no need for a transpersonal common doctrine formulated in terms of shared secondary symbols—a national 'ideology' which enables persons unknown to each other to engage in political controversy or achieve 'consensus' by comparing their opinions."

In contrast, modern society operates by consensus, or by citizens agreeing on personal decisions on public issues so that stable common governance is possible. 14

As modernization increases and capacities for empathy expand, tension must be dealt with. This paper will explore one possible means by which a modern person might keep in contact with his cultural traditions. It should not be inferred that the political party is the only such link with the past. There are possible links in religious affiliation or in adherence to the traditional social hierarchy in the form of caste identification. The political party can, however, provide a link with the past in its use of traditional symbols as well as a thoroughly modern group affiliation.

But, why look at political parties in the search for relationships between the socio-economic characteristics and attitudes of individuals? First, in order to have broadly meaningful results, the particular cases of individuals must be aggregated into some larger whole, and political parties perform an aggregation function in every system, and affiliation to political parties is more widely held than affiliation with other sorts of groups. Furthermore, there is the widespread opinion that the platforms of political parties reflect the values of society and values may thus be studied more
easily and accurately in the aggregate than in any other way.\textsuperscript{15} Clifford Geertz explains the function of political ideology such as that expressed by political parties in "Ideology as a Cultural System."\textsuperscript{16}

It is, in fact, precisely at the point at which a political system begins to free itself from the immediate governance of received tradition, from the direct and detailed guidance of religious or philosophical canons on the one hand and from the unreflective precepts of conventional moralism on the other, that formal ideologies tend first to emerge and take hold. The differentiation of an autonomous polity implies the differentiation, too, of a separate and distinct cultural model of political action, for the older, unspecialized models are either too comprehensive or too concrete to provide the sort of guidance such a political system demands. \ldots It is when neither a society's most general cultural orientations nor its most down-to-earth "pragmatic" ones suffice any longer to provide an adequate image of political process that ideologies begin to become crucial as sources of sociopolitical meanings and attitudes.\textsuperscript{17}

Political parties, then, are useful in that they aggregate social values of their members into more or less concise ideologies. They provide a convenient unit for studying large groups of people, and not unimportantly they are common to all societies, thus providing the opportunity for comparison.
Chapter II

THE PARTIES

India's one-party dominant system with a multiple-party opposition is a relatively recent phenomenon. From the founding of the Congress Party in the last century until Independence in 1947, Congress was the predominant political organization. It was only after Independence that groups within Congress (the Communists, Socialists and others) began breaking away and the "Fragmentation" of the opposition began. Since Independence, though, Congress has retained power on the national level despite threats from the opposition. The 1962 election results signalled the beginning of the so-called "decade of discontent" with Congress rule. In this election, and to a much greater extent in 1967, the vote of the nation was described as negative. That is, the vote was anti-Congress without giving power to any other organization. Minority parties made impressive gains at the state level and some substantial ones in the national legislature. However, there was no clear mandate for any one opposition party. The fortunes of the opposition, particularly the Swatantra and Jana Sangh, soared during these years, and there were optimistic predictions of bringing down Congress rule. These hopes were shattered on the national level, however, in the 1971 election when Indira Gandhi's government won a resounding victory.

In order to investigate the thesis of this study, it is useful first to review some of the literature on India's political parties. Our primary interest in these works is in the authors' estimations of the bases of
popular support of the parties. As a rule, however, this aspect is not emphasized by the authors, and in some cases, it is not stated explicitly at all.

The oldest and largest party in India is the Congress which was the party of Independence. It has successfully made the transition to a modern political party from a nationalist party, and has enjoyed hegemony, at least at the national level, since the first election in 1952. The Congress was begun by the English-educated elite of India, more as a debating society than a political party. As the independence movement grew, however, the party rose to the task and as it expanded, became the forum for all of India's leaders in the struggle. As it grew, it slowly became more heterogenous, with the emergence of new regional elites based on coalitions of caste, regional and communal factions. The party's organizations in the states "came to mirror more and more accurately the society in which they functioned, and the party's strength depended on the degree to which they could accommodate new groups." The leadership of the party has been passed from the upper caste, urban, upper middle-class into the hands of "peasant proprietors, businessmen, and bazaar merchants." Stanley Kochanek, in The Congress Party of India, strongly emphasizes the heterogeneity of the Congress and its very wide area of support. Others writing on Congress support agree, but some, such as Myron Weiner in Party Politics in India, see future difficulties for Congress in its inability to recruit young members. "On the debit side has been the failure of the Congress Party to attract large numbers of young people. The top leadership is growing old, and unless replacements are found, within ten to fifteen years, the Party may not have the leadership to move forward." 3 In one of the few studies of party support base, D. L. Sheth
concerns with this judgment of Congress. He concludes that while Congress is basically heterogeneous in support base it is more old than young, more poor than rich and more rural than urban.

The strongest opposition to the Congress comes from the so-called "right," the Swatantra and Jana Sangh. Evidence for the support base of Swatantra comes from The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism by Howard Erdman. The main point of Erdman's discussion of support base is that the leadership of the party comes primarily from former aristocrats. He states that "in the areas of its greatest electoral strength, Swatantra is heavily dependent upon the aristocrats; but elsewhere, local notables--both aristocratic and non-aristocratic--play a major role." Much of this was due to outright recruitment of aristocrats, and others joined the party as leaders of small, local groups which were absorbed. The 1962 election was the first in which the Swatantra participated. Its support was limited almost entirely to certain areas of the North. "In the 1962 general elections, only one Swatantrite was elected from south of the Vindhyas to serve in the Lok Sabha [national legislature]; and almost all of Swatantra's MPs (Lok Sabha) were from aristocratic areas, and were either aristocrats themselves or hand-picked followers thereof." The aristocrats Erdman mentions are members of the princely families who formerly ruled much of India, and also large landowners without royal lineage. In the 1967 elections, the party leaders came from somewhat wider backgrounds and the party won some further support in the South. The new additions to the party's leadership came primarily from "industrial and professional elements." Erdman believes that the Swatantra
leadership "lacks a strong, middle-class, rural component; and [that] the party will have to struggle even harder than before to persuade people that it is primarily a rural peoples' party." Although Erdman does not explicitly discuss the electoral base of the party, the appeal of the aristocratic candidates is in rural areas; areas which were formerly part of princely India. These areas of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat are often the more backward, the least modernized of India, and the support of the people in these areas for their former rulers was, in 1962, the primary base for the Swatantra Party.

The policy of the party centers around economics and advocates "individual initiative, enterprise and energy." The party is anti-statist, calling for "minimum interference by the State." Erdman believes that "Swatantra's roots in the most aggressively free-enterprise sectors of the business community and of the rural propertied class are thus abundantly evident." The party is most frequently characterized as "conservative," a judgment based on its policy rather than its support base. D. L. Sheth sees Swatantra as a party attracting those at opposite ends of the rural economic scale: landowners and their "clients," or landless laborers. It is an overwhelmingly rural and illiterate party (93% and 50% in his samples) with income base at the high and low extremes.

The other national party on the right is the Jana Sangh. It emphasizes social and cultural issues as Swatantra emphasizes economic ones. It idealizes a desirable past and advocates a return to it. Included in Jana Sangh policy is the teaching of Hindu sacred tradition in schools, the adoption of Hindi along with continued use of regional languages and other
traditional, "Hindu" ideas. The Jana Sangh claims to be open to all, but it is clearly Hindu oriented. D. L. Sheth finds Jana Sangh to be urban, attracting the middle and upper groups of each socio-economic factor.\footnote{11} Angela Burger states that its electoral strength is mainly among small Hindu shopkeepers and businessmen and in smaller towns.\footnote{12} Craig Baxter, in his study of the Jana Sangh, states that the "bulk of the underwriting \[ in 1967 \]... came from the middle-class shopkeeper and professional who make up the backbone of the party."\footnote{13} However, Iqbal Narain and Mohan Lal in an article in Asian Survey, suggest that in exploiting the "politics of the cow" (the highly religious and emotional issue of cow-protection or anti-cow slaughter legislation), Jana Sangh has captured rural and women's vote in backward parts of the country, especially in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.\footnote{14} Norman D. Palmer sees the tendency toward traditionalism in Jana Sangh a major threat toward Congress in rural areas.\footnote{15} In a more quantitative analysis, Roger W. Benjamin, Richard Blue, and Stephen Coleman found that membership in Jana Sangh shows a negative relationship with literacy, a less marked but still negative relationship with industrialization and inconclusive results with regard to urbanization—showing higher support for Jana Sangh in both the most rural and the most urban constituencies tested. They conclude that further modernization will tend to erode the support of Jana Sangh while support for the Communist parties grows.\footnote{16}

The two Socialist parties are offshoots of the Congress Socialist Group and have very similar policy. They favor nationalization of industries and their decentralization, encouragement of small industries, rapid social
change (equalitarian), economic equality and expansion of freedoms, and the protection of minorities. The SSP is, according to Burger, more oriented to rural areas and to those of lower castes.

Burger compared the three parties--Jana Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party and the Samyukta Socialist Party--on several scales. First, she concluded that all three are rural parties, with the Jana Sangh the least so. Second, she compared the characteristics of the MLAs (state legislators) of the three parties in Uttar Pradesh.

Table II-1

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Education</th>
<th>JS</th>
<th>PSP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Literate Primary</td>
<td>25.0% (12)</td>
<td>33.3% (11)</td>
<td>59.1% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>25.0 (12)</td>
<td>39.4 (12)</td>
<td>22.7 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>50.0 (24)</td>
<td>30.3 (10)</td>
<td>18.2 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Degree</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law Degree</td>
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From Table II-1 we see that the PSP MLAs are spread fairly evenly across the three education classifications. The Jana Sangh MLAs, on the other hand, are clustered at the higher end of the scale, while the SSP MLAs cluster at the lower end.

Table II-2 and Table II-3 are both marred by the high proportion of MLAs in the N.A. row. In spite of this, Table II-2 indicates that all three
parties' MLAs display a quite high degree of intergenerational mobility. That is, this generation has achieved a considerably higher educational level than the last. Table II-3 indicates that the SSP MLAs have the highest level of general social mobility with Jana Sangh next and PSP last. The very large N.A. row makes these findings somewhat less than perfect, however.

Table II-2

Intergenerational Mobility of MLAs

<table>
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<th>Intergenerational Mobility</th>
<th>JS</th>
<th>PSP</th>
<th>SSP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>31.3% (15)</td>
<td>36.4% (12)</td>
<td>27.3% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>33.3 (16)</td>
<td>42.4 (14)</td>
<td>40.9 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18.7 (9)</td>
<td>15.1 (5)</td>
<td>31.8 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Ascertained&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16.7 (8)</td>
<td>6.1 (2)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Son obtained education four or more groups higher than father (primary → university degree).

<sup>b</sup>Son two to three groups higher.

<sup>c</sup>Father and son at same level or son only one group higher.

<sup>d</sup>Note high proportion of Jana Sangh in this row—this could change the results significantly.

These comparisons apply only to a group of state legislators, though and not to the support base of the parties. For evaluations of this more nebulous group, we must turn to less concise evidence.

Myron Weiner suggests that Socialist recruitment is most successful among young people in the parts of the country in which Gandhi was most popular. The large cities of Uttar Pradesh have been the homes of many
party leaders. Weiner quotes Ashok Mehta, then General Secretary of the Praja Socialist Party as saying that "overwhelmingly the leadership is middle class or of those elements from the peasantry and working class who through education, etc. have become middle classish." Weiner also identifies the two main problems of Socialists in India--the problem of giving socialism an Indian character, and the problem of creating a program and ideology distinct from both Congress and Communists. He states that the difference between Congress and the Socialists is frequently unclear.

Finally, Palmer agrees with many others when he states that the Sanyukta Socialist Party makes its greatest appeals in rural areas and the Praja Socialist Party to backward castes. D. L. Sheth found the two Socialist parties to appeal primarily to the poorest and most deprived sectors of society, with the Praja Socialist party having a bit more urban support.

The remaining national party is the Communist party of India. Its history is one of factions and doctrinal confusion, and it finally split in two in 1964. The Communist vote is predominantly rural--approximately
three-quarters rural. Donald Zagoria states that the key to high Communist vote is in crowded, fertile areas in the "conflict-ridden relationship between landowners and the landless engaged in a struggle for survival." Communist strength is quite small, and in scattered areas of India. Weiner suggests that the Communists, like the other opposition parties, recruit most successfully among students, intellectuals and clerks in government and business and to some extent among professionals. He allows that rural support for the Communists is growing.

Benjamin, Blue and Coleman found support for the Communist party highest in districts with the highest levels of literacy and industrialization and a less strong but still positive relationship with urbanization. This finding is consistent with the observable fact of Communist strength in Kerala and urban West Bengal, both highly literate and generally urbanized and industrialized areas.

What preliminary conclusions can be drawn then from the literature on Indian parties? In general, party studies rely on party ideology when labels such as "traditional" or "conservative" are applied. Party support base is not considered in this judgment even though it is widely discussed.

The literature on the Congress Party is in agreement on the wide base of the party though there is concern that in recent times its appeal to young people has been insufficient. There is less agreement regarding the support of other parties, but most of the opposition is said to have support in rural areas with middle-class leadership. Only the Communist party is generally thought to have its greatest appeal in urban areas among the
educated. Only Donald Zagoria, with his ecological analysis, identifies the Communist parties with rural support.

Ecological Data

In addition to the sources reviewed in the previous section, we have available another secondary source for investigation of the thesis. This is a new sort of analysis called "ecological" data analysis. The two sources of this sort of analysis are an article by W. H. Morris-Jones and B. Das Gupta, and the article by Donald Zagoria mentioned above.

"Ecological" study is defined as a study of the changes in an organization's support over time and with respect to other organizations. Some of the questions asked in this type of study are: how far is a party's performance associated with areas of specified characteristics? How far do patterns of correlations change over time? This method, like most others in the social sciences has limits in explanatory power, for "even if we find that certain socioeconomic variables . . . reveal marked and consistent correlations with particular parties' vote-shares, we would not wish to insist on any simple causal relationship." 27

For instance, if the data show that Jana Sangh vote is closely associated with areas of high proportions of agricultural laborers, it does not follow that the laborers voted largely for Jana Sangh; in fact, the high Jana Sangh vote could be the result of high non-laborer vote, drawn to the Jana Sangh because of a growing identification of laborers with Congress.

The most interesting findings, in terms of investigating our thesis, are the authors' interpretations of their findings in terms of the bases of support for the parties.
First, the Congress, which presents a somewhat hazy picture, as might be expected since its support is so wide and variegated. "Where it is strong its strength is not confined to areas of a particular socioeconomic character, and where it is weak it is not usually for such reasons." When the authors took all variables indicating economic progress together, in 1967 the areas of Congress support were those at the lower levels of development, although in 1962 the picture was not clear, and the opposite occurred in 1957. Morris-Jones and Das Gupta state that "when one compares the 1967 Congress share of votes with that of 1962 in various districts it appears that the party lost more votes in areas with more literates, higher density of population, larger concentration of immigrants. ..."^{28}

The Communist share of votes was more clearly associated with socioeconomic and political variables. Their share was higher in areas of high literacy, but the association was not clear with rural areas. This is quite surprising, and is contrary to Donald Zagoria's results.^{29} It appears that the party improved its position in 1967 over 1962 in less literate areas (areas which do not normally favor this party), thus widening its scope.

The Jana Sangh gives a larger proportion of high correlations for 1967 than any other party. "We may presume that it is a party whose support areas are, in socioeconomic terms, clearly demarcated." In both 1962 and 1967 its share was positively associated with development variables like literacy, urban population, immigrants, workers in various trades and road networks. It appears that in areas with large Muslim minorities, non-Muslims turn to Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh share increased over time in developed areas.
Unlike Jana Sangh, Swatantra derives its support mainly from rural and less-developed areas with low levels of literacy and urbanization. In states where Swatantra is strong--Gujarat, Orissa and Rajasthan--the party has made further progress in areas which are low on the scales of literacy, density and other measures of modernity. That is, indications are that Swatantra's main support base is in poor, undeveloped, rural areas.

Like Congress, both Socialist parties produce weak correlations with the socioeconomic variables in this study. That is, their areas of support are not clearly delimited and vary widely from one state to another and from one election to another. There was little difference between the Praja Socialist Party and the Samyukta Socialist Party except in terms of literacy. PSP supporters tended to show a relatively more positive association with development variables than did those of SSP. PSP also showed a higher proportion of literate supporters.
Chapter III

METHODOLOGY FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. If a proposition can survive the onslaught of a series of imperfect measures, with all their irrelevant error, confidence should be placed in it.¹

In order to further study and compare the use of appeals to traditional sentiment by parties in India, a third measure was used.

First, in order to develop a measure of the use of traditional references of Indian parties in their appeals to voters, content analysis was used on two party publications. There were the official party platforms, or manifestos, and a group of campaign pamphlets in which the policies of the parties were set forth in a somewhat informal style. The pamphlets were prepared in a series by the Popular Prakashan Publishing Company of Bombay. There was one for each party, written by prominent members of the party. All of these documents were prepared for the 1967 elections.² These sources were examined for the mention of traditional concepts in either a favorable or an unfavorable context. Only six of the national parties were surveyed: Congress, Jana Sangh, Swatantra, Samyukta Socialist Party, Praja Socialist Party, and the Communist Party of India.⁴ All regional/communal parties were excluded. The ranking of the parties is illustrated in Table III-1 on the following page.

In the ranking, there were several factors accounted for. The positive symbols counted were allusions to India's "glorious" past, examples or
Table III-1

Factors Used to Rank Traditional Appeal of Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>#1</th>
<th>#2</th>
<th>#3</th>
<th>#4</th>
<th>#5</th>
<th>#6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>18 (1)</td>
<td>- (2)*</td>
<td>22 (2)</td>
<td>0 (2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>8 (2.5)*</td>
<td>- (2)*</td>
<td>26 (1)</td>
<td>-4 (5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>8 (2.5)*</td>
<td>(2)*</td>
<td>11 (3)</td>
<td>-1 (2.5)*</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praja Socialist</td>
<td>1 (4)*</td>
<td>-2 (5)</td>
<td>2 (4)</td>
<td>-1 (2.5)*</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samyukta Socialist</td>
<td>1 (4)*</td>
<td>-1 (4)</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
<td>-3 (4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>1 (4)*</td>
<td>-3 (6)</td>
<td>- (6)</td>
<td>-6 (6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ranking is based on Column #6, "total symbols."

#1 = +Symbols in Manifesto
#2 = -Symbols in Manifesto
#3 = +Symbols in Pamphlets
#4 = -Symbols in Pamphlets
#5 = Election Symbol
#6 = Sum of Rankings
* Tie

quotations from the classics, or examples made of leaders of the past. Excluded were references to the Independence struggle and modern leaders (after 1900). The negative symbol category was used when derogatory references were made to tradition—when a party called on the people to smash some "feudal tradition." Column #5, headed "election symbols", refers to the pictoral
symbol of the party. These symbols were chosen by the parties themselves, and then made legal by the Elections Commission—which patented them—making it illegal for them to be used in any other context. They are used on the ballots and in campaigning to aid the illiterate voter. All of the symbols except those of the Swatantra and Communist Parties evoke clear responses from the past. In order to rank them, a small jury of Indians on the campus of Kansas State University was asked to put them in order from the most traditional to the least. The three "jury" members agreed in their ranking. The yoked bullocks of the Congress refer to the traditional method of agriculture, the sacred cow, and in a subtle way to respect for the traditional agricultural life. The lamp of the Jana Sangh is the traditional deepak used in festivals and in Hindu worship; it refers to the sacred fire, and thus to the sacred duties of the wife and mother in the household. The others have similarly complex associations with tradition.

All of these categories were then put into a rank order in each column and added in column #6 in order to get a total ranking. The low number (8) indicates the most traditional party, the Jana Sangh, and the highest number (27) the least traditional.

In order to obtain data on the socioeconomic characteristics of party supporters, a survey conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion was used. This agency is an affiliate of the Gallup Poll of the United States. The sample questioned in this particular survey, The All India Political Poll of 1961, consisted of approximately 2,650 respondents. The questionnaire explored attitudes toward parties in relation to education, income, social
class, urban/rural residence, and various attitudes toward the policies of Congress government. Among the questions asked in the poll, one might find indicators which would allow some inferences about the "modernity" or "traditionality" of the people who claim to support one party or another.

Measuring Modernity

In measuring "modernity" one measures the relative progress of people moving from an agrarian, illiterate, rural society to an urbanized, industrial, literate one. The further consideration of "empathy" is added here, and is measured by the tendency of respondents to hold political opinions. 8

The first of the indicators measured is literacy. In India, newspapers share the media scene with radios, movies, and in Delhi, television. Since no questions were asked in the All-India Poll concerning media participation, literacy will serve as a rough measure of participation. It will be a rough measure because radios and movies are extremely popular and well-distributed, and literacy is, in a developing country, a commodity possessed primarily by the elite.

Table III-2

Among those who expressed preference for Jana Sangh and Congress, most are in the literate category. These results can be shown most dramatically in the Jana Sangh row, where none of the illiterates expressed preference for the Jana Sangh. Furthermore, the Jana Sangh showed itself to have the most educated group of supporters of all the parties. Seventy-five percent of Jana Sanghis had high school diplomas or higher education.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Education under Matriculate</th>
<th>Matriculate</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 2606

*Category collapsed to include Hindu Mahasabha, Independents, others.

Key:
Matriculate is equivalent of high school graduation.
Graduate means some university training.
Illiterate means no formal schooling whatever.
The only other party coming close to this figure was the Swatantra with 71.6% with high school education or above.

The second characteristic used to measure modernity is the social class of party supporters. The modern, psychically mobile person is most likely to belong to the middle class because, as societies become more urban and industrialized, the middle class grows in numbers and in political power. From Tables III-3 and III-4, we see that Jana Sangh and Swatantra are predominantly middle class with 84.2% and 97.9% respectively in the middle and lower middle classes. Jana Sangh leads in the middle class category by 13.2% over the nearest competitor, Swatantra. In Table III-4, it can be seen that Jana Sanghi's incomes are most evenly spread across the income levels. Jana Sangh has the highest proportion of wealthy supporters of all the parties, with 40% in the 351- over 700 rupees per month categories. Congress is next with 11.3% in these categories. The results for the Swatantra Party are somewhat surprising in that it is known as the "Capitalist Party," or the "big business" party, yet its supporters are mainly in the lower middle class rather than in the upper class, and upper income groups as would have been expected. The general trend here is simplified in Illustration 1. As social class goes up, party preferences tend more toward traditionally-minded parties.

Table III-5 again shows dramatic results for the Jana Sangh. A full 80% of Jana Sanghi's are urban.

The only other party which comes close is Swatantra with 70.6% urban. The results for Swatantra are not surprising since its following is expected to consist of business interests, but the finding for the Jana Sangh are very
Table III-3

Social Class of Party Supporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 2606

\[ x^2 = 368.08228 \quad \text{Sig. .001} \]

*Category collapsed to include Independent, Hindu Mahasabha, and others (regional/communal parties).

\(^1\)Classifications established by All India Poll.
Table III-4

Income (in Rupees per month) of Party Supporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Rs. 1-100</th>
<th>Rs. 101-200</th>
<th>Rs. 201-350</th>
<th>Rs. 351-700</th>
<th>Over 700</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 2636

\[ x^2 = 176.66156 \quad \text{Sig.} \quad .001 \]

*Category collapsed to include Hindu Mahasabha, Independents and others (regional/communal parties).
Illustration of the thesis that the traditional party will appeal to the most modern supporters.
Table III-5

Rural-Urban Distribution of Party Supporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ n = 2699 \]

\[ \chi^2 = 72.57210 \quad \text{Sig. .001} \]

*Category collapsed to include Hindu Mahasabha, Independents, and others (regional/communal parties).
surprising. The party is obviously not one made up primarily of backward farmers or rural women, but is an urban party with literate, indeed educated, middle class followers.

Finally in an attempt to get at Lerner's central proposition, that the "psychically mobile" have the capacity to have opinions on matters which are not of direct concern to their homes or businesses, questions asking opinions in the All-India Poll were analyzed. It is of no concern here whether respondents approved or disapproved these matters, but only whether they had any opinion or not. It should be kept in mind that in India, researchers often find their task complicated by a social code which requires polite cooperation with a polltaker. If he wants to ask opinions, then an opinion is given, whether it is held or not. To be polite, the respondent chooses an answer.

In section A of Table III-6, the Jana Sanghi's proved themselves to have opinions more often than any other party, with Congress, PSP and Communists clustered in a second category, and Swatantra and SSP lagging with only 50% or so of respondents having an opinion. In part B, Jana Sangh is third, behind Swatantra and the Communists in number of members with opinions. Section B concerns a matter central to Communist policy, and antithetical to Swatantra policy which would explain their degree of opinion holding there, just as the orthodox nature of part A would explain high Jana Sangh opinion holding. In part C, Jana Sangh is again in a cluster with Swatantra, PSP and the Communists, at about 80% with opinions. It is only in part D, on the issue of taxation, that Jana Sanghi's show a greater percentage of opinions than the other parties with 90% of Jana Sanghi's with opinions.
Table III-6
Percentage of Party Supporters with Opinions on Public Issues

A. Approve Prohibition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Do you think Congress has the right to enforce prohibition?

B. Approve Ceiling on Land Holding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Do you think Congress has the right to approve a ceiling on land holding?
Table III-6 Continued

C. Approve Cooperatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Does Congress have the right to seek production through land cooperatives?

D. Direct Taxation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Does Congress have the right to increase direct taxation?
Table III-6 Continued

E. Approve Increased Indirect Taxation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Do you think Congress has the right to increase indirect taxation?

F. Approve Basic Industries in Public Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Do you think Congress has the right to take basic industries in public sector?
Table III-6 Continued

G. Approve Restricting Private Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question asked: Do you think Congress has the right to restrict the field for the private sector?
In order to evaluate the relative degree of opinion holding of the party supporters, their "scores" on each of seven questions were averaged in Table III-7 (page 42).

Jana Sangh and Swatantra both have a very high proportion of opinionated followers--77% and 82%, respectively. From the previous conclusions about the modernity of Jana Sanghis, their "score" is not surprising. The Swatantra has been generally in a lower modernity ranking, so these results are somewhat unexpected. The PSP shows considerable difference from the SSP here, with degree of opinion-holding just behind Jana Sangh and ahead of the Communist Party. Congress and the SSP fall far behind the others with just over half of their supporters holding opinions. This would provide further evidence that they are more rural and traditional in support than the others. The results for the Communist Party belie its rural nature, and suggest that ideological rigor might override the factors of education and residence.

The results of the traditionalism scale of the parties and the socioeconomic measures of party supporters were correlated in the following graphs. The purpose of the correlations is to discover if there is a relationship between the socioeconomic patterns of party supporters and the degree of traditional appeal made by the party. The line plotted in the graphs is the least-squares line or the one line which minimizes the sum of squares of vertical distances from the line and estimating the regression of Y on X. 9

Graph III-1 shows the closest correlation, that between social class and tradition. The "r" value means that if r were -1.0 then social class could be perfectly predicted if the score on the traditionalism scale were known. The r of - .905 is extremely high, and thus we may conclude that the
Table III-7

Degree of the Opinionatedness of the Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
correlation is very close. This may be seen graphically by observing the relative "fit" of the points to the line. Graph III-2, correlating tradition and opinion-holding obviously does not have such gratifying results. The strong negative relationship of Graph III-1 is not present, and the r value does not approach -1.0 so closely. Graph III-3 also shows a weakened relationship than the first one in that the line shows a mildly negative relationship between the variables. Note the similarity between these lines and the hypothetical line in Illustration 1 (page 34). Here, one of the difficulties of the statistic is noted. The two broken lines are hypothetical, showing a logically possible alternative to the single line. The statistic assumes a linear relationship, disallowing the possibility of another sort of relationship. The hypothetical lines in Graphs III-3 and III-4 show a conceivable negative relationship of variables for the Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties and a positive relationship between the variables for the remaining parties. Keeping this in mind, however, the negative relationship shown in III-3 is still quite strong, and in III-4 is discernable.

We may conclude that social class is the strongest indicator we have. That is, it supports the thesis most strongly by showing the strongest negative relationship with traditional appeals of the parties. If we were to predict the party choice of people, our predictions would be most accurate if their social class were given. Education and opinion-holding are also relatively strong, with urban residence the least predictive of these variables. Yet even this one remains a negative relationship, though weak. Thus, in varying extents, every correlation upholds the thesis.
THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH DIAGRAMS THAT ARE CROOKED COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE INFORMATION ON THE PAGE. THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.
% Supporters in Middled Upper Social Classes

GRAPH III-1

Tradition/Social Class

a = 73.19
b = -2.16
r = -.905
% Supporters Holding Opinions on Public Issues

Graph III-2

Tradition/Opinion Holding

Sun (16.82)

JS (8.77)

PSP (18.571)

Comm. (2768)

Cong. (115.58)

SFP (21.61)

\( a = 75.31 \)

\( b = -0.44 \)

\( r = -0.262 \)
GRAPH III-3

Tradition/Urban Residence

\[ a = 81.56 \]
\[ b = -2.23 \]
\[ r = -0.187 \]
Graph III-4

Tradition/Education

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha &= 82.06 \\
b &= -2.03 \\
r &= -0.216
\end{align*}
\]
Chapter IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is thought that the traditional appeals of political parties have the greatest effect on the poor, uneducated, rural masses of a country. Samuel P. Huntington asserts that "competition among modern urban groups on the other hand, promotes traditionalization of these groups, as they attempt to enlist the support of the traditional rural masses." The study undertaken here is an attempt to examine a "traditionalizing" process independent of competition for the support of the rural masses. That is, that parties with a traditional image appeal most to modernizing and modernized voters. Other studies of Indian political parties have been employed as support for the thesis. We have seen that the Congress is a large, heterogenous party, with no reliance on any particular socioeconomic group for electoral support. The Swatantra Party appears to derive its support from rural areas and largely unmodernized voters. The Jana Sangh, on the other hand, is more clearly associated with a particular group. This is the educated, middle-class, urban voter. Like the Congress Party, the two Socialist Parties are not clearly associated with any particular group. They both tend to derive the most support from rural areas with low levels of literacy and development. However, the Praja Socialist Party was shown to have a somewhat more positive correlation with factors of development than the Samyukta Socialist Party. That is, PSP voters tend to be somewhat more educated, wealthy, and to live in larger communities than SSP voters. The Communist Party seems to draw support
from rural areas with a high level of literacy and density of population. Their support is concentrated in West Bengal and Kerala, primarily, where these conditions exist.

To further explore the thesis, empirical research was carried out with content analysis, and secondary analysis of responses in an All-India Political poll. When the parties were ranked on a traditionalism scale, these rankings were then correlated with indicators of the modernity of their supporters. It was found that in the case of every indicator, at least a moderate negative relationship was found between modernity of party image and modernity of party support.

As a result of this study, it became obvious that there are two types of traditionality to be considered when characterizing a political party. The one used by most writers is that of traditionality of party image. This neglects, however, the real differences of support maintained by each party. While the Jana Sangh might be legitimately called traditional in terms of its policy and official rhetoric, to characterize it as traditional in terms of support base, too, would be unwarranted. It has, in fact, a predominantly urban, middle-class support group with relatively high education, income, and tendency to hold opinions on national issues.

We might conclude, then, that persons who have left the village, and have "made it" financially, support the parties which emphasize most heavily the traditional in their appeal.

Daniel Lerner calls these people the "psychically mobile," those people who have left their traditional patterns of thinking and who have gained a capacity for "empathy," the capacity to have opinions on matters not
immediately related to their homes and business, and the ability to adapt to change.

This new capacity for empathy, and the modernizing conditions which accompany it bring, however, new insecurities and uncertainties, a void which must be filled by a new structure. Several works examined here suggest that there develops a need for tradition in the modern man. It may manifest itself in orthodox religious beliefs, or a revitalized social structure from the past or in political parties which use tradition in their appeals to voters. The adaptation of various structures to new strains in society is very much along the lines of what Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph call "the modernity of tradition," that is, the use of the past to serve present and future needs. They studied a traditional social structure, caste, and traced its adaptation to a modernizing, democratic society in India. They found that this hereditary group took on the qualities of a voluntary group in the new structure--caste associations. The new associations became the link between citizens and the government, and both thus became politicized. Because of its successful adaptation to modern society, caste is likely to remain very much a part of the Indian social structure. It has been revitalized and now performs new functions.

A very similar phenomenon can take place with history when it is used by a political party or political leader. History and national tradition becomes incorporated into the rhetoric of the campaign, and becomes, in fact, an integral part of party program. Clifford Geertz states that it is "the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations
meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them. . . ." He describes the new states as seekers after useable political concepts, yet not quite grasping them. He illustrates the merging of "the 'great tradition' of the exemplary state, the doctrines of contempo-
rary nationalism, and the 'little traditions' of the villages into one lumi-
inous image" in Indonesia. And, although Geertz concludes that this ideolog-
ical framework set out by Sukarno failed, it illustrates how national tra-
dition is incorporated into the political structure. Rather than serving a transitory void in modernizing society, tradition is more likely to become institutionalized through political use, and become enshrined as national culture. All developed nations have certain traditions and myths which serve nationalistic, political purposes. In India, there are indications that tra-
ditional parties, especially the Jana Sangh, have increased their share of the vote in developed areas, while other parties do not show this trend. It would seem, then, that tradition serves the purposes of political parties appealing to modernized voters, and that these references could well become the national culture of a modern nation.

In modern society, the unhistorical, the progressive, the modern and the historical are all necessary, as Nietzsche says, to the health of a per-
son, a community and a system of culture.

History is necessary above all to the man of action and power who fights a great fight and needs examples, teachers, and comforters; he cannot find them among his contemporaries.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction


2 Many authors have accepted this assertion -- see Cornelius, Wayne A., "The Political Sociology of Cityward Migration in Latin America: Toward Empirical Theory", Latin American Urban Research, I (1970),


4 See M. N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), for further evidence of the politicization of caste, especially Chapter 3, "Some Expressions of Caste Mobility."


Chapter I

2Ibid., p. 55.


4Perhaps the most famous case is that of certain Indian farmers who would not use an iron plough because it would tear the breast of Mother Earth; they thought the wooden plough to be more gentle.

5See Daniel Lerner's example of the peasant asked what he would do if he were president of Turkey. His reply, "My God! How can you ask such a thing? How can I...I cannot...president of Turkey...Master of the whole world?", op. cit., p. 3.


8UNESCO, op. cit., p. 269.

9Cornelius, op. cit., p. 98.

10UNESCO, op. cit., p. 271.


12Lerner, op. cit., p. 49.

13Ibid., p. 50.

14Ibid.


17Ibid., pp. 63-64.
Chapter II

1For an explanation of the vote in these terms see Jhangiani, Motilal A., Jana Sangh and Swatantra: A Profile of the Rightist Parties in India (Bombay: Manktalas, 1967), p. 197.


6Ibid., p. 144.

7Ibid., p. 266.

8Ibid., p. 71.


10Sheth, op. cit., p. 285.

11Ibid.


Chapter III


The discrepancy between the 1961 poll and the 1967 campaign pamphlets could not be avoided. However, the premise that appeals to voters and style of communication of the parties remain stable between two elections is not unprecedented, cf. Namenwirth and Lasswell.

In 1962 there was only one Communist Party. It split into two, the CPI (Marxist) and the CPI, in 1964. For the purposes of this study they were treated as one. That is, the scores of the two in the content analysis were added to make only one score.

This is the party of the Untouchables of India.
See India Votes for election symbols.

The importance of the emotive value of the election symbols can be illustrated by the recent battle over the Congress yoked bullocks symbol in the wake of the 1969 Congress Party split. Both the old and new Congress claimed the right to use the symbols, until the case was finally settled in court with the old symbol awarded to Mrs. Gandhi's section of the party. The new Congress, or Organization Congress chose a new symbol -- a cow and her calf -- very similar in theme to the disputed one.

There were two other polls available, but neither one could be used because they lacked a question on party affiliation.

Cf. Morris-Jones and Gupta for comparison of factors, p. 405. Also, Lerner uses these as indicators of "psychic mobility."


Chapter IV


See Jhangiani, op. cit., p. 197 for this type of assumption.

Especially Mead and Cornelius.

Geertz, op. cit., p. 64.

Ibid., p. 68.


Reis, John P. "Political Stance of the Communist Party of India (Marxist)." Indian Journal of Political Science, XXX, 2 (April-June, 1969), 177-184.


THE USES OF THE PAST IN MODERN INDIAN POLITICS

by

REBECCA JANE WILSON BRUNSWIG

B.A., Carleton College, 1970

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER’S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1971
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine one aspect of the use of tradition in modern Indian politics. The thesis is that "modernity" of party image and the degree of modernity among voters are negatively related, rather than positively related, as might be expected. This thesis is supported, first, by a review of some of the literature on Indian political parties, particularly as it relates to bases of party support, with some reference to ecological support for the thesis. Finally, several hypotheses emerging from the general thesis are tested, using content analysis of party manifestos to measure the extent of traditionalism of party image, and survey data from an Indian Institute of Public Opinion poll to measure some of the characteristics of party supporters. The parties are ranked on a traditionalism scale, then these rankings correlated with indicators of the economic and social characteristics of their supporters. In the case of every indicator, at least a moderate negative relationship was found between modernity of party image and modernity of party support.