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A CASE STUDY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: 
AN UNCOMMON CASE OF DRASTIC SOCIAL CHANGE

by

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PREFACE

A contemporary Cuban anthem refers to Cuba as the "beacon of the Americas, proudly and haughtily" awaiting for its Latin American neighbors "when the arms of liberty angrily (they) raise" (Obra Revolucionaria, 1963). This "beacon" theme is based on the assumption that other Latin Americans will adopt the Cuban solution because they identify with the Cuban situation. Fidel Castro stated: "In many countries of Latin America pre-revolutionary conditions are incomparably superior to those which existed in our country" (Toch, 1965:205). Yet eleven years have elapsed since the coming to power of the revolutionary regime, and although several guerilla rebellions have sprouted in other Latin American nations, no country has followed the Cuban "beacon." Partly this may be explained in terms of what Veliz denotes as excessive stability:

In spite of its reputation for frequent and violent political upheaval, perhaps the principal contemporary problem of Latin America is excessive stability. There exists in the region a resilient traditional structure of institutions, hierarchial arrangements, and attitudes which conditions every aspect of political behavior, and which has survived centuries of colonial government, movements for independence, foreign wars and invasions, domestic revolutions, and a confusingly large number of lesser palace revolts. More recently it has not only successfully resisted the impact of technological innovation and industrialization, but appears to have been strengthened by it. (Veliz, 1965:1)

Accounting for obstacles to change in Latin America, is a great challenge which I will not undertake. However, I will attempt to explain some of the conditions which, I will argue, partly account for the "uniqueness" of the Cuban change. Its drastic revolutionary changes in a span of ten years disrupted and recreated the institutional order. How successful was this change will not be considered. What is pertinent are the social forces which made possible this change.
CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A brief survey of the literature indicates that most sociological theories consider institutions to be society's major mechanism of socialization and social control. I argue hypothetically that estimates of the strength of the social system can be studied by analyzing the effectiveness of institutions. That is, unstable and ineffective social institutions do not effectively perform social control and socialization. Such a system is weak, and its weakness may result in unstability, ineffectiveness, and ultimately in disruption. Using a tautology simply manifests the poor state of knowledge which characterizes today's sociological thought on drastic social change. I am theorizing that such a system inclines to rapid and drastic social change. A revolution is more likely to occur in such a society rather than in one where deeply-rooted, popularly-supported institutions exist.

Even though a revolution is likely to occur when institutions are ineffective and unstable, the new social system is perhaps equally vulnerable to the pressures that brought about the disruption of the former. Thus, these new systems shortly collapse or compromise original hopes to bring about reforms rather than drastic change. Collapse of the total social system is uncommon. Such occurs when the institutional order collapses or when one institutional order, the political and/or the military, seizes the reins of power. History, however, shows this to be improbable. Few revolutions since the French Revolution have succeeded in drastically changing the social order. Huntington (1966:264) denotes these so-called "great revolutions" as merely "revolutions."

Palace revolts, insurrections, coups, rebellions, and wars of independence that are not accompanied by drastic changes in the social order are not revol-
olutions. This discussion follows Huntington: a revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies (1966:264). Thus, there have been few revolutions; the French, Russian, Mexican, Chinese, and Cuban follow closely the definition.

Being precise, then, prior to 1959, contrary to journalistic and some scholarly information, Cuba had had no revolution. Cuba had had small scale insurrections, coups, revolts, and prior to its liberation from Spain, two wars of independence. The changes resulting from those conflicts affected only the decision-making cadre. Beneath that level, crumbling institutional orders persisted. These insignificant changes—insignificant to the popular mass of Cubans—did not affect changes of the other institutional orders. The great masses of Cubans were left untouched as a result of those elite changes. Indeed, weakly-articulated institutions, education, economy, government, religion, provided rewards to officialdom but maintained coercive control of masses. In essence, institutions coerced and exploited the masses of the countryside but did not constitute viable social arrangements for most Cubans except that mass populations were victims of the operations of institutions.

There were institutions but not widely articulated, nor were institutions conceived as being relevant to the masses except as the masses were controlled by their institutions. At the national level—literally in Havana—all institutions were represented and the reins of those institutions were held there. I analyze the Cuban institutional order prior to 1959 as indicative of a crumbling social order. We are interested in those aspects which were necessary antecedent conditions for revolutionary change, and which after 1959
resulted in an effective revolution and an ineffective counterrevolution. Before proceeding with that analysis, it is necessary to establish some theoretical formulations on social control and institutions, social change, revolution, and modernization.

Institutions: Socialization and Social Control

This section briefly reviews theoretical formulations of social control as dominant paradigms of sociology. Following Kuhn's usage (1962:10), paradigms mean models giving rise to particular traditions and approaches of scientific research.

Conformity has been accounted for in two broad ways (Stone and Faberman, 1970:13). First, Durkheim's view of the nature of constraints, coupled with Freud's formulation of the superego as internalized social rules, led sociologists to interpret conformity as a consequence of socialization. Second, Parsons and Reisman see man as involved in a continuous quest for social acceptance. In the second instance, anxiety operates to maintain man's conformity and to minimize his deviance.

Durkheim and Parsons see society as controlling the individual from outside by imposing constraints on him through sanctions, such as codes of law or conventions. Durkheim's model emphasizes society as the single and decisive element in socialization. Society regulates the conduct of the individual through the collective conscience and the division of labor. Social solidarity occurs because individuals subscribe to the collective conscience and the division of labor. This pressure from society embedded in the division of labor makes man a moral being (Durkheim, 1947:390-405). In Parsons' model the relationship between man and society prevails. Through internalization and socialization the individual learns both to interpret the attitudes and
intentions of others and to adopt the commitments and capacities essential to perform his adult role (Parsons, 1964:20-30).

Marx (1937) sees society as dominated by the mode of economic production. The class structure consists of rulers (owners) and oppressed (nonowners) as related to production. The struggle between those two classes determines men's social relations. In particular, the ruling class, which owes its position to owning and controlling means of production, also controls, through often subtle ways, the whole moral and intellectual life of the people. According to Marx, law and government, art and literature, science and philosophy serve, more or less directly, the interests of the ruling class. For Marx, the organization of production provides a framework whereby some individuals become class conscious and engage in class conflict because of the ownership of production. Workers want a voice in production, owners resist their acquiring such a voice. For sensitized owners or workers, socialization into particular roles in social classes occurs because they understand how their interests are determined in relationship to production. Through the process of stratification, society controls and instills conformity on individuals. Class position dominates and conditions individuals. Classes result from the organization of production. Therefore, through his class, the individual becomes subordinate to society.

Some members of a society in the Marxian model are unaware of the central role of ownership. For the most part, those individuals are workers or bourgeois, who falsely conceive of their interests as being similar or identical to those of the owners. Such workers or bourgeois are manipulatable by owners and provide manpower for the so-called "silent" majority as identified by contemporary observers of the United States. So long as a substantial sector of public opinion is so disposed a revolutionary situation
is unlikely to develop.

Mannheim argues that social organization results because individuals give up their own freedom to procure higher social ends. Social organization defines and structures individual behavior. Society controls the individual by pressures in the form of incentives and rewards for which individuals strive. Social organization instills wishes and determines the range of possible gratifications (Mannheim, 1940).

Mead's process of socialization involves a never ending exchange between the "I" and the "me," that is, between the self and society. Personality results from the juncture of the "I," the "me," and the "generalized other." Society in the form of the generalized other influences the behavior of the individual. Mead's self develops as a result of relating to society and individuals (Mead, 1934:134-138).

Gerth and Mills, as Mead, see man and society as relating in interactive processes involving ego, individual, alter(s), and society. The individual molds his personality according to the several significant others around him and according to his position and career in society.

Those authors draw from Mead the two fundamental concepts which unite personality and social structure—role and institution. Role refers to units of conduct which (1) recur as regularities, and (2) orient to the conduct of other actors. Institutions are organizations of roles carrying different degrees of authority.

Institution is the basic unit on which Gerth and Mills build their notion of social structure. A social structure is more than the interrelations of its institutions, but these institutions in the authors' view do make up its basic framework. The authors classify institutions so as to enable them to construct types of social structure. They classify institutions according
to the ends served. An institutional order, for the authors, collects those institutions within a social structure having similar consequences and ends or serving similar objective functions (ends). Institutions vary in size, recruitment, and composition of membership, in forms of control or in proportions of permanent and transient roles. They distinguish five major institutional orders which are classified according to their having ends concerning power, goods, and services, violence, deities, and procreation. "Any social structure, according to this conception is made up of certain combination or pattern of such institutional orders" (Gerth and Mills, 1964:26).

1. The political order consists of those institutions within which men acquire, wield, or influence the distribution of power and authority within social structures.

2. The economic order is made up of those establishments by which men organize labor, resources, and technical implements in order to produce and distribute goods and services.

3. The kinship order is composed of institutions which regulate and facilitate legitimate sexual intercourse, procreation, and the early rearing of children.

4. The military order is composed of institutions in which men organize legitimate violence and supervise its use.

5. The religious order is composed of those institutions in which men organize and supervise the collective worship of God or deities, usually at regular occasions and at fixed places. (1964:26)

Any discussion of socialization and social control, whether extensive or briefly summarized, leads to a rather abstract philosophical level. That is so, because the question concerns defining the relationship between individuals and society. In briefly reviewing these models, I purposely excluded abstractly discussing origins and evolution of society. By limiting discussion to theoretical models which founded traditions and approaches of social research, a theoretical perspective is gained of the relationship existing among individuals, the institutional order, and society.

Those paradigms provide a basis for analysis and prediction. Each
paradigm acknowledges the decisive impact of society, through its institutions, to mold individual personalities and to exercise social control upon its members. The differences among those paradigms are of manner and degree, and concern authors' basic models of man and society.

The intention of this review is to stress the centrality of the institutional order in effectively performing socialization and social control. To say society is to say control of people. Social control is indispensable for the existence of the social system. Institutional orders socialize, reward, and coerce to perform that function. Institutional orders failing to perform that function yield an unstable and collapse-prone social system. Observing the theoretical context of that thesis follows.

**Drastic Social Change**

Amitai and Eva Etzioni observe that grand theories on social change give inadequate guidance for sociological research, but neither does modern social theory. "There is no adequate theory of social change, just as there is no fully developed general theory of society" (1964:75). Talcott Parsons and Wilbert Moore suggest that a theory of society and one of social change are inseparable. Parsons closes his discussion of change in *The Social System* with the statement:

> Perhaps, even, it is not too much to hope that this chapter as a whole will convince the reader that there is a certain falsity in the dilemma between "static" and "dynamic" emphases. If theory is good theory, whichever type of problem it tackles most directly, there is no reason whatever to believe that it will not be equally applicable to the problems of change and to those of process within a stabilized system. (1951:536)

Moore states: "An 'Integrated' theory of social change will be as singular or plural as sociological theory as a whole, and will include about the same subdivisions and topics" (Moore, 1960:818).
Smucker and Zijderveld observe that negative critics of the system-model of functionalism, in accusing that theory of being unable to adequately account for social change, may have encouraged functionalists to convince them that functionalism does account for change. Functionalists analyze change within a social system and note reactions to total systems to exogenous sources of change (1970:375). Further, they relate these analytic perspectives to the process of institutionalization. "However, even though an analysis of change requires an historical approach, the basic assumptions of functionalism remain conspicuously ahistorical." The authors note that the functionalist approach may view social systems as processual entities moving through history but the actual mode of analysis focuses more upon the effects of change rather than upon explaining the historical dynamics of change.

Conflict models offer an alternative, but they too are limited. Evolutionary and equilibrium theories conceive of society as including mutually interdependent structures that operate functionally or dysfunctionally to one another. If evolutionary and equilibrium theories see stable structure everywhere, conflict theories see structural change everywhere. Proposed conflict models introduce a historical dimension into the analysis of change, "but they share the limitations of the system-model in that they tend to restrict their analysis of change to only structural change. By not dealing with meaning, the impact of the historical perspective is seriously limited" (Smucker and Zijderveld, 1970:375).

Diversity in social change theory makes finding a precise and comprehensive definition of social change very difficult. Edward Tiryakian (1967:75) following Parsons, distinguishes between societal change and social change. Social change is essentially a continuous rather than a discontinuous
process and a quantitative elaboration of structural differentiation. It is characterized by quantitative increments within a certain pattern of organization within a certain institutional structure. Societal change involves change of the organizational structure of a total society (Tiryakian, 1967:70). Such change is radical in being a total transformation of institutional structures, or approximating what Meusel calls "a recasting of the social order" (1934:367). Societal change is, therefore, a qualitative change, a discontinuity or leap in the general normative pattern of the organization, which will be manifested in all major foci of institutional structure (Tiryakian, 1967:70).

In our forthcoming discussion, then, we will refer to Tiryakian's model of societal change, as we will be interested in radical change, the "recasting of the social order."

What distinguishes a revolution from other social upheavals as a type of societal change? It is not the magnitude of physical violence, but the revolution's permeation of the social structure. Revolutions radically, not gradually, transform the structure of the social order. Hannah Arendt observes, "violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government to bring about the formation of a new body politic . . . can we speak of revolution" (1963:28). Revolutions are rare. Most societies never experienced revolutions and most ages before modern times were without revolution (Huntington, 1966:264).

Great civilizations of the past--Egypt, Babylon, Persia, The Incas, Greece, Rome, China, India, and the Arab world--experienced revolts, insurrections, and dynastic changes, but these did not "constitute anything
resembling the 'great revolutions' of the West" (1963:644). More precisely, revolution is a characteristic of modernizing societies. Moreover, it is one way of modernizing a society. "Revolution is the ultimate expression of the modernizing outlook, the belief that it is within the power of man to control and to change his environment" (Huntington, 1966:265).

Revolution as modernization cannot occur in any society at any period in its history. It is not a universal occurrence but rather historically limited phenomenon. It will not occur in highly traditional societies with uncomplicated economies. Nor will it occur in highly modern societies. It occurs in societies having experienced some social and economic development (Huntington, 1966:265). And, particularly where some institutional orders have lagged behind economic change.

A social system whose political institutions cannot assimilate and absorb new groups is opened to an explosion of political participation. Without that explosion there is no revolution.

A complete revolution, however, involves another phase—the creation and institutionalization of a new social order. The successful revolution combines rapid mobilization with rapid institutionalization. As Huntington comments: "The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion of political participation. The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth." To summarize, a full scale revolution involves the rapid and violent destruction of the existing institutions, the mobilization of new groups, and the creation of new institutions. The sequence and the relations among these three aspects may vary from one revolution to another.

Delimiting his perspectives on revolution, Tiryakian (1967:75) observes that a revolution requires antecedent necessary conditions structural
prerequisites in Levy's sense (1952:71-76) for a structural transformation that may have no direct or manifest relation to the objectives of the revolutionaries. In fact, these antecedents may have developed over a long period of time at various "depth" levels of the social structure. They may not be publicly recognized, although there may be some awareness of a general "malaise" or "unrest" (1967:75). Chalmers Johnson (1964:5) following a structural functional approach refers to these antecedents' necessary conditions as dysfunctions. "Dysfunction is the condition that demands the response of social change--and of revolution." But what distinguishes revolutionary change from other forms of social change? Two considerations are relevant here: revolution occurs because nonviolent evolution is not occurring, and revolution occurs in response to a distinct condition of the system that we call "multiple dysfunction." It is a peoples' awareness of the actual, or incipient, metastasis of social ills that causes the "loss of confidence" that so often presages revolutionary conditions. In addition to the criterion of elite intransigencies in the face of system dysfunction, dysfunctions must "metastasize" beyond one substructure in order for revolution to become appropriate (Johnson, 1964:9).

Presumably revolutions occur when there is coincidence of certain conditions in political institutions and certain circumstances among social forces. In these terms, the two prerequisites for revolution are, first, political institutions incapable of providing channels for the participation of new social forces, and secondly, the dissatisfaction, demands, and desire of social forces.

Two Patterns of Revolution

The "Western" pattern involves a collapsing of the political institutions of the old regime, then the mobilizing of new groups in politics and then the creating of new institutions. The "Eastern" revolution, in contrast, begins with mobilizing new social groups into politics, and creating new institutions and ends with violent overthrow of the political institutions of the old order. The French, Russian, Mexican, and, in its early phases, Chinese Revolution approximate the "western" model. The latter phases of the Chinese Revolution, the Vietnamese Revolution and other colonial struggles against imperialist powers approximate the "eastern" model. In the "western" revolution, mobilizing new social forces is the consequence of the collapse of the old regime; in the "eastern" revolution, mobilizing new forces collapses the old regime.

Western revolutions require relatively little overt action by rebellious groups to overthrow the old regime. "The revolution," as Pettee says (1938: 100-101), "does not begin with the attack of a powerful new force upon the state. It begins simply with a sudden recognition by almost all the passive and active membership that the state no longer exists." Whether or not a revolution develops depends upon the number and the character of the groups involved. A crucial factor following the collapse of the old regime, however, is whether power concentrates or disperses. "The less traditional the society in which the old regime has collapsed and the more groups which are available and able and inclined to participate in politics, the more likely is revolution to take place" (Huntington, 1966:268).

After an old regime collapses, three social types have played roles in the ensuing political struggle. Initially, as Brinton and others have pointed out, the moderates (Kerensky, Madero, Sun Yat-Sen) assume authority. Typically, they attempt to establish some sort of liberal, democratic, constitutional
state which is described as restoring an earlier constitutional order. More frequently, moderates remain moderate and lose power because of their moderation. Their failure stems from both their inability to mobilize new social forces and to lead the radical forces. Incapable of performing either function, moderates are swept from power by counterrevolutionaries who perform the first, or by revolutionaries who perform the second. Castro was both Kerensky and Lenin to the Cuban Revolution. His style shifted from moderation to revolution as his movement assumed and then consolidated its power.

In most revolutionary situations, counterrevolutionaries attempt to stifle the development of increased political participation and to reestablish the old political order which relies on concentrated (unshared, authoritarian) power. Access to power is by ascription.

The radical revolutionaries are the third major political group in a revolutionary situation. They mobilize social forces and expand political participation. Revolutionaries with a scenario to mobilize and increase participation, have an advantage over either group of rivals when established institutions break down. The revolution becomes more radical as larger and larger masses of the population enter the political arena. In most instances, revolutionary success lies in appealing to peasants and other lower class groups. Appeals are usually social and economic. Both oftentimes nationalist appeals supplement socio-economic themes.

The Western revolution is distinguished by the period of political struggle or violence among moderates, counterrevolutionaries, and revolutionaries after the old regime's fall. The Eastern revolution is distinguished by
a prolonged period of "dual power in which revolutionaries expand political participation and scope and authority of their institutions at the same time that the government is, in other geographical areas and at other times, continuing to rule. In the Western revolution, the principal struggles are between contesting groups; in the Eastern revolution, struggle is between a revolutionary group and the established order" (Huntington, 1966:271).

In Brinton's terms, the Western revolution stems from the fall of the Old regime. Then follows events—the revolutionary honeymoon, moderate rule, efforts of counterrevolution, the rise of radicals, reigns of terror and virtue, and eventually, the thermidor—that differ in time and space as compared with Eastern revolutions.

With regard to institutions, the Western revolution features the collapse of established institutions, mobilization of new social forces and expansion of their political participation, and finally the creation of new institutions. The pattern of institutional evolution during the Eastern revolution is quite different. The mobilization of new social forces, and the creation of new institutions are carried on simultaneously and gradually by the revolutionary elite and the collapse of the institutional order of the old regime marks the end rather than the beginning of the revolutionary struggle. The Eastern revolution features parallel institutions within a political entity wherein a protracted struggle between competing institutional arrangements eventually is won by the revolutionary forces. The Western revolution, we speculate, is urban: it usually originates in the capital and gradually expands to the countryside. The Eastern revolution appears to be rural. It establishes itself in a remote section and gradually escalates military operations until the capital is successfully occupied.
This classification provides a useful model to illustrate paths followed by certain revolutions. For example, early phases of the Cuban Revolution came close to the Eastern model. Revolutionary forces were based in the remote countryside, their military operations escalated from isolated terrorist operations to guerilla warfare. However, in later phases, the Cuban Revolution approximates the Western pattern.

The old Cuban regime collapsed unexpectedly—not as revolutionaries occupied the capital. Whether or not guerilla warfare was capable of overthrowing the government remains open for speculation. We do know that guerilla advances substantially contributed to its downfall, but those advances were not the sole reason. The old regime collapsed in the capital city as the revolutionary group was located some distance from Havana. Here, as in the Western pattern, a struggle ensued among moderates, radicals, and conservatives. There was a period of anarchy as the revolutionary government was not established until some period after the Batista government had failed to govern. And, as in the Western model, an initial take-over by moderates among the revolutionists was threatened by counterrevolutionary action. Finally, the revolution was radicalized culminating in Castro's shift from moderation almost one year after the Batista regime's collapse.

Revolution requires not only political institutions which resist the expansion of participation to other major social groups, but also social groups which demand that expansion of political participation. We add that the existing institutional orders fail to effectively perform their function and thus fail to satisfy demands of social groups.

Theoretically, every social class is potentially revolutionary. Frustrating its demands, denying its opportunities to political participation may make any group a revolutionary group. But it takes more than one
revolutionary group to make a revolution. A revolutionary situation necessarily entails the alienation of many groups from the existing order (Pettee, 1938:12-100). Brinton and Johnson cite the revolutionary situation as a product of multiple dysfunction (Brinton, 1958:100; Johnson, 1964:5). One disaffected social group may lead to a coup, riot, or revolt. But for a revolution to occur, combining of several alienated groups is necessary. Although this combination may take the form of any number of possible group coalitions, the alliance must include both rural and urban groups. Combining rural and urban opposition is required to produce a revolution. Palmer notes, "Peasant and bourgeoisie were at war with the same enemy, and this is what made possible the French Revolution" (Palmer, 1959:484).

Huntington proposes that revolution in a modernizing country requires the following conditions: an urban middle class—intellectuals, professionals, bourgeoisie—who are alienated from the existing order; and a joining of the urban middle class and peasants to fight against the existing order and to fight for the same cause. The cause is usually nationalism. If one group is alienated at one time and the other group alienated at a different time, we hypothesize, revolution is improbable. "Hence, a slower general process of social change in a society is likely to reduce the possibility that these two groups will be simultaneously alienated from the existing system" (Huntington, 1966:277). So if the existing order authorizes gradual increases in political participation and reform programs it can remain in power. Thus, if the existing government brings moderates into decision-making positions that government can forestall the development of a revolutionary situation. If moderates are alienated from the existing order, then potential for a revolutionary situation is enhanced. As the process of socio-economic modernization becomes more rapid over time, the probability of revolution increases.
For a major revolution to occur, however, not only must the urban middle class and the peasantry be alienated from the existing order, but they must also have the capacity and the incentive to act along parallel, if not cooperative, lines. If the proper stimulus to joint action is missing, then again revolution may be avoided. (Huntington, 1966:278)

The existing order which yields even in minor ways buys time. Possibly more elites yield than do not or there would be more revolutions than have been observed.

The City and the Revolution

Which groups are most revolutionary in the city? Three possibilities are the lumpenproletariat, industrial workers, and middle class intelligentsia. The latter group is derived from the more general grouping of the bourgeoisie.

Although slum dwellers may seem to be the most promising source of urban revolt, data from modernizing nations demonstrate their inactivity. In the mid-1960's, shantytowns and urban slums have not been a locus of opposition to the existing order. With rare exceptions, urban slums of Latin America, Asia, and Africa increase in population with little or no improvement in level of living and still violence, riots, or insurrections have not materialized. Contrary to popular expectations, the slums of Latin America do not support Communist or other left wing movements. Slum dwellers who vote for opposition parties choose right wing rather than left wing groups.

In 1963 in Peru, the slums of Lima were carried by General Odria, the most conservative of the four candidates running for president. In the same year in Caracas, Uslar Pietri, the conservative candidate polled a majority of the slum vote. In Chile in 1964, the slums of Santiago and Valparaiso voted for the more moderate Frei rather than the more radical Allende. Similar patterns have been observed in Rio, Sao Paulo, and other Latin American cities (Halperin, 1965:65; Soares, 1964:91; and Pearse, 1961:96).
Four factors seem to play a role in the conservatism and acquiescence of lowest income urban residents. First, rural migrants to the city improved their living conditions by moving. Soares observes: "Comparing his urban economic status with that of his past years gives the migrant a feeling of relative reward. This may happen even though he is at the bottom of the urban stratification ladder" (1964:191). Second, the rural migrant to the city brought and retains patterns of social deference and political passivity. Low levels of political consciousness and political information characterize most urban slum dwellers. Pearse's study of urbanization of Rio de Janeiro found that politics is not a serious concern of slum dwellers because less than one fifth of a sample engaged in a serious political discussion over a six month period (1961:196). Various studies show that "the urban and rural poor in Latin America do not seriously expect their government to do anything to alleviate their poverty." Third, the strength of political conservatism among slum dwellers is their concern for food, jobs, and housing which are secured by working for rather than against the system. Halperin notes slum dwellers are, "realists on the lookout for material improvement, and in politics they tend to support the man who is in a position to provide such improvement even if he is a dictator or a politician with an unsavory record" (1965:66).

Finally, patterns of social organization in the slums may discourage political radicalism. In Latin America, mutual distrust and antagonism exist in many urban slums so that organized cooperation to articulate demands and engage in political action is difficult.

The individual proletariat in modernizing countries is a second possible source of revolutionary activity. In contrast to countries where industrialization preceded unionization, industrial labor in modernizing societies is
not radical. Unions tend to be politically conservative because they often
grew out of the existing order rather than growing by protesting that order.
In many developing societies consciousness in Lenin's terminology was brought
to workers not by revolutionary intellectuals, as in nineteenth century
Europe, but by political leaders and government bureaucrats. Landsberger
observes that in the competition for the leadership of Latin American labor
"ideologically less extreme elements triumph over more extreme ones, provided
they are vigorously progressive" (1967:260).

Finally, a third source of revolutionary activity is the middle class
intelligentsia. When intellectuals desert the existing order, Brinton and
others argue a context for revolution is being prepared. "In fact, however,
it is not the desertion of the intellectuals but rather their emergence as
a distinct group which may be the harbinger of revolt" (Huntington, 1966:290). They become distinctive in that the intelligentsia are no longer allied with
middle class hopes and aspirations. Among middle class intellectuals,
students are the most active oppositional group. They are the most active,
coherent, and effective revolutionaries within this group. The most consis-
tent, extreme, intransigent opposition to the government exists in the
university.

Peasants and Revolution

It is the thesis of those who study revolution that without peasant
support a revolution is impossible. Urban groups may overthrow a government,
but not overthrow a political system. The agrarian uprising, as Lenin
said at the time, is the "biggest fact in contemporary Russia and made the
case of insurrection stronger than a thousand pessimistic evasions of a
confused and frightened politician." The Brazilian economist, Celso Furtado,
observed "the peasants are much more susceptible to revolutionary influences of the Marxist-Leninist kind than the urban classes." The findings of Petras and Zeitlin show the decisive impact which the proximity of the radical miners to the peasants had in politicizing and radicalizing the Chilean countryside (1965:578-586).

Modernization impoverishes the peasantry. As the countryside gradually opens due to improved communication and transportation, peasants realize they suffer and that something can be done about this suffering. That awareness is prone to revolution. When peasants realize that their material hardship and sufferings are worse than those of other groups in society and that suffering is not inevitable, feelings of relative deprivation rise and radicalizing protest becomes possible.

Both peasants and industrial workers are concerned with immediately improving their economic and social conditions. However, peasants differ from industrial workers in relating to the social structures fostering economic development (Huntington, 1966:298). For example, "In industrial society, a more equitable distribution of ownership is the prerequisite to economic growth" (1966:299). Urban workers (other than the casually-employed shantytowners) benefit from national economic development but the modernizing trend costs peasants.

In modernizing nations, no recognized and accepted social means exist through which the peasant effectively advances claims. Labor's rights to organize is accepted in most countries; peasants' rights to organize is less acceptable. Any form of collective action by peasants is viewed as revolutionary by the existing order. For instance, in Guatemala, organizing labor unions among urban workers occurred in the 1920's but unions among agricultural workers were prohibited. This provision was repealed in 1949.
During the next five years, the Confederation of Guatemalan Peasants grew to include more than 200,000 members. However, after the counterrevolution overthrew the left wing Arbenz regime in 1954, agricultural unions were once again illegal. As Celso Furtado observed in commenting on the campesino movement in Brazil: "Ours is an open society for the industrial worker, but not for the peasant... Since the campesinos have no rights whatsoever, they cannot have legal claims or bargaining power." Modernization and counter-revolutionary actions encourage revolutionary propensities among peasants.

**Modernization and Development**

There is considerable variety of emphasis among observers of modernization and development. Whether conceptual priority is assigned to personality factors, institutions, cultural orientations, or social process determines variables observed. There is variety also among mechanisms regarded as crucial for modernization. For instance, urbanization, mass communications, or political mobilization are given priority. Furthermore, concrete areas to be considered, the family, religion, education, demographic trends, industrial development also vary. As Bernstein comments: "The total social transformation and universal pattern assumptions of modernization theory encourage the attempt to relate to each other the different types of changes, within and between levels, through organizing principles derived from the core definitions of the modern that is adopted and certain a priori theoretical formulations" (1971:145). Such a grand scope lies beyond the limits of this work.

Conceptualizing the term modernization has not been an easily solved theoretical problem. As Bernstein (1971:146) observes, "given that development or modernization denotes a particular kind of social change in the
contemporary context, it was necessary to find a heuristic designation of the beginning and end point of the process." Nineteenth century sociology provided a number of concepts in a range of dichotomous ideal-types such as status-conduct, sacred-secular, mechanical-organic, and community-association, to which were later added derived formulations such as Redfield's folk-urban concepts and Parsons' pattern variables.

Both dichotomous types and the differentiation model of social change involve an evolutionary rationale. Within this framework of polar ideal types and the differentiation-integration model, the achievement model is established. That model identifies and analyzes the social, cultural, and psychological conditions, concomitants, and consequences of economic development. It tends to assume that the necessary motivation has to be instilled in individuals—that a sufficient level of need for achievement is a precondition for development. A related model of modernization is that elites authorize and lead economic development. Political, bureaucratic, intellectual, and often military, elites are charged with articulating development goals and instilling what Shils calls "the will to be modern." Shils, as Pareto and Toynbee before him, advances elitists as more than powerful—they have insight into the needs and interests of mass populations and act in terms of development interests that coincide with popular interests.

Different writers focus on meanings or consequences of modernization. Lerner considers modernization as a social process of which development is the economic component (1967:21). Apter sees development, modernization, and industrialization as terms of decreasing conceptual generality (1967: 67-69). Some stress structural aspects while others stress culture and personality.

The notions of modernity and modernization have provided a theoretical
framework for the sociology of development. The principal assumptions of modernization theory used here are: (1) that modernization is a social process generally associated with a specific program of economic development wherein the preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the specific program has general influences (Bernstein, 1971:141); (2) that modernization is universal and includes subprocesses as follows: (a) a demographic transition with sharply declining death rates and birth rates; (b) a decrease in the size, scope, and influence of the family; (c) a degree of openness replaces former closedness of the stratification system; (d) an increase in using bureaucratic structures in place of the exclusive reliance on ascriptive social structures; (e) an increase in secularization and a decrease in religious influence; (f) a differentiation of education (occupational socialization) from kinship; (g) an enriching and lengthening of the years of education; (h) a spreading of education programs to the masses; (i) a developing of communication and mass media; (j) an emerging market economy and industrializing procedures (Etzioni, 1964:181).

Study Objectives

The assumptions limit the present analysis to analyzing changes of institutions; institutions comprise social mechanisms that socialize individuals and perform social control of the population. Cuba serves as case study concerning drastic changes of institutional orders. To what degree is the model initially proposed a viable one for describing and analyzing revolutionary change. Then, how can a sociological analysis account for the lack of success in extrapolating the Cuban model to other Latin American nations with similar social and economic circumstances.
Based on preceding theoretical formulations, this study will seek to generate hypotheses interrelating two ingredients of drastic change: the degree of institutionalization of the social system and the degree of alienation exhibited by social forces within the system. To generate such concluding hypotheses, antecedent conditions to the Cuban Revolution as well as specific occurrences of 1958–1960 are treated as a case study of analysis.
CHAPTER II

THE CUBAN ECONOMIC ORDER PRIOR TO 1959

In this chapter, I present the more salient aspects of the Cuban economic order prior to 1959. Only those aspects which are considered relevant for the objectives of this study are emphasized. A rather lengthy discussion of the Cuban economy has been considered necessary because as I will indicate later, Castro's favorably received appeals to nationalism were based on economic grievances of the Cuban masses. The economy was controlled by a small foreign-oriented elite, and large foreign investors, with the consequence that mass domestic economic needs were not considered by decision-makers.

A Sugar Economy

Cuba fits uneasily beside other Latin American countries in conventional tables of economic well-being or misery (Thomas, 1967:249). It is a sugar island. For most of the last 130 years, Cuba has been the world's largest sugar producer. As a consequence, for sugar cultivation implied Negro slaves, only Brazil among Latin American countries has anything like the same proportion of people of African descent. (The indigenous Indian population of Cuba vanished.) Still, there is in Cuba no overt mixture of Spanish and indigenous cultures, as in other Latin American countries, in particular Mexico, Central America, and the Inca countries of western South America. Cuba mixes two immigrant cultures, one of which was slave until eighty-five years ago.

Since Cuba lives by selling sugar, Cuba's economy has always been at the mercy of the large sugar-consuming countries: if there are rumors of wars, sugar prices go up (Thomas, 1967:250). Of course, Venezuela depends
on oil; Guatemala on bananas, and so on, "but the sugar market differs from these, for it is broader than any of them, broader even than the farrago of bribes and restrictions known as the oil market: for as incomes begin to go up in underdeveloped countries, sugar is the first craving, simply because of its capacity to vary the usual appallingly dull diet of poor people" (Viton and Pignolosa, 1961:16).

Cuba's sugar economy sets her apart from mainland Latin America but places her with the other sugar-dominated Caribbean islands, such as Martinique or Jamaica. In the eighteenth century, the aristocratic landowners, descendants of original grantees of the siglo de oro, who elsewhere in Latin America control vast tracts of land, began to turn over their estates to sugar plantations. By 1860, when Cuba was producing 30 percent of the world's sugar and, in consequence, was the richest colony in the world, there were 1,365 sugar mills, mostly in the western end of the island. Even then, most mills were owned by companies rather than individuals, perhaps thirty by North American companies (Thomas, 1967:250-251).

By 1860, the old landowners were falling behind. The largest sugar mills were mostly owned by self-made merchants who had come quite recently from Spain, not by the aristocracy. The sugar crisis of the 1880's as the Ten Year War of Liberation (1868-1878) brought further ruin to the old elite landowners. Only large mills with their own railways were able to survive the competition with European sugar beets. (Germany overtook Cuba as the largest sugar producer in the 1880's.) Between 1885 and 1895 most of the old landowners either sold their interests to companies, increasingly North American, or ceased to grind sugar, though continuing to grow cane. "They carried their canes by rail to be produced in new, million dollar mills which acted as their agents, ultimately their masters" (Thomas, 1967:251).
The pre-1959 organization of the sugar industry was established before Cuba became independent. By 1900, there were between 160 and 200 big mills which grew some cane, but purchased the rest from planters of varying wealth and capacity. The mills were owned in a few cases by individuals but more typically by public companies with equity shareholders, many North American.

A collapse of prices in 1920 caused the take-over of almost all the smaller, private mills by North American banks. After the depression, Cubans bought out a number of sugar mills previously owned by North Americans. Still, in 1960 about 36 percent of the sugar production was controlled by United States-owned mills. Table 1 illustrates the shifting pattern of control of Cuban sugar mills by Cuban and foreign national interests.

Over half of Cuba’s cultivable land was devoted to cane, either directly raised by the mill or by the planters without mills (colonos). Approximately 7.6 million acres or nearly 28% of Cuba’s total land area was controlled by sugar interests (Table 2).

Some colonos were well off. But because of the industrial structure of sugar, Cuba had, throughout the twentieth century, no traditional upper class in the sense of a single socially-exclusive group which controlled the bulk of the land. There were latifundia; but these were the latifundia of stockholders, not individuals. Latifundia is the concentration of land in the hands of a single owner, accompanied by a plentiful unorganized supply of labor possessing neither land nor any immediately available alternative type of employment. The latifundia owners exert considerable noneconomic (social and political) power over the peasants.

Cuba, by official records, contained 159,958 farms in 1945 with an average individual farm area of 56.7 hectares. Of the total number of farms, over one third were smaller than 10 hectares in size and approximately
### Table 1

CUBAN SUGAR MILL CAPACITY BY NATIONALITY OF CONTROLLING INTERESTS
1939, 1950, 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality of Controlling Interest</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Mills</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% of Output</strong></td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2
CUBAN ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION OF CANE AND SUGAR FOR VARIOUS YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>AREA IN CANE</th>
<th>CANE HARVESTED</th>
<th>SUGAR PRODUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (1,000 acres)</td>
<td>Harvested (1,000 acres)</td>
<td>Per acre Short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-40 (av.)</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>17.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-45 (av.)</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>2,054</td>
<td>16.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-50 (av.)</td>
<td>2,891</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>16.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20% had less than 25 hectares. About 45% had from 10 to 49.9 hectares. Only about 1.5% of the farms were 500 hectares or more.

According to the 1946 census, about 30% of the total number of farms representing 32% of the farm area were owner-operated (Table 3), while about six percent of the farms, representing one fourth of the farm area were run by hired farm administrators. Over half the farmers rented their farms, on either a cash rent or share crop basis, but less than 40% of the farm area is accounted for by this group.

**TABLE 3**

**TYPES OF FARM OPERATORS IN CUBA, 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF OPERATOR</th>
<th>FARMS</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL AREA</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>48,792</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>2,958,694.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>7,342</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2,320,444.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renters</td>
<td>46,048</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>2,713,929.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subrenters</td>
<td>6,987</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>215,215.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharecroppers</td>
<td>33,064</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>552,078.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squatters</td>
<td>13,718</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>244,588.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>72,134.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>159,958</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>9,077,086.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Cuban Agricultural Census, 1946.

The degree of concentration of land ownership is most clearly revealed by the fact that farms of less than 25 hectares constituted 70% of all farm units but occupy only 11% of the total area, while the 894 farm units with
holdings of more than 1,000 hectares occupied 36% of the entire farm area.

Even a cursory examination of the census information indicates that concentration of land ownership is great and that tenancy, while less prevalent than in many other areas of Latin America, is high by comparison with Western Europe and the United States."
(Report on Cuba, 1951:91)

Nelson (1950:139) distinguishes four clear phases following the breakup of the haciendas comuneras (a form of communal property) in the eighteenth century.

(1) The expansion of sugar production through multiplication of the number of small mills (1790-1870).

(2) The rise of the large landed sugar estate (1870-1895).

(3) The large landholding system in full flower, 1900-1925, transforming Cuba into an agricultural wage economy under industrial management.

(4) The stagnation of the sugar industry and restriction of the large estates from 1933 to 1950.

This sugar economic structure based on mills, colonos, and peasants constituted a system of rural stratification. The mills regulated the colono as it payed cash for the crop, the colono, depending on this price, controlled the wages and labor of peasants. The world market ultimately fixed prices. However, we must note that Cuba allocated more than one half of its crop to the United States market (Table 4); approximately 40% of this income returned to North American hands. Within the world market, the United States market for sugar essentially dominated Cuba's sugar economy.

To a great extent, Cuban agriculture was characteristically dedicated to one crop production. This is seen in the case of sugar growers, but equally in tobacco farms, cattle ranches, and coffee plantations. The principal crop—sugar cane—was grown on 26.6 percent of all the farms in 1945, but for only 18.2% of the total number of farms was it the major source of income (Report on Cuba, 1951:88).
### Table 4
CUBAN FARMS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF INCOME, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF FARM INCOME</th>
<th>ANNUAL INCOME</th>
<th>PROPORTION OF INCOME FROM PRINCIPAL CROP</th>
<th>NO. OF FARMS</th>
<th>PROPORTION OF TOTAL FARMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Cane</td>
<td>$153,345,413</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
<td>29,121</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock and Livestock Products</td>
<td>68,220,720</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>28,836</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>40,755,323</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>22,750</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereal and Legume Crops</td>
<td>21,272,941</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>26,828</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>16,486,010</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>16,969</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>10,472,608</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>9,331</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit (tree)</td>
<td>4,137,084</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
<td>4,758</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Products</td>
<td>1,608,372</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crops&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15,386,771</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>11,394</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>9,114</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$331,885,242</td>
<td>-%</td>
<td>159,958</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Includes cocoa, henequen, peanuts, melons, bananas, pineapples.

Source: Cuban Agricultural Census, 1946.
By presenting the foregoing data, I deliberately avoid discussing the economic aspects of other agricultural products. The latter's contribution to the economy was not substantial, nor did other crops vary greatly from the sugar economy. Rather I will proceed to discuss what is a more salient issue, the different socio-economic groups as related to Cuba's economy.

The Peasant

A tobacco farmer expressed his views about rural Cuba in 1950: "The wealth of the nation comes from the land; if the farmers are unprotected, the nation suffers" (Nelson, 1950:4). To which Nelson adds: "Perhaps the word 'unprotected' could be extended to mean unprosperous, uneducated, and all of the other conditions associated with a low status" (Nelson, 1950:5). Nelson writes about the miserable habitations of the squatters who settled on other people's land; the bohios, the peasant houses with their dirt floors, thatched roofs, and improvised walls of bark from royal palm trees; the trails; the naked children, their swollen stomachs testifying to an unbalanced diet and infection from parasitic worms; the evidence of great poverty everywhere; the absence of schools, medical care, and up-to-date method of agriculture. "Cuba presents a paradox on a grand order. Nature is bountiful . . . Yet the masses of Cuba's rural population are impoverished, ill-housed, ill-fed, and poorly-clothed" (Nelson, 1950:9).

These were the observations of an American sociologist in the 1950's. From Nelson's discussion, it is possible to perceive that the values and wishes of the Cuban farmer in the 1950's were distant from those which characterize the traditional peasant. The foremost wish of the Cuban farmer was the construction of roads. Roads that would have brought all his objectives closer, schools, hospitals, consumer goods, and amusements.
"They want above all, I think, to be connected with the outside world by a good road. They are hungry, not for food . . . but for food for the spirit. They were anxious for lectures, for reading material, for an opportunity to visit the city . . . " (Nelson, 1950:17).

Cuban peasants may be tentatively classified into four categories: the tenants, the squatters, the small farm owners, and the rural proletariat. The tenants rented land in cash or in kind. Cash renters were sometimes better off than small farm owners depending on the type of farm. Small farm owners, characteristically owning between 0.4 and 9 hectares were by no means well off. They usually lacked income to purchase either machinery or fertilizers, and were dependent on the closest latifundio. Most of the rural proletariat were sugar workers, although some worked in tobacco or coffee. They were the most underprivileged class in rural Cuba and also the most needful of revolutionary change. The majority of sugar workers lived in the countryside sometimes as squatters, some in rural hamlets. They worked for one third of the year usually under the most deprived circumstances and remained idle for the rest. An exception were those wage earners who owned small farms and worked their own land while not working for wages. Some belonged to the National Federation of Sugar Workers. (Membership claimed by the Federation for 1960 was 502,072.) However, most organized workers were employed by sugar mills; they tended to be skilled workers living in small hamlets in the proximity of the sugar mill. The most underprivileged of sugar workers were the cane cutters. They worked between 14 and 16 hours during the zafra (harvest) at low wages. They were employed either by the colonos or by the sugar mill. They had no protection whatsoever, and they were especially subject to chronic unemployment.
Several prominent social features result from the economic structure of rural Cuba in the 1950's which I will enumerate. Those features help explain the rapid acceptance Castro received from peasants. First, Cuban farmers were poor and deprived. Such a population is ready for socio-economic change. The owner of the latifundia, the big owners, were corporations and not individuals. Second, as a result of this arrangement latifundio owners did not live in rural areas. Cuba was a land of absentee landowners, no binding ties prevailed between landowners and peasants. Third, although Cuban peasants thought of themselves as being isolated, the realization of their isolation indicates that they were not. Enough roads had been constructed for the peasants to have contact with urban life; those contacts increased their feelings of deprivation because they knew better livings were possible. Fourth, the presence of sugar mills in isolated areas of the countryside brought peasants into contact with some unionized workers. Petras and Zeitlin note that such contact accounts for much of the radicalization of the Chilean peasant (1967:578-586). Fifth, the proximity of the sugar mill to the peasant acquainted the latter with machinery and people from the "outside" world. The complicated industrial machinery was a wonderment to the peasant, who enjoyed visiting mills as if attending an exhibition. Often, however, the peasant, in particular the small farm owner, felt deprived because he realized the impossibility of acquiring even a small tractor.

The people who visited or administered the sugar mill were often foreigners (Visitors, administrators, or technical personnel of North American-owned sugar mills.) They lived in better houses, spoke another language, ate differently and altogether led a different life from that of the farmer. Such contacts educated the peasant as he was exposed to culture
and values other than his own while increasing his feelings of deprivation. In short, I will conclude this section by stressing that the Cuban farmer was not traditional; he was transitional, he sought modern rights and privileges—education for his children, medical care for his family, and improved roads to town.

The Urban Middle Class

Victoria classifies the different socio-economic groups as exploiters and exploited. The exploiting social groups were the landholders and the major farmers and cattle breeders in the countryside and the industrial capitalists in the cities. The exploited included agricultural field hands, the landed proletariat, unemployed and underemployed, and all those workers lacking in any union protection (1970:547). Thomas looks differently at Cuba's socio-economic stratification. "Elsewhere in Latin America rich businessmen became landowners; in Cuba rich landowners became businessmen. This is not to say that there were no rich in Cuba; indeed, it is probable that there were more Cuban millionaires per head of population than in any other country of Latin America. But these were in general people living off stock or who had made themselves rich by one sugar gamble on another" (Thomas, 1967:252). The absence of an upper class in the old sense of the word (a Spanish aristocracy, descendants of grantees by the Spanish crown) altered the nature of the rural stratification system in Cuba as compared to other nations of Latin America. Without a visible landlord, the local scene represented a homogeneous mass of powerless peasants (Thomas, 1967:252).

Professor Nelson puts it differently; he said that he was "not at all certain that a middle class exists in Cuba, but there can be no doubt about the upper and lower classes" (1950:139). Thomas further notes that "the
essential characteristic of Cuba was that by the mid-twentieth century there were really only two classes, upper (or middle) and lower" (1967:252). Movement was possible between these classes. Possibilities for acquiring wealth existed in the early part of the century, and to a lesser extent in the years immediately after 1945. "Such possibilities further sapped traditional class divisions. Birth probably meant less in Cuba than in any other country of Latin America" (Thomas, 1967:253).

The Cuban middle class cannot be regarded as a solid bastion of bourgeois interests and liberties. Cuban wealth and white collar professionals of the middle class centered in Havana; the disproportion increased during the years of the Republic. Particularly, the disproportion favoring Havana in comparison to the remainder of Cuba increase between 1919 and 1943.

Thomas (1967:263) hypothesizes that the Cuban middle class was extremely conscious of North American race prejudice. He notes "prejudice was found as another example of the way that rich Cubans were in a sense already exiles long before Castro's revolution."

Rather than further discussion of the middle class, I turn to a topic more relevant to the economic structure, and will reconsider the middle class later.

The Worker: Unemployment and Trade Unions

Less than a decade before Castro's revolutionary government came to power in Cuba, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development noted that "the insecurities which result from chronic unemployment and from the instability and seasonal fluctuations of the Cuban economy, continue to keep the worker in a state of anxiety" (Report on Cuba, 1951:359). Zeitlin's thesis is that recurrent unemployment and underemployment and the consequent
"state of anxiety" of the Cuban workers in prerevolutionary Cuba was a significant determinant of their supporting the revolution and its leadership (Zeitlin, 1967:47). Widespread unemployment, both seasonal and structural, characterized the prerevolutionary economy. Two years preceding the Revolutionary government, known average unemployment and underemployment in the labor force was about 20 percent. The 1953 Cuban census estimated 8.4% of the labor force was unemployed during the year's period of fullest employment, namely, at the height of the sugar harvest.

The data collected by Zeitlin indicates comparative interindustry rate of unemployment fairly well (Table 5). Although as Zeitlin notes, he cannot infer the actual prerevolutionary unemployment rates in these industries because of the small number of workers in his sample who worked in the industries (Zeitlin, 1967:50).

"It scarcely seems problematic that the sever and recurrent fluctuations of the entire economy, and the widespread unemployment and underemployment in the population were of major significance in the formation of the workers' political consciousness . . ." (Zeitlin, 1967:52). Unemployed and underemployed workers were antagonistic to prerevolutionary regimes. That they were not regularly employed demonstrates a weakly-articulated institutional order.

Castro believed unemployment politically significant. In his speech at his trial in 1953, he said the revolutionaries based "their chances for success on the social order, because we were assured of the people's support . . ." Among "the people we count on in our struggle are the seven hundred thousand unemployed Cubans . . . and the five hundred thousand rural workers who live in miserable bohios (huts), work four months of the year and spend the rest of it in hunger . . ." (1959:38). Repeatedly since
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>6 or less</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10 or more</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar milling</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer and malt products</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco manufacturers</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile mill</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and paper products</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and petroleum refining</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather products</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural equipment</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel refining</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper mining</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>(152)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

coming to power, Castro has referred to the problem of unemployment, linking it with the destiny of the revolution.

The profound significance that prerevolutionary unemployment and underemployment had for many workers was evident from the spontaneous remarks they made during Zeitlin's interviews. Some typical remarks were:

"If I was lucky, I worked two and a half months a year... I worked at trying to work, and I passed the time hungry for the rest of the year."

"I fought for work, and then I got only about seven months a year." (Quoted from Zeitlin, 1967:54-55.)

Zeitlin notes that the workers with the least prerevolutionary economic security are the ones who are most likely to support the revolution (Table 6).

**TABLE 6**

**ATTITUDE TOWARD REVOLUTION BY PREREVOLUTIONARY EMPLOYMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTHS WORKED PER YEAR BEFORE THE REVOLUTION</th>
<th>FAVORABLE</th>
<th>INDECISIVE</th>
<th>HOSTILE</th>
<th>(N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 or less</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>(63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 9</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 or more</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>(105)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After the political crisis of 1933, industrial workers organized to defend their interests against industrialists. "This division of interests was a consequence of a system of free enterprise oriented toward profit, and it led the entrepreneur to want larger profits and the worker to demand higher
wages" (Victoria, 1970:548). These urban workers structured conflict on legal bases, aiming to legitimate such conflict. The movement, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) was controlled by the Communist party from 1933 to 1948. Most unions were organized according to industry rather than trade and covered all employees—laborers and office workers.

The connection between labor organizations and political activity has always been close. The unions found it virtually impossible to improve conditions without participating in politics (MacGaffey and Barnett, 1962:151). Labor unions were often used as means to enter politics. "Although this was in part the result of the workers' failure to demand responsible leadership, it also reflected an important function of the labor unions, which was to provide an outlet for leadership and opportunity for advancement to men otherwise barred by their social status from political and economic influence (MacGaffey and Barnett, 1962:151).

Local unions were linked into nationwide federations. Authority was centered in national headquarters. In 1960, there were thirty-three such federations claiming a membership of 1.2 million workers (Table 7). These federations were affiliated with the CTC. Before and after 1959, the CTC exercised considerable control over most of its affiliates, "a situation arising from the support of the government at the top and the absence of a strong democratic base."

"As a general rule," MacGaffey and Barnett note, "Cuban managers seemed to be more successful in dealing with labor difficulties than foreigners who were invariably faced with union antagonism" (1962:153). Labor leaders frequently viewed management-labor relations in terms of the "class struggle," and employers often refused to deal with unions except through their lawyers. Before the union movement could develop enough independent strength, prestige
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Federation of Sugar Workers</th>
<th>243</th>
<th>502,072</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Workers in the Construction Industry</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Commercial Workers</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>(a) 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Transport Workers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(a) 62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Gastronomic Workers and Related Trades</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>(a) 62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Tobacco Federation</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>(a) 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' Federation of the Food Industry</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Maritime Workers' Federation</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Workers in the Cattle and Derivative Industries</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(a) 24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Textile and Needle Industry Workers</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>(a) 23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federated Railway Brotherhood</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Chemicals Workers' Federation</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>(a) 22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of the Shoe Industry</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>(a) 21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Mine Workers and Similar Trades</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Graphic Arts</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Liquor, Beer, and Refrigerator Workers and Related Trades of Cuba</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>(a) 14,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Federation of Electric, Gas and Water Plants</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Workers in the Metallurgical Industry and Related Trades</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Workers in the Forestry, Wood and Furniture Industries and Related Trades</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Barbershop, Haircutting and Manicure Workers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Medical Workers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Petroleum (and Products) Workers</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Cinematographic Federation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Insurance, Surety and Related Trades</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Workers' Labor Federation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Musicians</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of affiliated unions</td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Federation of Telephone Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Salesmen and Helpers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Theater Workers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Medical Traveling Salesmen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Aviation Federation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation of Cable and Radio-Telegraph Workers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,522</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,143,817</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Estimated


and tradition to cooperate voluntarily with management at the shop or industry level, the pattern of state intervention had been firmly set (MacGaffey and Barnett, 1967:153).

Wide ranging social legislation benefitted unionized workers, and "they enjoyed the highest salaries among the exploited classes" (Victoria, 1970:548). The situation of the seasonal agriculture and sugar workers was peculiar because most of them were underemployed. "Despite being unionized, they worked under different conditions from workers employed all year or those who worked in the sugar mills" (Victoria, 1970:548). Cuban labor unions and their leadership related to institutions similarly as did other officials of institutions—they benefitted from participation in the system and were not a social force bent on revolution.
Foreign Investment

Castro's revolutionary program in 1959 was verbally aggressive against the "Yankee." Partially that was a reaction against Cuba's long dependence on the United States. Large American investments were regarded as evidence of North American economic imperialism. As early as 1896, United States investment ranged between $30 million and $50 million. Between 1920 and 1945, United States and other foreign interests dominated the economy, wielding almost exclusive control over the sugar industry and banking system. Export insurance was handled by United States and Canadian firms causing a heavy outflow of capital.

From 1902 until the end of World War II, about 80% of all exports went to the United States. Between 1945 and 1959 the figure declined to about 60% as sugar exports to European markets increased. There was, however, no comparable decline in imports from the United States. The United States furnished about 66% of imports from 1911 to 1940, 80% from 1946 to 1950, and 75% from 1950 to 1956.

According to Investment in Cuba, a United States Department of Commerce handbook "designed primarily to serve the needs of potential investors" (1956):

The only foreign investments of importance are those of the United States. American participation exceeds 90% in the telephone and electric services, about 50% in public service railway, and roughly 40% in raw sugar production. The Cuban branches of United States banks are entrusted with almost one fourth of all bank deposits.

Cuba ranked third in Latin America in the value of United States direct investments in 1953 (Table 8), outranked only by Venezuela and Brazil (United States Department of Commerce, 1955).

The trend toward increased American investments in manufacturing and mining industries continued during the 1950's up to the time of the Castro
TABLE 8

UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CUBA
SELECTED YEARS
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INVESTMENT</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utilities</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Industries</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table does not include United States Government direct investments in mining which were substantial. Much of the mining industry was owned by the United States. Cuba ranked second in nickel, first in cobalt, eighth in chromium and manganese in the world.

revolution. Expansion of United States' investments in mining resulted in the enlargement of the Nícaro nickel plant in Oriente province to approximately an investment of $90 million.

In contrast to United States investments, other foreign investments had been small and declining. The British, one-time large investors in Cuba, by 1955 had liquidated most of their assets; the United Railways of Havana, LTD had been sold to the Cuban government, and total investments which in 1950 had been between $60 and $70 million, had declined to one million. Canadian investments were placed at $9.4 million, of which banking accounted for $8.8 million (United States Department of Commerce, 1956). Former Canadian, British, and Netherlands interests in sugar mills had been
liquidated, but the French still owned one mill in 1955. Direct Spanish investment was negligible since the 1930's, consisting chiefly of holdings of property and businesses largely derived from the colonial period.

MacGaffey and Barnett summarized foreign investment:

United States businessmen dominated the field of foreign investment although other foreign investors were represented . . . The major American companies were closely knit, both by interlocking directorates and by common interests; business was conducted and decisions made with reference to their mutual interests. American business naturally promoted ventures which promised dollar profits . . . (1962:177)

This rather lengthy discussion of the economic structure has been considered pertinent because it impacts other institutional orders and international affairs as well. In the forthcoming chapter, I will discuss the remaining institutions.
CHAPTER III

OTHER INSTITUTIONS PRIOR TO 1959

The Republic . . . should not be the unjust predominance of one class of citizens over the rest, but the open and sincere equilibrium of all the real forces of the country, and of the free thought and desire of all the citizens. (Jose Marti, Obras Completas, 1936-49, II, 196.)

The Political Order

Marti's passage written before his death in 1895 urges the people of Cuba to create a Republic in which all the real forces of the country are in equilibrium. Ironically the "Apostle" of Cuba's independence gave his life for a dream which was never to come true during Cuba's fifty six years as a Democratic Republic. If the Cuban economic order exhibited the necessary conditions to create discontent among the people, within the political order were the necessary conditions to anger the masses. Elitism, Nepotism, graft, and violence are but few of the characteristics of politics in prerevolutionary Cuba. This, however, was a legacy of four hundred years of Spanish colonial administration.

Most Cubans were generally apathetic toward their government and politics. A nation, Nelson observes, that was a colony is likely to distrust government and its populace is anxious to be as free as possible from restraints. Also, the people feel there is little or no sense to democratic participation and to assume responsibility for the government or public affairs (1950:5).

Cuba's history of liberation from Spain had a bitter end. Between 1790 and 1860, Cuba had a black majority, which major population frequently revolted. The planters' relied on Spanish arms to crush these revolts.
The army's presence was the main reason that Cuba remained a Spanish colony until 1898.

After the slave revolts came wars of independence. The struggle for liberation began on October 10, 1868, a date known as the "Grito de YARA." The rebels proclaimed independence from Spain and emancipated slaves. However, the year was 1868 and Spain, having lost its colonies in continental Hispanic America, strove with all its might to retain Cuba and Puerto Rico, its two remaining possessions in America. The Ten Year War ended with a peace treaty but no victory for either side.

The following years proved to be the weakest and most corrupt of the Spanish administration. The second and last war of independence began in 1895 under the leadership of Jose Marti and Antonio Maceo. Between 1878 and 1895, the revolutionaries would go underground, but were often discovered by the Spanish police who imprisoned, tortured, murdered, and exiled them. The struggle for independence Matthews observed "was long, costly, and heroic. A rebellious spirit was bred into Cubans, which helps a little to explain why Castro's revolution has endured" (1969:36).

For thirty years Cuban revolutionaries fought and died in two Wars of Independence. Thomas, referring to the year 1899, comments: "And 1899 was not precisely a golden year. Cuba had just finished a three-and-a-half-year war (the Second Independence War) of an intensity unparalleled in the Americas" (1967:254). The 1895 uprising, which was to lead to the Spanish-American war of 1898, was decisive in obtaining independence from Spain. The intervention of United States troops in 1898 meant a moral defeat for the Cuban revolutionaries. Defeat for independence-minded Cubans was snatched from the jaws of victory.

Whether the Cuban rebels could have won their independence can never be
known. Independence wars, however, the ultimate goal of all who had fought, spanned thirty years. "During the bitterly fought guerrilla war of 1868-1878, United States 'non-intervention'--not to mention the sales of arms--helped the Spaniards" (Matthews, 1969:37). The Cuban rebels rose again in 1895 and fought and were still fighting hard in 1898 "when an American public, aroused by the wildest sort of yellow journalism, but also responding to a genuine and generous desire to help the Cubans intervened" (Matthews, 1969:37).

The Spanish-American war was called by Secretary of State John Hay "a splendid little war," lasting 114 days and costing 2,500 American lives, mostly from disease. The Cubans, however, looked at it differently; they had not fought for 114 days but for thirty years. Goldenberg (1965:100) describes the struggle:

The country had been laid waste. Almost 400,000 people had died, many in big "concentration" camps into which the Spanish General Weyler had collected a large part of the population. The 1899 census showed a population of 1.5 million inhabitants--60,000 less than ten years earlier.

In 1938, Portell-Vila, a Cuban historian, wrote in the introduction to his four volume study of the relations of Cuba with Spain and the United States:

The frustration of the Cuban Revolution (1868-1898) of its formidable effort and its awakened national conscience striving to make a truly new state--was the work of the United States, dictated by those with an appetite for annexation. No nation has been so victimized without developing a deep resentment in its resistance to the aggressor, a resentment which permeates the organization of society and its very life. (Quoted by Robert F. Smith in Background to Revolution, 1966:73.)*

*Portell Vila, incidentally, since 1960 is in the United States where he has chosen to live rather than in revolutionary Cuba.
In an article for the magazine, *International Affairs*, Che Guevara summarizes the feelings of most Cubans about the beginnings of the Republic:

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1898 and the Platt Amendment of 1901 were the signs under which our new Republic was born ... In the first, the Treaty of Paris, the Cubans were only observers; they had no part in the negotiations. The second, the Platt Amendment, established the right of the United States to intervene in Cuba whenever her interests demanded it.

Two features of the peace settlement were resented by Cuban Nationalists. Both were inscribed in the Platt Amendment written into the Cuban Constitution by United States insistence. Article III read as follows:

That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence ... Article VII stipulated that "the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States land necessary for coaling or naval stations," out of this clause came the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934.

For Cuba's Nationalists, its long struggle for independence did not end in 1898. Fidel Castro grew up and spent his university years with the conviction that the fight for independence had simply been transferred from Spain to the United States (Matthews, 1969:40). Jose Martí warned his fellow-Cubans that "Cuba must be free of Spain and of the United States." For Cuban "revisionists," Cuba became a colony in the sense that it was dependent on the United States for capital, technical knowledge, trade, ideas of government and economics, and even to a considerable degree for its culture and manners.

After the military occupation by the United States, at first under General Brooke (1899) and later under General Wood (1900-1902), the Republic was launched in 1902. Under its first president, Tomas Estrada Palma, the "new nation saw what most historians would agree were its
'best years'" (Nelson, 1950:6). Besides carrying out many public works as well as improving sanitation and education, he accumulated a surplus of twenty-six million dollars in the treasury. Cuban history demonstrates that this was the only administration in its history that accumulated any surplus. Before the end of his first term, he had a revolt on his hands. Although opinions vary, many explain this revolt in terms of Estrada Palma's honesty and the jealousy of greedy politicians determined to get their hands in the money. Threatened by armed revolt, he called upon President Roosevelt to intervene with military force. Nelson notes that: "the historians of the period seem to agree that it was the bungling of William Howard Taft, whom Roosevelt sent to Cuba that made military intervention inevitable" (1950:6).

There followed the administration of Charles E. Magoon as governor from 1906 until 1909. Succeeding Magoon, Cuban government was restored under the presidency of Jose Miguel Gomez (1909-1913). Under his presidency, all the political evils characteristic of the Spanish tradition were brought back. "He did not try to establish a new pattern of political morality for Cuba as Estrada Palma has done; he let the latent tendencies toward corruption have their way. By the time he left office, Cuba was on the downgrade politically" (Nelson, 1950:6-7).

The administrations that followed--Garcia Menocal (1913-1921) and Zayas (1921-1923)--were noted for increasing political corruption. "The high hopes of many Cubans for honest and competent administration were frustrated as nepotism, graft, election frauds, and other corrupt practices became common... Cuban political life had sunk to a new moral low" (Nelson, 1950:7).
The administration which followed Zayas, that of Gerardo Machado, 1924-1933, was one of the worst in the annals of the Republic. The sugar market had declined; therefore, Machado governed during times which were far from prosperous. Unemployment and poverty were widespread. He began a program of public works with borrowed United States money, most of which is estimated to have been graft. As his critics became more active, Machado resorted to common torture and murder to protect his regime. Such measures hastened his downfall in August, 1933. A general strike and an army rebellion compelled Machado's flight from Cuba.

The immediate successor to Machado was DeCespedes, who served only twenty-four days; a revolutionary junta with Grau at its head demanded his surrender of power. Dr. Grau, a medicine professor at the University of Havana, was made president, but after four months of intermittent violence and failure to gain recognition by the United States, he retired from office. Disorder continued until Batista, an army sergeant, organized a successful coup d'etat, ousted the commissioned officers and made himself chief of staff and master of Cuba (Nelson, 1950:8). He established order and ruled as the strong man of Cuba through a succession of presidents until 1940. He became president in that year but was defeated in the 1944 election by Grau, the chairman of the Autentico Party. Batista went into exile in the United States.

Cuba's constitution of 1940 was very liberal and incorporated most of the political ideals represented in the Western democratic tradition. During the democratic period between 1940 and 1952, the administrations, including Batista's, sought to improve conditions one way or another amidst considerable corruption. Promises were freely made by candidates and by party platforms of land for the landless peasantry, rural schools
and roads, and numerous other reforms for the benefit and welfare of the population. "Such promises" Nelson observed in 1950 "have led the rural people to expect much of the Autenticos, and it is to be hoped that the rural problems discussed . . . will gradually find solution (Nelson, 1950:8).

Yet in March, 1952, Batista returned to power just a few months before the general elections. Draper notes:

If anyone was responsible for opening the way to Castro's capture of power, that man was Fulgencio Batista . . . If there were gravediggers of the former social order in Cuba, they were all those, Cubans and Americans, who condoned the coup and supported the regime that came out of it . . . Cuba was full of revolutionary conspiracies against Batista rather than with Castro; Batista, not Castro, was the indispensable revolutionary ingredient. (1965:116)

Draper's argument overlooks the fact that Batista's coup was not an unusual action for Cuba and Latin America. Whereas Fidel Castro was more of a "unique phenomenon." As Matthews notes, one could use exactly the same words about Machado as Draper used about Batista—but there was not Castro in 1933 and hence no Cuban Revolution.

Batista's coup provided Castro with an excuse for action. But as Matthews very well notes, "anyone who was in Cuba at the time . . . could not help being struck by the fact that those who felt disgust and anger were a minority . . . The vast majority of Cubans shrugged their shoulders and took the garrison revolt, philosophically—'there's that man again!'" (Matthews, 1969:52). On this point, however, I am inclined to disagree with Matthews. It seems to me that the majority of Cubans did not take the coup philosophically, but rather, apathetically, the apathy born of endless frustration. Referring to the first chapter in which I discussed the preliminary conditions for revolution, I noted that it is not the realization of suffering, but the realization that something can be done
about that suffering that brings about revolution. It seems that the latter condition was not yet present in either 1933 or 1952. Or rather, it may be argued that if that realization existed, a leader or a guide was missing who could bring success within reach.

**Political Parties**

An analysis of the political parties leads to some enlightening conclusions about their position in the institutional life of Cuba. Let us begin by considering the political parties at the end of the Prio government, which marked the brief period (1940-1952) of Cuban democratic life.

Almond and Powell note that participation, real or formal, in the recruitment of political elites is one of the defining characteristics of political parties (1966:118). Political parties play a key role in modernization. They are valuable in inculcating masses with political values such as legitimacy and stability, and in mobilizing masses for political activities. In many developing nations, for example, Tunisia and Chile, the existence of strong well-motivated political parties account for much institutional rather than revolutionary social change. Cuba never had strong political parties. That is, parties capable of sustaining mass interests for prolonged periods of time.

According to the official register of party affiliations, compiled in 1951, two and one half million persons were legally qualified to vote in June, 1952. Presidential elections were to be held in June, 1952, three months after the Batista coup. Nine political parties had declared their intention of taking part in the elections. Their order of importance, based on membership, was as follows:
Authentic (Autentico) Cuban Revolutionary Party .......... 621,000
Orthodox (Ortodoxo) Cuban People's Party ............... 330,000
Unitary Action ............................................. 204,000
Democratic Party ............................................ 195,000
Cuban National Party ........................................ 189,000
Liberal Party ................................................. 185,000
Cuban Party .................................................. 94,000
Community Party (Socialist People's Party) ............... 53,000
Republican Party ............................................. 40,000


These parties formed coalitions—the Unitary Action Party, headed by Batista, with the Cuban Nationalist Party. Also, a number of splits took place in the leadership and membership of the political parties themselves and new splinter parties emerged. For example, the Cuban National Party, which has just been referred to, was founded by leaders who had formerly belonged to the Republican Party. Grau, the leader of the old Autentico Party, founded the Cuban Party in 1951. The expulsion or resignation of political leaders from their parties was a usual feature of Cuban politics.

Cuban politics were not wholly in the hands of the identified parties. In addition, there were also groups dedicated to revolutionary action. Their political aims varied but they agreed that violence was the only way to achieve power. These groups included the Revolutionary Institutional Union (U.I.R.), the Revolutionary Socialist Movement, the Guiteras Revolutionary Action, etc. (International Commission of Jurists, 1962:30).

It should be emphasized that notwithstanding the military coup in 1952, Cuban parties were characterized by crises of leadership, dissension, and
personal ambition. Here as everywhere else in the Cuban social structure, conflicting values were prominent. A modern political party structure was imposed upon members by persons who were more concerned with personal ambition and performing favors for family or friends. The result was dissidence and splinter parties.

Cuba's Communist Party was one of the bigger and more powerful in Latin America. The Cuban Communist Party was of key importance for a number of reasons. It was the first Communist party in Latin America to place one of its members in the National Government "thereby providing a demonstration of the way Communists often cooperate with dictatorship in order to seize power in the labor movement and eventually in the administration itself. In more recent years, it has given a fresh twist to the party's two-pronged tactics for dealing with the typical kind of military dictatorship encountered in Latin America" (International Commission of Jurists, 1967:31).

The Cuban Communist Party was a part of the labor movement. Lazaro Pena, one of its leading members, was the first General Secretary of the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC). The party, founded in 1925, was declared legal in 1938. The Communists won six seats in the Constituent Assembly during the elections of 1940. However, as Karol notes (1970:66-70) the leadership of the Communist Party failed to absorb the revolutionary intellectuals of the 1925-1950 generation; instead they decided to emphasize only the labor front which in Cuba's particular situation was by no means the most important area. "This blindness to the facts--this dogmatism--marked the Communist Party from its very beginnings" (Karol, 1970:64). That is, the Communists failed to grasp other fields of actions--foreign investment, unemployment, rural poverty, and student movements--which offered more revolutionary potential. "They were unable to use let
alone control, those 'other forces' which they dismissed as 'petty bourgeoisie anarchists'' (Karol, 1970:64).

A study of Cuban political parties at the end of 1952 leads to the following observations and conclusions:

1. There were no parties representing a solid majority.

2. There was a lack of ideological foundation and institutional stability with the exception of the Community Party.

3. There were a multiplicity of groups which was the reason for the splintering of parties.

4. Political leaders were characterized by their personal ambition, both for glory and immediate wealth, and family favoritism.

5. Parties and Movements arose which promised large-scale social and economic reforms.

6. The political leaders of parties, once in power, forgot their promises and were guilty of the same abuses and corruption they had criticized.

7. The result was the discredit and popular mistrust of political parties.

8. Because of these conditions, no party or political grouping had the authority or political power to oppose the advance of Fidel Castro and his followers.

**The Peasantry**

Aside from unionized workers and organized landholders and cattle breeders, no rural organization constituted an interest group. "The immense peasant class also constituted a quasi-class, though it had not yet taken shape as an interest group" (Victoria, 1970:548). This delay may have been due to several factors: (1) peasants lacked class consciousness; (2) they were isolated from one another; (3) they lacked leadership and a unifying ideology; (4) they lacked the means to maintain an organization. Each of these factors, Victoria explains, affected agricultural workers in the
authority relationships to which they contributed labor power. The same factors affected the unemployed sectors of rural Cuba.

A common characteristic of developing countries is the low degree of power held by marginal interest groups. In Cuba these groups counted the agricultural workers, the urban unemployed and to a certain extent blacks and mestizos. Agricultural workers were in the most critical situation, because they lacked even the minimal means of participation provided by urban styles of life.

In a survey made by Catholic University Association in 1957 among peasants, the following question was asked: "Where do you expect the solution of your problem to come from?" Answers were as follows: jobs, 73.5%; schools, 18.4%; roads, 5.0%; hospitals, 3.0%. The institutions capable of resolving those problems were identified as: government, 69.0%; employers, 16.7%; labor unions, 6.8%; freemasonry, 4.3%; Church, 3.0%. These data indicate that peasants expected economic problems to be solved politically. They equated economic improvements with the highest political authority. "At the same time," Victoria notes, "an extremely critical situation prevailed in the economic sphere. Because such institutionally marginal groups had no access to associations of exploitation, they began to question the nation's legal order, since the legal structures with which the exploited groups identified ultimate political power, supported the associations of exploitation. Only 16.7% of the peasants expected solutions to come from employers" (1970:551).

These data indicate that the Cuban peasant realized that his many socio-economic problems could be solved only by the government; yet at the same time, he was aware of his powerlessness and isolation vis a vis the government. And when he viewed his government he saw corruption, favoritism—again no
action suitable to solve his problems. He lacked the means and resources to organize an activist group. And by 1955 he had heard endless promises of improvement by ambitious politicians, promises that never materialized.

The Urban Middle Class

Since the beginning of the century a Cuban ruling class was composed in part of men who achieved prominence in the Wars of Independence and in part of upper class Cuban and Spanish landowners, bankers, businessmen, professional elements, and high ranking military officers. That ruling group dominated politics for six decades. "Insofar as a middle class developed, its objective was to join the upper economic and political level. Now and then an upstart like Batista . . . would break into the circle—but only himself to copy the methods and action of the ruling group" (Matthews, 1970:45).

Students of Cuba's social stratification present two contrasting views. One group stresses that Cuba had no middle class, only an upper class and a lower class; others argue that Cuba had no upper class, only middle and lower classes. It is very difficult to decide on who is right; however, I will note that Cuba had no middle class in the American or British sense, or else there was no upper class. A true aristocratic upper class of Spanish descent existed, but it became small and unimportant after independence.

MacGaffey and Barnett point out that:

In every historical period since the late 18th century, there has been a middle sector definable in political terms, consisting of a sharply divided aggregate of self-seeking factions, drawn from a wide range of occupations and income groups, including notably the better educated and more prosperous elements of the lower class and the younger generation of the upper class. (1962:38)
So long as some differentiation occurs between a lower class and the others, it is academic to argue whether those others are middle or upper class.

The Cuban middle class may be divided into two political sectors: the conservatives and the radical intellectuals and young revolutionaries. I argue that the Cuban middle class predominantly was politically and economically conservative. Illustrating this is done by analyzing the number and professions of Cubans who left after the revolution. There were few radical intellectuals, but considerably more student revolutionaries. As discussed earlier, even though the upper and middle classes dominated Cuban politics, they were alienated from it. The polity was supposed to serve their interests but direct involvement with it meant a certain social degradation for the family. Politics were mostly a job of the military for whom politics did not mean social degradation; others involved in politics were so-called "political gangsters," self-made men like Batista, and professional politicians. These professional politicians came from the upper and middle classes; they were usually regarded as "black sheep" of the family by other family members. However, this was a social facade. Everyone knew that when one's family included an important professional politician all relatives profited. Other upper class persons occasionally participated in politics by providing a "symbolic" figure. For example, at moments of disorder a non-military man widely known for his integrity could placate the public by publicly favoring orderliness. His role was "symbolic" and short-lived. Nonetheless, under the prerevolutionary regime powerful persons played such roles in the interest of obtaining temporary social control.
Urban Workers, The Unemployed

Unionized urban workers constituted a major political interest group. The CTC held considerable power, but its leadership was charged with the assorted ills of Cuban politics. Personal ambition and rivalries usually prevented the CTC from articulating its member's demands. Trade unions offered an opportunity to persons originating in the underprivileged classes to secure political careers. Unions shared that purpose with the military.

The urban unemployed were ignored in prerevolutionary politics. They constituted a major social force having revolutionary potential. Victoria observes, "the urban unemployed were marginal mainly because of the slow growth of industry. From 1954 to 1959, 606,000 rural inhabitants moved: 82.3 percent migrated to urban areas... These urban unemployed ranked very low within the system... they were totally marginal in the institutional sphere" (1970:550).

In Chapter II, I indicated discontent among the unemployed. Castro was able to foresee the revolutionary potential among them. It suffices to say that they were not organized politically, so no political interest group articulated their grievances. The unemployed, almost one fourth of Cuba's working force, had no voice whatsoever in Cuban politics.

The Military Order

Gerth and Mills cite the modern army's violence as being legitimated by national symbols and sentiments and its cause; soldiers are disciplined for obedience to a hierarchy of staff and line officers. Discipline rests upon acceptance of the nation's cause and is guaranteed by sanctions--including loss of status and career chances and, in the last analysis,
capital punishment (1964:228). I will briefly analyze the Cuban army in light of the above observations. The Cuban army never became a well-established, stable, non-political institution. Until the dictatorship of Machado, it could have been regarded as a professional army on the European model, writes the International Commission of Jurists. Yet this is debatable. Machado's regime began in 1924, only twenty-two years after the proclamation of the Republic; during these twenty-two years, Cuba experienced United States military interventions between 1906 and 1909. For all practical purposes, a professional army had 15 years duration. During such a short time span, it is difficult to develop a professional army.

The "Sergeants Revolution" on September 4, 1933, dealt a fatal blow to the Cuban military structure. During this revolt, Batista, a sergeant, promoted himself to Colonel, and having seized power, ousted commissioned officers. He turned the army into his personal instrument. The command structure and discipline suffered accordingly and the army became yet another tool in the hands of the political leadership. When Grau became president in 1944, he reorganized the army, as it had become a personal guard instead of a national institution. Batista, however, on returning to power in 1952, filled the senior posts with men faithful to himself, who in turn reorganized the army to buttress the regime. Moreover, the political crisis which gripped Cuba under Prio also affected the army, and the demagogy and administrative corruption of Prio's last years left it powerless to resist the onslaught of Batista (International Commission of Jurists, 1962:48).

The corruption of the Batista regime found a most willing ally in the army. Every political intrigue and rivalry had repercussions in the army. When Batista tried to contest Castro's revolution, the whole military
organization had been undermined from within. "Compared with Castro's forces, it was a giant—but it was a sleeping giant."

In these circumstances, it was easy to create diversions within the army; Castro played officer against officer and promised them revolutionary justice, only to dissolve the army after seizing power.

Here again as with political parties there were conflicting values. The structure of a modern army was imposed upon members who would not accept professionalism and discipline. The result was a corrupted army. Nepotism was frequent; wealthy fathers secured commissions for their sons; bribes were common. In brief, the following salient characteristics of the Cuban army:

1. absence of a professionally-trained officer corps
2. undermining of the principles of authority and command
3. permanent subordination of senior army officers to political power
4. national political crises influenced this disorganized army and resulted in numerous military conspiracies
5. ambition for power and lack of discipline, which induced the boldest members to seek rapid but undeserved promotion, thereby weakened still further the already seriously impaired command structure

In brief, referring to the earlier observations by Gerth and Mills, it can be concluded that the Cuban army possessed none of the features they proposed. Its violence was not legitimated by the symbols and sentiments of the nation and its cause.

Is it possible to distinguish any symbols, sentiments, and causes, other than personal ambition and corruption in the nation's polity and economy? Loss of status and career chances were arbitrary, they were either lost or
gained at garrison revolts, and not with a lengthy record of discipline and courage.

**Kinship**

The Kinship order, Gerth and Mills note, is composed of institutions which regulate and facilitate sexual intercourse, procreation, and the rearing of children. In his book, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (1963), Goode concluded that as the nations of the world become industrialized and urbanized, their familial systems converge on what he calls the conjugal family system. Wirth viewed the city as freeing the individual from the kinship group characteristic of the country" (1938:1-24). For Zimmerman (1947) the contemporary American family was atomistic, meaning that it exerted minimum influence over the behavior of the individual. Parsons views the emerging familial form as isolated and nuclear. Linton concurred by remarking on the "extreme degeneration" of the extended family. Other family theorists, however, have emphasized that the nuclear family is not isolated. In the investigations of Sussman, Greer, Sharp, and Axelrod, to name a few, nuclear families of the working and middle classes were found to engage in considerable interaction with other related nuclear families.

Goode then provides a synthesis by integrating the foregoing formulations into a cogent proposition. He notes the diversity of familial types in traditional societies and he concludes that coordinate with trends toward modernization, industrialization, and urbanization, there is a convergence of these diverse traditional familial forms into the "conjugal family." Goode also emphasizes that in both traditional and modern societies, the greatest degree of familism is encountered among the higher socio-economic strata. Winch and Blumberg (1968:176) define extended familism as the
gradient of functionality of the kin network as reckoned from a single nuclear family. Nuclear familism emphasizes the relative absence of the functionality of the extended kin network.

Goode (1963) notes several main characteristics of the system typical of the urban industrial Western World.

(1) The extended or joint family pattern becomes rare, and corporate kin structure disappears.

(2) A relatively free choice of spouse is possible, based on love, and an independent household is set up.

(3) Dowry and bride price disappear.

(4) Marriage between kin becomes less common.

(5) Authority of the parent over the child, and of the husband over the wife, diminishes.

(6) Equality between the sexes is greater; the legal system moves toward equality of inheritance among all children.

Goode emphasizes that these propositions are phrased in comparative terms.

Before looking at the Cuban family per these formulations, I will briefly observe a related aspect concerning the family--bearing of legitimate or illegitimate children. Goode (1960:21-30) notes that legitimacy, thence illegitimacy, fundamentally characterizes the human family (shared by no other animal grouping) and is central for understanding family behavior. A legitimate child is born into a family and in all societies the family confers social position upon its young (Winch, 1968:198). Thus illegitimacy means a family does not offer a social position to a child born to a union including one of its mature members. By determining social placement of the child, rules of legitimacy define role obligations of adults to the child (Goode, 1964:

Goode, referring to high illegitimacy rates of the Caribbena, often over fifty percent, observes that the norm of legitimacy is acknowledged in these
societies but that courtship relations as well as economic difficulties lead to a high illegitimacy rate (1960:30). The norm is known but not observed by many low income persons. It appears that high rates of illegitimacy indicate conflicting values operating at the junction of kinship, the economy, and legal institutions.

Thus the matrifocal Caribbean family results from a family pattern in which the mother or grandmother is the only blood relative to children and she alone wields parental power because in numerous instances no father is present (Goode, 1960:30). Adams (1960:30) reviews selected cases in which the nuclear family is only one type of family. He discusses cases from contemporary central and South America. He notes, "studies in Latin America have increasingly indicated that while most contemporary family systems of that region reckon descent bilaterally, there are many instances where family forms other than the nuclear are operative."

The nuclear family is generally replaced in these circumstances by a group based on the maternal dyad, a residential unit composed of a mother and one or more children. These dyadic households may include various other members, both kin and non-kin. Of course, many nuclear family households include non-kin. Adams concludes that woman-headed households are quite common in contemporary populations with bilateral descent systems (1960:30-44). In spite of the institutional norm which accords to legitimate births the family's positive sanction, so many departures from realizing the norm occur that such departures manifest conflicting situations. Thus social control fails to apply to human behavior at this fundamental point.

Turning now to the Cuban family in prerevolutionary Cuba, that family was an important institution because other institutions or social organizations—church, polity, community—were weak. In most Latin American
countries, for example, the family shares authority over its members with the church.

At all social levels in pre-Castro Cuba, claims of relatives were recognized and often determined the distribution of privileges. In the lower class, relatives cooperated in sharing food and housetoom; in the upper class, nepotism was expected. Whether privileges were food and shelter or job opportunities such were expected from one's relatives. There was a general assumption of responsibility for one another; yet as Goode has observed, the greater degree of familism was encountered among the higher socio-economic strata. Perhaps that only meant that upper class families had more to dispense rather than a more strongly integrated family.

The Cuban family in pre-Castro Cuba was based on Spanish heritage. Respective positions and roles essentially were those of the Roman Catholic family with some modifications resulting from Cuban experiences. The most important differentiating factors among Cuban families were class and rural or urban location. The rural family was most often a lower class family, and the urban family represented empirical instances of middle class and upper class position. Differences between those families were not entirely socio-economic but also socio-psychological and traditional. The upper class ideal was drawn from aristocratic traditions emphasizing the father's authority and the mother's gentility. Family ties were strong. Nepotism was a generally accepted and expected practice. Women and children led sheltered comfortable lives with few responsibilities and cares. However, double moral standards were common.

In the urban lower class, women provided part of the average family's income, either in domestic service or in industry and commerce. The lower
class rural or urban household frequently consisted of a woman and her children. Whether the family included both parents or not, the wife-mother was productively engaged. In La Habana, the most urban province, ten percent of all women over the age of fourteen were heads of households as compared with six percent in Pinar del Rio, the most rural province (MacCaffey and Barnett, 1962:54). Presumably, a female household head is required to work to provide for her family. One option available to her is to form common-law unions with men who will provide and protect the household. Under such circumstances, and if there is a procession of men through the household, any child born is an illegitimate child. In the rural areas, a complete family provided much of the social contact its members experienced. They are, as a rule, closer than the urban family because work and household tasks are closer in space. The father is the authority figure. Farm wives do their housework, but they do not typically do field work.

Regarding Cuban data, approximately one fourth of the population of Cuba in 1943 was reported as illegitimate (Table 9). The Cuban census for 1953, the last census before the revolution, shows a slight increase in the illegitimacy rate. In Cuba illegitimacy resulted from common-law unions which were not officially recognized unless the court ratified them. The incidence of common-law marriages in pre-Castro Cuba, which was approximately about one fourth of all couples living together, was greater among the rural areas than the urban. Several reasons explain the high incidence of illegitimacy in prerevolutionary Cuba; they also support the hypotheses of this thesis.

In rural areas, where common-law marriages and illegitimacy were commonly found, law and religion, which support the family institution at numerous
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENSUS YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>TOTAL PERCENTAGE ILLEGITIMATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>4,778,583</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3,962,344</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,889,004</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1,572,797</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

junctures, were absent. The conjugal family was the accepted legitimate norm, but as Goode has observed for the West Indies courtship relations and economic difficulties led to a high illegitimacy rate. In rural Cuba, the situation was strengthened by institutional inadequacy. The Cuban peasant realized that marriage was the accepted legitimate norm expounded by the institutional order. But he did not see himself as part of that institutional order, therefore he did not conform. Law and religion were part of the urban setting; their existence was remote from the peasant. Indeed, these coerced the peasant, as a result, he distrusted and avoided them. For example, the peasant's experience with the law had always been a most distressing one. He usually went to court to defend his land against the pursuit of wealthy landowners. In most cases his efforts were to no avail, and he lost his land. There were no lawyers to defend his case, no interest group to safeguard his rights. Thus, the peasant throughout
the years and as a result of his experiences had developed an attitude of mistrust toward the law. This attitude was intensified by his poverty and lack of education. Because he avoided any contact with the law, he did not go to church to get married, nor did he think it was necessary to have his common-law union legalized by the court. In most instances, he failed to report the birth of his children--one reason why statistics on rural births prior to 1959 are inaccurate.

Religion was not part of the rural setting, therefore, this institution, which in other instances exercises considerable control on marriage and the family, was conspicuously absent in rural Cuba.

However, it is necessary to note that although common-law marriages and illegitimacy were common in rural Cuba, the lower class rural family, when compared to the lower class urban family, was more stable. The high rates of illegitimacy and common-law marriages in rural Cuba are useful here because they accentuate the inadequacy of the institutional order. The legal system and the religious order were not relevant to the peasant. These institutions did not exercise control over the peasantry.

In the urban areas illegitimacy was also the result of a weakly-articulated institutional system. Chronic unemployment led many men to avoid permanent relationships. They sought temporary unions which allowed them to escape responsibility. Economic difficulties coincided with alienation from the legal and religious orders to produce high illegitimacy rates, although as noted earlier, the conjugal family was the accepted legitimate norm.

The revolutionary regime has attempted rather successfully to bring the peasant and the lower class closer to the institutional system. By exerting pressure on peasants to legalize common-law marriages and by
bringing courts into the rural areas, it has made it possible for the peasant to establish his family within the prescribed legitimate order. In the urban areas, it has successfully put an end to chronic unemployment and has made housing available to newly married couples. Besides improving economic conditions it has exerted considerable social pressure, sometimes even coercion, for couples to get married. It has also put an end to the former economic options available to women who were household heads, such as prostitution and domestic service.

The institutional order which legitimated marriage and the family was inadequate for the Cuban masses. A traditional aristocratic family pattern imposed upon Cubans was inappropriate for the Cuban lower classes. Many lower class Cubans were of African descent and practiced forms alien to the Spanish aristocratic tradition. The result was the establishment of convenient unions and family arrangements different from the prescribed legitimate order.

The inadequacy of the traditional family pattern was reflected in all strata. For example, a tradition of nepotism as a family value and double moral standards contributed to the corruption of the polity, the economy, and the military. This inadequacy of the family pattern coupled with weakly-articulated institutions, which otherwise support the institution of the family, contributed toward the instability of the prerevolutionary Cuban social system.

The Religious Order

In prerevolutionary Cuba, the clergy estimated that about ten percent of the Cubans were active and informed Catholics, 25% were practicing agnostics, but that approximately 85 percent of the people were nominally Catholic.
Church and State have been constitutionally separate since the beginnings of
the Cuban Republic. The Church was never so powerful in Cuba as in other
Latin American countries. Churches, whether Protestant or Catholic, were
located in the cities and towns. The Cuban farmer had minimal contact with
the church. Their attitudes, Nelson noted, suggest general indifference
to religion (1950:174). This condition was extremely useful to the revolu-
tionary government who found a peasantry secular in outlook.

Church inactivity rooted in the island's history. Observers agreed
that the quality of clergy sent to Cuba in colonial and later times left
much to be desired. Often they were "ecclesiastical exiles from the
peninsula Spain because of offenses which forbade their exercising their
offices among people who knew their offenses" (Pepper, 1899:240). As church
and state merged in colonial days, the clergy and political authorities
equally shared negative criticisms of the local inhabitants. Finally,
in the War for Independence, the Church hierarchy sided with Spain and thus
were divorced from their parishioners (Nelson, 1950:174). Most practicing
Catholics belonged to the middle or upper class.

There were few native Cuban priests so the church largely depended on
obtaining priests from Spain. That many priests were Spaniards oriented
toward Franco, hampered the church's acting as a social force. Liberals
labelled priests "Falangists," a term wisely exploited by Castro. The
biased class representation of membership in the Church also made the Church
a suitable target for Castro's oratory.

In spite of the too-late though vigorous Catholic action, efforts to
associate the Church with the life and interests of the lower class showed
few results by 1959. "While funds and personnel were short, in the opinion
of many Catholic observers the Church showed too little initiative"
(MacGaffey and Barnett, 1962:203). Nelson comments: "There is no evidence that the church showed any concern for the social and economic welfare of the population. The pastoral visits of the priests occur about once a year, and then only to baptize the infants—for a fee" (Nelson, 1950:175).

Church congregations included mostly middle class women. Only in wealthier areas did entire families regularly attend church.

In brief, poor church attendance in urban areas, almost non-existent participation in the rural areas, a tradition of anti-Cuban nationalism, extreme conservatism, a foreign clergy, and little initiative to improve the welfare of the population characterized the Cuban Catholic Church. Some of these characteristics applied to the rest of Latin America. However, the Catholic Church led the struggle against dictatorships of Argentina and Venezuela. The Catholic Church in much of Latin America, excepting Mexico, is a deep-rooted institution which together with the family holds authority over its members.

Thus, when Fidel Castro expelled Spanish priests from Cuba, he found no resistance from the public, who looked at the situation from a Nationalist rather than religious outlook. "Once again Fidel Castro found an institution . . . whose ability to resist had been sapped long before" (International Commission of Jurists, 1967:34). Cuban Catholics tried to resist the new government's anti-clerical policies but they acted too late. The church was unable to defend itself with vigor as in other Latin American countries and there were few laymen who acted in its defense.

Conclusions

The foregoing survey of Cuba's social institutions reveals that for various reasons Cuba had not by 1959 succeeded in consolidating its
institutional structure. The Cuban institutional order was not capable of performing the function of effectively socializing its members into the system. An institutional order that fails to socialize its members into the system is unstable as it cannot successfully exercise social control upon its members. Thus institutional immaturity, corruption, and ineffectiveness to control its members characterized Cuba in the eve of the revolution.
CHAPTER IV

ABSENTEE VERSUS AVAILABLE LEADERSHIP:

THE FINAL ELEMENT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

"If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change." (Guiseppe DiLampedusa: The Leopard)

An examination of nineteenth and twentieth century (prior to 1959) Cuba indicates Cuban elites incapable of understanding the above paradox. By seeking to maintain the status quo the elite slowly but decisively built the path which led to its own destruction. Horowitz explains:

The tragedy of the moment in Latin America is precisely the fact that, while the masses remain enveloped in an economic struggle for survival, the elites having solved such basic problems for themselves, have transformed this struggle into a political contest for power rather than meeting the political needs of immobilized masses. (Horowitz, 1970:24)

Between 1898 and 1959, Cuba's economic and political institutions were divided by conflicting values. Politics were condemned as the work of thieves and gangsters, reinforcing the antagonistic conflictive situation. The upper classes abstained from active participation in the polity in order to retain their prestige, and limited their influence to the manipulation of interest groups. The middle class, especially professionals, abstained from participation in Cuba's public life. Among the remaining social classes, the division reflected general skepticism or apathy. In contrast, values such as honesty and dependability to fulfill commercial transactions were espoused by those capitalists with vested interests in industrial growth.

The economy was partially controlled by foreign investors who also were committed to the world market. The military order was an amalgam in which traditional and modern values conflicted. Corruption and
authority juxtaposed in the military. That chaotic state led to an inability to control guerrillas and to resort to brutality and terrorism in combating urban opposition. Military control efforts substantially contributed to the already lengthy record of political corruption.

The religious and kinship orders, if less corrupted than other institutions, suffered from the general malaise affecting the other orders: conflicting values. Like in the military, traditional and modern values juxtaposed. Moral double standards persisting since the early colonization days and the slave era rendered religious and kinship as weak institutions.

In Chapter I, it was discussed that for an institutional process to become consolidated, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs is necessary. To the extent that the country's institutions do not provide this, there will be a predisposition toward supporting revolution; pre-1959 Cuba was such an example. The Cuban Revolution met three essentially necessary conditions for a revolution. First, institutions unable to meet the demands of the people; second, a people with a revolutionary tradition inherited from the decades of struggle against Spain and who realized that something could be done about their grievances; third, a leader, who was capable of organizing the opposition into a successful revolt. In Chapters II and III, I have related the chaotic state of institutions in pre-Castro Cuba to different social forces of the nation. That is, I surveyed the inability of the institutions to meet demands of the people and the dissatisfaction of social forces with respect to these institutions. A final comment must be made about the third condition, the leader.

Victoria (1970:557) notes that the problem of "caudillismo" has been neglected by present day sociology. Neitzt tells us that modern sociological research tends to study personal leadership within the framework of small or
informal groups, and impersonal domination within the framework of large and formal groups. Such study neglects the problems of charismatic leadership as Max Weber would say, or of leadership based upon personal prestige within the framework of large groups. One of the conditions favoring the emergence of such leadership is an element of personalism, or the extraordinary extension of the personal and emotional sphere, with the consequent rejection of abstract rules (1960:53).

Victoria comments that low degree of institutionalization may create a ready and willing population who will subject themselves to a leader with whom people identify so that he becomes a part of their personal lives. Does this occur in Cuba? (1970:557).

One may posit that when personal authority derives from impersonal institutions the greater the degree of institutionalization, the less important the person of the leader. Matthews notes: "Only or Cuban felt strongly enough and had the qualities of leadership to do something about it . . . There were reasons enough for a revolution whether Batista had come along or not. What was needed was the man to make the revolution" (1969:52). Castro emerged at a time of severe institutional crises for Cubans. Another strong man in Cuba's politics emerged from another severe institutional crisis, Fulgencio Batista. Indeed, institutional crises appear to be perennial in prerevolutionary Cuba. Emerging strong men demark its periods of history.

The succession of strong men by similarly-disposed leaders or by democratic forms of government provided the Cubans with a checkered political governmental history from Independence to the present time. During the first years of the struggle against Batista by radical groups, Cuba's problem was often said to be lack of leadership. At that time Castro
began to perform spectacular acts. From November, 1956 on, Castro's personality gained ascendancy over those of other leaders, and the charismatic element was intensified.

The leadership of the opposition was increasingly exercised by the 26th of July Movement and its leader, Fidel Castro. This was one of the decisive factors which enabled the tiny rebel army to take power, despite the fact that Castro's organization was not the only one to have resisted Batista (Victoria, 1970:559).

The Movement's main problem was to exploit the undermined foundations of the constituted order. Its goal was to collect the opposition struggling against the Batista regime under Castro's leadership. "This phenomenon took place in Cuban experience as a natural consequence of the polarization between the constituted order and the Movement or caudillo most radically opposed to that order" (Victoria, 1970:559).

Another problem was the high value given to personal courage, which found expression in Cuba's republican history. Confronted with change in institutions, people responded with violence. After the victory of 1959, admiration for the caudillo became veneration.

In a paper on Castro, Tannenbaum notes:

The leader has exclusive power of government. All the power had belonged to Batista, and when he was gone there was no army, no police, no judiciary, no congress, no one and nothing to substitute for the government that had vanished like a dream . . . There was only Castro, the new leader, coming out of the Mountains, who suddenly found himself possessed of all the authority formerly exercised by Batista. (1962:180)

I have to disagree with Tannebaum's comment, although I realize that the Latin American tradition of personalism operated on Castro's behalf. Consolidating power and authority was not as easy for Castro as Tannenbaum seems to imply. But in consolidating power and recreating a new order,
the tradition of personalism and his charismatic appeal were certainly invaluable. Matthews observes in his book, *Cuba* (1964:29):

The leader, the dictator, the military chieftain does not have to be, and rarely is, the embodiment of ideal qualities like Washington or Lincoln. He is different, unique, special, commanding. For his followers, his right to rule is in his stature as hero . . . A leader whose supreme virtue is to be like a vast majority of the population has no attraction for Latins.

Castro did and does rely on his personal magnetism and oratory to retain and control power. Without his popularity, he would have been unable to sustain power, let alone induce drastic reforms. As the established order becomes institutionalized, and the degree of institutionalization increases, it is estimated that Castro's personalism will become less significant in Cuban politics. However, before this final and decisive phase is accomplished by the revolution, the problem of succession being a very arduous task, Castro must use his charisma to institutionalize revolutionary reforms.

Max Weber notes:

Since charismatic leadership occurs most frequently in emergencies, it is associated with a collective excitement through which masses of people respond to some extraordinary experience and by virtue of which they surrender themselves to a heroic leader . . . The charismatic leader is always a radical who challenges established practice by going to the root of the matter . . . People surrender themselves to such a leader because they are carried away by a belief in the manifestations that authenticate him. They turn away from established rules and submit to the unprecedented order that the leader proclaims.

The Cuban people turned away from the "established rules" to follow the new order Castro proclaimed, however, not without much hardship and agony.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

As discussed earlier, revolution cannot occur in any society at any period in its history. It is a limited phenomenon. A revolution requires antecedent necessary conditions. These may develop over a long period of time at various depth levels of the social structure. Two considerations: revolutions occur because nonviolent change is not occurring, and revolutions occur in response to a distinct condition of the system that Johnson calls "multiple dysfunction." That nonviolent change was not occurring and that the system was affected by multiple dysfunction is illustrated by the above survey of the Cuban institutional order. Not only was no change occurring to improve social conditions, but slight changes in the economic structure apparently increased the deprivation of the underprivileged. Through its history, Cuba's elite was absentee, at least respecting rural Cuba, and unconcerned about Cuba's weakly-articulated institutions.

As Matthews observes (1969:52), "Fidel Castro was rebelling against a system, a society, a corrupt and rotten state of affairs... He was rebelling, too, against an economic structure run largely by foreigners, against income inequalities and high and growing unemployment." The same may be said about most Cubans; they rebelled against the system. But this rebellion, if present among most Cubans, was for many an unconscious or a far away expectation that had not materialized into concrete action for many as late as 1959. Thus, Victoria observes, the Movement which came to power was awaited by Cubans as a political revolution with economic and social manifestations, not a socio-economic revolution with political manifestations. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the necessary
conditions for a socio-economic revolution were present, if somewhat dormant on the eve of the revolution.

In our earlier discussion of Huntington's classification of revolutions, it was mentioned that the Cuban revolution fits his two patterns of revolution. In its earlier phases, it was noted, the Cuban Revolution comes close to the Eastern model. However, in later phases, it approximates the Western model. Yet a very important consideration must be made at this point. The Cuban Revolution began with the realization that the state no longer existed. Weakly-articulated institutional orders allowed Castro both to consolidate and legitimate his authority, and to reconstruct the social order. It was the ineffective institutional order, not Castro's charisma, which made drastic social change possible. Castro's organization and charismatic appeal made the revolutionary process credible and successful. Prerevolutionary national leadership was instrumentally self-serving and uninterested in the Cuban polity, economy, or other institutional orders.

Social Forces and the Revolution

As discussed in Chapter I, theoretically, every social class is potentially revolutionary. Frustrating its demands, denying its opportunities to political participation may make any group a revolutionary group. But more than one group is required to make a revolution. A revolutionary situation entails the alienation of many groups from the existing order. As observed from surveying relations between social forces and institutional orders in prerevolutionary Cuba, several distinct groups were alienated: the peasants, unemployed, students, lower rank and file of the political parties and the CTC, and the non-commissioned sector of the military. These urban and rural groups combined to produce a successful revolution.
Even a brief survey of the Cuban peasants indicates that together with the unemployed they represented a mass with great revolutionary potential. Revolutionary theorists agree that peasant support makes a revolution possible. A peasantry that had given up hopes of the government solving their many problems, without giving up the realization that only the government was capable of improving their situation seems to me to exhibit the most revolutionary potential. The Cuban peasant lacked only organization to become a successful revolutionary group. Castro organized them and they were his most faithful ally.

Huntington proposes that joining urban classes with peasants to fight the existing order and that their attacking simultaneously is indispensable for a revolution to occur. It is hypothesized that the Cuban peasant did not become revolutionary in the fifties but that the peasantry had been always revolutionary. The urban middle and working class became alienated, or more so than ever before, during the fifties. Thus, social conditions necessary for a revolution reached their peak in the fifties. Under Castro's leadership, who realized the situation was ripe and was able to combine the two groups, a successful revolution occurred.

The Moderates, The Counterrevolutionaries, and the Radicals

As briefly discussed earlier, after the collapse of the old regime three social types play major roles in the process of political mobilization. Initially, the moderates tend to assume authority. But they are usually swept from power because they cannot stop the mobilization of new groups into politics, and they lack the radicalism to lead it. Counterrevolutionaries, if successful, perform the first; the radicals, if successful, perform the second. Here it is proposed that the Cuban counterrevolutionaries and
moderates became a single group struggling against the radicals. After Batista's defeat in 1959, the population was either moderate or radical. Those to whom the term "counterrevolutionary" applies fled as early as 1959. The moderates became counterrevolutionaries during the early sixties and joined the earlier group by fleeing or alienating themselves from revolution. Cuban moderates assumed power immediately after the collapse of the Batista regime. During the short span of time that they were in power, (it is, of course, questionable whether they were in power as Castro was the real power behind the scene), Castro consolidated his authority and moved toward full control of the government at the end of 1959. Castro behaved moderately, or allowed the moderates to play with power as long as he needed them.

Why were the moderates so unsuccessful in opposing Castro? One answer is that they had nothing with which to fight. The institutional order lacked integration, was corrupt, and collapsed as a result. Castro reconstructed a social order, but he did not disrupt the old order. He was the final catalyst in a process which, I am speculating, began before his birth. It seems that as early as 1902, the Cuban Republic was prone to disruption. During almost six decades, Cuba's elite failed to provide a viable institutional order to replace the one inherited from colonial days. Weakly-articulated institutions were allowed to persist as they always had. Elitists were disinterested; no others had power to do the job.

The Cuban Revolution and Theories of Drastic Social Change

By December 31, 1958, Cuba had not consolidated its institutional structure. General political instability reflected that nonconsolidation.
The Cuban Constitution did not reflect real situations. The disparity between the written Constitution and the real structure of Cuba was manifested by frequently suspending, violating, or modifying the Constitution. The Constitution failed to legitimate institutions; at times, it failed to serve even a symbolic function. Thus, Castro found national leaders who presided over a disrupted institutional order. Their ability to resist had been sapped long before. Also Castro found many opposing groups who had not been able to collectively confront the national political leaders.

This institutional state was superb for revolutionary purposes and contributed to a successful revolution. Such circumstances are infrequently found throughout Latin America. Many regions of Latin America are predominantly traditional, which is one reason why Che Guevara was unsuccessful in the mountains of Bolivia. The Bolivian peasants of the Andes lacked the modern outlook of Cuban peasants, and was not ready for social revolution. The Church was powerful and held authority in Argentina as it did not in Cuba. When Peron attacked the Church that institution opposed the dictator and was ultimately a decisive factor in his downfall.

Land ownership also differed from the rest of Latin America. The big latifundia of Cuba were corporation- not individually -owned. Thus the traditional landlord-peasant personal relationship was absent. Peasants did not esteem local representatives of the elite. It also found peasants depending on wages, a modern characteristic, for their living. Finally, Cuban peasants were used to impersonal administrators rather than to the traditional personal treatment of the hacendado.

Urban conditions in the mid- and late-1950's had reached the peak of general discontent among all classes. The upper classes, including the middle sector fo professionals and small business, had been severely affected
by urban terrorism. They condemned the regime for their inability to control the opposition and their resorting to brutality as a means to suppress the opposition. The underemployed and unemployed sectors of the cities and towns had been for many years alienated from a system that promised them no hopes of a better future. They were ready to welcome and support any movement willing to rescue them from their poverty and aimless lives.

Although the conditions previously discussed reveal themselves more acute in pre-1959 Cuba, they, are, no doubt, present to a lesser degree in much of Latin America. In many countries, weakly-articulated institutions as those of Brazil, come close to collapse, yet a new regime seizes power and introduces small reforms which gradually decrease the possibility for revolution. Possibly those reforms benefit urban dwellers generally and the urban bourgeois particularly. The existing order which yields even in minor ways buys time. Possibly more elites in Latin America yield than do not. The success of the Cuban Revolution lay in combining and integrating alienated social forces with a leader and organizer having the capacity and incentive to act in the late 1950's. Castro's powerful leadership and the crumbling institutional order of Batista's Cuba provided the proper stimulus to that joint action.

The Cuban Revolution resulted from an uncommon joining or juncture of structural and processual circumstances. Therefore, the bold hope that Cuban-style revolution would spread through Latin America was not, indeed, probably, is not, realistic. Alienated mass populations, weakly-articulated, poorly-integrated, and inadequately-distributed social institutions, an unresponsive elite or governing body, joined with a charismatic revolutionary leader to provide the uncommon circumstances of the late-1950's that resulted in the successful Cuban Revolution. Indeed, piece meal reforms or successful
counterrevolutions perhaps are much more reasonable and expected.

The uncommonness of revolution makes such study difficult. For example, that Huntington's models of Eastern and Western revolutions fail to apply to Cuba or to China, the two recent successful revolutions, indicates that serious observers had inadequate theories of drastic social change. Perhaps more fruitful fields of study of social change are reform (Latin American elites who yield to some demands to allow change of national structures or processes) or counterrevolution. At least more cases for study and analysis would be available. Further sociological research of those kinds of social change appear to be most fruitful at the conclusion of this study of the Cuban Revolution.
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A CASE STUDY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: 
AN UNCOMMON CASE OF DRASTIC SOCIAL CHANGE

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Cuba serves as a case study of drastic change. The centrality of the institutional order to effectively perform socialization and social control is discussed as indispensable for the existence of the social system. Institutional orders socialize, reward, and coerce to perform that function. A revolution is unlikely to occur in a society where deeply rooted popularly-supported institutions exist. A system, it is theorized, with unstable and ineffective social institutions inclines to rapid and drastic social change. But findings of this thesis are that unstable institutions, in and of themselves, were not sufficient in Cuba. Other structural and processual circumstances joined with weakly-articulated institutions to result in the successful Cuban Revolution.

This study seeks to interrelate two ingredients of drastic social change: the degree of institutionalization of the social system and the degree of alienation exhibited by social forces within the system. The case study considers antecedent conditions to the Cuban Revolution as well as specific occurrences of 1958-1960.

It is concluded that the Cuban Revolution resulted from an uncommon juncture of structural and processual circumstances. Therefore, the bold hope that Cuban-style revolution would spread through Latin America was not, indeed, probably, is not, realistic. Alienated mass populations, weakly-articulated, poorly-integrated, and inadequately distributed social institutions, an unresponsive elite or governing body, joined with a charismatic revolutionary leader to provide the uncommon circumstances of the late 1950's that resulted in the successful Cuban Revolution.