PEASANT ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS ON ASPECTS OF MODERNIZATION: A PHILIPPINE PANEL STUDY

by

Vivienne S.M. Angeles

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Approved by:

Louis H. Douglas
Major Professor
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of independent nation states after the last war has ushered in a new emphasis in the study of nations - the study of development. It has almost been axiomatic that as the new states emerged, the next task of the scholars in the social sciences has been to observe and study the rates and patterns of growth in these newly independent states. The postwar years, therefore, witnessed the mushrooming of studies that were subsumed under the rubric of the concept "development" and such terms as "prismatic" and "transitional" have emerged in the attempt to categorize stages of growth of these new states. Almost all of the countries that became independent after the war have been classified under the category of transitional societies - societies that are at a stage of development with the movement being from the traditional to the modern and where institutions and people are caught in a fluid state of transition.

In the studies of development and modernization, there has been a growing recognition by the scholars in the social

sciences of the need for an integrated approach to the study of development. Obviously, sharpening theoretical models that reflect only one discipline would result in a narrowed view of development. As Horowitz puts it: "... social science can lend its distinctive focus and method that extend all the way from personality problems on one side to political problems on the other to help clarify the facts, truths and meanings behind the dilemmas of the world." Lucien Pye also notes that few of the essential prerequisites for economic growth are purely related to economic matters. The habits of mind, the values and world views, the social conditions of life, and the stability and effectiveness of government are clearly crucial factors determining the prospects of economic growth.

He further accepts the inescapable conclusion that the concept of development cannot be reserved for the economic sphere alone. It is along this recognition of the "inter-disciplinary" approach that this study is undertaken. For while pursued as a research in political science, this study touches on the field of psychology since it deals with attitudes of people toward aspects of modernization.

A. The Relevance of Attitudes in the Study of Modernization

Attitude formation and change, which normally falls

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under the field of psychology, assume critical importance in
the study of developing nations. For one thing, there are
apparent multiple relationships between the level of technol-
ogy that people can maintain and the manner by which they per-
ceive themselves and how they relate to one another. As mo-
dernization, industrialization and other changes take place,
people also change and while at times it appears that change
in people is a prerequisite for technological change, at
other times it appears to be a product of modified technology.

This importance of attitudes in relation to development
and change has been widely recognized. David McClelland, in
a provocative study, emphasized the relationship between the
need for achievement, otherwise known as n Ach of the people
and economic development. He further contends that develop-
ment occurs as people become more market oriented and respon-
sive towards the opinion of others. Daniel Lerner, in a
study of modernization in the Middle East, argues convincingly
that possession of an empathic capacity or the ability to see
one's self in another person's situation is necessary if a
person is to function in a great society. Equated with the

1 George M. Guthrie, The Psychology of Modernization
in Rural Philippines (Ateneo de Manila: Institute of Philip-
pine Culture, 1970).

2 David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton:
Van Nostrand, 1961); see also McClelland, et. al. The Achieve-
ment Motive (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, ;953).

3 Daniel Lerner emphasizes the concept of empathy in
relation to modernization in The Passing of Traditional Society:
mobile personality, Lerner asserts that "high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and participant."\(^1\) Together with Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lerner also placed importance on the role of mass media and communications in the changing perceptions of the people. Ithiel de Sola Pool argues further that transformations in values and personalities are far more important to modernization than are mere changes in actions.\(^2\)

The relevance of attitudes to development and modernization was further emphasized by Inkeles in his conception of the modern man. He noted that the exposure to a modern setting may affect the transformation of a traditional person and while it may necessitate the adoption of new roles for him, it is only when "man has undergone a change in spirit - has acquired new ways of thinking, feeling and acting - that we come to consider him modern."\(^3\) It is therefore a change in the latent structure of man's attitudes that would produce self-sustaining movement toward modernization.

While the prevailing literature on development and modernization seem to divide on the issue of which comes first,

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 50.
the attitude or the modernizing institution, it is clear that all these give importance to attitudes and new ways of thinking.¹ However it may be, either as a cause or effect, this change or shift in values, attitudes and perceptions of the people, their reactions toward any form of innovation become significant and crucial factors in the determination of how fast or how readily modernization will spread.

In the political sphere, the person's perception of the role of the government and his attitude towards authority show a bearing on his participation.² In much the same manner, the governments of developing nations could be motivated to formulate policies or developmental programs with due considerations on the possible effects of such programs on the people and how they would, in turn respond to them.

In the movement from the traditional to the modern stage, transitional societies experience tensions and strains and uneven rates of change in the various aspects of society. This paper assumes that they have a corresponding effect on the perceptions and attitudes of the people, which may impede


² For relevant studies on attitudes and political perceptions, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965).
or speed up the process of modernization. As Douglas E. Ashford contends:

The study of attitudes and attitudinal organization open the way for the investigator to document how remote aspects of abstract values may play a changing role in helping an individual to live in a more complex world.1

B. The Philippines: A Society in Transition

The Philippines provide an interesting area for the study of modernization and development. Like many developing countries and like its Asian neighbors, the Philippines was also subjected to colonial dominance - three hundred and seventy seven years under Spain and fifty two years under the United States.

Spain's arrival to a country that was characterized by the existence of isolated and suspicious communities was quickly followed by the establishment of a colonial rule that brought drastic changes to the life of the Filipino people. It introduced new ideas and practices that included, among other things, a religion, a centralized form of government and a system of town planning that gave emphasis to the unity of church and state as evidenced not only by the establishment of the cabesera-visita town set-up, but by the merger of spiritual and temporal power in the hands of the religious order.

By the nineteenth century, the patterns of settlement had changed into this form and the small towns were organized around a central plaza; and an upper class of *principalia*, *illustread*, or leaders of the town had emerged. These town leaders who had access to Spanish education and culture came to be the core of the upper class and at the same time, they provided the native leadership of the town and the province, under the direct control of the religious orders and the local priest.\footnote{Jean Grossholtz, *The Philippines* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 18.}

The role of the Filipino during the three centuries of Spanish rule varied from being member of the local ruling class who has had the opportunity of acquiring Spanish education and also being landowner, to being a poor peasant deprived of the opportunities that could improve his standard of living.

American rule provided a different turn in Philippine history. Starting in 1898 and lasting for fifty years, American domination introduced to the Filipinos new cultural patterns and a system of government based along democratic lines. The economic policies of the United States linked the two countries but made the Philippines heavily dependent upon the American market for its products. The "free trade program," which was a major aspect of United States policy furthered the "cash crop" pattern of agriculture, and provided
a growing source of export commodities and attracted manufactured consumer goods from the United States.\(^1\) This type of colonial economy has been viewed as a resultant of American investments and the laissez faire doctrine which ultimately resulted in the growing disparity between the rural populace and the leadership of the nation. The American governors, however, had given due emphasis to the cornerstones of a country on the road to modernization - local government, a civil service, public works, roads, schools, health services and financial institutions. For a colony at such stage, the more notable accomplishment of America was the introduction of the public school system which broadened the base of an educated populace.

The colonial experience brought with it western institutions that were superimposed upon a traditional setting and what has therefore emerged was a country, which, though possessing governmental institutions and adopting western social patterns has remained basically traditional. Gunnar Myrdal views that the American occupation has resulted in the "reinforcement and legitimation, in a democratic framework, the hierarchical power structure created under the aegis of Spain."\(^2\)


Post-colonial Philippines has been characterized by a rapidly growing population which is placed at 3.0 per cent increase yearly. By 1970, the population has been estimated as close to 38 million. An economy that registered only a 5.6 per cent growth in gross national product in the last two years\(^1\) is faced with the problem of providing employment for thousands of college graduates turned out yearly. There has also been a remarkable spread of education that has resulted in a literacy rate of 75 per cent which is the highest in the East Asia and Pacific area.\(^2\) The communications network has expanded tremendously, with electricity, radio and television reaching many remote communities. The transportation system has also been improved, with roads and bridges connecting distant communities to centers of urbanization. Like its Asian counterparts, however, we see packets of modernization side by side with the traditional rural communities where roughly 80 per cent of the population resides. All these, not to forget the colonial influence and experience, has introduced to the Filipinos a culture of modernization that is quite unique. The norms and values brought by these changes assume their

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\(^1\) "Philippines," Background Notes, United States Department of State, August, 1969.

\(^2\) Ibid. also, Seymour Lipset, in Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 41., asserts that the Philippines actually ranks second to the United States in the proportion of people attending high school and universities.
position in the individual personality of the people alongside the norms and values of the traditional culture. As a historian puts it, the country is at a stage where neither culture has displaced the other in the governance of his behavior and social outlook. What is old has not been abandoned and what is new has not been quite established, so that both exist, often competitively, side by side.\(^1\)

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF STUDY

In a country that is basically agricultural, with roughly 80 per cent of the people engaged in agriculture and residing in the countryside, a study of modernization necessitates the choice of groups of people most affected by the changes. It therefore becomes important to focus on the groups of people whose response would determine, to a significant extent, the success or failure of the modernization program. In this transitional society, the social structure and the economic order are predominantly static or stable as there is a marked absence of a major technological advancement that could create an impact on both the economy and the social system. The economy is agricultural, and land is the major source of income. In transitional Philippines, this is further evidenced by the absence of manufacturing units in the rural areas as they are concentrated on the fringes of the urban areas, close to the cities which provide the market for manufactured goods.

In such a situation where land is highly valued and provides income for a majority of the population, two classes of people dominate the social structure: the peasants and the leaders. The former constitute the majority and the latter, a minority which virtually controls and commands the
socio-economic and political resources. In rice-producing Philippines, this division is almost synonymous with tenancy and landlordism, especially in the Central Luzon area where the tenancy rate is high. Other researches have observed this division not only in rice-producing areas but in other parts of the Philippines as well, where the categories have been limited to two levels: the elite dakulang tao (big people) and the more numerous but dependent sadit na tao (little people).¹ A middle class is developing, but it has yet to manifest itself as a distinct, identifiable social group, in the way that we could distinguish the peasants from the leaders in Philippine society.

This paper focuses on the peasants for two major reasons: first, they have been considered as a majority of mankind;² and second, this paper recognizes that the stability of the government is largely dependent on the conditions of the peasantry.

Various studies portray the peasant as a group of people that is very difficult to understand,³ the more so because

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¹ Frank Lynch, "Social Class in a Bikol Town," IPC Papers, Ateneo de Manila, Quezon City.
his ways and his attitudes seem to be crucial variables in the conduct of his day-to-day existence. Unpredictable as their ways may be, their being a majority provides ample reason for choosing them as the focus of a study on modernization. If we have to consider or measure the spread of modernization, then we should give due importance to those who would be greatly affected by it.

In the developing nations and in the now developed nations, the role of the peasants as crucial factors has been widely acknowledged. Their roles in the revolutions in France, Russia and China have strengthened their position as critical factors determining the stability and fragility of the government. In modernizing societies, they are considered as an audience that must be reached, in order for a country to move forward on the development continuum. Roads, bridges, schools and communications networks may be built and expanded, but the questions of whether they satisfy or answer the needs of the majority and whether they get the favorable reactions necessary for continued development loom large, particularly


as long as we fail to understand the responses and attitudes of the majority of the people that would be necessary for maintaining such modernization structures.

In agricultural countries, the change in attitudes among the farm people become pivotal to the entire developmental program, both economic and political. If farm people are not motivated to change, then change will not take place. And because the peasants constitute the majority in transitional Philippines, it becomes imperative, therefore, to understand the peasant and his lifestyle. To introduce something new to a community, it is the task of the innovator to persuade and convince the people of the merits of the changes to be introduced. And to be able to persuade, one must know the audience, and in this type of society, the peasants.

In view of the above, this study focuses on the peasants and their attitudes toward aspects of modernization.

A. Peasants and Leaders: Problems in Definition

For purposes of this paper, it becomes mandatory, at this point, to resolve operational problems. The terms peasants and leaders, which will be used extensively in this study, have both been subjected to different connotations and therefore require clarification for our purposes.

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A survey of literature on peasant studies serves as a means of accentuating the problem of establishing a working definition on the term peasant. To Wolf, peasants are "agricultural producers in effective control of land who carry on agriculture as a means of livelihood, not as business or profit."\(^1\) Redfield's definition closely approximates this, and his work on peasant society describes them as "people in old civilizations, rural people who control and cultivate their land for subsistence and as part of a traditional way of life."\(^2\) Firth, on the other hand, bases his definition along economic lines but emphasizes the subsistence nature of the means of livelihood of the peasants, which is primarily cultivation of the soil.\(^3\) From these definitions and others that have dealt with peasant societies, a fairly clear consensus seem to emerge on the attributes of the term peasants.

To re-state the definition within the working premise of this study and in the light of Philippine transitional characteristics, the term peasant will therefore be defined as agricultural producers from the rural areas who are largely oriented to subsistence production. Since practically all of

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the peasants in the sample used for this study are farmers, the term peasant will be used alternately with the term farmer. Taken in class terms, they approximate the lower classes in the sociological classification.¹

This study also recognizes the role of the leaders as agents of modernization and change in transitional Philippines. In a country where the clear division between the rich and the poor, the landlord and the tenant, between those who govern and the governed prevails, it becomes important to deal also with those who assume the super-ordinate position in this predominantly two-level social structure.

The term leaders, as used and as perceived in this setting is synonymous with the term elite. For our purposes, leaders would be taken to mean as those who possess all or most of the key values of wealth, education, power, prestige and skill, the utilization of which has determinable consequences for the many members of society. It must be noted at this point that in the Philippines, especially in the local community level, the elites or the leaders could be best viewed as "multifunctional," serving all purposes of economic dominants, social influentials and political leaders, as well as being leaders in other spheres of activity. A concern for their role in society becomes a necessity due to the relation-

¹ Chester Hunt, et. al., Sociology in Philippine Setting (Quezon City: Phoenix Publishing House, 1965) classifies the farmers as being in the lower classes.
ships with the peasants which in many ways affect the outlook of the peasant. Operating through the network of Philippine traditional values, the elite or leaders are seen as performing or given the chance to perform, a super-ordinate role while the peasants maintain the subordinate status. The elite assumes a position of dominance and the performance of his role is oftentimes seen as crucial to the functioning of the community. Jean Grossholtz views this relationship in terms of the "Filipino's instinct to turn to his jefe (chief), his landlord, or his boss for help, for guidance, for justice, for all problems of his life."¹ The leader-peasant relationship therefore has been so maintained in a manner that the elite is usually viewed by the peasant as being either a paternalistic entity, a social and political leader, a lending institution, and as an innovator.

Other than the consanguinal relationship, the ties between the elites and the peasants are usually established through the compadrazco system,² a ceremonial form of family ties which relate the persons involved as if they were members of the same family.

A peasant's looking up to his leader is also a manifestation of the status-oriented behavior of the Filipinos in which a person relates himself to somebody higher in status

¹ Jean Grossholtz, op. cit., p. 88.
² This type of family ties will be discussed further in the next chapter of this paper.
than he is. All these established relations or associations with the leaders reflect the acceptance and recognition of the dominant role of the leaders in Philippine society.

The super-ordinate role of the leaders is further stressed by the fact that in the rural areas, in any community project, social gathering, political function, the leaders are always approached and consulted, whether it be for moral or financial support, before anything could be done. The leaders represent the business sector, the landlords, or the government, whose affirmative reaction would assure the adoption or the implementation of a community undertaking. This tie-up of relationship between the peasant and the leaders therefore poses certain implications for the developmental process. While the leaders may approve programs or provide resources for development, the success or failure then depends on the peasants and their acceptance or rejection of such changes or developmental programs introduced.

B. The Modernizing Peasant: A Profile

In societies that are considered transitional, wherein traditional values are found to be intermingling with modernity, it becomes interesting to note the interplay of forces that make up the modernizing individual; how technology and attitudes play against each other or induce reciprocal changes which could either result in the modernization of a man or the modernization of society.
This paper then would analyze the extent of the modernity of the Philippine peasant on the basis of his changing attitudes and perceptions. In studying the attitudes and perceptions of the peasants toward modernization, the peasants would be analyzed along the conception of modern man as drawn up by Alex Inkeles. At this point, it must be noted that while there seems to be no exact or standard definition of what a modern man is, it seems evident that scholars and students of modernization agree of what distinguishes the traditional man from the modern man. Mainly described in terms of his attitudes, characteristics and ways of thinking, McClelland considers the modernizing man as highly achievement motivated; Kahl characterizes him as an activist, while Smith and Inkeles may rank him high on the modernity scale in the sense that he exhibits most if not all the traits of modern man. Lerner attributes to him a high degree of empathy which includes the capacity for identification with new aspects of one's environment.

1 Alex Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 138-150.
5 Daniel Lerner, op. cit., p. 50.
The themes suggested by Inkeles provide a meaningful approximation of what we could view as a modern man. It is against these themes that this paper will analyse the changing perceptions and attitudes of the Philippine peasant. The themes suggested were as follows:

1.) The readiness for new experience and openness to innovation and change;

2.) A disposition to formulate opinions not only of matters within his immediate concern, but of other areas as well;

3.) An orientation towards the present and future rather than the past;

4.) An orientation towards planning and organization of his beliefs as a manner of handling life;

5.) A sense of efficacy, that involves an orientation to the idea that man could master nature and environment;

6.) A confidence in institutions and other people as regards to their ability to meet and fulfill their obligations;

7.) An awareness to the dignity of others and more disposition to show respect for them;

8.) A faith in science and technology;

9.) A belief in distributive justice - a system of rewards based on individual contribution and not in terms of

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1 Alex Inkeles, _op. cit._, pp. 141-144.
whims or special properties of people not related to his contribution.

The transitional nature of Philippine society and the characteristics of the Philippine peasant make it necessary to give full consideration to Inkeles' theory and his scale.

Isolating our case to the peasants now in the political aspect, this paper is concerned with the perceptions of the role of the government and modernization and change in this society. In a political system that is still characterized by the persistence of traditional values that seem to conflict with the demands of a bureaucratic-oriented democratic system, this paper would attempt to investigate the peasants' perception of the role of government. The government, being a change agent in the Philippines as well as in other developing countries, requires the support of the people in the implementation of its goals. The person's view of the government may, in one way or another, serve as guidelines for the government's modernization program, in the sense that they set the limits on the possible success of the program. Along this line, it then becomes important to determine the perceptions of the peasants of community improvement through governmental activity. It should be noted that one of the characteristics of a democratic society is that people are active participants in the democratic process and therefore the peasant perception of the role of government may have a meaningful bearing
on the political participation of the peasants.

For purposes of this paper, the perceptions of the peasants will be grouped under four major areas: Optimism/Pessimism on the Direction of Change; Traditional Values/Modernism; Perception of the Role of Government; and Political Participation. These areas will be explored and discussed in detail in the succeeding parts of the paper.

In line with the above categories, this paper will investigate the hypothesis that: As modernization proceeds, the following changes will take place in the following areas:

Pessimism/Optimism on the Direction of Change

1.) The peasants will be more optimistic regarding their future living conditions;

Traditional Values/Modernism

1.) There will be less emphasis on the importance of relatives, especially those outside the nuclear family;

2.) There will be more importance placed on the individual's ability and less on his connections;

3.) There will be a decline in the belief in omens, and there will be a corresponding rise in the belief in science and expertise;

Perception of the Role of Government

1.) There will be a more positive perception of government in terms of its values to the life of the people; and its role in moving the country towards progress and change;
Political Participation

1.) A more positive perception of the role of the government in their daily lives would determine his participation in politics.

The general hypothesis for this study therefore, is: over time, peasant attitudes and perceptions will change in the directions indicated which we interpret as modernization.

C. The 1964 and the 1968-69 Studies

This paper compares the responses of the peasants to two surveys, one conducted in the summer of 1964 and the other, during the last months of 1968 and early part of 1969. In the two surveys conducted, the same sample was used, which was drawn through random methods from the list of farmers compiled by the office of Agricultural Productivity Commission. In 1964, two barrios were drawn up (Capalangan and Pambuan) for the sample, one close to the town proper (poblacion) and the other, far from it. The test conducted on the two-sample survey did not yield significant differences, and therefore the two samples were considered as one. The questionnaire administered

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1 The 1964 study was conducted by Dr. Louis H. Douglas and appeared as "Modernization in a Transitional Setting: A Philippine Case Study," in Civilizations, XVIII, (1968), pp.1-26. The 1968-69 study was conducted by Fred Clemente in two municipalities, Gapan and Morong, where this researcher had the opportunity of taking part.

in the 1964 survey was designed to "examine areas of attitude and value structures related to the types of change connoted by modernization."¹ These same questions were administered again as part of the 1968-69 study which also covered the bureaucratic perceptions of the peasants, the town leaders and the bureaucrats. While the total number of respondents (peasants) in 1964 and 1969 were 51, it was found out that in the 1969 survey, there were respondents who were not subjected to interview in 1964, and there were respondents interviewed but were not interviewed in 1968-69. Some changes in the respondents were made in 1968-69 for two reasons: first, some of the 1964 respondents could not be located, and second, two of the original respondents had passed away.

To be able to determine changes in responses, this study deemed it more meaningful to limit the sample to respondents who were subjected to both the 1964 and the 1968-69 interviews. This reduced the peasant sample to 39. While the small number may be viewed as too small to be called a representative sample, it therefore assumes the character of a panel, but is of value and significance because the individuals were twice interviewed. This then allows us to perceive clearly and observe the behavioral changes of the individuals. In the study of modernization, the changing stttitudes, perceptions and predispositions of the people show an indication of

¹Ibid., p. 10.
the effects of modernizing influences on the people, and at
the same time, provides an indicator of whether the people are
veering towards modernization or are still drawn to their tra-
ditional values and ways of life.

On the part of the town leaders, all 22 in the 1964
sample were interviewed again in 1968-69 and therefore utilized
fully for this study.

While the time lapse of four years may be considered
short when viewed along the long range program of development
and change, this study considers it as the first step in stu-
dying the changing attitudes in Gapan. An important factor
that is viewed as partly responsible to the changes in atti-
tudes and perceptions of the people is the designation of
Gapan in 1964 as the second Land Reform area in the Phil-
ippines.\footnote{1} Land Reform, in its simpler terms, is the expropri-
tion of landholdings, with or without compensation and their
redistribution to farmer tenants, serfs or laborers.\footnote{2} In a
heavily tenanted locality, such governmental policy would
affect the system of land ownership that has persisted for
centuries and obviously bring with it some implications and

\footnote{1}{The Land Reform Code was signed and became effected
on August 8, 1963 as Republic Act No. 3844.}

\footnote{2}{Phillip Raup, "The Contribution of Land Reform to
Agricultural Development: An Analytical Framework," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Volume XII, No. 1 (October,
1963), p. 3.}
effects on the outlook and the way of life of both the farmers and the landlords. Land reform itself therefore, is a force of change in this municipality. And within the four and a half years that such innovative policy has been "implemented," the before and after effects on the attitudes of the people become an interesting subject of study. At the same time, it has implications on the future policy formulation by the government.

D. Locale of the Study

In order to arrive at a more meaningful and closer view of the modernization process and the perceptions of the peasants, this study has chosen the community as the locale of the investigation. In many ways, the study of the community brings us closer to the understanding of the ways of the rural populace who, as this paper contends, provide the critical factor in the spread of modernization. While studies of modernization and development have moved along cross-cultural national levels, we cannot ignore the importance of the community in relation to a country's move towards progress and development. As Janowitz puts it:

The growth of industrialism weakens, or more accurately, transforms traditional community affiliation, but does not eliminate them. The dominant trend towards urbanism as a way of life increases the importance of occupations and associations linking a person to the nation state. Yet, the community must be understood as a social reality,
a political context, and as an ideological symbol if contemporary political behavior is to be analysed.\footnote{Morris Janowitz, "Converging Perspectives in Community Political Analysis," in Morris Janowitz, ed., Community Political Systems (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), p. 13.}

Our concern with rural behavior and the contention that the community is an important entity brings our attention to a municipality, which, like any other municipality in a transitional country is also beset by the problems that accompany modernization and development.

The provinces that comprise the Central Luzon region in the Philippines are considered as being the "rice granary" of the country, mainly because of its high agricultural productivity potential. Nueva Ecija is one of these provinces, wherein the municipality of Gapan is located. Gapan itself is heavily agricultural, and contributed an annual rice production of approximately 320,000 cavans (as of 1968-69) to the total rice productivity of the whole country. Located at approximately 96 kilometers from the city of Manila and about 20 kilometers from Cabanatuan city (the capital of the province), Gapan is therefore easily accessible to two places that are comparatively urban. In many ways, this accounts for the penetration of urbanizing influences to Gapan.

A total of 15 barrios\footnote{The 1960 census, as mentioned in the study of Professor L.H. Douglas, lists only 9 barrios, but the municipal records show 12. In 1969, three more barrios were created, thus making it 15.} make up the municipality and
cover a total land area of approximately 155.9 square kilometers or 15,590 hectares. Situated on the southeastern part of the landlocked province of Nueva Ecija, Gapan's terrain is flat on the center down to the west and rolls up to the eastern part going to the Sierra Madre mountains. The land is generally clayish and well-suited for rice cultivation, thought other barrios engage in such industries as brick-making, pottery and other forms of agricultural production like vegetable-growing. The river banks provide good sources of gravel and sand and in one of the barrios, some petroleum companies have looked into the possibilities of the presence of oil deposits. On the main, however, rice production continues to be the main industry of the people.

In 1964, Gapan registered a population of about 38,000\(^1\) of which some 85 per cent are Catholics and the rest belonging to minority religions wherein the members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (a Philippines based religion) predominate. Although the population is largely agricultural, "there is also a nucleus of business and professional people who are active in the economy of the town."\(^2\) Their type of business, however is tied to rice production as evidenced by the preponderance of rice mills, warehouses, threshers and tractors for rent and a rural bank that provides agricultural loans.

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\(^1\) Gapan, Municipal Records, 1968-1969.
In terms of classification according to income, Gapan is considered as a second class municipality with an annual income of ₱ 277,127.84 (as of 1969). In 1964, it had an income of ₱ 176,000.00 and was considered as a third class municipality then.¹

Gapan is an important community for the study of perceptions on development and modernization mainly for the following reasons: 1.) the occupation of the majority of the people is farming; 2.) it has been for sometime the area of huk activity² and 3.) it was declared a land reform area. Added to these is the fact that Gapan exhibits a high rate of tenancy (approximately 71 per cent), with a majority of the farmers operating on the conventional share-cropping system. This set-up usually puts the farmer in debt for all of their crop by the time of the harvest, thus keeping them on the subsistence level.³

E. The Gapan Peasant

The peasants in this sample approximates the character of the peasants in the heavily-tenanted areas of Central Luzon. In terms of the prevailing attitudes, he may be likened

¹ Gapan, Municipal Records, 1964 and 1969. Incomes of municipalities are largely drawn from tax revenues and license fees.
² The huks are a group of people who have continuously sought to effect changes in the social structure in Central Luzon, due to what is claimed as persistence of injustices committed by the landlords.
to the peasant in other areas of Luzon, and in fact, the 1968-69 study partly attests to this. In terms of his attitudes and perceptions, there is a close similarity between him and his counterpart in the town of Morong in Rizal province, which was also included in the 1968-69 survey.

The characteristics of the sample as drawn in 1964 and included all 51 peasants are summarized in the following table:

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION BY AGE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, EDUCATION AND HECTARES CULTIVATED OF THE SAMPLE OF 51 GAPAN FARMERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>SES</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Education No.</th>
<th>Hectares Cultivated</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Prof.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Under 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(College 12 - 15)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(H.S. 8 - 11)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7 or over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 and over</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The socio-economic status of the farmers were scaled from I to V, with I for high and V for low. Though subjective in its approach, this ranking provided an indication of

---

the living standard of the farmers. Along these lines, it was found out that the farmers were concentrated at Level IV which indicated minimum subsistence living conditions. A clear example of this was a peasant in 1964 who made a net of only 1 and a half cavan that year and was heavily indebted to his landlord. The landlord tenancy system that prevails in this area has brought about a system of debt peonage that ties the peasant to his landlord to whom all his earnings are given as fast as he borrows from him. Added to this is the usual usurious rate of interest which, as one respondent claimed, was of such a kind wherein if you owe the landlord 10 cavans, you have to pay him 15. These practices have pinned the tenant all the more to the subsistence level where he barely provides for the needs of his family. It has become necessary then for the peasants to seek other means of cash income in order to meet such needs. During off-seasons then, the peasant is usually seen performing other jobs that would augment his income however slightly.

In terms of the characteristics summarized in the table, only age has changed by 1968 while all other characteristics have remained the same. From the above table, we could see that the educational level of the peasants is concentrated below high school with majority of them in the Grades 1 to 4 level. There were 13 or 25.49 per cent who belonged to the group that had no formal education higher than
the "katon" which was a part-time program that instructed them on the rudiments of the alphabet and catechism.

In terms of hectares of farmland cultivated, 33 of the respondents were cultivating 2 to 5 hectares in 1964. This included either leasehold or tenancy, usually tenancy. The 1964 study indicated the presence of four farmer respondents who were at the same time landlords with their own tenants, and who, in some ways represented an emerging barrio middle class.

On the basis of the 1964 findings, the pervasive picture of the Gapan peasant then, shows him as categorized under low socio-economic status, a small farm operator with an average age of 52 and possessing a low level of education.
CHAPTER III

THE CHANGING VIEW OF THE PEASANT TOWARDS
SELF, SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT

Like his counterparts in other developing nations
of the world, the Philippine peasant also exhibits certain
characteristic traits that reflect his deep attachment to tra-
ditional norms and values. Such traditional norms and values
which are deeply rooted in the peasant's culture are mani-
fested in their day-to-day interaction with other people.
The Philippine peasant, being in a transitional setting, is
also caught in a stage of transition and therefore has his
share of the penetration of modernizing influences into his
traditional personality.

In the intervening years between the 1964 and the 1968-
69 surveys, several changes took place in the Philippines.
On the national level, there was a change of leadership as a
result of the presidential elections in 1965 which placed a
new president, Ferdinand Marcos in power.\(^1\) Land reform was
an issue in this election. It was under the administration of
Diosdado Macapagal when it was signed into law, and during
the election campaign in Central Luzon, both political camps

\(^1\) The province of Nueva Ecija gave Marcos 106,391 votes
and Macapagal 78,258. This was taken from the Commission on
Elections tabulations as reported in the Manila Times the fol-
lowing week after the elections. This tabulation was also used
in W.A. Clemente, "The Philippine Land Reform - A Problem in
Policy Formulation and Implementation" (Unpublished M.A Thesis,
Kansas State University, 1968), Appendix B.
vowed to implement the land reform program.

The year 1967 was marked by local elections, and by late 1968 the campaign for the 1969 presidential elections was already in full swing. These years and the change of leadership had meant a change in the manner of implementing policies, and at the same time witnessed differences in the formulation of developmental and economic programs. In the agricultural sector, the introduction of a high-yielding variety of rice, (I-R 8 (miracle rice), had boosted rice production, and pushed the country towards self-sufficiency in rice.

In Gapan itself, the pivot of change was the land reform program. By 1968 up to the present, the progress of the program is still being questioned by national leaders, militant newspapermen and the peasants themselves. In these four years, it had been anticipated that the success or failure of the land reform program would have considerable consequences on the attitudes and perceptions of the people whose source of income is highly dependent upon land ownership and rice production.

The responses of the peasants will be analysed along the categories established in Chapter II of this paper.

A. Perception of the Direction of Change

In the investigation of the peasant's perception on the direction of change, the questions dealing with the following topics were analysed: Present vs. Distant Past; Pre-

1 See pp. 22-23 of this paper.
sent vs. Future; Chance of Owning Land, and the Overhaul in the Tenancy System.

In studying the peasant perception of his present, the questions that asked him to compare it to conditions when he was ten years old was considered for this paper. The following table shows the distribution of responses:

**TABLE II**

**DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON THE PEASANT PERCEPTION OF THE PRESENT AS AGAINST DISTANT PAST**

Question: "Compared to present conditions, how do you feel about conditions that existed when you were about 10 years old?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Much better now?</td>
<td>25.6(10)</td>
<td>28.2(11)</td>
<td>1. Much better now?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Somewhat better now?</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
<td>33.3(13)</td>
<td>2. Somewhat better now?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. About the same?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td>3. About the same?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Somewhat better then?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
<td>4. Much better then?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Much better then?</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A slight 2.6 per cent increase was noted in the perception of present conditions as being "much better" (1) in 1968. In both years, the responses appeared to have been concentrated on the "somewhat better now" category (2) which
had 38.5 per cent in 1964 and 33.3 per cent in 1968. The percentage changes in response to this question are remarkably small as compared to those in the other questions. The responses therefore appear to be practically the same for the two years that the surveys were conducted. The distribution of responses clearly indicate that there are more of the peasants who considered that conditions were much better now than when they were ten years old in the 1964 survey than in the 1968 study. However, the slight difference in the percentage distribution does not offer enough explanation to consider the responses to the two surveys as completely different.

Related to the perception of the present as compared to the past, is the question on the perception of the present as compared to the future. Against the conception of a modern man as being oriented to the future, we turn now to the investigation of the responses to the question: "Do you expect it to become more difficult for most people in Gapan to make a good living during the next 10-15 years?" (see Table III for distribution of responses to this question).

The results of the 1964 study as compared to the 1968 survey revealed a more optimistic peasant (61.6 per cent - combined total of categories 1 and 2 of 1964), who perceived that in the next 10 to 15 years, it would be easier to make a good living in Gapan. The year 1968 was within the span of the following 10-15 years, but the changes in the responses
TABLE III

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON THE PEASANT PERCEPTION OF THE PRESENT AS AGAINST THE FUTURE (Living Conditions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Much easier?</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>1. Much easier in future?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Somewhat easier?</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
<td>2. Somewhat easier in future?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. About the same?</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
<td>3. About the same?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More difficult?</td>
<td>25.6(10)</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
<td>4. Future more bleak than present?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though showed a different pattern from the 1964 study. This time, a much higher percentage registered an answer that sees the next decade and a half as much more bleak and difficult than the present (41.0 per cent). In 1968 too, only 33.4 per cent (combined 1 and 2 of 1968) indicated that they perceive it to be easier in the future. Obviously, this percentage is half of the combined response to the 1964 survey (of the 1 and 2 categories).

There was a small percentage of 7.7 which was registered for the don't know category, which may be interpreted to be a reflection of the ambiguity of the peasant's perception. Another factor that could be related to this is the Filipinos' well-known attitude of bahalana, the usual atti-
tude taken when it comes to the question of "what will happen next?" Roughly translated, bahala na implies a trust that time and providence will take care of the future.\footnote{O.D. Corpuz, "The Cultural Foundations of Filipino Politics," in Espiritu and Hunt, eds., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 420.}

The results of the two questions on the perceptions of past, present and future give an indication that the Gapan peasant has started to exhibit a pessimistic attitude towards the future. From an investigation of the reasons stated by the respondents in regard to the two questions above, it could be noted that they were not a reflection of personal factors, but rather of forces in society that to the peasant, were apparently beyond his control. While many of the respondents have claimed that economic opportunities may have increased as compared to the past, they feel that at their socio-economic level, it is very difficult for them to catch up with those who are or were better-off. A majority of the peasants considered that although they have increased their incomes, the responsibility of keeping a family, coupled with the increasing cost of living did not pull them up from their socio-economic level, but merely allowed them to satisfy their basic needs. In the comparison of the present to the distant past, and in their perception of the present as better, the questions indicated reasons which boiled down to the central idea that as a child of 10 years old, he was completely dependent upon the family and whatever their economic
conditions were. At the time of the interview, and as a family man, he has learned through the years of ways of augmenting his income, but he said with caution that he was unsure of his economic situation as long as the prices of goods kept rising.

In this heavily-tenanted area where living conditions depend on rice production, the peasant's pessimism on the coming years may also be understood in terms of his perception of the chances of owning land. The high rate tenancy in Gapan is also supported by the finding that of the 39 respondents, 84.3 per cent were tenants as against the remaining 15.4 per cent who either operated the farmland as leasee or as owner. This situation, coupled with the high value placed on land poses possible effects on the peasant's notion on their chances of owning land in the course of time.

The 1964 distribution of responses on the chance of owning land is shown in a graphical illustration (see Figure 1 on the following page) with the vertical axis indicating the percentage and the horizontal axis the categories of responses.¹

The 1964 responses offered a possibility that the peasants' perception of the chance of owning land may have been influenced by the declaration of Gapan as a land reform area in 1964. As was indicated in the findings of the 1964 study, "part of the optimism may have been a result of the temporary

¹ This pattern of graphical representation will be followed throughout the whole paper.
Fig. 1.-- Graphical illustration of the percentage distribution of the responses on the chance of owning land.

situation."^1^ Four years later, when land reform was supposed to have been at the stage of full implementation, the distribution of responses showed a decrease on the belief that "more will own lands." However, the percentage response for the category "same as before" remained at 33.3 per cent. The question asked in the two surveys provided for a span of 10 to 15 years, and therefore the 1968 survey was still well within that time span.\(^2\) The graph shows that there was a noticeable similarity of the percentage of those who indicated that "more will own" and "some will lose" in 1968, with 28.3 per cent.


\(^2\) The exact question asked was: "In the next 10-15 years, what do you think the opportunity for people will be regarding ownership of land?" See Table I in the Appendix.
The similarity of the percentage distribution brings out the question of whether the peasant, after four years, still sees some changes regarding land ownership. Evidently, the respondents had pinned their hopes on land reform as shown in their responses as to why they think more will own lands. The responses of the peasants regarding land ownership and tenancy appear to put to test the effectiveness of the land reform program in Gapan. When it came to the question on the overhaul in the tenancy system, the percentage of those who clamored for complete overhaul doubled, with 64.1 per cent in 1968, as against 30.8 per cent in 1964 (see Table IV). This sudden increase in the complete overhaul category was a result of the shift made by 13 respondents from the other categories (2,3 and 5) to the complete overhaul category (1).

The Land Reform Code seeks to establish owner-cultivatorship of farmland, and in order to implement the policy, it seeks first to change all existing share tenancy arrangements with the leasehold system. Viewed as it is, and considering that eventually, the peasants would own the lands that they are cultivating, land reform provides a better cure for the problems of tenancy and living conditions of the tenant. All of these respondents were to have been affected by the provisions of the Land Reform Code more specifically in matters of land ownership, but after four years, why the increased demand for a complete overhaul in the system of tenancy in
spite of the Land Reform Code?

As compared to the responses of the town leaders to this question, a different pattern emerged. It is interesting to note that these town leaders are also the landlords. They are also affected by land reform in the sense that it is their landholdings that would be expropriated. To this question on the overhaul of the tenancy system, 49.0 per cent of the leaders indicated a few minor changes in 1964 and the same percentage registered for major changes in 1964 as in 1968. The differences in the landlord-peasant response in this category could easily be seen in the following table (Table IV).

TABLE IV


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A complete overhaul?</td>
<td>30.8(12)</td>
<td>18.2(4)</td>
<td>64.1(25)</td>
<td>18.2(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A big change?</td>
<td>30.8(12)</td>
<td>4.5(1)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
<td>40.9(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A few minor changes?</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
<td>40.9(9)</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
<td>36.4(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No change now?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>18.2(4)</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>4.5(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No change ever?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>18.2(4)</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The response distribution obviously differs. While majority of the peasants opted for complete overhaul in 1968, the leaders registered the same percentage in both 1964 and 1968 (18.2) - much lower than that of the peasants in both years. The 1968 response of the peasant indicated a continued demand for complete overhaul, but the increase in percentage may be an indication that more peasants are becoming radicalized. The leaders, on the other hand, have confined themselves to major and minor changes, indicative of their "working within the system" posture. This meant a continued adoption of the traditional arrangement of landlord-tenant which includes the old arrangement of division of the produce and a rental system that keeps the tenant heavily indebted to the landlord.

It must be noted at this point that the Land Reform Code was not without landlord opposition. The constitutionality of the law was challenged, and the case brought to the Supreme Court.1

Going back to the analysis of peasant response and relating it to the published facts, it is paradoxical that out of 1,934 farmers in Gapan in 1968, only 148 applied for leasehold. Others adopted the "wait and see" attitude as to the progress of the land reform program.2 An explanation that could be offered to this is the peasant's reluctance

to break off with landowners who supplied them with working capital since new methods designed for increased productivity require more capital investment. A number of peasants are heavily indebted to the landlords but have continued the landlord-tenant relationships. Perhaps a real change asked for by the tenants is in the system of share tenancy which seldom, if at all follows the 70-30 rule wherein 70 per cent of the produce should go to the tenant and 30 per cent to the landlord. What usually happens is that the landlord demands an equal share of the produce on a 50-50 basis in spite of the fact that the tenant has put in more effort in the cultivation of the crop. In many instances where the harvest was not plentiful, the tenant was forced to give the share expected by the landlord.¹ The alternative of seeking changes in the share-tenancy arrangement, however, remains a speculation since the peasant, while demanding a complete overhaul in the tenancy system did not explicitly state the nature of the type of farm operatorship preferred. With due consideration to the high percentage of response on the category of "more will own" in 1964 it could be inferred that the peasants had looked forward to owner-cultivatorship of the farmlands.

From the responses under the category of perception of the direction of change, it seems evident that the Gapan

peasant showed changes in his perceptions of the past, present and future. While accepting that the present is much better than the time when he was 10 years old, the Gapan peasant somehow showed a growing pessimism towards the next 10 to 15 years. Their perception of chance of owning land also showed a big change from the 1964 survey to the 1968 study, specifically in the category of "more will own." This showed the optimism that characterized the Gapan peasant of 1964, and its decline in 1968. In terms of his attitudes toward changes in the tenancy system, the high percentage registered in 1968 (which doubled the percentage registered in 1964) is indicative of the radicalization of the Gapan peasant. While there have been findings that the Filipino farmers are more in favor of incremental changes that would bring positive results, the reactions of the Gapan peasants in 1968 showed a demand for complete change in the tenancy system. This brings to the fore the unrest that prevailed in the Central Luzon provinces in the 1950s and the clamor for "land for the landless" by the huks in that region. From a restive period that followed the anti-huk campaign of the early 1950s, it can be inferred that there is a growing feeling against the set-up of the landlord-tenant system. Momentarily appeased by the promise of the Land Reform Code, it appears that within the span of four years that saw the land reform as mainly a paper plan, the peasant has somehow been radicalized by the very law that sought to
deliver him from tenancy.

On the basis of the responses to the categories on the perceptions of the direction of change, the hypothesis that: "The peasants will be more optimistic on their future living conditions" was not fully supported.

B. Traditional Values/Modernism

Like his counterparts in the other developing nations of the world, the Gapan peasant also exhibits certain characteristic traits and attitudes that reflect his deep attachment to traditional norms and values. While aspects of traditionalism are also found among other groups of people other than the peasants, they are more pervasive among the peasants and the rural populace. To be able to understand the peasant reaction towards modernization and change, it becomes necessary to understand his traditional values also.

Traditionalism, for purposes of this paper, is considered as: the persistence in the placing of strong importance to family ties; the perception of luck and connection as the predictors of one's station in life; a firm belief in omens or signs that could foretell what would happen to a person; and a strong adherence to the old ways of farming.

Modernism, on the other hand, is equated in this section with the growth of secondary associational ties as replacing the traditional familial strongholds; a belief in ability or capacity as the determinant of a person's station in
life and a corresponding disbelief in omens and signs; and
lastly, a faith in science, technological knowledge and ex-
pertise.

It is along these lines therefore that the peasant
views will be investigated - as to whether they are veering
towards modernism or sticking to their traditional beliefs.

The Filipinos have always been characterized as posses-
sing a high degree of familism1 and exhibiting strong fa-
mity ties that extend well beyond blood relatives. An indi-
vidual's deep attachment to the family is reflected in inter-
mingling norms that seem to rule out the idea of individual
action or atomization. An individual moves as a member of
a larger unit, not as himself.

Three types of relationship characterize the Filipino
family: consanguinal, affinal and ceremonial. Consanguinal
relationships particularly refers to blood-relatives, and be-
cause of its bilaterally extended nature, covers relatives
from both sides and includes as far as the fourth or fifth
cousins.

Affinal relatives are those who are in one way or an-
other attached to the family but are not related by blood.
They are usually friends of the family, who, because of the

1 Familism has been defined by E.M. Rogers in Moderni-
ization Among Peasants (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1969) p. 30, as the subordination of individual goals to that
of the family. It is also found to be a dominant trait in
other peasant societies as evidenced by the findings of Mar-
garet Mead in Latin America in her work, Cultural Patterns and
length of association and depth of friendship are considered family members as well.

The establishment of a third type of relationship, the ceremonial type brings with it the question of why certain persons are chosen as ceremonial relatives. Otherwise known as the compadrazco system\textsuperscript{1} it is usually accomplished by having persons stand as sponsors or witnesses to the performance of a baptismal, confirmation, or marriage ceremony. These individuals are then regarded as compadres of the mother and father and become members of the family, while the individual or the godchild becomes a member of the godparent's family. As ritual co-parents, they are expected to perform certain obligations of the family towards the child when needed. Usually, it is a politician, the landlord or members of his family and other socially prominent persons who are chosen as godparents or sponsors. Since the relationship implies reciprocal obligations between the two compadres as well as between the godparents and the godchild, the usual pattern has been for the godfather to help his compadre and godson with little favors such as letters of recommendation for employment, to help in dealings with the government, or with financial problems; he in turn receives small gifts or free labor services.

\textsuperscript{1} For an extensive discussion of the compadrazco system and the nature of Philippine family, see Human Relations Area Files Handbook, Volume I on the Philippines, published by the University of Chicago, 1956.
in election campaigns or other political situations, and during occasions of need in his household. Such actions are actually intertwined with the Filipino concept of reciprocity or utang na loob (debt of gratitude) whereby a person attempts to reciprocate any favor done to him. Ritual co-parenthood is a more or less permanent relationship, and therefore, the persons involved are subsumed under one large family.

When familial values conflict with communal or societal values, it is not uncommon that familial values are allowed to prevail. Family influence or "pull" are many times resorted to when it comes to applications for employments, contracts and the like. Family interests and values largely support the dynastic structure of politics in the Philippine provinces.

This perceived importance of the family which also emphasizes the comparazco system as a part of the family structure provided the reason to consider the perceptions of the peasants on their relatives. Familial ties and the subordination of communal goals to that of the family also poses some implications for the modernization of the peasantry and the country as well.

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1 O.D. Corpuz, op. cit., p. 84.
2 This is adequately explained by Mary Hollnsteiner in "Reciprocity in Lowland Philippines," in Espiritu and Hunt (eds.) Social Foundations of Philippine Community Development (Quezon City: Phoenix Publishing House, 1965), pp. 335-356.
3 O.D. Corpuz, op. cit., p. 84.
In view of this, the peasant responses to the question: "How valuable in modern life do you find your relationships with your relatives (outside of your own immediate family) and your compadre?" were analysed.

On the basis of the responses, there was an apparent decrease in the perception of the relationship with the compadre as very valuable (see Figure 2). The perception of the relationships with the compadres as somewhat important (2) increased with 48.7 per cent of the responses in 1968. A sharp decline in the neutral position (3) is noticeable with almost half of the respondents indicating that such relationship was neither good nor bad.

Fig. 2.-- Graphical illustration of the percentage distribution of the responses on the perception of importance of relatives and compadres.
As 5.1 per cent perceived it to be quite a bit of trouble (4), the same percentage considered such relationships as too much trouble in 1968. In 1964, there was zero response to this category.¹

It is interesting to note that 11 who responded very important in 1964 moved down to the somewhat important (2) category in 1968. The increase of percentage response in this category may be viewed in terms of the transitional nature of the society where the traditional values are not completely displaced yet, but somehow exist side by side with modernism.

It cannot be denied that personal factors may have something to do with the decrease in importance placed with such relationships, but the data show that the trend is towards a declining perception of the relationships with the compadre as very valuable. In transitional Philippines, the compadre still functions as he was envisioned and expected to perform, but not as meaningfully as before. The choice of important people whom they hardly know as being sponsors defeat the expectations of close ties with them, but intensifies the status-oriented behavior of the Filipino.

This declining importance of the compadre provides certain implications on the peasant's perceptions of what determines his station in life. In otherwords, in recognition of

¹ Refer to Table 1 in the Appendix.
the old role of the compadre as a giver of recommendation letters and a benefactor or a job-giver, the peasant's perception of him as somewhat important in 1968 as against very valuable in 1964 could mean that the peasant now sees other means of attaining those things that a compadre was expected to give before. The responses to the question on what the peasant thinks would determine what a person gets in life attest to this. As shown by the following table, it is striking to note that there was a big change towards the perception of complete ability in 1968 with 48.7 per cent as against 15.4 per cent in 1964. This could be taken to mean a growing positive perception on the recognition of the individual's ability as a determinant of his future in life.

**TABLE V**

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONSES OF THE GAPAN PEASANTS ON FACTORS THAT DETERMINE A PERSON'S STATION IN LIFE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Always luck and connections?</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Somewhere in between?</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td>20.5(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Usually ability?</td>
<td>30.8(12)</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Complete ability?</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td>48.7(19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Viewed along the lines of the modernizing man, it is more in consonance with the idea that he is oriented towards the mastery of nature rather than allowing himself to be completely dominated by nature. This could also be viewed along the criteria of ascription vs. achievement, and this table shows a clear tendency towards achievement, putting more emphasis on the ability of the individual rather than on his ascribed status.

This growing rationality of the peasant is further evidenced by the findings on their response to the question on belief in omens. In 1964, the apex of the responses was at "sometimes" (2), with 66.7 per cent. In 1968, there was a big drop to 25.6 per cent of those who considered that omens sometimes foretell. Correspondingly, there was an increase in the groups which stated that omens never foretell. This gradual breaking away from the world of superstitions and myths is interrelated with the peasant's conception of his future life. Traditional peasants were observed to have intertwined these belief systems into an attitude that clearly spoke of fatalism, or the degree to which the individual recognizes a lack of ability to control his future.¹ This is further tied to the traditional peasant's acceptance of fate without question but with resignation - a type of adjustment that he made to any type of misfortune that befell him.

The graphical illustration below indicates the changing nature of the peasant's belief system in relation to the perception and belief in omens as indicators of a person's good or bad luck in his activities. (See Figure 3).\textsuperscript{1} The increase in the category of "never" (4) was made by the changing response from "sometimes" (2) in 1964 to "never" in 1968 by 9 persons. On the basis of the responses on the reason why they don't believe in omens, the peasant's reasoning boiled down to two main reasons: first, they tried to believe, but the omens failed them; and second was the realization that man could, in many ways, mold his destiny as he wishes, as long as he has the necessary ability and the willingness to do so.

As compared to the 1964 perception of "never", there was a marked increase in 1968, with 38.5 per cent as against 17.9 per cent in 1964. The 1968 survey included a category of "not sure" (5) wherein 25.6 per cent responded. This somehow reflects an attitude of ambivalence on the part of the peasants and may be taken to mean a degree of disbelief or uncertainty.

In some ways, it could again be viewed along the transitional plane - in terms of the nation's move towards development which, in the process, may have created an atmosphere of ambivalence in regard to the discarding of traditional

\textsuperscript{1} See also Table 3 in the Appendix.
beliefs and the acceptance of new ones. Like Fred Riggs' model of a prismatic society,\(^1\) the peasant is caught within the prism and though his rational mind tells him not to believe in omens, a part of him, the emotional, tells him to do so. This is a prevailing trait of the transitional man.

The peasants' veering towards modernism is once more evidenced by his growing positive attitude reflecting the acceptance of science-based innovation and knowledge. Technological progress, which is usually equated with modernization,

\(^1\) Fred W. Riggs, *op. cit.*
entails the employment of technology to methods of production in the agricultural sector. As Wharton contends, modernization in agriculture involves the conversion of the subsistence level of agriculture, with traditional techniques and with its primary orientation to food and fiber for the family, into one where modern techniques predominate and the primary orientation is not to the direct physical sustenance of the farm family, but the same goal is met indirectly by the skillful manipulation of the farm resources to maximize the net revenue derived from them in the market.¹

The infusion of technology in traditional agricultural economies necessitates the employment of the services of persons who have been trained for such purposes. However, the acceptance of these trained personnel as agents of change or innovation and the success of the new methods that they introduce depend largely on whether the people or the peasants recognize and accept the fact that science and technology can increase their well-being or security. On the basis of this, the question on belief in expertise was considered for this study.

The positive perception on belief in science and expertise was indicated by the high percentages of those who showed a belief that science and trained technicians could teach them to produce better crops. The 1964 study already

¹ Clifton Wharton, op. cit., p. 21.
indicated this positive perception with 36.8 per cent responding "yes" and 31.6 per cent answering "usually." The 1968 study did not include the "yes" category, so for purposes of comparison, the first two categories of 1964 were lumped together to compare with the first category of 1968 which is "most of the time" and registered 78.9 per cent (see Table VI).

**TABLE VI**

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON THE BELIEF IN SCIENCE-BASED KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. Yes?</td>
<td>36.8(14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Usually?</td>
<td>31.6(12)</td>
<td>78.9(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sometimes?</td>
<td>26.3(10)</td>
<td>10.5(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Seldom?</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Never?</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>7.9(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparatively speaking, the total of the first two categories of 1964 which is 68.4 per cent was increased by 10.5 per cent.

On the basis of the results analysed in this section, we could very well state that the peasant has moved farther from traditionalism. There appears to be a significant change that indicated the growing rationality of the peasant. In the perception of science-based knowledge, the responses shown by the peasant imply that any form of scientifically-based
innovation coming to Gapan would not be hampered by the traditional attitudes that impeded change in other similar communities. As Ithiel de Sola Pool stated, it would be easy to induce peasants to adopt new practices, either in terms of using authority, money, persuasion or proving it to be the will of the gods but such practise does not mean that the peasant has in many ways modernized - it is only when he has developed the scientific attitude towards the adoption of new practices, has internalized them that we could call him modern and it is only through adoption of attitudes that will sustain the program of modernization.¹

In view of the findings related to traditional values and modernism, it is obvious that the hypotheses offered in this section are supported. We could state therefore that the Gapan peasants have: (1) placed lesser emphasis on familial relationships; (2) accepted an individual's ability as the measure or determining factor of his success in life; and (3) have begun to free themselves from the world of omens and superstitions and correspondingly have shown a faith in science and technology. It could then be asserted that the peasant attitudes are a reflection of his growing modernism.

C. Perception of the Role of Government

A long colonial history that showed the picture of an abusive and corrupt governmental structure and personnel during the more than three hundred years of Spanish rule has left to the Filipino a negativistic attitude towards the government. The practices in governmental circles that ended in enriching the officials at the expense of the populace, coupled with the high degree of inefficiency has caused the Filipino to view the government "at its best, an institution that was burdensome; at its worst, it was predatory ... and the government was an institution to be avoided, for its interests were contradictory to his."\(^1\)

With the time lapse that has seen another type of government brought by another colonial power, and the establishment of a Philippine government that was styled along democratic lines, it becomes interesting then to see how the Filipino peasant sees his government now.

In developing countries, the role of the government is not merely confined to maintaining justice and order, but also in planning and coordinating the economy, building infrastructure, and breaking up the concentration of power in feudal hands.\(^2\) At the same time, it undertakes the major task

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\(^1\) O.D. Corpuz, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

of drawing up developmental programs that could improve both the economy and the people. All these imply far-reaching changes that affect the society as a whole. Developmental programs, social movements that effect changes in the established order are generally defined by the government and public policies. The attitudes of the peasants toward government assume critical importance, and attitudes favorable to the government are necessary if the government is to remain stable. Peasant dissatisfaction with the government could threaten the latter's stability, as was the case during the 1950s when the huks agitated for reform and justice the Central Luzon areas.

In discussing the findings of the study pertinent to this section, two things are kept in mind: first, if the negativistic attitude of the Filipino towards government has been accepted as traditional, then a movement towards a positive attitude towards the government could be viewed as a move towards modernity; and second: a positive towards the government would generate support of the peasants to the government, and most likely, enhance its stability.

To the people in the rural areas, the government's presence is usually felt through its Community Development Programs, Land Reform Policies, Miracle Rice and the regular elections. The peasants perception of the government therefore affected by such programs, and through government pro-
jects that find their way to the community.

Questions relating to three levels of government, namely: the barrio, the municipal and the national, have been considered for purposes of this study.

The barrio government, being the lowest level of government has the most direct and immediate contact with the peasants. The passage of a Barrio Charter in 1959 and its implementation on January 1, 1960, granted a measure of autonomy to the Philippine barrio. A trail-blazing piece of legislation, it accentuated the role of the barrio people in the governmental machinery and allowed them, among other things, the chance of undertaking government projects like roads, schools and others. At the same time, it recognized the barrio as a legal entity with its own taxing powers. In more ways than one, the provisions of the charter indicated that it was to reduce the barrio's dependence on the national government.

Responding to the questions on the meaningfulness of the barrio government and on whether they believe the barrio government should undertake more projects, the responses showed noticeable correspondence, as illustrated by the graph below:

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The responses to this question in 1964 showed 59.0 (2) per cent considering it as "helpful" as against 53.8 per cent in 1968. There was a noticeable increase in the neutral (3) perception of the role of the barrio government with only 10.3 per cent in 1964 but 23.1 per cent in 1968.\footnote{See Table 4 in the Appendix.} The negative response, that is, the barrio government as doing more harm than good (4 and 5) remained the same for both years. This decrease in the perception of the barrio government as "helpful" and the corresponding increase in the "neutral" category in 1968 does not, however, alter the trend of the
perceptions of the peasants established in 1964. The correspondence is noticeable, and this was exhibited again in the distribution of responses on the belief on whether the government (barrio) should undertake more projects or not. There were fewer peasants (61.5 per cent) who believed that the barrio government should undertake many more projects (1) in 1968 than in 1964 (76.9 per cent). There was more clamor for projects in 1964 than in 1968. (See following graph).

Fig. 5--Graphical illustration of the percentage distribution of responses on the perceived need for the barrio government to undertake projects.
Grouping together the two categories that indicated the need for more barrio government projects (many more and somewhat more [1 and 2]), we can see that they total 94.8 per cent in 1964 and 92.3 per cent in 1968. The reasons for such demand for projects could not be fully ascertained since the respondents did not indicate their reasons - though it is possible that such demand could mean that the barrio government has not been undertaking many projects in the two barrios of Capalangan and Pambuan, where the study was conducted.

In the municipal level, the peasants of Gapan indicated that in 1968 there were more who perceived the municipal government as being neither good nor bad (3). As compared to the 1964 response, this was a big jump from 10.3 per cent. This sudden increase was made when 9 persons who had considered that the municipal government was essential to their lives changed their position to neutral in 1968. The table below indicates that in 1964, there was a more positive perception of the role of the municipal government with 41.0 per cent considering it essential and an equal percentage viewing it as helpful (see Table VII).

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1 See Table 5 in the Appendix.
TABLE VII
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES
ON PERCEPTION OF THE VALUE OF
THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Essential?</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Helpful?</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neutral?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>43.6(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More harm than good?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Oppressive?</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above shows that there was a more positive perception of the role of the municipal government with a combined 82.0 per cent (categories 1 and 2) in 1964 as against the combined percentage of 41.0 per cent in 1968.

After a lapse of four years and with such trend of response, this leaves us then to question the performance of the government at the municipal level in Gapan. Though unanswerable at the moment, it is obvious that there has been a big decline in the positive perception of the municipal government.

The increasing neutral position (3) was manifested again in the peasant's perception of the value of the national government projects. While the percentage of those who consi-
dered the national government projects as fairly valuable remained constant (see Table VIII), the percentage of those who considered it as neither good nor bad (3) more than doubled as shown by the percentage distribution of 12.8 per cent in 1964 and 33.3 per cent in 1968.

**TABLE VIII**

**PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON THE VALUE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very valuable?</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fairly valuable?</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nothing positive or negative?</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
<td>33.3(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Somewhat harmful?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Very harmful?</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These perceptions on the value of the government could be also viewed in terms of the peasants perceptions of the performance of the government. On the national level, the peasants indicated the need for more government involvement in the solution of the country's problems, as indicated by the higher percentage of those who perceived that the government is doing only few of the necessary things to solve the country's problems.¹

¹ See Table 6 in the Appendix.
The responses that touched on the questions dealing with the three levels of government gave an indication of the perception of the Gapan peasants on the relevance and value of the government to their daily lives. On the basis of the responses in the two surveys, it is obvious that there was a higher percentage of those who held a more positive attitude towards the government in 1964 than in 1968. There was a higher percentage of peasants who indicated that the government was either essential, valuable or somewhat valuable to their lives in the last two or three years. In 1968, the pattern of responses has been altered, with slight increases on those who held a negativistic view towards the government, indicating it as either doing more harm than good or oppressive (see Tables VII and VIII).

The responses also showed that in terms of meaningfulness, the peasants rank the municipal government first and the national government second, and the barrio government third, in that order.¹ The year 1964 saw promise and expectation on the part of the government and the people, and after four years, there appeared to be a decline in the perception of the government as meaningful and valuable to the life of the peasants. In many developing nations, the demand for government services increases as the population gets bigger and as the people become more aware of the function of the government - but with such expectations are tints of frustrations

¹ This was evident in the 1964 responses.
once the government fails the people. It seems apparent from the responses of the Gapan peasants that in 1964, the peasants not only showed a positive perception of the government but obviously pinned their hopes upon it.

In terms of the activity level of the government, the peasants indicated in both years a demand for more activity of the government. As shown by the graph, there appeared to be a higher percentage of those who perceived that the government should be much more active in 1964 than in 1968 (see the illustration below).

--- 1964
1968

1-much more active
2-somewhat more active
3-about the same
4-somewhat less active
*The 1968 survey included
5-don't know

Fig. 6 -- Graphical illustration showing percentage distribution of responses on the perception of the activity level of the government.
The 1968 responses indicated 5.1 per cent who answered "don't know." It is rather surprising that the two respondents who asserted that the government should be much more active in 1964 were the same ones who indicated that they don't know in 1968. The sudden shift in response may be a resulting ambivalence or apathy that may have developed out of disappointment in the poor implementation of the government policies.

On the basis of the responses on these questions that dealt with the government, it seems that the year 1968 did not see an increasing positive perception of the government. In more ways than one, there was a decline in the perception of the government as valuable to the lives of the people. Obviously, the data did not provide ample support for the hypothesis offered for this section which was: there will be a more positive perception of the government in terms of its value to the life of the people and its role in moving the country towards progress and change. While there was a decline in the positive perception of the government, the peasants also indicated expectations of help and aid from the government. This was evidenced by the responses to the question in 1968 on what kind of help they wanted from the government. A higher percentage of 43.6 indicated loan and credit; 17.9 per cent indicated infrastructure and jobs; 2.6 per cent opted for just a "moral" boost, while 28.2 per cent indicated others (this last category included such demands as personal
favors; the persecution of usurers and land profiteers; fuller implementation of land reform and others). Only 2.6 per cent indicated that they did not expect any form of government help, while 5.1 per cent did not respond to the question. This shows therefore, that while the peasants may have declared a waning attitude towards the value of government to their daily lives, they still showed a desire for government help that would allow them to achieve the things that they aspire for in life¹ (see Table 7 in the Appendix). In 1964, when asked whether they would like to see an important industry put up in Gapan, such as an automobile industry which could employ a thousand men, 89.8 per cent favored the idea; with 7.7 per cent indicating that it was a good idea but would create problems in Gapan. Only 2.6 per cent indicated that it would be an unfavorable development which would create serious problems for the municipality. The data therefore showed that in both years, the peasants still exhibited a form of expectation of help from the government. (See Table 8 in the Appendix).

The 1968 responses which put priority on government credit and loan are tied up with the peasant situation in Central Luzon wherein the peasants are heavily indebted to the landlord. In the Philippines, indebtedness in the rural areas

¹ A 1964 study by Manuel A. Dia, "Filipino Farmers Image of Government: A Neglected Area in Developmental Change," 1964 Summer Seminar on Social and Economic Aspects of Agricultural Development, University of the Philippines, also indicated the reliance of the farmer and his expectations from the government.
does not only mean payment in cash or kind, but in the landlord-tenant or patron-client relationship, it also meant the rendering of services to the landlord as a way of acknowledging how much he is indebted to the landlord. 1 Government loans and credit would not entail such bondage on the part of the peasant.

The expectation of help from the government as shown by the 1968 responses could not be taken as an adequate measure of the dependency of the people on the government. Nevertheless, it could also be taken to indicate that the people have not completely given up their hope of the government as an institution that could aid the people. While the 1968 responses indicated a decline in the perception of the government as meaningful to the lives of the peasants, it could also be interpreted to have positive underpinnings, in the sense that it could lead to a lesser dependency on the government and eventually bring about an increase in the individual initiative of the peasants in improving their lots. However, continued frustrations on the poor implementation of government programs and dissatisfaction on the part of the people could possibly lead to instability of the whole society, with peasants continuously agitating for better government performance. Should this happen, a massive national upheaval may not be remote.

1 Mary Hollnsteiner in "Reciprocity in Lowland Philippines," in Hunt and Espiritu, eds., op. cit. explored this fully.
D. Political Participation

The Philippines, together with Malaysia, have often been considered as the only two working democracies in South-east Asia. The democratic system in the Philippines could be viewed as an American export that was superimposed upon a predominantly traditional setting. This was part of the reason why some scholars have noted that it is rather surprising that the system is working in the Philippines.

In this transitional setting, the democratic institutions do not function exactly as those of their western counterpart, due mainly to the persistence of certain elements of Filipino behavior. To this, Grossholtz labels Philippine political culture as a bargaining culture, which is made evident by the Filipino way of perceiving and responding to power, conflict and human interaction.¹

Whatever the peculiarities of this bargaining political culture, it becomes interesting to see how the traditional values have merged with modernity, and how the people function as democratic citizens.

It is a basic assumption in democratic theory generally that a developed political system is one wherein the citizens exhibit a high degree of political participation. This paper shares this assumption and views political development in the democratic systems as part of the modernization process where

¹ Jean Grossholtz, op. cit., p. 159.
the traditional society moves toward a participant society.

In the determination of the political participation of the Gapan peasants, the questions that dealt with voting, participation and attendance in other election activities were deemed meaningful for this paper. The hypothesis formulated for this part was: a more positive perception of the government would determine the peasants' participation in politics.

Recognizing the existence of political parties as indicative of political development, it becomes important therefore to explore the perceptions of the peasants on political parties, since it could have some possible effects on their political participation.

Philippine politics is generally recognized as having a two-party system. Third parties have been established, but did not last long, and the party leaders themselves realigned with either one of the two established parties, the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party. In a number of ways, the political parties in the Philippines do not appear to exhibit and perform the same functions as their counterparts in other democratic countries.\(^1\) It is not normally viewed as a political structure functioning as a bridge between the individuals

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\(^1\) Political parties in democratic systems are generally viewed as performing interest aggregation, articulation, political socialization and recruitment functions. See Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 114-127.
and the political system. Even between the two parties, there is an observable lack of distinction as to what makes the Liberal party the Liberal party and the Nacionalista party the Nacionalista party. Party platforms tend to overlap each other, and raise the same issues every election. In terms of membership, there are no formal membership procedures or regular dues and fees. Contributions to the party coffers are mainly through "voluntary" means and the heaviest contributors to the campaign funds are usually the business firms.

The political parties, however, have their own core members who are usually in the higher positions in the government. However, they themselves continuously shifted from one party to another, depending usually on which party is in power. As Corpuz observed, "political survival in the Philippines normally requires that one must be with the winning side." He further observed that in the shift to the majority party, the defector usually justified his actions with the words of the late President Quezon: "My loyalty to my party ends where my loyalty to my country begins."¹ It is not unusual then to see hundreds of local political leaders swearing in as new members of the victorious party after every elections. Prominent political figures, including no less than the president of the country himself, have defected from one party to another.

¹ Corpuz, op. cit., p. 101.
The fluidity of membership specially on the national level; the rampant "mass turncoatism" or party defection; the absence of distinct ideological lines that could distinguish the political parties from each other; and the similarity of the socio-economic origins of the national party leaders—all these blur out what the political parties really stand for. To the rural peasant the political party has come to mean more or less an extension of personal relationships, and more often than not, the tenant usually followed the party and the vote of the landlord.

The peasants indicated a higher percentage of those who indicated that they were closer to the Nacionalista party during the elections with 44.7 per cent. A lesser percentage of 42.1 considered themselves as independents while 13.2 per cent were affiliated with the Liberal party. The Nacionalista party, which had a bigger following has been the party in power since 1965 when Marcos was elected president.

Against the background of the political party as the arena for the contests of personal interests, especially on the national level, we turn now to the perception of the peasants on whether it makes any difference at all to them which party controls the government. To this, 81.6 per cent asserted that parties do not make any difference at all; as against 18.4 who mentioned that parties do matter. This therefore supports the assertion made earlier that the absence of any distinction between the two parties affect the perception of the
people as to whether it makes any difference at all as to which party is in power. Philippine politics has often been described as basically a politics of personalities wherein as Grossholtz observed, "the Filipino has personalized his ties to the political systems, where he uses his vote as a quid pro quo, and fully expects that his demands will be met if he is skillful in exploiting his relationship to those in power." In view of this, what has developed is more of a personal commitment between the voter and the candidate, a personal type of "you help me, I help you" situation.

While political parties in the Philippines have their many faults as compared to the political parties in operation in other democratic societies, the Gapan peasant still showed that they considered the political parties as helpful in Gapan in some ways, with 46.2 per cent in 1964 and 56.4 per cent in 1968. Several respondents answered that it is usually the party leaders who work for the implementation of certain projects, like roads and schools in Gapan. This again implies the personal nature of the political party. It is seen as made up of individuals with whom the peasant has established relationships. It is worth noting that there was a sharp decline in the category of "help it greatly" - from 41.0 per cent in 1964 to 20.5 per cent in 1968. To the Gapan peasant

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1 Grossholtz, op. cit., p. 159.
2 See Table 10 in the Appendix.
then, the political party does not assume top priority, but he maintains a conviction that in some ways it could help Gapan. Like the other political leaders in the Philippine municipalities, the party leaders are not only influential when the people have some project in mind that needs the support of the public officials - and in this case, they approach the leaders of the political party where the specific official is a member. In view of the responses, and in accordance with the performance of the political parties in the national level, we could say that the political parties in the Philippines have not yet achieved that status of being an important vehicle for the channeling of the demands and interests of the people into the political system. Other interests groups, like the sugar bloc, socio-civic organizations, Federation of Farmers and the like, have surpassed the functions of the political party when it comes to interest aggregation and articulation.

A lukewarm attitude towards participation in barrio government was exhibited by the peasants, and this was intensified by the findings of the survey in 1968 when a much higher percentage of the peasants (38.5%), responded that they did not feel they should participate at all. (See the illustration below). Ten of those who indicated that the barrio government was somewhat valuable mentioned that they do not participate in the barrio government.
For 1964:
1-often serve in committees, take part in debates
or participate in community projects
2-occasionally do these things
3-attend meetings only
4-seldom attend meetings
5-not participate at all.
For 1968:
1-serve in committee, projects
2-help in work
3-drop by meetings
4-rarely participates
5-never.

Fig. 7 -- Graphical illustration of the percentage distribution of responses on the participation of the peasants in barrio government.

While the graphical illustration showed a similar pattern in the first four categories, there was a sudden shift in the fifth category with 38.5 per cent not participating at all in 1968 as compared to 7.7 per cent in 1964.\(^1\) The pattern of participation in barrio government does not appear

\(^1\) Refer to Table 11 in the Appendix.
to have any correspondence with the responses on the perception of the value of the barrio government. While a higher percentage responded that the barrio government was somewhat valuable, in terms of participation, there was a higher percentage of those who never participate. Part of the reason used for this was the load of work that the peasants claimed to have been taking most of their time. To this lack of participation, we could also consider Kornhauser's\(^1\) assertion that it may be due to lack of exposure to information and indoctrination concerning democratic values. At the same time, it could also be attributed to possible lack of habits of discussion, debate, and modes of conduct that are indispensable to the democratic process.

Even if the peasant has exhibited a very low level of participation in the barrio decision-making process, the data gave all indication that he was more active in the elections on the national, provincial and municipal level than he has been at the barrio level. In accordance with the responses recorded, the distribution of electoral participation of the Gapan peasant is shown in the following table:

TABLE IX

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
OF THE GAPAN PEASANTS, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Vote in Last Election</th>
<th>Help in the Campaign</th>
<th>Attend Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above distribution of responses give evidence to a high degree of voting participation in the last national elections (1965) before the 1968 survey. Of the 39 respondents there were 97.4 per cent who voted, with only 2.6 per cent who did not vote. An awareness of the democratic system that provides for political recruitment through regular elections was noted in 1964 when a majority of the peasants viewed having elections as more beneficial to the whole society than having appointed officials.

The table also showed a high percentage of those who attended the "miting de avance", the election meetings that are usually held in the week of the elections where party candidates deliver their last-minute campaign speeches. A lower percentage helped in the campaign (33.3) as compared to the other two activities.

The data on political participation give evidence to a decline in their interests in the decision-making process
in the barrio but an increased participation in matters of elections which involve municipal and national government levels. The data do not give enough support to the hypothesis that a positive perception of the government would mean an increased participation in the government. It could be seen that the peasants of Gapan have yet to go beyond voting in order that they may be viewed as fully active participants in the democratic process.
CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERNIZATION

As the Philippines move along the planes of development, the people also experience changes in their prevailing beliefs, attitudes and practices. As the findings of this study revealed, the short time lapse of four years witnessed changes in some of the perceptions and attitudes of the Gapan peasants. On the basis of the responses of the peasants, the findings of this study could be summarized as: In the year 1968, the peasants exhibited the following changes in their attitudes and perceptions:

1.) They were more pessimistic regarding their future living conditions;

2.) They have placed less importance and emphasis on the value of their relationships with their relatives outside of the nuclear family (specifically their compadres);

3.) Individual ability has been given priority in terms of the factors that determine a person's future;

4.) They exhibited a declining belief in omens and a corresponding rise in the belief in science and expertise;

5.) They showed a decline in their perception of the government as highly valuable and essential to their daily lives; and

6.) They exhibited a high rate of participation in
election activities rather than in the decision-making process in the barrio government, and in other activities that required him to put in time and effort, such as barrio improvement projects.

On the basis of the above summary of findings, we infer that the uneven pattern and rates of growth that accompany the transitional process has its mark on the Gapan peasant. From the above, two general trends are brought out, which appear rather paradoxical, and yet evidenced by the findings: the growing pessimism of the peasant and his being more rational in 1968 than he was in 1964. This phenomenon could be better understood in terms of the changes that have taken place in Philippine society in the interim years between 1964 and 1968, and in the municipality of Gapan as well.

As earlier stated in this study, the fact that Gapan was declared a Land Reform area in 1964 appears to have considerable bearing on the perceptions and attitudes of the peasants. A heavily tenanted municipality, the aspirations and hopes of the people in 1964 revolved around the prospects of eventual ownership of land which the Land Reform Code promised. By 1968, however, the optimism that was exhibited by the peasants, especially on the direction of change in land ownership had been blurred by such factors as poor implementation of the Code provisions, lack of credit facilities as promised by the provisions of the Code, coupled with the in-
creasing prices of goods and commodities that affected the income of the peasants.

By the time of the 1968-69 survey, the country was faced with problems in the economy, increasing rates of unemployment and problems of law and order. The government had indicated problems of deficit spending, as the value of the Philippine peso continued to go down. All these and the growing inflation have affected the living conditions of the poor people in both the rural areas and the cities as well. Added to this was the rising problems of peace and order, and during the later parts of 1968, there was the resurgence of huk unrest in the Central Luzon area. All these factors have their corresponding effects on the people, and in more ways than one, could account for the growing pessimism of the Gapan peasant in the perception of his future living conditions.

The growing rational character of the peasant, however, provides indications that the case for the Gapan peasants is not hopeless. His growing perception of ability as the determinant of one's future suggest the acceptance by the peasant of the possibility that man could master and dominate nature which in turn implies the development of a sense of efficacy - and a departure from the old attitude of letting nature take its course and accepting whatever the gods and nature wills.

It could also be inferred that this growing rationality may have resulted from the frustration of the peasants on his
expectation of government aid and help from the promises of public officials which are reiterated time and again during election time, but normally left unfulfilled. It is apparent that since it is the government that takes care and defines development plans and policies that involve and bring about changes in the social and economic order, the peasant attitudes toward the government and vice versa have a direct bearing on the phenomenon of rising pessimism and rising rationality of the Gapan peasant. A declining view of the government as an institution that would help the peasant rise up from his status may be held responsible for the peasants' growing awareness of individual initiative as the possible answer to their dilemma. This situation then brings about another problem in the sense that sustained individual initiative and drive may not always be possible in societies where the resources are either limited or concentrated in the hands of those who have the necessary skills to acquire them — usually the elites and leaders in the developing countries. Possession however of attitudes that give importance to ability and individual capacity could drive the peasants to seek other means of improving their living conditions other than solely depending on rice production in Gapan.

It cannot be discounted however, that continued frustrations of the peasants regarding the performance of the government may have determinable consequences for the rest of
society. It seems obvious from the responses that there is a demand for a big change in the conditions in Gapan, specifically in the land tenancy situation. While the 1964 study\(^1\) asserted that the type of change that the peasants adhered to was of the "incrementalist type," the 1968 findings asserted that a call for big changes is in order. From the mid-1960s until the present, there has been a clamor for reforms and changes not only by the peasants but the other sectors of society as well. Late 1969, 1970 and up to the present has seen Manila and other places in the Philippines as the scenes of demonstrations staged by the peasants, the labor leaders, students and teachers as well. Talk of revolution has been going on for the last few years, and by the way things have been in the Philippines, it is not to be discounted, as long as the people express their dissatisfaction with the government.

Since the programs of agrarian reform have been found to be beset by problems that are mainly financial in nature, and considering that the Land Reform Code has been viewed as an agent of change itself in Central Luzon, it becomes apparent now that other means of delivering the peasant from such conditions should be explored. If the government cannot provide for programs and policies that will improve the living conditions of the people, then it must give way for private

\(^1\) Douglas, op. cit., p. 32.
agencies, or possibly induce private entrepreneurs to establish industrial concerns in Gapan that will provide stable income for the people. Another possibility is for the government to subsidize farm production, but considering the fiscal problems of the government, it seems unwise to depend on or anticipate more government help until the government has recovered from such problems. As the 1964 study found out, the peasants indicated a favorable attitude towards the question on whether they would like to see and industry put up in Gapan. It is indicative that the idea is strongly welcomed.

In making a final note on the Gapan peasant, and the implications of the changing perceptions to modernization, the question of which comes first, the modernizing institutions or the attitudes comes to the fore again. In this study, it has earlier been asserted that the presence of attitudes conducive to the acceptance of modernization and change facilitates growth and progress. The relevance of modernizing institutions is not negated, and this study counts the Land Reform program as a form of modernizing institution that would free the peasant from his traditional bondage with the landlord. It was in itself a force of change that was expected to bring about alterations in the prevailing social system in the Central Luzon region, notably the Gapan area.

This paper sees both modernizing institutions and attitudes as necessary elements in the modernization process.
While scholars have argued that certain conditions are necessary elements in the development of attitudes, this paper concludes that attitudes and development are, at best, viewed as functioning side by side, each influencing the other. McClelland, who stresses motivation as primary, also asserts that some agency could alter fundamental motives.¹ In Gapan, the government provided this through the institution of Land Reform, and generated the corresponding attitudes, which, ironically, included a declining reliance on the government in the succeeding years. In this case of Land Reform, its formulation and implementation (as declared in 1964) were not enough to sustain peasant attitudes to its favor. Logistical problems of the program have yet to be settled before it could succeed as an agent of change. For while favorable attitudes toward it were registered in 1964, it has yet to see better days, depending in more ways than one on the national leaders who have vowed to implement the law.

In this transitional setting, the uneven pattern of peasant responses on aspects of modernization is well within the conception of the transitional stage where the traditional values are still intermingling with modernity. It could be asserted, however, that the peasants, in exhibiting the dual character of pessimism and rationality, exhibit the trait that makes up the mental set and attitudes of the developing

¹ See McClelland, op. cit.
man on the road to modernity, but at the same time, still moving away from his traditional orientations. Placed against the themes drawn up by Inkeles,¹ we could very well say that the Gapan peasant is undergoing a process of change that is veering towards modernity. This paper would assert that in the development of man, it is not always necessary to completely alter and change one's traditional orientations, but rather an integration of the traditional and the modern may be necessary to avoid immediate breakdown of institutions and traditional values.

Peasant attitudes, in a number of ways, give an indication of government efficiency and a measure of government concern for the rural populace. While the government may have received negativistic impressions on the part of the populace, the peasant attitudes and perceptions of their performance may prod the leaders to do better in the implementation of goals and policies that have to do with the development and modernization process of the country. The leaders also have their roles in development and in relation to the question of which comes first, the modernizing institution or the attitudes, the task of assigning priorities and incentives for the people depends on the leaders. The major determinant of the success of the modernization program, however,

¹ Alex Inkeles, op. cit.
still depends on the peasants since their attitudes and perceptions set the limits on the possible success or failure of the development programs introduced.
LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED

A. Books


B. Articles and Periodicals


C. Unpublished Materials


### TABLE 1

**CHANCE OF OWNING LAND**

Question: "In the next 10 - 15 years, what do you think the opportunity for people will be regarding ownership of land?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Most people will own land?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. More people will own land?</td>
<td>46.2(18)</td>
<td>28.2(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Same as now?</td>
<td>33.3(13)</td>
<td>33.3(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Some will lose land they have?</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td>28.2(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Most people lose land they have?</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2

**IMPORTANCE OF COMPADRE**

Question: "How valuable in modern life do you find your relationships with your relatives (outside of your own immediate family) and your compadre?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very valuable?</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
<td>35.9(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Helpful and natural?</td>
<td>30.8(12)</td>
<td>48.7(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neither good nor bad?</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quite a bit of trouble?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Too much trouble?</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3

**BELIEF IN OMENS**

**Question:** "Do you believe that there are omens which can foretell whether a person can have good or bad luck in his activities?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Always foretell?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sometimes foretell?</td>
<td>66.7(26)</td>
<td>25.6(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Seldom Foretell?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Never foretell?</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4

**VALUE OF BARRIO GOVERNMENT**

**Question:** "How meaningful has your barrio government been to your life in recent years - 2-3 years?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Essential?</td>
<td>25.6(10)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Helpful?</td>
<td>59.0(23)</td>
<td>53.8(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Neutral?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>23.1(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More harm than good?</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Oppressive?</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 5

**NEED FOR BARRIO GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE MORE PROJECTS**

**Question:** "Do you believe that the barrio government should undertake more or fewer projects?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Many more?</td>
<td>76.9(30)</td>
<td>61.5(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Somewhat more?</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
<td>30.8(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. About the same?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fewer?</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 6

**PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

**Question:** "Do you think that the government is doing the necessary things to solve the country's problems?" (this question applies to the government over the last 10 years considering both recent Liberal and Nacionalista Administrations together).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Almost all of them?</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Many of them?</td>
<td>25.6(10)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Some of them?</td>
<td>33.3(13)</td>
<td>25.6(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Few of them?</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
<td>43.6(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Almost none of them?</td>
<td>10.3(4)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7

FORM OF GOVERNMENT HELP IN 1964

Question: "Would you like or not to see an important industry, such as an automobile industry, establish a plant in this community which would employ a thousand men?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The very best thing that could happen to Gapan?</td>
<td>23.1 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A highly favorable thing for Gapan?</td>
<td>23.1 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A good thing for Gapan?</td>
<td>43.6 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A good thing but one which would create problems for Gapan?</td>
<td>7.7 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. An unfavorable development which would create serious problems for Gapan?</td>
<td>2.6 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8

FORM OF GOVERNMENT HELP IN 1968

Question: "What form of government help would you like to enable you to acquire the things you aspire and hope for?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Loan/credit?</td>
<td>43.6 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Infrastructure/jobs?</td>
<td>17.9 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Moral boost</td>
<td>2.6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Others?</td>
<td>28.2 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nothing?</td>
<td>2.6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Inapplicable</td>
<td>5.1 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 9
**Activity Level of Government**

Question: "In general, do you believe the government should be more or less active in Japan than it has been?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Much more active?</td>
<td>79.5(31)</td>
<td>53.8(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Somewhat more active?</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
<td>28.2(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. About the same?</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Somewhat less active?</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Much less active?</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 10
**Value of Political Party**

Question: "Do you believe that political parties help Japan or not?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Help it greatly?</td>
<td>41.0(16)</td>
<td>20.5(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Help it somewhat?</td>
<td>46.2(18)</td>
<td>56.4(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Not have much effect?</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Harm it somewhat?</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
<td>5.1(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Harm it very much?</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
<td>0.0(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 11

PARTICIPATION IN BARRIO GOVERNMENT

Question: "Besides voting, is it your opinion that you should actually take part yourself in the decision-making process of the barrio government or that you need not do so?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Often serve on committees, take part in debates or participate in community project?</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1. Serve in committees, projects?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.9(7)</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Occasionally do these things?</td>
<td>15.4(6)</td>
<td>2.6(1)</td>
<td>2. Help in work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attend meetings only?</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
<td>30.8(12)</td>
<td>3. Drop by meetings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Seldom attend meetings?</td>
<td>20.5(8)</td>
<td>12.8(5)</td>
<td>4. Rarely participates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Not participate</td>
<td>7.7(3)</td>
<td>38.5(15)</td>
<td>5. Never?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PEASANT ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS ON ASPECTS OF MODERNIZATION: A PHILIPPINE PANEL STUDY

by

Vivienne S.M. Angeles

B.A., University of the Philippines, 1964

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1971
This study is mainly an examination, through survey research, of the perceptions and attitudes toward aspects of modernization and the prospects for acceptance of innovation and change in a Philippine municipality. With Gapan, a town in Nueva Ecija, in the Central Luzon region of the Philippines as the setting, this study traced whether there had been considerable changes in the attitudes and perceptions of the peasants after the introduction of governmental policies that had to do with the agricultural development of the area.

In studying the attitudes and perceptions of the peasants, this paper contends that there are multiple relationships between the level of technology which people can maintain and the manner by which they perceive themselves and how they relate to one another. As modernization and other changes take place, people also change and while at times it appear that change in people is a prerequisite for technological change, at other times, it appears to be a product of modified technology.

To determine whether there were changes in the attitudes and perceptions of the peasants, the results of two surveys conducted in the same locality with the same sample were analyzed and compared. The first survey was conducted in 1964 by Professor Louis Douglas and the other was conducted in 1968 by Fred Clemente as part of a larger study where the
author participated. The number of respondents was limited to only those who were interviewed twice to determine individual changes in attitudes and perceptions.

This study found out that after four years, there were significant changes in the attitudes of the people. These changes were related to the implementation of a Land Reform Program in this heavily-tenanted rice producing area. The peasants indicated a growing pessimism on their future living conditions; a decline in their perception of traditional family ties as valuable to their lives; a growing perception of ability and individual capacity as determinants of a person's future; a decline in the perception of omens and luck and a corresponding increase in reliance on science-based knowledge and expertise. On their perception of the role and relevance of the government to their daily lives, the peasants indicated a decline in their perception of the government as highly essential, but at the same time expressed a desire for the government to be more active and responsive to the problems and needs of the people.

These changing perceptions of the peasants indicated that they are veering towards modernity, but the varying patterns of responses show that the Gapan peasant is still in a process of transition wherein part of his traditional values intermingle with values associated with modernity. The chang-
ing attitudes and perceptions also show the effects of the Land Reform program on the people.