

UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE:  
THE PROPOSALS OF SENATOR MANSFIELD

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## INTRODUCTION

For nearly a quarter of a century the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has symbolized Western resolve to deter aggression in Europe. Throughout this period the United States, in addition to providing a massive strategic nuclear deterrent, has contributed sizable conventional and tactical nuclear forces to the Alliance. The American commitment has been costly in terms of personnel as well as in terms of dollars. Inflation and the weakened position of the dollar abroad are making the U.S. force commitment more expensive each year.

Since the late 1950's Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana), the Senate majority leader, has been at the forefront of attempts to cause a reduction of U.S. force levels in Europe and a corresponding increase in defense outlays by the European members of NATO. Although Senator Mansfield's proposals have been put forward, in one form or another, for about fifteen years, it has been during the last five years that these proposals have gained substantial support in the Congress. During this same time period there has been a marshalling of support by those opposed to unilateral U.S. reductions in Europe. Although opposition to Senator Mansfield's ideas has been widespread, the principal organized opposition has come from the Nixon Administration.

This report will be limited to an examination of the arguments of Senator Mansfield and the counter arguments of

the Nixon Administration. Although there will be some reference to Senator Mansfield's early opposition to U.S. force levels in Europe the bulk of the report will be devoted to the period 1969-1973. It was during this time that the majority leader switched tactics in his efforts to gain force reductions in Europe. That is, he abandoned the idea that a "Senate resolution" would affect the Administration's policies in Europe and attempted, via legislation, to force the unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.

Budgetary constraints, balance of payments deficits, the idea that the United States provides too many military resources and that the European NATO members provide too little, are all factors which contribute to the current efforts to force a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. While the reduction idea claims supporters from many corners of the country it is probably most visible in the United States Senate.

Senator Mansfield's arguments have been rearranged by priority from time to time but they continue to be the same arguments he has espoused since the late 1950's. He is opposed to the high cost of maintaining large forces in Europe, he objects to what he considers a shirking of duty on the part of the European allies and he is opposed in principle to the idea of large American military forces stationed on foreign soil.

In addition to opposition from the Nixon Administration, Senator Mansfield is continually confronted with a myriad of lesser politicians, and political and military analysts

who purport to expose the folly of Senator Mansfield's views. For every Mansfield argument in favor of reduction there is proposed a counter argument in favor of maintaining the status quo or in some cases, increasing the U.S. forces assigned to NATO.

Chapter I of this report presents an overview of the U.S. contribution to NATO. Chapter II examines the arguments made by Senator Mansfield for unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. Chapter III compares these proposals with the counter arguments of the Nixon Administration. Chapter IV is an analysis of the Mansfield arguments and draws conclusions concerning the applicability of the majority leader's recommendations.

## CHAPTER I

### THE SETTING

Any discussion of a unilateral reduction of U.S. troops in Europe must necessarily be prefaced by an overview of the raison d'être of the American contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance.

The history of the Soviet Union's domination of the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Red Army backed 1948 coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, is well known and will not be discussed here. Suffice to say the countries of Western Europe feared further Soviet hegemony and sought collective security, in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an alternative to further Soviet incursions. On April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington.<sup>1</sup> The original signatories included the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty in February, 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in May 1955.<sup>2</sup> Although the Soviet Union had opposed NATO from the very beginning, the accession of the FRG seemed to be the principal catalyst in the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The Warsaw Pact was concluded on May 14, 1955, just nine days after the FRG became an active member of NATO. The signatories of the Pact included the Soviet Union, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Albania and Bulgaria.

The general international environment after World War II was greatly affected by the bipolar security equation. The Soviet Union attempted to extend her influence by supporting a communist insurgency in Greece and was answered by the Truman Doctrine.<sup>3</sup> The United States offered economic aid to Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan and the Soviet Union formed the COMINFORM. The Western powers created NATO and the Soviet Union countered with WTO. By 1954 the "cold war" was well along and the U.S. troop commitment to NATO totaled 404,000 military personnel. Additionally, there were 10,000 U.S. civilian employees and some 182,000 dependents in Europe.<sup>4</sup> Between 1956 and 1960 the U.S. military force was reduced to 379,000, but the number of U.S. civilian employees increased slightly and the number of dependents nearly doubled to 335,000. U.S. forces were reinforced after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and reached a postwar high of 416,000. However, by 1972 the troops numbered 313,000, a reduction of some 25% compared to 1962 while dependents were reduced by 32% during the same period. There were two reasons for the reduction. First was the easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Secondly, reductions were a result of attempts by the Department of Defense to reduce military spending in general and the military contributions to the balance of payments deficit in particular. Significant reductions resulted from the implementation of the concept of "dual basing." Two-thirds of one infantry division, four tactical fighter squadrons and a number of support units were relocated to

the United States with a mission of being prepared for rapid redeployment to Europe.

TABLE 1

U.S. Department of Defense Personnel in U.S. European Command Geographical Area (in thousands)<sup>5</sup>

Year	U.S. Military	Civilian Employees		
		U.S.	Foreign	Dependents
1954	404	10	169	182
1956	398	12	149	281
1958	380	11	129	269
1960	379	12	123	335
1962	416	12	124	352
1964	374	12	99	310
1966	366	14	92	264
1968	316	14	82	245
1970	309	14	NA	234
1972	313	14	NA	235

Throughout the 1954-1972 period Soviet and WTO military capabilities improved both quantitatively and qualitatively. After 1964 the United States, especially the U.S. military, became immersed both physically and doctrinally in the Vietnam War. This effort had a telling effect on the efficiency and readiness of U.S. forces in Europe. Conversely, the Soviet Union was able to improve the combat readiness of her forces while committed to a policy of

peaceful coexistence with the United States on the political front. By about 1968 the Soviet Union had achieved rough nuclear parity in both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, when compared on a NATO versus WTO basis, many analysts considered the conventional forces to be roughly in balance. Alain C. Enthovan and K. Wayne Smith, in their book How Much Is Enough?, points out:

In summary, based on years of study, we believe that NATO's conventional forces are not smaller than those of the Pact and, therefore, that a strong conventional capability is feasible. This is not to say that NATO could defeat the Soviets... the balance is close -- so close that even moderate changes can have a significant effect on the balance of power.<sup>6</sup>

#### Soviet Union's Objectives in Europe

An assessment of the objectives of the Soviet Union vis a vis the NATO Alliance is complicated because of the inherent difficulties associated with synthesizing intent and capability. Analysis of Soviet political and diplomatic policies in the present era of detente might lead to a premature conclusion that the Soviet Union has no intention of seeking hegemony in Western Europe. On the other hand an evaluation of military capabilities, including trends in force structure, weapons modernization, training and readiness exercises might produce conclusions to the contrary. The principal danger, when considering the advisability of continued unilateral troop reduction in Europe, is to be over influenced by analysts who deal in the area of intent and tend to disregard capability. Likewise a preoccupation



with capability can lead to conclusions which would preclude any alternative other than a continued arms race. Those who deal totally in terms of military capability often fail to recognize that most weapons can be used for defensive as well as offensive purposes.

Quite obviously military commanders tend to think of the Soviet threat in terms of capability. For example, General David A. Burchinal, former Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1970, said:

I am not sure that I would say their (the Soviet Union) firm objective is to make it [Western Europe] a part of the Russian empire. I would certainly, however, say that it is at least their objective to be able to reach a position where they could influence Western Europe and spread Soviet influence further west than they have been able to do thus far.<sup>7</sup>

Even allowing for biases predicated on General Burchinal's assigned mission and his interest in maintaining troop levels in Europe, it seems clear that the evaluation is based on military capabilities, since in 1970 the Soviet Union was taking part in Strategic Arms Limitations talks (SALT) and gave the outward appearance of seeking more openings to the west.

In assessing the military forces opposing NATO in terms of military capability it is important to keep in mind the pitfalls of pure quantitative comparison, that is, attempting

comparison in terms of opposing divisions or number of tactical aircraft. For example, a U.S. mechanized infantry division, at full strength, will consist of about 16,000 men while a Soviet division of the same type will have only 10,000 men assigned.<sup>8</sup> Likewise tactical aircraft may have marked advantage, one over the other, in terms of pay load, range, and maneuverability.

Since the vast majority of U.S. troops which would be affected by Senator Mansfield's reduction proposals are located in northern and central Europe, capability comparisons will be limited to those areas. For NATO this includes forces located in West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Denmark and Norway. For the WTO it includes the command for which the Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Soviet units normally stationed in western USSR have been included.

TABLE 2

NATO/WTO Balance 1972/1973  
North and Central Europe (includes France)<sup>9</sup>

Category	NATO	WTO Total	USSR Only
Ground Forces in Divisions	26	67	41
Manpower (000's)	700	1000	650
Tactical Aircraft	2060	4700	2700
Tanks	6000	16000	10000

While there is a great disparity in divisions, the manpower figures bring the comparison into clearer perspective. The greatest disparity is obviously in tanks and tactical aircraft. NATO's weakness in tanks is offset, to a certain extent, by the fact that NATO has approximately 50% more anti-tank weapons, an airborne anti-tank capability, and NATO tanks are, in general, more effective at longer ranges than those of the WTO. Similarly NATO aircraft in general are superior in range and payload; NATO also has a greater worldwide inventory of tactical aircraft that could be committed quickly in the event of conflict.<sup>10</sup>

Another important factor in the evaluation of the WTO threat is the reliability of the Soviet Union's allies. The Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 and Rumanian attitudes in recent years cast a shadow of doubt over the degree of loyalty they might show the Soviet Union in an aggressive war on Western Europe. Of course, the reliability of some members of NATO cannot be guaranteed in every conceivable situation. This factor is not unique to either WTO or NATO, it is a general problem facing alliance organizations.

Those who would measure the Soviet Union's intentions in terms of foreign policy statements and current conciliatory actions are, in the main, favorably disposed toward unilateral reductions of U.S. force levels in Europe. Senator J. William Fulbright, a long time proponent of troop reductions, exemplifies this point of view:

The agreement reached at Moscow in May 1972 limiting ABM sites and the deployment of offensive weapons was more important as an act of mutual coexistence than for the actual arms limitations

it imposed...it [each side] also commits itself to peace and to the survival of the other's power and ideology.<sup>11</sup>

While purporting to assess all dimensions of the Soviet Union's intentions, those who perceive the Russians as becoming more conciliatory must, by necessity, attach less significance to the history of improvement in Soviet and WTO tactical and strategic resources.

Planning against a potential WTO attack presents problems to NATO staffs because of the many forms the "attack" could take. Most analysts agree that WTO power could be applied against NATO in at least five ways: (1) A massive attack into the center of Germany through the Fulda and Hof gaps; (2) A limited probe into NATO territory such as in Berlin or the Finmark area of Norway; (3) Hostilities initiated as a result of a revolt or insurgency in East Germany or other Eastern European countries; (4) An accidental initiation of hostilities such as might be caused by a chain of events emanating from a West German aircraft straying across the East German border; (5) A political incursion into a West European Government, e.g., a communist election victory in France or Italy.<sup>12</sup> While each of the eventualities described above seems remote, all are contingencies among which NATO's limited resources must be allocated.

#### NATO Resources and Strategy

Of all the arguments leveled at the size of the American commitment to NATO none seems more valid than the premise that European members of NATO do not contribute as much to the Alliance as they could. Most of the critics of the size

of the American contribution, Senator Mansfield included, point to the disparity between the proportional share contributed by the U.S., and those made available by the Eurogroup\* members. There are many arguments against using percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) spent on defense as a measure of commitment to NATO, but that figure along with other selected statistics provide, to a degree, an indication of commitment.

TABLE 3  
NATO Nations-Defense Expenditures  
and National Economies:1972<sup>13</sup>

Country	GNP (\$U.S. Billions)	Defense Expendi- ture (\$ U.S. millions)	Defense Expendi- ture per capita	Defense Expendi- ture as a % of GNP
USA	\$1,073	\$78,743	\$378	7.3%
Belgium	26.0	594	61	2.3
Canada	45.6	1,688	77	1.8
Denmark	17.3	410	82	2.4
France	170.0	5,202	101	3.1
Great Britain	130.6	6,108	109	4.7
Germany**	210.0	5,961	100	2.8
Greece	10.2	338	37	3.3
Italy	103.6	2,651	59	2.6
Luxembourg	1.0	9	26	0.9
Netherlands	39.9	1,161	87	2.9
Norway	13.1	411	105	3.1
Portugal	6.3	398	41	6.3
Turkey	13.4	446	12	3.3

\*\* Excludes financial assistance to West Berlin.

\* The Eurogroup consists of Belgium, Denmark, FRG, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and Great Britain.

Two factors tend to soften the contrast between U.S. military spending and that of the other NATO nations. The figures above include U.S. spending for Vietnam which was running about \$20 billion at the time. Secondly, the U.S. role as a global superpower and the attendant defense expenditures tend to put things somewhat out of focus when compared with the NATO countries who are, in general, small or medium powers and who, with the exception of Portugal and Great Britain, have no security interests outside of NATO.

Although Table 2 seems to indicate an imbalance of forces heavily in favor of the WTO, a look at NATO and the WTO in terms of an overall capability to wage war, that is, in terms of total military and economic potential, evolves a somewhat different picture.

TABLE 4

NATO-WTO Military and Economic Potential: 1970<sup>14</sup>

	NATO (Incl. France)	WTO
Population (millions)	529.3	341.9
GNP (billions)	\$1,714.2	596.0
Defense Expenditures (billions)	\$97.4	64.0
Men-Military Age (millions)	100.8	67.4
Ground Forces (millions)	3.71	2.83
Armed Forces (millions)	6.08	4.8
Military aircraft (thousands)	12.0	8.0

Clearly all the forces and aircraft belonging to the NATO member countries, would not be available immediately to

NATO military commanders, especially in the event of surprise attack. The inference to be drawn from Table 4 is that NATO's long haul ability to wage conventional war is actually stronger than that of the WTO.

NATO's strategy has evolved from an early dependence on U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear superiority in the 1950's and early 1960's to one of "flexible response". Flexible response is a strategy which provides for controlled escalation from conventional war to nuclear war in the event of aggression against any member of the Alliance. This excerpt from the final communique of the 1970 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council emphasizes the strategy of flexible response and the need for adequate conventional forces to implement such a strategy.

Ministers confirmed the continued validity of the NATO strategy of flexibility in response, which includes forward defence, reinforcement of the flanks and capabilities for rapid mobilisation, and calls for the maintenance of military capabilities which are able to provide an appropriate counter to any aggression.<sup>15</sup>

An initial appraisal of NATO and the WTO from a purely quantitative point of view, especially when focusing on the northern and central regions, tends to give the impression that the NATO forces are hopelessly outnumbered. The tendency for military planners to consider the "worst case" situation adds to this illusion. By applying some qualitative factors it can be shown that NATO forces, as they exist today, are likely to give a good account of themselves in a con-

ventional war environment. NATO aircraft, while fewer in number (on station in Europe), have the range capability for deep strikes. WTO tactical aircraft are designed for an interceptor role and do not have the loiter time nor the payload capacity of the NATO aircraft.<sup>16</sup> The WTO numerical advantage in tanks is offset by the NATO superiority in anti-tank weapons and more effective tank guns. On the other hand NATO is severely handicapped tactically by the withdrawal of France from the NATO military structure and the forced displacement of logistics installations from French soil to other NATO countries. Most analysts agree that France would stand by NATO in the event of attack but current battlefield deployment is made difficult by the orientation of logistical lines of communication which run through northern German ports and the low countries. These supply lines run parallel, instead of perpendicular, to the front and thus are extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. The loss of French territory severely restricts maneuverability and in time of war would make the NATO tactical area nearly untenable due to its lack of depth.

Tactical nuclear weapons have been and continue to be an integral part of NATO's strategy for defense. The moral question of their employment in densely populated Western Europe has been debated time and again and can never be answered until the appropriate conditions present NATO council members an opportunity to make such a decision. There are many who doubt that they would ever be employed even in the face of certain defeat by conventional means. Conversely,



others see the early employment of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of bringing hostilities to an end and both sides to negotiations. Currently NATO has about 7,000 nuclear warheads which can be delivered by aircraft or short range missiles and artillery pieces. While the delivery means are in the hands of U.S. and allied troops, the warheads are under U.S. custodial care and the double key system of control, i.e., they cannot be employed unless both parties are in agreement. The Soviet Union has about 3,500 warheads which also are deliverable by a variety of means. The Soviet weapons, in the main, have a greater yield than the U.S. weapons, underscoring the historical Russian preference for overwhelming tactical fire support.<sup>17</sup>

#### U.S. Forces Assigned to NATO

The U.S. forces assigned to NATO consist of about 313,000 military men. This includes personnel assigned to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean under U.S. control in peacetime but earmarked for NATO in the event of hostilities. The U.S. Army force, amounting to about 190,000 men is concentrated primarily in central and southern Germany and is organized into two Corps with a total of 4 1/3 combat divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, air defense forces and various combat support and combat service support troops. Air forces in Europe total about 50,000 men assigned to 21 fighter squadrons, five tactical reconnaissance squadrons and miscellaneous support units. Additionally the United States maintains 2/3 of a division plus supporting units and four tactical fighter squadrons

which rotate to Europe on an annual basis to test reinforcement capabilities.

The annual cost of U.S. forces assigned to support NATO is difficult to pin down. Obviously many of the forces assigned to NATO and equipment developed for NATO have world wide employment potential. For fiscal year 1974 the Department of Defense generally concedes a figure of about \$17 billion for the total cost (less strategic forces) of all U.S. forces assigned or earmarked for NATO. The direct cost of forces stationed in Europe, for fiscal year 1974 is estimated to be about \$4 billion.<sup>18</sup>

TABLE 5

Cost of U.S. Force Contribution to NATO (\$ billions)<sup>19</sup>

Fiscal Year	Total	Direct
1968	12	2.7
1970	14	2.9
1972	16	3.7
1974	17	4.0

Table 5 points up the continual increase in costs associated with the stationing of a large American force in Europe. The impressive increase in total costs may be attributed to several factors. The cost of military pay has risen dramatically in the past few years, likewise inflation has driven up costs of equipment and services. The

most recent rise in direct costs of the force in Europe, in addition to the above influences, is due, in the main, to the devaluation of the dollar.

The U.S. Contribution to NATO Compared to  
the European Contribution

A persistent argument in favor of U.S. force reduction in Europe holds that the European nations do not do enough on their own behalf. There have been backhanded implications by the Nixon Administration that the Europeans are not putting forth the effort in defense that they are capable of. Deputy Secretary of State Rush, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in July of 1973 spoke of efforts to improve NATO's defense posture and "developing a multilateral mechanism for more equitable burden sharing and helping with our balance of payments problems."<sup>20</sup> A cursory inspection of Table 3 reveals that U.S. defense expenditures for 1972 dwarfed those made by the Europeans for their own defense. There is no question that the U.S. spends much more for defense than the European NATO countries. The question is, are the Europeans doing their share?

Roland Paul, former counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, argues that the U.S. contribution to NATO is not out of line with the benefits derived from that commitment, nor is it as top heavy vis a vis the Eurogroup countries as it might appear. Paul's thesis holds that the U.S. position as a world power requires financial and military outlays in excess of those which could be expected of regional powers such as the

Western European countries or Canada. From this position, argues Paul, the U.S. derives certain benefits such as having a finger on the nuclear trigger. The U.S. has worldwide defense interests whereas the Europeans are generally concerned with only one frontier. Paul claims that in 1972 the U.S. actually spent about \$26 billion of its budget on the defense of Europe. The \$26 billion consisted of \$16 billion for the general cost of the U.S. contribution to NATO (see Table 5) plus \$10 billion for the cost of strategic forces which could be considered as earmarked for NATO. (Paul estimates that about one-half of the \$20 billion strategic force budget went for the defense of Europe.) He argues that the \$26 billion figure was, in 1972, about 2.6% of the trillion dollar Gross National Product. This percentage was actually lower than the amount expended by most of the European nations.<sup>21</sup> Even if one were to accept Paul's calculations, one could argue that the U.S. is still doing far too much for what amounts to the defense of someone else's homeland. Many government officials in Europe would take issue with the idea that the U.S. is defending "someone else's" country. They would put forth the argument that U.S. interests are so entwined with the fortunes of Western Europe that the defense of the United States homeland actually begins in Europe. Helmut Schmidt, former West German Minister of Defense, made this point in 1970 in an article in the Washington Post:

...There is frequently fundamental misunderstanding of what the American commitment is all about...Basically, it is a contribution to America's own security; the front line of defense against the rival super-power, the fulcrum of the global balance, and the chief stake in the

competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup>

### Effectiveness of Current Strategy and Weapons Systems

Steven L. Canby, a RAND Corporation social scientist, has argued that NATO strategy is obsolete. Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity along with rough tactical nuclear and conventional parity has caused the NATO strategy of flexible response to become outdated.<sup>23</sup> NATO is structured along a U.S. model which envisions a World War II type conflict fought in a protracted manner with the industrial and population resources of NATO countries ultimately providing the margin of victory over the WTO forces. A good example of the logic of Canby's thinking is provided by a direct comparison of Soviet and American division "slices" in Europe. A division slice is defined as the division itself plus its share of nondivisional support personnel. An American division slice in Europe totals about 42,000 personnel while a similar Soviet division slice consists of about 18,500 personnel.<sup>24</sup> Even adjusting for the smaller size of the Soviet division there is a marked contrast in the "teeth to tail" (combat forces to support forces) ratio of the two units. Canby argues that the Soviet Union, by buying more combat units and applying a "short" war concept to their strategy, have gained a significant advantage over their NATO adversaries.<sup>25</sup>

The stated military objectives of NATO, defense and deterrence, rest on the Alliance's capabilities in three areas: strategic nuclear forces, tactical nuclear forces, and conventional forces. In recent years the basic WTO

"trump card" of strategic nuclear superiority has become inoperative. Owing to the financial requirements and the "anti arms race climate", this particular edge will probably not be regained in the near future. This being the case, it becomes imperative for NATO to search for a strategy based on an advantage to be gained from improvements in one of the two remaining area. A number of suggestions have been made regarding the tactical nuclear force in Western Europe.

Dennis Gormley, an intelligence specialist with the U.S. Government, suggests that the tactical nuclear force, both in warhead size and in total number of warheads, is too large to be truly described as "tactical". In fact, the location on European soil of 7,000 warheads with an average yield of 20 kilotons each, must be interpreted by the Soviet government as an offensive threat and as such could be the target of a preemptive strike in the event of hostilities.<sup>26</sup> The current NATO strategy dictates a flexible response beginning with conventional forces and failing that, holding the enemy with tactical nuclear weapons while a NATO buildup provides the men and material to defeat the enemy or bring him to the negotiating table. The inherent complication of employing tactical nuclear weapons that are too big, is the possibility of a rapid escalation to the strategic level. Needless to say, the same problem exists for the Soviet Union, her tactical nuclear weapons being even larger than those of NATO. Many of the nuclear weapons are programmed for delivery by tactical aircraft. The current NATO tactical aircraft inventory is resplendent with fighter-bombers which have a deep strike

capability.<sup>27</sup> Conversely, the WTO aircraft are designed primarily as interceptors and do not have the long range interdiction capability associated with the NATO aircraft. Both Canby and Gormley disapprove of this type aircraft in the inventory; the former because of the excessive cost and the latter because of the "offensive" nature of the weapons systems as an important part of a "defensive" alliance.<sup>28</sup>

### Role of U.S. Forces in Europe

One of the basic issues concerning U.S. forces in Europe is the question of their actual role in NATO. Are U.S. forces primarily a measure of the reliability of the total American commitment to the Alliance or are they an integral and important part of NATO's fighting force? While no one would argue that U.S. forces in Europe are not capable of conducting combat operations, it has been argued that their primary mission is to "show the flag", that is, to demonstrate American resolve in Europe.

If they are primarily a demonstration of American commitment then a substantial reduction could be accomplished. On the other hand, if they are an indispensable part of the NATO fighting force as well as a symbol of American resolve, a substantial cut would seriously affect NATO's combat potential unless the European allies increase their contribution to NATO.

The best summation of the role of U.S. forces as an integral part of the American commitment to NATO may be that offered by John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner for Germany:

The positioning of a substantial United States force in Europe under NATO was intended as a

convincing step to allay European fears and inspire confidence in the United States resolve. Indeed, in many respects these decisions...were probably more telling than the Treaty itself. The troop provisions were certainly in the nature of a linch-pin between the Treaty and real security...as has since become clear, the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons may lead to a kind of muscle bound impotence unless supported by a range of effective conventional military power...The United States presence has underscored our commitment, has shown the Soviets that any aggressive maneuvers in Western Europe will involve United State's forces, and has helped to guard against the possibility that probes and harassments will get out of hand and thus risk general war.<sup>29</sup>



## CHAPTER II

## SENATOR MANSFIELD'S ARGUMENTS -- IN FAVOR

Of all the voices raised in opposition to continued maintenance of current U.S. force levels in Europe, none has been more consistent nor more insistent than that of Senator Mike Mansfield. Senator Mansfield's cajoling, requesting and demanding began in the 1950's and has continued unabated to this day.

In 1967, Senator Mansfield, along with a number of co-sponsors, introduced Senate Resolution 49 which called for "substantial" reductions of U.S. forces in Europe.<sup>30</sup> The resolution was based on Mansfield's conviction that although the United States had maintained troops, air forces, and naval strength in and around Europe for twenty years, times had indeed changed. He argued that the European members of NATO were, on one hand, able to do more both economically and militarily on their own behalf and, on the other hand, that they were not putting forth the necessary effort in this regard.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the spirit of detente, not only between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the Western European countries and the Soviet Union, deemed it no longer essential to keep large numbers of American troops in Europe.

In May 1971, Senator Mansfield proposed an amendment to the Selective Service Bill, then before the Senate, that placed a ceiling of 150,000 on U.S. military forces in Europe.<sup>32</sup>

In September 1973, Senator Mansfield again proposed an amendment, this time to the Military Procurement Bill, which would require a 40% reduction of all U.S. troops stationed abroad.<sup>33</sup>

The resolution of 1967 never came to a vote, the amendment of 1971 was voted down 61-30, and the amendment of 1973 was initially approved by the Senate 49-46 and then narrowly defeated 51-44 on a second vote.

There are two noteworthy shifts in Senator Mansfield's proposals: First, there is his switch from "resolution" to "amendment", the latter having the force of law while the former merely expresses the "sense of the Senate." Secondly, there is evidence of growing support in the Senate for reducing U.S. troops abroad.

While Senator Mansfield has shifted tactics, he has never changed his ideas. His basic arguments have remained constant over the years. The majority leader believes that NATO serves an essential purpose, and that it has acted and will continue to act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe. He also believes that while the United States has definite interests in Europe, and would be willing to go to war in defense of those interests, the basic responsibility for defense in Europe lies with the Eurogroup members of NATO.

Senator Mansfield's personal belief in the viability of NATO is a matter of record. On numerous occasions he has stated his firm support for the concept of NATO strategy. Speaking in the Senate in support of his 1967 resolution for a substantial reduction of troops in Europe he said:

A substantial reduction...would leave an impressive U.S. military presence on the European continent. The U.S. treaty commitment...would remain intact...there would be no abandonment of international responsibilities and no invitation to provocation ...What nation would be so foolhardy as to conclude that the United States, which has fielded several hundred thousand men in Vietnam, on the fringes of its vital international interests, would abandon the North Atlantic region which is a cornerstone of those interests? If there is a war again in Europe or over it -- make no mistake -- the United States will be party to it...If NATO is to survive, and I believe that we should make every effort to see that it does survive, the Organization must be adapted to reflect the changing attitudes and pre-occupations of all of its members.<sup>34</sup>

Mansfield has continually supported the position that a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe is not a reduction of the solid U.S. commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. This position is exemplified by his statement in 1967:

...even if a reduction of U.S. forces does take place, we are still committed as solidly as ever to the North Atlantic Treaty and the commitments which we made when NATO was created. That treaty signed two decades ago still holds as solidly today as it did then.<sup>35</sup>

In September 1973, Sen. Mansfield reaffirmed his basic support of NATO as a viable treaty, and reiterated the necessity for U.S. commitment to its international obligations while questioning the cost involved:

It has been my premise that the United States should not trim its sails on its international obligations, that it should bear any price tag to fulfill not only its international obligations but to defend itself against any real threats.<sup>36</sup>

## The Financial Burden

Senator Mansfield's contention that Western European NATO members do not do enough for their own defense, that they are not shouldering their share of the financial burden for Atlantic defense, is even more important today than in the 1960's.

In a Senate speech on January 19, 1967, he was openly critical of the fact that of all the NATO nations only the United States had truly met its commitments for the common defense:

No member of NATO spends as much of its gross national product on defense as does the United States. No member has as great a percentage of its available manpower in uniform as does the United States.<sup>37</sup>

After a 1971 trip to Europe which included high level discussions with many Western European leaders, Senator Mansfield expressed great concern over European contributions to NATO. In a report to the Senate made on September 14, 1971, he summarized his impressions of the financial contribution issue:

There is no indication however, that any NATO nation is ready to make a substantial increase in its support of NATO. On the contrary, it is not farfetched to anticipate further reductions in the present European effort under the organization.<sup>38</sup>

Senator Mansfield's argument increased in intensity in recent years because of inflation, the declining strength of the dollar abroad and the deteriorating balance of payments:

...the overall costs of our commitment to NATO amounts to something in the neighborhood of \$17 billion, including everything except strategic forces; that the direct annual operating costs for the approximately 300,000 U.S. forces actually located in Europe amounts to approximately \$4 billion, and with equipment, over \$7 billion; that the net balance of payments drain because of the U.S. forces in Europe is approximately \$1.5 billion annually; and that these figures are growing daily because of the U.S. disadvantage because of inflation, successive devaluation of the dollar and other weakenings.<sup>39</sup>

In 1962 West Germany took steps to alleviate some of the balance of payments deficit brought on by the stationing of American troops in West Germany. These efforts resulted in a series of "offset agreements," designed to bring dollars back into the United States by West German arms purchases and other financial transactions. The Nixon Administration has argued that these offset payments have eased the balance of payment deficit connected with the direct costs of stationing U.S. troops in Europe.

Senator Mansfield responded that while the early agreements (in the mid 1960's) were indeed beneficial, the more recent agreements actually contributed to the deficit. During recent years the German need for American arms and military equipment has declined, while greater amounts were needed to offset U.S. foreign spending. The difference has been made up by West German loans to the United States, retention, in the United States, of interest earned by the FRG on U.S. Treasury deposits and purchase of U.S. Treasury securities.<sup>40</sup> All of these items represent postponed payments of dollars to West Germany. When the accumulated

interest is added in, the total represents an aggravated balance of payments deficit. Moreover, each year that troops remain in Europe expenses increase as a result of inflation and devaluation of the dollar. Finally, the offset agreements (generally concluded for two year periods) tend to bind the United States to specific force levels in Europe for the duration of the agreement.<sup>41</sup>

In 1970 Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, lent further credence to the idea that offset payments created a certain air of commitment to specified force levels. Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations he stated:

Well there is no formal commitment which would be legally binding but I think it is understood that there is a moral and political commitment not to violate in effect, our part of the bargain....<sup>42</sup>

TABLE 6

Balance-of-Payments (BOP) Cost of U.S. Forces in NATO  
European Countries and Defense Cash Receipts<sup>43</sup>

Year	Gross BOP Expended	Defense Cash Receipts	Net Deficit
1961	1,529	165	1,364
1962	1,469	778	691
1963	1,524	1262	262
1964	1,447	1003	444
1965	1,372	990	382
1966	1,464	711	753
1967	1,473	1172	301
1968	1,534	419	1,115
1969	1,516	691	825
1970	1,653	785	868
1971	2,100	600	1,500

Although the figures shown in Table 6 are for U.S. forces in all NATO European countries, and likewise defense receipts from all NATO European countries, the bulk of U.S. expenditures are in West Germany and of course, the offset agreement with FRG comprises the bulk of the defense receipts. The sharp drop in net deficit after 1961 reflects the early offset agreements. However, a very substantial increase in net deficit during 1968-1972 indicates a decreasing German requirement for American arms and military equipment. Starting in 1969 the level of net deficit reflects the postponed balance of payments deficit which will ultimately arise upon repayment of loans, with interest, to the FRG and the redemption of U.S. Treasury securities currently held by the West Germans. The actual net deficit is, therefore, considerably higher for recent years.

West European and American Perceptions of the  
Soviet Union's Objectives in Europe

Senator Mansfield's assessment of the Soviet Union's objectives in Western Europe reflects the growing sense of East-West detente. Although he tends to agree with analysts such as Alain C. Enthovan and K. Wayne Smith who point out that a Soviet conventional attack into Central Europe would not result in the immediate collapse of NATO conventional forces, this is not the main thrust of his argument.<sup>44</sup> Mansfield's arguments concerning Kremlin intentions tend to be based more on the Soviet Union's doctrine of peaceful co-existence rather than on military capability. In this regard he has continually pointed to the factors which have reduced

tension such as the SALT agreements of 1972, Ostpolitik, and the increasing volume of East-West trade and cultural exchanges. Thus it seems incongruous to the majority leader that while detente characterizes most East-West relations, military planning and deployment in Europe is based on a degree of tension that existed in the early 1950's.<sup>45</sup> He has repeatedly argued that the Europeans themselves do not consider military confrontation with the WTO as a very likely possibility. This particular theme has been developed with increasing intensity. In his Senate speech of September 14, 1971, reporting on the trip to Western Europe, the majority leader said: "The reluctance of the European nations to take over any part of the heavy U.S. burden in NATO is part and parcel of the present mood of Europe. The mood is one of detente and peace not of confrontation and war".<sup>46</sup> In October 1971, Senator Mansfield reasserted his belief that tensions had eased to the point where U.S. troops should be cut back substantially in Europe. In a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, he stated, "It is difficult to find people in Western Europe who believe such attacks [Soviet conventional attacks] are within the realm of likelihood."<sup>47</sup>

By 1973 events had transpired which reinforced Senator Mansfield's view that detente had further reduced the threat. On September 26, 1973 he introduced, into the Congressional Record, a list of 82 events which had occurred since 1963 and which supported his conclusion that detente was a reality. This list ranged from installation of the Washington-Moscow hotline and the nuclear test ban treaty to the SALT agree-



ments and the Soviet-West German treaty.<sup>48</sup>

The North Atlantic Treaty left the actual size of national force levels to the discretion of the member countries.<sup>49</sup> Consequently NATO member nations have altered the size of their forces assigned to NATO with some degree of regularity. The most conspicuous examples of reduction of forces are those of France in 1966 and Canada in 1970. Although the French remained nominal members of NATO, all French troops were withdrawn from NATO units and likewise all French personnel were withdrawn from NATO combined staffs. In 1970 Canada reduced her forces in Europe by about 5,000. Although the number is small, the significance of this reduction lies in the fact that it involved about 50% of Canadian forces in Europe.<sup>50</sup> Both of these reductions were unilateral and lend credence to Senator Mansfield's arguments that unilateral reductions will not destroy NATO. In fact, argues Mansfield, substantial U.S. reductions could well lead to reductions by the Soviet Union since the size of the Soviet commitment to NATO is due, in part, to natural suspicion of NATO intent.<sup>51</sup>

#### Unilateral Reduction

Substantive Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) talks between NATO and WTO countries opened in Vienna on October 30, 1973. The "full participants" include the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. There are eight nations who have been accorded "special non decision making" status. They include: Hungary, Rumania,

Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Norway, and Denmark.

Before MFR talks were actually scheduled, Senator Mansfield argued that the possibilities of such talks were remote especially in light of the Soviet Union's propensity to keep large forces in Eastern European countries for internal control.

Once talks were scheduled, Senator Mansfield's position remained relatively unchanged. Since it has been generally conceded that MFR could not be made on a "division for division" basis, Senator Mansfield felt that meaningful negotiations could result even if the U.S. reduced its European forces to about 150,000. Nuclear weapons and delivery means were likely to be major bargaining chips with the Soviet Union thus the U.S. troop level is less significant. Senator Mansfield warned against a postponement of significant force reductions:

At the outset we were told by all the experts that MBFR negotiations will be even more complicated and lengthy than the first phase of SALT. Most informed and optimistic speculations are that the outcome of such negotiations after perhaps 2 to 3 years might be a reduction of no more than 10 to 15 percent...I really doubt that the United States can remain immobilized on the troop question for a minimum of 2 and possibly even 4 to 5 years. So the argument to wait for MBFR really is a postponement of significant action indefinitely.<sup>52</sup>

Senator Mansfield has been criticized for his proposals because they would take away the "trump card" the U.S. hopes to employ in bargaining with the Soviet Union and her allies for MFR. Critics argue that any unilateral reduction would minimize the likelihood of compensating reductions on the part of the Soviet Union.

Organization of U.S. Forces Assigned to NATO

One of Senator Mansfield's principal objections to the U.S. forces assigned to NATO is the manner in which the force is organized. He argues that there are too many admirals and generals, too many intermediate headquarters and too many service and logistical units to support an effective fighting force which amounts to only 4 1/3 divisions:

We have headquarters on headquarters on headquarters. We have superfluous headquarters, we have 128 general or flag officers, or one general or one flag officers for every 2,343 men in Europe. Think of it. That is the way they describe the Mexican Army of the last century.<sup>53</sup>

Although the bulk of NATO nations provide 30 days supply for their units and some as few as 10 days, the United States insists on maintaining 90 days supply in accordance with Department of Defense policy. Such a supply level requires additional personnel and installations and contributes to an unfavorable "tooth to tail" ratio.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, Senator Mansfield is critical of the large number of military dependents which accompany U.S. forces in Europe. He holds the view that the U.S. forces are limited in their ability to wage effective war by the large number of American dependents on station in Europe. The location of the dependents, practically on the battle positions assigned to the U.S. forces, would tend to create chaos in a combat situation. The psychological implications of families trapped by war would further restrict American combat capability.

### Senator Mansfield's Position and His Recommendations

Senator Mansfield has never moved for a weakened Atlantic Alliance; on the contrary, he has stated that the United States must and will bear the cost of insuring security in Europe. He has emphasized that his proposals do not, in any way, reflect a return to isolationism but are, in fact, representative of a new internationalism and are in conformity with the Nixon Doctrine. That is, the Mansfield proposals have called for the European partners to do more; to provide a greater share of the conventional resources needed to continue the deterrent which has maintained the peace in Europe since the end of World War II. Times have changed, European economies are strong, European currencies are strong; the dollar is weaker. U.S. balance of payment deficits are getting larger and military resources cost more each year. There is a spirit of detente between East and West, diplomatic and economic indicators point to a relaxation of tensions. The rigid military focus on an aggressive WTO should be refined and brought into tune with the times. While we should never sacrifice our security for monetary or any other reason, a streamlining of the U.S. commitment to NATO is in order. U.S. troops are a measure of U.S. resolve to aid Europe in time of war. As such they can be reduced substantially without reducing the level of U.S. commitment to the Alliance. The majority leader is fond of quoting General Eisenhower since their views are similar on this issue. In a 1963 interview with the Saturday Evening Post the former President said:

I believe the time has now come when we should start withdrawing some of those troops...one American division can 'show the flag' as definitely as can several.<sup>55</sup>

In 1971, Senator Mansfield echoed Eisenhower's sentiments when he said:

The critical factor in maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty in present circumstances is not the size of the U.S. military contingent but the reliability of the total U.S. commitment. In my judgement, two divisions or less of U.S. forces would be as effective in the latter connection as four or more.<sup>56</sup>

In general, Senator Mansfield would recommend: U.S. forces should be substantially reduced; even with a large reduction there would remain an impressive American commitment on the continent. A substantial cut should be made in U.S. participation on NATO combined staffs and a European officer should be appointed to the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). A multinational NATO Naval force should replace the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Techniques should be developed for streamlining NATO in general, while keeping the vital concept of North Atlantic defense alive. Senator Mansfield has even proposed that NATO develop rapid mobilization procedures that would allow, if present conditions in Europe continue, the conversion of NATO to standby status.<sup>57</sup>

## CHAPTER III

## THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION ARGUMENTS -- OPPOSED

If we would have a major, unilateral reduction of our forces in NATO, what it would do would be to undercut the confidence of our friends; but more so, it would destroy an initiative that we are now undertaking with the Soviet Union and with the Warsaw Pact forces mutually to reduce our forces...the only way, in any kind of negotiation, you can get something in dealing with a major power like the Soviet Union... is if you have something to give. If the United States unilaterally cuts back on what we have, you have destroyed their incentive to come to the conference table, because they will already have what they want.<sup>58</sup>

This statement, quoted from President Nixon's address to the American Legion's national convention in August 1972, summarizes the Administration's opposition to unilateral force reductions in Europe. President Nixon agrees with Senator Mansfield that the situation in Europe has changed, that the Eurogroup NATO nations are more capable of shouldering a greater portion of the military burden and that military forces of NATO must be readjusted to accomodate Soviet-U.S. nuclear parity.<sup>59</sup> However, the President strongly disagrees with Senator Mansfield's stand that a unilateral U.S. force reduction would remedy the situation in Europe. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, speaking for the Administration before a Congressional subcommittee, reinforced the President's stand when he said:

In order to remove any possible doubt that may exist, I want to assure you that we are unequivocally opposed to any unilateral reduction of American forces in western Europe and therefore to those proposals that now lie before your committee that would commit the Congress or bind the administration to such an act.<sup>60</sup>

The Nixon Administration prescription for remodeling the Atlantic Alliance is based on maintaining the credible deterrent which has stayed war in Europe for over 25 years. If there are to be further substantial troop reductions they will be made on a reciprocal basis with the Soviet Union. The Administration is loath to unilaterally reduce troops in Europe for several reasons:

(1) The fear of losing bargaining chips in MFR talks with the Soviet Union and her allies.

(2) The fear that a reduction would affect the deterrent value of NATO forces.

(3) The fear that the fighting capability of NATO would be significantly impaired.

(4) The fear that the move would be interpreted by Europeans, as a lessening of the U.S. commitment to NATO.<sup>61</sup>

Additionally, the Nixon Administration contends that the current troop levels are an important factor in the Phase II SALT talks and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>62</sup>

The Administration argument for the use of existing troop levels as a bargaining chip in MFR talks with the Soviet Union and her allies is predicated on the theory of power politics. President Nixon's views on the importance of strong

military forces are made clear in the following excerpt from his address to the nation on October 29, 1973:

...war is caused not by the strength of one nation alone, but by the weakness of one nation in relation to another...Strength and resolution command respect. They are an incentive for negotiations leading to peace. But weakness and naive sentimentality breed contempt. They are an open invitation to pressure tactics and aggression leading to war.<sup>63</sup>

While results of such an approach can only be measured in the realm of speculation, it would seem logical that chances for Soviet reductions, of any consequence, would be increased in proportion to what the U.S. is willing to give up at the time of negotiations. If there is less to give at that particular time it follows that the Soviet Union will be less willing to make substantial reductions. President Nixon, in his report to the Congress, May 3, 1973 reaffirmed his stand on U.S. force levels in Europe and their significance for MFR:

In light of the present strategic balance and of similar efforts by our allies, we will not only maintain but improve our forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action by our adversaries.<sup>64</sup>

The Administration claims that U.S. forces in Europe make the conventional NATO deterrent credible. If those forces were substantially reduced argues the President, the deterrent would be correspondingly reduced.

The balance of conventional forces in the center of Europe would be seriously upset



by the unilateral withdrawal of a substantial number of U.S. forces. Unless our reductions were completely replaced by European forces, deterrence would be weakened.<sup>65</sup>

The Administration claim, that the U.S. forces make a significant contribution to the fighting capability of NATO is supportable. Of the 26 1/3 NATO divisions in the central and northern regions, the U.S. contribution comes close to 25% of the total ground forces. If that contribution were cut in half, it would seriously affect NATO's ability to conduct defensive operations. Even if, as Senator Mansfield has proposed, the reduction was gradual, the final result would be the same unless the European allies provide more troops to replace the U.S. forces. As President Nixon said in his May 3, 1973, report to the Congress:

The conditions of this decade require the United States to maintain substantial forces in Europe. In conditions of near strategic parity, a strong capability to defend with non-nuclear forces becomes increasingly important, the United States contributes about one-quarter of NATO's forces in Europe's vital central region, though our allies' proportionate share of forces in the entire European NATO area is far higher.<sup>66</sup>

The Administration argument, that U.S. forces stationed on the Continent tend to convince the Europeans of U.S. resolve and commitment to the Alliance, implies that a substantial reduction of U.S. troops might be interpreted by government officials in parts of Europe as a lessening of U.S. willingness to go to war over Western Europe. During the debate preceeding the Senate vote on the 1971 Mansfield amendment to reduce U.S. forces in Europe by one-half, the New York Times reported that

the amendment worried senior NATO officers because of the effect they feared it would have on their respective governments.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the FRG, speaking on the television program "Meet the Press" in April of 1970 said:

It is a political and psychological problem as well. In at least parts of Europe, a major withdrawal of American troops, unilaterally from Europe, would be regarded as a step towards, well, more or less, Soviet hegemony, as far as Europe is concerned.<sup>68</sup>

While such statements may be discarded as political rhetoric, there is concrete evidence that some European governments do fear a major unilateral reduction of U.S. forces. For example, Eurogroup NATO defense expenditures began increasing in the midst of Senator Mansfield's campaign to force troop reductions. This can be interpreted as a European effort at appeasing those in the U.S. who were critical of the European contribution to NATO.

#### The Realities of the Financial Burden

Much has been said of the cost of maintaining 300,000 U.S. servicemen in Europe. Costs are generally quoted in terms of: (1) The general cost of the NATO commitment; this includes the total costs of all forces that would be committed to NATO in time of war (less strategic forces) and will run about \$17 billion for fiscal year 1974. (2) The direct cost of maintaining U.S. forces in the European theater; this figure is about \$4 billion for fiscal year 1974. (3) The balance of payments deficit consisting of the costs spent in Europe which are not recouped through European expenditures for U.S. arms and

equipment; this deficit totaled about \$1.5 billion in fiscal 1972.

Even if the U.S. force levels in Europe were reduced by 50%, the general cost and the direct cost would not be reduced by any significant amount, provided these forces were merely returned to the United States. The difference in cost of basing troops overseas and basing the same troops in the United States is known as "incremental" cost. In 1973 the incremental cost was about "\$400 million and is composed largely of such expenses as transportation."<sup>69</sup> Assuming that those units affected by the 50% reduction were not deactivated but stationed in the United States with the mission of rapidly reinforcing those U.S. elements which remained in Europe, it is probable that there would be no savings in direct or general costs. If an assumption is made that these units must be "prepared to reinforce NATO on short notice" then it will be necessary to pre-position heavy equipment in Europe and to conduct deployment exercises on a regular basis to insure mission readiness. Thus it follows that there would be additional expenditures for training exercises (such as the current "REFORGER" and "CRESTED CAP" operations), for heavy equipment which would have to be procured for training at home, while the units' primary equipment remained pre-positioned in Europe, and finally, for custodial care, maintenance and installations for pre-positioned equipment. It is likely that these costs could run to more than the current \$400 million incremental cost of European stationing.

The balance of payments deficit is most often mentioned as an area where great savings could be made by reduction

of troop levels in Europe. While direct military contribution to the deficit for 1972 was about \$1.5 billion, it is not safe to say that the deficit would be reduced by 50% if the U.S. forces were halved. Foreign currency expenditures for U.S. forces in Europe, in fiscal year 1972, amounted to approximately \$2.1 billion; European purchases of military goods and services in this country amounted to about \$600 million thus the \$1.5 billion deficit.<sup>70</sup> The \$600 million includes only military purchases and does not include West German purchases of U.S. Treasury securities and loans to the United States. While it appears at first glance that a 50% troop reduction would result in a reduction of about \$750 million in the balance of payments deficit, this might not happen.

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, pointed out to a Senate subcommittee in 1970 that a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe might bring about a reduction in the size of West German offset payments:

...if you start with the assumption that the kind of reduction you are suggesting would start off a disintegrative process, a crisis of confidence in the United States, a feeling that we are getting out of Europe...then the motives as you can see, for the Germans to expend any of their resources to help us would be pretty thin indeed, and I think they would<sup>71</sup> then think about alternative arrangements....

If the Germans should answer a U.S. force reduction in Europe with a corresponding reduction in offset payments the balance of payments savings could be reduced well below

the expected level.

The Nixon Administration would agree that the interests of the United States are so vital as to require an inordinate percentage of the defense budget. In addition to the historical and cultural ties with the continent it has been pointed out that Western Europe is the most important market for American goods and the most important supplier to the American economy. American business has over \$28 billion invested in Western Europe and that American investors earn more than \$3 billion per year from these investments.<sup>72</sup> President Nixon has characterized the security of Western Europe as being "inseparable from our own."<sup>73</sup>

#### Consequences of a Unilateral U.S. Reduction

Any predictions concerning the future of NATO, in light of major unilateral U.S. reductions, would necessarily be speculative in nature. Nevertheless President Nixon has predicted that major unilateral U.S. force reductions could have serious effects on the stability of the Alliance:

In short, disengaging our forces would risk serious instability in Europe, the consequences of greatly enhanced Soviet influence, and the dangerous implications of a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.<sup>74</sup>

Others have been even more pessimistic than the President. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, SACEUR, testifying before a Senate subcommittee in June 1970 said:

The substantial balanced American contribution in Europe has resulted in a degree of cohesion among our allies....Lacking

that cohesion, the individual preoccupations and disintegrative tendencies -- which are many, varied and substantial -- would inevitably prevail.<sup>75</sup>

Additionally, many Congress members share the President's apprehension about the adverse affects of unilateral U.S. force reductions. For example, Senator Javits (R-New York), speaking in opposition to the 1971 Mansfield amendment, said:

So we have a choice not of simply withdrawing two divisions. Our choice is whether or not to dismantle NATO, which is what the Mansfield amendment would do. It would bring the entire structure down around our ears...just when we have a partner who is reaching a position to help us bear the load in a material way, we should not break up the partnership. That would be the effect of the Mansfield amendment.<sup>76</sup>

While these opinions are highly speculative in nature, there is evidence that European interest in NATO tends to be reduced in times of a low perception of the threat. European defense expenditures declined during the period 1964-1969, that is, during a period of relative calm and growing detente in Europe. President Nixon focused on this line of reasoning when he said:

It has been true, however, that as the relaxation of East-West tensions became more pronounced, some of our allies questioned whether the United States would remain committed to Europe....<sup>77</sup>

#### The Nixon Administration Position

The Nixon Administration is unequivocally opposed to

unilateral U.S. force reductions in Europe. President Nixon's stated objective of dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of power precludes any major reductions especially since MFR talks have begun. The Administration contends that a unilateral reduction at this time would weaken the U.S. bargaining position at the talks.

The Administration believes that U.S. forces in Europe are an integral part of both the deterrent and the fighting capability of NATO. In central Europe (where the U.S. provides about 25% of the forces) NATO units are equal in capability with those of the WTO. If the questionable loyalty of the Eastern European countries is considered, the NATO forces actually become superior, especially in a defensive configuration.

The argument that a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe would lead to significant financial savings is of questionable validity. Unless such forces are deactivated, cost savings are likely to be minimal. Savings in balance of payment deficits would likely be smaller than projected due to West German reluctance to continue sizable offset payments in light of U.S. reductions.

While U.S. officials concede that the Europeans could do more for their own defense, the disparity in defense expenditures between U.S. and European budgets is not nearly so great when one considers the worldwide commitments and responsibilities of the United States.

Finally, the reduction of U.S. forces could affect the

future of the Alliance. A European perception that the U.S. no longer considers the WTO a great threat, could set off a chain reaction of concomitant European reductions which could undermine the credibility of the Alliance. Worse, a weakened Europe might feel a need to accept a certain amount of Soviet influence to avoid conflict.



## CHAPTER IV

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF  
SENATOR MANSFIELD'S PROPOSALS

A meaningful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals made by Senator Mansfield should proceed in terms of substantive arguments rather than in terms of emotional and unsubstantiated contentions which tend to be based on a misconception of the majority leader's views.

Time and again Mansfield has pointed out that he is not an isolationist and does not favor any troop reductions which would affect the deterrent value of NATO forces vis a vis the WTO. While favoring a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, on the order of 50% of current strength, he does not advocate a lessening of U.S. resolve to come to the aid of Western Europe in the event of war. Although he favors a gradual drawdown of total U.S. armed forces' strength, he has not advocated immediate demobilization of all troops which would be returned from Europe in the event the Mansfield proposals were implemented.

Basic Areas of Disagreement

There are a number of points on which there is basic disagreement between Senator Mansfield and the Nixon Administration. They may be categorized as follows:

- (1) Perception of the Soviet Union's objectives in Europe.
- (2) Financial savings which would be realized by a

substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.

- (3) The fighting capability of U.S. forces in Europe versus their role as a measure of total U.S. commitment to NATO and the defense of Western Europe.
- (4) The value of the current U.S. force levels as a bargaining chip in the MFR negotiations with the Soviet Union and her allies.
- (5) The apparent inequities in sharing the burden of NATO defense between the United States and the European NATO nations.
- (6) Organization of U.S. forces assigned to NATO.

#### Perception of the Soviet Union's Objectives in Europe

There is a strong argument to be made for the fact that the Soviet Union and the other WTO countries have never stopped improving the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of their forces in Europe. Since most military planning is based on potential capability of the adversary, it is not surprising that American and allied military leaders are strongly opposed to major unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.

It would not be difficult, understanding the basic Soviet distrust of the West, to explain these military improvements in terms of a Soviet desire to insure an adequate deterrent against Western aggression in Eastern Europe. Moreover, it has been necessary for the Soviet Union to deploy fairly large numbers of troops in Eastern European countries to maintain internal stability and conformity with the Soviet

political model.

Most political and economic indicators have, for the past ten years, pointed toward a reduction of East-West tensions. Even allowing for temporary setbacks such as U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, there have been negotiations, agreements and exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States and the Soviet Union and Western European countries which would make it difficult to substantiate the idea that the Soviet Union is prepared to embark on military adventures in Western Europe. Even assuming the worst case, that the Soviet Union harbors a desire to spread its influence westward, it seems likely that the U.S. nuclear deterrent would make the benefits that might be derived from such an undertaking far too costly in terms of risk to the Soviet homeland.

In the final analysis Senator Mansfield's perception of the Soviet Union's objectives, while it admittedly underplays Soviet and WTO capabilities, seems to be more accurate than that of his critics.

#### Financial Considerations

Senator Mansfield has always held the view that security should never be sacrificed for monetary savings. On the other hand, he has argued that the cost of U.S. forces for NATO was larger than necessary and that it should be reduced. The idea that there would be substantial financial savings connected with the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe may be one of the majority leader's weakest arguments. Since incremental

costs associated with basing forces in Europe versus basing them in the United States are so low, the additional costs associated with training, exercising and pre-positioning of heavy equipment in Europe would obviate any savings in terms of the direct cost of forces earmarked for NATO and based in the United States. Only by demobilization of large numbers of the forces returned from Europe could large savings be made.

While the military contribution to the balance of payments deficit would certainly be favorably affected by a force reduction, such savings are likely to be tempered by a corresponding reduction in West German offset payments. Following this line of reasoning and using 1972 figures, a reduction of 150,000 personnel in the European theater would probably realize a balance of payments savings of less than \$750 million per year. The balance of payments deficit for 1972 was about \$10 billion; in this light the savings do not seem overly significant.

#### Role of U.S. Forces Committed to NATO

Senator Mansfield has said that he perceives the role of U.S. forces in Europe as a demonstration of the reliability of the total American commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. While they do contribute to the NATO force structure, their principal mission is to emphasize U.S. resolve and that two divisions or less of U.S. forces would be as effective as four or more. If, however, one considers the U.S. forces as an integral part of the NATO conventional and tactical nuclear defensive capability, quite a different picture emerges.

Since the U.S. forces in Europe form about 25% of the available NATO forces in the central region they must be considered as an important part of the tactical scheme. Based on analyses such as those done by Enthovan and Smith, Roland Paul, and the Institute for Strategic Studies, we can conclude that NATO conventional forces would not be immediately overpowered by Pact forces, that they have sufficient tactical capability to withstand a major thrust from the East, especially if there is some period of warning and NATO forces have the advantage of defensive positioning.

Here again Senator Mansfield's argument which centers on the U.S. role as a measure of commitment, waxes thin when juxtaposed with the evidence of the U.S. role as an important contributor to the NATO fighting forces. Unless the European NATO members provided replacement troops, a substantial reduction of U.S. forces would seriously affect the Alliance's ability to defend central Europe.

#### U.S. Forces as a Bargaining Chip in MFR

Those in opposition to Senator Mansfield's proposed reductions, especially the Nixon Administration, have argued vociferously that unilateral U.S. force reductions will destroy any chance at gaining reciprocal reductions from the Soviet Union at the talks on MFR. Based on historical Soviet toughness at the bargaining table it is unlikely that the Russians would be willing to reduce forces in Europe without assuring themselves of a similar reduction on the part of the United States. Senator Mansfield has long held that such talks with the Soviet Union were unlikely and even if

they did take place, the Soviet requirement, to keep large numbers of troops in Central Europe for internal stability, would limit concessions the Russians would be willing to make.

Now that preliminary talks have led to substantive talks, it might be assumed that Senator Mansfield would be more amenable toward the Administration position, but this is not the case. He has maintained his position that such talks are likely to be long and arduous and after several years they will produce, at best, marginal mutual reductions. Based mainly on his arguments of finance and principle, Senator Mansfield discards the idea that mutual troop reductions are worth waiting for. It is generally conceded that the U.S. is not likely to agree to mutual reductions in terms of "division for division" and that trade offs in terms of U.S. nuclear weapons for Soviet tanks and aircraft are more likely. It seems that Senator Mansfield could hold off at least long enough to find out what the Soviet Union will demand in terms of U.S. reductions. If, as predicted, the talks proceed with an orientation toward weapons and equipment rather than military units, he could then press his demands for unilateral reductions. Senator Mansfield may be correct in assuming that agreements will not be reached immediately, but it is likely that the discussions will produce some guidelines within a reasonable amount of time. Though Senator Mansfield's arguments against the "bargaining chip" concept may have had some applicability in 1969, they seem somewhat unsound at present.

Inequities in U.S. and European Contributions to NATO

Senator Mansfield has been consistent in his argument that the European NATO members are not shouldering a sufficient amount of the burden of NATO defense. He has pointed to the fact that, in terms of defense expenditures and manpower, the Europeans have been unwilling to make sacrifices which come near to those which are demanded of the United States. Even when the superpower aspect of the U.S. role is factored into defense spending, the United States remains inordinately high in terms of percent of GNP spent for defense, per capita amount spent for defense and men per thousand in military service. The Nixon Administration has lent some credence to the Mansfield arguments by launching a campaign to encourage the European nations to do more. The main point of disagreement between the Administration and the majority leader tends to be the recommended solution to the problem. While the Administration tends toward a campaign of encouraging the allies, Senator Mansfield is more inclined toward forcing them to do more via unilateral troop reductions. The Administration's stand, that such a move might have a negative effect and lead to further reductions in NATO strength, receives no sympathy from the majority leader. He feels that if the European nations will not take steps to shore up their own defense, the United States should not bear an undue burden to do it for them. The question evolves to the point made by Helmut Schmidt that the defense of the United States begins in Europe. Senator Mansfield would dispute that statement. While he would agree that the

United States has interests in Europe which would cause this country to enter a war on Western Europe's behalf, he would stand on his argument that the primary responsibility for the defense of Europe lies with the Europeans themselves.

#### Organization of U.S. Forces Assigned to NATO

Senator Mansfield has taken issue with the fact that there are 134 American general or flag officers in Europe, one for every 2,342 men. He disputes the dogmatic contention that the Supreme Allied Commander must be an American. He also argues that there are far too many U.S. headquarters in Europe. The current situation in which France has ceased to be an active participant in the NATO military structure has put present U.S. forces in a nearly untenable position tactically. Their lines of communication (logistical) run parallel to their battle positions, there is no depth to the battlefield. The present tactical arrangement is unsuitable against a massive WTO attack. The issue of military dependents, literally among the tactical positions, has been previously discussed. Arguments to the contrary posit that the various generals, admirals and multiple headquarters must be available to support a massive Allied buildup in time of war, that they must exercise regularly and that they must be physically located in Europe to insure efficiency when they are needed. Although the Administration admits that the withdrawal of France from military participation in NATO weakens the tactical arrangement in Europe it is not an insurmountable obstacle and that lines of communication through the low countries



will provide an acceptable substitute for France.

Senator Mansfield's arguments are especially strong in this area. Department of Defense rejoinders to his queries do not provide a convincing argument for the top heavy command structure and attendant expenditures which exist in the U.S. European Command.

### Assessment of Arguments

Senator Mansfield's most persuasive arguments tend to be his contentions that the Europeans could do more on their own behalf. His point of view is borne out in most statistical analyses concerned with the proportionate share of resources contributed to NATO by the U.S. and that contributed by the European nations. Analyses, such as Roland Paul's, asserting that the U.S. does not do more than its rightful share are suspect because of arbitrarily assigning dollar values to abstract concepts such as a dollar amount expended on strategic forces for the defense of Europe versus strategic forces for the defense of the American homeland.

Senator Mansfield's observations about the organization of the U.S. forces are in agreement with a number of analysts and stand as his second strongest argument. Most evidence points to the fact that U.S. forces in Europe have too many intermediate headquarters, too many senior officers, an excessively large logistical tail and are improperly positioned with respect to their lines of communications. The solution to these problems, however, would tend to be a major restructuring of forces either with or without overall force reductions.

Senator Mansfield's perception of the Soviet Union's objectives, based as it is on political and economic indicators, seems fairly sound except for the continual improvement and buildup of Soviet and allied forces in Eastern Europe. It is acknowledged that the Soviet Union has internal security problems in the other Pact countries, but the size of the forces and their weaponry are far more than would be needed for internal problems.

Senator Mansfield's argument concerning the primary role of the U.S. forces in Europe is questionable. While U.S. troops in Europe demonstrate the reliability of the total U.S. commitment to the Alliance, they also represent an essential component of the NATO defense. In the absence of increased force contributions from European NATO members, a substantial reduction of U.S. forces would seriously weaken NATO defense in central Europe. Studies show that NATO has a credible conventional force and U.S. forces are an integral part of that force. There are far too many unknowns to draw firm conclusions with respect to NATO's chances in a conventional conflict with the WTO. However, it is probably safe to say that the NATO forces are not doomed to destruction within the first day or two of an attack. There is good evidence that they are about the equal of the Pact forces and would give a good account of themselves especially having the additional tactical advantage of defending on familiar terrain.

The majority leader does not make a very good argument for pushing on with his proposals despite the convening of MFR talks. It would seem less than logical to implement unilateral reduction when there is reason to believe that a

framework for mutual reduction may be close to becoming a reality.

It is difficult to evaluate Senator Mansfield's arguments which emphasize budgetary and balance of payments savings associated with a major force reduction. In the event of substantial U.S. force reductions it is unlikely that West German offset payments will continue at their present rate. There are questions about the status of troops brought home by such a reduction; would they be kept ready for redeployment? Would they merely be kept on active duty in a lesser state of readiness, or would they be demobilized? If the returning forces are demobilized, the budgetary savings would be significant; if they are kept ready for deployment there likely would be no budgetary savings, in fact, there could be increased costs. Any balance of payments savings would be tempered by expected reductions in West German offset payments. Since Senator Mansfield has not advocated immediate demobilization of returned forces, it is likely that his proposals would not, as they stand, contribute significant budgetary savings.

### Recommendations

From the assessment of Senator Mansfield's arguments above and the weaknesses of strategy and weapons systems described in Chapter I, the following general recommendations are offered for the restructuring of the U.S. force contribution to NATO:

- (1) Do not make significant unilateral reductions until

- the substantive MFR talks are underway for a reasonable period of time and some conclusions can be drawn as to the direction the talks will take.
- (2) Begin phased withdrawal of long range, high yield, tactical nuclear weapons. Leave sufficient short range, low yield weapons in position to insure the Soviet Union understands that a credible tactical nuclear threat exists.
  - (3) Streamline U.S. forces to include a cutback to about three divisions with minimal support troops. Relocate remaining support units to the United States with a mission and capability of rapid redeployment to Europe. Reach an understanding that the Western European countries will provide adequate forces to replace those U.S. forces returned to the U.S.
  - (4) As the current generation of tactical fighter aircraft become obsolescent replace them with shorter range interceptor aircraft.
  - (5) Reposition U.S. ground forces in West Germany to the North to facilitate a perpendicular orientation to lines of communication which run through the low countries.
  - (6) Institute a concerted effort aimed at European defense improvements with emphasis on a goal of about 6% of the GNP's of Western European NATO countries spent on defense.
  - (7) Relinquish more senior NATO command positions to Europeans, including the position of Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe.

The implementation of these recommendations would have several far reaching effects on the future of NATO. In addition to some dollar savings, U.S. reductions on the scale recommended, would symbolize an American commitment to East-West detente without significantly reducing the defensive capability of NATO forces.

Secondly, the European NATO members would be required to do more for their own defense in order to maintain the viability of the deterrent.

Finally, the removal of "offensive" weapons systems from European soil is likely to have a positive effect on the Soviet Union's historical distrust of the West and could well signal the beginning of reciprocal reductions on the part of the Soviets.

## FOOTNOTES

1. NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 22.
2. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
3. "It must be the policy of the USA to support free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressures." Ibid., p. 14.
4. U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1971/1972, p. 12,513.
5. Ibid. and New York Times, October 27, 1973.
6. Alain C. Enthovan and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), p. 156.
7. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 2036.
8. The Military Balance 1972/1973 (London: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1972), p. vii.
9. Ibid., pp. 87-90.
10. Roland A. Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 46.
11. J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 46.
12. These views are a synthesis of the views of several authors. See especially: Paul, op. cit., pp. 133-134 and Delbert M. Fowler, "How Many Divisions," Military Review, LII (November, 1972), p. 81.
13. The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 70.
14. Paul, op. cit., p. 133.
15. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communique (Brussels - December 1970), quoted in NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971), pp. 85-86.
16. The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 89.
17. Ibid., p. 90.

18. U.S. Congressional Record, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, CXIX, p. S17,644.

19. Ibid.; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit., p. 2053; John Newhouse, et al., U.S. Troops in Europe (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1971), Chapter 5.

20. Kenneth Rush, Statement before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 10, 1973, quoted in Department of State Bulletin, LXIX (August 6, 1973), p. 210.

21. Paul, op. cit., pp. 147-149.

22. Helmut Schmidt, Washington Post, April 2, 1970, quoted in U.S. Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, CXVI, part 8, 10,308.

23. Steven L. Canby, "NATO Muscle: More Shadow Than Substance," Military Review, LIII (February, 1973), p. 67.

24. Ibid., p. 66.

25. Ibid.

26. Dennis M. Gormley, "NATO's Tactical Nuclear Option: Past, Present and Future," Military Review, LIII (September, 1973), pp. 15-16.

27. Canby, op. cit., p. 71.

28. Ibid., p. 71 and Gormley, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

29. John J. McCloy, The Atlantic Alliance: Its Origin and Its Future (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 28-29.

30. U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, CXIII, part 1, 997.

31. Ibid., p. 998.

32. U.S. Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, CXVII, part 22, 14,398.

33. New York Times, September 29, 1973, p. 2.

34. U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, CXIII, part 1, 998.

35. Ibid., part 3, 3666.

36. U.S. Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, CXIX, p. S 17,644.

37. U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, CXIII, part 1, 998.

38. Senator Mike Mansfield, "The New Economic Program," a speech delivered in the U.S. Senate, September 14, 1971, quoted in Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXVIII (October 15, 1971), p. 6. In December, 1970, the European members of NATO had committed themselves to spending about \$1 billion more for NATO defense over a 5 year period (this was increased to \$1.5 billion later). Mansfield obviously did not consider it a "substantial" amount since, when divided among ten countries over five years, it only amounted to about \$20 million per country annually. Alliance Defence for the Seventies, Annex to the final communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Brussels - December, 1971), quoted in NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 90.

39. U.S. Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, CXIX, p. 517,644. These figures reflect inflation, the monetary crisis and the rapidly increasing personnel costs associated with today's defense budget.

40. U.S. Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, CXV, part 27, 36,148 - 36,150.

41. Ibid., p. 36,148.

42. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit., p. 2263.

43. U.S., Congress, House, Hearings, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments, op. cit., p. 12,512.

44. Enthovan and Smith, op. cit., Chapter 4.

45. U.S., Congressional Record, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, CXIX, p. S 17,643.

46. Senator Mike Mansfield, "The New Economic Program," op. cit., p. 6.

47. U.S., Senate, Western Europe and the new Economic Policy, Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print, 92d Cong., 1st sess., October 1971, p. 7.

48. U.S. Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, CXIX, pp. S17,643 - 17,645.

49. Article 3 of the Treaty states that nations "...will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." It does not require specific sized commitments to accomplish this goal. NATO Facts and Figures, op. cit., p. 238.

50. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit., p. 2027.



51. U.S. Congressional Record, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, CXIX, p. S 17,644.

52. Ibid., p. 17,643.

53. U.S. Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, CXVII, part 11, 14,673.

54. U.S. Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, CXIII, part 1, 998.

55. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Saturday Evening Post, October 26, 1963 quoted in U.S. Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, CXVI, part 8, 10,308.

56. Senator Mike Mansfield, "The New Economic Program," op. cit., p. 6.

57. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

58. Richard M. Nixon, speech given at the National Convention of the American Legion, August 24, 1972 quoted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 8 (August 28, 1972), p. 1273.

59. Richard M. Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace." The President's report to the Congress May 3, 1973 quoted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 9 (May 14, 1973), pp. 523-524.

60. Rush, July 10, 1973, op. cit., p. 209.

61. Kenneth Rush, statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 25, 1973, quoted in Department of State Bulletin, LXIX (August 20, 1973), p. 286.

62. Ibid.

63. Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation, October 29, 1972," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 8 (November 6, 1973), p. 1600.

64. Nixon, May 3, 1973, op. cit., p. 526.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. New York Times, May 16, 1971, p. 22.

68. Chancellor Willy Brandt speaking on the television program "Meet the Press," April 12, 1970, quoted in Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, CXVI, part 9, 12,329.

69. Rush, July 25, 1973, op. cit., p. 290.
70. William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, statement before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 12, 1973, quoted in Department of State Bulletin, LXIX (August 6, 1973), p. 217.
71. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit., p. 2262.
72. Rush, July 10, 1973, op. cit., p. 211.
73. Nixon, May 3, 1973, op. cit., p. 526.
74. Ibid.
75. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, op. cit., p. 2129.
76. U.S. Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, CXVII, part 11, 14,739.
77. Nixon, May 3, 1973, op. cit., p. 533.

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UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE:  
THE PROPOSALS OF SENATOR MANSFIELD

by

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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MASTER OF ARTS

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Since the late 1950's, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) has been at the forefront of attempts to cause a substantial unilateral reduction of U.S. force levels in Europe. During the last five years these proposals have gained considerable support in the Congress. At the same time there has been a gathering of support by those opposed to unilateral U.S. force reductions in Europe; the principal organized opposition coming from the Nixon Administration.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the arguments made by Senator Mansfield for unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, to compare these proposals with the counter arguments put forward by the Nixon Administration and to draw conclusions which would tend to verify or reject Mansfield's recommendations.

The U.S. force contributed to NATO totals approximately 300,000 military personnel. In Senator Mansfield's judgment, this force is unduly large and costly especially when compared with force contributions from the European NATO members. Mansfield also argues that the size of the U.S. force is inappropriate in view of the Soviet Union's contemporary diplomatic and economic policies which have been described by the Administration as characterizing detente. Finally, Senator Mansfield claims that the U.S. forces are poorly organized. They have too many support units for the number of available combat units and the command structure is top heavy with general and flag officers.

The Nixon Administration takes a hard stand concerning unilateral troop reductions. According to the President,

no reduction of U.S. force levels in Europe will occur without reciprocal reductions on the part of the Soviet Union and her allies. The Administration is singularly opposed to any unilateral reductions at this time because they would weaken the U.S. bargaining position vis a vis the Soviet Union and her allies at the ongoing Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) talks.

According to the Administration, the U.S. forces in Europe are more than a symbol of U.S. resolve for European defense, they are an integral part of the NATO conventional and tactical nuclear deterrent as well as a formidable contribution to NATO tactical fighting forces. Any unilateral reductions would seriously affect NATO's ability to defend Western Europe.

The research shows that the U.S. force levels are too high in light of the current climate of East-West relations. Further, it is shown that while the cost of maintaining a large force in Europe is high, and tends to increase each year, significant financial savings will not be realized unless substantial force reductions occur and those forces which are returned from Europe are demobilized. Moreover, the European members should spend more for their own defense and that some streamlining of U.S. forces should take place albeit after allowing a short period to determine what direction the MFR talks will take.

In sum, Senator Mansfield's proposals, with some modifications, are generally appropriate to the situation in Europe today.