

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY  
INSTITUTIONALIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND STABILITY IN  
THE THAI PARTY SYSTEM

by

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

At the present time, political parties are indispensable institutions to modern politics and to the key political development of the societies both in modernized societies and in transitional societies. Because Thailand is characterized as a transitional society and is in a stage of growth, the need to have effective political parties is crucial. Besides, Thailand has a parliamentary system and in this type of system the stability of government is assumed to depend very much upon an absolute majority or one-party government which, of course, requires effective and highly institutionalized political parties.

Political parties are important and necessary agencies for modernization. According to Apter:

Political party is such a critical force for modernization in all contemporary societies that the particular pattern of modernization adopted by each is quite often determined by its parties.<sup>1</sup>

Suleiman also notes:

In the modernizing process, the need for the creation of a new homogeneous political culture is also determined by the parties.<sup>2</sup>

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1. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, ( Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965 ), P. 179.
  2. Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon : The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture, ( Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965 ), PP. 282-283.



The notion of political party was introduced to the Thai people after the revolution in 1932 by the members of the revolutionary group who organized themselves into various political cliques. The way they performed political activities could not be described as typical of political parties, however, for it was different from the way parties performed in Western societies. The difference between the political performance of the members of the revolutionary group and the later political parties can be seen in the evolution of Thai political parties.

#### THE EVOLUTION OF THAI POLITICAL PARTIES

The 1932 Revolution was Thailand's first said to be a democratic revolution. It began on the morning of June 24, 1932 when a group of young intellectual civilians and educated senior military officers organized a bloodless coup d'état which ended the control of the absolute monarchy that had dominated the country since the founding of the Thai Kingdom in the thirteenth century. The revolution did establish parliamentary democracy, but it failed to make possible the development of Thai political parties.

The proclamation of this revolution was to bring self-government to the people. But shortly after the revolution, the so-called "promoters" of the revolutionary group organized under the name "People's Party" and appointed itself as the only government of the people. People were

kept away from electoral participation and absolute power was in the hands of key members of the revolutionary group. There also was fighting for power among members of this group. The group was divided into three major cliques. The first clique was led by Colonel Phraya Phahon Phonpayuhasena who represented the senior army officers. He had received advanced military education in Germany. The second clique led by Lieutenant Colonel Luang Phibun Songkhram represented the junior army officers. He had taken his advanced military study in France. He later became one of the most powerful men of the country. He promoted himself from Major General to Field Marshal in 1941. The third clique was led by Dr. Pridi Phanomyong or Luang Pradit Manutham, a Doctor of Law from the University of Paris who represented young intellectual civilians. For about 25 years the country was almost totally under the domination of these three men and the premiership was passed around from time to time among them.

Since absolute power was in the hands of key members of the revolutionary group, the people were not permitted to participate effectively in the process of self-government. Although they were allowed to have elections, they did not directly elect their representatives to the parliament. The only reasons given by the key members of the revolutionary group for not permitting direct elections were the people's low literacy rate and their lack of political experience. In fact, however, the key members of the revolutionary group

had no real intention of giving political freedom to the people and wanted to hold the power among their own cliques. Therefore, the members of the Upper House as well as the prime ministers and many important government officials were appointed. The country did not have direct elections till the promulgation of the 1946 Constitution.

Even though the 1946 Constitution gave people political freedom, the right to vote, the right to assemble, and the right to organize political activities, political parties were still outlawed. Again, the only reason given by the key members of the revolutionary group for not permitting people to organize a political party was that the people still did not have enough experience with and knowledge of the party system. In any democratic society, political parties are the most important institutions for the development of political stability. Thailand had no political party during the 23 years between 1932-1946, for the " People's Party " of the 1932 Revolutionary group which dominated the country could not properly be classed as a political party. It was more an interest group than a political party. It was not until the promulgation of the Political Party Act in late 1955 that political parties became legal.

Even though political parties were not legal until after the Political Party Act of September 19, 1955, some cliques of members of parliament already after 1946 had organized into groups which called themselves political parties, although they had no legal standing. Some of these groups,

such as the Co-Operative, the Constitutional Front, and the Democrat groups, were able to form governments, but none of them lasted longer than one year. It was not until the general elections on February 26, 1957 that these groups had a real opportunity to exercise political activities as legally recognized political parties. In this election, there were as many as twenty-three registered political parties and candidates of eight parties were elected. The Seri Manangkhasila Party captured a majority of the votes in this election and Field Marshal Phibun, the leader of the party, became the prime minister. Shortly after the elections, however, the party came under mounting criticism for alleged frauds in the elections and finally Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Army-Commander-in-Chief, staged a bloodless coup d'état on September 16, 1957 and set up a new election immediately afterward on December 15, 1957.

The new government, with the support of the Unionist Party, was formed under the premiership of Lt. General Thanom Kittikachorn, Sarit's deputy. Thanom's government was faced with some difficulties in pleasing all the members of the Unionist Party ( the name was later changed to the National Socialist Party ) and the government was beset by intra-party wranglings over political and economic spoils; so, Field Marshal Sarit, who initially remained in the background, with the consent of General Thanom, again on October 20, 1958 staged a counter coup and assumed personal control of the government.

Sarit proclaimed martial law, abrogated the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, banned all the political parties, closed down a dozen newspapers suspected of leftist inclination and arrested a number of persons suspected of leftist thoughts or activities. Sarit established himself as prime minister and ruled the country under his dictatorship until he died in December 1963. General Thanom succeeded to the premiership and also ruled the country under martial law until promulgation of the new constitution in 1968.

The promulgation of the 1968 Constitution gave rebirth to Thai political parties which had been outlawed for nearly ten years and once again they were allowed to organize for the elections which followed on February 10, 1969. There were fifteen political parties, and a total number of 1247 candidates ran for the 219 seats in the House of Representatives. The United Thai People's Party won in this election and formed a government under the premiership of Field Marshal Thanom; however, his government did not last long. Because of the discord, the turmoil among members of his party and of Field Marshal Thanom's impatience concerning the opposition which beset him from all sides, Thanom finally decided on November 17, 1971 to overthrow his own government, abolish the constitution, ban all the political parties and establish himself as the leader of the Revolutionary Group ( Khana Patiwat).

On October 15, 1973, Thanom's regime came to an end after three days of severe student riots and street fighting with the government's troops. The major cause of

this riot was the government's arrest of thirteen students and university lecturers who were accused of distributing leaflets calling for a permanent Thai constitution to replace the temporary charter. Sanya Thammasak, Dean of the Law School and Rector of Thammasat University, was appointed by the King to be the next prime minister.

The caretaker government of Sanya succeeded in preparing the country's new constitution and in arranging the new elections on January 26, 1975. In this election, there were as many as forty-two political parties registered and candidates from twenty-two parties were elected. None of these parties captured a majority of the 269 seats in the House of Representatives. The coalition government of the Democrat Party and the Social Agrarian Party, which was under the premiership of M.R. Seni Pramoj, did not receive a vote of confidence and fourteen days after forming the cabinet, they had to resign. The newly chosen prime minister was M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, a younger brother of the former prime minister, an Oxford graduate, a journalist, and the leader of the Social Action Party which had only 18 seats in the parliament. Kukrit's coalition government consisted of seven different parties which had a total number of 121 supporting MPs. This figure was not even enough to form an absolute majority government. However, his government did receive a vote of confidence, 135 votes out of the total 269 votes.

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Since the revolution in 1932, Thailand has tried to govern with a party system, but it never has been able to bring political stability to the country. Evidence supporting this statement can be seen in the short lifetime of governments, the military domination and the myriad constitutions and parliaments. For the past 43 years, Thailand has experienced 6 constitutions, 36 governments, almost 38 years of military domination, including 10 successful coups and 5 attempted ones. The lack of party institutionalization and the ineffectiveness of Thai political parties are considered major causes of this instability. However, before analyzing the relationship between parties and stability, we shall first look at some of the characteristics and the structure of Thai parties.

### THE STRUCTURE OF THAI POLITICAL PARTIES

Since 1932, no Thai political party has been well enough organized to be called an effective or highly institutionalized party. No party was able to form an absolute majority government. Most of the governments formed after the elections were coalition governments, and the duration of each government was short. Even the Democrat Party, which was founded in 1946 and was the oldest party, probably



could not be described as an effective political party. In the latest election, January 26, 1975, the government of the Democrat Party lasted only 14 days.

The structure of Thai political parties may be characterized as a fragmented party structure which can be explained in the following terms.

#### 1. INTEREST GROUP

Thai parties are more like interest groups which represent and speak for the interests of some groups of rich and powerful men in the city rather than representing the majority of the people. Most of Thai parties do not perform their functions well enough to be characterized as autonomous, which seems to be an essential characteristic of effective political parties. None of the Thai parties have attempted to politicize people. Most do not even seek control of the policies of government or to form a stable government. What the parties generally attempt to do is only to have some seats in the parliament. Most of the parties send their candidates to run only in the constituencies that they are sure they will win. Since 1946, there has been only one party, the United Thai People's Party, that has sent its candidates to run in all the constituencies. This occurred in the 1969 Elections. Because Thai parties have acted more like interest groups or political cliques, they have been unable to form one-party governments with single party controlling the majority of seats in the parliament.



## 2. HIGHLY PERSONALIZED PARTIES

Thai parties also have been characterized as highly personalized parties rather than highly institutionalized parties. Many of the Thai parties' leaders such as Field Marshal Phibun ( the leader of the Seri Manangkhasila Party), Field Marshal Sarit ( the leader of the National Socialist Party ), and Field Marshal Thanom ( the leader of the United Thai People's Party ) tried to build their own personal power and stability instead of building the stability of their political parties. So when they lost power or died, their parties died with them , too. The death of the Seri Manangkhasila Party in 1957, of the National Socialist Party in 1958 and of the United Thai People's Party in 1971 were good examples. Besides, there were also many small parties that collapsed because of the bankruptcy of the party leaders.

Another way to look at why Thai parties have been characterized as highly personalized organization is to look at the way Thai politicians formed their parties. Liang Chaiyakarn may be a good example of the way many Thai politicians form and organize parties.

Liang Chaiyakarn was one of the organizing members of the Democrat Party in 1946, and a leader of the opposition to the government of Pridi and Luang Thamrong. In 1947, Liang bolted the democrats and organized his own People's Party. After the coup of 1947, he co-operated with the Kuang government until it was overthrown in 1948, and then he carried his

People's Party into the so-called United Parties Party which supported the government of Field Marshal Phibun. After the " silent coup " of 1951, he returned to the opposition as an adversary of the coup group government from 1952 until the election campaign of 1956-1957. After announcing his intention to campaign on the ticket of his own party, he suddenly went over to the Seri Manangkhasila Party and became one of its leading political advisers. His reward was a ministerial portfolio in Phibun's government of March 1957. Shortly after Field Marshal Sarit's coup in September 1957<sup>3</sup>, a new election was held and Liang was elected as an Independent. In the 1969 Elections, Liang once again formed the People's Party, but he was not elected at this time. In the country's latest elections on January 26, 1975, Liang , for the first time, did not run in an election. He was, perhaps, too old or too tired.

Because most of the Thai parties were characterized as highly personalized organizations, this was one of the reasons why they did not perform the functions usually associated with parties in well-established party systems in some western countries. Instead, the parties tended to be, to use<sup>4</sup> Pye's term, " the public relations organizations "

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3. David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand, ( Ithaca , N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1966 ), P. 242.

4. Lucian W. Pye, " Southeast Asia ", in Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis, ed., Modern Political System : Asia, ( Englewood Cliff, N.J. : Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963 ), P. 341.

serving the leading political actors in the country. The problem of Thai parties being highly personalized organizations has been the major obstacle to the development of the Thai party system. In this manner, Pye also observed that the highly personalized parties were the cause of instability. He said :

Much of the instability of the political parties themselves resulted from the fact that the parties have been highly personalized organizations reflecting the personalities of the leading figures. Lacking any deep roots within the societies, such parties have been able to change their positions according to the whim of their leaders, thus increasing instability for all.<sup>5</sup>

#### PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is to seek to see whether or not there is a relationship between the level of party institutionalization and political stability and to see whether or not this relationship still can be observed in a country like Thailand where the general level of party institutionalization is low. Parties are not the only factor affecting governmental stability, but many studies suggest that they are the most important one.

This study attempts to test some hypotheses from one such study, Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies. Huntington says :

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5. Ibid., P.342.

The stability and the strength of a party and of a party system depend upon both its level of institutionalization and its level of participation.<sup>6</sup>

Huntington expresses the relationship between these variables as follows :

$$\frac{\text{Political Participation}}{\text{Political Institutionalization}} = \text{Political Instability}$$

or

$$\frac{\text{Political Institutionalization}}{\text{Political Participation}} = \text{Political Stability}$$

Huntington implies in these equations that the relationship between institutionalization and stability is positive, given a certain level of participation. From this interpretation, we will test the following hypothesis:

" The higher the level of institutionalization of a party, the more likely it is that stability will be high. "

Conversely, participation and stability are negatively related, given a certain level of institutionalization. Huntington at this point, however, is dealing with participation generally, including increases in mass mobilization such as riots and demonstrations.

However, in this analysis, we are concerned only with electoral participation. The reason why we limit our analysis only to electoral participation because there is much difference between participation per se and electoral

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6. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, ( New Haven and London : Yale University Press 1972), PP. 401-402.

participation. The electoral participation is to some extent an " institutionalized " form of participation and is much more institutionalized than riots or demonstrations. Therefore, we shall proceed with the hypothesis that participation ( voter turnout ) is positively related to stability. Our testing hypothesis will be :

" The higher the level of electoral participation, the more likely it is that stability will be high. "

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7. When talking about the stability of a party and of a party system, Huntington seems to refer to two different types of stability : a government and a party. As it has been stated previously that Thai political parties are characterized by low institutionalization and by lack of stability. This statement comes from the fact that none of the Thai party is able to form the government more than one time and the lifetime of each party government is too short to be called a stable party, if we wish to compare with the Congress Party of India. In case of the Congress Party, we, of course, can study the stability or instability of the party ( by comparing the number of votes received in each different election, the number of seats hold in both the states and national legislative assembly ). On the contrary, it is very difficult and almost impossible to study or do any comparison about the stability or instability of Thai political parties, even though we can analyze the level of party institutionalization and compare which party is more institutionalized than the other. So, the term " stability " in this analysis will refer to only " governmental stability ".

In chapter II, we will operationalize the definitions of party institutionalization, political participation and political stability. The research studies of Paul R. Brass, Adam Przeworski, Michael Taylor and V.M. Herman, and Hoang Kim Giam concerning the relationship between party institutionalization, participation and stability will be mentioned in this chapter as well.

Chapter III will use regression and analysis of variance techniques on Thai data to test selected aspects of Huntington's hypotheses.

Chapter IV will be our conclusion.

## CHAPTER II

### BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

#### POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The concept of institutionalization has been used by many scholars concerned with political development, most notably S.N. Eisenstadt and Samuel P. Huntington. David Truman, Fred R. von der Mehden, Joseph LaPalombara, Myron Weiner, and Gabriel A. Almond also should be included. David Truman introduced the concept of institutionalization long time ago, but he did not mention the institutionalization of political party as the key element of political development. Truman said :

When group patterns are characterized by a high degree of stability, uniformity, formality and generality, they are usually called institutions, and a group that has these qualities is thought of as an institutionalized group.<sup>8</sup>

However, Huntington seemed to be the first one who introduced the concept of " party institutionalization " as the key element of political development. He first introduced this concept in his article, " Political Development and Political Decay " and later in his book, Political  
Order in Changing Societies ( 1968 ).<sup>9</sup>

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8. David Truman, The Governmental Process, ( New York : Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1951 ), P.26.

9. Samuel P. Huntington, " Political Development and Political Decay ", World Politics, Vol. XVII, ( April, 1965 ), PP. 386-430.

In this thesis, Huntington's concept of party institutionalization will be used for the analysis of the level of institutionalization of Thai political parties. Huntington stated :

Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures. <sup>10</sup>

#### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The question of what is political participation may be well answered by the definition of Verba, Nie and Kim. They said :

Political participation is the means by which the interests, desires, and demands of the ordinary citizen are communicated. By political participation we refer to all those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the decisions that they make.<sup>11</sup>

Actually in any democratic society, the role of citizen participation in governmental affairs is the essential factor in the process of self-governing. There are many different ways that a citizen may participate politically. Some may participate only in psychological involvement;

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10. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., P.12.

11. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation : A Cross-National Comparison, ( Beverly Hill, California : Sage Publication, 1971 ), P.9.



some may take part in campaign activities, or in voting, or may even run for the government positions. The level of citizen participation depends much upon the level of socio-economic status and the interest of the citizens themselves.

There are many factors to measure the level of political participation, but for the purpose of this paper, the scope will be limited to voting participation. Voting will be our analyzing unit to find out whether or not it leads to greater stability of instability and whether or not it is related to political stability.

#### POLITICAL STABILITY

The concept of " political stability " in this paper will be concerned only with the ability of legal elected government to persist effectively. The index of political stability will include consideration of the resignation of governments either voluntarily or by force, and of the change of prime ministers and the change of cabinets. The index of government stability will not include the change in prime ministers due to natural death such as through sickness, old age, or an accident, but will include the change in prime minister due to political death such as assassination. The level of political stability will be considered by comparing the duration of each government.

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12. SEE, Leon Hurwitz, "An Index of Democratic Political Stability : A Methodological Note" , Comparative Political Studies, Vol.4, No.1, ( April 1971 ), PP. 41-68.

## REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Several studies have tested various aspects of the hypotheses which concern us. It is helpful to review some of these here.

PAUL R. BRASS took issue with Huntington in his article, " Political Participation, Institutionalization<sup>13</sup> and Stability in India ". He showed that there was no correlation between party institutionalization and political stability in India's party system. Brass compared the level of party institutionalization of the Congress Party which was the highest level with the other low institutionalized parties in India. He found that in the 1967 and 1968 Indian State Elections, the Congress Party was unable to form a government in six states and was replaced by multi-party and multi-group coalitions. Brass concluded :

Political stability clearly does not depend solely upon whether or not the Congress is returned to power by the electoral process. Congress governments can be brought down as well as coalition governments and coalition governments can be stable as well as Congress or other single-party government.<sup>14</sup>

In short, it is not generally true that the higher institutionalized party will bring more stability than the less institutionalized one.

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13. Paul R. Brass, " Political Participation, Institutionalization and Stability in India ", Government and Opposition, Vol.4,( Winter 1969 ), PP. 23-53.

14. Ibid., P. 49.

Brass also did a comparative analysis of participation and stability. He compared the electoral participation of the all-India vote to the changes in the Congress vote for the State Assemblies from 1957-1967. During this period, there were three general elections in the years 1957, 1962 and 1967. In these three elections, the percentages of electoral participation increased continuously from 47.74 % in 1957 to 56.29 % in 1962 and to 61.43 % in 1967. At the same time, there was a steady decline for the Congress vote from the 1957 General Elections through 1967. In the 1957 General Elections, the percentage of the Congress State Assembly vote was 45.49 %, then dropped to 44.38 % in the 1962 elections and dropped to 39.96 % in the 1967 elections. Brass concluded :

However, despite the fact that the general increase in participation occurred simultaneously with a general decline in the Congress vote, the correlation coefficient for increased rates of participation and the variation in the Congress vote over the decade is not significant (0.13).<sup>15</sup>

In a recent article, Adam Przeworski seemed to contradict to Huntington's hypothesis. In his article, " Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization the Source of Decay ? " <sup>16</sup> Przeworski concentrated

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15. Ibid., P. 27.

16. Adam Przeworski, " Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization the Source of Decay ?", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIX, ( March 1975 ), PP.49-67.

on Huntington's hypothesis that stability is threatened by either excessive or rapidly increasing political participation. He investigated political participation ( France, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Germany, United Kingdom, Finland, Canada and Switzerland ) in ten democratic developed societies and found :

The threat to the stability of democratic capitalist system comes not from political participation, which for most people involves little more than voting at regular intervals. Rather, the real threat is posed by withdrawals of groups from the electoral process and a loss of legitimacy of the institutionalized forms of conflict processing.<sup>17</sup>

In short, Przeworski found that there was no relationship between rapid increases in participation and stability. Rather, the major threat to stability was the withdrawal of groups from the electoral process.

The studies of Brass and Przeworski were strongly contradictory to Huntington's hypothesis, both to the relationship between party institutionalization and stability and as well as to the relationship between participation and stability.

However, the following studies of Michael Taylor and V.M Herman , and part of Hoang Kim Giam's thesis, unlike Brass and Przeworski, and seemed to support Huntington's hypothesis.

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17. Ibid., P. 67.

Michael Taylor and V.M. Herman, in the American  
<sup>18</sup>  
Political Science Review, tested the relationship between  
 the duration of cabinets and the fragmentation of the party  
 system in the whole of the Lower House. They analyzed 196  
 governments ( of 19 countries ) that had experienced  
 competitive elections and uninterrupted parliamentary  
 governments since the formation of the first post-war  
 governments up to January 1, 1969.

By examining these 196 governments, Taylor and  
 Herman found out that there were 137 coalition governments  
 with a mean duration of 624.5 days , and 59 one-party  
 governments with a mean duration of 1107.9 days. An analysis  
 of variance showed that the relationship between stability  
 and the existence of coalition governments is significant  
 at the .001 level.<sup>19</sup> This analysis, therefore, strongly  
 supported their hypothesis that:<sup>20</sup> "one-party governments are  
 more stable than coalition governments."

Taylor and Herman also tested the correlation  
 between majority government and stability. Their hypothesis  
 was that : " Majority governments are more stable than  
<sup>21</sup>  
 minority governments."

18. Michael Taylor and V.M. Herman, " Party Systems and Govern-  
 ment Stability ", The American Political Science  
Review, Vol. LXV, ( March 1971 ), PP. 28-37.

19. Taylor and Herman defined a dichotomous variable , C, which  
 takes the value 0 when the government consists of a single  
 party, and the value 1 when the government is a coalition  
 of two or more parties.

20. Ibid., 31.

21. Ibid., 31.

This hypothesis was tested by an analysis of variance of the dependence of the stability variable on the majority/minority government dichotomy. There were 159 majority governments with a mean duration of 838.8 days, and 37 minority governments with a mean duration of 501.3 days. The analysis revealed that the relationship was significant at only the .05 level, so that the above <sup>22</sup> hypothesis was confirmed, but not very strongly.

The Taylor-Herman analysis seems to support Huntington's institutionalization hypothesis in the sense that the higher the level of institutionalization of a party, the more likely it is that stability will be high. The ability of a one-party government or a majority government to survive longer than the other types of party governments is apparently a result of their higher level of party institutionalization.

Hoang Kim Giam's thesis, "Governmental Instability in the Indian States 1967-1972" <sup>23</sup> seemed to support Huntington's hypothesis as well. In his thesis, Giam tried to test whether or not a more fragmented legislative party led to more unstable government. Giam looked at 27 governments

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22. Ibid., P. 31.

23. Hoang Kim Giam, Governmental Instability in the Indian States 1967-1972, Unpublished Master Thesis, Kansas State University, 1974.

formed after the fourth general elections in 1967 in eight states : Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, West Bengal, Haryana, Madhaya Pradesh, Orissa and Kerala. On the basis of his analysis, Giam concluded that his hypothesis, " the lower the degree of fractionalization there is in legislature, the more likely that government will be stable " was well confirmed.

Second, Giam also tried to find the answer to the question, " How much does the fractionalization of the party system in a coalition government explain the variation in governmental stability ? " His selected hypothesis was, " the lower degree of fractionalization there is in coalition, the more likely it is that government will be stable." In this analysis, Giam concentrated upon the 21 coalition governments during the full term of five years from 1967-1972 in the above mentioned eight states. The correlation between governmental stability and governmental fractionalization was found to be  $r = -.479$  (  $r^2 = 0.229$  ) which was moderately strong. Giam's above hypothesis was, again, well confirmed.

The testing of the above two hypotheses well supported Huntington's hypothesis that the higher the level of party institutionalization, the more likely it is that stability will be high.

However, the process of our analysis in the next chapter will be a little different, but the purpose of finding out the correlation between party institutionalization, participation and stability will remain the same. It might be interesting to find out whether our analysis will support Huntington or will support Brass and Przeworski.



### CHAPTER III THE ANALYSIS OF DATA

The purpose of this thesis as well as of this chapter is to analyze whether the correlation between party institutionalization, participation and stability still can be observed in Thailand where party institutionalization, participation and stability are low.

Even though the over all level of institutionalization of Thai parties is low, still the level of institutionalization of some parties is higher than others, at certain periods of time. So, what we will first analyze in this chapter is the level of institutionalization of specific parties at specific periods of time and see whether or not the parties that have higher levels of institutionalization bring more stability than the less institutionalized parties.

#### THE SCOPE OF MEASUREMENT

Huntington designates the four criterion of party institutionalization :

- adaptability - is an acquired organizational characteristic. It is, in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. <sup>24</sup>
- complexity - may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits.<sup>25</sup>

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24. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., P.13.

25. \_\_\_\_\_, op.cit., PP. 17-18.

autonomy - is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior.<sup>26</sup>

coherence- the more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group.<sup>27</sup>

However, we are unable to analyze all of the four aspects of Huntington's concept of party institutionalization. We are able to analyze only two aspects of his concept : adaptability and coherence. The main reason for our limited scope of analysis is the unavailable data of complexity and autonomy of Thai parties.

Data and documents mostly have come from the Thai Ministry of Interior, the House of Representatives, the National Institute of Development Administration and some Thai weekly magazines and newspapers. The data have been coded and analyzed using regression and analysis of variance techniques.

28

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26. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., P.20

27. \_\_\_\_\_, op.cit., P.22

28. A Stepwise Regression Program and the analysis of variance parties of the Aardvark Program have been utilized. STEPWISE is a FORTRAN IV program which does a stepwise multiple regression for a dependent variable Y and a set of independent variables  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$  showing the equation at

# 1. ADAPTABILITY-RIGIDITY

According to Huntington :

The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization.<sup>29</sup>

Huntington explained the concept of adaptability in terms of the age of the party. Huntington stated :

The longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period.. The adaptability of an organization can in a rough sense be measured by its age.<sup>30</sup>

The correlation between party institutionalization and stability which we will find out in this category will be on the examination of the ages of the parties and the duration of the governments that were governed by these political groups or political parties.

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each step of the regression, and, in addition, reporting averages, standard deviations, and Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients for all of the variables. The Stepwise Program is prepared by the Computing Center at Kansas State University. AARDVARK is a generalized statistical program that was obtained from Iowa State University, Ames, by the Kansas State University computing center and the statistical laboratory in 1969. The KSU version of AARDVARK run under two basic modes of analysis ; analysis of variance of balanced data, including covariance analysis of balanced data, and regression analysis.

29. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., P.13

30. \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, op.cit., P.13

As it has been said, some political groups have been organized in the parliament since 1946 and some of these groups were able to form the governments. From 1946-1975, Thailand experienced twenty-three governments and out of these, only twelve governments were governed by political parties. These twelve governments are shown in in the following table.

TABLE 1

<u>Age of Parties (Establishing-Ruling)</u>		<u>Duration of Govts</u>	
	<u>Days</u>		<u>Days</u>
1.	24 (Mar.1-Mar.,1946) Sahacheep Party-Pridi I		74 (Mar.24-June 7,1946)
2.	98 (Mar.1-June 8,1946) Sahacheep Party-Pridi II		2 (June 8-June 9,1946)
3.	101 (Mar.1-June 11,1946) Sahacheep Party-Pridi III		70 (June 11-Aug.22,1946)
4.	113 (May 1-Aug.23,1946) Constitutional Front-Thamrong I		227 (Aug.23,1946-May 29,1947)
5.	395 (May 1,1946-May 30,1947) Constitutional Front P.-Thamrong II		157 (May 30-Nov.8,1947)
6.	580 (April 5,1946-Nov.10,1947) Democrat P.-Kuang III		86 (Nov.10,1947-Feb.6,1948)
7.	680 (April 5,1946-Feb.21,1948) Democrat P.Kuang IV		46 (Feb.21-April 8,1948)
8.	26 (Feb.26-Mar.24,1952) Seri Manangkhasila P.-Phibun VII		1795 (Mar.24,1952-Feb.26,1957)

<u>Age of Parties (Establishing-Ruling)</u>		<u>Duration of Govts</u>	
	<u>Days</u>		<u>Days</u>
9.	1844		175
	(Feb.26,1952-Mar.21,1957)		(Mar.21-Sept.16,1957)
	Seri Manangkhasila P.-Phibun III		
10.	180		290
	(July 2,1957-Jan.1,1958)		(Jan.1-Oct.20,1958)
	Unionist P.-Thanom I		
11.	134		964
	(Oct.24,1968-Mar.7,1969)		(Mar.7,1969-Nov.17,1971)
	United Thai People's P.-Thanom III		
12.	10,536		14
	(April 5,1946-Feb.21,1975)		(Feb.21-Mar.6,1975)
	Democrat P.-Seni II		

31.

The data in this table showed no significant correlation between the ages of parties and the stability of governments. In the last election, we saw that the age of the Democrat Party when it took power was the oldest, 10,536 days, which should have brought the most stability, but it did not. The duration of the Democrat Party government was only 14 days. In the three previous elections, the ages of the Seri Manangkhasila Party, the Unionist Party and the United Thai People's Party were less than that of the Democrat Party, but the duration of their governments was much longer than that of the Democrat Party.

However, in order to be able to get a better conclusion about the correlation between party institutionalization and stability, the Stepwise Program has been used

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31. We assumed that every month had 30 days.

in this analysis. Six selected regression equations were tested. These equations are :

1.  $y = a + bx$
2.  $y = a + bx^2$
3.  $y = a + bx + cx^2$
4.  $y = a + bx^3$
5.  $y = a + bx + cx^3$
6.  $y = a + bx + cx^2 + dx^3$

In this program :

$y$  = stability ( duration of governments )

$x$  (1) = age of the party

$x$  (2) =  $y^2$

$x$  (3) =  $age^2$

$x$  (4) =  $age^3$

The multiple correlation coefficient found in this analysis was only 0.32164 and the best regression equation was  $Y = a + bx + cx^2$

TABLE 2

Multiple Correlation Coefficient = 0.32164

Constant Term = 462.3097

<u>Var.</u>	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Std. Dev. Coeff.</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Beta Coeff.</u>
1	-0.3268	0.3941	-0.8293	-1.8315
3	0.0000	0.0000	0.7361	1.6258

**THIS BOOK  
CONTAINS  
NUMEROUS PAGES  
WITH DIAGRAMS  
THAT ARE CROOKED  
COMPARED TO THE  
REST OF THE  
INFORMATION ON  
THE PAGE.**

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When coming to this point, it is quite interesting to compare the stability of governments that are ruled by political parties with those that are not ruled by political parties, using a difference of mean test. The purpose of this comparison is to see whether or not the governments that are ruled by political parties are more stable than governments not ruled by political parties. From 1946-1975 Thailand had twelve different party governments and eleven governments that were not ruled by political parties but by dictators or by civilian caretakers. These governments and their duration are as follows :

TABLE 3

<u>Age of Parties (Establishing-Ruling)</u>		<u>Duration of Govts.</u>
	<u>Days</u>	<u>Days</u>
1.	0 Kuang II	53 (Jan.31-Mar.23,1964)
2.	0 Phibun III	345 (April 8,1948-Mar.23,1949)
3.	0 Phibun IV	976 (Mar.24,1949-Nov.29,1951)
4.	0 Phibun V	7 (Nov.29,1951-Dec.6,1951)
5.	0 Phibun VI	107 (Dec.6,1951-Mar.23,1952)
6.	0 Pote I	99 (Sept.21-Dec.31,1957)
7.	0 Sarit I	1760 (Feb.9,1959-Dec.8,1963)

<u>Age of Parties ( Establishing-Ruling )</u>		<u>Duration of Govts.</u>
	<u>Days</u>	<u>Days</u>
8.	0 Thanom II	1931 (Dec.9,1963-Mar.7,1969)
9.	0 Thanom IV	297 (Dec.18,1972-Oct.14,1973)
10.	0 Sanya I	218 (Oct.14,1973-May 22,1974)
11.	0 Sanya II	234 (May 27,1974-Feb.14,1975)

By looking at the mean of the duration of governments in these two tables, we see in Table 3 that the mean of the duration of governments - of those not ruled by political parties, is 547.2 days which is higher than the mean in Table 1 - governments which are ruled by political parties - which is only 329.2 days. From this comparision, it looks as though governments without party backing are more stable than governments which come to power by political parties. An analysis of variance , however, shows that these difference are not significant, with the significance level indicated at  $\alpha$  ( alpha ) = 0.38079. This thirty-eight percent risk was too high to make any conclusion. So all we can say is that there is no significant difference of stability between the governments that are ruled by political parties and the governments that are not ruled by political parties.

## 2. COHERENCE-DISUNITY

A second measure of party institutionalization is the coherence of the parties. In this measurement, Huntington explained :

The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less it is institutionalized.<sup>32</sup>

From this conception, the analysis of the party affiliation of voters will be our target.

### PARTY AFFILIATION

In general, the unification and the coherence of any political party can be seen from its ability to mobilize and canvass voters to vote for a party's candidates. The failure of any party to do so is interpreted as the lack of party coherence which, of course, includes the lack of party institutionalization. The increasing rates of the re-elected members of a party is also interpreted as a high level of party coherence and high level of party institutionalization, and the diminishing rates of re-elected members of any party is interpreted as the low level of party coherence and low level of party institutionalization. According to Huntington, the more institutionalized the party, the more stability it brings to government.

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32. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., P.22.

Because the coherence of parties will be our criterion to find out about the level of party institutionalization, the degree of a party's coherence is determined by the numbers of re-elected candidates of the party.

To find out the correlation between party institutionalization and stability, we will be looking at the numbers of the re-elected MPs in the last six general elections and the duration of each government in these periods. The following table shows the percentages of the re-elected MPs and the duration of the government formed by these elections.

TABLE 4

<u>Elections Years</u>	<u>% of MPs Re-elected</u>	<u>Duration of Govts(Days)</u>
1. Jan.29,1948	26.2 (26/99)	46 (Feb.21-April 8,1948)
2. Feb.26,1952	33 (40/121)	1795 (Mar.24,1952-Feb.26,1957)
3. Feb.26,1957	40.6 (65/160)	175 (Mar.21-Sept.16,1957)
4. Dec.15,1957	55 (89/160)	290 (Jan.1-Oct.20,1958)
5. Feb.10,1969	23.3 (51/219)	964 (Mar.7,1969-Nov.17,1971)
6. Jan.26,1975	25.6 (68/265)	14 (Feb.21-Mar.6,1975)

The data from this table, again, did not support Huntington's hypothesis and did not show any relationship between the numbers of re-elected MPs and the duration of the government. Since the percentage of the re-elected MPs in the December 1957 Elections was the highest, the government following this election should have been the most stable. But it was not. The government formed after this election lasted only 290 days while in the 1969 Elections when only 51 MPs or about 23.3 % were re-elected, the government lasted 964 days, much longer than the government formed after the December 1957 Elections. The duration of the government formed after the 1952 Elections did not support Huntington's hypothesis, but the three governments formed after the 1948, the February 1957 and the 1975 Elections which had 26.2 %, 40.6 % and 25.6 % of the re-elected MPs did support Huntington's hypothesis and did show some relationship between the numbers of the re-elected MPs and the duration of the governments. Before we make conclusion, let us look at the result of the computer analysis.


The computing process to find out the correlation between party institutionalization and stability showed that the best multiple correlation coefficient was only 0.32834.

TABLE 5

Multiple correlation coefficient = 0.32834

Constant term = -1750.3375

<u>Var.</u>	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Std.Dev.Coeff.</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Beta Coeff.</u>
1	138.6475	268.4789	0.4810	2.3602
3	-1.9022	3.6512	-0.5210	-2.5408

FIGURE 2

The graph in this figure showed a curvilinear relationship instead of a simple linear relationship. we tried a simple linear equation,  $Y = a + bx$ , but we did not get a closer correlation. From the six selected regression equations that we tested, we found that the equation  $Y = a + bx + cx^2$  which showed a curvilinear relationship gave the closer correlation. However, the multiple correlation coefficient which we found was only 0.32834. We may conclude that there is no correlation between party institutionalization and stability.

#### NUMBERS OF THE ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE PARTY GOVERNMENTS

Another way to study the correlation between party institutionalization and stability is to look at the numbers of elected members of the party governments and the duration of the governments formed afterward. Actually in the countries that have a parliamentary system, the stability of government depends much upon a party's holding seats in parliament and the government will be more stable when it consists of only one party. As Lowell said :

..... the parliamentary system will give the country a strong and efficient government only in case the majority consists of a single party.<sup>33</sup>

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33. A. Lawrence Lowell, Government and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. 1, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1896, PP. 70 and 73 - quoted from Michael Taylor and V.M. Herman, "Party System and Government Stability", The American Political Science Review, op.cit., P. 28.

This observation can be applied to Huntington's conception of the institutionalization of political party. If any party captured a majority of seats in the parliament, it could be interpreted that the party has more ability to canvass people to vote for it and is more institutionalized than the others. So in order to find out about the correlation between party institutionalization and stability in this category, we will look at the number of candidates of each party government and see whether or not the parties that capture more seats in the parliament will bring more stability than the parties that capture fewer seats.

In this comparison, the independent variable is the number of the elected members of the last four party governments.

TABLE 6

<u>Elections Years</u>	<u>Party Governments</u>	<u>% of Elected Cands.</u>	<u>Dura.Govts</u>
1. 1957 (Feb.)	Seri Manangkhasila	51 (82/160)	175
2. 1957 (Dec.)	Unionist	28.1 (45/160)	290
3. 1969	United Thai People's	34.2 (75/219)	964
4. 1975	Democrat	26.7 (72/269)	14

The data in Table 6 would have shown the significant correlation between party institutionalization and stability if the duration of the Seri Manangkhasila's government would



have been higher than 964 days. However, there is a reason to explain the cause of the instability of the Seri Manangkhasila 's government. Right after the elections in February 1957, the government of the Seri Manangkhasila Party was accused of being corrupt and abusing of power in the elections. The government of the Seri Manangkhasila party, finally, was overthrown on September 16, 1957 by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Army-Commander-in-Chief. The downfall of the Seri Manangkhasila Party in this time was different from other party downfalls in the sense that the abuses of power and the corruption in this election was obvious. Usually, the fall of Thai parties comes from bankruptcy, loss of interests and loss of power of the party leaders.


Though the data from Table 6 shows some positive relationship between party institutionalization and stability, the Seri Manangkhasila deviant case reduces the correlation to near zero.

TABLE 7

Multiple correlation coefficient = 0.07583

Constant Term = 407.9578

<u>Var.</u>	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Std. Dev. Coeff.</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Beta Coeff.</u>
3	-0.0357	0.3317	-0.1075	-0.0758

FIGURE 3

The graph in this figure, again, showed a curvilinear relationship from the regression equation  $Y = a + bx + cx^2$ . From this equation, the closest multiple correlation coefficient showed in this analysis was only 0.07583, it indicated an insignificant correlation, so, we may conclude that there was no correlation between party institutionalization and stability in case of Thai parties.

## II. PARTICIPATION AND STABILITY

Our second major testing of Huntington's hypothesis will be the correlation between participation and stability. As it has been stated previously, we expect electoral participation ( voter turnout ) to be positively related to stability. This means that we will be testing whether or not the higher the level of electoral participation, the more likely it is that stability will be high ( positive correlation ) .

From 1946 to 1975, Thailand experience seven general elections and the percentage of voting participation was different in each election. The following table will show the percentage of voting in these elections and the duration of governments formed afterward.

TABLE 8

<u>Elections Years</u>	<u>Eligible Voters</u>	<u>Voted-percentage</u>	<u>Duration of Govts</u>
1. Jan.6,1946	6,431,827	32.5(2,091,988)	53 (Jan.31-Mar.23,1946)
2. Jan.29,1948	7,176,891	26.54(2,117,464)	46 (Feb.21-Apr.8,1948)
3. Feb.26,1952	7,602,591	38.76(2,961,291)	1795 (Mar.24,1952-Feb.26,1957)
4. Feb.26,1957	9,859,039	57.50(5,668,566)	175 (Mar.21-Sept.16,1957)
5. Dec.15,1957	9,917,417	40.10(4,370,586)	290 (Jan.1-Oct.20,1958)
6. Feb.10,1969	14, 820,180	49.16(7,285,832)	964 (Mar.8,1969-Nov.14,1971)
7. Jan.26,1975	20, 243,791	47.17(9,549,924)	14 (Feb.21-Mar.6,1975)

The data shown in this table do not appear to support to Huntington's hypothesis because the more participation did not bring more stability than the less participation. As we may see, the percentage of participation in the February 1957 Elections was the highest ( 57.50 % ), so the government formed afterward should have been more stable then the governments formed after other elections. But, it was not. The government formed after the February 1957 Elections lasted only 175 days, much shorter than the government formed after the 1952 Elections which lasted for 1795 days and had only 38.76 % of the electoral participation. The two governments formed after the 1952 and 1957 Elections were also under the same prime minister : Field Marshal Phibun.


The result from our computer analysis shows in the following table.

TABLE 9

Multiple correlation coefficient = 0.07556

Constant term = 276.0971

<u>Var.</u>	<u>Coeff.</u>	<u>Std.Dev.Coeff.</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Beta Coeff.</u>
1	4.8134	28.4072	0.1694	0.0756

FIGURE 4

The correlation between participation and stability was found to be  $= 0.07556$  which showed no significant correlation, so we may conclude that there is no correlation between participation and stability concerning Thai political parties.

CHAPTER IVCONCLUSION

On the basis of our analysis of Thai party institutionalization, participation, and governmental stability, we found the following :

1. There was no correlation between party institutionalization and stability and it could not on the basis of this study be soundly argued that the parties which had higher level of party institutionalization would bring more stability than the lower levels.

2. There was no correlation between participation and stability.

3. Huntington's hypothesis, " the stability and the strength of a party and of a party system depend upon both its level of institutionalization and its level of participation " , did not appear to hold concerning Thai political parties.

4. The governments without the support of political parties are generally more stable than the governments ruled by political parties, but not significantly so.

So, we will evaluate our analysis on Thai political parties as an exception to Huntington general hypothesis. The reasons for making this kind of conclusion are :

1. There are too few cases. Even though we are able to collect the data from many different sources, we still do not have many elections for our analysis.

2. The over all level of institutionalization of Thai political parties may be too low to affect stability at all. As we said, the purpose of this thesis is to test Huntington's hypothesis and to see whether or not the correlation between party institutionalization , participation and stability still can be observed in a country like Thailand where political parties are characterized by low institutionalization and low intensity. As the result of our analysis, we find that Huntington's hypothesis does not appear to hold in a country like Thailand where the over-all level of party institutionalization is very low.

In closing, it is helpful to relate these conclusions to some of the historical and cultural factors discussed in earlier chapters.

#### 1. Inexperience with the Struggle for National Independence

Thailand is one of a few countries in Asia that never has been a western colony and never has experienced a struggle for national independence. Unlike some countries like India or Israel, Thailand, after the revolution in 1932, was not ruled by an overwhelmingly preponderant party which

had won national independence. The experience of winning national independence usually provides stability and helps unify a country. The lack of this experience is the reason the the characteristics of the Thai party system happened to be something like a coalition of clique-like and sectional parties. These factors have kept the country from becoming unified under a democratic party system. Some of the characteristics of the Thai parties that have been the causes of the ineffectiveness and the low institutionalization of Thai parties also have been discussed in the first chapter.

## 2. Long Periods of Military Domination

Thailand, like many other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, has been faced with the interventions of the military in the process of political development. For the past 43 years, since the revolution in 1932, Thailand has tried to create democratic-type institutions, but it never has totally succeeded in reaching the ideal of political democracy as described by John J. Johnson :

The regime of civilian rule through representative institutions and public liberties.<sup>34</sup>

However, out of these 43 years, Thai parties experienced political democracy for only 7 years and 10 months, and the country was under the military domination

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34. John J. Johnson ed., The Role of the Military in Under-developed Countries, ( Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962 ), P. 44.



for about 38 years and was faced with 1 revolution, 10 successful coups, 5 attempted coups and many mass arrests and assassinations.

Because of the inexperience of the military in handling governmental affairs and their lack of preparation in making any fundamental changes in political processes and institutions, they failed to establish a strong, stable, and effective political party system in the country. The problem of the ineffectiveness of Thai parties was also determined by the long period of military domination that did not given an opportunity for Thai parties to develop continuously and effectively.

### 3.Low Faith in Party System

The majority of Thai people are peasants, who constitute approximately 85 % of the total 40 million population of the country. In general, they do not have faith in the party system. They do not consider politics their business but consider it the matter of politician. They seem not to understand the necessity and the importance of political parties and in the promises of political parties. A dominant characteristic of the majority of Thai people was clearly explained by Robert L.Mole when he described Thai peasants.

The Thai peasant is largely concerned with his immediate word and not too concerned about events beyond his horizon. Moreover, he tends to ignore or not question matters beyond his ability to influence or control them.<sup>35</sup>

This attitude may help to explain why the percentage of electoral participation of Thai people is not too high. The average percentage of voters from the last seven elections was only 41.19 %. The more interesting fact about the faith in the party system of Thai people can be seen from the survey of the Department of Public Relations in finding out the problems of the low percentage in voting participation ( only 47.17 % ) of the latest General Elections ( January 26, 1975 ). Out of the 5,000 questionnaires that had been sent to the people in every profession, the department received about 72 % response. From this 72 % response, the department found the answers of why many people did not go to vote in that election and these were some of the answers :

1. 84 % of the people believed that the candidates were running for their " self-interest " rather than " national interest ."

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35. Robert L. Mole, Thai Values and Behavior Patterns,  
( Tokyo, Japan : Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1973 ),  
P. 70.

2. 78.19 % had no faith in the promises of the candidates.

3. 69.36 % saw that there were too many parties to choose ( 42 parties were running ).<sup>36</sup>

Even though Thai people participate in elections, elections to them still are means of selecting personnel, not policies of parties. They choose on the basis of a candidate's personal style. A candidate usually campaigns as an individual, not as a member of a political party, even though he belongs to a party. Party offers little help and sometimes does not help at all. This is why many of the Thai MPs do not have a strong sense of obligation and loyalty to their parties after elections. They usually play their roles in free style and often refuse to obey the rules and orders of their own parties. And thus, there is little government stability. In the history of Thai politics, none of the elected governments lasted longer than three years, and none was able to form a one-party government; most were coalition governments.

If Thai people had faith in the party system, knew their duties and obligations, the possibility of controlling the behavior of many disorganized politicians might exist and the hope of seeing effective and institutionalized parties might be fulfilled as well.

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36. Siam Rath Weekly Magazine, Bangkok, Thailand, (May, 25, 1975), P. 23.

APPENDIX

## CHRONOLOGY OF THAI POLITICAL HISTORY, 1932-75

Date	Cab. No.	Types	Date	Prime Minister	Overturms Realignments Readjustments	Critical Events	Legitimation
1932	1	ov	June 28	**Mano I	Revolution of June 24		Prov.Const. June 27
	2	lg	Dec.10	Mano II			Perm.Const. Dec.10
1933	3	rd	Apr.3	*Mano III	Junior clique weakened	Mano ousts Fridi Apr.1	Parl.prorog. Apr.1
	4	rl cn	June 21	*Phahon I	Phibun's coup June 20	Resig.of Song, June 10	Parl.convenes June 22
	5	lg	Dec.16	Phahon II		Boworadet reb. Oct.12-27	Elections Nov.-Dec.
1934						King leaves Jan.12	
	6	lg	Sept.22	Phahon III		Parl.debate Sept.	Phahon resigns
1935						King abd. Mar.2	
1936							
1937	7	lg	Aug.9	Phahon IV		Parl.debate Aug.	Phahon resigns  Elections Nov.7

KEY

** cabinet crisis	cn consolidation
* major cabinet crisis:overturn	lg legitimation
ov overturn	reb rebellion
rl realignment	Roman numerals following a name refer to the
rd readjustment	number of that prime minister's cabinet

Date	Cab. No.	Types	Date	Prime Minister	Overturns Realignments Readjustments	Critical Events	Legitimations
	8	lg	Dec.21	Phahon V			Parl.convenes Dec.10
1938						Phahon resigns Sept.11	Dissol.of Parl. Sept.11  Elections Nov.12
	9	rd cn	Dec.16	*Phibun I	Rise of jr. clique		Parl.convenes Dec.10
1939						Song's re- bellion, Jan. 29	
1940							
1941		rd	Dec.17	*(no cabinet change)	Pridi resigns Dec.17	Japanese occu- pation Dec.8	
1942	10	lg	Mar.7	Phibun II			
1943							
1944	11	ov	Aug.1	**Kuang I	Resig.of Phi- bun July 26	Allied victo- ry Predicted	
1945	12	rd	Aug.31	*Thawi	Rise of Free Thai	Allied victo- ry Aug.16	
	13	lg	Sept.17	Seni I			
1946	14	rd lg	Jan.31	*Kuang II	Return of Kuang		Elections Jan.6
	15	rd	Mar.24	*Pridi I	Defeat of Kuang		New Const. May 10
	16	lg	June 8	Pridi II		King's death June 9	Parl.convenes June 1
	17	lg	June 11	Pridi III			
	18	rd	Aug.23	Thamrong I			

Date	Cab. No.	Types	Date	Prime Minister	Overturns Realignments Readjustments	Critical Events	Legitimations
1947	19	lg	May 30	Thamrong II		Debate in parl. May	
	20	ov	Nov.10	**Kuang III	coup d'etat Nov.8		Pro.Const. Nov.9
1948							Elections Jan.29
	21	lg	Feb.21	Kuang IV	Kuang resigns		New Parl. Feb.19
	22	rl cn	Apr.8	*Phibun III		coup de main Apr. 6	
						Staff rebellion Oct. 1	
1949						Pridi's Palace reb. Feb.26	New Const. Mar.23
	23	lg	June 24	Phibun IV			New Parl. June 15
1950							
1951						Manhattan reb.June 26	
	24	lg?	Nov.29	Phibun V	"silent coup" Nov.29		1932 Const. proc. Nov.29
	25	rl	Dec.6	*Phibun VI			
1952							Elections Feb.26
							Rev.of '32 Const.Mar.8
	26	lg	Mar.24	Phibun VII		Peace reb. Oct.	New Parl. Mar.18

Date	Cab. No.	Types	Date	Prime Minister	Overturns Realignments Readjustments	Critical Events	Legitimations
<hr/>							
1953-56							
1957							
							Elections Feb.26
	27	lg	Mar.21	Phibun VIII			New Parl. Mar.14
	28	ov	Sept.21	**Pote I	Milit.Group coup Sept.16		Const.susp. Sept.16
							Elections Dec.15
							New Parl. Dec.26
1958	29	cn	Jan.1	*Thanom I			
		rd	Oct.20	(abolition of cabinet)	Revol.Group coup Oct.20		Const.susp. Oct.20
1959							
							Prov. Const. Jan.28
	30	lg	Feb.10	Sarit I			Const.assem. Feb.5
1960-62							
1963	31	cn	Dec.9	Thanom II	Sarit died		
1964-68							
1969	32	rl	Mar.8	Thanom III			Elections Feb. 10
1970							
1971	33	ov	Nov.28	Thanom IV	coup de main Nov.28		Const.susp. Nov.28

	Cab.			Prime	Overturns		
Date	No.	Types	Date	Minister	Realignments	Critical	Legitimations
					Readjustments	Event	
<hr/>							
1972							
1973	34	ov	Oct.15	**Sanya I	Students'revol		
					Oct.14-15-16		
							Const.assem
							Dec.19
1974	35	rd	May 24	Sanya II			
							New Const.
							Oct.8
1975							
							Elections
							Jan.26
	36	lg	Feb.21	Seni II		failed to	
						receive a	
						vote of	
						confidence,	
						Mar.6	
	37	lg	Mar.14	Kukrit			

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY  
INSTITUTIONALIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND STABILITY IN  
THE THAI PARTY SYSTEM

by

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B.A., Thammasat University, 1971, Bangkok, Thailand

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AN ABSTRACT OF MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

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The purpose of this thesis is to seek to see whether or not there is a relationship between party institutionalization, participation and political stability in Thailand during the period from 1946 to the present. This study would appear to differ from others in its consideration of a single country over a long period of time, while most research in this area takes several countries at a single point of time. This study also attempts to test the validity of hypotheses suggested by Samuel P. Huntington.

Two sets of hypotheses are tested, using aggregate data and standard regression and analysis of variance procedures. The expected positive relationship between institutionalization and stability is tested with the life-time of the government ( in days ) as the dependent variable and two aspects of institutionalization ( adaptability and coherence ) as independent variables. Party age is used as the measure of adaptability and party affiliation as measure of coherence. The relationship between participation and stability uses voter participation in elections as the independent variable.

None of the hypothesized relationships is supported by the data. It is concluded that the general levels of institutionalization, participation and stability and the number of cases may all be inadequate to support the hypotheses.