IDEOLOGY AS A SYMBOL SYSTEM: ASSOCIATIVE RESPONSE CONSISTENCY AND INTERRELATION

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PREFACE

At what point does reductionism stop in political science? And what method of inquiry provides valid, reliable, or useful answers to questions?

If one proceeds scientifically does he utilize an analytic or empirical approach? Does he pursue his investigation through the linking of symbolic statements, through chains of reasoning that obey logical rules? Or is he more reliably rewarded by the operational potential of empiricism, by the association of analysis to facts?

This difficulty has been faced head-on in the topic discussed. I have agonized over the dilemma of method, validity, reliability, utility, combinations of previous findings, and alternative approaches to the topic. There has been no resolution to the problem, but the questions have been asked.

Before the central topic and theory is related, I gratefully acknowledge the advisers and critics who have pointed in fruitful directions. Were it not for the suggestive assistance and the critical scrutiny of Drs. H. Pierre Secher, Louis H. Douglas, and Phillip Althoff, the scope of the inquiry would have been severely curtailed. Their encouragement and hesitation have been mutually beneficial. A word of thanks is given also to Drs. Michael Suleiman and K. Erik Solem. Without their inspiring example of disciplined devotion to their profession of personal excellence, this thesis would not have been written.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The central topic of this thesis concerns my abiding interest in ideology. The generic term is used at this point for a particular reason. The eventual plan of the thesis would be frustrated by an initial conceptual limitation of the concept by a prefix, e.g. "political." A full explanation of the emphasis I shall develop is delayed until the constituent elements which traditionally make up ideology are considered.[1] But it can be noted for now that a common theme running through this broad concept ideology is idea analysis or the notion of belief system.

I intend to distinguish between traditional meanings of ideology, including the emphasized component parts of these meanings, to propose an alternative perspective. Ideology will be explained as a system of symbols rather than as a system of belief. The development leading to this argument contrasts and compares a traditional to a symbolic approach.

Pursuing a reductionistic direction, I hope to respond to previous analyses of ideology. By integration and amalgamation of previous work, the theory and findings of my perspective and research should evidence the value of previous work. In fact, the theory developed here will be built upon that already recognized and accpeted in the literature. But what is presented is suggested by combining an analytical and an empirical approach to examine the theoretical utility not only of previous analytical theory but also of past empirical investigations.[2] It will be suggested that some past analytical and behavioral analyses may be too narrowly based and

consequently suffer from a limited scope of investigation.

The hypotheses I examine have been considered from traditional perspectives. But a symbolic approach should provide additional reductive insight to previous assertions.[3] The first hypothesis of this study examines ideological consistency within a population. There have been numerous queries about the nature of belief within a population. Authors such as Lipset, Truman and Converse have been concerned with consensus and conflict among believers at the regime level.[4] I share their interest but approach this investigation from a different analytical and empirical perspective. Free verbal association responses to selected symbols are the focus of concentration. Through them I hope to offer evidence which indicates that public belief or symbol response is consistent within a population. The hypothesis may be phrased in question form: do associative responses to symbols cluster in generally similar response patterns? Or do responses scatter such that no similar association pattern emerges?

A second hypothesis has traditionally been directly linked as the expected result of the first hypothesis.[5] If there is consistency within a population should it not follow that there is likewise interrelationship between the clusters of belief? In other words, should not symbol responses correlate with one another? Traditional theorists do look for some type of interrelation.

This reasoning is based upon a suspected interconnection, a congruence, an organization among beliefs constituting a belief system. Traditional analytical theory accepts the logic of this expected result. However traditional empirical theory refutes this same logic. Converse, for example, finds only limited constraint within a mass population.[6] Blaming low educational and low participatory development as the reasons, Converse

explains that mass emulation of an ideological elite is responsible for the constraint solidifying belief. The key point upon which I base my hypothetical postulations is in identifying a distinct difference between constraint and consistency. Most traditional analytical and empirical theorists do not.[7]

The hypotheses I offer do not anticipate symbd-interrelationship. It will be seen consistent with the logic of symbol theory, as well as the o rationalized data results, that belief lacks interrelationship wi hi a population even while indicating general consistency. Constraint follows a contradictory, yet paradoxically logical, route. Consistency, at the same time, does not depend on the constraint of the belief or symbol system.

The basic motivation for developing and utilizing the perspective chosen lies in an unfortunately underdeveloped, but what I consider essential, approach to ideological analysis. Great emphasis is placed upon a cultural perspective. In the past too few theoretical developments cited as their source that fundamental area of man's valuative origins. Too few theorists emphasize the combinatory effect of ideas, emotions, and patterns of behavior which, when integrated and taught, constitute culture. I recognize culture as the fundamental base of man from which his life patterns and ideas are fashioned. The immediate consequence for this study is an awareness of the broad nature of ideology. It will be seen that ideology does not exist in political isolation. Rather, it reflects social, psychological, political, economic, and philosophical interconnectives which result in the formation of influential value orientations.[8]

This cultural approach allows the conceptual freedom to suggest

that rationality and strict logic are not necessarily at the heart of a belief system or a symbol system. The distinction between elite and mass belief becomes an academic examination of insignificant differences. Much traditional theory becomes viewed as a boundaried system of a logic which cannot comprehend the illogic of ideology. Without a cultural perspective as a base such perceptions incorporating the personal and the social constituents of ideology may become lost to the analyst.[9]

Chapter II is a survey of traditional ideology theory. The multiple meanings ascribed to ideology are considered in historical perspective. Ideology, in terms of an historico-political, comprehensive set of ideas which analyze reality, such as Marxism, liberalism, or Maoism, is a key theme. This treatment views ideology as a philosophical structure of global dimensions.[10] Some attention is paid to the provision ideology makes for the stability of individual and community identity.[11] The discussion stretches conceptually from a Weltanschauung to a phenomenology. It includes considerations of myth, utopia, the problem of knowledge, and the end of ideology.

Chapter III will consider symbol theory. Its development will be based upon the combined efforts of theorists from diverse fields. The contributions from psychoanalytical theory, psychology, and philosophical semiology are briefly noted. The potential of a multi-dimensional approach should clarify the theoretical consideration of the hypotheses of symbol consistency and interrelation within a population.

From a consideration of symbol theory combined with the traditional development of ideology, Chapter IV describes the research procedure. The validity of the method is argued by citing previous research utilizing it.[12] Also, the reliability of the sample will be debated.

The questionnaire design and test format are briefly discussed. The

questionnaire itself and certain coding materials are found in Appendix I and II.

Chapter V presents the findings of the research. This will be done within a broad context incorporating and demonstrating inadequacies of traditional theory. By relating the analytical content of symbol theory to the findings, a clearer picture of the value of a symbolic perspective should emerge.

An unfortunate aspect of this research will be the limitation placed upon an interpretation of the meaning-content of symbol responses themselves. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to consider actual meaning in detail. I hope rather to demonstrate the operational potential of a symbolic approach.

Concluding with Chapter VI, the alternate uses of symbol theory beyond ideology analysis will be suggested together with the need for a developmental systematic model. The potential utility of symbols within political science is discussed for the range of topics affected.

I anticipate that the method presented here may further a conceptually developing direction. Through a symbolic approach the outcomes of analytic thought are utilized. Likewise, through empirical method, the hypotheses of thought are verified. It is with this orientation and multi-dimensional perspective that ideology is examined. I hope the perceptions gained through this investigation will accrue to the mutual intellectual reward of other students of the topic.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See particularly, Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962); and Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1956).

[2]The works of Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261, and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII (June, 1964), pp. 361-382, have not led to any conclusive assertion about ideology.

[3]Among others, Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960); Lorand B. Szalay, Dale A. Lysne, and Jack E. Brent, A Study of American and Korean Attitudes and Values Through Associative Group Analysis, (Detroit: Management Information Services, n.d.).

[4]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960); and David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951).

[5]Gustav Bergman, "Ideology," Ethics, LXI (April, 1951), pp. 205-18.

[6]Converse, Op. Cit., pp. 228-229.

[7]Roger W. Cobb, "The Belief-System Perspective: An Assessment of a Framework," Journal of Politics, XXXV (February, 1973), pp. 121-153.

[8]Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Random House, 1952), pp. 283-302; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951).

[9]Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 60-65.

[10]David Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, V (November, 1961), p. 319.

[11]Robert E. Lane, "The Meanings of Ideology," in Power, Participation and Ideology, ed. by Calvin J. Larson and Philo C. Wasburn (New York: David McKay & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 322.

[12]Claire Selltiz, et. al., Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Szalay, Op. Cit.; and Gerard de Wit, Symbolism of Masculinity and Femininity (New York: Springer Publishing Company, Inc., 1963).

CHAPTER II

TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGY THEORY

It is possible to speak of the nature of ideology in traditional theory only in the broadest sense. A survey of the literature suggests that differences between writers are based upon emphases of points of view rather than absolute conceptual distinctions. The styles of presentation and the methods of developing particular approaches have evolved over time.[1] But the nature of the topic, as presented here, is the same. The evolution of traditional ideology theory has added clarifications rather than radical innovations to its essential nature.

The survey I present will focus initially upon the dual development the theory has received over time. Attendant conceptual development will mention additional points furthering a more complete understanding of traditional theory.

Ideology as Idea Analysis

The initial treatment of ideology began from a perspective which might be termed "idea analysis." Thinkers focused upon ideas as cognitive elements. Analysis attempted to determine what, if any, relation existed between ideas and subsequent behavior.

Destutt de Tracy, writing in the early 1800's, seems to be the earliest noted analyst. He presented the first systematic exposition of "studies on the formation of ideas" in his Elements d' Ideologie.[2] This emphasis was designed to analytically trace ideas to their origin in the sensations of

body and mind which created them.[3]

The Ideologues, as analysts such as de Tracy came to be called, threatened the political status quo by attacking at least indirectly the current predominance of a priori thinking. The roots of the pejorative understanding of ideology are connected to the original politically unpopular sensationist, enlightenment thinking.

Although originally conceived as a technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusions, ideology under Marxian development accrued further negative connotations because of its behavioral ramifications.[4] The analysis of ideas took on an action-orientation which superceded behavioral causal analysis. With Marx, idea analysis combined with valuative prescriptions of behavior. Ideology became philosophy (ideas) on paper which ultimately recommended a certain manner of action.

The effect of a volitional, behavioral and analytical combination was the creation of the philosophical understanding of ideology. Although this perspective will undergo further analytical development, ideology came to present a system of ideas, a philosophy, which deterministically affected behavior. The analysis of ideas came to include examination of the values underlying the ideas. The eventual result was the creation of such idea systems, for example, as Marx's economic determinism, Nietzch's ideas on power,[5] Lenin's internationalism, Dewey's instrumentalism, and Mao Tse Tung's revisionism.

Ideology in Belief System Perspective

A natural debate was forthcoming however with the steady progression of idea analysis. This sense of ideology came to be seen more and more as political thought. Increasing awareness of collective behavior inconsistent

with these prescribed philosophical tenets suggested the doubtful interrelation between thought and behavior. Ideology theory was revised from an emphasis upon ideas related to behavior to include a conceptual intermediary: belief or belief system. Since ideas and behavior followed no constant direct relationship, analytical effort was directed toward the belief element which hypothetically bound the two former notions together.

The connective within the admittedly cloudy concept belief is the more usable idea: meaning. Thus the focus in the development of ideology theory no longer was purely ideational or behavioral. Ideas and actions were considered ideologically connected because a meaningful relationship existed between them. It is possible to note a two-directional perspective with which to view this more recent conceptual refinement. Szalay notes that a continuum for belief ranges from a philosophical to a psychological dimension.[6] In the former, ideology or belief may be viewed in terms of a life doctrine or Weltanschauung.[7] The philosophical components of the meaningful set of ideas follow a logical pattern varying in degrees of tightness or coherence. The assumptions of the life theory "purport to bear on reality."[8]

Within this dimension, too, the cognitive plays an important role. Connolly, for example, suggests that the philosophical sense of ideology "tells us how the system is organized."[9] Or as Kluckhohn states,"It always refers to a system of ideas."[10] These same writers are quick to strike a balance, however, noting that more than pure cognition is involved in ideology. Belief or meaning includes an amalgamation not only of the real and the rational, but also the unreal and the irrational. To conceptually incorporate the contrasting elements, the psychological dimension of meaning is introduced.

By way of clarification, the psychological and the philosophical dimen-

sions blend within belief in a manner described by Sartori. He speaks in terms of ideology as knowledge and ideology as politics. The difference is the distinction between ideological doctrine and ideological mentality.[11] Politics in this broad sense includes feelings and values while knowledge includes only fact. The psychological perspective absorbs the range of possible feelings and combines the knowledge of belief to make up ideology. The philosophical expresses an external logical consistency; the psychological pertains to the internal consistency of belief related to the values and personality of the individuals or groups concerned.

Rokeach offers a development of the same philosophical-psychological distinction in his cogent analysis of belief.[12] He isolates the structure and function of belief. For the sake of discussion I choose to equate structure with the philosophical side of meaning; function, with the psychological. The distinction deals essentially with the "what" and "why" of belief.[13]

Structure is best viewed in terms of the constraint within belief. Thus the parts of a meaning system are interrelated such that "a change in the perceived status...of one idea-element would require...some compensating changes in the status of idea-elements elsewhere in the configuration."[14] Included in the structure are the cognitive and social "belief packages" which constitute the ideational side of the belief system.[15]

The functional perspective addresses the purpose of ideology. The psychological side of belief may be understood in terms of establishing the solidarity of a collectivity and the identity of an individual.[16] Ideology provides for the development and maintenance of community and individual role-reliance with particular meanings, according to belief and meaning development in ideology theory.

The belief system perspective of ideology then extends the notion of idea and behavior into the philosophical-psychological dimension of the concept, the increasingly sophisticated understanding of ideology has been clarified to better satisfy the analyst. Ideology is thus seen in its all-embracing perspective of meaning. The connection between thought and behavior is completed by the intermediary notion of belief in traditional ideology theory. Thus hypothetical arrangements between action and ideas follow in meaningful patterns within a belief system.

Ideology and the Sociology of Knowledge

The theoretical development of ideology has progressed along a conceptual trail replete with various emphases.[17] Disagreements over conceptual development have arisen however between analytical and empirical writers. Particularly dissatisfying to the latter are the postulates advocated through non-empirical analysis. The behavioral analysts have voiced their complaints not with the analysis of ideology per se, but in the hypotheses offered by normativists related to the action manifestations of ideology. It is to the problem of operationalizing the scientific analysis of ideology that these comments are pointed. The difficulty lies essentially in what Mannheim has termed the problem of knowledge.[18]

The conceptual disagreement is the identification and proper evaluation of fact and value. The theorist must determine what is real about the doctrine or belief system he considers. He must distinguish the truth within the properties of the ideology studied. Mannheim postulates that an awareness of the sociology of knowledge focuses upon the problem of achieving valid knowledge in the political realm.

The behavioral emphasis has focused upon objectivity in research.

It has made the case that all non-behavioral research is subjective while its own work is objective. The normative rebuttal, however, maintains that the reliability of behavioral measurement is only "a matter of degree."[19] The non-scientific analyst asserts that the nature of behavioral study remains subjective to the degree that the subject matter itself is not objective, the observer's values influence the decision to analyze the subject matter, and the method chosen to test the material is unreliable and not strictly scientific. Consequently the results of normative analysis are as legitimate as those of empirical analysis.

The sociology of knowledge recognizes the inherent problem of research. It "attempts to show men in their mental relation to social history and to their immediate circumstances."[20] The problem of knowledge becomes one of determining the relationship among the actions, motivations, beliefs, prior conditioning, in short, the experiences of life, for the individual or group under analysis. The result of the contrasting views to both analysts is to present a dilemma of investigation. The sociology of knowledge attempts to resolve this problem from three directions. By making the research aware of his task, it attempts to separate factual, logical and normative statements. Secondly, it suggests that since the nature of the social scientist's subject matter is most likely subjective, his analysis is not strictly objective. Finally, it separates the various ideological elements in the formation of any social or natural science. Ultimately the social researcher becomes aware that the problem of knowledge means that every topic to be investigated contains both a subjective and an objective element.[21] The consequence is a bewildering paradox for the investigator. All objective research is subjectively tempered in one of these ways.

If there is no resolution to the problem of knowledge itself, an

awareness of it clarifies the conceptual requirements expected in an analysis of ideology. The result is a relative objectivity attained "not through the exclusion of evaluation but through the critical awareness" of it.[22] The sociology of knowledge does not solve the conceptual development of ideology. An awareness of it however places the contributions of all analysts in a clearer perspective. This orientation will govern the critique of traditional theory. It has guided my own efforts at operationalization.

Ideology, Myth and Utopia

Although the traditional definitions of the basic concept are clear, the additional conceptual distinction offered here partially indicates why indeed the analysis of ideology has been confusing. Many analysts have spoken of ideology to include more perspectives than can be conceptually handled by the single term. Ideology has been interpreted in ways which might better be clarified by separate distinctions.

I shall continue to emphasize the previous central notions of idea analysis or belief system as constituting the basis of ideology. Particularly in this latter sense, ideology is a valuative internal cultural system.[23] All the components of belief, meaning and ideas are contained in this interpretation. In the analytical past, however, ideology has had associated with it a sense of futuristic goal-attainment. It has also been defined as a potion-like curative which temporizes current popular dissatisfactions. For these reasons of conceptual mixture it is necessary to separate ideology by stressing the mythical and utopian element within ideology.

A combination of two analytical distinctions, and possibly a third, determines how an analyst will treat ideology vis a vis its ascribed utopian and mythical content. A theorist might have a personal preference

for one or the other notion. In this case placement order determines the significance to be stressed. If the analyst believes that ideology is essentially futuristic, he stresses the utopian aspect of ideology. He views ideology as a prescription for a better future social and political order. In the case of myth, the sense of numbing the critical cognitive abilities would be stressed. Ideology thus masks the trying realities of life experience. Placement order determines the positional emphasis of the conceptual ordering of ideology.

The analyst could also follow a time-perspective approach. In this case ideology is considered in relation to the time emphasized. Ideology as cultural belief system would be considered belief shaped by an appreciation of past history, present circumstances, and future expectation.[24] Myth and utopia would not exist along a continuum in line with ideology. Myth is associated, in this time-perspective, however vaguely, with the founding of a socio-political order. It cannot be temporally pinpointed. Likewise utopia does not concentrate upon a specific moment within the flow of the historical process, but upon an eventual world structured without frailty.[25] The time-perspective then determines the emphasis within ideology in relation to past, present or future time.

A final possible distinction is a functional perspective. Each conceptualization performs a unique function. Thus myth performs a solidarity function; ideology, an identity; and utopia, a futuristic function.

The particular emphasis chosen is an arbitrary chice by the individual analyst. But it is an important one. The interpretation of the broader meaning attributed to ideology is a result of each analytical perception. Within the literature of the last ten years, the ideology-belief system approach would be considered most current. Other times have seen writers

dwell upon the utopian or mythical aspects of ideology. But a separation of concepts contributes to analytical clarification. I would recommend the tripartite distinction be used for continued clarity of analysis.

The End of Ideology

A final point of discussion within traditional theory has come about as a result of unclear conceptualization surrounding ideology. I refer to the famed end of ideology discussion. The indiscretion with which the concept has been considered over time has resulted in the proliferation of emphases, rather than identification of the boundaries of the concept.

It has been proposed that ideology in western democracies and totalitarian states has followed a consistent demise since the first half of the twentieth century. It has been hypothesized that the vital force of ideology, its passion and its action,[26] has declined because political ideas have become exhausted, analysis has replaced ideology, and there is no longer an exciting struggle in the transformation of political ideas into social action.[27] This behavioral transformation may indeed go unquestioned. Political action might be said to have evolved into a less passionate, less comprehensive and organized form of behavior than has been witnessed in the past. Controversy in totalitarian states is less expressive, the effects of egalitarianism in welfare states has diminished the potential for conflict, and a pluralist consensus has decentralized power so that the appearance, at least, of greater political freedom has defused a former source of demand.[28] But one might still ask if these changes imply an actual decrease in ideology.

Based upon the previous discussion of ideology, however, recognizing that the core notion of ideology is idea analysis and meaning, does one

reliably conclude from external manifestations alone that ideology has come to an end?

La Palombara suggests, contradicting the proposition of the end of ideologists, that what these writers mean by ideology is not a given set of values, beliefs or meanings, but a set of "-isms," paper ideologies, formal written doctrines, which may, or may not, be meaningful to popular masses.[29] To exclaim the end of ideology in this sense is not to announce ideology's end at all. It is rather to announce that political expectations and external behavior patterns have shifted.

Ideology might better be described as an independent variable not directly subject in essence to external social change, according to La Palombara.[30] Ideology then does not dpend upon its rhetoric for its existence. Likewise, ideology need not be utopian. Rather, ideology is more or less meaningful, coherent, expressive, and attuned to modern life, despite the decline in "ideological action." The mistake made by the end of ideology writers is to misinterpret Mannheim's notion of utopia for ideology.[31] Mannheim points out that the final test for a utopia is empirical, but it can only be performed ex post facto. End of ideology writers perform the test before a utopia has been achieved. By confusing the term ideology with utopia, the conclusion is reached that ideology is no longer a salient force. They should more accurately conclude, if anything, that the age of utopia, not ideology, has ended.

The ultimate resolution of the debate will come only with a definitive understanding of ideology. The numerous perspectives of many analysts must be accommodated within a boundaried concept. The open-ended nature of the core notions of ideology may be responsible for the numerous interpretations. Although traditional theory offers useful reductionary analysis

most helpful to both the novice and sophisticated student, the natural tendency remains for each scholar to isolate a key emphasis and develop his individual orientation to it. The result is a continued conceptual expansion which must ultimately diminish the analytical return on investment.

Given the major tenets of traditional theory the scope of this paper will turn to an examination of an alternative approach. While it is not my purpose to appear definitive, I do intend to point in a direction where collective future efforts may work towards that end. Ideology as either idea analysis or belief system remain viable and useful concepts. For the sake of eventual clarification of research focus, I would like to propose the examination of ideology as symbol system. The remainder of this study is devoted to the theoretical development and empirical operationalization through which this concept can be considered. The hope and the anticipation are that these efforts can contribute to the eventual definitive identification of the concept ideology.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Of particular note is the advent of behavioral techniques which have in the last twenty years, particularly, added new insights to the same basic concept which was previously explored only analytically.

[2]Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964), p. 300.

[3]Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, LXVI (June, 1972), p. 499.

[4]Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity, (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1956), p. 153.

[5]Bendix, Op. Cit., p. 305.

[6]Lorand B. Szalay, Rita M. Kelly, Won T. Moon, "Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement," Comparative Political Studies, V (July, 1972), p. 152.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]William Connolly, Political Science and Ideology, (New York: Atherton Press, 1967).

[10]Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 432.

[11]Giovanni Sartori, "Politcs, Ideology, and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review, LXIII (June, 1969), p. 398-400.

[12]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960).

[13]The end result of all functioning is the fulfillment of a goal. This is the case in the range of topics from ideology to pure science. See: Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (New York: the Free Press, 1956), p. 18.

[14]Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964), p. 209.

[15]Ibid.

[16]David E. Apter, Ideology and Discontent (New York: the Free Press, 1964), p. 21.

[17]Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: the Free Press, 1962); Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1971), p. 655.

[18]Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936).

[19]Gustav Bergman, "Ideology," Ethics, LXI (April, 1951), p. 207.

[20]Irving Louis Horowitz, Philosophy, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1961), p. 5.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964), p. 71-72.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Mullins, Op. Cit., p. 504

[25]Ibid.

[26]Robert Lane, "The Meaning of Ideology," in Power, Participation and Ideology, ed. by Calvin J. Larson and Philo C. Wasburn (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969), p. 323.

[27]Bendix, Op. Cit., p. 295.

[28]Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review, LX (March, 1966), p. 8.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid., p. 13.

[31]Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the West," in Power, Participation and Ideology, ed. by Calvin J. Larson and Philo C. Wasburn (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969), p. 452; and Seymour Martin Lipset, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960).

CHAPTER III

SYMBOL THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

Chapter III begins with a discussion of the theoretical base I anticipate using to further explore the conceptual constituents of ideology. Having noted the comprehensive efforts of other theorists, there is some dissatisfaction with the inconclusive progress toward an ultimately reductive analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to present the analytical potential of symbol theory. Its contrast to traditional theory in an understanding of ideology is noted. In fact it is possible to offer some criticism of previous theory in terms of symbol theory. The format for this discussion will be as follows: symbol theory itself will receive consideration. The disciplinary interrelatedness it requires for a complete discussion becomes obvious, as well as a partial similarity to traditional ideology theory. Secondly there is an attempt to critique traditional theory in view of the postulates of symbol theory. Four broad criticisms will emerge. Finally, the support for symbol theory is traced among previous ideology writers. There is some indication in past literature that the analytical and empirical potential of symbolic analysis offers a promising alternative approach to ideology.

The Foundations of Symbol Theory

Traditional ideology theory demonstrates that the essential nature of the topic is metaphysical.[1] Analyses based upon a scientifically rootless base pass along this empirically non-verifiable aspect of ideology.

What is needed is an approach which grasps some potentially hard element of ideology to tack it down for the sake of reliable and empirically satisfying analysis. The ultimate goal of symbol theorists is to develop an analytical handle with which to grasp the concept. The search is for both a conceptual and an operational tool to confront this topic for the future.

Thus the symbol is viewed from several perspectives. The theoretical development points to its conceptual soundness and operational utility. The range of analytical concentration extends from the psychoanalytical and psychological dimension to a philosophical perspective; attention is given to the metaphysical difference between traditional ideology theory and symbol theory. I shall return to the structure and function of the symbol but in terms of their role in symbolic ideology theory.

The Psychoanalytical and Psychological Dimension

In coming to an appreciation of what elements surround the notion of the symbol and through what terms one can approach an understanding of the symbol, a basic distinction can be made in the psyche of man. As suggested by psychoanalytic theory, it is possible to distinguish between the conscious and unconscious component to man. The conscious consists of the obvious, the observable, the effeable, the concrete, the objective. All tangible experience, past and present, when observed or remembered makes up the conscious side of man.[2] The mental constructs which attend and constitute the conscious mind act as a synchronic system when functioning consciously.[3] But according to many theorists, an awareness and emphasis of the conscious is to omit, at a minimum, fully one-half of reality. Jung, Freud and Erikson are noted leaders among many who advocate the analytical and positive reality of the unconscious (subconscious).

Reality, in fact, to a Jungian, is only half-grasped by man's conscious experience; it is more fully understood and more wholly conceived by an acceptance of, and an appreciation of, the unconscious.[4] Though a cursory reading of Jung might suggest that he addresses primarily the period of sleepfulness, equating that concept with the unconscious, and that he consequently only considers the topic of dreams and dream symbolism, a closer reading and appreciation of his thinking expands the role and operation of the unconscious right up to the boundaries of the conscious, even during periods of wakefulness. The unconscious consists of and is the expression of that which at any point in time is unknown.[5] The state of physical being, awake or asleep, is therefore inconsequential. Acceptance of such a concept is assured if the analyst considers it in logical fashion. What is known is conscious; what is unknown is unconscious. If the known exists in time and not all reality is in the present time, then that which is not present is unknown; but also it is real, since it exists in past or future time.

Jung takes the syllogism much farther for his own purposes in his development of psychoanalytical theory. This need not concern us but for one point. He says, "The conscious mind is based upon, and results from, an unconscious psyche which is prior to consciousness and continues to function together with, or despite consciousness."[6] Jung's emphasis upon the unconscious is obvious.

It is not difficult to accept the possibility of unconscious predominance, based upon logic. It is recognizably the case that the unknown for most individuals is greater than known reality. From a totalistic view of life, more history and consciousness remains unknown to the

individual than known. Jung had an expression with which he classified the cumulative unknown of individuals, groups and societies: "the collective unconscious."[7] This is the collection of phenomena essentially unknown or not apparent which comes together through time and embodies for all men the unknown content of reality.

It is the comprehensive nature of this "reality" in collaboration with another concept which forms the theoretical base, from the psychoanalytical perspective, of the symbol. This additional conceptual suggestion by Jung is the process of individuation. It is the natural growth of the unique individual. The two phenomena, in mutual operation, are responsible for the existence and utility of the symbol. Individuation is a process of growing consciousness. It emerges from the collective unconscious but it never totally divorces itself from it. The connection between the two is the symbol. It represents and is the linkage between the conscious and unconscious experience of man. It is in essence a carrier of meaning. The psychoanalytical contribution is essentially this: the symbol is the explanatory device which carries the meaning of existence from the unconscious to the conscious. Although Jung suggests a motivational potential to the symbol, it is also possible to look upon it as a passive rather than an active agent. By supplying meaning to consciousness the symbol is the integral and distinct key, not only to understanding rationality, but irrationality as well.

The psychological perspective is not far removed from the above. In fact, its theoretical development is derived from psychoanalytical theory. The emphasis changes however to an application of the symbol and analysis of same in observable reality. It demonstrates how the symbol acts as a connective between the conscious and the unconscious. There are at least

two ways in which this is done.

First, the symbol is viewed as the representation of a referent as the product of an association.[8] In this sense the symbol operates along a continuum of imagination. That is, the unconscious has a varying effect upon the stimulation of the conscious. The amount of unconscious involvement varies. Acting in this way the perceiver of the referent has the freedom "...to encounter aspects of the referent of his own personal choosing," and he may create, based upon his own historical experience, "...new meanings for the referent symbolized."[9] In other words, the personal and historical experience, stored in the unconscious of the individual, has a variable effect upon an individual perceiving a stimulus and reacting to it.

The association, i.e. what is called into conscious existence by the basis of the stimulus, is directly dependent upon the individual's subconscious make-up (and also its connection to the collective unconscious). The symbol, or the representation of the referent, is said to be in a state of flux.[10] An associative response depends upon the individual and the immediate moment of association. Continued association may produce the evolution of a symbol, depending upon the personal history of the referent.

The second means by which psychological theory demonstrates the connection between the conscious and unconscious is a consideration of the symbol as a referent on the ground of analogy.[11] In an sense this duplicates the previous notion of association. However there is a difference. Analogous symbols represent the referent, not in terms of a simple association. However there is a difference. Analogous symbols represent the referent, not in terms of a simple association of a sign and the thing it signifies to a perceiver, but in terms rather of a connection to an

essential aspect of symbol and referent.[12] The difference between association and analogy is a limitation, or semi-logical connection, between symbol and response. There must be a relation between the symbol and referent which is in reasonable keeping with the expectation of a logical outcome. The difference may be exemplified thusly: an associative response in terms of the first relation, or simple association, might be the symbol response "run" to the referent "study." There is no inherent or expected connection between the two. In the case of an analogous relation, however, there is a more obvious logical or expected relation. For example, the response "read" to the referent "study" is such an example. The difference between simple association and analogy may be said to be technical and hardly worth the distinction, but it is stressed here to demonstrate the possible difference in conscious-unconscious relations and the symbol as a carrier of meaning.

The next step in psychological utilization of symbolism is to demonstrate the operationalization of the symbol as the linkage between conscious and unconscious. Tests can be designed which realistically demonstrate this connection.[13] This study will attempt to point to the utility of, and analytical potential of, such a test in an empirical study of ideology. Chapter V will demonstrate this operationalization.

The Philosophical Dimension

Philosophers have made singular contributions in the development of symbol theory. Their work has not been independent of psychoanalytical or psychological theory, but they investigate certain metaphysical components with which the former analysts are less concerned.[14]

The philosophical analysis of the symbol falls somewhat roughly per-

haps, but identifiably, into two categories. The dichotomy is developed from the writings of major theorists.[15]

Symbols are objective or subjective, i.e. they have both form and content which is empirical or non-empirical.[16] Analysts favoring the measurable or observable type of symbol define symbols as representative of fact. In this sense math, logic, and physical science may be called conceptual symbol systems. The thinking is a type of symbolism consisting of mental associations and identifications not completely structured in the picture of the symbol, or in the mental structure of the user. In the psychoanalytical sense, there is still some connection between the conscious and the unconscious.

A difference between objective and subjective symbols is that the former have a generally agreed-upon meaning. Consequently the mathematician may symbolize relations between symbolic phenomena and the physicist may discuss relativity in terms of $E=mc^2$ with little or no question about the verity of their assumptions or results. In essence such symbols are no more than arbitrary agreements among fellow symbolists. The observable is not really the complete meaning of the symbol. Behind such symbols lie the "boldest, purest, coolest abstractions mankind has ever made."[17] The objective symbol is not totally empirical. It retains, even at a minimum, an unconscious base. But there is general agreement among symbolists, i.e. anyone who studies symbols, that such objective symbolic constructions constitute what is identified as knowledge.

Subjective symbols on the other hand do not always involve generally agreed upon meanings. Rather, they are valuative abstractions. Analysis of non-empirical symbols places one in the realm of sense experience, metaphysical reality, and possibly even fantasy. The identifiable subjec-

tive symbol is analyzed in terms of its connotative content. The objective symbol is analyzed by its denotative definition. The subjective symbol is usually identified with emotion, even though emotion is a real phenomenon. It is because sense experience is more individually or particularistically-oriented that it obtains less general agreement and is subject to more controversial or open-ended interpretation than objective symbolism.

Langer and Morris are representative of the distinctive emphases between symbols. The contention of objective symbolists is that subjective symbols are analytically irreducible and theoretically useless. They contend it is not possible to apply the scientific method to analysis of subjective symbols. Langer, representing the subjective symbolists, disagrees. She chooses to group all symbols together distinguishing them by their respective contributions to knowledge. The distinction she makes is between discursive and presentational symbolism. The former concerns logical discursive knowledge; the latter, psychological, ineffable knowledge. Discursive symbolism can only communicate thoughts described in verbal language, bound by rules of logic and syntax. Presentational symbolism serves the communication of ideas that are uncommunicable by means of words.[18] But all are classified as "...the keynote of all humanistic problems..." focusing on "...a new conception of mentality that may illumine questions of life and consciousness, instead of obscuring them as traditional scientific methods have done."[19] Morris refutes the "mentalist" approach Langer takes and its metaphysical orientation. He identifies the purpose of symbol analysis, "to advance semiotics (symbolism) as a science."[20] He suggests it is to this end alone that concentration on symbols should be designed.

Though it is obvious in this specific instance that two symbol theorists voice contrary opinions, one might ask in view of the previous discussion of objective symbols how great the essential difference between the viewpoints really is. It is clear that *Morris disagrees* with the lumping of symbols together, but it is reminiscent of the sociology of knowledge discussion to seriously advocate a true scientific method for an essentially metaphysical concept. Both analysts here are correct in their thinking, but both are also incomplete in the extension of their arguments into the problem of knowledge. By noting the relatively objective nature of one or the other symbol type, perhaps their distinctions could be better clarified and demonstrated.

Ultimately both schools of thought agree that symbolism is a mental process. Consequently no absolute distinction can be made between the materiality or immateriality of symbols. However, in a philosophical perspective an analytical distinction between mechanical symbols and connotative symbols can be identified. The former reflect material, observable, empirical, and for the most part, acceptable symbols. The latter include the individual, emotional, subjective, non-observable, valuative and ultimately controversial symbols.

This distinction classifies material symbols in the realm of what are considered the natural and physical sciences. The quantitative rather than the qualitative dimension is stressed. The world of art, spirit, thought and belief emphasize qualitative over quantitative mental distinctions. The area of the qualitative is the realm of connotative symbolism. In both areas, however, the rational processes are involved. In the connotative, greater sense experience allows more hypothetical analysis. In the mechanical, the scientific method provides valid and reliable analysis.

Ultimately neither is totally quantified nor qualified. In both areas feeling and form are involved to frustrate the conclusiveness or inclusiveness of either. For as Hall puts it, "...it is the conceptions, not the things, that symbols directly mean..."[21] The primary contribution of the philosophical approach is summed up in this distinction and unifying clarification.

Metaphysical Clarification

A point suggested briefly in previous discussion must receive some elaboration. How is the symbol to be understood when it is offered as an alternative, in fact more concrete, approach to an analysis of ideology? Ultimately the essence of each concept appears to be metaphysical in nature. That is, traditional theory and the symbol both seem to be abstractions without roots in empirical reality.

One might argue perhaps that the two theories serve interchangeably to represent the same concept. There is a basic common bond between them. The essence of the symbol, as it is of ideology, is meaning. The symbol is the meaningful connection between conscious and unconscious experience as meaning is between the subjective and objective components of ideology. In both, meaning is direct and indirect, conscious and unconscious, tentative and certain. Also in both, perception is the criterion for determining the relevance of meaning. What is recognized as more or less meaningful is arranged along the centrality of the belief or symbol system.

But despite these similarities and a basic sameness of conceptual structure I would maintain certain distinctive, albeit non-empirical, differences recommend the development and utilization of the symbol in ideology as a tool or analysis rather than a continued emphasis on tradi-

tional theory. This distinction is again based upon a "degree of metaphysics" involved in an understanding of the concept.

In the case of the symbol it may be more logically useful than ideology. Although concepts are based on meaning, the realization of the unconscious and recognition of its effect on meaning allows a consistency of logic (or illogic) not permitted with the concept ideology. Thus it is possible for the symbol system to develop and maintain consistent logical contraditions without offending the rules of logic. The effect of the collective unconscious and connotative meaning sets is not bound by the stricter logic of a constrained belief system. Although there is room for apparent illogic in most analyses of ideology, the expectancy of consistent logic is stronger by traditional ideology theorists than among symbolists.

Another difference which recommends the use of the concept symbol over traditional theory is the applicability of empirical psychological testing and the substantive conclusions and theoretical inferences which may be drawn from it. Psychologically, an understanding and application of the symbol offers an operational potential for anlaysis which seems to be lacking with ideology. The mingling of the conscious and unconscious and the communication and expression of the personality of the individual or collectivity offers both analytical and contextual possible analyses. Because of the operational method of association and the consequent reflection of meaningful responses, the symbol appears to be a perspective which can examine the basic concept of meaning.[22] This anticipation for the symbol is of course tempered by an awareness that a basic root in abstract reasoning causes one to hesitate in drawing a definite conclusion and absolutely advocating the superiority of symbol over traditional theory.

The point is that although both the symbol and ideology are metaphysical in nature, the conceptual development of one rather than another is more than a valuative analytical preference. There are differences between the concepts which legitimize the selection of one over another.

The Structure of Symbols

Symbol structure may be considered in relation to traditional theoretical structuring. The basic components are initially similar: the cognitive logical, psychological and social components are included, as in Chapter II. But there is a major difference. The notion of constraint is not included in symbol theory. To expect symbol interrelations is incompatible with the notion of the collective unconscious of individuals and groups. It is not known how far the limits of consciousness or unconsciousness extend. Consequently it would be fruitless to advance a notion of constraint. It is too dependent upon a realization of the limits of meaning.

A difference likewise exists in the cognition content of the symbol vis a vis ideology. Rather than emphasizing the ability to abstract and rationalize, the cognitive component in symbolization refers to the recognizable differences between signs and symbols. Strictly speaking symbols have no cognitive content. The symbol is merely the messenger of meaning. A sign, indicating something other than itself, affects the symbol. The sign is the cognitive component of symbolization. This is not to say that the sign may be of greater effect than the symbol. Such an effect would depend upon the conceptualization of the association.

The logical constraint of the symbol system may likewise be nonexistent. However, a subject-object relationship exists in symbolization

which follows a pattern of logic. But even this logic should not be expected to follow normal syllogistic form. It cannot. An intervening variable is the collective unconscious and the role it plays in the process of individuation. The illogic of a symbol system reflects an illogical framework even greater than that suggested in traditional ideology theory. But none of this negates the ultimately logical nature of the symbol, given its unconscious premise.

The psychological structure of the symbol depends upon the mixture of the individual's implicit and explicit awareness of known reality as it relates to the symbol system.[23] The extent of consciousness is a primary determinant of either type of awareness. Basically one might hypothesize in terms of previous considerations that the more explicity the awareness, the less the role of the unconscious and the greater the involvement of the individual's conscious in symbolization. Conversely, the more implicit the awareness, the greater the role of the unconscious and the less the direct involvement of the individual's consciousness in the process of symbolization.

In terms of the social component in symbol systems and its action-potential, there is again no constraint within the value and belief patterns of the social structure. The social content of the symbol system, realistically however, is subject to the conscious-unconscious relationship of the individual to himself and to the society of which he is a part. The cultural make-up of his immediate and extended social grouping has a determining effect upon the level of consciousness and unconsciousness, based on life experience. The effect of this interrelationship depends upon the references of the moment and the feedback cycles of various forms of behavior.[24] In addition the level of complexity within the individual

and society has an effect on continuing symbol situations. A chain-like continuation of associations related in behavior within the social order has a cumulative effect constantly becoming more and more involved in the whole conceptual process of the social order. The result is the social structuring of ideology.

An additional structural component of a symbol system, omitted by many ideology theorists, is the notion of language.[25] Its importance is seen in terms of symbolic function. Language is the systematization of symbols. That is, thought is organized, or made conscious, in a population and combined with sense experience through language. Language evolves in a pattern appropriate to the communication level of its users. As Langer points out, it is gradually accumulated.[26]

Language is essentially discursive; it has permanent units of meaning combinable into larger units. It is also adaptive to the social organization surrounding it. As such, language articulates what comes to be recognized as rationality. It is possible to infer from this the logical conclusion: since language consists of symbols, symbols portray the rationality of a meaning, or belief system.

The extension of the symbol system incorporates myth and utopia into the language of a society.[27] Thus myth, utopia and meaning become interrelated and more or less meaningful depending upon historical and immediate circumstances. The relevant symbols in any of these areas constitute the mental life of a group.

The Function of Symbols

The notion of language becomes important also in appreciating the central function of symbols. The functions discussed in traditional ideology

can be integrated within the basic operation of communication. The communicative function of the symbol embodies the cognitive, affective, identity and solidarity functions of ideology.[28]

Thus, the cognitive function is provided for and developed by the need for instrumental communication. The purposive effect is to emphasize key meaning points which can be incorporated into the conscious or objective reality of a society. In this sense, an obvious interrelatedness with other functions becomes apparent. The isolation of obvious meaning as communicated symbolically may result quite readily in the development of solidarity among individuals around the key symbols, identification of persons with the symbols, and finally as a result of the other two the affect surrounding the symbol becomes a part of the general meaning.

The affective function is recognized in the expressive communication surrounding the symbol. People are joined, develop and recognize relevant points as a result of the non-objective, emotional, affective connotations they attach to symbolic communication. While the function is largely subjective as opposed to the relatively objective make-up of cognitive communication, the effect does not discredit, but enhances, the essential purpose and the interrelatedness of other functions of symbolic communication.

The identity function is incorporated into the communicative purpose of the symbol in that the psychological needs of society, i.e. the individuation process, are assured by the common source of symbols. Every individual need not develop the same key meaning centers; there is variety within a large basic supply. Identification with particular meaning sets assures the unique, yet meaningful development of the self. The common source is likewise contributive to the solidarity of unique individuals. The essential meaning base is shared. Likewise, association with cognitive

and affective communication symbols assures the continued interrelation of purpose.

Finally the solidarity function is guaranteed in the symbolic communication process. The point is that social integration, required for the origination and maintenance of society, depends upon the communication symbols assures the continued interrelation of purpose.

Finally the solidarity function is guaranteed in the symbolic communcation process. The point is that social integration, required for the origination and maintenance of society, depends upon the communication of meaningful symbols. Symbols both create and sustain social beliefs because they function as names which signify proper, dubious, or improper ways of expressing relationships.[29] Solidarity is dependent upon the communicative viability of the symbol system as it is expressed throughout society and interpreted within society. The overall effect on solidarity is dependent upon the simultaneous satisfactions of symbolic intercommunication in the cognitive, affective and identitive areas.

The communicative function forces meaning to pass the test of relevance in society. The symbols which pass become consistent in a given society because of the functional satisfaction resulting from common acceptance. This agreement or consistency is an agreement on effect, not meaning per se, of symbols. Most meaning is too intertwined with the collective unconscious to fully follow the expectations attributed to conscious meaning. However the possibly superficial consistency, superficial because of functional rather than essential commonality, resulting from symbol communication still results in solidarity to a society. The communicative solidarity of society is a result of symbol association. It is uncertain whether basic meaning can be determined from functional communication. At any

rate, in terms of function, the point can be made that social harmony, cognitive focus, affective attachment and individual growth are embodied within symbol communication.

A basic understanding of symbol theory, then, combines considerations from numerous sources. From psychoanalytical theory to philosophy through psychology, there are important theoretical points to be contributed. Linguistic considerations which bear heavily on the topic have been unfortunately neglected. In addition depth has been sacrificed for breadth of discussion. The essential points stand out. The symbol is the carrier of meaning extending from the conscious to the unconscious in a variety of ways: from the objective to the subjective. All phenomena are symbolic in nature. Acceptance, relevance and conscious reality versus unconscious reality determine for the population collectively and for individuals singly the objective denotations and the subjective connotations which attend a symbol.

In terms of structure and function the symbol follows closely the outline for traditional theories of ideology with two important differences. There is no constraint expected in symbol structure and the basic function of the symbol is communicative.

Criticism of Traditional Ideology Theory

Both traditional ideology theory and symbol theory have received some consideration. The main points of each have been at least touched upon. In order to better establish the preference this project expresses for symbol theory one might note its theoretical advantages as compared to possible criticisms of traditional ideology theory.

It has been noted that accepted theory, both past and current, in ideology literature offers much reductive analysis of ideas and meaning.

It is not sufficient to conclude from these works, however, that ideology has been satisfactorily described, explained or analyzed. Minar expresses the frustration of ideology theorists who rely upon continued analytical work from the perspective of definitional analysis.[30] There seems to be either a lack of direction or repeated considerations of similar themes. The need remains, particularly if one is motivated by theoretical reductionism, to pursue the topic. But the approach should shift to a perspective other than a direct definitional approach.[31]

Previous theory, by largely restricting itself to the political definition of the topic, has limited the possible directions available for analysis. Though this would not have to be so in the development of definitions per se, Putnam and Lane demonstrate that the key themes of idea and belief system running through the literature, concentrate on the political ideas of belief.[32] While it is possible to support the fact that ideology is a central theme of politics, as politics incorporates numerous aspects which may be analytically separated from the purely political, analysis of ideology could be separated from strictly political perspectives.

Szalay demonstrates what this means for another area when he suggests that, "The exploration of thought patterns, culturally conditioned referential meanings, cognitive organizations, and value orientations generally fall within the competence of psychology."[33] The point is that these areas of analysis are not strictly psychological. There are obvious political ramifications, among others, to each of these phenomena. Szalay, a psychologist, demonstrates the same limited vision in the above case, as some political analysts have been doing in regard to ideological analysis. Ideology is not strictly a political phenomenon. Consequently there may be advantages for political scientists in viewing the topic

from alternate perspectives.

Pye offers the suggestion that to consider more fully the psychological dimensions of political phenomena (ideology) what could be done is treat the topic of ego-functioning in the total development of the political personality.[34] Likewise he suggests relating identifiable personality variables, as they effect politics, to specific sociological variables.[35] This type of analysis broadens the base for political analysis. The results of perspectives from the various behavioral sciences can contribute to greater fundamental understanding of the phenomena at hand.[36] This criticism of limited scope of analysis is made in the hope of finding a potential in symbolic analysis to concentrate upon several variables simultaneously in a manner not restricted by a predominating concentration on politics alone. In fact the psychological, cultural, philosophical dimensions within symbol theory bring out the potential for analysis by this means.

A second possible criticism is that within the somewhat limited perspective of traditional theory there is possibly a conceptual overdevelopment of those analyses which have contributed to the understanding of ideology. Minar notes with similar criticism the "global scope" of ideology analysis.[37] The end of ideology debate exemplifies the result of a conceptual overdevelopment not properly controlled by adequate boundaries. Many writers discussed what appeared to them to be the same topic. Contradictions and debate arose however because the development of the concept did not proceed within recognizable conceptual boundaries. The notion ideology then became overdeveloped until writers began properly distinguishing between emphases.

This does not contradict the previous criticism. That is, the sugges-

tion of alternative, integrative approaches does not contradict the call for some type of boundaried analysis. Theorists should properly appreciate the legitimacy of varied approaches. They also must clearly state the proposed analysis with an understanding of what directions are being pursued and within those areas analysts must retain a sense of the dimension of ideology. The analyst must define for himself, and state clearly, how incorporative he understands the concept to be. The end of ideologists and their counterparts made this mistake. It is important, particularly with recent attempts at empirical analysis which have opened new analytical vistas, to clarify the dimension of analysis and note the perspectives utilized. Perhaps unnecessary and unlimited conceptualization may in this manner be properly eliminated.[38]

A third criticism of ideology theory might also be offered. Traditional theory has not sufficiently operationalized the concept for reliable empirical testing. Focusing upon what Rokeach terms "the most crucial relevant variables" one might note particularly the inability of traditional theory to come finally to terms with the structure and content of ideology,[39] particularly as regards constraint.

The researcher must know what a concept means to an individual or group within a particular culture and also he needs to know, apart from the actual meaning of concepts, how important the various elements of a concept are and how they are related.[40] Traditional theory has moved in the right direction but still does not satisfy these conditions by its present means of operationalization. Thus I suggest that opinion studies may not accurately reflect the content and structure of ideology with its dependency upon constraint.[41] Both Converse and McClosky point out that except for an ideological elite, constraint is for the most part absent in

public belief. It is difficult however to accept the notion that the public has no belief system. It is necessary therefore to look elsewhere for an operationalized measure of structure of belief. Cultural value orientations and meaning are not the private domain of an elite. The public enjoys cultural meaning, often independent of an elite.[42]

A symbolic approach operationalizes both the content and structure of ideology. It does so because by means of association responses the conscious is symbolically connected with the unconscious.[43] Response sets indicate what symbols constitute meaning. In addition the structure of ideology is determined by noting the interrelatedness of these same responses to each other and to other responses. The fact that constraint is not required within symbol theory potentially demonstrates belief structure for both elites and non-elites alike.

In support of this Pye offers the statement that, "The psychoanalytical notion of personality development and identity should help the political scientist." The logic of ideology is not encompassed by accepted rationality. "Erikson...has provided us with an analytical framework to understand the inner structure of ideologies."[44] Association tests are operational means for determining this construct within ideology.

A further problem with operationalization of ideology is empirical method. Even if opinion and constraint are not used as operational measures, or even if they are, an investigator must concern himself with statistical validity. So, for example, Putnam's study of British and Italian elite ideologies demonstrates constraint along the political spectrum, right to left, for parliamentarians in each country. To do so he factor analizes open-ended responses from survey research questionnaires. The results of the study, i.e. the factor loadings, represent

the correlations of interrelation between idea-elements. The scores however should not be interpreted as absolute belief measures. There may be some difficulty with the use of parametric statistics for non-parametric data.[45] Putnam of course recognizes this. While the utility of this study is not to be questioned, it is through alternative means of operationalization that the difficulty presented here can be eliminated.

The final criticism of traditional theory embodies the former three. Because of the limited approach taken by political scientists and their consequent over-development of the central concept without proper distinctive boundary identification, and without the ability to operationalize what is under analysis, traditional theory may lack the degree of utility it seeks to acquire. There are reductive results from previous work. The concept has been examined, described and typologized.[46] The understanding that emerges is comples but still analytically rewarding to the student of the topic. But ultimately the concept has not reached a sufficiently reductive level of analysis to enable researchers to use the concept as a device to explain men's actions, i.e. to hypothesize relations between behavior and belief.

A symbolic approach is not a final perspective either, particularly in its dependence upon sometimes questionable psychoanalytical theory and methodology. However the symbolic approach is in an underdeveloped stage and it yet offers explanatory results which enhance the previous postulates of traditional ideology theory. It seems to continue probing where prior theory must draw back. Continued development and concentration may eventually demonstrate increasingly the utility of symbols as a method of analysis and means of research.

Previous Symbol Theory Literature

Obviously symbol theory as presented in this paper in relation to traditional ideology theory does not exist in a vacuum. Others share a concern for an alternate emphasis in the analysis of ideology. This area has enjoyed some development, although too little to offer immediate substantive revision of traditional theory. There is both theoretical and empirical support however. The analytical development is presented here. The data which offer behavioral strength for the analytic theory are considered in Chapter V.

Geertz suggests, writing in 1964, that there is indeed a need for the development of a science of symbols.[47] Formal development since this time has not been forthcoming however. There are traces of repeated concern for emphasis, but little systematic work has been done.[48]

A symbolic perspective fits within a framework of cultural emphasis. A stress on the cultural content and effect of symbols readily subsumes the social or political realm. By incorporating both the cognitive and expressive realms, culture treats phenomena more fundamentally than other emphases. This is because, "Culture patterns...provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organiz process..."[49] An examination of the behavioral and valuative organizations of individuals, groups or societies allows the investigator insights into the whole life and belief matrix of his subjects. While it is possible and merited to isolate a particular area of values and behavior, e. g. the political or social, a perception of the fundamental operation of the observed persons is the result of a cultural perspective. Certainly it is necessary to dwell on the particulars of individual or group behavior. But it

might also be advantageous to approach the particular from an awareness of the general.

It may be that reductionism may proceed in the social sciences through an appreciation of the general make-up of socio-political behavior patterns and their underlying value system. A cultural emphasis may point research efforts in this direction. By understanding that behavior patterns are guided primarily by cultural blueprints, investigation can proceed. Cultural patterns consist of the overall psycho-physical context which includes the whole socio-economic-political setting.[50] By proceeding through a cultural orientation, one omits none of the particular specializations possible in investigation.

To use a symbolic approach to advance this means of analysis requires a basic understanding of the metaphor. As noted earlier a symbol is the carrier of meaning extending between the conscious and unconscious make-up of man. The metaphor is the instrument which casts the personal attitude or belief into public form.[51] The metaphor is not necessarily a symbol. It would be a generalization not always applicable to reality to say it was. The metaphor does serve as a symbol, but so do other common and recognized figures of speech. Thus hyperbole, personification, oxymoron, and other figures of speech, all serve in a variety of capacities to convey meaning from the unconscious to the conscious. All figures of speech do not always operate in the manner suggested, viz., in expressive form and content. Rather, just as symbols are both subjective and objective, figures of speech are likewise more and less expressive and more and less literal.[52] The symbol and oxymoron "Iron Curtain" for example may be both expressive and literal. Historically it has encompassed great emotive content. Over time however it has become accepted as almost a definitional

description of certain countries.

The symbol itself is but a semantic structure of a mental complex. Verbal symbolism has been stressed only as a matter of convenience. It would be as permissible to speak of any visual, physical, or auditory symbol. An analysis of any of these symbol structures would enable one to trace the multiplicity of referential connections linking the meaning expressed by the symbol to any social, personal, or political experience. The final symbol, as it communicates meaning, derives from a configuration of dissimilar meanings with varying expressive power. An emphasis upon the symbol as a carrier of meaning then potentially enables the researcher to develop insights into the whole behavioral, valuative, cognitive complex which makes up the belief system of the individual or group studies. The results of such investigation may be more analytically satisfying than the less descriptive results of ideological analysis. The difference may be due in part to the analytical tool used. Since traditional ideology analysis leaves the investigator in the position described by the four criticisms, one may look to symbolic analysis for a possible means of deriving analytic results from both the analytical tool, in the development of symbol science, and from the topic of investigation, ideology.

Other writers, both directly and indirectly, suggest the possibility of symbol analysis. However many of them do so with what is perceived to be a lack of familiarity with the basic points of symbol theory. Some seem to have only landed upon the word "symbol" for the lack of a better word.

Connolly is one without an appreciation of the symbol.[53] Though he quotes George Herbert Mead liberally, noting Mead's emphasis upon the symbol as the basic means of communication,[54] his own definition of ideology

omits either direct or indirect development of the symbol. Devine is also somewhat disappointing in his use of the concept. In his book The Political Culture of the United States he presents a comprehensive analysis of the symbol, as treated in current literature. He notes, "In this widest of conceptions of symbol, it is the basis for all human comprehension."[56] I express complete agreement with his theoretical development. However his use of the symbol for the purpose of analysis suggests a theoretical regression which is objectional. He neglects the theoretical strength of symbols in the analysis of belief. Instead he notes, "The symbol system emphasizes artifacts and myths which are politically relevant."[57] By such a downgrading of the profundity and reductive potential of the symbol and by emphasizing its superficial and more popular connotation, Devine loses analytical power.

Mullins, at first, appears to adhere to the theory of symbols. He calls ideology a "system of symbols."[58] But he then directly contradicts the analytic possibility that ideology is indeed a symbol system. He maintains it is a "logically coherent" system.[59] As has been pointed out traditional logic and ideological logic in terms of symbols are not necessarily similar. The latter is free to operate from irrational premises, while the former must more strictly adhere to rules of rationality.

Among those who more strongly adhere to a basic understanding of the potential of symbol analysis are Lasswell, Szalay and Brent, and of course, as mentioned earlier, Geertz. Lasswell notes that symbols run through the utterances of the common man, that certain symbols are key symbols, and that these key symbols are the basic terms of the political myth.[60] The symbol provides common experience for everyone in a particular group or state, binding human beings together. He recommends a continued

emphasis upon the symbol, stemming from his early content analysis studies of the late 1940's.[61]

Szalay and Brent have conducted a study of the symbolic content of ideology in a cross-national comparison of free associations as determinants of meaning between Korean and American students. This study will later be cited for its not dissimilar results from the project here. The empirical support for analytical development offered by such a study as this by Szalay and Brent could contribute to the development of a symbol science.

Noting that this thesis has not been developed in a vacuum, one might feel some additional confidence in the direction chosen for this study. It should be clear that there is no rejection of the contributions of traditional theory. On the contrary, it has been incorporated into the framework of symbol theory. Given the criticism of previous theory, however, it is permissible to venture into another, although underdeveloped, direction for analysis.

The method and the process by which the research for this project was conducted will now be considered. In Chapter IV the research design is presented and the sample described. The hypotheses introduced earlier will be reconsidered in terms of symbol theory, as will the operationalization of the hypotheses.

FOOTNOTES

[1]David Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, V (November, 1961), p. 327.

[2]Carl Jung, Man and His Symbols (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964).

[3]It is not inconceivable to take the position that pragmatic, westernized man is a conscious being. A strict empiricist, in fact, has little choice but to accept this as so.

[4]Ibid., p. 12-14.

[5]Carl Jung, Symbol and Psyche (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958), p. 21.

[6]Ibid., p. 23.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Gerard De Wit, Symbolism of Masculinity and Femininity (New York: Springer Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), p. 28.

[9]R. Stagner and C. E. Osgood, "The Influence of War on a Nationalistic Frame of Reference," Journal of Social Psychology, XXIV (1966).

[10]James Deese, The Structure of Associations in Language and Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 6.

[11]De Wit, Op. Cit., p. 29.

[12]G. Dumas, "La Symbolization," in Nouveau Traite de Psychologie (Paris: Alcon, 1937).

[13]Carl Jung is credited with the development of the most utilized test: the free association test.

[14]There is a possible contradiction made here and I will explain it directly. The distinction, although logically impossible, is used to consider "degrees of metaphysics." The root of symbolism is essentially metaphysical. The discussion would break down, however, if I were to note this without reservation. Given an obvious metaphysical base, this discussion can continue by calling to the reader's awareness the difference of initial emphasis between psychoanalysts, psychologists, philosophers and, possibly, philologists. The premises of each school differ in the degree to which they rely upon a priori development. The former two call upon empirical validation of their initial theory, particularly by the results of free association. The latter refer back to the nature of man and rationality. For further discussion, see: Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951); and Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946).

[15]In addition to the two major works above of Ernst Cassirer's see the major writings of his disciple: Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942); and Feeling and Form: a Theory of Art (New York, 1953). The objective side of the dichotomy is developed primarily by Charles Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior (New York: 1955).

[16]Langer, Op. Cit., Feeling and Form, p. 30.

[17]Langer, Op. Cit., Philosophy in a New Key, p. 18.

[18]Ibid., p. 81, 82.

[19]Ibid., p. 25.

[20]Morris, Op. Cit., p. 28.

[21]C. S. Hall, The Meaning of Dreams (New York: Dell, 1959), p. 61.

[22]Deese, Op. Cit., p. 2. The author points out that the essence of association is through leading to another because it causes another.

[23]De Wit, Op. Cit., p. 103.

[24]C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. The Meaning of Meaning (London, 1936), p. 10.

[25]Generally it is the most comprehensive traditional ideology theorists who note the importance of language. For example: Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, LXVI (June, 1972); Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review LXIII (June, 1969); and Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1956). Also it is noted by those leaning towards a symbolic approach, especially, Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964).

[26]Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 30.

[27]Harold Lasswell, et al., Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics (New York: George W. Stewart, 1949).

[28]This conclusion is inferred, not quoted. Strength for the inference however is provided by: Hugh D. Duncan, Symbols in Society (New York, 1968), p. 6.

[29]Ibid., p. 29.

[30]Minar, Op. Cit., p. 320.

[31]What I mean by a definitional approach is the construction of a definition followed, or preceded, by typological or paradigmatic analyses. The contributions and utility of such an approach have been demonstrated

in Chapter II, but I suggest now that an alternative may be more useful and fruitful.

[32]Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: the Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, LXV (September, 1971), p. 651-681.

[33]Lorand B. Szalay, Rita M. Kelly, and Won T. Moon, "Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement," Comparative Political Studies, V (July, 1972), p. 154.

[34]I am dwelling upon the psychological for the sake of emphasis. I could as readily emphasize the cultural or social bases of belief.

[35]Lucian Pye, "Personal Identity and Political Ideology," Behavioral Science, VI (July, 1961), p. 208.

[36]I suggest Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther as an example of the analytical possibilities available for political phenomena. Through a concentration upon the personality in general and personal identity in particular Pye notes in the cited article the benefits of such a concentration: "His concept covers not only the individual's constitutional givens and his idiosyncratic libidinal needs, but also the nature of his cognitive processes and the historically specific quantities of information which he has stored in his memory." (Pye, Op. Cit., p. 209.).

[37]Minar, Op. Cit., p. 327.

[38]Ibid., p. 326

[39]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960).

[40]Szalay, Op. Cit., p. 154.

[41]Thus the results of work by Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Beleif Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964) and Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII (June, 1964) do not reflect content or belief directly, because they are measurements of opinions rather than actual meaning sets. Although opinions are held a;nd do have meaning, they are not a sufficient operational device because opinion does not, or at least has not been shown to, satisfy the structural-functional, and even, content requirements of ideology theory. Opinions are indirect, rather than direct, indicators of meaning.

[42]Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: the Free Press, 1960).

[43]Deese, Op. Cit.

[44]Pye, Op. Cit., p. 220.

[45]Putnam, Op. Cit. Although it is often done in political science, parametric statistics are not completely valid nor reliable measures of nominal and/or ordinal data. The use of factor analysis here does demonstrate, statistically, a relationship, but the ultimate strength of the relationship cannot be absolutely determined.

[46]A particularly insightful article which combines these very points is Mullins, Op. Cit.

[47]Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," p. 57.

[48]See especially, Duncan, Op. Cit.; and Edward G. Whitmont, The Symbolic Quest (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1969).

[49]Geertz, Op. Cit., p. 62.

[50]Ibid., p. 63.

[51]Ibid., p. 58.

[52]Ibid., p. 59.

[53]William Connolly, Political Science and Ideology, (New York: Atherton Press, 1967).

[54]George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago, 1934).

[55]Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Little, Brown and Company, 1972).

[56]Ibid., p. 106.

[57]Ibid., p. 111.

[58]Mullins, Op. Cit., p. 510.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Lasswell, Op. Cit., p. 13.

[61]Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Symbols, Meanings, and Social Science," in Symbols and Values: An Initial Study, ed. by Lyman Bryson and others (New York: 1954).

[62]Lorand B. Szalay and Jack Brent, "The Analysis of Cultural Meanings Through Free Verbal Associations," Journal of Social Psychology, LXXII (1967), pp. 161-187.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESEARCH PROCESS

In this section the process and the means by which the data have been operationalized to investigate the major hypotheses are considered. It will be necessary, if the symbol theory discussed is to become an accepted part of ideology theory, to present valid and reliable support for the major claims of the theory.

Of course in any social science research absolute validity is a practical impossibility.[1] Since the subject of research is man, no measure of certainty exists that determines the "true differences" among individuals and groups. Insofar as human response can be trusted to reflect the truth, a social scientist can conduct a valid study. What is emphasized in this work, rather than absolute validity, is what Selltiz terms "pragmatic validity."[2] This study relies upon the "usefulness of the measuring instrument as an indicator or a predictor of some other behavior or characteristic of the individual."[3] The method chosen is a free association test, as developed by Jung, described by Deese, and used by Szalay, to measure the strength of the hypotheses.[4] It seems legitimate to base the use of this method upon the successes achieved by others. Consequently the primary measuring instrument is considered a pragmatically valid tool for this research.

From the evidence obtained in the pre-test of this method the measurement technique may also be judged reliable. In addition to the repeated successes of the above investigators, there is pre-test evidence suggesting

that very little variation in responses exists among respondents of any of my tests. Thus to assure that the results of the test were reliable, i. e. consistent over time, independently of the final test, I comparably measured the same group situation with the same test on several occasions.[5] The results indicate that the measuring device is indeed a consistently reliable means of obtaining results.

Restatement of the Hypotheses in Terms of Symbol Theory

To review the purpose of this research and as well to restate and clarify the major hypotheses in terms of the previous discussion of symbol theory, the following comments are offered.

This study was devised for one basic reason: to direct the theoretical analysis of ideology in a continual reductionary direction to add to the perspectives already developed by traditional theorists. Traditional theory was not invalidly or unreliably derived. But certain questions require considerably more investigation. Those postulates previously analyzed offer insightful but admittedly incomplete explanations of the nature of ideology. Consequently it is possible to approach the topic from an alternative direction. Rather than viewing ideology in terms of "meaning," "idea analysis," or "belief system," the possibility of developing and applying symbol theory to the concept can be attempted. It is anticipated that an operational potential may be indicated in this latter approach which views ideology in terms of its constituent symbols. The basic reason for doing this is related to the reductive quest of a scientist. I hope to explore the possibility of offering a reduction of the concept ideology through symbolic analysis.

Specifically the focus is upon two major hypotheses. Both are derived from unanswered questions in traditional theory. There is an attempt to discover whether ideology as a symbol system is consistent throughout a cultural grouping. Secondly, I am interested in the nature of the interrelation, or as some have called it, the constraint within a symbol system. In other words it is hypothesized that within a group with a common cultural experience it is basically the case that responses, or associations, to cultural, ideological symbols are the same or similar throughout the population. The anticipation is that groups of people will respond simiarly to common and familiar meaningful stimuli. This hypothesis has been derived from work by Converse, McClosky and Lane, among others.[6] But these authors maintain there are different levels of belief and suggest that the belief system of the public is of a different nature than that of an elite, or perhaps it is non-existent. There is no attempt to differentiate between levels here however. Instead this study relies upon the basic notion of symbol theory that a common ideological bond, viz. symbolic structure of the belief system, constitutes the basis of belief for all groups in a population. The meaningful components of the relevant symbols may indeed vary. But both elites and mass derive belief from the same cognitive-emotive structure: the symbol.

The second hypothesis is suggested from the same sources as the first. These authors speak also of levels of belief constraint. They maintain that differences exist between elite and public belief systems in the interrelations between beliefs. Converse points out, for example, that among an ideological elite there is a measurable difference in the relationships existing between idea-elements, when compared to a belief public. For an elite, changes in certain ideas result in simultaneous alterations

in other ideas. But, he reports, this is not so with public belief systems.[7] However, this study suggests that belief is not to be equated with the ability either to articulate or rationalize abstractly. Belief depends rather upon identification with certain symbols. Without distinguishing between levels of belief, it is further hypothesized that constraint between symbols is relatively, or practically, non-existent in a population. Symbol constraint does not exist in fact. Theoretically, tied to the unique unconscious experience of individuals, constraint should not be expected to exist. Each individual relies upon his own life-experience and reflects individual differences.

It may be that Converse and McClosky find a reliable measure of articulated thinking among an elite, but according to symbol theory this does not necessarily imply constraint of actual belief or meaning. They have measured opinions or attitudes rather than what symbol theory would consider meaning.

There may be a paradox to this lack of interrelationship. Even though the general system is not constrained, constrained, certain types of symbols do interrelate in various degrees, such that a response to one symbol suggests, albeit variously faintly, an interconnection with another symbol.

The second hypothesis then does not expect symbols throughout a cultural group to be interrelated by the members of the group. At the same time, however, certain symbols do suggest an interrelationship with certain other symbols. While the general belief system is not interrelated, specific parts of it may be.

Viewing this pragmatically one could conceivably comprehend the contradictions which plague ideology systems. For example, the inconsis-

tency between belief and practice for the "Bill of Rights" in the United States, which McClosky describes, can be explained in terms of this hypothesis, in addition to the notion of elite emulation by a mass or elite guardianship of the nation. Either the "Bill of Rights" is not a meaningful part of American belief, or there is little constraint between the central and peripheral symbols surrounding this particular belief construct. The contradiction by the population, then, is to be expected. It is in the nature of belief. Similarly, the acceptance of, but the logical inconsistency between "Equality" and "Capitalism" in the American belief system is understood. This hypothesis addresses contradictions which some theories may fail to explain.

The major purpose of this project then is to investigate these two hypotheses which focus upon the nature of ideology. The data may suggest a higher level of theoretical satisfaction in the postulates of symbol theory which serve to advance the hypotheses of traditional theory.

The basic emphasis upon a cultural perspective is also suggested by a concentration upon symbols. Just as cultural bonds tie individuals together in a community, so symbols tie these same individuals to mutually identified common meanings. The symbol may, both in theory and fact, explain the cultural tie resulting from ideology.

Questionnaire Design

A survey questionnaire was chosen as the actual research tool for this study.[8] While recognizing the limitations it presents, e.g. the reliance upon the respondents own verbal reports and the potential inability of people to openly report their true beliefs and feelings, the information to be obtained could only be gathered in this manner.[9] Dealing with

the possibly sensitive response material surrounding central political beliefs, the impersonal nature of a questionnaire recommended its use over personality-involving interviews. It was particularly the first section of the questionnaire which required the impersonal response situation. The attempt was to restrict the valuative influence of the research in the symbol associations. Hopefully, this facilitated the respondent's ego-involvement in his responses.

The questionnaire was administered in group situations under strictly controlled conditions. Each person administering the test was trained to explain the directions and follow procedure exactly.

With the first page presenting the association test, the respondents were prevented from speculating or "pre-associating" to the symbols. The questionnaires were distributed face down and no one was permitted to begin the test until the entire format was explained. The respondents were requested to write down their first mental response to the symbols provided. Thus, for example, the student was requested to write his association in the black space opposite the symbol. He could proceed in any manner to respond to the rest of the symbols.

All symbols were capitalized whether or not they were a proper noun. It was thought that small and capital letters could possibly bias the perceived salience of the symbol provided.

Several categories of symbols were included on the response sheet. In a total of fifty symbols eight general categories are represented. These eight classifications were deemed those most common in the general symbol system of American culture. The categories enabled drawing a relatively comprehensive selection of subject topics representative of the multitude of symbols relevant to the population. Only verbal symbols

were used to maintain a consistent pattern for our questionnaire. However there may be additional value in using varied symbols, such as visual pictures, physical representations, or even audible.

The eight categories can be briefly described as follows: modern, refers to symbols connecting meanings to contemporary persons, places, or ideas; historical, to past phenomena; abstract, to meanings with relatively connotative conceptualizations; concrete, to relatively denotative meanings; negative, to ideas opposed to cultural preferences; positive, to ideas acceptable to cultural values; threatening, to notions which arouse insecurity; reassuring, to ideas suggesting security.[10] Obviously many can be classified in more than one category. Consequently it was necessary in part to arbitrarily assign symbols to categories. Before doing so however several interested colleagues were consulted to provide at least a minimum of objective balance to the classification.[11]

The eight symbol categories were later subdivided into a total of twenty-four coding categories. It may have been possible to confine the codes to the eight pre-selected categories, but the felt need for greater analytical specification suggested the additional classifications.[12] Coding reliability was, needless to say, a major responsibility in the overall purpose of this research. The additional codes tightened the overlap among the original eight categories.

In addition to requesting an associative, some would call it cognitive, response, the respondents were required to note their general attitudinal response to the symbols. It is within the mental-emotional-social range of the symbol to test consistency of feeling as well as cognition. Attitudes are viewed as products of experience referring, in both the conscious and unconscious frame of the individual psyche, to his combined

self-organization.[13] The persons tested were asked merely to mark a positive or negative sign beside the symbol. Since there are only two attitudinal directions and the test did not include intensity of feeling, the opportunity for a zero response was eliminated. Students were permitted to omit marking the direction of their feeling altogether if they could not associate positively or negatively. But it was felt, and the response corroborates the notion, that to allow a zero response element would not accurately reflect the true nature of the individual's position. As the data suggest by the small number of omitted responses, there is emotive direction to every symbol. It was this simple positive or negative response that was wanted.[14]

A correlation score to numerically demonstrate the attitudinal evaluation of the symbols was employed. The following formula was used:

$$\frac{\text{Sum of positive responses - Sum of negative responses}}{\text{Sum of all responses}} \times 100$$

The figures will be used for illustrative purposes to aid in the determination of symbol consistency and emotional affect.

The remainder of the questionnaire was devoted to the accumulation of socio-economic, political efficacy and trust, socialization, politicization, and participation information. A number of questions designed to determine the influence and salience of political belief were included. But as the basis of these later questions was traditional ideology theory, the relevance of the responses in terms of symbol theory, is questionable and the results are not included in the later presentation of questionnaire returns.

The computer manipulation of the coded responses employed only two steps. A frequency distribution was run for all symbols, attitudes, and

responses. Secondly a number of the symbol associations were cross-tabulated.[15] The latter stage of the operation utilized the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, in which there was particular interest in the Tau Beta and Correlation Coefficient statistics. The non-parametric nature of the data obviously determined the selection of these particular statistical tests.

The Research Sample

The population for this study consisted of 155 students enrolled in Kansas State University, Department of Political Science, Principles of Political Science courses.

This group would have to be described either as a non-probability sample or a population.[16] The 155 students constitute a total cultural grouping for the purpose of this study. They are the whole population for the test.

The function of the persons tested was to provide empirical support or non-support for the hypotheses of this research. It was essentially inconsequential therefore whether a perfectly random sample was obtained either from the student body as a whole, or from the general population available in this, or any, community.[17] The test utilized a specific group of persons readily available and willing to participate in the thirty minute test. Since the data results are not inferred from the test group to the general population, but are restricted to the test population only. There is relative safety in demonstrating the data results obtained.

Naturally if this study was designed to have universal validity, a random sample of the general population would have been used. Converse, for example, had the liberty to make valid generalizations. His data were derived from a national sample.[18] The nature of this study is so experimen-

tal, however, that the hypotheses are satisfied merely by testing whether symbols are consistent and paradoxically interrelated in any population.

The desirability of a perfectly random sample is never to be qualified. However the availability of the 155 students and the willingness of the several test administrators to assist in this effort, as well as time and financial limitations, compromised certain scientific aspirations. As Selltiz also points out, a non-probability sample works reasonably well. As long as there is no estimation of the relation of the sample results to the general population, it is safe to make inferences pertaining to the test population in support of the hypotheses.

The question of the reliability and utility of a sample of college students for any study whatsoever naturally arises. Some note the generally rootless, transient, and fluctuating nature of student experience. The developing nature of their personalities may so far remove their plans, opinions and reactions from those of the general population that one cannot reliably infer student test results to any practical reality. The nature of this study, however, did not concern future goals, aspirations, or political opinions, as do many student studies. There was more concern with the nature of the cultural belief of the group as derived from its symbolic associative responses. Students remain a part of the culture and are, to a great extent, the products of its socialization. So it may be that student associations can be legitimately utilized in an experimental study such as this.

To partially compensate for the possibility that the students tested might not reflect reality, they were given the test as early as possible in a new school year. Also the youngest students available in a collective body, i. e. those nearest the agents of their general population socializa-

tion, were tested. As Converse notes describing his ideological elite, there is a correlation between level of education, age and ideological constraint.[19] That is, the greater the political experience and educational level of a person, the more probable is the higher constraint of his belief system. Since this population included primarily freshman and sophomore students, a minimum age category was used. This means the political educational level of the group was limited in terms of a college population.[20] Also the educational level is only slightly higher than that for the general population of Kansas. The mean is 12.8 years of formal education. For the state of Kansas, it is 12.3.[21] By testing the students as soon as possible after their return from summer vacation, a further attempt was made to compensate for differences between students and the general population. It was anticipated that symbol associations would in part be the product of summertime communication with the general public. Peer contact was at a minimum through the summer in comparison to during the academic year. The result might provide test results containing greater belief-harmony with the general population at the start of the school year than the common associations based upon contact with other students apart from the general population later in the academic year. The whole attempt was to obtain a sample as close to the general population as possible without sacrificing the economies which had to be considered.

For further comparison I refer to Table IV-1.[22] This table compares the test population with the general student body, considering undergraduates only, and where applicable, the general population of the state of Kansas.

The sample obviously differs in some categories from the make-up of Kansas State University and the general population of the state. But

TABLE IV-1

SAMPLE COMPARISON WITH TWO GENERAL POPULATIONS

	Sample	Kansas State	State of Kansas
Age (years)	19.0	19.5	28.5
Sex			
male	57%	60%	49%
female	43	40	51
Race			
white	95	97	93
black & chicano	5	3	7
Academic Status			
freshman	38	24	--
sophomore	43	26	--
other	19	50	--
Major Field			
agriculture	7	13	--
arts & sciences	49	48	--
business admin.	7	10	--
education	9	6	--
engineering	8	8	--
home economics	15	13	--

differences, apart from income and age of the general population, are not great. (The income difference between the sample and state of Kansas is $6,400.)[23] As suggested, however, a non-probability sample is used and all data inferences will keep that fact in mind. There will be no attempt to infer or conclude that any findings apply to a broader population grouping than that of this test group. It is within the purpose of this project to conduct only this type of investigation.

From a conservative perspective it is initially necessary to develop the factual basis of symbol theory in an incremental fashion.

From a description of the research procedure it is possible now to consider the test results. In sum the questionnaire collected the symbolic responses to relevant cultural stimuli and included the attitudinal direction accompanying the associative response. It also gathered information about the physical make-up, political experience and political belief of the respondents. While the test group does not allow general inferences to be made from the data analysis, there remains the possibility of demonstrating the potential utility of the hypotheses in terms of a specific cultural grouping.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Claire Selltiz, Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 155-56.

[2]Ibid., p. 157.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Carl G. Jung, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954-1960); James Deese, The Structure of Associations in Language and Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965); and Lorand B. Szalay, Rita M. Kelly, and Won T. Moon, "Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement," Comparative Political Studies, V (July, 1972).

[5]The initial test of the design took place in April, 1972. Compilation of test results suggested that the early hypotheses were indeed practical. After minor revisions and additions to the questionnaire, the test was formally administered in the same manner under approximately the same conditions in September, 1972. The same individuals did not take both tests, but an equivalent sample did.

[6]Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964); Herbert McClsoky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII (June, 1964); and Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: the Free Press, 1962).

[7]Converse, Op. Cit.

[8]The reader is referred to Appendix I for the complete questionnaire.

[9]Selltiz, Op. Cit., Chapter 7.

[10]The actual symbols are categorized and identified in Appendix I.

[11]Including fellow graduate students who assisted in the administration of the test.

[12]See Appendix II.

[13]A similar position is expressed by Lorand F. Szalay, Dale A. Lynse, and Jack E. Brent, A Study of American and Korean Attitudes Through Associative Group Analysis (Detroit: Management Information Services, n.d.) p. 13.

[14]A more developed and more sophisticated manner of ascertaining attitudinal consistency would have been to utilize the semantic differential. This technique however would have detracted from the overall make-up of the project. It would have required too much attention in and of itself.

[15]Needless to say, more complete analysis of the data would have required additional hundreds, perhaps thousands, of dollars which might have been fruitlessly spent. Certain time factors also limited the amount of data manipulation I was able to perform. Extra money would have been unnecessary because of the satisfactory results already derived, at least for the purposes of this study.

[16]Selltiz, Op. Cit., p. 514-515.

[17]The thesis is being written in Manhattan, Kansas.

[18]Converse, Op. Cit. This author was able to use Survey Research Center data.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Eighty per cent of the sample was in the first two academic classifications and seventy per cent were below the age of twenty.

[21]U. S. Bureau of the Census. Census of the Population: 1970. Detailed Characteristics. Final Report PC (1) - D18 Kansas. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, August, 1972), Table 147.

[22]All data, in addition to the sample itself, come from the U. S. Bureau of the Census and from E. M. Gerritz, Dean of Admissions and Records, "Final Tabulation for Spring, 1973," Mimeograph data sheet, February 8, 1973. Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas.

[23]We have combined the total incomes of parents for the sample, so the median incomes of males and females for the state of Kansas are also combined to derive this statistic. There may be some question as to the accuracy of the reported incomes in the sample. Many respondents only guessed at the approximate income of their parents.

CHAPTER V

THE RESEARCH RESULTS

In this chapter the findings of the empirical tests of the hypotheses are presented. The discussion will be contained in three sections. The first hypothesis receives initial consideration with the presentation of consistency clusters. The interrelatedness between symbols is discussed in the third part of the chapter. The two hypotheses are tied together with the discussion of the Attitudinal Evaluation Index. Technically the AEI correlations refer to consistency, i.e., similarity of response, rather than constraint. But they also serve as a useful introduction to the interrelatedness of response.

I regret the selectivity of data presentation. However the inclusion of all, or even the greater proportion, of the findings of the research would expand this paper beyond feasible limits. It might possibly also result in a diminishing analytical return. While all the data accumulated are unique and non-repetitive, there is a pattern that develops suggesting no greater descriptive explanation than can be preseneted in a selective data presentation.

The first part of the chapter is a figurative illustration of symbol consistency. The consistency charts represent more clearly than would prose discussion the nature of symbol association. All of the AEI correlations are included in the second part. However the discussion does not exhaust their meaning or significance. Constraint data results are presented in the third part of this chapter. The nature of interrelationship

becomes apparent even with the limited number of tables included.

The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the relation between the hypotheses and data results. Underlying this purpose is the opportunity to demonstrate the operational potential of symbol theory and symbolic analysis as compared to traditional theory and analysis. By operationalization of the theory is meant that the data indicate the structure, particularly, of ideology. Through symbol associations and the graphic presentation of their consistency and constraint it is possible to suggest a representative view of actual cognitive-emotive symbol structure.

The question naturally arises where does the problem of knowledge fit into this empirical consideration of ideology. That is, is this study so objective that there is no longer any concern with subjective contradictions within this empiricism? Obviously this work is as confined by t he paradox as any previous analyst's.[1] The subjectivity of this research began with the topic selection and choice of emphases. It continues through the design of the research method and ends only after the final research results are discussed in one manner rather than another. However, the subjective elements obvious here are no greater than those of any previous analyst. Every researcher works within the confines of this limitation. What can be contributed from attempted symbolic operationalization of ideology is then not absolute objective proof of hypotheses. Rather, the symbolic approach contributes to the utility of ideology analysis and points in the direction of the hypotheses. Its long term contribution is in the continued analysis of belief and in development of broader analytical perspectives for all behavioral phenomena. This attempt at objectivity is sincere and disciplined. But it is still a captive of the paradox.

Symbol Consistency in a Population

I have selected a number of symbols according to subject headings and illustrate their consistency patterns in an arbitrarily designed model.[2] The general subject categories into which the selections for this discussion fall are the following: Traditional American Ideology; American Institutions; Military Branches; and Specific Personalities.

Given the possible differences of symbol associations by the respondents guidelines were established to distinguish meaningful symbols and significant response patterns. A meaningful symbol is one which can be categorized within any of the possible coding categories of this study, one through twenty-four.[3] The remaining three categories are not meaningful in the sense required for pattern analysis. They represent a meaning which does not reflect the content of the symbol. Of course this lack of meaningful response indicates something important about the particular symbol and the respondents. But for the illustrative purpose of demonstrating consistency, and based upon the few responses made according to these last three categories, they are not identified as meaningful.

Similarly for illustrative purposes a limit was established to identify significant response patterns. In this case a cut-off point at the traditional level of chance probability was used. Consequently any symbol category receiving less than a five percent response association can be termed an insignificant response category. The consistency diagrams include, then, any symbol category which has received greater than five per cent of the responses to the symbol. This means that any symbol to which eight of the 155 in the population associated similarly is represented as a significant response.[4]

Traditional American Ideology Clusters

Illustration V-1 presents the symbol consistency clusters for what is identified as Traditional American Ideology. The classification of these symbols under one subject heading emphasizes the traditional understanding of what is termed a belief system.[5] That is, the symbols are meaning sets which for the greatest part of the population hold the most salient identity and solidarity content. American have thus emphasized the valuative and philosophical ideas of "Freedom," "Equality," "Democracy," "Justice" and "Individualism." Analysis of the meaning and interrelatedness of these ideas has resulted in comprehensive analyses by many authors.[6] The ties between cognition and emotion, belief and behavior, have been the stress of the more recent considerations. This work has sometimes resulted in inconsequential and inconsistent findings. Traditional investigations have not yet found the key link between meaning and behavior, or completely defined the nature of belief in public belief systems.[7] It may further this work to examine the manner of interrelationship between ideas through a symbolic method of analysis.

Illustration V-1 demonstrates a high level of belief consistency. With an average of five clusters of response, over seventy three per cent of the sample associates similarly. It is obviously impossible to determine an absolute level of response consistency and inconsistency. It seems natural to say however that if even half of a population group responds similarly, the response is consistent. The fact that the response is in several directions does not diminish the notion of consistency. Within the confines of this study, the population could respond in twenty-four different directions. That over seventy per cent of this population responded in only five directions to this type of symbol is indeed consis-

THIS BOOK CONTAINS NUMEROUS PAGES WITH DIAGRAMS THAT ARE CROOKED COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE INFORMATION ON THE PAGE.

THIS IS AS RECEIVED FROM CUSTOMER.

ILLUSTRATION V-1

SYMBOL CLUSTERS: TRADITIONAL AMERICAN IDEOLOGY





"Individualism"
(69% response represented)



"Equality"
(74% response represented)



"Democracy"
(69% response represented)

tent response.

However in relation to later consistency patterns Traditional American Ideology symbols cluster in relatively inconsistent response structures. Except for "Justice" the percentages of responses represented in these clusters, together with the average number of significant response patterns, indicate that our sample interprets the traditional symbols of American culture variously. There is less common association to these symbols than will be demonstrated to other symbols. The percentage of the sample responding in significant clusters is on the whole lower. It ranges from sixty nine to seventy four per cent. The number of significant clusters, itself, is higher than for other symbol types. The average is slightly over five clusters. Even though "Justice" does not strictly follow this trend, in another sense it does. Apart from the high institutional response, all of the other associations follow a subjective response pattern. The nature of subjectivity is diversity. "Justice" is likewise interpreted diversely along with the other traditional symbols.[8]

The lower response consistency of traditional symbols is meaningful in itself. If these symbols are seen as the core elements of the American ideology or belief system, it would follow from the uncertainty of response association that few in our research population similarly understand precisely what it is they are supposed to believe. If there is difficulty in understanding what it is they are hypothesized to believe, this may indicate a weak base of belief. What is more, it may suggest that those who emphasize the common traditional foundations of American belief should speak with very guarded and tentative certainty. This idea will be further expanded upon in considering the interrelation between these symbols.

Obviously with this confused notion of belief it could only be expected that previous analysts be frustrated in any attempt to demonstrate the logic and coherence of ideology, as it is reflected in this population grouping.

There is some common structure to the relative inconsistency of traditional ideology association. For example, there is a recurring repetition of traditional-philosophical associations. An average of seventeen per cent of the sample associates traditional-philosophical responses in each cluster. However it is possible to question the common meaning of the core elements of ideology. It might logically be expected that most associations to a traditional symbol be traditional-philosophical responses. Rhetorically at least American ideology associates democracy with freedom, equality, and so forth. For example the standard American pledge links "Freedom," and Justice," "For All." Typically we should expect that our respondents, as members of this culture, would respond to a core ideology symbol in a traditional-philosophical manner because of the linkage popularly associated between them. But less than one fifth of our sample does so. This indicates again the relatively inconsistent pattern of traditional belief response.

Further evidence that the core idea elements of American ideology are less consistent than other symbols is the frequent occurrence of subjective connotative associations. This reflects a certain lack of concrete meaning or specific identification within either the mental or emotional constructs of these symbols. Given the abstract nature of the symbols this diversity should realistically be expected. The meanings of these traditional patterns in American thought should not suggest general agreement as to the meaning of the term. The constituent groups of American

culture emphasize various slants in the meanings of the term. Quite obviously then "Equality" between groups or "Justice" for persons of different races or "Individualism" to Republicans and Democrats all take on different interpretations. The only possible result of this diversity becomes the apparent inability to identify a strictly common objective denominator connecting the possible response associations experientially available to the test group. The consistency clusters then represent the high amount of subjective content associated with these symbols. For previous theorists to expect consistency or politicians to represent consistency is obviously unsupportable, to the degree that the consistency indicated here is relatively less than that for other symbols.

It is possible to observe the relatively greater inconsistency of response to the symbol "Individualism." Seven response clusters represent only sixty nine per cent of the response. This response pattern is paradoxical in that such diversity surrounds such a key American symbol. Although more respondents associate in significant clusters than do not (69% to 31%), they respond in diverse fashion. This may suggest that simultaneously there is a common diversity of meaning associated with "Individualism." It may be that at the base of the meaning to "Individualism" is the personification of the term for the individual respondent. Consistent with this possibility is the unusual occurrence of a personal association cluster.[9] The associations may well reflect the unique individual differences of the persons in the sample.

Unusual is the lack of positive expressive or positive descriptive associations with the symbols in comparison to those associated with other symbols. This omission will become even more obvious in considering the high AEI correlations of these same symbols. One inference

to suggest may be the lack of salient or intense affect surrounding the symbols sufficient to elicit an expressive or descriptive response. "Individualism" demonstrates, along with "Freedom" a significant emotive association, but they are the only ones. And even for these symbols a rather small group of respondents reacts in this way. A conclusion suggested by this fact is the argument made previously by the end of ideologists. Ideology in the West has lost its passion.[10] There is no longitudinal evidence in this study however which supports this view. The possibility remains that cognitive associations combined with social and personal experience, constitute the greatest proportion of traditional belief consistency. The emotive content is not demonstrated in the response clustering. Further evidence will demonstrate that expressive responses to the belief system are generally not much a part either of historical abstract symbols or non-traditional abstract symbols.

The definitional associations of "Individualsim," "Equality," and "Freedom" add a measure of support to this inference. It is necessary to recall that this population consists of better educated people than would a general population. The greater cognitive response could be expected from a more educated group.[11]

The large systemic cluster among the responses for "Democracy" is slight evidence that there exists a limited amount of rational logic in the response. The most common reference in this category is an association with the U. S. political system. However this association, although logical in appearance, is at best only superficially logical. Even as the most common response to "Communism" is the "Soviet Union" or the "People's Republic of China"[12] these two systems no more demonstrate "Communism" than does the U. S. "Democracy." This association suggests, more than logic,

a mythical quality to the symbol. There is a meaningful expectation that the U. S. is, indeed, democratic, just as the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China are communistic. The tie between the expectation and the historical popularization associating the political system with the political idea satisfies the definition of political myth. The two are tied historically rather than practically. In terms of the socialization experience of the population, the association fits the system's pattern of logic but it in reality is a myth.[13]

The obvious point to be made about the consistency structure of Traditional American Ideology symbols is that symbol consistency is relatively lower among the abstract symbols which embody the core idea elements of the belief system. They are lower, at least, than the more specific symbols which will be considered. Also the cognitive content of the symbols receives greater response than the emotive. This will indicate a paradox of belief when it is noted that the highest AEI scores are those for the abstract traditional ideology symbols. Finally there is less concrete, objective than abstract, subjective association with traditional symbols. None of this inconsistency however is sufficient to totally jeopardize the first hypothesis. The fact that there is better than a seventy per cent consistency for all responses, grouped in an average of five clusters, indicates that our sample in not inconsistent in response similarity.

American Institutional Clusters

The definition of institution in this discussion broadly encompasses not only obvious physical structures, but also official documents and established practices. Consequently the range of institutions here extends

from "Congress" and "White House" to the "Declaration of Independence" and the "Bill of Rights."

In Illustration V-2 the consistency structures of the symbol associations are presented. The fewer significant clusters and higher percentage of total associations represented in the clusters suggests a higher response consistency than was evidenced in Illustration V-1.

The Institutional patterns contain an average of four clusters representing seventy six per cent of all responses. This indicates higher consistency than the five Traditional American Ideology clusters, which represented seventy four per cent of the responses in more clusters. The difference could perhaps be attributed to the specificity of the symbol meanings themselves. There is greater denotative meaning within the institutions than the traditional ideological symbols. Each institution has a more distinct physical or otherwise observable structure.

Consistent with this observation is the relative lack of identifiable subjective association. Although each symbol does indicate some subjectivity of association content, the overall percentage is less than that for traditional symbols. The subjective responses average a fifteen per cent response for Institutional symbols but twenty-four per cent for traditional associations. The number of specific associations is also higher for Institutional symbols, averaging twenty per cent of the overall responsee as compared to only one instance of specific association among the former symbol subject grouping. Greater specificity of symbol content may then be related to higher response consistency.

Of particular interest in the symbol clusters of the more specific meaning of institution, viz. the symbols "White House" and "Congress," is the high percentage of strictly institutional responses. This seems

ILLUSTRATION V-2

SYMBOL CLUSTERS: AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS



"Congress"
(81% response represented)



"White House"
(77% response represented)

ILLUSTRATION V-2--Continued



"Declaration of Independence"
(76% response represented)



"Bill of Rights"
(70% response represented)

to be an analogous association response connecting these most frequent responses to the meanings of the symbols. The obvious implication is the cognitive association which may again result from the educational level of the population. The respondents may have learned the denotative meaning of the two institutions and responded accordingly to these symbols.

Both symbols also contain a significant proportion of specific responses. Since the symbols have specific meanings themselves, this response is to be expected.

The unusually large racial consistency cluster associated with "Congress" reflects an interesting observation.[14] The frequent response of "Civil Rights" to the symbol "Congress" implies a combined cognitive and emotive structure of associative content. The cognitive element indicates that the respondents are aware the Congress has indeed dealt with the subject. The emotive affect surrounding this association explains this high clustering (18%). Civil rights does not constitute the greatest proportion of Congress' time, interest, or policy output.[15] But the emotional salience of the issue, perhaps, adds to a cognitive appreciation of the relative importance of the issue. The result is the significant response cluster.

The most obvious consistency cluster of the more broadly defined institutions, "Declaration of Independence" and "Bill of Rights" is an association with traditional-philosophical meaning content. Because of this cluster, there was originally some difficulty in classifying these symbols in the Institutional category. I considered placing them in the traditional ideology category. But these symbols do technically represent institutions rather than abstract ideas, excluding the time factor of historical evolution. They are formal documents or propositions and

represent a consistency over time which, theoretically at least, the philosophical symbols do not. The strong traditional-philosophical clustering is meaningful in that it associates these symbols to the core idea-elements of the belief system. The fact that a traditional-philosophical association was made by over twenty-five per cent of the population indicates a strong consistency of this meaning to these symbols. The implication of the association might be that both ideas and institutions can be an integral and consistent part of symbolic belief.

It is interesting to note again the relative lack of positive expressive and descriptive associations to these symbols. Again the general lack of emotive belief in the sample might be a possible explanation. Perhaps it is the result of cognitive comprehension of the meanings of the symbols. The lack of positive expressive association is less striking in the two more specific institutions, "White House" and "Congress." There is, in fact, a significant negative description associated with the latter symbol. This may suggest the feasibility of expecting emotive attachment with current symbols. The debatability and changeability of their function and performance may give rise to a measure of affect not associated to more historical symbols. This implies less mythical association to current belief elements than is the case for more traditional symbols.

The significant patterns of these institutional symbols then demonstrate that specificity of symbol content may induce a greater consistency of response association to the meaning of the symbol. Although there are differences between these institutions, particularly demonstrated by the traditional-philosophical associations of the broader, historical institutions, the consistency of response is generally higher for

institutional symbols than for the traditional symbols in Table V-1.

Military Symbols

The clusters associated with Military symbols demonstrate two points. The clusters show, individually, high response consistency. Secondly, there is an associative difference between these three symbols, considered collectively, which might initially be unexpected.

Illustration V-3 suggests along with the previous tables that the associative response to symbols by a population is indeed consistent. Again the sample demonstrates a high degree of common association to individual symbols. An average of seventy five per cent of the respondents associate in four significant response clusters in this subject area. These military symbols elicit specific responses for the most part. The definition of the symbols can be expressed in concrete terms. This implies again that specific symbols garner greater response consistency than abstract traditional symbols.

At the same time that the symbols represent generally consistent response, the differences between their response structures is interesting. Despite the common meaning base of the symbols, the connotative differences are reflected by different consistency clusters.

"Navy" has only three significant symbol clusters. All of them indicate concrete meaning associations. The specific responses particularly predominate. "Marines" has an equal number of specific responses but there is greater diversity in the overall pattern. It may be that "Army" and "Marines" have more emotive affect for our sample than "Navy." This could partially explain the greater diversity of symbol clusters. This possibility is based upon the idea that this Kansas-based population identifies more closely with the Army and the Marines.[16] The idea of

ILLUSTRATION V-3

SYMBOL CLUSTERS: MILITARY SERVICES



"Navy"
(72% response represented)



"Army"
(76% response represented)

ILLUSTRATION V-3--Continued



"Marines"
(77% response represented)

sea-related service is less common to Kansas raised without an appreciation of ocean-related activity. In terms of military service, Kansans may be more attracted to land-based activity than sea-based service. As a consequence, "Navy" associations would be based upon cognitive rather than identitive experience associations. At the same time the army and marines may be a greater part of the personal experience of these respondents combining both cognitive and emotive association potential which becomes obvious in the less concrete response patterns.

Institutional associations in varying percentages are also common to all three symbol patterns. "Army" and "Navy" receive more frequent associations of this type than "Marines." Undoubtedly this is partially due to the popular sports association "Army-Navy game." The response to either symbol seems to frequently (22% and 18%) elicit a reciprocal response. Also particularly common to "Army" is an association with the military draft which also fits the coding definition of institution.

Emotive expressive responses do not constitute a significant response for any of the symbols. But there is some descriptive association. "Army" receives a significant amount of negative description and Marines, neutral description. This response is partially reflected, as will be seen, in AEI scores. It may be that "Army" stands in a position of less favorable association because of its greater relatedness to the lives of the respondents, both in terms of the military draft and recent relation to the Vietnam war. It was the Army which had the greatest part to play in the war. It was also the Army to which the males were most liable for military service. The combined emotive effect of this relationship to "Army" could possibly explain the negative descriptions. At the same time, the Navy had the least amount of participation in Vietneam, at least

participation that was visible to the sample, and the least identitive association to Kansans. It consequently received a different set of responses, which do not include negative emotive associations.

The subjective associations connected both "Army" and "Marines" may be due to the same Vietnam-related reason as the negative descriptions. It may also be the case that there is significant response consistency in this direction because of the varied functions and roles of these two services as compared to the Navy. "Navy" is confined to sea-related service. "Army" and "Marines" have a greater diversity of responsibility and performance. It is reflected in the more abstracted symbol response.

Of interest also in this clustering is the significant, albeit small, racial association to "Army" and "Marines." A complete explanation cannot be offered but the possibility that these two services evoke the combined cognitive and emotive responses associating military membership and action to specific races is suggested. In the case of this ninety five per cent white sample, the small association may connect non-white races to these branches of military service.

The most striking feature of the military symbol grouping is again the high level of response consistency to the individual symbols. Differences exist between the symbols, indicating the "Navy" is viewed with less emotive reaction because of a cognitive relation and a lack of personal identification. "Army" and "Marines" however reflect a greater indication of combined emotive and cognitive associations, due perhaps to more personal attachment to these services.

Specific Personalities

A final consistency pattern is represented by Illustration V-4.

ILLUSTRATION V-4

SYMBOL CLUSTERS: SPECIFIC PERSONALITIES



"President Dwight Eisenhower"
(73% response represented)



"President Abraham Lincoln"
(77% response represented)

ILLUSTRATION V-4--Continued



"President Richard Nixon"
(70% response represented)



"President George Washington"
(78% response represented)

This category consists of particular personalities who are now a part of the American symbol system because of their achievement and contribution to the belief system of the culture. It includes the names of three past Presidents and the current Chief Executive. Their particular positions in the symbol system are both historical and modern. Differences and similarities may be noted in the symbol response patterns as a result of this temporal position.

In terms of previous discussion these symbols are specific as opposed to abstract. Comparatively the average consistency level of the symbols is seventy five per cent in five clusters, expressing not much more consistency than Traditional American ideology symbols.

"President Dwight Eisenhower" indicates the highest level of concrete response.[17] Only two other response categories are significantly associated with this symbol. The use of "President Dwight Eisenhower" as a symbol for this particular population may be judged ill-advised by some. The argument could be made that this group of native Kansans would naturally demonstrate a cognitive appreciation of the President higher than that of the general population. This might mean that the response pattern is too unrepresentative of a broader cultural grouping. The fact that "President Dwight Eisenhower" was also a Kansan would mean that the socialization experience of many Kansans would tend to stress facts about this President. And this would bias our sample. Furthermore, the age of this sample could constitute an additional bias. As Greenstein suggests, "evaluations and 'affective knowledge' about political leaders precede the factual information on which one might assume they would be based."[18] The fact that this group were young children while Eisenhower was President could mean their symbolic judgement of him is permanently affected.

Indeed noting the types of responses most frequently associated with this symbol there may be some support for this argument. Many respondents associate Eisenhower's Kansas heritage in their response to this symbol. We doubt this would be the case outside of Kansas. But the response is nonetheless useful. It still shows remarkable consistency even within a population of this age and from the state of Kansas. With all the association possibilities avaiable, it is nonetheless significant that nearly three fifths of the sample would associate in this one direction. The consistency strength of symbolism is then further evidenced by this fact.

Other Presidential symbols show more diversity of symbol clustering. All, however, have a significant specific cluster. This indicates that there is a concrete nature to these symbols. "President Abraham Lincoln" particularly evidences a high level of specific association. This fact matches the typical popular images attributed to Lincoln. The common individual associations in this category were frequently such words as "beard" and "top hat." Lincoln is popularly represented with both visual images.

But "President Abraham Lincoln" presents an interesting contrast. If on the one hand there is a large percentage of cognitive responses, there is an even greater pattern of subjective or emotive response. Thus "President Abraham Lincoln" receives both positive expressive and positive descriptive as well as neutral descriptive responses. The obvious inference is that "President Abraham Lincoln" is not only a fact of history but largely caught up in the affective content of the symbol system. This point can easily be extended to the other Presidential symbols as well. "President Richard Nixon" and "President George Washington"

also contain numerous expressive and descriptive associations. A broader generalization might possibly be made. Presidents seem to be a viable and important part of the emotive content of a symbol system. If the expressive and descriptive categories are identified as affective responses, "President Abraham Lincoln" receives a forty one per cent emotive response, "President Richard Nixon," a forty six per cent, and "President George Washington," a thirty two per cent response. The three Presidential symbols have emotive associations surpassing either the cognitive or combined cognitive-emotive associations of other symbols.

"President Richard Nixon" and "President George Washington" present a contrast to the simpler response patterns of the other two symbols. They both have two additional significant response clusters that are different than the others. There is a high combined percentage of connotative response to "President George Washington" and there is none to "President Richard Nixon." This association may be attributed to the historical nature of the former symbol. While still a part of the emotive symbol structure, "President George Washington" is historically removed from concrete identification. The combination of these two responses indicate perhaps a mythical and non-denotative association now connected to the symbol. "President Richard Nixon" on the other hand is a symbolic product of mixed directional affectives. It receives positive, negative and neutral descriptions and expressions in both positive and negative directions. Combined, these emotive responses constitute nearly half of all responses to the symbol. The contemporary nature of the symbol may explain in part this uncommon response pattern. Because of the opportunity of the respondents to react to current events, the general consistency represented by this symbol is composed of a diversity of

consistency patterns. The fact that "President Richard Nixon" is a current part of politics may subject the response pattern of this symbol to the vagaries of popular feeling. The fact that the test was made two months before a general election meant the symbol was also in the attention span of the population to perhaps a greater extent than usual. This suggests further the probability of diverse response to contemporary symbols. We may also add to this particular symbol the interpretation offered by the popular notion that this President has about him a "mystique" that defies exact identification. The multiple response pattern reflects all these possibilities.

The Presidential symbols present an interesting mixture of consistency patterns. There is strong specific identification response. There is also a large proportion of various emotive response. While "President Dwight Eisenhower" might not be included in this sample for certain reasons of bias, the symbol nonetheless represents a significant degree of consistency. Both our most historical and most recent Presidential symbols present diverse and dissimilar response patterns. They connote multiple associations for a variety of reasons.

The consistency hypothesis of this thesis is generally satisfied by the similarity of response indicated throughout the illustrations presented here. The diagrams show that approximately three quarters of all responses are represented in five symbol clusters. Given the potentiality for unlimited diversity of response, the hypothesis expresses the expectancy of limited response. Based upon all symbol responses a code system was developed allowing for a maximum of twenty-seven associative directions. That a population of 155 persons might be categorized in less than these categories indicates that symbol response is indeed

consistent in this population. That three fourths of the responses might be classified in five response directions quite strongly suggests the similar nature of symbol association.

It is possible to examine symbol consistency from a different perspective. In addition to associative responses, attitudinal responses can be considered. The combination of both types of response may add further perceptual understanding to the nature of symbol consistency and, as well, provide additional empirical support for the hypothesis.

The Attitudinal Evaluation Index

The utility, apart from the similarity, of consistency responses should be obvious. By illustration of symbol association patterns it is possible to present a mixed real and hypothetical view of the structure of a population's symbol system. The structure of belief becomes apparent in the response patterns of the symbols. Through this hypothetical model, the directions of meaning are clarified.

It would be insufficient however to consider symbol associations for their structural content alone. It has been suggested that there are emotive associations as part of many symbol response patterns. Possibly this emotive, as well as the cognitive, structure of the symbol could be clarified further by observing and measuring the attitudinal direction of the emotion. Likewise, the entire consistency pattern becomes clearer through use of a dual, attitudinal and associative, perspective.

To demonstrate the analytical insight of an attitudinal perspective an Attitudinal Evaluation Index (AEI) has been developed.[19] As mentioned in Chapter IV, the respondents were asked whether they felt positively or negatively about the symbol presented on the questionnaire. The value

"1" was associated to each positive or negative response. As mentioned, this eliminated the possibility of a zero response because, it was suggested, attitudes have only positive and negative directions.[20] A value score achieved the the AEI formula ranges from +1.0 to -1.0. A positive correlation reflects the dominance of positive over negative responses, and vice versa.

The accuracy of the correlation scores is nearly perfect. That is, most respondents marked an attitudinal direction to each symbol. In fact, the average response for all the directional associations is over ninety seven per cent.

The scores of all symbols have been ranked in order from most positive to most negative. They are presented in Table V-1.

The first observation to be gleaned from these AEI scores is that the consistency indicated by the high positive correlation of what have been termed Traditional American Ideology symbols is paradoxically related to the expected outcome. The relatively higher diversity of response consistency for the abstract traditional symbols presented in Illustration V-1 was noted. The suggestion was made that perhaps the core of American ideology or the symbol system was note adequately comprehended because of both the inconsistent and predominantly subjective nature of the response. However, the AEI scores, ranging from .741 to .935, and averaging .843 suggest that perhaps consistency is indeed quite high among these symbols.[22]

Cognitive consistency, however, cannot be inferred. Rather, I would suggest emotive consistency. Having noted the relative inconsistency of cognitive association <u>vis a vis</u> other symbols, the high similarity of emotive response suggests that cultural adherence to these symbols is

TABLE V-1

ATTITUDINAL EVALUATION INDEXES: RANKED ORDER CORRELATIONS

1. Liberty	.935	26. Chicano	.387
2. Freedom	.929	27. American Indian	.341
3. Declaration of Independence	.916	28. Navy	.212
4. Bill of Rights	.916	29. Minorities	.135
5. Constitution	.864	30. President Richard Nixon	.116
6. Democracy	.858	31. Marines	.025
7. Freedom of Speech	.858	32. Power	-.025
8. Peace	.851	33. Women's Liberation	-.077
9. Justice	.812	34. Revolution	-.187
10. President Abraham Lincoln	.812	35. Welfare	-.193
11. President George Washington	.793	36. Politics	-.219
12. Individualism	.774	37. Army	-.225
13. Equality	.741	38. Taxes	-.270
14. Law and Order	.664	39. Soviet Union	-.367
15. President Dwight Eisenhower	.632	40. Bussing	-.393
16. Civil Rights	.632	41. Red China	-.529
17. Supreme Court	.612	42. Communism	-.651
18. Congress	.548	43. War	-.716
19. Working Class	.548	44. Slavery	-.729
20. President John F. Kennedy	.522	45. Vietnam	-.793
21. Nationalism	.522	46. Inflation	-.793
22. Capitalism	.477	47. Poverty	-.832
23. White House	.464	48. Violence	-.838
24. Memorial Day	.451	49. Depression	-.851
25. Blacks	.445	50. Hitler	-.864

predominantly based upon affective rather than cognitive belief. The utility of symbolic analysis here demonstrates the difference between cognitive and emotive belief structure. And symbol theory explains the data results. The ideological core of American belief, for this population, is based upon conscious and unconscious symbol awareness. In this case it appears the unconscious acceptance of these idea-elements exerts greater meaning influence than the conscious. The emotive consistency demonstrated by the attitudinal responses is not indicative of the cognitive responses of the associative response pattern. The relative inconsistency of the symbols suggested a weak, ideological foundation. However the attitudinal consistency suggests the opposite. Traditional theory seems to lack the ability to pinpoint in this manner what has been suspected but not empirically shown,[23] viz., that ideological consistency depends upon an emotive rather than a cognitive foundation. The equivalency between cognitive and emotive responses with the percentages of total significan-cognitive response clusters, compared to the attitudinal cluster percentage of responses, can also be demonstrated. As seen in the comparison in Table V-2, the average seventy three and a half per cent of cognitive consistency is well below the average ninety one and a half per cent of emotive consistency for these symbols. The paradoxical finding here lessens the probability that ideology follows a rational or coherent pattern of belief. It is also not dependent upon the ability of an ideological elite to abstract and rationalize for the masses, at least insofar as this population is concerned. Rather, although ideology is built upon these symbols and the combined cognitive and emotive structure represented, the predominant building block is emotive symbol response.

TABLE V-2

COGNITIVE AND EMOTIVE CONSISTENCY COMPARED

	Cognitive Consistency	Emotive Consistency
Justice	83.9%	90.3%
Freedom	73.1	96.1
Equality	73.4	86.5
Individualism	67.1	87.7
Liberty	78.1	95.5
Peace	71.0	92.3
Democracy	68.4	92.3

In the same vein it was noted in earlier discussion that possibly the consistency of response to Presidential symbols was based largely upon significant emotive association clusters. The AEI scores tend to confirm this suggestion. The Presidents receive significant expressive and descriptive associations and high AEI scores. "President Abraham Lincoln" receives the highest AEI correlation of .812. "President George Washington" follows immediately with a score of .793. "President Dwight Eisenhower" was observed to have less emotive clustering. It receives the lower correlation score of .632. The contradictory emotions represented in the clusters associated with "President Richard Nixon" demonstrated, it was noted, the possibility of a mystique or a subjection of the symbol to popular reactions to current issue topics. The index rating of .116, the lowest for any Presidential symbol, seems to follow

this suggestion. This reaction should also be expected to vary rapidly over time. Indeed it does. In comparison with pre-test results, this correlation earlier approached zero.[24]

With regard to the military symbols discussed in terms of their consistency of symbol clusters, it is interesting to observe the connection between cognitive and emotive response patterns. "Navy" has only cognitive, concrete symbol clusters. It also has the highest AEI correlation of military symbols, .212. At the same time "Army" has the highest percentage of descriptive symbol associations and the lowest AEI score of the three, -.225. "Marines" combines a nearly equal percentage of cognitive and emotive associations and has a score of .025. There is not sufficient empirical support in any one direction to offer a firm inference from these data. One thing that could perhaps be said is that the closer the personal involvement with the military, the more negative the emotional affect associated with the connection.

Although an illustration of racial consistency patterns in the first section was not included, the AEI pattern is worthy of attention here. The differences between the attitudinal responses associated to racial symbols offers interesting commentary even without the benefit of the significant structure patterns. The data are presented in Table V-3.

The observable trend among racial symbols seems to be that as the symbol meanings move from the theoretical or abstract to the concrete or specific there is a lessening of positive affect. A possible explanation might be to refer to McClosky's findings. He demonstrates that a population is more willing to positively associate with abstractions and to progressively show less positive affect as the situation indicates higher specificity of subject matter.[25]

TABLE V-3

RACIAL SYMBOLS ATTITUDINAL SCORES

	AEI Correlation
Civil Rights	.632
Blacks	.445
Chicano	.387
American Indian	.341
Minorities	.135

This does not completely follow for Table V-3, however. Consequently McClosky's finding applies only partially to this racial scale. "Civil Rights," it is true, indicates a higher degree of abstraction by definition than "Blacks," "Chicano," and "American Indian." There is also a decreasing order of attitudinal correlation with increasing specificity. However, "Minorities" is an abstraction and also shows the lowest AEI correlation on the table. McClosky's theory does not account for this attitudinal dimunition of the abstract concept. Combining McClosky's point with the benefit of a symbolic perspective, I might agree with the partial explanation offered by McClosky and add the further suggestion, for this particular case, that "Minorities" embodies subconscious feelings indicating a less positive attitudinal response than to "Blacks," "Chicano," "American Indian," and "Civil Rights." That is, there may be more negative latent regard for minorities in general. It is bound up in the emotive construct of the symbol system and not evidenced in purely cognitive analyses of the symbol. The true latent feeling bound up in this

symbol is hidden by the otherwise abstract content embodied by the symbol and only expressed when the attitudinal affect is directly sought.[26] The empirical test for this thesis was not designed, unfortunately, to properly control variables to develop sound support for this unconscious suggestion.

It is possible with the use of AEI correlations to demonstrate a number of logical contradictions in the affective consistency patterns of attitudinal responses. The point in doing so is to recognize that a symbol system need not be logical to be consistent. It is in keeping with previously discussed symbol theory to expect an amount of consistency unsubstantiated through normal logical patterns.

In terms of purely emotive responses rational logical inconsistency is apparent in the fact that both "Freedom" and "Individualism" attain high positive AEI rankings, .929 and .774 respectively. Yet at the same time a symbol which theoretically embodies the fullest ramifications of both symbols, "Women's Liberation," receives an AEI score of -.077. This relationship follows no logical pattern, except the illogic of the unconscious. Similarly, "Nationalism" receives the attitudinal consistency score of .522. The great advocate of nationalism, "Hitler," has the highest negative correlation for the whole set of symbols, -.864. Again the cognitive, logical or analytical connection between responses is inconsistent. Finally, a positive score is attributed to "Capitalism," .477, but negative scores are associated with the frequent results of "Capitalism." If "Inflation," -.793, and "Depression," -.851, receive such negative response, the logical conclusion should be a greater affective disregard for "Capitalism."

The point of demonstrating these obvious logical contradictions by

the varying attitudinal consistency connected to the symbols is to suggest that rational explanation connot fully account for all ideological phenomena. The point is that if traditional ideology theory continues to demonstrate the logically coherent nature of ideology, its explanatory potential may suffer. Symbol analysis offers some analytical potential in this regard. It easily accounts for inconsistencies in logic by recognizing the legitimate reality of the unknown, or unconscious, and its effect upon belief.

The response patterns demonstrated by AEI scores add an additional perspective to the first hypothesis of this study. Throughout there is data supporting the fact of symbolic response consistency. The analytical power of consistency analysis from a dual perspective, i. e. both cluster analysis and attitudinal analysis, enhances the demonstrability of the hypohteses. The clearest example of this is the observation made regarding Traditional American Ideology symbols and relative inconsistency. It was seen, for example, that emotive consistency substitutes for cognitive inconsistency, assuring a solidarity of belief which otherwise would not obtain.

The consistency of response is one aspect to symbol theory. Both cognitive and emotive symbol consistency have been shown to exist within a population. In the next section the second hypothesis of the study: the constraint of belief, is considered. The question concerns whether the data from the respondents support the possibility of constrained belief.

Symbol Constraint Patterns

Converse defines a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of con-

straint...."[27] He continues distinguishing between static and dynamic constraint. In the former, one is able to predict eventual attitudes given some knowledge of other basic attitudes. In dynamic constraint, ideas change in relation to each other. I propose to examine the basic foundation of these propositions by considering the second hypothesis. Earlier constraint and interrelationship were equated. The relation between ideas, meanings and symbols has been registered and it was suggested that symbols are the bases of the former concepts. Now the evidence can be examined which purports that constraint in the population is relatively non-existent. A belief system may not match the interpretation Converse has advocated.

The data presented will be familiar. The discussion of consistency began with certain symbol selections and continued with them into the attitudinal development. They are carried over to consider the nature of interrelationship of belief. For the sake of discussion, the same topic areas are used, although with fewer symbols. This is for the benefit of the reader. The same symbols facilitate comparison. Also, since the data selected were representative, i. e., the data results resemble and represent most of the patterns for all the symbols there is no loss of analytical potential; nor is there an intentional injection of selective bias.

Comparison of this data with any other shows no great difference in overall symbol consistency or attitudinal direction. There is also no difference in general interrelationship patterns, only individual differences in particular symbol interrelations.

To obtain the results presented below, simple crosstabulations of symbol responses were made. The tables were developed from these cross-

tabulations. To include as much of the data patterns as possible, without sacrificing significance, single category responses were omitted. That is, if only one response interrelation appears for a coded symbol response category from the whole sample, it is not shown.

Nor is the same chance response cut-off point used, as in symbol consistency. In demonstrating consistency only those clusters with greater than a five per cent response were presented. If these same measures where used in considering symbol interrelation there would be very little evidence to present. Every cluster with more than two responses is included.

The question may be raised that a less than five per cent response indicates results due to chance alone, i. e., without reliable probability of re-occurrence, and consequently the results here are meaningless. That is essentially the point. As will be seen in the tables, many symbol intercorrelations are less than chance. Less than eight of the sample of 155 respond in the same way to two different symbols. They are not, therefore, likely to re-occur. But this lack of significant response is in itself quite meaningful. The point to the hypothesis is that constraint is not to be expected. A symbol combines conscious and unconscious experience such that it varies from individual to individual and even within the person himself. Rather than speaking of constraint of ideas for this group it may be necessary to discuss the randomness of ideas. The population's belief system, rather than being interrelated, is more non-related.

The evidence is presented in tabular form. Following each table there will be some discussion of the constraint pattern, its comparative relation to other symbol intercorrelations, and in brief fashion, its particular meaning.

Tables V-4 and V-5 are constructed from the subject-symbols Traditional American Ideology. Based upon the symbol clusters apparent in both tables a wide diversity of response patterns is obvious. In fact, the tables represent intercorrelated clusters occurring in respectively ninety five per cent and eighty eight per cent chance positions.[28] Significant clusters are only one and two in number. (circled)

Initially it might be suggested from the scattered nature of the internal relations between symbol responses that the symbols are not related in any meaningful way. Only the marginally probable intercorrelations of system responses between "Freedom" and "Democracy" and positive-expressive and subjective connotative and traditional-philosophical and subjective denotative responses between "Individualism" and "Justice" evidence intercorrelations. But they represent only five per cent and twelve per cent of the symbol responses for each table. The point is that the lack of meaningful relationship, the lack of constraint, demonstrates the expectation expressed in the hypothesis.

It is interesting to recall that these symbols registered an average consistency level of seventy four per cent in five clusters. They also showed an average AEI score of .818. In terms of consistency, measured both by cognitive and emotive structure, these symbols were suggested to be consistent in this population. Yet at the same time these symbols indicate practically no interrelationship.[29] The suggestion was made earlier that analysts have had difficulty definitely determining the nature of belief linkage. This evidence tends to suggest that the problem might be in the realization that there may be no linkage. The analyst should differentiate between consistency of belief and constraint of belief.

It is meaningful that despite high consistency and attitudinal

TABLE V-4

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "FREEDOM" BY "DEMOCRACY"



TABLE V-5

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "INDIVIDUALISM" BY "JUSTICE"



correlation, symbols which are said to lie at the center of American belief are not significantly related to each other.[30] That the symbols themselves contain meaning is demonstrated by the fact that all respondents made associative responses.[31] Yet there is little evidence that persons in the tested group see "links between values," even though they could legitimately be expected to have a developed belief system.[32] This absence of relationship is the basic finding for cross-tabulations between all of the Traditional American Ideology symbols.

Because of the lack of interrelationship between symbols, it is difficult to expand further on the meaning content of the interrelations that do appear. There is only the slightest suggestion of a tendency in any of the interrelations. But it is at least possible to try. Thus there is the indication that the more common meeting ground between "Freedom" and "Democracy" is the "United States" or "America." The respondents seem to correlate slightly in this direction. Eight of the 155 do so. The common systemic response is barely of measurable significance. Likewise the linkage between "Individualism" and "Justice" is not sufficient to draw a strong inference. Again there is the barest indication of interrelation between a notion of fairness for "Justice" (subjective-connotative) and an acceptance of, or regard for, "Individualism" (positive expressive). Also the relation between other core bases of American ideology (traditional-philosophical) and the relatively concrete ramifications of "Justice," e.g., law, (subjective-denotative) is quite weak.[33]

The military symbols cross-tabulated in Table V-6 indicate a slightly higher percentage of probability of re-occurrence. Twenty-seven per cent of all responses fall within significant intercorrelation clusters. However this still means that seventy three per cent of all responses occur by

TABLE V-6

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "NAVY" BY "ARMY"



chance alone.[34]

The nature of these symbols may differ somewhat from the traditional symbols of the American heritage. They may be said to be more concrete, less abstract, by nature. This was suggested in considering the consistency pattern for these symbols. Indeed it does seem that just as the consistency response was slightly higher for military symbols on the whole than the more abstract ideology symbols, the interrelations between them are also slightly higher.

The number of constraint clusters is four, compared to two in Table V-5. There are also more responses in the significant clusters. Their absolute number is still exceedingly low, allowing for only the most tentative suggestions. However it is relatively higher than the previous tables.

If it follows that more concrete symbols indicate relatively greater constraint, the nature of the interrelated associations do not contradict this notion. The primary response patterns connect the services with one another (institutional by institutional); the physical attributes of the services with each other, e.g., ships and gear (specific by institutional); and tangible items, e.g., helmets, uniforms, etc. with each other (specific by specific).

Interrelation between racial symbols (Table V-7) demonstrates a pattern of chance percentage similar to military symbols. Twenty-eight per cent of all responses do fall into significant clusters. But as can be seen, the nature of the pattern meanings differs.

There is some uncertainty whether or not to consider the symbols "American Indian" and "Blacks" abstract or concrete. They present possible interpretations in either direction, suggesting specific associations to

TABLE V-7

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "AMERICAN INDIAN" BY "BLACKS"



some and less clear meaning to others. Perhaps they should be considered as existing between the two, combining elements of both. The nature of the response patterns suggests, although again without strength, that the predominant indication is toward the less concrete.

The significant clusters indicate slightly that there is some common relation between appreciation of unfortunate physical and social conditions for the two groups (descriptive negative by descriptive negative). Likewise unfortunate circumstances are associated with more or less identifiable situations surrounding both groups, e.g., poverty and historical circumstances (descriptive negative by objective connotative and subjective denotative). In the case of both these two symbols, as well as the military symbols presented in Table V-6, the paradox between high consistency and low interrelation is somewhat, although slightly, mitigated. The lower AEI scores, averaging 0.006 for "Army" and "Navy" and .393 for "Blacks" and "American Indian,"[35] stand in less striking constrast to the low interrelatedness of the constraint table.[36] This does not erase the anticipation of higher relatedness. Not only is the consistency high, but from a logical standpoint the two groups of symbols traditionally should be interrelated.

The cross-tabulation of Institutional symbols presents response clustering with even greater significance of pattern than the specific military symbols. Table V-8 has forty two per cent of its responses in clusters with a probability of reoccurrence. We saw earlier the high consistency clusters for these two symbols, from which a high degree of interrelation was anticipated. Both symbols "White House" and "Congress" had large institutional clusters and significant specific clusters.

Observing the constraint pattern we see the areas of interrelation include for the most part specific and institutional clustering. Thus

TABLE V-8

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "WHITE HOUSE" BY "CONGRESS"



cognitive associations link the President in general and specific Presidents and their wives to the structure and operations of the Congress. Persons who respond in one way tend, though only very weakly, to respond in the other. This links institutional with institutional symbols and specific with institutional.

An unexplained paradox obtains however. Even though the consistency patterns are greater and the chance constraint patterns have decreased to fifty eight per cent of the responses, the AEI scores are neither high, nor low. The medium nature of the scores is not helpful in suggesting the possibility either of constraint or consistency.[37] Perhaps AEI scores are not helpful predictors of patterns throughout. The high scores for abstract traditional ideology symbols and low scores for military symbols, with the medium scores indicated here, have not regularized any pattern of expectations. Perhaps the AEI index is more useful solely for the purpose of measuring attitudinal consistencies, rather than predicting consistency or constraint.

Observation of two more Institutional symbols suggests at least two things. From Table V-9 one can determine that not all Institutional symbols are similarly interrelated. Secondly there is additional support for the observed tendency for more specific symbols to indicate a higher percentage of contrained clusters.

Even though the two symbols are Institutional and in that sense interrelated, the diversity of response is greater for these historical institutions. The lack of visual structure may have something to do with an inability to focus upon similarities of meaning between the two symbols. Similarly the symbols tend to suggest an abstraction which becomes apparent in the high percentage of chance clustering, seventy

TABLE V-9

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "BILL OF RIGHTS" BY "DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE"



seven per cent.

The correspondingly low level of probability clustering centers also on more abstract aspects of the institutions' meaning. There is a small cluster suggesting a connection between the Constitution (institutional) and persons and places associated with the "Declaration of Independence" (specific). But a larger, though still marginally significant congruence indicates a relation between responses which focus upon traditional core belief ideas of the system. Although this point is tentative, these institutions seem to carry key concepts with them vis a vis other central notions. The more specific, institutional response connects core ideology symbols which do not relate in this manner to each other.

To finalize the trend that has been observed in the relation between concrete, or readily identifiable, and abstract, less identifiable or definable, symbols, Table V-10 is presented. This corss-tabulation between specific symbols relates an Institutional to a Presidential symbol. The table represents the highest probability clustering of all the symbols in this study. Nearly half, forty nine per cent, of all responses cluster significantly. This seems to confirm that greater specificity of symbol meaning results in greater interrelationship of meaning association. This conclusion is recognizably tenuous. The statement is based on at best a cluster pattern consisting of not quite half of all symbol responses. But the trend is nonetheless obvious. From a low of five per cent significance to a high of forty nine per cent, the more abstract the symbol, the less the interrelation of meaning, or the greater the lack of interrelation.

The response clusters in Table V-10 contribute further to this suggestion. The primary response cluster links specific to specific symbol

TABLE V-10

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "WHITE HOUSE" BY "PRESIDENT DWIGHT EISENHOWER"



meanings. Respondents tend to associate individual Presidents and their wives to "White House" while mentioning individual places, events, and activities of "President Dwight Eisenhower."

The consistency illustrations show likewise the very high symbol clustering for these two symbols. Both contain a high number of institutional and/or specific responses. The respondents tend to interrelate these meanings.

In all, this table indicates relatively more relationship of response than previous tables. Absolutely, however, the table remains more non-related than interrelated.

Conclusion

The constraint tables presented here indicate one basic fact. It is not possible to speak of symbol interrelatedness for this population. There is no table with more than five significant intercorrelated clusters. And even these five clusters represent only forty two per cent of the responses for that symbol.[38] Also there is no table with even one half of its response associations intercorrelated. Although greater correlation is obvious for specific rather than abstract symbols, the amount of constraint never affects more than half the sample.

An objection might be made that potentially higher measures of constraint have been eliminated by an unnecessary multiplication of response categories. Some might say that random clustering has been too narrowly restricted by the association possibilities in the coding categories. This is not the case however. The different coding categories were developed independently of any correlation considerations. They were devised to distinguish between symbol meanings because of the unlimited

possibilities of meaning in symbol response. Rather than too many possible categories defined too narrowly, it is more likely that there are too few defined too broadly. If the symbol is indeed the connection between conscious and unconscious experience, allowance must be made for all possible areas of response. One could only assert that the interrelation categories represent an unrealistic picture of response constraint if he considers the meaning description too narrow rather than too broad.

Converse and McClosky indicate greater response interrelation because the focus of their studies was opinions rather than symbols. This has been discussed previously and it was suggested that while opinions do measure belief, they do so only indirectly. In comparison to associative measurement by symbols, opinions are more conditioned by environment, time, situation, cognitive and emotive functioning than symbols. They do not directly represent the meaning or response to a stimuli. It is rather to the symbol, the carrier of communicative meaning, that one might turn for more direct measurement of belief. Although the symbol is a product of the same environmental, situational, cognitive-emotive process, the response to the associative symbol is a clearer expression of real meaning because the time factor is immediate and original. There is no pre-set social requirement or expectation to symbol response. There are likewise no overt political ramifications to associative response as there are for opinion responses. One cannot be held accountable for a free association as he can for an opinion. An individual will never be called upon to defend his free association. Symbol response also resolves to some extent the problem Converse mentions of articulation. To respond to an opinion requires, for the most part, some understanding of the issue or relevant variables. The symbol response, technically, requires no

cognitive understanding, even though some is often present. Both opinions and symbols include emotive content often outweighing the cognitive.[39] Again the same conditions suggest greater direct reliability of response from the symbol than the opinion. The emotional reaction of an opinion is more likely the object of greater conditioning than the association to a symbol.

In sum there is considerable for the hypotheses of this work. Symbols are relatively consistent in a population. They are also relatively unconstrained or not interrelated. There is a tendency for specific symbols to be both more consistent and more interrelated than abstract symbols. Symbols may be said to be consistent because nearly three quarters of a population makes similar identifications when asked for an associative response. Likewise symbols are not interrelated with one another because they indicate at most only partial marginal correlations with each other, based on these same responses. The greatest number of responses exist in only chance relationships with each other. It could be expected therefore that a re-test would indicate different interrelation patterns, except for the significant clusters.

Between these two findings is the measure of attitudinal relationships. The AEI scores found for the symbols offer little explanatory strength for the lack of interrelationship and in some cases for the level of consistency. For example, Traditional American Ideology symbols have the highest positive AEI scores, the least constraint and the lowest consistency percentages. Yet they exist at the core of the American value system. The AEI scores do suggest the possibility that emotional affect is indeed a salient, perhaps the most important, structural component of belief. It may also be the attitudinal strength, the

emotional attachment, registered symbolically rather than cognitively, that serves the identity and solidarity functions for belief.

Superficial consistency, variable affections and non-related meanings are the essence of a symbol system. Since it was earlier noted that "symbol system" underlies "belief system," our conclusion is re-worded. A belief system is consistent within our population but it is not constrained. It is not necessary, based upon the data and theoretical development, to distinguish between elite and mass levels of response. Belief, in general, is the conscious-unconscious entity affecting both mass and elite response. Symbols are a common base to this belief. Thus belief, when operationalized symbolically, should show a variability of both cognitive and emotive structure, whether for elites or for a mass public.

The data presented offer an operational potential to some extent missing in traditional ideology theory. The use of the symbol associative mechanism and attitudinal response indicates utility for an analysis of ideology. It provides additional commentary upon the structure of belief. It might be possible to apply this structural analysis to future functional analysis. As a brief introduction to its potential, several concluding remarks are offered in Chapter VI considering the broader applicability of this developing theory.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936); also, see Chapter II, this manuscript.

[2]The design for these illustrations is an arbitrary, but useful invention. Proceeding in a clockwise direction, I divided twenty-four codes into 360 degrees. The scale of the directional arms is one inch equals ten per cent response.

[3]See Appendix II.

[4]8/155 = .051.

[5]Willian Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York: Atherton Press, 1967). It is interesting that although Connolly's book was published after Converse's "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, Connolly makes no reference to the useful findings in this study. This is so even though he cites work published after this article.

[6]Authors from Alexis de Tocqueville to the more scientific writings of Philip E. Converse and Herbert McClosky have directed their efforts toward this end.

[7]The reader is referred to the discussion in Chapter III on the shortcomings of traditional ideology theory.

[8]Included on the consistency tables are actual raw response associations to exemplify the typical, or common, responses categorized in the particular significant code classifications.

[9]This demonstrates perhaps that Mullins' definition of ideology in "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review LXVI (June, 1972) could use some revision. Ideology, as he defines it, could not be a "logical and coherent system of symbols."

[10]Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: the Free Press, 1960); Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960).

[11]Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent demonstrates the same point regarding opinion constraint

[12]Thirty nine per cent of the sample associates in a systemic direction for the symbol "Communism."

[13]Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 63-80.

[14]This eighteen per cent response is the largest racial association in the entire study.

[15]A brief survey of the committee structure and/or policy output of Congress suggests that civil rights occupies far less than one fifth of the Congress' time or interest.

[16]Eighty five percent of the sample has always been domiciled in Kansas.

[17]The word, "President," was included before each Presidential symbol for a reason. Pre-test results showed that the name of the President by itself usually elicited the relatively meaningless association, "President." The use of the word before the formal name, admittedly, biased the response. But it was felt that it was pushed in a more meaningful direction.

[18]Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 35.

[19]The Attitudinal Evaluation Index, as we use it, is not the same as Szalay's Evaluative Dominance Index (EDI). Our data scores are compiled from actual attitudinal responses made by our respondents. In Szalay's study, the EDI was derived from the positive, negative, or netural direction of the response word. See Lorand B. Szalay, Dale E. Lysne and Jack E. Brent, A Study of American and Korean Attitudes and Values Through Associative Group Analysis (Detroit: Management Information Services, n. d.), p. 16-17.

[20]Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 6-10.

[21]Szalay, Op. Cit., p. 17.

[22]I have included the AEI scores of Traditional Ideology Symbols "Liberty" and "Peace." The patterns are not represented in Illustration V-1.

[23]The typology presented in Mullins' article, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," is no doubt accurate. From all appearances howere it has not been empirically derived.

[24]The pre-test took place approximately six months prior to this test.

[25]Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII (June, 1964), p. 373-379.

[26]At least one reliable foundation for this rationale is the finding of the Kerner Commission and the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights that, indeed white racism is at the heart of much racial discrimination. U. S. Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report (New York: Dutton, 1968) and U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: A Report(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

[27]Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David E. Apter (New York: the Free Press, 1964), p. 207.

[28]The chance percentages indicate that there are fewer than eight responses (8/155 = .051) in any cluster for ninety five per cent (Table V-4) and eighty eight per cent (Table V-5) of the symbol response in each table. These figures were computed by totalling the number of responses not in significant clusters and dividing by the total responses for the whole sample. We will continue to refer to the percentage of non-significant clusters as "chance percentages."

[29]Further evidence along this line: a cross-tabulation of "Freedom" by "Individualism" demonstrates a 100 % chance interrelationship. This is the case even though there is an average consistency percentage for these symbols of seventy one per cent and an average AEI correlation of .851.

[30]Kenneth Dolbeare, Directions in American Political Thought (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), p. 15.

[31]The symbols received a ninety seven per cent response.

[32]The quotation is from Dolbeare, p. 10. Converse points out that an educated sample shows greater belief constraint. We have shown that our sample has a higher level of education than its surrounding general population.

[33]The Tau Beta statistics for the correlation between these symbols is .097 and .143 for Tables V-4 and V-5, respectively.

[34]The intercorrelation of other military symbols indicates a similar constraint pattern.

[35]These scores were obtained by averaging the AEI scores for each set of symbols.

[36]Tau Beta correlation for "Blacks" versus "American Indian" is .045.

[37]The AEI scores for "White House" and "Congress" are .464 and .548 respectively.

[38]I am referring to Table V-8.

[39]cf. our own data. Also, Converse, Op. Cit., p. 214-15. In accordance with Converse's argument, this population is made up of relatively high level "ideologues." That is, considering background and education, neglecting age, this sample could be expected to rely on a priori and abstract conceptual dimensions, according to traditional ideology theory.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The basic purpose of the thesis has been completed. In the previous sections it was my intention to consider the roots and development of traditional ideology theory; the bases of symbol theory; the possible shortcomings of traditional, in comparsion to symbol, theory; and discuss the data results of the tests of the hypotheses. It was seen that the basic premise of traditional theory is that ideology constitutes either idea analysis or a belief system. As such, it has resisted empirical analysis, while allowing much analytical development. Through substituting the psychoanalytic, psychological and cultural explanatory potential of symbol theory, I sought to exchange "belief system" for "symbol system" in the further development of ideology theory. This was done to introduce an empirically feasible operationalization of ideology via the symbolic mechanism of associative response. Further, by statistical manipulation of the data, the reliability of these hypotheses was tested, and previous empirical tests on ideological data were questioned. With the use of symbol responses ideological consistency was represented as distinguished from ideological constraint. For this population, a belief system was shown to be consistent, but not constrained. Furthermore consistency was not solely based, if at all, upon logical coherent belief, but upon unconscious emotional stimuli. Such findings do not support the constraint theory of other authors. Constraint, particularly for the core idea elements of the belief system, is relatively non-existent. Conse-

quently attitudinal affect, rather than the logical selection of preferred values, explains the solidarity of belief.

But this research, apart from the theoretical utility of these findings, says noting about the broader applicability of symbol theory and symbolic analysis to political science's repertoire of analytical tools.

These final pages then will suggest several theoretical possibilities for the practical utilization of symbolic analysis. The description only points in a general direction.

Before symbolic analysis attains any level of broader applicability or more frequent use, there is a preliminary need for an analytical or developmental model. This work demonstrates that there is presently no structured approach with which to apply symbolic perspectives to a body of phenomena. I would anticipate that some energy be spent developing a flexible, testable model of symbolic analysis. A survey of symbol literature indicates further the need for a model of analysis. To date there is none. The scarcity of symbol analyses is the direct result.

Table VI-1 demonstrates the need for a structured approach. Currently the only method available for this symbolic analysis is to analyze the contextual findings in the data results of this table. Thus it is possible to speak of the lack of symbol correlation between the symbols "President Richard Nixon" and "Civil Rights." Only one significant cluster correlates the two symbols. This indicates some slight constraint between recognizing the purpose of "Civil Rights" and negatively describing "President Richard Nixon." The obvious meaning is that a slight portion of the sample, cognizant of civil rights, describe the Presidential symbol negatively. But since the cluster represents only twelve per cent of the sample, the remaining eighty eight per cent does not connect the two symbols, except by chance.

TABLE VI-1

SYMBOL RESPONSE INTERRELATION: "CIVIL RIGHTS" BY "PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON"

"Civil Rights"	"President Richard Nixon"	Institution.	Personal	Specific	Racial	Systemic	Posit. Exp.	Negat. Exp.	Descrpt.Pos.	Descrpt.Net.	Descrpt.Neg.	Subjct. Con.	Objct. Con.	Subjct. Den.	Objct. Den.	No Answer
Specific		:::		::	.	.	.	.		.	::	::	.	.	.	.
Need							::			.	::	.			.	
Function		::		::::	.	::	::		::	::	(:::)	::	.	::	::	::
Racial		.							.							
Definitional									.	.						
Positive Exp.			.	::		.		.		.	::					.
Negative Exp.									.							
Tradition. Phil.		::		:::		::	.	.		::	:::	.	.			::
Descript. Pos.								.								.
Descript. Neg.		.							.	.						
Subject. Conno.		::					::	.	::	::	::	.				
Subject. Denot.		::		::			::			::	::		.	::		

Perhaps one can be satisfied with this unconnected, point by point analysis of symbol interrelation. But if symbolic analysis is to be truly comprehensive, there must be an identification of common elements in the patterns of symbol response. In terms of ideology theory, this project has but touched the surface. In essence, it has done little more than distinguish between consistency and constraint, pointing to the salience of attitudinal involvement. Further research must continue. What is needed is a cumulative stock of symbolic analyses from which a model can be derived. There is no short term or immediate pattern elicited from symbols. The basic problem and the reason for a stockpiling of research results is the fact that symbolic research does not deal with conscious reactions alone. The data analyzed symbolically include an overriding emphasis on unconscious phenomena. At the present time it is futile to anticipate a model of unconscious behavior. Carl Jung, however, faced a similar dilemma in the realm of psychoanalytic theory. His reaction was the eventual development of archetypes and the theory of the collective unconscious. I am not the first to suggest the feasibility, nor advocate the development, of the symbolic approach. Other writers, from Thurman Arnold to Murray Edelman, have recognized the need for demonstrating the use of the symbol in politics. They too however met with the stumbling block of solitary analyses.

The development of a comprehensive model of analysis will eliminate the inadequate research attempts demonstrated by efforts such as those in Table VI-1. Isolated as they are the data represented here have little meaning either by themselves or in terms of symbolic analysis. Joined to a larger body of multiple research efforts, such data may benefit from recognizable common themes.

With the use of a model other familiar areas of political science research can undergo analysis from a symbolic perspective. These areas include the traditional political science interests of public policy and public law, political behavior, international relations and comparative studies of nations.

In the fields of public policy and public law, symbol research can demonstrate the functional importance of both areas by isolating what is is these governmental institutions actually do. A symbolic analysis of public policy pinpoints the true nature of policy. It determines whether a specific policy results in concrete benefits for a population, or an elite, or whether it serves a quiescent purpose, connoting an effect to the public which is not correspondingly real when measured by tangible results. Similarly, it determines whether policy output is designed for security or utility purposes. That is, does the governmental plan merely attempt to attach the population to the expressed purposes of the policy by associating emotional security to the policy? Or does the government seek the public's allegiance by dispensing actual rewards through the policy?

In the field of public law symbolic analysis is able to penetrate constitutional structures and legislative rigmarole. It demonstrates that law is little more than a way of thinking, an attitude, about government and its popular responsibility. Symbolic analysis of specific laws demonstrates the legal embodiment of high or low principles. It exposes the tangible results which accrue to particular groups in a population to the deprivation, possibly, of other groups. It demonstrates the possible folly of surrounding certain laws with sanctimonious regard and hallowed respect. The true nature of the law, as symbolically revealed, may only

be worthy of popular repudiation. The key determinant is recognition of what are the unconscious, emotive elements but portrayed as conscious, rational institutions or decisions.

Analysis of political behavior may benefit from symbolic analysis. Application of symbol theory to political action may lead to the identification of motivational links between belief and behavior. By concentrating upon the language of politics, formal and informal, and by distinguishing cognitive from emotive structure, the basic components of behavior may be isolated. A symbolic view then may appreciate the positions of the components resulting in the possible explication of the relationship between behavior and belief.

By noting the language of a political campaign, for example, and its relation to the cultural values of a population, a candidate may be in a position to affect the electorate's behavior. A symbolic analysis of the language and the meaning content coupled with popular response pinpoints the affective and effective language keys. The relation then between behavior and belief is less unclear, more comprehensible.

The field of international relations, like political behavior, rests upon the motivational keys of relevant actors. It is worthwhile then to use symbolic theory to determine real interests of groups in the international arean. Distinguishing between cognitive and emotive meaning could possibly demonstrate the relative importance of various topics. The motivation to action and/or mobilization of feeling could be anticipated by understanding relevant symbols as used by the actors involved.

Similarly comparative studies of nations are advanced by symbolic analysis. The emphasis upon the cultural perspective within nations through symbolic study allows the clearest possible view of differences

and similarities between peoples. From a variety of perspectives: diachronic, linguistic, or developmental, the application of symbol theory through the isolation of key cultural meanings advances the analytical fruits of research.

Symbolic analysis realizes the basic purpose of political analysis. Taken holistically the political scientist views the cultural development of man. Whether his emphasis is a particular culture, a sub-culture, or a cluster of cultures, the analyst is motivated by and works toward one central goal. He seeks to advance cultural reductionism. Despite the arguments about methods, the varying opinions about the legitimacy of analytic or empirical research, the common element binding every analyst together is this fascination with defining observable reality. A symbolic approach is not a new method of realizing this end. It can be noted that the references in this study date back well beyond the advent of behaviorism. It is however a little used method. It is not difficult to comprehend or apply, given a useful model.

It is valuable for at least two theoretical reasons. Symbol theory offers a relativistic base for cultural analysis sometimes lacking, for example, in structural analysis. Unlike the latter method, no comparative valuative differences are connoted in comparing symbol systems, as may be the case in considering structural differentiation of political systems. Each symbol system functions independently and there is no need to evaluate the merits of one over another. The objectivity potential of this type of analysis is needed to distinguish for the analyst what is indeed observable reality.

The second benefit of symbol theory is its potential operationalization. While the normative analyst benefits from the cultural relativism

of symbol theory, the empirical analyst gains from the operational applicability of symbol theory. Although the obvious need for an analytical model is apparent here, we have demonstrated by our own research the operational potential of symbol theory through the identification of relevant symbols. Whether one chooses associative response or isolates certain structural or functional symbols, the empiricist can rely upon the nature of his data to provide valid and reliable research results.

In sum, it is to the reductive end of observation that I have committed my efforts in this research project. A symbolic approach has been used to further the attempt to suggest its broader applicability and fruitful utility. Based upon the analytical and empirical success of this project, with proper development, political science may gain new insights from the additional perspective of a symbolic approach to political analysis.

APPENDIX I

I have included a copy of the questionnaire used in this study. It has been slightly altered in that the symbols are all identified according to the category of selection.

Questionniare

Following each word please write in the first word or words that come to you. Also in the space provided please mark (+) or (-) to show whether you feel positively or negatively about the word provided. Please be assured of your anonymity in making your responses and in answering all questions.

1. Justice (Abstract) ___
2. Congress (Concrete) ___
3. President Abraham Lincoln (Historical) ___
4. Violence (Threat) ___
5. Freedom (Abstract) ___
6. Marines (Concrete) ___
7. Capitalism (Abstract) ___
8. Bill of Rights (Abstract) ___
9. President Dwight Eisenhower (Historical) ___
10. Red China (Threatening) ___
11. Working Class (Abstract) ___
12. Inflation (Threatening) ___
13. President Richard Nixon (Modern) ___
14. Equality (Abstract) ___
15. Revolution (Threatening) ___
16. Civil Rights (Abstract) ___
17. Communism (Threatening) ___
18. Taxes (Abstract) ___
26. Poverty (Abstract) ___
27. Liberty (Reassuring) ___
28. Navy (Concrete) ___
29. Vietnam (Modern) ___
30. Depression (Historical) ___
31. American Indian (Concrete) ___
32. Politics (Abstract) ___
33. Declaration of Independence (Historical) ___
34. Peace (Reassuring) ___
35. Welfare (Concrete) ___
36. Supreme Court (Concrete) ___
37. Democracy (Abstract) ___
38. Slavery (Threatening) ___
39. President George Washington (Historical) ___
40. Minorities (Abstract) ___
41. President John Kennedy (Historical) ___
42. Nationalism (Abstract) ___
43. Law and Order (Abstract) ___

19.	Bussing (Modern)	___	44.	Soviet Union (Concrete)	___
20.	Army (Concrete)	___	45.	Hitler (Negative)	___
21.	Individualism (Abstract)	___	46.	Blacks (Abstract)	___
22.	White House (Concrete)	___	47.	War (Threatening)	___
23.	Power (Abstract)	___	48.	Chicano (Concrete)	___
24.	Constitution (Historical)	___	49.	Freedom of Speech (Historical)	___
25.	Memorial Day (Reassuring)	___	50.	Women's Liberation (Modern)	___

Please fill in the appropriate information:

1. Age: 2. Sex: 3. Race:
4. Hometown
5. Population of Hometown: (Please circle appropriate letter)
   a. below 500
   b. 501 - 2,000
   c. 2001 - 5,000
   d. 5,001 - 10,000
   e. 10,001 - 25,000
   f. over 25,000
6. Do you live on a farm? 7. Number of brothers and sisters?
8. Academic status: 8. G. P. A.?
10. Major Field:
11. What approximate percentage of your support do your parents provide?
12. What approximate percentage of your support do you provide yourself?
13. What is the approximate size of the high school from which you graduated?
14. What is your father's occupation?
15. What is your mother's occupation?
16. What is your parent's combined income?
    a. below $5,000
    b. $5,001 - 10,000
    c. $10,001 - 15,000
    d. $15,001 - 20,000
    e. $20,001 - and above.

17. What is your own approximate income?
    a. below $500
    b. $501 - 1,000
    c. $1,001 - 2,000
    d. $2,001 - 3,000
    e. $3,001 and more.

18. What is your religious affliation? (Please be specific)

19. Have you served in the military?

In answering the following questions, please circle the response which most closely states your opinion, or most correctly answers the question for you.

20. People like me don't have any say about what the government does: a) strongly agree; b) somewhat agree; c) somewhat disagree; d) strongly disagree; e) don't know.

21. I don't think that public officials care much what people like me think: a) strongly agree; b) somewhat agree; c) somewhat disagree; d) strongly disagree; e) don't know.

22. Is voting the only way people like you can have any say about how the government is run; or are there other ways you can have a say? a)voting is the only way; b) there are other ways besides voting; c) there are other ways but they are not very effective; d) don't know.

23. Which response best describes your feeling about politics in general? a) I avoid it and can do without it; b) I have mixed feelings about it; c) I enjoy it very much; d) don't know.

24. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right? a) always; b) most of the time; c) some of the time; d) rarely; e) never; f) don't know.

25. Is government run for the benefit of all, or for the interests of a few? a) for all; b) for the few; c) don't know.

26. How would you rate the overall operation of our political system? a) couldn't be better; b) good, but there are areas for improvement; c) fair, some areas need major imporvement; d) poor, many areas need much improvement; e) terrible, the whole system needs an overhaul; f) don't know.

27. How often have you, or do you, intend to vote? a) all of the time; b) most of the time; c) some of the time; d) rarely; e) never; f) don't know.

28. Do you ever discuss politics with other people? a) yes, often; b) sometimes; c) rarely; d) no, never; e) don't know.

29. If you do discuss politics, do you ever try to persuade the other person to your point of view? a) yes, usually; b) sometimes; c) rarely; d) no, never; e) don't know.

30. Do you usually think of yourself as: a) Republican; b) Democrat; c) Independent; d) Other; e) don't know.

31. Have you ever given any money in support of a political candidate, political party, or political cause? a) yes, frequently; b) yes, on occasion; c) yes, but rarely; d) no, never; e) don't know.

32. Have you ever written to any public official expressing your opinion about something that should or should not be done? a) yes, frequently; b) yes, occasionally; c) yes, but rarely; d) no, never; e) don't know.

33. Have you ever participated in a political campaign in any way? a) yes; b) no; c) don't know.

34. Would you say you follow what is going on in government and public affairs? a)most of the time; b) some of the time; c) only now and then; d) hardly at all; e) never; f) don't know.

35. Can you recall your parent's interest in politics? a) both very interested; b) both somewhat interested; c) both hardly interested; d) both not interested; e) father interested, mother not; f) mother interested, father not; g) don't know.

36. Can you recall your parent's party affliation? a) both Republican; b) both Democrat; c) both Independent; d) Father Republican, Mother Democrat; e) Mother Republican, Father Democrat; f) other; g) don't know.

37. In general, do you consider yourself better off or less well off than your parents? a) better off; b) about the same; c) less well off; d) don't know.

38. Can you recall how often politics were discussed in your home as a youth? a) quite often; b) occasionally; c) rarely; d) never; e) don't know.

39. As a youth did your parents explain to you why or how they voted? a) yes; b) no; c) cannot remember; d) don't know.

40. Can you recall having any classes and discussion in grade school which dealt with politics or goernment? a) yes; b) no; c) cannot remember; d) don't know.

41. Can you recall having had any classes in high school which dealt with politics or government? a) yes; b) no; c) cannot remember; d) don't know.

42. Did you ever participate in any grade or high school projects which included any of the following activities? a) making patriotic displays; b) participating in political debates or discussions; c) writing reports on political issues; d) participating in political plays, games, or skits; e) other; f) don't know.

43. Do you feel that you learned anything significant from high school or grade school in the areas of political affairs?
High school: a) yes; b) no; c) don't know.
Grade school: a) yes; b) no; c) don't know.

44. Can you recall whether your family has certain traditions or makes a special occasion of : Memorial Day: a) yes; b) no; c) don't know. Independence Day (July 4th): a) yes; b) no; c) don't know. Labor Day: a) yes; b) no; c) don't know. Washington's Birthday: a) yes; b) no; c) don't know. Lincoln's Birthday: a) yes; b) no; c) don't know.

45. Were you ever associated with the Boy Scouts of America (Girl Scouts of America)? a) yes; b) no; c) don't know.

46. Does your family ever display the American flag? a) yes, often; b) yes, especially on national holidays; c) yes, but rarely; d) no, never; e) don't know.

47. How often do you read a newspaper? a) every day; b) most of the time; c) occasionally; d) rarely; e) never; f) don't know.

48. In reading the newspapers, which section do you pay most attention to? a) front page; b) editorial page; c) sports page; d) women's page; e) entertainment page; f) other; g) don't know.

49. How much television would you estimate you watch on the average day? At home: a) none; b) less than 1/2 hour; c) 1-2 hours; d) 2-3 hours; e) more than 3 hours; f) don't know. At School: a) none; b) less than 1/2 hour; c) 1-2 hours; d) 2-3 hours; e) more than three hours; f) don't know.

50. Which type of television show do you prefer to watch? a) comedy; b) sports; c) drama; d) movies; e) news; f) variety; g) other; h) don't know.

51. Do you feel that television generally as a good effect or a bad effect on people? a) good effect, TV is worth watching; b) medium, there is some good and some not so good effect; c) poor, there is little good and most bad effect; d) bad, there is nothing worth watching; e) don't know.

52. Would you say your religious beliefs and your commitment to your Church are: a) strong and meaningful; b) neither as strong nor as meaningful as they should be; c) meaningless, Church and religion are not an important part of my life; d) don't know; e) would rather not answer this question.

53. How would you estimate your patriotism and your loyalty to your country? a) very strong, I love my country and would be willing to die for it; b) moderately strong, it's the best place to live, but I'd rather not give up my life; c) not very strong, I would not die for my country; d) non-existent, it means nothing to me; e) don't know; f) would rather not answer this question.

54. Please name your favorite three magazines in order of your preference: a) first preference; b) second preference; c) third preference; d) don't know.

APPENDIX II

The following list describes and defines the coding categories used to classify symbol responses.

00. Institutional: of, or referring directly to, a recognized distinct part of a governmental structure.

01. Personal: of, or relating directly to, the individual respondent.

02. Specific: reference to another person, distinct place, or certain time.

03. Opposite: direct contradiction of, or recognized antonym of, the provided symbol.

04. Religious: reference to God, Christianity, or other recognized or organized religion or religious object.

05. Need: reference to the level of, or desirability of, requirement.

06. Lack of need: reference to the absence of the level of, or desirability of, requirement.

07. Racial: of, or pertaining to, the race or racial characteristics suggested by the referent.

08. Function: of, or pertaining to, the role performance or function of the referent.

09. Systemic: national reference, pertaining to a recognized and organized nation, historically, or in the present.

10. Definitional; Substitute interpretation; response which could be interchanged without loss of meaning with the referent.

11. Positive-expressive: response laden with or consisting of some degree or strength of emotion in a favorable direction.

12. Negative-expressive: response laden with or consisting of some degree or strength of emotion in an unfavorable direction.

13. Traditional-Philosophical: direct reference to an ideological tenet of the American heritage.

14. Ideological: reference to a recognized system of belief; ideology in the pejorative, systemic sense.

15. Descriptive-positive: referring to or attributing characteristics of the referent which are not substitutes for the referent, in a favorable direction.

16. Descriptive-neutral: referring to, or attributing characteristics of the referent which are not substitutes for the referent in an indeterminable direction.

17. Descriptive-negative: referring to, or attributing characteristics which are not substitutes for the referent in an unfavorable direction.

18. Subjective-connotative: intangible reference suggestive of many or unlimited interpretations; no absolute or measurable base.

19. Objective-connotative: intangible reference suggestive of one or limited interpretations; no absolute or measurable base.

20. Subjective-denotative: tangible reference suggestive of many or unlimited interpretations; generic terms; absolute or measurable base.

21. Objective-denotative: tangible reference suggestive of one, or limited, interpretations; absolute or measurable base.

22. Indecipherable: inability to determine the symbol response due to unreadable response.

23. Irrelevant: response which does not follow the normal and fringe patterns of responses, which is totally unrelated to the general flow of responses.

24. Conditional: qualified response tentatively offered; response which is dependent on certain other satisfactions of requirements; partial attributes.

25. Consequential: brought about as a result of suggested causality.

26. Other: response which cannot legitimately be included in any of the above categories.

27. N. A.: not applicable, or no answer.

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IDEOLOGY AS A SYMBOL SYSTEM: ASSOCIATIVE RESPONSE CONSISTENCY AND INTERRELATION

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ABSTRACT

Ideology has been variously defined through analytic and empirical investigative history. From Destutt de Tracy to the present, analysts have viewed the topic initially as idea analysis and lately as a belief system. There is hope that analysis of belief may lead to understanding behavior.

In this report the history of ideology analysis has been traced. The result of the survey reveals that the nature of ideology remains vaguely understood when considered in either of the traditional perspectives. Although significant contributions have identified the functions and the structures of belief, the scope of this analysis does not satisfy remaining unanswered questions. In addition the problem of operationalization has stymied investigators and consequently hindered the continued examination of the topic.

Frustrated by the inconclusive efforts of past theorists this research suggests the potential of a different perspective. Joining theory from outside political analysis, psychoanalytic, psychological, philosophical and anthropological suggestions indicate that ideology may be viewed as a symbol system. This means essentially that belief includes as much, if not more, unconscious, as conscious content. The major problem of past analysis has been the de-emphasis of the role of the unconscious. The symbol is the messenger of meaning linking conscious to unconscious belief, and vice versa. Concentration upon its nature may offer further insight into ideology.

This study hypothesizes that belief, as a symbol system, is consistent for a non-probability sample of young college students. But contrarily, belief as viewed from this perspective is not constrained for this same population. Using a method of associative response to selected symbols,

this project indicates that consistency, similarity of response, is indeed natural to the sample. At the same time, however, the meaning expressed by the responses is not related to the meaning of other symbol responses. That is, persons who react to a symbol stimulus in one way do not react to similar symbols, or diverse symbols, in the same way. The initial consistency finding is not unlike previous findings by authors emphasizing the belief system approach. The latter evidence, however, is in direct contrast to previous theory. Former analysts suggest that ideology is interrelated. It is not so for this test group.

Because of this it is necessary to distinguish between consistency and constraint in belief. In addition this research finds that the previous popular notion of belief constraint may be based upon emotive affect rather than cognitive comprehension. It is also found that there is a tendency for a symbolic response to be less consistent and even less constrained the more abstract the nature of the symbol. Particularly in the case of the abstract symbols which popularly make up the core of the American belief system, there is the greatest inconsistency and lack of constraint. Conversely, the greater the specificity of the symbol, the greater the possibility of finding both consistent and constrained responses.

The symbolic approach seems useful in the analysis of ideology. The method of free association operationalizes the symbol system of the population. But it is in the broader perspective of applying symbolic analyses to several areas within political science that the greatest contribution of this approach is to be developed. If the potential of symbolic analysis may be realized for ideology, it likewise might further the analytical endeavors of political scientists in topics from public policy to international relations and comparative studies of nations. The long range development

of the theory depends upon the monumental task of building a model for analysis. The haphazard method of associative response may be suitable for individual case study, but it does not readily allow more comprehensive investigation. Continued symbolic investigation could accumulate the necessary data base which in turn might supply the component parts of a symbolic model.