

CHANGE IN ARMED CONFLICT PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIOR:
SUBOPTIMIZATION IN ARMED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

by

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
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Twentieth Century has produced a multitude of technological advances and the changes caused by the introduction of such achievements have been readily apparent in practically every field of human endeavor. Science, medicine, agriculture, industry, transportation, and communications all have witnessed far-reaching improvements that have not only caused changes in the quantities and sophistication of machines but also and most important, changes in the deeper forms of cultural and social life styles. These changes may be compared to a nuclear reaction, for changes react with another and cause chain reactions of further change which seem to increase in both magnitude and frequency.

Change in two extremes of armed conflict -- general nuclear war and specific internal war -- provides the impetus for this research. During this century and especially since World War II, the means with which to wage armed conflict in all of its various forms have also made significant and proliferating advances.¹ Yet, this change primarily connotes armaments and their increased complexity and destructive efficiency instead of focusing upon how men think and act in relation to armed conflict.

COMMUNICATION AND CHANGE: A GENERALIZED MODEL


This paper reviews strategic literature for perceptions of alternatives to nuclear war. It then empirically compares data for one of these alternatives, internal warfare, before and after Hiroshima built a nuclear threshold into the range of conflict options. This investigation regards both intellectual perceptions in the literature, and conflict behavior within states, as communication. Armed conflict is a form of

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communication in which opponents exchange information designed to influence each other's behavior. From this perspective, armed conflict resembles other communication forms. A close analogy is law. Norbert Weiner, in The Human Use of Human Beings, characterizes law as a form of conflict. He elaborates on this definition by defining both law and conflict as forms of communication in that they are communicative attempts to canalize the behavior of a second party to a pre-selected pattern through the exhibition of certain prohibitions and the threat of sanctions if those prohibitions are transgressed.² These concepts and their pertinence to this effort are illustrated by the following stylized "model".

Figure 1. Generalized Research Model.



METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

Two separate methods are used to investigate the univariate condition of change in armed conflict perceptions and behavior. First, selected authoritative writings and statements were reviewed as intellectual history in order to discern perceptual change and test the hypothesis that:

Hypothesis I:

Perceptual change as to how armed conflict should be conducted concurs with the continued existence of large-scale conventional and nuclear based military strategies.

Awareness in such writings and statements of the ramifications of nuclear force, together with increasing intellectual search for alternatives to its possible use would provide both evidence of changing armed conflict perceptions generally and concurrence specifically. The testing of the hypothesis thus serves as a measure through which to assess the over-all condition of perceptual change.

The second portion of this effort has as its goal the determination of behavioral variance. It is hypothesized that armed conflict behavior is also changing with emphasis being increasingly given to less intense forms of conflict management. Thus:

Hypothesis II:

If internal wars and external involvement in them are defined as examples of low intensity conflict, then increases in such activities could be related to change in armed conflict behavior in general.

A statistical analysis of specific internal warfare events is therefore used to assess the degree and direction of change in this form of conflict behavior specifically and the conduct of armed conflict in general. In contrast with much of the literature on internal warfare, this investigation regards internal

wars as events which continue over time instead of as single events meeting specified casualty or damage intensity limits.

Although this research involves the examination of two separate conditions -- the presence of perceptual change and the presence of behavioral change -- the possibility of uncovering indications of an association or correlation between the two does exist due to the similarity of the factors involved in the analysis of both. Three clear-cut types of association might obtain. Perceptual change might either precede or lag behind behavioral change, each might "parallel" the other with reciprocal effects, or there might be no consistent association between the two at all. Variations of all of the above might also obtain over time. Other associations which are less dependent upon time may also exist, for example, the "intensity" of perceptions to the "intensity" of behavior in specific armed conflicts/internal wars. However, since this thesis is not directly concerned with the analysis or proof of association between the two conditions being separately examined, only mention of the above noted associations will be made where and if variations in both perceptions and behavior indicate their possible existence.

The following chapter searches intellectual perceptions vis-à-vis pertinent literature in order to ascertain the presence of change in such perceptions concerning armed conflict and any factors which may be effecting this condition. Chapters three and four compare the incidence and intensity of internal wars during pre- and post-1945 periods of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 2

PERCEPTION AND CHANGE

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Constitution states that "wars begin in the minds of men ...".³ Addressing perceptions of war, such conflict analysts as Andrew M. Scott and others have contended that since the end of World War II international conflict has been more readily perceived in forms other than that of purely military belligerence.⁴ Scott says that this growing awareness of omnipresent international conflict and multiple conflict methods such as economic, political, and psychological warfare led to the coining of the phrase "Cold War" which, however, he contends is too often confused with the "continuing phenomenon" of "cold warfare ... of which the Cold War is but one example".⁵

In the style of an intellectual history, this chapter examines such statements in order to provide evidence of perceptual change as to how both professional "students" and "effectors" of national security practices alike envision the international use of armed force. Many of the statements examined were made by individuals who in various ways have been directly or indirectly involved in actual strategic policy making.⁶ Keeping this caliber of intellectual in mind, this chapter examines perceptual shifts in conflict management from that of a reliance upon the quantity of force and armaments, including nuclear strategies without restraints, to a reliance for success in international conflict management upon the quality of conflict forms short of the nuclear threshold.

THE NUCLEAR MILITARY CEILING

Four hard realities of international politics in the nuclear military age discourage resort to nuclear weapons.

First, increasing difficulties in being able to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants as the destructive capability of weaponry also rises blurs traditional perceptions of proper weapons usage and objectives. Secondly, growing worldwide economic interdependence tends to make hitherto slight shifts in one part of the system more readily acceptable throughout the entire system. The compatibility of early and late Marxism-Leninism and Maoist doctrine to variance of conflict forms complements this increase in mutual acceptance of slight shifts. Finally, "quick decision/rapid response" attributes of nuclear weapons tend to deprive, or at least drastically curtail, the time available to diplomats for negotiation, bargaining, and maneuvering thereby making the question of their own survival as well as that of the nations which they represent critical. These realities also imply a search for decisive but less costly ways to resolve conflict short of nuclear war. This chapter searches post-World War II literature for its recognition of these realities. Unlike manifest conflicts themselves, perceptions of conflict options cannot be measured by duration or intensity but their prevalence is undeniable.

PERCEPTION, CONFLICT, AND THE HISTORICAL PREDOMINANCE OF MILITARY FORCE AND ARMS

Until 1945 international conflict was generally thought of as "war" or "warfare" with military force being predominant.⁷ Robert Osgood succinctly described this view of the military use of armed force as "the traditional instrument"⁸ and added that the "phenomenon of military deterrence is as old as the state system itself, even older; ...".⁹ This pre-nuclear age reliance on pure military force to resolve international conflict has also been pointed out by Andrew Scott as a major stumbling block in United States foreign policy operations in situations of conflict.

The American view of power and the way it related to war and peace, made it difficult for the United States to grasp some of the power realities of the mid-Twentieth century. ... the American approach treated war and peace as mutually exclusive. "War" called for maximum, unrelenting effort, with no holds barred. "Peace" meant the absence of violence, the absence of deep involvement in foreign affairs, 10

Stanley L. Falk states that rigid perceptual distinctions between peace and war affected domestic and external affairs most profoundly with the advent of this century because the "twentieth century world wars were the first great outbreaks of large scale violence in history in which new weaponry with mass-destruction capabilities played a significant part" ¹¹. This obsession with firepower, adds D.S. McLellan, "almost to the exclusion of military and political ends had detrimental consequences for U.S. policy" [emphasis added] ¹².

This diplomatic rigidity did not end with World War II. Although other methods of conflict management, and conflict termination, drew more attention after Hiroshima and Nagasaki ¹³, strategic thinking about the wars in Korea and Vietnam still tended to emphasize purely military force where other forms to include economic and politico-military strategy might have proven more successful or efficient. The analytical studies of Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss on "small wars" led to the conclusion that:

International law and organization are still shaped by classic notions of nation-states, sovereign equality, and legally impregnable barriers to intervention unless and until uniformed soldiers of one state cross the national boundaries of another. ¹⁴

Andrew Scott, noting an increase in "informal penetration and attack" as a problem of international law, cites the problem of third power intervention in an internal conflict when non-uniformed, "irregular" troops and "mercenaries" are involved. ¹⁵ Here again, traditional perceptions of peace and war were irrelevant, or worse, dysfunctional. As

Bloomfield and Leiss point out, "A persistent -- though not necessarily dominant ... tradition insists that once ... forces are committed, there is no substitute for military victory" ¹⁶. Although alternate methods of conflict management began to be studied after World War II, a tendency yet exists to stress active military force where it may not be applicable or, at least, not the best alternative.

Warner R. Schilling provides insight into perceptual change and the confusion associated with it. According to Schilling, the crux of the problem is not just advanced weapons technology. Behavioral change actually stems from far more complex, submotivational moral and social causes which are related to such weapons sophistication.

World War I was a preview of many things to come. Among them was the accelerating development in this century of military doctrine and military weapons which by choice and design have proved incapable of keeping to former discriminations between the uniformed and non-uniformed personnel of the enemy. ¹⁷

Herein lies the deeper problem. Certainly in ages past innocent civilians were often casualties of war, but with today's technology of warfare, the probability of destruction of large population segments is assured if not designed. This inability to separate combatants from non-combatants blurs the images of warfare and its goals on highly emotional grounds. Therefore, it becomes only too certain that perceptions concerning armed conflict in general will also become blurred and thus change. Moreover, Colin Cherry points out that rapidly expanding communications assets tend to make larger masses of the world's population mutually aware of their situation. ¹⁸ Stanley Falk additionally contends that rapid expansion in the number of new "emerging" nations and the rise of the threat of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments only tended to compound the confusion as to the changing nature of armed conflict which expanded conventional weaponry and growing mutual communicability emphasized ¹⁹.

Faith in humanity's ability to learn from past mistakes remains.²⁰ However, despite scholar-diplomat Henry A. Kissinger's acceptance that "the present period of revolutionary change will not be managed solely by reliance on military doctrine"²¹ change in both perceptions and behavior appear to be agonizingly slow. Regardless of the speed of change, Scott asserts that "the contrast between the more traditional forms of [international] activity -- primarily diplomatic and military -- and the newer forms ... clearly stands out"²². Stanley Falk adds, "The role of persuasion has taken on new meaning for the diplomat, while a traditional weapon, the threat of the use of force, has been severely limited in both credibility and application".²³ Such statements, when read in isolation, seem to be euphoric optimism while they skirt the question of whether perceptions of conflict, and hence actual behavior, have yet reduced reliance upon armed force.

However persuasive these statements or the idealism of Walter Millis' writings, it is doubtful whether man has, or ever will, realize Millis' central thesis conveyed by the title of his essay, "The Uselessness of Military Power"²⁴. Yet, perceptions of nuclear strategies and related weapons systems appear to be a linchpin between traditional reliance on military force and more recent acceptance of alternative conflict forms.

THE ADVENT OF NUCLEAR-BASED MILITARY FORCE

The introduction of nuclear armaments into the arsenals of the major powers following World War II was initially heralded as a possible method by which to end all wars and attain global peace and prosperity.²⁵ This attitude however soon gave way to strategic "one-upsmanship" and the nuclear-military arms race. The birth of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of other forms of warfare were historically if not necessarily causally related. More re-

stricted or "limited" forms of armed conflict and "informal attack", such as external support of internal wars, insurgencies, and various other forms of warfare were

well established before the advent of nuclear weapons, hence, the development of the latter cannot be used to explain the emergence of the former. On the other hand, the development of super-weapons made full-scale war a less attractive instrument of national policy and thus led to an increased emphasis on limited modes of conflict. ...The growth of informal penetration [which by Scott's own definition would include the mentioned forms 26] is therefore, associated with super-weapons, even if not causally connected. 27

The nuclear-based strategies aided not only perceptual change. In fact, the purposes of these same strategies have themselves also changed. Originally, as illustrated by the Dulles doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the purpose of nuclear armaments was more "personalized" in nature in order to allow the so-called "Western powers" to deter the "Communist bloc" from transgressing certain sanctions. As Soviet nuclear might grew, strategies were still individualized as to how the West perceived primarily Soviet intentions and vice versa without any significant degree of stress upon mutuality of interests, perceptions, or circumstances which such concepts might bring about. Aggression against an individual party/bloc was stressed while concern for the over-all mutual effects of nuclear retaliation upon the global community, to include the civilian population of the concerned party/bloc, received at best only secondary attention.

Such strategies additionally offered high security return for low cost under various conditions. The importance of this latter concept can best be illustrated by a description of what John Foster Dulles termed "massive retaliation".

The basic decision (has been taken) to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing. Now [we] can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready

to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits of a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost. 28

The primarily military doctrine of massive retaliation was thus seen at the time to offer the most security oriented options for possibly the least in manpower and material as well as monetary costs. David Abshire explained the reasoning behind such a strategy in a manner which not only indicates the rationale behind it, but also provides an invaluable insight into what may have been growing variations of existing perceptions even at the outset of the military oriented nuclear doctrine. "The success of the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of securing maximum deterrence value from our margin of superiority compensated for a potential lack of versatility on lower levels of conflict" [emphasis added]. 29

CHANGE IN THE BASIS FOR NUCLEAR FORCE

Dulles' reasoning for the "massive retaliation doctrine" appears paradoxical in retrospect. Apparently it sought to make sub-nuclear forms of armed conflict less frequent. Yet, it not only stimulated increase in less intense conflict forms, but also initiated perceptual re-examination of the true value of nuclear deterrence itself. Thomas C. Schelling supports this position by arguing that since their origin, the exclusion of nuclear weapons use in limited war has become an "accepted convention" or "tacit bargain" which has been "accepted because there is no other equally obvious upper limit on the instruments of ... war on which all parties could agree" 30.

The capability of nuclear fission and fusion weapons themselves provide a source for this change. Although their magnitude of destructiveness was initially grasped, it is evident that the complete significance of their

creation was slighted. That which was regarded by many as just another improvement in the arsenals and techniques of military warfare and as simply "more bang for the buck" was indeed novel. T.C. Schelling indicates that, in reality, the concepts of nuclear armaments represent change in strategic perception in their own right ³¹ and that,

Man has, it is said, for the first time in history enough military power to eliminate his species from the earth, weapons against which there is no conceivable defense. War has become, it is said, so destructive and terrible that it ceases to be an element of national power. ³²

The sheer magnitude of such a statement and the situation which it represents is best elaborated upon by Max Lerner in a passage which has become classic.

As I sat in the big furnace at Dachau, ..., I thought about history and the human condition. I tried to puzzle out how a great people, ..., had committed these enormities, There was no answer to the puzzle, but there was a moral: The intolerable is not by that fact impossible. A number of times in history the intolerable has happened. It can happen again. ... for the first time in human history men have bottled up a power (that of overkill) which they have thus far not dared to use. ³³

Both Schelling and Lerner point out that it is not the immense destructiveness which is the crucial point. "It is not true that for the first time in history man has the capability to destroy a large fraction, even a major part, of the human race." ³⁴ That which is crucial is that nuclear weapons "can do it quickly. That makes a difference." ³⁵ When these realizations are added to Bloomfield's and Leiss' assertion that the "indivisibility of security in the world of the last third of the twentieth century has come to imply a built-in potential for what is commonly called 'escalation'" ³⁶, a prime reason for the existence of change as interface between nuclear usage and strategic security policy becomes apparent.

The strategy that was initially regarded as a "cure-all" or the ultimate in deterrence has changed. To be sure, major

power deterrence is still based upon nuclear armaments but it has gravitated toward a mutuality of clearer realizations of what such use may unleash. Its meaning, or the meaning of its possible use, has burrowed deeper into the strategic thoughts of all, to include Americans since this country no longer truly possesses the position of superiority that it once enjoyed. Because of this latter reason, the proper maintenance of nuclear strategic forces is still deemed a necessity.

Perceptual confusion yet continued to exist, because the realization of the enormity of nuclear weapons did not fully antiquate the predominance of thought concerning military warfare. This singular fact makes change in both perceptions and actual behavior more important.

Traditionally the full array of a nation's military power served as both a warning -- deterrence -- against potential aggression and as the means of defense should aggression occur. The advent of nuclear weapons had changed tradition. Because it was too horrible to contemplate the use of atomic bombs except in defense of the most vital interests, nations would rely primarily upon conventional weaponry for defense. 37

The paradox and change of perception from Dulles' rationale for "massive retaliation" thus revolves full cycle. Bernard Brodie reasons that the existence of a nuclear option changed to the following:

One use of it will be fatally too many. Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies will not be called upon to function at all. Nevertheless that instrument has to be maintained at a high pitch of efficiency and readiness and constantly improved. ... In short we expect the system to be always ready to spring while permanently unused. 38

The true value of nuclear deterrence thereby changed from the threat of its use to the fear of its possible use based upon a mutual hope of its disuse. Stanly Falk sums up the effects of this process of perceptual change upon the actions of the major world powers:

The salient limitation on major armed conflict since 1945 has been the withholding of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons. Fear of unleashing a nuclear war has caused the major nuclear powers, beneath the noise of ideological contention, to cooperate effectively in maintaining a low ceiling on small-power violence. 39

Such a change in perceptions concerning nuclear deterrence is, according to Stanley Falk, highly significant in that the "deliberate non-use of the immense existing capabilities for destruction since 1945 has little, if any precedent in history" 40.

NUCLEAR IMPASSE AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

As membership in the nuclear power circle grew, intellectual writings on how war was to be waged in the future again exhibit a perceptual shift due to the confusion caused by the nuclear strategies impasse. According to Schelling:

between alternatives of unsuccessful local resistance on the one extreme, and the fruitless, terrifying, and probably unacceptable and incredible threat of general thermo-nuclear war on the other, there is a strategy of risky behavior, ... 41.

It is precisely within this realm of what Schelling calls "risky behavior" that falls the effectiveness of a wider range of low intensity conflict management options to include the suboptimization of the use of armed force. Also in this respect, if "brinkmanship" means anything, "it means manipulating the shared risks of war" [emphasis added]. 42 This risk was, and still is to a certain extent, increased by the continual lingering of various perceptions concerning an over-reliance upon the use of armed force. Military considerations still at times over-ride political goals while political and other conflict management means are slighted in favor of military expediency.

Clausewitz' conception of war as an instrument and a continuation of politics ... has remained a basic tenet of Western military thought even when, ..., political aims tended to coincide with the purely military goal of disarming the enemy. 43

The lack of the use or emphasis of other forms of conflict management in favor of possibly less effective, more destructive military methods may only increase the intensity of risky behavior, especially when, as Bloomfield and Leiss again point out, "U.S. military strategy until recently was [still] geared to great power confrontation" ⁴⁴. Such a statement gains further gravity when in Herman Kahn's book, On Thermonuclear War (Second Edition), one reads "of a revolution in weapons taking place every five years since the end of World War II" ⁴⁵. Yet the critical nature of nuclear weapons appears to have made a difference even in local conflicts involving small or "middle" powers, for again as Bloomfield's and Leiss' research findings conclude, "Recognition of the extreme dangers of resorting to nuclear weaponry encourages a strongly held desire to minimize violence and avoid conflict intensification that would involve great powers" ⁴⁶. Conversely, their findings also aver that, "If there appears a genuine danger of direct confrontation between U.S. and Soviet military power both superpowers tend to place the avoidance of such intensification above all else" ⁴⁷.

Such statements again illustrate perceptual change concerning armed conflict by implying that reliance upon nuclear arms has shifted from active threats of possible use bordering on what Schelling defines as "compellence" ⁴⁸ to a more passive, deterrent use based upon mutual fear of use and hope of disuse. Now more than ever before conflicts are manipulated and the use of armed force is executed with the grim realization that:

It is the strategic forces in the background that provide the risk and the sense of danger; it is they whose disposition will preoccupy national leaders as much as anything that is going on It is the strategic forces whose minute-by-minute behavior on each side will be the main intelligence preoccupation of the other side. ⁴⁹

Thus, "the threat of violence in reserve is [now] more important than the commitment of force in the field" ⁵⁰.

RE-EMPHASIS OF POLITICAL ENDS AND DE-EMPHASIS OF MILITARY MEANS

Shifts in types of strategy away from those solely based upon military force to those also based upon nuclear threats is not the only apparent variance in perceptual development. Change as to the degree of how and why even such concepts as military or nuclear-military force should operate can also be illustrated. The qualitative shift from national security positions based on active nuclear deterrence without restraints to those based on a more passive nuclear defense with restraints is but only one example.

A far more significant and deeper based qualitative shift in perceptions that is apparent in various writings concerns the "traditional instrument" -- military warfare. Questioning as to the very nature of military warfare and how it should be conducted increased in conjunction with the flux caused by nuclear impasse. Thomas Schelling provides an example of this growing concern of the continued utility of military force.

Nuclear weapons make it possible to do monstrous violence to the enemy without first achieving victory. With nuclear weapons and today's means of delivery, one expects to penetrate an enemy homeland without first collapsing his military force. ... Nuclear weapons [thus] threaten to make war less military, and are responsible for the lowered status of military victory at the present time [emphasis added]. 51

In this light, Henry A. Kissinger's view that "the present period of revolutionary change will not be managed solely by reliance on military doctrine" ⁵² and further, that "as the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses its credibility and therefore its political effectiveness" ⁵³ suggests a marriage of intellectual perceptions and a policy maker's operational code.

Since political ends may now be reasserting themselves vis-à-vis military ends, compatible techniques of using military force must become more varied. Glenn Snyder followed this line of reasoning when he wrote:

the function of military forces themselves may be shifting in the direction of a demonstrative role; the signalling of future intentions to use force, in order to influence the enemy's intentions, as opposed to being ready to use, or using, force simply as a means of conquest or denial Warfare itself may in the future become less a raw physical collision of military forces and more a contest of will, or to demonstrate one's willingness to raise the intensity of fighting, with the object of inducing the enemy to accept one's terms of settlement. While direct conflict or competition is going on at a low level of the spectrum of violence, selective force demonstrations using means appropriate to higher levels may take place as threats to "up the ante". 54

Here again variance in intellectual perceptions becomes evident, for as Stanley Falk argues, perhaps it is not really the emphasis of political ends over military means that is now important. Possibly the true significance in this shift

lies not merely in the substitution of deliberate self-restraint for the systemic constraints which historically have served to limit war, but also in the limitation of means rather than ends. Limitation of means, one might say has become an end in itself; ends are not so much limited as postponed. 55

Such changes in how military warfare and therefore armed conflict are viewed are an omen for the superpowers, especially the United States which has a long tradition of predicating strategic security policy on a military basis.

America ... has discovered new restraints and limitations on its powers. It has witnessed changes in world and national society and in global political and military realities that have altered long-accepted concepts of international behavior and relations. The United States today, mightier than ever in its history and more deeply committed to world involvement, is in some aspects less powerful and more isolated than in earlier days when it sought neither power nor involvement. For just as this country has changed, so has the world it inhabits and the attitudes and actions of all peoples and nations. 56

The findings of Bloomfield and Leiss mirror this feeling of American strategic policy being cast loose to search listlessly on a changing sea of perceptions:

There is some evidence that the 1970's may see much greater reluctance on the part of the United States to intervene militarily than has been in the past -- a trend that places a premium on the development of effective non-military conflict-control options. 57

CHANGE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS

Strategic literature in English suggests that within the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, perceptions as to the nature of war and conflict also are changing. In the Soviet Union, McLellan says, nuclear weapons "did have a profound influence upon Russian thinking. At first slowly and then with a rush, the Soviet leadership, ... conceded, contrary to Leninist doctrine, that war was no longer 'fatally inevitable'" 58. Zbigniew Brzezinski lucidly pointed this out when he quoted from a September, 1960 issue of the Soviet Communist Party's monthly, "Kommunist":

It is thus clear that a present day nuclear war in itself can in no way be a factor that would accelerate revolution and bring the victory of socialism closer. On the contrary, it would hurl mankind, the world revolutionary workers' movement, and the cause of the building of socialism and Communism back by many decades. 59

Such a statement concerning Soviet perceptions of the impact of nuclear weapons adds early (1960) proof to a growing mutuality of awareness. In order to cope with this awareness and still project its strategic efforts globally, Soviet perceptual and actual strategic conflict management techniques have undergone various stages of change. According to Bloomfield and Leiss, the Soviet Union "appears to be increasingly adjusting its tactics and configuring its military forces for more effective manipulation and exploitation for Soviet benefit of local conflict, ..." 60. An intuitive summation of current American and Soviet strategic positions comes from D.S. McLellan:

The world has learned to live with nuclear weapons and missiles. In the process the two superpowers have taken the measure of each other's strengths and weaknesses, and they have found their efforts to undo each other unavailing. Without abandoning their hopes and their efforts to fragment the capitalist world, the Soviets have evidently come to conclude that they too, have a stake in limited détente with Western Powers. How long such a détente will endure is unknown. But much can be learned from the experience of the past twenty years to prepare for the next twenty. 61

Evidence in various written sources indicates that Chinese Communist strategic perceptions also are changing. Although they do not possess the degree of nuclear might of the United States or the Soviet Union, current indications are that they too are learning and changing through experience. Current willingness to open themselves up to a guarded Asiatic form of détente is routinely evident in newspapers, periodic journals and magazines, and official statements. The People's Republic of China still however maintains a more active revolutionary air than their Soviet counterparts.

The Chinese ... made it clear that they intend to exploit the bomb for whatever additional influence it would give them within the Communist bloc, to support wars of national liberation, and to enhance Chinese hegemony in Asia. 62

A.M. Halpern says, additionally, because the Chinese are aware of the ramifications of nuclear warfare and their current vulnerability to the strategic forces of the superpowers, their strategy proceeds "not by direct confrontation but indirectly -- that is to say on the territory of third parties -- whether the means employed are political, economic, or military" 63.

This statement focuses attention on another important facet of changing perceptions concerning armed conflict. Not only are alternate forms of conflict management coming to the forefront, but due to the increased risks inherent in direct confrontation between the great powers, third parties are increasingly ensnared in great power politics.

THE QUEST FOR ALTERNATE MEANS: ECONOMIC WARFARE

Both the great powers and a majority of the smaller powers realize the current global strategic situation.⁶⁴ They also allegedly perceive the diverse forms of modern conflict and the need to shape more effective and active methods of conflict management. Less obvious, however, is the relationship between diverse non-military forms of conflict and William James' "moral equivalent of war: something heroic that will speak to men as universally as war does ..." ⁶⁵. Most of the alternate methods of conflict management are really not new; in fact, most have existed as long as military warfare. What is new and therefore important is that in the past these alternate forms acted as adjuncts or supplementary measures to the main conflict form -- military warfare. This is one of the truly important aspects of perceptual change, for now these alternate methods of conflict management are beginning to be considered and evaluated as effective implements in their own right and not just as auxiliaries to military force.

Growing worldwide economic interdependence has aided in making economic "warfare" a prime example of this change. According to Harold J. Clem,

In its traditional concept, economic warfare was confined in application to periods of formal armed hostilities, and then only to the disruption of international trade. It could be described simply as actions of a nonmilitary nature (though they might be supported by military means) that were taken in wartime to reduce the enemy's economic potential by denying him access to outside resources. ⁶⁶

The Nazi application of economic warfare measures and the allied successes at resource denial during World War II were to mark an upswing in the importance of this alternate form of conflict control. ⁶⁷

The post-war rise in the use of economic warfare, although aiding in the deterioration of the over-reliance upon military force, has also tended to blur perception as

to the actual nature of conflict by substituting an over-emphasis in the use of both military and economic means while still paying little attention to the political ends. In America,

Given the economic orientation of the nation, it was perhaps to be expected that the United States should innovate more effectively in the economic realm than in the political. ...This has slowed American understanding of the complexity of social change and the need for a frank recognition of the political context in which social and economic change takes place. 68

Since the end of World War II the United States has not been the only nation to stress economics. The rapid technological advances have generally had an economic warp and have thereby assisted in increasing the economic aspirations of practically every society worldwide. Such a tendency is easily recognizable in the "developing" nations which are often described by such scholars as Ted Robert Gurr as undergoing "a revolution of rising expectations" and a realization of "relative deprivations" 69.

Any such situation of perceptual flux in addition to tendencies to degenerate even the simplest conflict into a "hot" war which may lead to even more serious conditions poses almost insurmountable problems for today's diplomats and strategists. Further perceptual change is innate in such a situation. If any strategic options are to remain effective, alternate methods of conflict control must continue to be formulated. Any method short of one which threatens nuclear holocaust becomes promising as long as it lessens chances of armed intensification and realizes that it is the political ends which are important. Certainly the past importance of political motivation in situations of conflict should not be degraded for it may be true that political activism and innovation were more apparent in the past. But, as George Thomson notes, "The lack of new political ideas today, compared with the period of the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century,

masks the fact that this is the most political time in history" ⁷⁰.

Herein lies the value of such phrases, and the activities which they represent, as "limited war" and one of its related forms, "internal warfare". These types of armed conflict may be increasing in esteem because as Henry A. Kissinger explicitly points out, "A limited war, by contrast, is fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the forces employed and the goal attained" ⁷¹. By clearly specifying objectives perhaps it may be possible to circumvent confusion which may lead to further escalation. It becomes essential to recognize as evidently Secretary of State Kissinger does that,

The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is to reintroduce the political element into our concept of warfare and to discard the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war can have goals distant from those of national policy. ⁷²

INTERNAL WARFARE AS ANOTHER MEANS TO POLITICAL ENDS

Internal warfare and the existence of an increasing number of small powers begin to assume greater importance in association with perceptual change at this point. With the possibility of great power confrontation and escalation acting in the manner of what Karl W. Deutsch would define as "limit images" ⁷³, small nation interactions, surrogate and other, directly and indirectly increase in significance.

only a madman could regard a general thermo-nuclear exchange as a rational means for gaining political ends. Because of this fearsome realization, local quarrels and disorders far from the capitals of the great powers have become in a sense substitutes for "general war". ... today the most powerful nations on earth have found themselves entangled with small-scale conflicts to a degree that is unique in political history. ⁷⁴

As suggested here by Bloomfield and Leiss, local wars are not new. That which is new, they assert, is that some of these local conflicts "resemble the traditional type of warfare. ... But over half have been internal insurrections, civil wars, and guerrilla-type conflicts" ⁷⁵. Harry Eckstein supports Bloomfield's and Leiss' findings by asserting that "if internal warfare was commonplace in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is practically the essence of contemporary political life" ⁷⁶.

The number of volumes concerning internal warfare seem to be increasing at a phenomenal rate as strategy intellectuals come more and more to conclude, with Bloomfield and Leiss, that the "forces that generate local conflicts show no sign of diminishing" ⁷⁷. Indications of Soviet ⁷⁸ and Chinese ⁷⁹ perceptions also appear to bear out such statements. If, in UNESCO's words, wars begin in men's minds and it is there that one finds the nuclear ceiling, then it becomes crucial further to ask whether actual behavioral change has occurred in great and small power conflict beneath that ceiling. The following two chapters examines both the quantity and quality of internal warfare in the twentieth century before and after nuclear-military weapons built a ceiling on states' traditional use of maximum force for security.

CHAPTER 3
INTERNAL WARFARE AS BEHAVIORAL CHANGE;
PROPOSITIONS AND INVESTIGATIVE CRITERIA

Since intellectual perceptions, especially those of the great powers, have shifted in emphasis toward alternate, less intense forms of conflict management including added interest in internal warfare situations, an increase in the actual frequency of such events would indicate behavioral change parallel or at least similar to that of perceptual change. Such "parallelism" or co-occurrence would thus provide evidence of an association between them particularly if such situations also noted similar increases of involvement by external powers. However, prior to any discussion or analysis of actual internal warfare data, certain definitive criteria must be presented in order to determine exactly what quantities were tested.

THE PROBLEM OF SEMANTICS

The study of pertinent terminology is currently one of the most confusing facets of conflict research. This confusion is due primarily to ambiguities in the terms used to describe various conflict concepts. Such ambiguity is easily pointed out by an inspection of the definition of conventional warfare. Two current dictionaries, one unofficial and one official governmental, provide a lexical bridge and further suggest associations between what scholars are thinking and governments are doing. Edward Luttwak's authoritative Dictionary of Modern Warfare reflects intellectual perceptions and represents one professional point of view from that portion of the intellectual and academic community which is directly involved in the study of conflict. The United States' Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (hereafter referred to as the JCS Pub. 1) is both an

authoritative and official government source of common terminology and concepts upon which the DoD and other national agencies' strategic planning and assessments are founded.

The JCS Pub. 1 does not mention "conventional warfare" but defines "conventional forces" as "forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons" ⁸⁰. Following this line of reasoning, any "force", including insurgents, terrorists, opposing military and/or paramilitary factions, using any form of weapon except nuclear arms, including such devices as shotguns, plastic explosives, or "punji stakes" could be described as a "conventional force". Yet, JCS Pub. 1 cites these types of forces to define "unconventional warfare" while related weaponry is not defined. The only descriptive parameter which is placed upon unconventional warfare is that it is waged "within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel ..." ⁸¹.

DoD apparently tried to relieve this confusion with a 1973 revision in which not only unconventional warfare was redefined, but two additional terms, "direct action mission" and "low visibility operations" were also added as further possible sub-components of an unconventional warfare situation. ⁸²

Luttwak's dictionary generally follows the same pattern of terminological vagueness as does the DoD publication. Whereas the JCS Pub. 1 does not define conventional warfare, Luttwak defines it as an "inadequate term for any non-nuclear conflict" and does not list unconventional warfare. ⁸³

PROPOSITIONS

Internal warfare in this paper includes only three forms of internal conflict: insurgencies, insurrections, and revolutions-by-force. These forms have as an express purpose the forcible overthrow of an existing form of govern-

ment. Each of these three internal warfare forms in turn had to meet the following propositional criteria in order to be considered as a valid portion of the statistical analysis:

INSURGENCY: An organized and armed attempt by a nucleus of dissident personnel (may include non-indigenous, external support) to overthrow forcibly a nation-state's or territory's existing form of government. Examples of an insurgency include Venezuela, 1962-1970, and Malaysia, 1963-1966.

INSURRECTION: Any forcible attempt by an organized nucleus of dissident personnel actively backed by a significant portion of a nation-state's or territory's citizenry (externally aided or not) explicitly to overthrow their existing form of government. The 1967-1970 "Biafran Secession" in Nigeria and the primarily anti-colonial conflicts in the Portugese colonies and former colonies of Angola, Portugese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau), and Mozambique fall mainly within this category of internal warfare.

REVOLUTION-BY-FORCE: Any attempt which includes the use of the means of armed force by a major portion of a nation-state's or territory's citizenry (externally aided or not) to modify the socio-cultural system under which they live. Such attempts would include attempts to change the existing form of government and/or political system. The 1917 "Bolshevik Revolution" in Russia and the anti-French war from 1954 through 1962 in Algeria are examples of revolution-by-force in that they effected significant changes not only in the forms of government, but also in the overall political and economic subsystems as well as causing measurable socio-cultural changes in other sectors of their societies.

Insurgencies may lead to insurrections or revolutions. In fact, an insurgency may have these forms as intermediate goals to achieving its end of changing the government by the involvement of the masses.

An insurrection may change into an insurgency if the existing government proves too strong or if continued mass popular support proves impossible. Insurrections may also escalate into revolutions if or when the involved public's goals outstrip solely a determination to change their form of government.

Revolutions-by-force may degenerate into either an insurgency or an insurrection, but in themselves and if successful, are all encompassing. A revolution-by-force may not have as its sole aim the changing of a specific government. However, due to the magnitude of change inherent in a revolution, such a goal, explicit or implicit, will be included along with desires to modify portions of the economic, socio-cultural, and internal/external security subsystems.

This paper's proposition concerning revolution stated, "Any attempt which includes ... the means of armed force, .." because a revolutionary condition is not solely characteristic of a warfare situation. A revolution may be brought about "peacefully", that is to say without the threat or actuality of force or bloodshed. Industrial, social, cultural, and technological revolutions are a few examples of non-force, primarily non-violent revolutions. Revolution-by-force, however, is a legitimate category of armed conflict, including internal warfare, and is the specific form of revolution to be dealt with in this paper.

The targets of a revolution correspond to the four subcomponents of Talcott Parsons' "General Interchange Model"⁸⁴ of any society. These four subcomponents are: (1) pattern maintenance; (2) adaptation to the environment and its changes; (3) established goals attainment; and (4) system integrative efforts. These four so-called "functional prerequisites for any social system"⁸⁵ are depicted here as: (1) pattern maintenance -- internal/external security subsystems, police and military; (2) environment


adaptation -- economic subsystems; (3) established goals attainment -- political subsystems; and (4) system integrative efforts -- socio-cultural subsystems. By its mass character in both means and ends of changing the entire system, a revolution attempts to institute change in all four subsystems.

If derived from these propositions, other conflict terminology becomes only phrases by which to define techniques for the three included forms of internal warfare. Hence, guerrilla warfare, civil war, civil disorder, civil disobedience, assassinations, coups d'état, and terrorism become specialized techniques which may appear during any internal warfare situation and are therefore not in themselves types or forms of internal warfare. Categorizing such actions as techniques instead of as types or forms of internal warfare additionally allows an easier transitional use of such activities in relation to other forms of armed conflict. For example, if guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or the coup d'état were strictly related to internal warfare they would not easily apply to other armed conflict forms such as interstate and international wars. However, since they have been classified as techniques, such acts assume more of the role of tactics which become equally applicable to other more globally and regionally oriented forms of armed conflict than just exclusively to internal situations.

These propositions and their corresponding explanations form the basis for statistical investigation of the internal warfare portion of this research. Based upon these criteria, any forcible attempts to overthrow an existing form of government, confined within the boundaries of a single nation-state or territory, is counted. The word "territory" is included in order to encompass colonial wars and wars of secession because such acts of armed conflict are also internal attempts by indigenous elements to change a style of government and possibly other portions of a social system oriented at administering a specific geographic area.

Figure 2 illustrates these propositions:

Figure 2. Diagram of Pertinent Propositions and Their Relationships.



NOTE: There are no truly distinct "technique categories"; any technique may merge with others, or be used in other types of warfare e.g., international terrorism.

METHODOLOGY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL PARTICIPATION

The propositions upon which this statistical analysis are based all include the use of armed force with the objective of overthrowing an existing form of government.⁸⁶ Such internal events are included regardless of the number of casualties or the intensity of damage incurred. Situations meeting these specifications also had to fall within the time frame 1915 through 1973 in order to be considered. A further statistical comparison was made relating events for period 1915 - 1944 to those of 1945 - 1973.

When referring to internal warfare, it must be stressed that this research is not only interested in change in the actual frequency of internal warfare per se. This analysis also ascertained whether or not external involvement in internal situations of this type also indicated a tendency to change. External involvement is operationally defined for the purpose of this paper to include actual physical involvement (ranging from "advisors" to military interventions) and/or direct materiel and training support to one or more of the belligerent parties. Any increase in external participation by especially the major powers in the internal conflicts of others could indicate an increase in behavioral change similar to the increase in perceptual interest already noted for this form of warfare. Such increases tend not only to indicate the possibility of an association between perception and behavior, but in this case also to point toward perceptions and behavior causing reciprocal effects upon each other as changes in one co-occur with changes in the other.

METHODOLOGY COMPARED WITH OTHER STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF ARMED CONFLICT

Most previous analyses of conflict data differ from this effort in several ways. This analysis includes data on internal wars for the fifty-nine year period from 1915 through 1973. The bulk of other efforts have limited themselves to analysis of armed conflicts primarily since 1945. One notable and important exception is J.D. Singer's and Melvin Small's The Wages of War 1816 - 1965: A Statistical Handbook. However, the work of Singer and Small and others such as Quincy Wright⁸⁷ are oriented basically to major scale war, usually of international or at least of regional or interstate proportions. Most of such works have included internal warfare statistics only where they have impinged upon larger, global or regional considerations.

For further purposes of comparison, in this paper each internal war is not only noted as a single event (S_e) but also where appropriate, as an event continuing-over-time (COT_e). An internal war which lasted five years would thus receive a value of five "conflict years" (CY) while one which lasted only one year or less would receive a value of one conflict year. This method brings out internal wars which continued during years in which no new internal wars broke out. Most statistical summaries of armed conflict consider any given warfare situation as a singular event, that is to say, World War I = 1, World War II = 1, Algeria = 1, Biafra = 1. Such a classification hides the difference between long and short wars.

Additionally, this research does not adhere to the normal method for delineating the significance between wars of similar character since no casualty or damage intensity limitations have been imposed. L.F. Richardson's Statistics of Deadly Quarrels follows such a format generally for large scale warfare while L.P. Bloomfield's and A.C. Leiss' Controlling Small Wars does so for the type of armed conflict more pertinent to this study. Unfortunately, and by

their own admission, Bloomfield's and Leiss' establishment of such casualty and intensity criteria prevented them from including all situations of internal warfare.⁸⁸

Yet some restrictive criteria should be used in order to determine exactly what is to be considered as an internal war and whether or not any one such event is of more or less international significance. A case in point may be exemplified by comparing the statistical differences of the noted conflict researchers Harry Eckstein and the team of Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss. Eckstein's book Internal War does not statistically restrict such activities by definite, fixed casualty/damage limits and only does so by defining internal war as, "attempts to change by violence, or the threat of violence, a government's policies, rulers, or organization"⁸⁹. Under this definition, Eckstein lumps such widely dispersed incidents on the spectrum of conflict as "localized rioting", "widely dispersed turmoil", "coups d'état", "guerrilla wars", and "revolutions".⁹⁰ Using this definition as a guide for statistical research, Eckstein's content analysis concludes that internal war "is practically the essence of contemporary political life" and finds that the New York Times alone "reported well over 1200 [sic] unequivocal examples between 1946 and 1959 ..."⁹¹. Bloomfield and Leiss on the other hand attempt to impose an intensity limitation upon their definition of conflict thus relegating certain occurrences defined by Eckstein to more of a techniques of conflict role instead of as specific conflict types or methods. They thus define conflict as "disputes in or between nations that involve the threat or use of significant violence ..."⁹². "Significant violence" to Bloomfield and Leiss means one thousand or more casualties. Keeping this casualty limitation in mind, only thrity-seven "internal" local conflicts (to include subcategories, "with significant external support", "primarily internal", and "colonial") occurred between 1944 and 1969.⁹³

The establishment herein of criteria formulated upon the use of only three forms of internal warfare with specific participatory bases and the explicit objective of forcible overthrow of an existing government, while at the same time not overly restricting such efforts by the use of the so-called S_e method or casualty/damage limits, compromises between the various previous methods and the two exemplified extremes.

CHAPTER 4

BEHAVIOR AND CHANGE

Intellectual views of conflict forms, especially after World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons, changed in the direction of a search for alternatives other than the continued use of purely military oriented force. This perceptual search was characterized by intellectual emphasis on more limited forms of conflict management, lower on the intensity scale and away from the dangers of major power confrontation and nuclear warfare. If actual conflict among nations reflected intellectuals' views on acceptable forms of conflict in the nuclear age, then internal warfare should have increased during the three decades of instabilities under the nuclear-military ceiling.

COMPARATIVE INCIDENCE OF INTERNAL WARFARE

Comparing the period 1915 through 1944 with the period 1945 through 1973, the annual average and total number of actual incidents of internal warfare during the nuclear era did sharply increase. A comparative extract of the various cumulative results of these data provides a more visible illustration of this behavioral shift by noting more than a three-fold increase in the total number of nations involved, conflict years, and the average number of conflicts per year since the end of World War II and the elaboration of strategic nuclear doctrine.

Table I. Total Participants, Conflict Years, and Annual Averages of Internal Warfare Incidents, 1915 - 1944 and 1945 - 1973. *

	<u>1915-1944</u>	<u>1945-1973</u>
Total Number of Nations Experiencing Wars	19	58
Total Number of Conflict Years **	110	364
Average Number of Conflicts Per Year	3.66	12.55

Further examples of the possible association between great power perceptions and conflict behavior may be ascertained by scrutiny of Table III. The upper ends for the conflict scales for periods 1915 - 1944 and 1945 - 1973 indicate that during both periods those nations experiencing the highest incidence of internal warfare were also those which were entangled in various manners in great power politics for the era concerned. In conjunction with this observation, the fact that of the same internally involved nations, those experiencing ten years or more of internal warfare for the period 1945 - 1973 is five times greater (15 nations) than those for 1915 - 1944 (3 nations). This fact provides a somewhat different perspective of both the total increase in such events since 1945 as well as the probable increased influence of great power rivalries in the conduct of small nation internal affairs.

NOTES:

- (*) The base data for all of the summarizations which appear in this chapter may be found in the attached appendix.
- (**) The term "conflict year" represents one year of internal conflict for a single nation or territory. "Total Conflict Years" is a chain calculation obtained by summing the total number of internal conflicts occurring during each year for the total number of years in any given period.

Table II. Nations Experiencing Internal Wars by Total
Number of Conflict Years Involved; 1915 - 1973.

Vietnam	25	Cameroon	6
Haiti	21	Congo	6
Laos	21	El Salvador	6
Nicaragua	19	Chad	5
Muscat and Oman	16	Ireland (Republic of)	5
Colombia	14	Northern Ireland	5
Angola	13	Tibet	5
Malaya*	13	Cambodia (Khmer Rep.)	4
Dominican Republic	12	Costa Rica	4
Morocco	12	Malaysia*	4
Philippines	12	Nigeria	4
Thailand	12	Russia	4
Yemen (Sana)	12	Spain	4
Cyprus	11	Turkey	4
Indonesia**	10	Chile	3
Iraq	10	Ethiopia	3
Mozambique	10	Finland	3
Portugese Guinea	10	Jordan	3
Venezuela	10	Bangladesh	2
Burma	9	Burundi	2
Cuba	9	Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	2
Kenya	9	Mexico	2
Niger	9	Sudan	2
Paraguay	9	Bolivia	1
China (Mainland)	8	Guatemala	1
Ghana	8	Guyana	1
Greece	8	Hungary	1
Rhodesia	8	Lebanon	1
West Irian**	8	Madagascar	1
Algeria	7	Maldiv Islands	1
Iran	7	Pakistan	1
Rwanda	7	Tanganyika	1
Uruguay	7	Uganda	1
Total Number of Nations		66	
Total Number of Conflict Years		474	
Average Number of Conflicts Per Nation		7.18	
Average Number of Conflicts Per Year		8.03	

NOTES:

- (*) Malaya (British/Pre-Federation) internal situation counted separate from internal strife since the establishment of the Malaysian Federation.
- (**) Two separate and distinct periods of internal war: Indonesia, 1945 - 1950, anti-Dutch colonial; West Irian, 1962 - 1969, anti-annexation by Indonesia.

Table III. Nations Experiencing Internal Wars by Total Number of Conflict Years for 1915 - 1944 and 1945 - 1973.

<u>1915 - 1944</u>			
Haiti	20	Spain	4
Nicaragua	19	China (Mainland)	3
Dominican Republic	10	Costa Rica	3
Niger	8	Finland	3
Morocco	7	Ghana	3
Muscat and Oman	6	Cuba	2
Ireland (Republic of)	5	Greece	2
Iran	4	Mexico	2
Russia	4	Bolivia	1
Turkey	4		
Total Number of Nations.. 19 Total Number of Conflict Years.. 110			
Average Number of Conflicts Per Nation for Period 1915-1944.. 5.78			
Average Number of Conflicts Per Year for Period 1915-1944 ... 3.66			
<u>1945 - 1973</u>			
Vietnam	25	China (Mainland)	5
Laos	21	Ghana	5
Colombia	14	Morocco	5
Angola	13	Northern Ireland	5
Malaya*	13	Tibet	5
Philippines	12	Cambodia (Khmer)	4
Thailand	12	Malaysia*	4
Yemen (Sana)	12	Nigeria	4
Cyprus	11	Chile	3
Indonesia**	10	Ethiopia	3
Iraq	10	Iran	3
Mozambique	10	Jordan	3
Muscat and Oman	10	Bangladesh	2
Portugese Guinea	10	Burundi	2
Venezuela	10	Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	2
Burma	9	Dominican Republic	2
Kenya	9	Sudan	2
Paraguay	9	Costa Rica	1
Rhodesia	8	Guatemala	1
West Irian**	8	Guyana	1
Algeria	7	Haiti	1
Cuba	7	Hungary	1
Rwanda	7	Lebanon	1
Uruguay	7	Madagascar	1
Cameroon	6	Maldiv Islands	1
Congo	6	Niger	1
El Salvador	6	Pakistan	1
Greece	6	Tanganyika	1
Chad	5	Uganda	1
Total Number of Nations.. 58 Total Number of Conflict Years.. 364			
Average Number of Conflicts Per Nation for Period 1945-1973.. 6.28			
Average Number of Conflicts Per Year for Period 1945-1973 ...12.55			

NOTE: For explanation of (*) and (**) see above notes, page 36.

INCREASED ALIEN INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL WARS

This research stressed the upward change in great power intellectual perceptions, especially American ones, of alternative, limited conflict forms short of the nuclear threshold. If the great powers practiced what the intellectuals were preaching, as it were about acceptable limited involvement after 1945, then this emphasis in less intense conflict forms should be qualitatively reflected in a post-World War II increase in limited war ventures by the great powers. The evidence (see Figure 6, Tables VI and VII) bears out heaviest involvement by the great powers, with four of the five pre-1974 nuclear-military nations being the most active intervenors.

Table IV shows the principle aggregate measures of external involvement.

Table IV. External Involvement in the Internal Wars of Others for Periods 1915 - 1944 and 1945 - 1973.

	<u>1915-1944</u>	<u>1945-1973</u>
Total Number of Nations Externally Involved	12	39
Total Number of Conflict Years	126	639
Average Number of Conflicts Per Year	4.2	22.03

For the post-war years 1945 -1973, the total number of nations involved as external support in the internal wars of others more than tripled over that recorded for 1915 - 1944. This major increase in the total number of nations externally involved is even more significant when considering that even with such a large increase in the total number of external participants, the total number of conflict years and the average number of conflicts per year still increased well over five-fold for the post-World War II period. Not only did the number of actors involved increase, but the individual efforts of those actors also continued to rise.

Further evidence of a possible association between perceptions and behavior is also provided by comparisons of data which specifically concern the nuclear-military great powers; the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and France. During 1915 through 1944 all these major powers except the People's Republic of China, which was not established until 1949, were at the upper end of the involvement spectrum. However, observation is incomplete since only the United States showed any notable involvement in the internal affairs of other nations: a total of fifty-six conflict years, thirty-eight conflict years above the total for its next major power rival, France, with eighteen conflict years. United States efforts during this time can be mainly attributed to a renewed interest in Central and South America and enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine during and following World War I.

A comparison of total conflict years of involvement for the major powers again indicates a tripling of activity for the post-World War II era (1915 - 1944 = 98 conflict years; 1945 - 1973 = 298 conflict years). This fact gains further significance when considering the following comparative extract:

Table V: Major Powers' Involvement in the Internal Wars of Other Nations, for 1915 - 1944 and 1945 - 1973.

<u>1915 - 1944</u>		<u>1945 - 1973</u>	
United States	56	United States	71
France	18	Soviet Union	68
United Kingdom	16	United Kingdom	68
Soviet Union	8	Communist China	52
		France	39
<hr/> Totals:	98		<hr/> 298

All of the major powers significantly increased their involvement during 1945 - 1973, with the United States (indicating the smallest comparative, but still highly significant, increase in frequency) maintaining its position at

the upper end of the involvement spectrum. In addition, the finding that the total number of conflict years for external involvement for the years 1945 - 1973 (639 conflict years) is more than 1.75 times greater than the total number of conflict years for internal parties involvement themselves (364 conflict years) further suggests a parallel variation in intellectual perceptions of conflict forms, and manifest involvement in internal wars.

Table VI: Nations and Other Entities Involved in the Internal Wars of Others by Total Number of Conflict Years (CY), 1915 - 1973.

United States	127	Albania	7
United Kingdom	84	Bulgaria	7
Soviet Union	76	Spain	7
France	57	Yugoslavia	7
People's Republic of China	52	Netherlands	6
Portugal	40	Czechoslovakia	5
North Vietnam (DRVN)	38	East Germany (GDR)	5
Thailand	38	Indonesia	4
South Vietnam (RVN)	24	Italy	4
Cuba	19	West Germany (FRG)	4
Southern Yemen (Aden)	17	Greece	3
Australia and New Zealand	14	Japan	3
Philippines	14	Turkey	3
South Korea (RoK)	14	Burundi	2
Saudi Arabia	11	India	2
United Arab Republic	11	Pakistan	2
Belgium	10	Rwanda	2
Tanzania	10	Organization of African	2
Mozambique	8	Unity	
United Nations	8	Ghana	1
Zambia	8	Organization of American	1
Germany (Pre-WW II)	7	States	
		Syria	1

Total Number of Nations/Entities..... 43
 Total Number of Conflict Years..... 765
 Average Number of Conflicts Per Year..... 12.97

NOTE: No attempt has been made to obtain an average of the number of conflicts per nation since any such average would not exhibit any true significance due to the large disparity between involvements by conflict years for those most involved nations and the remainder.

Table VII: Nations and Other Entities Involved in the Internal Wars of Others by Total Number of Conflict Years (CY) for Periods 1915 - 1944 and 1945 - 1973.

	<u>1915 - 1944</u>		
United States	56	Italy	4
France	18	Portugal	4
United Kingdom	16	Japan	3
Soviet Union	8	Albania	1
Germany	7	Bulgaria	1
Spain	7	Yugoslavia	1

Total Number of Nations..... 12

Total Number of Conflict Years..... 126

Average Number of Conflicts Per Year.... 4.2

	<u>1945 - 1973</u>		
United States	71	Zambia	8
United Kingdom	68	Albania	6
Soviet Union	68	Bulgaria	6
People's Republic of China	52	Netherlands	6
France	39	Yugoslavia	6
North Vietnam (DRVN)	38	Czechoslovakia	5
Thailand	38	East Germany (GDR)	5
Portugal	36	Indonesia	4
South Vietnam (RVN)	24	West Germany (FRG)	4
Cuba	19	Greece	3
Southern Yemen (Aden)	17	Turkey	3
Australia and New Zealand	14	Burundi	2
Philippines	14	India	2
South Korea (RoK)	14	Pakistan	2
Saudi Arabia	11	Rwanda	2
United Arab Republic	11	Organization of African	2
Belgium	10	Unity	
Tanzania	10	Ghana	1
Mozambique	8	Organization of American	1
United Nations	8	States	
		Syria	1

Total Number of Nations/Entities..... 39

Total Number of Conflict Years..... 639

Average Number of Conflicts Per Year..... 22.03

NOTE: No attempt has been made to obtain an average number of conflicts per nation since any such average would not exhibit any true significance due to the large disparity between involvements by conflict years for those most involved nations and the remainder.

METHODOLOGICAL EVALUATION: THE ADVANTAGES OF THE "COT_e" METHOD

Internal wars are best viewed as events which continue over time (COT_e), as in Figures 4 and 6, rather than as single events of the year when they begin (S_e), which hides the richness of the data. Figures 3 and 5 depict the total number of internal wars and external involvement since 1915 using the S_e method. These graphs do display an increase in the frequency of internal warfare and external involvement for the entire period and for the comparative period of 1945 - 1973 over that of 1915 - 1944. However the trend in internal warfare since 1945 is not so readily apparent using only the S_e method.

This problem can best be illustrated by a close examination of the concerned graphs. Using the S_e method, a conflict or involvement is recorded only once. There is no way to identify continuing, long-term situations. The data contained in Figures 3 and 5 therefore do not accurately portray the continuing importance of events still in existence after the initial year of report. Examples of cases in point are the years 1950, 1951, and 1957 in both figures. Using S_e, these years appear relatively peaceful with little or no internal warfare or external involvement. However, in 1950 four internal wars ended (Greece, El Salvador, Indonesia, and Chile) and five were continuing (Vietnam, Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and Paraguay) (See Appendix). External participants were involved in four of the wars (Greece, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaya). For 1951, five wars continued (Vietnam, Philippines, Burma, Malaya, and Paraguay) with external involvement in two of them (Vietnam and Malaya). In 1957, hidden by the S_e method but exposed by the COT_e method, there were ten continuing internal wars (Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Laos, Algeria, Muscat and Oman, Cuba, Rwanda, Tibet, and Cameroon), all with external participants.

Figures 4 and 6 use the same data as Figures 3 and 5 but employ the COT_e method. The differences between the pre-World War II and the post-World War II occurrences of internal warfare and external involvement are equally as discernible as they were in Figures 3 and 5. However, the COT_e method further provides a far better view of the significant and continuing rise of both internal warfare and external involvement since 1945. The COT_e method further provides one key point which the S_e not only fails to show, but appears to negate. Using the S_e method, the trend lines from 1970 on suggest that both internal warfare and external involvement are decreasing. Yet as described by the COT_e trend lines in Figures 4 and 6, both internal warfare and external involvement therein indicate no current downward shift or sign of returning to the low frequency of use similar to that of the pre-World War II era.

Figure 3. Total Number of Internal Wars: Illustrated as Single Events (S_e).




Figure 4. Total Number of Internal Wars: Illustrated as Continuing-Over-Time Events (COT_e).




Figure 5. Total Number of Internal Wars Involving External Participants: Illustrated as Single Events (S_e).

Quantity





Figure 6. Total Number of Internal Wars Involving External Participants: Illustrated as Continuing-Over-Time Events (COT_e).

Quantity



CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis compared twentieth century internal warfare before and after nuclear military weapons intensified strains upon strategic leadership and built a supposed ceiling on the wars any nation could profitably wage and survive. In order to interpret evidence of changes in internal warfare before and after 1945, this research reviewed concurrent changes in the ways selected "defense intellectuals" perceived the nuclear ceiling and the strategic implications of non-nuclear internal wars

Perceptions of what constitutes armed conflict and how it should be "managed" or "controlled" were demonstrated to be continually changing. A significant factor in this change is the inherent risk attributed to nuclear related armaments and strategies. These strategies in turn also appear to be changing from primary reliance upon nuclear force as a national and bloc deterrent to an enhanced mutual awareness of its existence as an upper bargaining limit or ceiling in international politics.

The presence of behavioral change has also been shown. Statistical analysis of internal wars indicates that since 1945 the incidence of such events has increased more than three-fold over their occurrence for the preceding, 1915 - 1944, period. Likewise, alien involvement or external support, especially by the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, also increased significantly.

The co-occurrence of these two forms of change suggests an association between perceptual change and behavioral variation. However, internal warfare and external involvement existed prior to strategic perceptions associated with the threat of nuclear force and thus, as Andrew Scott notes, the

"latter cannot be used to [completely] explain ... an increase in the former." Yet nuclear weapons made the "use of full-scale warfare less attractive" and thus led to increases in the emphasis of other more "limited modes of conflict."⁹⁴ Although demonstrating a causal relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, the evidence presented should encourage future, wider ranged analysis aimed at determining specific types of association between the two.

The normative direction of this research is toward suboptimization in recurrent conflicts beneath the nuclear ceiling, not the indiscriminate continuation of armed conflict in any conceivable form so long as it does not beckon toward direct major power confrontation and the threat of nuclear war. Thus conflict manipulation and mediation may be the best alternatives to any future armed attempts at conflict control. For, as Bloomfield and Leiss have pointed out, most opportunities for conflict mediation -- and therefore manipulation -- appear in the majority of cases to exist prior to actual hostility initiation.⁹⁵ Because such possible chances for settlement prior to the threat of open, large-scale conflict are available, this manipulatory goal and the suboptimization of the use of armed force should be kept in mind.

ENDNOTES

1. Bernard and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 5, 12, 172-3, 201, 268-78.
2. Norbert Weiner, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (New York: Avon Books, 1954), pp. 143-52.
3. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47 (Lake Success, New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1947), p. 712.
4. David Horowitz (ed.), Containment and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), especially pp. 9-11.
5. Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 7-8.
6. All authors quoted in this chapter are members of a widely recognized intellectual strata whose works are read by various members of the highest circles of national policy formulation and implementation. Several of them (T.C. Schelling, S.L. Falk, George Thomson, and H.J. Clem as examples) have at times or are at present by various degrees of official position been responsible for actual education and training of both civilian and military members of the international defense community. Additionally, at least two of the quoted intellectuals (John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger) were or are at the time concerned themselves key makers and implementors of such policy.
7. Richard B. Foster, et al., Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the Defense Planning Process, Stanford Research Institute Document SSC-TN-8974, in partial fulfillment of Task Order 71-7 under Defense Contract DAHC 19-71-C-0001 (Washington: Stanford Research Institute, 1972), pp. 3-4.
8. Robert E. Osgood, "The Uses of Military Power in the Cold War", Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), America Armed: Essays on United States Military Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), p. 4.

9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. Scott, op. cit., p. 70.
11. Stanley L. Falk, The Environment of National Security (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1968), p. 164.
12. David S. McLellan, The Cold War in Transition (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 40.
13. Scott, op. cit., pp. 72-84.
14. Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the Seventies (New York: A.A. Knopf, Inc., 1969), p. 416.
15. Scott, op. cit., pp. 168-75.
16. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 393.
17. Warner R. Schilling, "Weapons, Doctrine, and Arms Control: A Case for the Good Old Days", Robert J. Art and K.N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), p. 448.
18. Colin Cherry, World Communication: Threat or Promise? (London: Wiley-Interscience, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1971), pp. 26-27; and Scott, op. cit., p. 133.
19. Falk, op. cit., p. 7.
20. Scott, op. cit., p. 3.

21. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Problems of Limited War", R.J. Art and K.N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), p. 110.
22. Scott, loc. cit.
23. Falk, loc. cit.
24. Walter Millis, "The Uselessness of Military Power", R.A. Goldwin (ed.), America Armed (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), pp. 22-42.
25. Ibid.
26. Scott, op. cit., pp. 7-11.
27. Scott, op. cit., p. 12.
28. John Foster Dulles, excerpt from an address before the Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954; cited here as reproduced in The New York Times, January 13, 1954 (Late City Edition), p. 2, col. 2.
29. David M. Abshire, "Grand Strategy Reconstructed", E.L. Dulles and R.D. Crane (eds.), Détente (New York: F.A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 257.
30. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 261; see also Schelling's "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War" in the same source; and Falk, op. cit., p. 163.
31. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 18-26.

32. Ibid., p. 18.
33. Max Lerner, The Age of Overkill (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 47.
34. Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 19.
35. Ibid., p. 20.
36. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 10.
37. McLellan, op. cit., p. 38.
38. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 272-3.
39. Falk, op. cit., p. 162.
40. Ibid., p. 163.
41. Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 109.
42. Ibid., p. 99.
43. Falk, op. cit., pp. 156-7.
44. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 405.
45. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Technology, Strategy, and the Use of Force", R.J. Art and K.N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), p. 2; Art and Waltz' comments based upon : Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Second Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 311-15.

46. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., pp. 392-3.
47. Ibid., p. 397.
48. Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 69-91.
49. Ibid., pp. 110-11.
50. Ibid., p. 143.
51. Ibid., p. 22.
52. Henry A. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 110.
53. Ibid., p. 100.
54. Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense", R.J. Art and K.N. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 75-6.
55. Falk, op. cit., p. 164.
56. Ibid., p. 5.
57. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 398.
58. McLellan, op. cit., p. 69.
59. Quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski in "A Book The Russians Would Like To Forget", Reporter, XXIII (December 22, 1960), p. 30.
60. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 405.
61. McLellan, op. cit., p. 128.
62. Ibid., p. 138.

63. A.M. Halpern, "China in the Postwar World", The China Quarterly, Number 21 (January - March, 1965), p. 41.

64. All of the sources listed herein indicate that perceptual change concerning armed conflict is global and not just limited to the United States and other great powers. Examples are provided by statements such as those of Stanley Falk (op. cit., pp. 5, 8.). Numerous authors have dealt directly with small power conflict involvement and conflict perceptions of international politics. Examples of such works are: L.P. Bloomfield and A.C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1969); Harry Eckstein, Internal Wars (London: Glencoe Free Press, 1964); M.R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers (New York: Free Press, 1972); S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Metin Tamkoc, International Civil War (Ankara, Turkey: Faculty of Administrative Sciences, 1967); and Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1974). Such works as these provide evidence that the vast majority of smaller powers, to include non-sovereign internal factions of various nation-states, are all cognizant of the increasing effectiveness of various forms of conflict management, other than purely military armed force.

65. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928), p. 367.

66. Harold J. Clem, United States Foreign Economic Policy (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1970), p. 83.

67. Ibid., pp. 83-101; see also Scott, op. cit., pp. 30-44.

68. Scott, op. cit., p. 109.

69. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24.

70. George Thomson, "The New World of Asia", Stanley L. Falk (ed.), The World in Ferment: Problem Areas for the United States (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1970), p. 105.

71. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 104.
72. Ibid., p. 105.
73. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 212-13.
74. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 3.
75. Ibid.
76. Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (London: Glencoe Free Press, 1964), p. 1.
77. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 4.
78. Ibid., p. 405.
79. Ibid., p. 10.
80. U.S., Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publication Number 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 78.
81. Ibid., p. 311.
82. U.S., Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Change 1 to Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publication Number 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 6.
83. Edward Luttwak, A Dictionary of Modern Warfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 60.
84. As discussed in Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 116-20.

85. Ibid., p. 116.

86. There is one specialized and singularly important technique which may be used in all three forms of internal warfare which is not included in the statistical analysis. This technique is that of the coup d'état. Granted, an extremely large number of forcible changes and attempts at change of governments may be attributed to the coup d'état. An effort was initially made to include the results of the coup d'état in the statistical investigation; however, based upon this attempt, the below listed reasons led to the conclusion that the advantage of such an inclusion was far out-weighed by the disadvantages noted below.

1. Due to their nature of extremely short time duration, there is no single or group of authoritative sources which list all coups or attempted coups.

2. Because of this, diverging accounts in various sources may not include the same data, even on the same reported coups. Some cases listed as coups in some sources may not be listed, or even be disclaimed, as coups in other sources.

3. A successful coup is easy to discern. But, it was found to be for all practical purposes impossible to accurately determine unsuccessful or attempted coups because:

- A. A great many events which could be legally counted as coup attempts are never officially or unofficially reported for various reasons, to include the possibility of bad political publicity.

- B. Certain events which are sometimes even officially reported as unsuccessful coup attempts are done so only as a ploy upon which to base internal reforms, restrictions, and repression.

4. There is no one absolute and singular definable purpose behind all coups d'état. Since their attempt may be for other than purely political reasons; this is another good reason for including them only as a technique rather than as a form of armed conflict.

- A. Some coups may solely aim at overthrowing a specific government or only one selected portion of the governmental structure.

- B. Some may aim at only ousting the key or selected official(s).

- C. Others may be designed to oust a government or its leader(s) for purely political, non-governmental or otherwise "social systemic" reasons.

- D. Finally, such efforts may have as their single intent a technique by which one person or a group of persons may replace others for purposes strictly related to power aggrandizement and not for the good or benefit of the entire system or its citizenry.

5. The attempt at coup d'état has become so frequent an event, especially in that portion of the world which is commonly called "under-developed", that many such attempts are disregarded and/or not reported because locally they have become a way of life.

These reasons were based primarily upon personal attempts to unravel the mystery of the coup d'état; however, one source deserves mention because it does provide support to these findings as well as providing a basic conclusion upon which to rest efforts in behalf of the coup d'état. The source is Edward Luttwak's Coup D'Etat (London: Penguin Press, 1968). Although Luttwak's efforts were basically oriented at discussing the tactics of the coup, the entire book is based upon a theme which is carried throughout: the usage of the coup d'état has and is increasing over time (see especially pp. 9, 11-12, 17, 20-21, 25-52, and Appendix C). Another source of information concerning the growing usage of the coup is provided by Walter C. Soderlund's "An Analysis of the Guerrilla Insurgency and the Coup D'Etat as Techniques of Indirect Aggression", International Studies Quarterly, Number 14 (December 1970), pp. 335-60. With these sources serving as a basis for proof of an increase in the use of the coup d'état, endeavors to investigate the frequency of internal warfare were turned to means other than the coup.

87. Quincy Wright, A Study of War, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

88. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., pp. 24-31.

89. Eckstein, op. cit., p. 1.

90. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

91. Ibid., p. 4.

92. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 4.

93. Ibid., Appendix C.

94. Statement is derived from a passage in Scott, op. cit., p. 12.

95. Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., p. 33.

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GENERAL REFERENCE DATA SERIES

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- Facts On File. New York: Facts On File, Inc., Issues for years 1941 through 1972.

APPENDIX
INTERNAL WARFARE DATA, 1915 - 1973

The following sources were used to provide the base data for all statistical compilations and analysis in this paper. Other sources of statistical information listed within the body of this report were only reviewed as to contents in order to provide a comparative view of methodologies involved. Both the sources used in this appendix and those which were summarily reviewed appear in the bibliography of this report.

Preceding each source listed below is a number. This numbering sequence is only for brevity in the appended table. The numbers with the source data which follows each therefore acts here as a legend for the information listed under the source column on each page of the appended table.

LEGEND NUMBER

SOURCE

1. The Official Associated Press Almanac, 1974. Maplewood, N.J.: Hammond Almanac, Inc., 1973. Sections used: "World Nations", pp. 465-665; and "Outline of World History, 1900-1970s", pp. 802-807.
2. Information Please Almanac, Atlas, and Year-book, 1974. 28th Edition. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973. Sections used: "Headline History of Our Times", pp. 384-394; "News Chronology of 1973", pp. 54-62; and "World History: Countries, Territories, Dependencies", pp. 170-314.

3. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1974.
New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1973. Sections used: "Nations of the World", pp. 542-619; "Memorable Dates", pp. 858-873; and "Chronology of Year's Avents", pp. 979-1014.
4. Singer, J. David and Melvin Small. The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972. Portions especially used: Appendices A,B,C, and D, pp. 381-403.
5. Bloomfield, L.P. and A.C. Leiss. Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the Seventies
New York: A.A. Knopf, Inc., 1969. Portion especially pertinent to statistical data: Appendix C.

Where any of these numerical codings 1 through 5 appear under the source column of the attached table, the above listed sources noted by 1, 4, and 5 are designated "primary" or "base" sources. Sources "2" and "3" were utilized as back-up sources in order to clarify pertinent points dealing with a specific conflict event, i.e., discrepancies involving dates or participants. Where discrepancies arose as to two or more of the primary sources listing different initiation or termination years for a conflict event, the dates listed under source "1", in conjunction with checks in "2" and "3" were normally held as the appropriate dates to list unless date data listed in sources "2" and "3" corroborated that data listed in the other primary sources instead of confirming source "1" listings. If the same dates were listed in two of the primary sources these data were held as appropriate for listing over any other discrepancies.

If another source was found to be more reliable than the data included in sources 1 through 5, then the appropriate citation is included under the source column in line with that conflict entry.

TABLE OF INTERNAL WARFARE DATA
1915 - 1973

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1915:</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4,	Unsuccessful. Anti-"colonial", anti-interventionist.
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4	Unsuccessful. Anti-"colonial", anti-interventionist.
Muscat and Oman	1913-1920	Government/ Tribal insurgents		1,2,3,	Unsuccessful. Oman tribal insurgents against Sultan of Muscat government.
Niger	1901-1922	Government/ Tribal insurgents	France	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Taureg Rebellion; anti- colonial.
Nicaragua	1912-1933	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4	Unsuccessful. Anti-"colonial", anti-interventionist
<u>1916:</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1913-1920	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1916 (continued):</u>					
Niger	1901-1922	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Mexico	1916-1917	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4	Governmental reforms. "Civil war", Zapata and Villa.
Ireland	1916-1920	Government/ Insurgents	U.K.	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Anti-"colonial", "Sinn Fein" nation- alist movement, the "Easter Rebellion".
1917: *****					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1913-1920	continuing			
Niger	1901-1922	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Mexico	1916-1917	continuing			
Ireland	1916-1920	continuing			
Russia	1917	Czarist Gov- ernment/ Bolsheviks and Mensheviks		1,2,3	Successful but faction split leads to further unrest. "Bolshevik" Revolution, Provisional government ousted, rise of Lenin.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
1917 (continued):					
Cuba	1917	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4	Unsuccessful. Anti- U.S. supported government, anti- interventionist.
China	1917	Government factions; Kuomintang/ Northern warlords		1,2,3,	Successful but split loyalties. Rise of Chiang Kai-shek's power.
Costa Rica	1917-1919	Government/ Military and Insurgents		1,2,3	Successful. Dictator- ship established by F. Granados.
Finland	1917-1920	Government factions; "Red" (Commu- nists) vs. "White" (Na- tionalists)		1,2,3	Government split and Republic estab- lished. Nationalists led by C.G. Mannerheim assume control.
1918: *****					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1913-1920	continuing			
Niger	1901-1922	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1918 (continued):</u>					
Ireland	1916-1920	continuing			
Costa Rica	1917-1919	continuing			
Finland	1917-1920	continuing			
Russia	1918-1920	Government factions; "Red" vs. "White".	U.K., France, 1,2,3,4 Japan, Ger-many, U.S.		Unsuccessful. Establishment of the Soviet state.
***** <u>1919:</u> *****					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1913-1920	continuing			
Niger	1901-1922	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Ireland	1916-1920	continuing			
Costa Rica	1917-1919	ended			
Finland	1917-1920	continuing			
Russia	1918-1920	continuing			
***** <u>1920:</u> *****					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1913-1920	ended			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
1920 (continued):					
Niger	1901-1922	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Ireland	1916-1920	ended			
Finland	1917-1920	ended			
Russia	1918-1920	ended			
Morocco	1920-1926	Colonial government/ Insurgents	Spain, France	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. "Riff Rebellion", tribal insurgents.
Turkey	1920-1923	Government factions and Insurgents		1,2,3	Successful. Kemal Ataturk leads nationalists to oust government and establishes republic.
1921: *****					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Niger	1901-1922	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Morocco	1920-1926	continuing			
Turkey	1920-1923	continuing			
1922: *****					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1925	continuing			
Niger	1901-1922	ended			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1922 (continued):</u>					
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Morocco	1920-1926	continuing			
Turkey	1920-1923	continuing			
<u>1923: *****</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Morocco	1920-1926	continuing			
Turkey	1920-1923	ended			
<u>1924: *****</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Dominican Republic	1905-1924	ended			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Morocco	1920-1926	continuing			
<u>1925: *****</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
Morocco	1920-1926	continuing			
<u>1926: *****</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1926 (continued):</u>					
Morocco	1920-1926	ended			
China	1926-1927	Kuomintang (nationalists) vs. Communists		1,2,3	Short term success. Rise of Mao Tse-Tung; Nationalist Army led by Chiang Kai-Shek takes over Nanking, Hankow, and Shanghai.

<u>1927:</u>	*****				
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
China	1926-1927	ended (however, Nationalist strength starts to decline as Communism gains)			

<u>1928:</u>	*****				
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			

<u>1929:</u>	*****				
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			

<u>1930:</u>	*****				
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1931:</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
<u>1932:</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	continuing			
<u>1933:</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	continuing			
Nicaragua	1912-1933	ended			
Cuba	1933	Government factions/ Military and Insurgents		1,2,3	Successful. Former Army Sargent Batista ousts Machado government during popular unrest.
<u>1934:</u>					
Haiti	1915-1934	ended			
<u>1935:</u>					
Greece	1935	Government factions/ Military and Insurgents		1,2,3	Successful. Republic dissolved and monarchy re-established. Civil unrest and mass rioting results in numerous coups causing government instability.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1936:</u>					
Spain	1936-1939	Government factions; Republicans vs. Falangists.	Germany, Italy, Russia, Portugal, international "volunteers"	1,2,3,4	Successful. Spanish Civil War; coining of phrase "guerrilla" for "small war".
<u>1937:</u>					
Spain	1936-1939	continuing			
<u>1938:</u>					
Spain	1936-1939	continuing			
<u>1939:</u>					
Spain	1936-1939	ended			
<u>1940:</u>					
None					
<u>1941:</u>					
Iran	1941-1947	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.S.R., U.K.	5	Unsuccessful. Soviet backed Azerbaijan "government" attempts secession.
<u>1942:</u>					
Iran	1941-1947	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1942 (continued):</u>					
Ghana	1942-1949	Colonial government/Insurgent nationalists	U.K.	1,2,3	Unsuccessful, but new constitution in 1951. Anti-colonial.

<u>1943:</u>	*****				
Iran	1941-1947	continuing			
Ghana	1942-1949	continuing			
Bolivia	1943	Government/Labor led insurgents		1,2,3	Successful. Civil war; MNR (Movement for National Liberation) led by labor Party assumes control.

<u>1944:</u>	*****				
Iran	1941-1947	continuing			
Ghana	1942-1949	continuing			
Greece	1944-1950	Government/Insurgents (Communist)	U.K., Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, U.S.	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. Communist and Royalist guerrillas wage war after Nazis expelled. U.S. in 1947 sends aid under Truman Doctrine.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1945:</u>					
Iran	1941-1947	continuing			
Ghana	1942-1949	continuing			
Greece	1944-1950	continuing			
China	1945-1949	Government factions; Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek and nationalists) vs. Communists (Mao Tse Tung)	U.S.	1,2,3,4,5	Successful. Mao's forces succeed in ousting Chiang Kai-shek's government.
Indochina	1945-1954	Colonial government/Insurgents	French	1,2,3,4,5	Viet Minh forces defeat French in 1954 decisively at Dien Bien Phu.
Indonesia	1945-1950	Colonial government/Nationalist insurgents	Netherlands	1,2,3,5	Successful. Sukarno led nationalist forces resist Dutch re-entry after WW II.
El Salvador	1945-1950	Government factions/Military factions/Insurgents		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Widespread civil unrest and low intensity guerrilla warfare.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
1945 (continued):					
Venezuela	1945	Government factions/ Military factions and Insurgents		1,2,3	Successful. Mass civil unrest and general strikes; government dissolved, R. Betancourt forms new government.

1946: *****					
Iran	1941-1947	continuing			
Ghana	1942-1949	continuing			
Greece	1944-1950	continuing			
China	1945-1949	continuing			
Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Indonesia	1945-1950	continuing			
El Salvador	1945-1950	continuing			
Philippines	1946-1954	Government/ Insurgents (Communists)		1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful. Huk Rebellion.

1947: *****					
Iran	1941-1947	ended			
Ghana	1942-1949	continuing			
Greece	1944-1950	continuing			
China	1945-1949	continuing			
Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Indonesia	1945-1950	continuing			
El Salvador	1945-1950	continuing			
Philippines	1946-1954	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1947 (continued):</u>					
Madagascar 1947 (Malagasy Republic)		Colonial government/ Nationalist insurgents	France	1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful. Anti-colonial.
Pakistan 1947		Government factions		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Primarily religious (Hindu/Moslem) conflict after partition which claims approximately one million lives.

<u>1948:</u> *****					
Ghana 1942-1949		continuing			
Greece 1944-1950		continuing			
China 1945-1949		continuing			
Vietnam I 1945-1954		continuing			
Indonesia 1945-1950		continuing			
El Salvador 1945-1940		continuing			
Philippines 1946-1954		continuing			
Burma 1948-1954		Government/ Tribal and Communist insurgents and Chinese nationalists (see remarks)		1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful. Chinese nationalist troops stranded in SE Asia after Communist victory on mainland.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1948 (continued):</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	Government/ Insurgents, Communists	U.K.	1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful. Ethnic Chinese led by Chen Peng fail due to only minority support.
Chili	1948-1950	Government and Military factions		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Mass civil disorder, after key political figure Gaiten assassinated, President Gomez established martial law.
Paraguay	1948-1954	Government/ Military		1,2,3	Successful. Civil War: Military junta, General A. Stroessner assumes power.

<u>1949:</u>					
Ghana	1942-1949	ended			
Greece	1944-1950	continuing			
China	1945-1949	ended			
Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Indonesia	1945-1950	continuing			
El Salvador	1945-1950	continuing			
Philippines	1946-1954	continuing			
Burma	1948-1954	continuing			
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Chili	1948-1950	continuing			
Paraguay	1948-1954	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1949</u> (continued):					
Costa Rica	1949	Government/ Insurgents		1,2,3,5	Successful. Civil War; Civilian junta established O. Ulate as President.
<u>1950:</u> *****					
Greece	1944-1950	ended			
Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Indonesia	1945-1950	ended			
El Salvador	1945-1950	ended			
Philippines	1946-1954	continuing			
Burma	1948-1954	continuing			
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Chili	1848-1950	ended			
Paraguay	1948-1954	continuing			
<u>1951:</u> *****					
Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Philippines	1946-1954	continuing			
Burma	1948-1954	continuing			
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Paraguay	1948-1954	continuing			
<u>1952:</u> *****					
Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Philippines	1946-1954	continuing			
Burma	1948-1954	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1952 (continued):</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Paraguay	1948-1954	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	Colonial government/ Tribal insurgents	U.K.	1, 2, 3, 5	Unsuccessful. "Mau Mau" Uprising by primarily Kikuyu tribe against white "colonists".
Morocco	1952-1956	Colonial government/ Nationalist insurgents	France	5	Unsuccessful. Anti-colonial.
Cyprus	1952-1959	Government/ Ethnic and Communist insurgents	U.K.	1, 2, 3, 5	Unsuccessful. Turkish/Greek ethnic animosities plus E.U.K.A. (Communist Party) subversion.

1953: *****

Vietnam I	1945-1954	continuing			
Philippines	1946-1954	continuing			
Burma	1948-1954	continuing			
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Paraguay	1948-1954	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Morocco	1952-1956	continuing			
Cyprus	1952-1959	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1953</u> (continued):					
Cuba	1953	Government/ Insurgents (Communist)		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. "July 26" Attack on Havana military bases. Castro brothers jailed but released one year later.
Laos	1953-	Royal government/ Insurgents (Communist)	U.S., NVN, PRC, USSR, Thailand	1,2,3,4,5	Continuing. Smoldering warfare among royalist-nationalist, neutralist, and Communist (Pathet Lao) forces. U.S. and USSR support primarily logistic oriented but use in past of U.S. "advisors" acknowledged. USSR support primarily weapons and munitions acquisitions.
<u>1954</u> : *****					
Vietnam I	1945-1954	ended			French involvement ended however internal rivalries (North/South) begin to form.
Philippines	1946-1954	ended			
Burma	1948-1954	ended			
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Paraguay	1948-1954	ended			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Morocco	1952-1956	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1954 (continued):</u>					
Cyprus Laos	1952-1959 1953-	continuing continuing			
Guatemala	1954	Government/ Insurgents (Communist), and national- ists with military factions	Cuba, U.S.	1,2,3,4,5	Successful. Arbenz pro-communist govern- ment under pressure from more extreme Cuban motivated ele- ments. Nationalization of foreign firms causes reaction, U.S. supported group ousts government and establishes a mili- tary government under Castillo Armas.
Algeria	1954-1962	Colonial government/ Insurgents and Military (French) factions	France	1,2,3,4,5	Successful. Anti- colonial; after initial set backs, gains inde- pendence as separate republic.
Muscat and Oman	1954-1958	Government and Tribal factions	U.K.	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. Sultan Imam dies; Muscat/Oman rift reopens but U.K. supports re-established order.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1955:</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Morocco	1952-1956	continuing			
Cyprus	1952-1959	continuing			
Algeria	1954-1962	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1954-1958	continuing			
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Cuba	1955-1959	Government/Insurgents (Communist)	USSR, GDR (East Germany) Czechoslovakia	1,2,3,5	Successful. Fidel Castro ousts Batista government.
Rwanda	1955-1959	Government/Tribal insurgents	Belgium	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Anti-colonial influence. Belgium backed government of Hutu tribal majority vs. Tutsi minority nationalist movement.
Tibet	1955-1959	Government/Nationalist insurgents	PRC	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. Nationalist, anti-communist, and anti-Chinese elements finally suppressed by PRC dominance.
Cameroon	1955-1960	Colonial government/Nationalist insurgents	France	1,2,3,4,5	Successful. Anti-colonial. Becomes independent republic in 1960.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1956:</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Morocco	1952-1956	continuing			
Cyprus	1952-1959	continuing			
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Algeria	1954-1962	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1954-1958	continuing			
Cuba	1955-1959	continuing			
Rwanda	1955-1959	continuing			
Tibet	1955-1959	continuing			
Cameroon	1955-1960	continuing			
Hungary	1956	Government factions	USSR	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. "Hungarian Revolution"; Neutralist element under I. Nagy splits from Communist govern- ment of J. Kadar, de- clares Hungary neu- tralist and attempts to withdraw from War- saw Pact; Soviet Union "assists" in ruthlessly crushing revolt.

<u>1957:</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Cyprus	1952-1959	continuing			
Laos	1953-	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1957 (continued):</u>					
Algeria	1954-1962	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1954-1958	continuing			
Cuba	1955-1959	continuing			
Rwanda	1955-1959	continuing			
Tibet	1955-1959	continuing			
Cameroon	1955-1960	continuing			

<u>1958:</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Cyprus	1952-1959	continuing			
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Algeria	1954-1962	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1954-1958	ended			
Cuba	1955-1959	continuing			
Rwanda	1955-1959	continuing			
Tibet	1955-1959	continuing			
Cameroon	1955-1960	continuing			
Jordan	1958	Government/ Insurgents	U.K.	1,2,3,4	Unsuccessful. Pro-UAR guerrillas attempt to oust government. Jordanian forces and U.K. paratroops restore order.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1958 (continued):</u>					
Lebanon	1958	Government and factions and Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. "Lebanon Crisis". U.S. troop landings show of force aids in restoring order.

<u>1959: *****</u>					
Malaya	1948-1960	continuing			
Kenya	1952-1960	continuing			
Cyprus	1952-1959	ended			
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Algeria	1954-1960	continuing			
Cuba	1955-1959	ended			
Rwanda	1955-1959	ended			
Tibet	1955-1959	ended			
Cameroon	1955-1960	continuing			
Paraguay	1959-1960	Government/ Insurgents (Communist)	Cuba	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. A. Stroessner's govern- ment directed military campaign crushes rebels inspired by Castro's Cuban victory.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1959 (continued):</u>					
Vietnam II	1959-	Government/ Insurgents	Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, U.S. vs. NVN, PRC, USSR	1,2,3,4,5	Continuing. Increased insurgent (Communist) activity (Viet Cong) leads to strong govern- ment counter-measures, civil unrest; President Diem assassinated, new government formed; start of increased Viet Cong and their allies drive to oust government. U.S. takes increased ac- tive role. USSR role primarily counter-U.S. polit. check and arms supplying.

1960: *****

Malaya	1948-1960	ended
Kenya	1852-1960	ended
Laos	1953-	continuing
Algeria	1954-1060	ended
Cameroon	1955-1960	ended
Paraguay	1959-1960	ended
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
1960 (continued):					
Congo	1960-1965	Government and Military factions	United Nations, Belgium	1,2,3,4,5	Government dissolved. Provisional government finally established a new constitution in 1967. Political in-fighting causes government to split; Katanga Province tries secession, fails. U.N. supervision finally lessens situation but stability still precarious until 1967 when J. Mobutu consolidates government.
Maldiv Islands	1960	Government/ Insurgents (Nationalists)	U.K.	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Insurgents take control of three southern islands in an attempt to revolt. U.K. troops and local forces re-establish control.
Colombia	1960-	Government/ Insurgents (Communist)		1,2,3,5	Continuing. Low intensity guerrilla warfare with sporadic flareups, terrorism, and assassinations.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1961:</u>					
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Congo	1960-1965	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Cuba	1961	Government/ Insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. At- tempted "Bay of Pigs Invasion" ends with Castro government fur- ther solidifying its position.
Yemen	1961-1972	Government/ Insurgents (Communist)	UAR, Saudi Arabia, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. Inter- nal strife lessened in 1972 when external pressure relieved by signing of pact be- tween Yemen and South Yemen.
Angola	1961-	Colonial government/ Insurgent nationalists	Portugal	1,2,3,4,5	Continuing. Anti- colonial; primarily nationalist, self- determination oriented.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1961 (continued):</u>					
Iraq	1961-1970	Government/ Tribal insurgents	USSR	1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful - successful. "Kurd Rebellion", arms supplied by USSR aid communist oriented tribesmen but conflict ended when Iraq gives Kurds a degree of autonomy.

<u>1962:</u>					
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Congo	1960-1965	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing			
Thailand	1962-	Government/ Communist insurgents	U.S.	1,2,3	Continuing. Low intensity insurgency unable to gain momentum due to successful government security forces. US advisory and arms support to government; probable PRC and NVN arms support to rebels.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS INTERNAL EXTERNAL	SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
<u>1962 (continued):</u>				
Venezuela	1962-1970	Government/ Communist insurgents	Cuba	1,2,3,5 Unsuccessful. Urban based with rural support fails to gain popular support due to well planned government programs.
Indonesia (West Irian)	1962-1969	Government/ Nationalist insurgents	1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful. Prolonged low intensity guerrilla war after Dutch leave West Irian; dissipates in 1969 when Indonesia formally annexes West Irian area.

<u>1963:</u> *****				
Laos	1953-	continuing		
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing		
Congo	1960-1965	continuing		
Colombia	1960-	continuing		
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing		
Angola	1961-	continuing		
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing		
Thailand	1962-	continuing		
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing		
Indonesia	1962-1969	continuing (West Irian)		

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1963</u> (continued):					
Cyprus	1963-1965	Government factions and Ethnic factions	Greece, Turkey, United Nations	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. Civil war between Greek/Turk factions, unrest abated with UN mediation but UN Peace Keeping Force remains.
Malaysia	1963-1966	Government/ Communist insurgents	Indonesia	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Inter- nal factions trained, armed, and supported by Indonesian Commu- nists fail in an at- tempt to oust govern- ment.
Rwanda	1963-1964	Government/ Tribal in- surgents	Burundi	1,2,3,4	Unsuccessful. Tribal animosities rekindle civil war; Insurgents "invade" from basecamps in Burundi but fail, losing in excess of 12,000 casualties.

1964: *****

Laos 1953- continuing
Vietnam II 1959- continuing
Congo 1960-1965 continuing
Colombia 1960- continuing
Yemen 1961-1972 continuing
Angola 1961- continuing

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1964</u> (continued):					
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing			
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing			
Indonesia	1962-1969	continuing			
Cyprus	1963-1965	continuing			
Malaysia	1963-1966	continuing			
Rwanda	1963-1964	ended			
Tanganyika	1964	Government and Ethnic-religious factions	U.K., PRC	1,2,3,4	Successful. Government split by ethnic-religious cleavages. Africans can majority oust Arab minority government; Tanganyika and Zanzibar join to form the Republic of Tanzania.
Uganda	1964	Government and Tribal factions	U.K.	1,2,3,4	Unsuccessful. Civil unrest with government formed after 1962 causes widespread terrorism; government reforms and realigning lessen tension.
Guyana	1964	Government factions	U.K.	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Formation of coalition government causes communal warfare; state of emergency declared and U.K. troops aid in restoring order.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS INTERNAL	EXTERNAL	SOURCE	RÉSULTS/REMARKS
<u>1964</u> (continued):					
Niger	1964	Government/ Insurgents	Ghana	1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Government forces quell terrorism and guerrilla war by leftist insurgents led by exiled opposition leader D. Bakary and based out of Ghana.
Sudan	1964-1965	Government split and Nationalist insurgents		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. General Abboud's military government ousted and civil government established; black militant groups in southern Sudan start low intensity insurgency.
Mozambique	1964-	Colonial Government/ Nationalist insurgents	PRC, USSR, Portugal	1,2,3	Continuing. Anti-colonial; primarily black nationalists but some aid from PRC and USSR as an attempt to influence.
Portugese Guinea	1964-	Colonial government/ Nationalist insurgents	PRC, USSR, Portugal	1,2,3	Continuing. Anti-colonial; also basically Afro nationalism but PRC and USSR attempts to aid in order to gain influence through local fronts as in Mozambique.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1965:</u>					
Portugese	1964-	continuing			
Guinea		continuing			
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	ended			
Congo	1960-1965	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing			
Thailand	962-	continuing			
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing	(West Irian)		
Indonesia	1962-1969	ended			
Cyprus	1963-1965	continuing			
Malaysia	1963-1966	ended			
Sudan	1964-1965	continuing			
Mozambique	1964-				
Dominican Republic	1965	Government and military factions	U.S., O.A.S.	1,2,3,4,5	Unsuccessful. Government overthrown; civil war starts between right wing, leftist and military elements, US intervention doesn't stop. Mediation by OAS finally calms situation.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1965 (continued):</u>					
Indonesia	1965-1968	Government and Military factions and Communist insurgents		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Sukarno withdraws Indonesia from UN and aligns with PRC. Coup attempt by Communists quelled by anti-Communist army and Communist purge begins; over 300,000 Indonesians killed and General Suharto emerges as new strong man.
(NOTE: This conflict is separate and distinct from Indonesian activities in the West Irian situation.)					
<u>1966: *****</u>					
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1962-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing			
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing			
Indonesia	1962-1969	continuing	(West Irian)		
Malaysia	1963-1966	ended			
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portuguese	1964-	continuing			
Guinea					
Indonesia	1865-1968	continuing			

1966: *****

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1966 (continued):</u>					
Rhodesia	1966-	White minority government vs. black majority	PRC, USSR, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique	Adelphi Papers No. 100, International Institute of Strategic Studies; London.	Continuing. Low intensity guerrilla warfare based primarily out of Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique. Low success due to multi-splintering and no consolidated front. Primarily nationalistic but many trained in USSR and PRC thus Communist efforts present.

1967: *****

Laos	1953-	continuing		
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing		
Colombia	1960-	continuing		
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing		
Angola	1961-	continuing		
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing		
Thailand	1962-	continuing		
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing		
Indonesia	1962-1969	continuing		
Mozambique	1964-	continuing		
Portuguese Guinea	1964-	continuing		
Indonesia	1965-1968	continuing		
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing		

(West Irian)

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1967 (continued):</u>					
Nigeria	1967-1970	Government, Military, and Tribal factions	France, Portugal, U.K., USSR, GFR	1,2,3,5	Unsuccessful. Strict government rule and establishment of tribal states causes Ibo tribe to secede and form the Republic of Biafra; secession fails and government under M.G. Gowan assumes control.
Uruguay	1967-	Government/ Communist insurgents	Cuba	1,2,3	Continuing. Continuing guerrilla warfare with sporadic highs of terrorism and bloodshed. Insurgents primarily Communist based around one of the most effective Communist movements in Latin/South America outside of Cuba; the "Tupamaros" - primarily urban based but with good rural support.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1968:</u>					
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing			
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing			
Indonesia	1962-1969	continuing	(West Irian)		
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portuguese	1964-	continuing			
Guinea					
Indonesia	1965-1968	ended			
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing			
Nigeria	1967-1970	continuing			
Uruguay	1967-	continuing			
Haiti	1968	Government/ Nationalist insurgents		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Anti-Duvalier insurgents attempt to "invade" Haiti; government troops restore order.

<u>1969:</u>					
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Iraq	1961-1970	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
1969 (continued):					
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Venezuela	1962-1970	continuing			
Indonesia	1962-1969	ended (West Irian formally annexed)			
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portuguese Guinea	1964-	continuing			
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing			
Nigeria	1967-1970	continuing			
Uruguay	1967-	continuing			
Chad	1969-	Government/ Ethnic (Arab) factions	France	1,2,3	Continuing. Arab factions in North and Eastern areas wage guerrilla warfare against primarily black-Afro government. France sends some 3500 combat troops to "assist" government. Now conflict is sporadic with occasional intense increases.
Muscat and Oman	1969-	Government/ Insurgents	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Southern Yemen)	1,2,3	Continuing. Mixture of Communist, nationalist, and pro-Arab League (Muscat and Oman are not a member) guerrillas operating out of sanctuaries in Southern Yemen.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1969</u> (continued):					
Northern Ireland	1969-	Government/ Religious factions and Nationalist insurgents	U.K.	1,2,3	Continuing. Religious riots between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast and Londonderry open deep political as well as religious rifts. Notwithstanding the religious issues, political claims basically hinge upon demands for separation from U.K. and either unification with its southern neighbor, the Irish Republic, or independence as a separate entity. The main rebel activist group other than religious factions, is called the "Irish Republican Army". As of 1973, fighting has caused approximately 850 deaths (about 190 were U.K. troops), 10,000 wounded, and in excess of \$100 million in damages. (Northern Ireland's "rebellion" is especially interesting in that it provides an example of insurgent warfare in an

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		

1969 (continued):

Northern Ireland (continued)

old, established Western democratic society, instead of the normal pattern: "emerging, under-developed" nations, usually involving Communism or some form of dictatorial rule.)

1970: *****

Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Iraq	1961-1970	ended			
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Venezuela	1962-1970	ended			
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portuguese Guinea	1964-	continuing			
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing			
Nigeria	1967-1970	ended			
Uruguay	1967-	continuing			
Chad	1969-	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1969-	continuing			
Northern Ireland	1969-	continuing			

(France withdraws combat troops, leaves 1800 "support troops" under mutual defense pact.)

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1970 (continued):</u>					
Khmer Republic (Cambodia)	1970-	Government/ Communist insurgents	NVN, PRC, USSR/ RVN, Thailand, U.S.	1,2,3	Continuing. Prince N. Sihanouk is ousted by forces led by General Lon Nol, Cambodia declared a Republic, and RVN/US troops start RVN cross-border operations against Viet insurgent sanctuaries. Low intensity confrontations become full-blown insurgency as Viet Cong, NVN, and Cambodian "Khmer Rouge" Communist insurgents join forces against Khmer Republic Army, ARVN, and US forces.
Jordan	1970-1971	Government/ Palestinian separatist groups	Syria	1,2,3	Partially successful. King Hussein sends army against Palestinian insurgent groups which had virtually established a state within a state in sparsely inhabited portions of Jordanian territory. Insurgents primarily active against Israel; however, selected acts of terrorism and open attempts at subversion prompted Jordanian

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1970</u> (continued):					
Jordan	(continued)				action for fear of growing insurgent strength. Operations successful as insurgents relocate to remote northern border regions and into other sympathetic Arab countries, but Jordanian actions cause disfavor with other Arab states. Since the operation insurgents have focused attention mainly on Israel and away from Jordan.
Burma	1970-1971	Government/ Ethnic factions and Communist insurgents		1,2,3	Continuing. Low keyed guerrilla warfare against government by Communist rebel groups and ethnic minorities such as the large Karen population increases as government troops start campaign in isolated northern areas. Insurgency has continued for 21 years and is characterized by low intensity marked by government or insurgent initiated high points.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1971:</u>					
Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing			
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Yemen	1961-1972	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portuguese	1964-	continuing			
Guinea					
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing			
Uruguay	1967-	continuing			
Chad	1969-	continuing			
Muscat and	1969-	continuing			
Oman					
Northern	1969-	continuing			
Ireland					
Khmer	1970-	continuing			
Republic					
Jordan	1970-1971	ended			
Burma	1970-1971	ended		(Government campaign did; however, rebel problem still remains at present low key.)	
Ethiopia	1971-	Government		1,2,3	Continuing. 1971 rebellion led by pro-communist Eritrean Liberation Front expands to full-scale guerrilla warfare against isolated government installations and outposts.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS INTERNAL	EXTERNAL	SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
<u>1971</u> (continued):					
Philippines	1971-	Government/ Ethnic-religious factions		1,2,3	Continuing. Ethnic-religious differences between Moslems and Christians on Mindanao becomes open civil war with national army involved. Conflict starts wider based insurgency with political implications.
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1971-1972	Government/ Student based dissidents		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. Ultra-leftist students, seeking to replace the government with one more militantly socialist, lead an uprising that becomes a full-scale insurgency that resulted in the deaths of rebels and civilians that unofficially totaled in the thousands.

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1971 (continued):</u>					
Bangladesh	1971-1972	Government (Pakistan)/ Bangladesh secessionists	India	1,2,3	Successful. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) winning a majority of seats in the December, 1970 Pakistan National Assembly opened long standing fissure between East and West Pakistan when East sued for autonomy. West Pakistan attempted to crush ensuing revolt only suppresses it. December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War rekindles Eastern insurgency. East secedes and declares itself independent; India aids and recognizes Bangladesh. Pakistan cannot control insurgency and also loses war with India. Pakistan finally recognizes Bangladesh in 1973.

1972: *****

Laos	1953-	continuing
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing
Colombia	1960-	continuing
Yemen	1961-1972	ended
Angola	1961-	continuing
Thailand	1962-	continuing

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS INTERNAL	EXTERNAL	SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
1972 (continued):					
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portugese Guinea	1964-	continuing			
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing			
Uruguay	1967-	continuing			
Chad	1969-	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1969-	continuing			
Northern Ireland	1969-	continuing			
Khmer Republic	1970-	continuing			
Ethiopia	1971-	continuing			
Philippines	1971-	continued			
Sri Lanka	1971-1972	ended			
Bangladesh	1971-1972	ended			
Burundi	1972-1973	Government/ Tribal factions	Rwanda, Tanzania	1,2,3	Unsuccessful (O.A.U. mediated situation, open warfare ended but situa- tion still precarious because of tribal fac- tionalism. The attempt to assassinate President Micombero, a Watusi, by members of the out of power tribe (the largest ethnic group but with little government -- Watusi held -- power)

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1972 (continued):</u>					
Burundi (continued)					precipitates open civil war; Burundi insurgents, many trained by PRC and USSR institute attacks against government forces from their bases in Tanzania and Rwanda. Organization of African Unity mediate situation which cost over 90,000 dead.

1973: *****

Laos	1953-	continuing			
Vietnam II	1959-	continuing		(All U.S., Australian, New Zealand, Philippine and South Korean combat troops withdrawn.)	
Colombia	1960-	continuing			
Angola	1961-	continuing			
Thailand	1962-	continuing			
Mozambique	1964-	continuing			
Portuguese	1964-	continuing			
Guinea					
Rhodesia	1966-	continuing			
Uruguay	1967-	continuing			
Chad	1969-	continuing			
Muscat and Oman	1969-	continuing			
Northern Ireland	1969-	continuing			
Khmer Republic	1970-	continuing			

TITLE	DURATION	PARTICIPANTS		SOURCE	RESULTS/REMARKS
		INTERNAL	EXTERNAL		
<u>1973 (continued):</u>					
Ethiopia	1971-	continuing			
Philippines	1971-	continuing			
Burundi	1972-1973	ended (but hostilities still exist)			
Dominican Republic	1973	Government/ Insurgents		1,2,3	Unsuccessful. In February, a small band of guerrillas land on the coast of Azua province and move into mountainous interior. Government dispatches 2000 troops and intense fighting breaks out; martial law declared and calm finally restored.

CHANGE IN ARMED CONFLICT PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIOR;
SUBOPTIMIZATION IN ARMED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

by

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This thesis examines internal warfare, the commonest form of armed conflict in the twentieth century, in relation to defense intellectuals' perceptions of the supposed "nuclear ceiling" and the problems of suboptimization in manipulating conflicts. Perceptions of how armed conflict should be conducted are posited as not only dynamic, but also impelled by the continued existence of large-scale military and nuclear-related armaments and strategies which, if applied in combat, could threaten to precipitate an intensity of destruction which has no parallel in history.

It is hypothesized that actual armed conflict behavior has changed since 1945, with emphasis increasingly being given to less intense forms of conflict control and management. Internal warfare with external involvement exemplifies such low intensity conflict. An increase in this form of warfare, and especially the external involvement in them, could thus suggest behavioral change in how armed conflict generally is being waged.

Since change is the very property which is being investigated in relation to both perceptions and states' behavior, the possibility of establishing a demonstrable association between the two is attractive. However, except for extracting hypotheses of low level internal warfare from the perceptual literature, tight associations between perceptions and behavior are beyond the scope of this study.

A review of selected authoritative writings and statements by defense intellectuals does indicate that armed conflict perceptions have changed and that although other factors may be influencing such a change, nuclear force realities significantly affect the direction of perceptual change. The overlap between defense intellectuals and policy officials concerned with less intense conflict forms, including internal warfare, further suggests the possibility of an associative link between the two.

A statistical analysis following specifically designed criteria and propositions of what was to be included

indicated a definite increase in both the frequency of internal warfare and external involvement. The literature on internal wars typically treats such armed conflicts as single, even discrete, events organized by year of outbreak. By presenting them statistically as events continuing over time, this investigation emphasizes the importance of stages of internal warfare affecting its manipulation and outcomes.