

A MODERNITY-MATURITY CONTINUUM

WHERE STAND THE ARABS?

by 1264

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MODERNIZATION:

"Modernization is characterized by a core belief in rational or scientific control. This belief is the most important characteristic."<sup>1</sup>

THE ARABS:

"Suspicion, fear, restlessness, lack of confidence in the future, lack of social balance and stability are characteristics which the people display."<sup>2</sup>

MATURITY:

"When the adolescent falls short of what he considers to be adult standards, he feels inadequate and insecure, and he attempts to compensate for or overcome this feeling by boastfulness, aggressive behavior and competitiveness...<sup>3</sup>  
an emotionally immature individual tends to feel all  
/authorities'/ actions which involve him are attempts to embarrass or humiliate him."<sup>4</sup>

THE ARABS:

"Incompletely emancipated, the Arab's resentment has exploded in the same direction as before: boastfulness, exaggeration of his capabilities, and a tendency to see the slightest skepticism in another as a grave insult."<sup>5</sup>

## FOREWORD

The purpose of this paper is to place the Arab character on a dual continuum, which shall be entitled a "modernity-maturity continuum". There would seem to ample support for the conjecture that there is an Arab character.<sup>6</sup> Hamady lists their shared characteristics as follows: They share the "same way of life", "a transmittable community of acting, thinking, believing and feeling". The Arabs are alike in the "way they bring up their children... family patterns...social relations". They live, or have become accustomed to living under basically the same "economic system", "class hierarchy", type of government, and hold the same attitudes toward government. Communication is through "one medium of thought"; the "traditions...history and cultural heritage" are the same. In aspirations for the future and orientation towards unity they are one; their "symbolic system" is the same and based primarily on the Muslim tradition.<sup>7</sup>

To say that there is an Arab character is to admit simultaneously that a national character is not only possible but real and definable. This point too would seem to have been amply documented.<sup>8</sup> Erich Fromm says that different "societies or classes within a society have a specific social character":<sup>9</sup>

"The social character comprises only a selection of traits, the essential nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group which has developed as the result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group."<sup>10</sup>

That group behavior patterns may be so similar as to be predicted statistically is noted by Ledger Wood.<sup>11</sup>

Lastly, it should be noted that the Arabs of whom we speak are chiefly the eighty per cent<sup>12</sup> who still live as farmers and peasants: i.e., the unmobilized and traditional. The validity of this discussion is dependent on the exclusion of those subjected, and respondent to, rapid change.

## PREFACE

Certain assumptions are taken for granted in this paper. They are as follows:

1. THAT ANY GIVEN SOCIETY OR SOCIETAL GROUPING WILL TAKE AS ONE OF ITS TASKS THE TRANSMITTAL OF A CERTAIN FRAME OF REFERENCE TO ITS NEW MEMBERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF UNDERSTANDING AND DEALING WITH THE REALITIES OF ITS ENVIRONMENT. THESE FRAMES OF REFERENCE, AND THE VARIETY IN WHICH THEY MAY BE FOUND, ARE SYMBOLIC OF MAN'S ADAPTABILITY.

2. THAT THE FRAME OF REFERENCE WILL BE BOTH A CREATION AND A REFLECTION OF A SOCIETY'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE TRADITIONAL INTERACTION THAT A SOCIETY HAS HAD WITH THE REALITIES OF ITS ENVIRONMENT.

This point is supported by Erich Fromm:

"Character in the dynamic sense of analytic psychology is the specific form in which human energy is shaped by the dynamic adaptation of human needs to the particular mode of existence of a given society."<sup>13</sup>

This character in turn molds the "thinking, feeling and acting of individuals"; especially on non-empirical concepts, e.g. ethics and philosophy. These concepts, which have an "emotional matrix" in an individual's character, are answers to specific needs:<sup>14</sup>

"The social character internalizes external necessities and thus harnesses human energy for the task of a given economic and social system."<sup>15</sup>

Two additional assumptions should be included at this point. First, though the mode of one's existence is set by one's environment, there are certain

"...inherent human qualities: [man's] striving to live, to expand and express the potentialities that have developed in him in the process of historical evolution."<sup>16</sup> (My emphases).



Secondly, realities will shape man's frame of reference in more than one way; i.e., they will not only shape an individual's interaction with them, but also his lack of interaction. We will expect to find the tolerability of reality and the emphasis it receives in direct proportion.

3. THAT A FRAME OF REFERENCE -- IN THAT IT IS REFLECTIVE OF A CERTAIN, DEFINABLE SOCIETY -- IS A DEFINABLE CONCEPT, AND LIKE MOST, MAY BE PLACED ON A CONTINUUM REPRESENTING AT LEAST TWO DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THAT CONCEPT.

4. THAT FEW GROUPS OR ENTITIES EXPLORED IN LIGHT OF A GIVEN CONCEPT CAN BE PLACED AT THE EXTREME ENDS OF A CONTINUUM: RATHER, THAT MOST TAKE A POSITION SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO POLES AND INCORPORATE ASPECTS OF EITHER EXTREME.

5. THAT A "TRADITIONAL PERSONALITY"\* NOT ONLY EXISTS, BUT IS CAPABLE OF DEFINITION: THAT CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS, AND PATTERNS OF CHARACTERISTICS EXIST IN THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN THE PRODUCT OF "TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES".

6. THAT A "MODERN PERSONALITY"\* EXISTS, AND IS CAPABLE OF DEFINITION: THAT CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS, AND PATTERNS OF CHARACTERISTICS EXIST IN THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN THE PRODUCT OF "MODERN" SOCIETIES.

7. THAT A "MATURE PERSONALITY"\* EXISTS: ONE WHICH IS AGAIN CAPABLE OF DEFINITION. THAT, FURTHERMORE, THE MATURE PERSONALITY IS A REFLECTION OF A MATURE SOCIETY, i.e., ONE WHICH INCORPORATES THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MATURITY.

8. THAT AN "IMMATURE PERSONALITY"\* EXISTS, IS DEFINABLE, AND IS ALSO A REFLECTION OF ITS SOCIETY.

9. THAT MATURITY IS DOUBLY SYMBOLIC: IT REPRESENTS THE MAXIMIZATION OF HUMAN POTENTIAL, AND THE MINIMIZATION OF DEFENSE MECHANISM UTILIZATION.

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\*To be defined in the introduction.

10. THAT IMMATURITY IS LIKEWISE A DOUBLE CONCEPT: REPRESENTING THE MINIMIZATION OF HUMAN POTENTIAL AND THE MAXIMIZATION OF DEFENSE MECHANISM UTILIZATION.

Conclusive Assumptions

11. THAT THE TRADITIONAL PERSONALITY WILL INCORPORATE THE DUAL ASPECTS OF IMMATURITY AS A REFLECTION OF A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY.

12. THAT THE MODERN PERSONALITY WILL INCORPORATE THE DUAL ASPECTS OF MATURITY AS A REFLECTION OF THE MODERN SOCIETY.

13. THAT, THEREFORE, ONCE DEFINED, ANY GIVEN "SOCIAL CHARACTER" CAN BE PLACED ON A CONTINUUM REPRESENTING AT ONE END THE "TRADITIONAL PERSONALITY" AND "IMMATURITY", AND AT THE OTHER "MODERN PERSONALITY" AND MATURITY.

14. THAT, IN APPLICATION OF ASSUMPTION #4, FEW, IF ANY SOCIETIES COULD BE PLACED (ON THE BASIS OF THEIR CULTURE) AT EITHER END OF THIS CONTINUUM: THAT MOST CAN BE POSITIONED AT AN INTERIM POINT, AND WILL INCORPORATE A MIXTURE OF BOTH POLES. IN SHORT, THE LABELS REPRESENT A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES.

Before proceeding with a discussion of these assumptions, some of the terms used heretofore, and to be used from here on, shall be defined:

SOCIETY - a group of people who share a sufficient number of background experiences and traits to make them definable as a single entity.

CULTURE - the set of traits symbolic and representative of any given society.

"SOCIAL CHARACTER" OR NATIONAL CHARACTER - synonymous terms meaning the collective manifestation of those traits in the people of that society.

FRAME OF REFERENCE - the culture of a society as passed on to, and adopted by an individual.

CHARACTER - the manifestation in an individual of his frame of reference.

Going directly from the first definition to the last supports the point that character is a reflection of society.

Referring again to the forenamed assumptions, it is, of course, recognized that maturity and immaturity are not just nationally definable concepts; that "mature" societies can produce a phenomenal number of immature individuals, and vice versa. However, in that maturity is here being measured by a maximization of human potential and a minimization of defense mechanism utilization, it would seem to follow that repression does not allow complete maturity. Repression is defined by Webster as "the prevention of the natural development of or expression of..." Lest there be a disagreement on terms, oppression is also defined: "a weighing heavily on the mind, spirits, or senses of; lying heavily on; burdening...keeping down by the cruel or unjust use of power or authority".

Therefore, in that traditional societies have been largely characterized by repression by nature, other human beings, or their own reflected philosophies, we could logically expect to see a greater degree of defense mechanism utilization and a lower degree of utilization of human potential than in "modern" societies.\* We could also suppose that they will reflect immaturity in every phase of their society from philosophy to economics; from psychology to politics.

The primary hypothesis is then, that the Arabs may be characterized as both traditional and immature and, as such, may be placed on the left-hand side of our continuum. To test the validity of this hypothesis, we shall measure these peoples by a set of eight double-concepts; each of which are corollaries of maturity or immaturity. These eight double-concepts are given below, on the relevant side of the continuum.

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\*Repression, of course, does not always have this effect. It depends a good deal on the type of repression involved. Repression that emphasizes, and forces a people into education, science, and a non-mythical approach to reality could be said

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the use of the terms "mature" and "immature" does not imply, in any way, a value judgment on the part of the writer. It has been amply stated, that a frame of reference, be it categorized as mature or immature, is a reflection of an individual's background. It has also been noted that repression is scarcely conducive to maturity. In short, the terms have been, and hopefully shall be, utilized in as scientific a manner as possible, and not without sympathy.

### The Continuum

Minimization of potential	The Transition	Maximization of potential
<u>TRADITIONALISM</u>		<u>MODERNISM</u>
<u>IMMATURITY</u>		<u>MATURITY</u>
Higher defense-		Lower defense-
<u>mechanism utilization</u>		<u>mechanism utilization</u>
Immature reaction to authority.....		Mature reaction to authority
Non-acceptance of responsibility.....		Acceptance of responsibility
a. Personal		a. Personal
b. Public		b. Public
Emotionalism.....		Rationalism
Myth and falsehood.....		Reality and truth
Fatalism.....		Awareness of potential for change
Atomism.....		Structured reality
Intolerance.....		Tolerance
Identity as part of a group.....		Identity as an individual
 INTOLERABLE REALITY		 TOLERABLE REALITY

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to allow for the maximization of human potential in formerly traditionally repressed peoples.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The introduction is devoted to definitions and discussions of the four concepts on the continuum: traditionalism, modernism, maturity and immaturity.

#### Traditionalism

Certain postulates are set forward as definitive of traditionalism: certain psychological patterns that appear in an examination of traditional societies.

1. First, that a traditional culture (not necessarily nationally delimited) is both observable and definable; that it is, furthermore, far more definable than a "modern" society, as it usually has the characteristics of stability, homogeneity, and relative isolation.

2. That traditional frames of reference are thus equally subject to examination incorporating not only all of the above qualities, but being, partly as a result of these qualities, specific, particularistic and highly prescriptive; i.e. all-pervasive in their influence.

3. These frames of reference will therefore, being both a creation of, and a structure for understanding the traditional society, be in great conflict with change of any type and at any level, and will thus rest upon conservative bases.

4. Traditionalism would seem to incorporate the following in its frame of reference: emotionalism or sensualism (as opposed to rationality); emphasis on myth (unprovable beliefs), superstitions and the past; and a consequent de-emphasis on reality or this world. Further characteristics are fatalism, and a frame of reference that places the real world in an undifferentiated sub-structure and looks at realities in an atomistic and unrelated fashion. Lastly, we can find a simultaneous fear, mistrust and near-reverence for authority;

unwillingness to take the initiative or responsibility outside one's own structured role; a high degree of group identity and conformity, and considerable intolerance for those who do not conform.

These qualities are well documented by other authors.<sup>1</sup> David Apter characterizes traditionalism as:

"...validations of current behavior stemming from immemorial prescriptive norms. It is not that traditionalist systems do not change, but rather that innovation, i.e. extra-systemic action has to be mediated within the social system and charged to antecedent values."<sup>2</sup>

He further notes that traditionalism is wont to put "novelty on trial rather than the people that novelty is supposed to serve."<sup>3</sup> Claude Welch defines it as "the validation of current behavior by long-standing prescriptive norms".<sup>4</sup>

Quint supplements the picture with his description of the "ideal man" in traditional society: he is a "conformist, pious, hospitable, truthful (within the limits prescribed by family and group solidarity); loyal to his immediate family, clan, village group, and tribe in decreasing order of intensity".<sup>5</sup> Above all he is completely predictable. Emerson notes the pervasive sense of inferiority and lack of self-respect and acceptance of both.<sup>6</sup> Nor do traditional people question the hierarchical structuring of society; it is accepted as natural.<sup>7</sup> The MIT Study Group notes a fear of changing their way of life "which offers psychic security as well as a familiar protection from some of the crushing burdens of society".<sup>8</sup> Lastly, two "substitutions" are documented: loyalty for, (in many cases) honesty; and age for status.<sup>9</sup>

### Modernism

Before discussing "modernism" it should be said that there is no completely "modern" society. There is no political, social or economic system in existence today which makes possible the maximum utilization of the potential of all its



people.

"No political system, however modern, ever fully eliminates intermittency and traditionality. It can penetrate it, regulate it, translate its particularistic and diffuse impacts into the modern political language of interest articulation, public policy, and regulation."<sup>10</sup>

"The best that can be said is that the West has discovered the potentiality of access to a richer life than was possible before." (My emphasis).

In general, the "modern" society is characterized by a respect for, belief in, and freedom of an individual; a rational approach to the environment; a de-emphasis of myth and stress on reality (even the myths stress reality); a structured frame of reference for looking at the "real world"; empathy and tolerance for the other groups and individuals in the society; a respect for and freedom to participate in instituted authority; responsibility, both personal and public; and a high valuation of change and optimism for the future based on that change.

It is further postulated that the "modern" frame of reference, having become accustomed to change, will be far more flexible and less prescriptive than the one which is not.

Of the eight original postulates, all but one are supported by other authors.<sup>12</sup> Again, we can supplement these postulates with five additional characteristics. The MIT Study Group says: "Modern man is psychically mobile, his distinctive characteristic being the ability to imagine himself performing all manner of tasks and roles".<sup>13</sup> Kohn notes "...the regard for the universally human, the faith in reason, one and the same everywhere, and in common sense".<sup>14</sup> He also notes the concept of an individual conscience.<sup>15</sup> It could indeed be said that the idea of "conscience is a moral necessity for a mobile society. A society whose control depends on primary group shaming is quite obviously going to fall apart when its members leave home. Welch and Emerson both note

the kinetic quality of the modern existence: Welch calls it "dynamism",<sup>16</sup> Emerson entitled it "activism".<sup>17</sup> Apter notes that modernism shows a much more remote relationship between traditional values and goals<sup>18</sup>, while Pye notes impartial justice, and a high valuation of merit.<sup>19</sup>

In general, it could be said that the purpose of modernization is to make reality tolerable for man. This involves understanding reality first, and then changing that portion of it that needs to, and can be changed. Reason, and its logical end, science, are necessary for understanding. So, in connection with this, the most modern society is one in which reality is (1) understandable and (2) tolerable and/or changeable. Modern ideology is that which states this premise, and a modern mentality is one that believes it.

### Maturity

Generally speaking, there are, for the purposes of this discussion, two types of realities: the actual and the perceived. The latter is generally the most important in determining the actions of an individual. The synonymy of the two is highly relevant to mental health. When the two are far distant, we speak of an individual as maladjusted. If the individual perceives reality correctly and acts in accordance with it, he is well-adjusted. Adjustment to one's environment is not sufficient for maximum human development if the environment is oppressive. Maximum human development is maturity. Therefore, adjustment and maturity, while related, are not synonymous. Adjustment is vital for maturity, but maturity demands more than just adjustment. The latter can be representative of little more than passivity: the former involves an outward-looking, active orientation to the environment. In general, the characteristics of maturity are synonymous with those of modernity:

Identification as an individual. - The identity of an individual is not defined in terms of his group. He is self-reliant, self-directed, responsible

and productive.<sup>20</sup> He has his own set of goals and works toward them with self-discipline. He knows that he is an individual and relates to others on the basis of his own values. He can take his own qualities for granted.

Reason. - The mature person has learned to channel his emotions effectively and rationally; he has found a "flexible system of controls and outlets".<sup>21</sup> He has found a way to direct his aggressions into constructive channels, usually in relation to others, which lessen "and remove the cause of frustration".<sup>22</sup> He finds a way to "combat evils instead of merely resenting them", his fears are not unreasonable, and he maintains a feeling of purpose in spite of frustrations.<sup>23</sup> He takes a rational view of society, he uses objective bases for making decisions, and utilizes reason in approaching problems. He can live with his emotions without being at war with them.<sup>24</sup>

Reality. - The mature have a "good grasp of the realities of everyday living".<sup>25</sup> There is a realistic appreciation of one's own capabilities and limitations and an ability to take oneself for granted. Life is structured around the "real", and the environment is acted upon. The mature man does not resort to myth in situations that demand his use of reason.

Structured and related view of the "world". - The mature man sees the world in structured fashion. He understands relationships and similarities and is able to conceptualize on the basis of this understanding. He sees the world as an intimately related totality and can see causes and effects.

Tolerance. - He is tolerant of others. He has a sensitivity to "the difficulties that others experience in everyday living and an appreciation of the ability to maintain integrity and purpose in spite of frustration and conflicting pressures".<sup>26</sup> This is primary to acceptance of himself and others, and to the realization of his need for others and others' need for him. It is also primary to respect for himself and for others. He can discriminate between individuals and place his trust in others.<sup>27</sup>

Rational view of authority. - "He can deal with those in authority on a rational basis. He knows his rights and privileges and he does not undervalue himself because he is dealing with someone with more power, authority, or status." He does not distrust or fear those in authority; he realizes that they too are people with needs.

Responsibility. - He takes responsibility for his own action and is willing to take responsibility for others in his relationship to them. He is productive. He does that which is required of him and is dependable.

Realization of the possibility of change. - Dissatisfaction and frustration lead him to constructive action rather than resentment, passivity or withdrawal. He recognizes the difference in things which can and cannot be changed and acts on his realization.

### Immaturity

The immature person could be said to be "just on the other side of the coin". The situation is not that simple, however. Immaturity is not an "opposite" concept: it represents only a lower stage of development on a continuum of growth. Maturation is a developmental process; immaturity in great part is a static concept: it implies that growth has stopped at some point. Maturity, or a mature person is one who is "always arriving".<sup>28</sup> In general, however, the immature person is likely to show the following characteristics, which are highly relatable to traditionalism:

Identity as part of a group. - The immature seldom comes to recognize his own separate identity. He is unable to set realistic goals for himself or work toward them. He is unable to rely on himself in areas which call for self-reliance. White points out that the failure to establish separate identity from the group, especially the family, is a result of coercive discipline, early deprivations and rejection. It may result in one of two patterns: the first

he calls "anxious conformity", when the individual tries to "be all things to all men"; to live up to the demands of every individual he comes in contact with. The other reaction is "an enduring resentment against demands, an essentially negative attitude even when overt resistance is impossible".<sup>29</sup> In general, it involves lack of trust in one's individual abilities, a lack of self-knowledge and appreciation, and often self-hatred, or depreciation of one's own worth.

Emotion. - The immature individual is often aggressive, irritable, depressed, ill-tempered, and unreasonable. He may be excessively pleasure-seeking. He is constantly at war with his own emotions. His energies are dissipated in reducing the anxiety from his feelings of insecurity and inadequacy. His subjective fears structure a good part of his life.<sup>30</sup> His emotions are channeled in non-constructive ways: "fight" or "flight".<sup>31</sup> "Fight" in this instance involves irrational, explosive reactions. "Flight" is synonymous with withdrawal of the mental variety: too-great dependence on defense mechanisms.

Myth. - The immature are wont to boast, lie to keep others (and sometimes themselves) from knowing the truth about their own character or actions, and structure their existence in general around non-realities. In times of stress they turn to myth, whether it be a mythical set of beliefs about themselves, or a higher myth. At any rate, they turn from reality to that which gives them consolation. Turning to consolation when reality is intolerable is very much an adjustive technique; and adjustment, while necessary for maturity, is not necessarily synonymous with it. A truly mature person acts only on the basis of reality. The ideal self as a concept of psychology is intimately relatable to the Arab trait. According to Karen Horney, the neurotic becomes bent on actualizing his ideal self, which entails not only a search

for worldly glory, but also a dedication to a tyrannical inner system whereby he tries to mold himself into a godlike being. He makes special claims on the world for attention, consideration and deference, on the one hand, and develops, on the other hand, an unrealistic pride (as distinguished from a healthy self-confidence) which prevents him from doing the things that might achieve for him some of the worldly glory he feels to be his right. The central inner conflict of the neurotic, as Horney saw it, is a battle between the constructive forces of the real self and the obstructive forces of the pride system, between healthy growth and the neurotic drive to prove in actuality the perfections of the idealized self.<sup>32</sup> ("Neurotic...is those aspects of the personality which are immature and which are not attuned to reality."<sup>33</sup>) He is unable to accept criticism or suggestions of any kind.<sup>34</sup> He utilizes patterns of behavior that are no longer relevant and tends to live in the past. He reverts to childhood patterns of continual daydreaming.

Atomism. - The immature person, because he does not feel that he can bear to understand, or look at the totality of his existence, is inclined to look at things in disjunctive, disconnected pieces. He does not see connections between the different aspects of his own life and that of others; or between the different aspects of reality. If reality appears to him to be intolerable he will have no desire to understand or relate.

Intolerance. - The immature have a rigid, inflexible way of looking at other people and reality in general. They tend to see things, at worst, in shades of black and white. They seldom see more than one side of a question. This projection of negative traits on other people is very often reflective of their response to themselves.<sup>35</sup> They are apt to make judgments readily, and these judgments are usually negative, severe, and very seldom, if ever, changed. Their attitude toward other people is generally one of distrust, which, because they act upon the basis of it, is very often justified. They are beset by fears



and see threats or danger where none exist.<sup>36</sup> Neither do the intolerant accept change easily. They are likely to regard it as a threat to their security.

Authority. - The immature man thinks of the actions on the part of the people in authority as attempts to embarrass him: he sees them as directly related to himself even when they are not. This is in great part a result of authoritarian upbringing, which creates a simultaneous fear of, and reverence for authority. He distrusts its presence, yet cannot act without it. He tends to see the actions of authority only as they affect him. In being aware of his own fears, he assigns special meanings to the actions of those in authority; and thus is prone to become the victim of his own unreasonable fears.<sup>37</sup>

Lack of responsibility. - He fails to take responsibility for his own actions, or for other individuals with whom he comes in contact. He is wont, at best, to ignore or procrastinate at the tasks that have been given him, or, at worst, to actively resist them. He takes a non-contributory, and non-productive approach to his world.

Fatalism. - The immature is likely, as a result of his irresponsibility, to blame others for his failure, or to consider that his fate is in their hands. He cannot see the relationship between his own actions and their results. It is a deterministic outlook, which leaves everything in the hands of others, or supernatural figures, and refuses to admit the role of action in structuring reality.

White outlines a case of "adolescent maladjustment" which is very apropos to the following discussion:

"The individual had feelings of severe self-consciousness, feeling always a painful uncertainty as to his standing in the opinion of others, and with this went an irresistible submissiveness designed to avoid conflict with people and win their favor. He could neither control this submissiveness nor accept it. If anyone showed him friendliness he immediately, as he put it, 'began acting like his

son or kid brother; but he was ashamed of this afterwards, and wished that he could behave like a man. 'I can't make a decision on my own and back it up...it's always guided by some factor outside my own intellect'...He expected people to give him a great deal of easy appreciation; when they did so, he was worried and hungrily asked for it...he was satisfied with a personality only if it pleased everybody; he was unwilling that anyone should fail to notice and like him. From his own description we can see that he was making a frantic search for esteem. His overwhelming motive was to make people like him, and his well-practiced method, when all else failed, was to make himself noticeable. Failure cast him into despondency and alarm. At times, he lapsed into passive daydreaming, but at other times he struggled to learn new and more appropriate attitudes."

### The Defense Mechanisms

Each individual daily meets his quota of frustrating situations. For the most part, these conflict-producing situations may be, and usually are, handled consciously, i.e. on the conscious level of thought. When these frustrating situations last over a longer period of time, however, or are especially anxiety producing, unconscious mechanisms come into play. These "defense mechanisms" are a psychological balancing factor, enabling each of us to meet difficult situations without being debilitated by them. When, however, the situation lasts too long, or is totally intolerable, this defense mechanism utilization may, in and of itself, prove debilitating.

In extreme situations, we see total withdrawal from reality or what we know as insanity. In situations which are but partially intolerable we see a greatly lessened effectiveness to deal with reality, but not complete withdrawal. The degree to which these mechanisms are utilized is symbolic of the tolerability of the environment, i.e. the ability of the environment to satisfy basic needs:

"Maslow sees needs as ranked in a hierarchy, ranging from the most physiological to the most psychologically mature and 'civilized'...

First level - the most essential body needs - to have access to food, water, air, warmth, sexual gratification, and so forth.

Second level - needs that relate to physical safety - to avoid external dangers or anything that might harm the individual.



Third level - Needs that relate to love - to be given love, affection, care, attention and emotional support by another person or persons.

Fourth level - Needs that relate to maintaining satisfying relationships with oneself and others - to be valued, accepted and appreciated as a person; to possess self-esteem and self-respect and to be esteemed and respected, to have status, and to avoid rejection or disapproval.

Fifth level - Needs that relate to achievement and self-expression - to be creative and productive, to perform acts that are useful and valuable to others; to realize one's potentials and translate them into actuality."<sup>39</sup> (My emphases.)

When these basic needs are not met, the defense mechanisms come into play.<sup>40</sup>

## CHAPTER II

## INDIVIDUALISM

"It may be said that the Arab has not attained full individuation as a person. He lacks complete formation of his personality with respect to emancipation from home, self-realization, self-dependency, and ability to solve his own problems. Certain phases in the making of his personality have not developed into their mature stage. The Arab has yet to be weaned from the family, to learn to be self-reliant, think for himself, have initiative, and act on his own accord. He is still a non-differentiated part of his family...Arab society has no structure for an individualistic life. The person who has broken with his family finds no circle and no accommodations apart from it."<sup>1</sup>

Berger entitled this lack of individuality a "negative individualism". that is, in effect, a revolt against those who attempt to keep him in bondage. He considers the causes of this negative individualism fourfold: family instability, casual child rearing, arbitrary rule and poverty. The consequent insecurity is manifested in "considerable oral activity, in the relation between hospitality and hostility, in suspicion, and in certain kinds of extremism".<sup>2</sup>

Hamady documents its presence within the circle of the extended-close friendship group (primary group), and looks for its causes in the early years of life. We shall also be looking at its effects on intra-societal relationships, at the manifestations of individualism that do exist, and lastly, at the effects on the larger society of all these factors.

In Arab society the family is the social unit; status and station; privileges and duties are all derived from it. Failing to live up to all the family demands does not change the individual's place within its ranks. It has remained, in the most insecure of times, a stalwart protector of individuals.<sup>3</sup>

Families are large and are representative of the traditional extended family. Hamady also notes that others are often attached to the group out of love and respect; but these bonds do not carry the same privileges and obligations. The family is further strengthened by intermarriage.

The solidarity of the family may be seen in several contexts. A child is usually called until marriage "the daughter of...", "the son of...". Parents are likewise addressed "father of...", "mother of...", after the birth of their first son.<sup>5</sup> Solidarity also shows up in extra-family conflicts. An Arab is expected to support his relatives first, against his friends, if necessary.<sup>6</sup>

The need for cooperation in a poverty-stricken society is in great part the cause of such close ties: the continuing demands of this cooperation are the manifestation of this need. The requirements of intra-familial cooperation are manifold. They can generally be placed in two categories: sharing of property and fulfillment of duties and obligations. Communal use of property is on the decline, but can still be seen in Syria. Even in cities brothers may hold property in common.<sup>7</sup> The duties and obligations are so numerous as to be almost impossible of fulfillment: they are, however, considered both sacred and compulsive.<sup>8</sup>

"The Arab is tied hand and foot by the demands and interference of his group. He is not left alone to do what he pleases. His duties, if not fulfilled, are exacted from him. Advice is given even when not asked for. He may not make decisions for himself without consulting his near relatives and the senior members of his group."<sup>9</sup>

Hamady further notes that the individual often suffers because of his understandable inability to live up to all the group demands.<sup>10</sup> The demands are both specific and particularistic, e.g. individuals are expected to extend their occupational privileges to all members of their family.<sup>11</sup> Hospitality is one of the highest requirements of Arab society: individuals are expected to be ready to entertain at any time, and visits are frequent. Privacy is almost non-existent and as little understood.<sup>12</sup>

These group demands are reinforced by "shaming". Public opinion is harsh in the Arab countries and readily expressed. Fear of each other's opinions is

one of the greatest problems of the society.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, because norm enforcement is predicated on shaming

"...it depends on primary and close groups in which everyone knows everyone else's acts. In contrast, the members of 'guilt societies' will be constrained, even among strangers, to live up to their moral code of behavior because of their conscience."<sup>14</sup>

Dickson also documents this selective Arab conscience: "thou shalt not be found out is a well-understood commandment in Kuwait".<sup>15</sup>

Arbitrary rule was previously cited as one of the causal factors in the Arab's "negative individualism". Berger notes that the "ingratiation demanded by authoritarian governments has further decimated the Arab confidence".<sup>16</sup> This limited individual fulfillment is also the result of casual child-rearing practices. Hamady notes that a baby is "tossed from one lap to another and fed by any wet nurse who happens to be there when he cries for his mother who may not be available".<sup>17</sup> In the early years of childhood the child is seldom given attention; he usually receives it only when his demands are too great to be ignored.<sup>18</sup> His parents demand his cooperation and his questions are stilled by "you are too young to understand". He is given no choice in his role, and very little freedom.<sup>19</sup>

The child must also become accustomed to shifting both his affections and his behavior. The former must be transferred constantly from relative to relative, and to visiting guests. Behavior is dichotomized between public and private: he has no single pattern of expectations to meet.<sup>20</sup> When the child reaches six or seven years of age, Berger notes a sudden transition to rigid training, as if the parents wished to make the child an adult as quickly as possible.

"The arbitrariness of parental control induces children to learn ways of getting attention and approval, to ingratiate themselves in order to qualify for the rewards and avoid the punishments Arab parents consciously confer as a calculated method of getting children out of the period of 'ignorance' and into one of usefulness."<sup>21</sup>

Highly encouraged school competition and divorce also play a part in increasing the uncertainty of a child's life. Arab parents are not likely to give much credence to their children's wishes in reaching a settlement on the latter, and children are often moved from one home to another.<sup>22</sup>

Collectivity as a way of life is manifested to a rather high degree in the Arab's behavior. He spends a good deal of the time giving and receiving gifts and services from other members of his group. This "mutual aid" quality is one of the primary criteria for selection of friends. An individual is expected to make demands; but he is expected to respond in kind.<sup>23</sup>

The collective "shaming" technique also leaves its marks. Hamady notes that it makes the Arab far more desirous of avoiding disapproval than actually doing good. She looks at this phenomenon as a partial explanation for lack of incentive and sustained effort. In addition, as has been mentioned before, it makes morality dependent on an audience. The Arabs do not adhere to the doctrine of original sin per se: if no one is watching, the individual is free to do as he pleases.<sup>24</sup>

The demands of a closely-knit society can also be seen in the expressions of politeness. These are generally rather rigid and stereotyped, and the individual is seldom allowed to use his own discretion in expressing his feelings. This social conformity springs from "religion, traditional prescriptions and kinship customs".<sup>25</sup>

Intra-family demands are both a cause and a reflection of societal stipulations. Parents are revered by the Arabs: obedience is considered a sacred duty and lack of it a religious sin. The children are expected to show great respect for their parents and assist them whenever necessary even after marriage. Each member of the family has his place and status and each is accorded the prestige that accompanies his position. These factors serve as a partial explanation for the respect accorded to age in Islamic society:<sup>26</sup> the demands of hospitality have already

been noted. Hamady says: "One is judged largely on the basis of the manner in which he receives his guests".<sup>27</sup> These standards appear to be the result of desert insecurity.

Arab society demands a great deal from its members, but it shows little tolerance for deviation; and it proffers little mercy to those who fall by the wayside. It allows little sympathy for the frailties of human nature. This lack of sympathy results, not surprisingly, in frequent and heated clashes (to be covered under "Emotion").<sup>28</sup> "Intimacy and rivalry nourish each other."<sup>29</sup> Hamady points out, though, that the individual does recognize the great degree of interdependence within his group, and that he tries on occasion to strongly assert his independence.<sup>30</sup> This is especially true of some of the urban Arabs, who have attempted to throw off the stultifying bonds of their group and assert their freedom.<sup>31</sup>

It could not be stated, however, that there is no individuality within the close family groups. That it is repressed is true, but it is by no means nonexistent. Hamady points out that the geographic location of the Arab countries has led to a continuing change of rule, and to continual needs for assimilation and adaptation. She raises the question of the individual's survival under the onslaught. She notes their easy readiness to "change the wrappings"; to assume the garb and the habits of another. "He always manages to find some common ground and hastens to create the atmosphere of an in-group."<sup>32</sup> But, she concludes, these superficial changes are deceiving; the Arab's personality is not so easily rocked. It rests on a double base: tradition and an "ideal self". In speaking of tradition, she notes that the most modern and westernized of urban elites hold rigidly to conservatism. The ideal self is quite another concept. It is basically a mental image incorporating all the aspects of perfected humanity. It is, says Hamady, "untouchable, sacred, and so strong that it constantly intrudes in his daily life."<sup>33</sup> It is manifested in a strong sense of pride and self-esteem:<sup>34</sup>

an egotism "that takes the form of extreme self-assertion before others, pride and sensitivity to criticism".<sup>35</sup> Facts should never be presented to him without an overgloss of deception. This deception, however, results in mistrust: a quality that is apparently all-pervasive in Arab society. The realization that this glossing over is taking place is responsible for a defensive attitude. This is internalized in childhood and appears most frequently in relationships with friends.<sup>36</sup>

This group-oriented individualism is, or was in the beginning, a reaction to the society. This reaction, however, like all reactions, has in turn left its effects. It has resulted in a high degree of nepotism in the public sector: loyalty to the family and religious group standing supreme over loyalties to the nation, the bureaucracy or business. These bonds result not only in nepotism, but in a "we-they" dichotomy that continues to keep the social groups at odds with each other. Poverty has already been mentioned as a cause of familial separatism; the Islamic tradition added a schism of its own by creating a dichotomy between the Community of Believers and other religious groups.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, the mistrust resultant of "negative individualism" has been manifested in an abhorrence of the credit system; and a fear of pooling resources.<sup>38</sup> Berger notes that extra-familial cooperation on the whole is nearly unknown, in spite of the lack of individualism.<sup>39</sup> In actuality, cooperation is unlikely because of the lack of individuality. The underdeveloped are seldom flexible, and the compromise involved in decision participation is not easily possible to those who have never been allowed to make their own decisions.<sup>40</sup>



## CHAPTER III

## EMOTION

Reason is here defined as a rational approach to society; objectivism, and an emphasis on logic: a strict adherence to reality in all things; from one's self-image to society as a whole. Emotion implies the opposite concept; subjectivism, and non-logical thought processes.

Emotions would almost seem to be the fuel keeping Arabic society activated: emotional reactions are wide in range and broad in depth.<sup>1</sup> There are certain areas which are especially emotion-provoking: "speaking and reading, pain and sorrow, anger and quarrel".<sup>2</sup>

This high degree of emotionalism has its value: "...it channelizes the aggressive feelings accumulated from a multitude of frustrating experiences in the life of the Arab".<sup>3</sup> This frustration is, in general, traceable to three factors: poverty and disease; oppression; and close personal ties and group dependence. The intimacy of Arab life results almost automatically in a high degree of friction and factionalism. Shared property serves to widen the gap still further.<sup>4</sup> Shaming, when combined with a tradition of externally expressed emotion, lack of work and need for entertainment results almost naturally in gossip;<sup>5</sup> and in Arab society gossip is one of the chief incitements to anger. In a civilization universally attempting to live up to an "ideal self", gossip is deadly, and bitterly resented: reputations are broken on a misplaced word, and family morale depends on upheld reputations.

These emotions are manifested, as we have noted, in specific ways. First,

"The Arabs are immersed in sadness. This is apparent in their sighs, their reflections, their conversations, in their songs that are full of lamentations, in their love poetry that speaks of bygone days and lost hopes, and in their philosophy that is so pessimistic."<sup>6</sup>



Nor is the Arab slow to express pain -- he is very verbal about it, "manifesting his sufferings by groaning, moaning and crying...[his reaction] is exaggerated and emotional".<sup>7</sup> There is no shame connected with emotional expression, however: it is common practice.

Hamady also notes that failure draws an offensive reaction from the Arab; this would seem to have been institutionalized in the holy war.<sup>8</sup> Failure to live up to another's expectation draws adamant reproach, which strips an offering almost completely of its real virtue.<sup>9</sup>

Emotionalism is especially apparent in oratory and extemporaneous speech. The Arabs have a "talent of speech, an abundant verbal facility, and an excellence in expressing one single idea under multiple forms".<sup>10</sup> Hamady notes that Arabic is vague and tends to convey non-explicit meanings: fitting all the details into a comprehensive whole is difficult. The writer or speaker does not improve the situation: "...[he]...does not find it obligatory to be very specific, so long as the reader or listener can 'guess' the meaning".<sup>11</sup> The reader or listener is no better: "If the Arab understands the general meaning or significance of a sentence or a paragraph, with all its effective colorings and intuitive revelations, he will think that he understands it perfectly".<sup>12</sup> This is partially explained by insistence on the perfection of grammatical forms, regardless of meaning, and partly the result of playing with words: thoughts are fitted to words so that the latter eventually become substitutes instead of representatives of the former. Finally, the phonetic and musical qualities of the words "invite emotional response and weaken the faculty of reasoning."<sup>13</sup>

These same factors show up in the Arab's interpersonal relations. He is wont to shout and be overly aware of his own part in a conversation: he is fond of grandiose phrases and subjective judgments. He is always on the correct side of a discussion; his opponent is always on the wrong side. His responses are disorganized, and show far too much sensitivity. He tends to be overbearing

and appears very learned in his judgments.<sup>14</sup> In hearing public news, his enthusiasm is high: but it does not, for the most part, result in action.<sup>15</sup>

He enjoys personable individuals and likes dealing with people on the subjective level: most of his dealings with others carry an element of affectation.<sup>16</sup> He is also

"...inclined to judge a person by a single trait and from an insignificant remark he may form fantastic views. He is easily deceived by some irrelevant peculiarity of dress or attitude. Delusions are thus formed and on their strength misleading rumors spread."<sup>17</sup>

Aggressivity is common in the Arab world. It shows up in public scolding matches, especially between women, who attempt to win with a superior stock of derisive, contemptuous and obscene words. "No appreciation in such situations is available for the gentle and composed; he is considered weak and despicable."<sup>18</sup> Arab homes are generally quarrelsome; envy and jealousy are common. In general, even though aggression is generally expressed verbally, it is limitless when the Arab is really angry. Others tolerate this anger, and expect the same treatment when they are angry.<sup>19</sup>

The Arab has difficulty in analyzing and conceptualizing. Not being interested in "motivational forces, the quest for the 'why' is not his problem".<sup>20</sup> T. E. Lawrence noted that the "Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord..."; that no matter what they had at home, a man with a new idea could pull them to the ends of the earth.<sup>21</sup>

"Their mind was strange and dark, full of depressions and exaltations, lacking in rule, but with more of ardour and more fertile in belief than any other in the world. They are a people of starts, for whom the abstract was the strongest motive, the process of infinite courage and variety and in the end nothing. They were as unstable as water."<sup>22</sup>

The Arabs are likely to select details from the whole on the basis of emotion -- the whole is seldom understood in and of itself.<sup>23</sup> (See the chapter on atomism.)

There are times though, when the Arab shows no emotion at all: he does not exhibit his joys, his fears or his weakness; nor does he reveal confidences. Part of his silence is the need for discretion in a "shame" society, part a result of fatalism, and a third part the need for respect from those in superior positions. Showing joy is not recommended and fears are either expressed through fatalism or "hidden under the disguise of a bombastic and assertive personality".<sup>24</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

## MYTH

The myth-reality spectrum has been trichotomized. Each of the areas discussed are labeled "myth" either because they are (1) unprovable beliefs or (2) represent falsehood. Myth is not, in this case, considered synonymous with falsehood. It is, as stated, merely a belief that cannot be empirically proved. In this sense religion is a myth. A lie is also a myth, but it has an additional qualification: it can be proved false.

Having thus qualified the terminology, we shall proceed to look at myth in three different areas: (1) Lying as a response to the "shame" society, (2) Superstition and magic and (3) The Islam-tradition-custom complex and its effects.

Lying

Lying is quite common among Arabic peoples and they have no particularly exalted belief in the truth. This lying would seem to have a two-fold cause; colonialism and autocratic rule which demanded submission regardless of feelings; and shaming as a social control: "To be frank does not pay among people who admire the...smart and despise the...meek."<sup>1</sup> Deception appears in three different areas of Arab socializing; impossible promises, blandishment and adulation: "He does not recoil from false affiliations if he knows that he can reach his goal."<sup>2</sup>

Superstition and Magic

"The Moslem peasant is conscious, above all, of a recurrent dance of life governed by supernatural forces too powerful, arbitrary, and incomprehensible to need 'conserving' or defending. The peasant attempts to enter into a personal relationship with these forces through propitiation, intermediation or careful avoidance."<sup>3</sup>

Belief in superstition is very common in the Arab world. Individuals see the world as populated by large numbers of spirits and forces, both good and bad.

Women are especially susceptible to these beliefs and seemingly spend hours with fortune tellers and soothsayers to protect themselves and their families. These supernatural forces usually appear in one of three forms: angels, devils and the jinn.<sup>4</sup> The first two assume the same role as in folk Christianity; the latter are "supernatural creatures [that] find their place between men and the angels".<sup>5</sup> Disagreeable words are avoided that might bring about their revenge; sacred words, shrines and pious people are thought propitious.<sup>6</sup> Ayrout explains part of the reason for these beliefs:

"There is an affinity between withcraft and faith in the power of the past. People have great belief in anything that is ancient or primitive. Many of their superstitions can only be explained by their being beliefs that have been handed down from the past."<sup>7</sup>

#### The Islam-Tradition-Custom Complex and Its Effects

##### The Islam-tradition-custom complex

"In every action the Arab seeks to conform to the three-in-one constellation; custom, tradition, and religion."<sup>8</sup>

Hamady points out that Arab customs and traditions are basically religious, and backed by religion both in theory and practice. God and tradition represent continuity: custom springs from a belief in both. Antiquity is not the sole basis for reverence of custom: even those of recent vintage may be hallowed. It is instead their connection with or support of Islam; and Islam stresses the importance of tradition. Furthermore, "respect of tradition is pushed by the Arab to the realm of superstition".<sup>9</sup> It serves as a source of power and it lies at the base of all values. N.A. Faris calls the Arab a romantic about his past and its glory and notes that he uses it as an escape from the intolerable aspects of the present.<sup>10</sup> Hamady further documents this escapism when she says:

"...in the long run and in the face of great and important problems of life the Arab is a dreamer. He lacks the systematic, energetic and

persistent striving after outward success. He has moments of primitive, childlike impressionability, but in the broad lines of his development he is self-centered, introverted, rather independent of the outer world, and tends to prefer his seclusion."<sup>11</sup>

Islam affects every side of Arab life, and its forms and rites are practiced daily. It is, in short, the most important frame of reference for the great majority of the Arab population.<sup>12</sup> "Piety alone brings souls to perfection."<sup>13</sup> It is synonymous with resignation: all things come from God, and not to accept His commandment is to ask for difficulties. Though Muhammed attempted to unite this world and the next one, the other-worldly aspect of Islam was later emphasized for the sake of the poor.<sup>14</sup> "Sojourn on this earth with all its possible gains and losses appears as a mere lower and lesser part of a great totality of existence, the essentials and ultimates of which lie in the Beyond."<sup>15</sup> This world is thought vain and useless. Piety and moral righteousness represent the highest good, a philosophy which succeeds in elevating man above the ugly side of everyday life. Sufism is the most extreme expression of this view: it glorifies the pains and sorrows of the world, denigrates happiness and satisfaction and demands a complete abnegation of desire. It stated that "salvation was to be found passively through prayer, humility and poverty".<sup>16</sup> This philosophy has had a great effect on society as a whole. Hamady makes it clear that this is a reflection of the state of the society; if there were not so many miserable aspects of society to be contended with, the ideas would never have taken root. This attitude, however, only deepens the sense of pessimism and despair. "Death, the frailty and misery of man, the vanity of worldly possessions, and the cheapness of the fleeting joys of this life, are always on the mind of the Arabs."<sup>17</sup> The effect this has on the attitudes toward progress would appear to be obvious: the Arabs feel that the only good change is one which takes them backward into the past. The passage of time represents a dilution of Islamic precepts; and therefore a degeneration of society.<sup>18</sup>

Lastly, Islam "takes man for what he is, and in this it is human. However, it is not humanist since it is not interested in the unfolding and development of man's potentialities."<sup>19</sup> (My emphasis.) Civilization has as its sole purpose the directing of man towards salvation. Salvation is sought by passive means: "prayer and silence, humility and poverty".<sup>20</sup> This, of course, hardly encourages an active life and attempts to change reality. One of the most significant aspects of this philosophy is brought out by Hamady:

"When a philosophy invites the devaluation of living and its enjoyments and successes, it ceases to be a mechanism of adjustment to the deprivations of life and becomes a means of self-destruction."<sup>21</sup>

### The ideal self

We have noted that the Arab attempts, in all his actions, to live up to an internalized image of the "ideal self". He carries this image with him at all times, but it is especially relevant to his interactions with other people. He follows this ideal in preference to living within his own limitations.<sup>22</sup> Hamady further notes that this ideal self is:

"...a haven of safety, blessing and happiness in times of failure. In such circumstances the Arab is most emphatic about his potential goodness and values. He evaluates himself not by his actual behavior and achievement but by the ideal self and its unlimited good potentialities."<sup>23</sup>

He can sit with this glorified image for hours without boredom and with complete peace on his face; seemingly completely oblivious to life going on around him. Men in particular spend a great deal of time in meditation.<sup>24</sup>

The ideal self as a concept springs from two sources: the Bedouin ideal man and the Muslim ideal man. The Bedouin ideal man represents pride, chivalry, bravery, non-submission to authority, decency, dignity, fulfillment of promises, discretion, tolerance, generosity, obedience, loyalty to friends, firmness, stability, patience and endurance. The Muslim ideal man incorporates the following



characteristics: fear of God, piety, continence, modesty, forgiveness, compassion, frugality, asceticism, fatalism, fortitude, endurance, stability, gravity, dignity, wisdom, seeking of knowledge.<sup>25</sup>

### Boasting

An ideal self must involve, if it is to be considered believable, a false projection of what one's real character is. It incorporates a very real fear of being "found out" -- a fear of having another know what one really thinks and does and feels. These factors together necessitate boasting -- and boasting is a well-documented Arab trait. Says Hamady: "He shows overt self-confidence, challenges and menaces anyone who accuses him of fear and demonstrates daring and courage".<sup>26</sup> She points out that his real strength and ability is not commensurate with his boasting: the surprising thing is that he is not aware of this, he does not know that he is not what he says he is, even though this ideal image cannot hold up during depression or delay. He feels no shame in making his grandiose gestures and assertions. "What a person pretends to be counts far more than what he actually is".<sup>27</sup>

The Arabic language is the perfect vehicle for the exaggerated self-expression. An un-exaggerated statement is, at best, not believed, and at worst, taken to mean the opposite.<sup>28</sup>



## CHAPTER V

## ATOMISM

Atomism as a psychological concept denotes an outlook on the world which is highly particularistic and singularly disconnected. It implies a frame of reference without a frame: a series of boxes which are never linked. The atomistic mind conceives of the passing ideas and events in kaleidoscopic fashion; as a series of emotion-producing, incongruous colors which never really make sense. The atomistic mind does not conceptualize; it does not build thoughts on thoughts to find an explanation. It neither relates nor builds bridges.

The presence of this phenomenon in a child is very understandable: a child is not yet able to do anything more than see the passing world; he is not yet able to explain. But what shall we say of an adult? It would seem obvious that the trait is not innate: man as a species is born with the ability to conceptualize. So if he does not, it must be the result of environmental factors; he must be unable to do so because of the nature of his immediate realities, or unwilling to do so for the same reason. Inability to do so may be found in physical debilitation. A man who is constantly exhausted by hours of heavy manual labor, or by disease and hunger is not likely to have any desire to understand the whole of his all-too-dreary world. To relate all the aspects of his existence is to submit to overwhelming despair. Things taken one at a time are not intolerable. Intolerable reality is then a cause of atomism, as is physical exhaustion.

Psychologically speaking, this disconnection is not a conscious activity. It is, in fact, dissociation, one of our previously annotated defense mechanisms and is thus, by definition, an unconscious process. Lindgren given the best definition:

"[It is] an inability to perceive relationships among various aspects of behavior that are obviously related - for example, the tendency to

see similar actions as dissimilar. Repression and other forms of behavior mechanisms have the effect of enabling the individual to dissociate his behavior from its causes, for to face the true causes would activate the very anxiety he is trying to escape."<sup>1</sup>

In looking to the Arabs we find ample documentation of the trait.<sup>2</sup> It is manifested in societal separatism and in unstructured psychic differentiation. Berger notes that the Arab view of nature and the arts both display a "similar rigidity, formalism, and disinclination to look into the unknown".<sup>3</sup> He draws heavily on H. A. R. Gibb in seeking explanations. Gibb sees the process as a result of Islam, which considered knowledge a collection of givens, a collation of the known rather than a basis for understanding the unknown. Tradition insisted that anything which did not correlate with the old and known was unacceptable. The concrete and atomistic aspects of their thought did allow the development of the experimental method but prevented "the bold imaginative questioning of the nature of things which leads to the fundamental theories at the basis of experimental and technological advances..."<sup>4</sup>

Berger documents the same tendencies in both philosophy and the arts: "...Arab Moslem civilization has emphasized structure, repetition, and perfection in detail at the expense of meaning, originality, and the joining of parts into a related unity".<sup>5</sup> He also notes its effect on language; it made "their literary forms intellectual strait jackets, static vehicles for a show of geometric virtuosity rather than plastic means for conveying emotion, ideas, or a rounded interpretation of human life".<sup>6</sup>

Bernard Lewis sees its application in every aspect of Arab life: "He [the Arab] conceives his society not as an organic whole, compounded of interrelated and interacting parts, but as an association of separate groups - religions, classes - held together only by the ground beneath and the governments above". The same process is evident in theology, poetry, music, art, history, biography, fiction and personal characterizations.<sup>7</sup>

Hamady notes that in the abstracting the Arabs do attempt, they choose "the most minute and far-fetched points...combin[ing] them in a fantastic manner irrespective of the main points of the figures".<sup>8</sup> She also notes that their choice of these details is based on emotional likes and dislikes rather than logic, and relates this to the effectiveness of the learning process.<sup>9</sup> Bleuler calls the Arab "a fussy, nagging fellow and a romantic dreamer at the same time".<sup>10</sup> Ayrout notes the heavy use of proverbs to save thinking.<sup>11</sup>

## CHAPTER VI

## INTOLERANCE

We have seen in the chapter on the individual that Arab judgments were readily pronounced and frequently severe. The severity of judgment is almost a direct reflection of the application of polar values.

"The fact that any action is judged by two polar values, by halâl (right, permitted) and harâm (wrong, forbidden), by mu'ib (shameful) and maqbûl (acceptable) by good or bad adds to the severity of the situation. There is no continuum in evaluation. Every category of human behavior falls into one of these two extremes."<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, this extremism is buttressed by dogmatism: an absolutistic structure of beliefs that does not allow compromise or contradiction.<sup>2</sup> Traditional beliefs are rigidly upheld, as is the image of the "ideal self": an attack on either of these is likely to bring violent anger.<sup>3</sup>

These dogmatic, polar values are applied with a series of negative sanctions. Hamady notes that the effectiveness of these controls corresponds with a postulate of Radcliffe-Brown's that "...in all human societies the negative sanctions are more definite than the positive".<sup>4</sup> Arab society is ruthless, as noted before, and has no sympathy for the weak, nor understanding of the vagaries of human nature. Misfortune is an opportunity for revenge.<sup>5</sup>

The effectiveness of these sanctions and a widespread awareness of lying to escape such sanctions results, as seen before, in a deep sense of distrust and fear of others.<sup>6</sup> As a result of this distrust, the Arab expects complete consistency of behavior on the part of other group members: he cannot tolerate deviation.<sup>7</sup>

All these factors added together, of course, add to a picture of rather deep intolerance. This lack of empathy may be measured in specific areas. Berger

notes the continual movement between the poles of "hostility and hospitality, suspicion and ingratiation, intimacy and formality".<sup>8</sup> Friendships move from the highest degree of intimacy to an equally high degree of hatred.<sup>9</sup>

In larger areas, we may witness this intolerance in great degree between city and countryside<sup>10</sup> and in the hatred of manual labor<sup>11</sup> on the part of the educated elites. The intolerance of the newly westernized youth goes even deeper; it grows from a core of dissatisfaction, and finally bears fruit in an almost total hostility for their native society and its singularities.<sup>12</sup>

There has been, however, a tradition of egalitarianism in Islam - though it has seldom been given credence. Muhammed specifically stated that all believers should be equal before God and man.

## CHAPTER VII

## REACTION TO AUTHORITY

In discussing authority, we turn first to the attitudinal manifestations, both historical and contemporary; and then to the causes of these attitudes.

Historical concepts of authority appear to have been a sort of tri-part complex, reflecting, as usual, the nature of the society with which it was dealing. Bedouin tribes were likely to consider their sheiks as respected equals who had earned the right to seek consensus and administer judgments. In general, however, freedom was maximal, and the sheikh was not in a position of unquestioned authority.<sup>1</sup>

The secular governments drew yet another kind of reaction. These were usually considered (and rightly so) dispensers of violence and harsh rule, and collectors of taxes and military conscripts. The Arabs came to "despise the compassionate ruler and delayed the payment of his taxes".<sup>2</sup>

Islamic sanctions came to have a bearing on these attitudes, however. The religious stress upon obedience, and the widespread feeling that any price was worth the maintenance of temporal authority led to a sort of cynical acceptance of the worst a government could have to offer. This acceptance left its mark: the Arab's feeling "was that of utter hopelessness and resignation".<sup>3</sup>

Divine law buttressed such authority in such a way that "absolutism was heralded in the name of religion" till the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>4</sup> The deplorable state of affairs eventually resulted in the feeling that:

"There were two planes for happenings in life - the spiritually valid and actually unreal, and the factual and religiously invalid. To this very day the Muslim lives under two laws, the eternal and valid and the revocable and practical. The latter is a device to cope with the complications and to bridle the sinfulness of this life."<sup>5</sup>

Contemporary attitudes reflect the last two of the three historical patterns. The previously documented elasticity of identity applies to attitudes on authority as well:<sup>6</sup> the Arab is used to changes in government, and shifts allegiance (or lack of it) easily. For the most part government is still associated with violence, and the populace seems to have developed a simultaneous mistrust and tolerance for its machinations.<sup>7</sup>

Government remains elitist in attitude as well as in actuality. Landlord-politicians hold the countryside in contempt and deprive its representatives of the reins of government. "The masses have traditionally accepted this de facto expression of the sources of power."<sup>8</sup> Government employment is sought as much to continue a way of life as to secure a steady income. Favoritism and patronage are the hallmarks of rule and

"...the feeling that any regulation may be circumvented is prevalent and effective...[this is] a remnant of an older society in which government was not clearly differentiated from the family organization and it was neither rational, uniform, nor professional."<sup>9</sup>

"The relations between the government and the people are undefined, due partly to popular confusion as to government aims, and partly to official failure to build a rapport with, and really represent the constituents. We have noted previously the lack of civic spirit in Arab society;<sup>10</sup> with the fellaheen, however, this goes deeper than indifference:

"Towards his superiors, whether officials or landlords, the fellah adopts an attitude of awesome respect, of servility and mistrust. He puts up with the cruellest treatment from them, and they, despising him as they do, believe that such methods are a necessity."<sup>11</sup>

These contemporary attitudes would seem to spring, in general, from five sources: the factional spirit; religious quietism; group demands and "shaming"; non-benevolent authoritarianism, both native and foreign; and fatalism. As



the latter shall be dealt with in another chapter, we shall only deal with the first four at this time.

Dr. Hamady quotes Landberg on the factional spirit:

"It is in fact difficult to overestimate the part which was played in all aspects of the administrative and social life of the Arab provinces by family, group, or tribal rivalries. It was these that stirred the deepest passions of the soul; personal ambitions, let alone moral and religious ideals, counted for nothing beside them."<sup>12</sup>

Religious quietism and Islamic emphasis on passivity and obedience have also encouraged opportunism, and consequently an even greater passivity.<sup>13</sup>

The almost exorbitant demands on the Arab by family and friends and his inability to fulfill them completely create a sense of rebellion at the authority they are trying to assert over him.<sup>14</sup> We have also noted that the child is taught very young to shift his attention and affection from relative to relative and group to group frequently and with ease. He learns to obey without question; independence brings little but punishment.<sup>15</sup>

Authoritarian government, native and foreign, would seem to have played the most important role in shaping the contemporary Arab's concepts of authority. The degree of authoritarianism in general allowed a subsumption, under each set of rulers, of both economic and social power. Politics, wealth and status consequently reinforced each other, no matter which group stood in power. However, each new set of rulers introduced its own brand of authoritarianism, and with it its own set of effects.

The 'Abbâsids merged "the concept of rulership with...the Muslim idea of the theocratic representative of Allah, but not with the ideal of the Arab chieftan of pre-Islamic times"<sup>16</sup> (and the consensus type of rule that this implied). Furthermore, the principle of election soon gave way to a hereditary elite; that lasted five centuries.

The Turkish rulers were

"...apathetic, unprogressive, careless...often arbitrary and violent... direct relations...were mainly through...taxation...often obtained by extortion...administration was corrupt. Promotion was given by favoritism and bribery, and administrative as well as judicial and theological offices were put to auction, and so were the land grants and concessions of all kinds."<sup>17</sup>

They also added their own elites, with titles, to the ruling structure.<sup>18</sup>

European colonialism imposed yet another set of variables upon the Arab populace. They too added their own ruling class to the elite structure, affecting, as they did so the nature of these elites. The upper class was greatly attracted to and soon began to acquire the vestments of the Western rulers. This created an imbalance in Arab society. Previous to this the difference between a low-class Arab and a high-class Arab had been one of degree, not kind; they both shared the same culture, but at different levels. With the arrival of the West, however, the acquisition by the upper class of Western goods led, on the one hand to a situation in which "their local culture became non-existent for them",<sup>19</sup> and on the other, to lower-class frustration and an eventual turning to nativistic movements. In short, the schism was widened considerably.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, Western influence led to the inclusion of the formerly secure artisan class in an urban proletariat, whose chief hallmark was discontent; a result of slum living and proximity to the ostentatious wealthy.<sup>21</sup> The changes that took place in the Arab world are not entirely the result of the European rulers, however: they are explained in large part by the Arab past:<sup>22</sup>

"Before the advent of the Europeans, parochial forces, primarily social-economic, were the bases of political power in the Arab world. Since medieval times" (both as a result of Islam and the need for control of conquered peoples<sup>23</sup>) "the population has been divided into tribal and town-dwellers, and the latter have subdivided into the relatively wealthy ruling class and the exploited masses, with a striking absence of an important middle class."<sup>24</sup>

The mandatory powers combined with the liberals, since they found them more cooperative, in keeping the discontented lower classes at their repressed level.

Nor has authoritarianism in general been a foreign monopoly: "The peasants of landlord villages, particularly, are the victims of every predatory interest of colonialism. They are no less its victims if the colonialism be of the home-made variety or impressed by a foreign power".<sup>25</sup> Fryer adds that the servility and degradation of the fellaheen are mainly due to the oppression of their masters.<sup>26</sup> These "masters" are generally absentee landlords; equally unconcerned about the state of their land and the state of their workers. The latter are, as a consequence, usually in debt; often to the point that their occupation as day-laborers for life becomes a certainty.<sup>27</sup>

## CHAPTER VIII

## RESPONSIBILITY

A modern society demands that its citizens take a certain degree of responsibility. This section will be devoted to a discussion of the responsibility taken, or not, by the Arab in four different areas: in regard to himself, his family and close friends, the larger society and nation as a whole, and lastly in his work.

The Arab in general seems reluctant to take responsibility for himself. Islam delineated the only guides to individual responsibility that really seem to exist. It stated that no man should be judged for another's crimes and that each should be responsible for his own actions.<sup>1</sup> The latter has not, however, usually been the case. It does seem to be present in one area; though not particularly long-lasting in its effects. Hamady notes a "readiness to volunteer out of pride, eagerness for a cause, enthusiasm or protecting others".<sup>2</sup>

Generally speaking, however, we see a curtailment of responsibility by those same negative factors that keep all sectors of the society in bondage. "Shaming" as a control technique serves to inhibit responsibility in two ways: it creates a fear of innovation and absolves individuals of any responsibility away from their own group.<sup>3</sup> This is not to say, of course, that the Arabs never act in responsible fashion once they leave home. If they merely replace one set of group mores with another they are scarcely submitting to moral abnegation.

Tradition, oppression, and a determinist philosophy combine with social controls to inhibit originality and encourage scapegoating. An emphasis on the past in general helps to deter an imaginative approach to reality. Hamady does note though that "originality is not wholly non-existent, it is only suppressed in the supposed interests of the group or ignored so much that its achievements may suffer from lack of promotion".<sup>4</sup>

Oppression is discussed by H. H. Ayrout, who notes that the fellaheen have had neither moral encouragement nor anyone to teach them what responsibility entailed; servitude and isolation assured their passive approach to the environment.<sup>5</sup> The determinist philosophy encourages scapegoating:

"He attributes the ills of his society, his mistakes and failures either to fate, to the devil or imperialism...This refusal to assume responsibility in the issues of his life and environment increases the Arab's weakness and encourages his surrender, as if fate were bound to act against him and not for him."<sup>6</sup>

The Arab seems to take the maximum degree of responsibility in and for his own family-friendship group. We have spoken in depth of the number of obligations attached to family membership, and the need for sincerity, loyalty and devotion to group needs. The strongly reinforced moral requirement for filial respect and assistance has also been mentioned, as has the "mutual aid" quality of relationships. Only one other factor need be mentioned. Hamady documents a decline in intra-group responsibility that has outpaced authority; resulting in a greater feeling of rebellion on the part of group members.<sup>7</sup>

In the area of public responsibility the indices again drop to a lower level. Again, Islam provides a precedent, albeit limited, for acceptance of responsibility. It basically amounts to an injunction to serve well at home, and thus serve the nation.<sup>8</sup> Again, however, Islamic prescriptions are not necessarily put into effect. That the Arabs have taken little or no public responsibility would seem to have been amply documented.

"It is hard to find among the Arabs a trace of civic spirit or municipal life. Organization, solidarity and cohesion are lacking. In addition to the factional spirit...and the kinship structure on which it is primarily based, the theocratic authoritarianism...failed to stimulate a sense of civic responsibility."<sup>9</sup>

Extra-familial cooperation is, as previously noted, an unfamiliar concept: a furthering of family and religious group aims are the chief considerations.

Again we find the scapegoating complex and unwillingness to accept responsibility for failure. Landlords, the nation's elite, seldom even take responsibility for their own lands, considering them only a source of income.<sup>10</sup>

Again, in his work attitudes the Arab is representative of traditional psychology, and as such, symbolic of a traditional environment. His lack of responsibility in this quarter may be seen in his devaluation of time and in his tendency to talk rather than act. He is seldom prompt and when he does work, he does so slowly; often taking far too much time for simple tasks. Arabs do not mind taking extra time if the work is enjoyed in the process. Yet, says Hamady, "...being a man of impulse, [he] sometimes surprises people with his energy, enthusiasm and application".<sup>11</sup>

## CHAPTER IX

## FATALISM

We shall be examining first the causes of fatalism in Arab society, and then turn to its manifestations. This could be said to be a circular discussion: the causes are in part manifestations, and vice versa. In other words, while poverty and oppression may be considered causes of a fatalistic outlook - they may at the same time be present in great part because of fatalism. This is not, however, entirely a question of "which came first". We have determined that frames of reference are a reflection of society: Arab countries have never, partly because of their geographic location, and partly because of their climatic conditions, offered much in the way of hope for the residents of the area. The desert preceded the resignation, and disease the hopelessness. That the attitudes help to further the conditions is not a matter of doubt; there does seem to be validity in the assumption that the conditions preceded the attitudes.

We could classify causes into primary and secondary groups: oppression and socio-economic conditions being in the first group and religious quietism, family structure and attitudes toward work and wealth being in the second. Under oppression we need only briefly note again that both native and foreign autocrats have succeeded in stripping all freedom, responsibility and confidence from the individual; simultaneously refusing to take responsibility for those over whom they ruled.

Socio-economic conditions also demand but brief coverage. Malnutrition, disease, lack of incentive for private enterprise, natural climatic conditions, grinding, life-long poverty, illiteracy and a high mortality rate all have made life a hopeless span of existence for the fellaheen. Hamady also notes that the small employees in government and business are in the same position; their standard of living is no higher than that of the farmer.<sup>1</sup>



Religious quietism has also played a large part in encouraging resignation,<sup>2</sup> though not to as great a degree as the former category. This is not by any means a direct result of Muhammed's preachings: there is considerable support for a doctrine of free will in the Koran:<sup>3</sup>

"Landlordism and sheikcraft are the two main institutions that keep the people in the bondage of fatalism. Through an erroneous concept of religion, religious leaders have indoctrinated the people with a defeatist attitude to life, with unquestioning acceptance of authority and with resignation to their miserable lot in this world."<sup>4</sup>

Family structure has also played its part: status is determined by birth, rigid family training stresses denial and inculcates acceptance, and the individual without a family has no place to go.<sup>5</sup>

The upper-class attitude toward work, (mainly that it has no value outside of producing income) reinforces fatalism. This group also has established the belief that wealth is to be spent, not hoarded and invested. Both attitudes are compounded by a disdain for manual labor.<sup>6</sup>

The manifestations of fatalism are basically fourfold: a continuation of religious quietism, scapegoating, lack of (a) curiosity about causes or (b) action to change the situation, and an all-pervasive feeling of pessimism and fortitude. Religious explanations are still felt to be sufficient for understanding the universe.<sup>7</sup> There is, moreover, a feeling of security in following the divine ordinance:<sup>8</sup> a feeling that assertion of man's will is equivalent with denial of God's: a dangerous position to be in.<sup>9</sup> God's name is mentioned in connection with all things: "If God will it" follows every stated plan and hope expressed. Scapegoating has already been discussed; the propensity to blame all societal ills on "fate, the devil or imperialism."<sup>10</sup>

Fatalism results first of all in a total lack of curiosity; little attempt is made to see a connection between cause and effect.<sup>11</sup> It also greatly inhibits incentive to change: innovation would risk disturbing the security-producing

status quo.<sup>12</sup> Work is thought useless: a belief that is reinforced by unjust social rewards and paternalistic appointments. This entire complex of attitudes results, of course, in almost total lethargy and stagnation.<sup>13</sup> Subsistence for oneself and family group becomes the main concern; almost the only concern of an individual.<sup>14</sup>

Attitudes revolve around a core of pessimism taking on various forms and colorations depending on the situation. Patience, fortitude, dignity, courage, poise, temperance, prudence, self-control, devaluation of happiness as a goal: all are variations upon a theme of fatalism.

## CHAPTER X

## SUMMARY

No elaborate summary is required to show the relationship between the Arab character and the traits designated as immature and traditional. Reiteration of one point, however, is vital to understanding.

It has been stated that the topics to be discussed were on a continuum. This cannot be stressed too strongly. The concepts of maturity and immaturity, traditionalism and modernity are dynamic in nature -- they are not separate nor opposite: they represent stages in development. We have also stated that very few if any societies sit at either polar extreme. More specifically, one would expect to find very few societies, of the primitive, tribal variety, at the far left; a minority between one-half and three-fourths of the way along the continuum; and the majority somewhat to the left of center -- in the second quarter of a quadri-delineated continuum.

Speaking of the Arabs in particular, we could scarcely place them, as the evaluation might appear to suggest, at the left-hand pole. They do in fact belong approximately one-fourth of the way "up" the continuum; and the majority somewhat to the left of center, in the second quarter of a quadri-delineated continuum.

Speaking of the Arabs in particular, we could scarcely place them, as the evaluation might appear to suggest, at the left-hand pole. They do in fact belong approximately one-fourth of the way "up" the continuum if it is viewed from left to right. Even those portions of the Arab populations treated are not by any means completely group-identified, emotional, myth-oriented, fatalistic, etc. They live with their realities in the best possible fashion; maximally adjusted, one might say, to their environment as it has traditionally stood and often still stands. They do not deny, and indeed, never have denied all their

realities: they have denied only those which were both intolerable and seemingly incapable of change; a tendency which, if we must be subjective, draws a deep feeling of sympathy; scarcely prejudice. All these characteristics which are incorporated in their national character have been incorporated for a reason; to make reality tolerable for themselves. In this they are no different from any man in any society anywhere on the globe.

Only one further elaboration need be made. The subject chosen for this paper is very nearly inexhaustible and very insufficiently covered. No assumption is made that the characteristics discussed as traditional or modern; mature or immature, run the gamut of representative traits. Quite the contrary is in fact true: the amount of research done seemed very nearly in inverse proportion to a feeling of adequate coverage. As a consequence, generalizations in the psychological sphere are too readily applied to specifics in national character, and too many important details go without analysis. The writer does not, however, and indeed cannot, discount the validity of the relationships discussed. They would appear to be capable of manifold verification.

## CHAPTER XI

## CONCLUSIONS

The theme of this paper is wrapped up very concisely in the statement by White that "the psychogenic story cannot be told unless the sociogenic story is also told".<sup>1</sup> The initial postulates stated that traditionalism and immaturity were highly related concepts; that maturity and modernity were equally synonymous. This has been proved, at least to the writer, beyond the highest expectations.

In the beginning, "maturity" as a concept was considered but a corollary to the all-embracing term "mental health". After discussion, the latter was thrown out, and maturity was substituted. It should here be stated that the original concept was completely correct: that maturity, while being a very large part of good mental health ("Neurotic...refers to those aspects of the personality which are immature and which are not attuned to reality"<sup>2</sup>), it is not sufficiently inclusive of its properties.

It has been assumed that the original objections to the use of "mental health" as an organizing concept resulted from the fear of psychological chauvinism. This objection must now also be put aside. The original concept remains valid: mental health, like its sub-corollary, maturity, is not a static thing: it represents a wide range of possibilities. Minimally, but by no means unimportantly, it involves adjustment to one's environment. Optimally, it allows for the fullest utilization of man's potential. Man is, by nature, a kinetic creature, capable of action as well as reaction. This is a simplistic statement perhaps in American society; but an idea of no small novelty to a good portion of the world's population.

To realize the higher limits of man's potential, however, is scarcely to assume post-haste a position of superiority over those who have not reached it. The question comes naturally: "who has?" The attachment of Western "labels"

to non-Western peoples does not necessarily stem from cultural jingoism. It provides instead a basis for understanding. Modern psychology, away from the layman, does not speak of immaturity as static and causeless: nor does it consider mental health to have a one-word explanation. It looks, above all, for reasons; for explanations of limited growth. This is the basis for universal application. Traditionalism and repression are hardly unknowns in Western societies; their presence can in fact almost serve as explanation for the development of psychology as a science. The manifestations resultant of these two factors in other populations then provide us with a basis for understanding. The colonialists merely "pointed the finger" and said "you're children". The psychologist says "you are immature because...and this is what can be changed."

The attachment then of labels is nought but means to an end - the end being explanation. Immaturity and a lower degree of mental health are the result of repression by intolerable realities on at least one, and often many, levels. The repression may be real or imagined; it may be natural or societal; past or present; but its effects have been felt in the chronologically adult but psychically immature. On the basis of this judgment, societies as well as men may be measured. An unhealthy society is one which manifests the maximal number of repressive factors. It rests on a base of defense mechanisms; it expends its energies "fighting" or "flying" from realities because it cannot tolerate them. A healthy society has long since left the stage of over-use of its defense mechanisms; it has come to a point of "rational offense". It has, at a lower level, made reality both understandable and acceptable; at the highest level, contributory. It has allowed for full utilization of man's potential in relation to his environment, and has satisfied his basic needs. That change is possible has long since become a presupposition and rational change becomes a way of life. This type of society; equivalent, of course, with a modern society; is not, as we have said before, in existence today. The

degree to which any given society is distant from this goal is a measure of the number of changes that need to be made.

One final point should be added. A society may be measured not only on the negative bases of repression, or on the degree to which it maximizes potential, but also on the basis of the needs that it is, at any given point in time, attempting to fulfill. In other words, the way in which man helps, or tries to help man is synonymous with the kind of basic needs that are not fulfilled by society. Traditional society emphasizes the importance of answering physical needs: the wealthy are expected to be generous and misers are despised; hospitality is the highest good one man can offer to another, food is treasured, physical protection (as in the Bedouin three-day protection guarantee) is considered important.

Modern offerings are more likely to be mental than physical; i.e. qualities like understanding, acceptance and tolerance are more highly valued than physical offerings.

Referring back to Maslow's basic needs given in the section under defense mechanisms, we see that modern society is most concerned with fulfillment of the top two levels of needs; traditional society is most concerned with the lower two, while both seem to be equal in their striving after the middle.



## FOOTNOTES

Frontspiece, Foreword and Preface

<sup>1</sup>Claude E. Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization", in Claude Welch (ed.), Political Modernization (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1967), pp. 3, 4.

<sup>2</sup>From Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Benn, 1957) in Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (2d ed.; New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 143.

<sup>3</sup>Henry Clay Lindgren, The Psychology of Personal and Social Adjustment (2d ed.; New York: American Book Company, 1959), p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 137.

<sup>6</sup>See Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 371; Berger, op. cit., pp. 135-36; and Sania Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), pp. 17-24. See also Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. xii, xiv. Halpern also lists some of the divisive influences, pp. 365-78.

<sup>7</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>8</sup>See Erich Fromm, "Character and the Social Process", in Gardner Lindzey and Calvin S. Hall, Theories of Personality: Primary Sources and Research (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965); Ledger Wood, "The Free-Will Controversy", Philosophy, XVI, Intro, 1941, pp. 386-97, reprinted in Maurice Mandelbaum et al. (eds.), Philosophic Problems (New York: Macmillan, 1967) pp. 431-32; Hamady, op. cit., pp. 22-24; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 11-13; and Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. xvi.

<sup>9</sup>Fromm, op. cit., p. 118.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>11</sup>Wood, op. cit., p. 431.

<sup>12</sup>Michael Suleiman, Lecture in Middle Eastern Political Systems Class, February 7, 1968.

<sup>13</sup>Fromm, op. cit., p. 117.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 117, 118.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

## Chapter I

<sup>1</sup>See especially: (1) Emotion. - Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface", and the whole of Fanon's treatment of the subject in Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963). (2) Myth. - MIT Study Group, "The Transitional Process", in C. E. Welch, Political Modernization, op. cit., pp. 24-32; Malcolm Quint, "The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village", in C. E. Welch, op. cit., p. 55; and Lucian Pye, op. cit., p. 74. (3) Fatalism. - See MIT Study Group, op. cit., pp. 24, 34. (4) Atomism. - Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation Building (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 144. (5) Authority. - Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 23. (6) Responsibility. - Lucian Pye, op. cit., p. 72. (7) Group identity. - MIT Study Group, op. cit., pp. 24, 32; Claude E. Welch, "Modernization and Social Integration", in C. E. Welch (ed.), Political Modernization, op. cit., p. 148; and Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States", in Welch, Political Modernization, op. cit., pp. 168-69. (8) Intolerance. - Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 142.

<sup>2</sup>David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda", in Welch, Political Modernization, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>4</sup>Claude E. Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization", op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>Quint, op. cit., p. 56.

<sup>6</sup>Emerson, op. cit., pp. 152, 193.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>8</sup>MIT Study Group, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>9</sup>Pye, op. cit., pp. 69, 72.

<sup>10</sup>Gabriel Almond, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>11</sup>Emerson, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>12</sup>See especially: (1) Belief in the individual. - Kohn, op. cit., pp. 17, 18. (2) Rational approach. - C. E. Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization", op. cit., pp. 2, 4, 7; and Pye, op. cit., pp. xiv, xv. (3) De-emphasis of myth and stress on reality. - Quint, op. cit., p. 58; Kohn, op. cit., p. 159; Welch, op. cit., p. 4. (4) Structured view of the world. - No support for this point. (5) Empathy and tolerance for others. - Ibid., pp. 4, 7; Emerson, op. cit., p. 110. (6) Respect for and freedom to participate in instituted authority. - Apter, op. cit., p. 204 (excellent treatise of both traditionalism and modernism,

as is this whole book); Quint, op. cit., p. 58; Welch, op. cit., p. 4. (7) Responsibility: public and private. - Kohn, op. cit., p. 14; MIT Study Group, op. cit., p. 35. (8) High valuation of change and consequent optimism for the future. - Welch, op. cit., pp. 2, 4, 7; Apter, op. cit., p. 66; Welch, "Modernization and Political Institutions," in Welch, (ed.) Political Modernization, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>13</sup>MIT Study Group, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>14</sup>Kohn, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>16</sup>Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization", op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>17</sup>Emerson, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>18</sup>Apter, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>19</sup>Pye, op. cit., pp. xiv, xv.

<sup>20</sup>Franz Alexander, "Emotional Maturity", Mental Health Bulletin of the Illinois Society for Mental Hygiene, (24: 1-4, 1948), taken from Lindgren, op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>21</sup>Robert W. White, The Abnormal Personality (2d ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 142.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Lindgren, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-10.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>29</sup>White, op. cit., pp. 105, 124.

<sup>30</sup>Lindgren, op. cit., pp. 6-10.

<sup>31</sup>White, op. cit., p. 142.

<sup>32</sup>Karen Horney, "Culture and Neurosis", in Gardner Lindzey and Calvin S. Hall, Theories of Personality: Primary Sources and Research (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 131-37.

<sup>33</sup>Lindgren, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>38</sup>White, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

<sup>39</sup>Lindgren, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>40</sup>The defense mechanisms are as follows:

1. Compensation - the mechanisms whereby the individual devotes himself to a given pursuit with increased vigor in an attempt to make up for some feeling of real or imagined inadequacy. Direct compensation - the generation of an intense desire to succeed in an area in which one has experienced failure or inferiority. Indirect compensation - the effort to find success in one field when there has been failure in another... Overcompensation - compensatory effort which is made at the expense of a well-rounded and complete adjustment to a variety of life's demands. The individual who devotes all or an unreasonable amount of his time to a very narrow area in response to failure or a feeling of inadequacy, even though he may enjoy great success from his efforts, is said to have "overcompensated" if he finds adjustment in other areas of life difficult.
2. Conversion - the mechanism in which emotional conflicts gain external expression through motor, sensory, or somatic manifestations.
3. Denial - the process whereby an individual avoids painful or anxiety-producing reality by unconsciously denying that it exists. The denied reality may be a thought, a wish, or a need, or some external object or condition. Denial may take on verbal form in an occasional statement that something is not so or in a comprehensively repeated formula which is resorted to as a means of keeping the thought, wish, etc. out of consciousness. Completely ignoring unpleasant aspects of reality is one way of denying that they exist. In an extreme form, such a denial may result in complete loss of contact with surrounding reality... in less serious manifestations... denying that one has unpleasant traits.
4. Displacement - the process in which pent-up emotions are redirected toward ideas, objects, or persons other than the primary source of the emotion. Displacement may occur with both positive and negative emotions. One example is the displacement of desire for physical aggression to verbal aggression.
5. Dissociation - the mechanism in which a group of mental processes are separated or isolated from consciousness and operate independently or automatically. The end result may be a splitting of certain mental content from the main personality or a loss of thought-affect relationships.
6. Fantasy - the process in which daydreaming or some form of imaginative activity provides escape from reality, with satisfaction obtained through imagined achievements, or martyrdom. A certain amount of daydreaming, especially in the earlier years of life, must be regarded as normal. As a preparation for creativity, fantasy is not only desirable but even essential. But fantasy becomes a dangerous and sometimes a disabling mechanism if it is consistently preferred to reality and is indulged in as a method of problem-solving. In extreme forms of fantasy, characteristic of psychotic adjustment, the individual is unable to differentiate fact from fancy.
7. Identification - the mechanism in which the individual enhances his self-esteem by patterning himself after another person. This may be done in fantasy or in actual behavior. Employed in moderation, identification may be both helpful and stimulating, and it frequently leads to superior achievement. Used to excess, it may deny the individual gratification of his own personality needs.

8. Introjection - the process of taking into one's ego structure all or a part of another person or an object, which is then reacted to as if it were an element of oneself.

9. Negativism - the process of active or passive resistance to demands on the individual; active, when the person does the opposite of what he is asked to do; passive, when he avoids doing what is expected.

10. Overcompensation - see compensation.

11. Projection - the mechanism by which the individual protects himself from awareness of his own undesirable traits or feelings by attributing them to others. In its function of self-deception this mechanism is particularly injurious to personality adjustment, since it tends to undermine or completely destroy insight. There is no constructive use of projection and its overuse is often dangerous, for it is the mechanism underlying suspiciousness and, therefore, can be especially harmful to effective interpersonal relationships.

12. Rationalization - the mechanism through which an individual justifies inconsistent or undesirable behavior, beliefs, statements, and motivations by providing acceptable explanations for them.

13. Reaction formation - the process in which urges that are not acceptable to consciousness are repressed and in their stead opposite attitudes or modes of behavior are expressed with considerable force. Overprotestations of sincerity or of willingness to help may often mean the very opposite.

14. Regression - the mechanism whereby the individual returns to an earlier and less mature level of adaptation.

15. Repression - the process of complete exclusion from consciousness of impulses, experiences and feelings which are psychologically disturbing because they arouse a sense of guilt or anxiety. Repression is essential for the existence and operation of all other defense mechanisms. It must be distinguished from suppression, the conscious control of unacceptable impulses, feelings and experiences. Repression is especially operative during early childhood.

16. Sublimation - the process by which unconscious and unacceptable desires are channeled into activities that have strong social approval.

17. Undoing - the mechanisms in which the individual symbolically acts out in reverse (usually repetitiously) something he has already done or thought which is unacceptable to his ego or to society. Through this behavior he strives to erase the offending act or thought and with the accompanying sense of guilt or anxiety.

All of the above is from Walter A. Coville, Timothy W. Costello and Fabian L. Rouke, Abnormal Psychology, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1960), pp. 55-58.

## Chapter II

<sup>1</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

<sup>2</sup>Berger, op. cit., pp. 138-39.

<sup>3</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 90.

- <sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 91.
- <sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-29.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 32.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 33.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-29.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 32-33.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 34.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 34, 35.
- <sup>15</sup>H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 204.
- <sup>16</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 147.
- <sup>17</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 70.
- <sup>18</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 146.
- <sup>19</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 70.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 146-47.
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 153.
- <sup>23</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 31, 84.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 34-35.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 75.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 76.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 77.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 83, 84.
- <sup>29</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 148.
- <sup>30</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 85.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 33.
- <sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 67-69.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 69.



<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>35</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 136.

<sup>36</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 99.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 125, 95, 96.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp. 101-02.

<sup>39</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 151.

<sup>40</sup>Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 284-86.

### Chapter III

<sup>1</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 39, 40.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 204.

<sup>11</sup>Michael W. Suleiman, "The Arabs and the West," reprinted from Il Politico, XXXII, No. 3 (Pavia, Italy: University of Pavia, 1967), p. 516.

<sup>12</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 207.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 208, 209.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>15</sup>From F. A. Sayegh, Understanding the Arab Mind (New York: Organization of Arab Students in the United States, 1953), p. 102; in Hamady, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>16</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 73, 75.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 49.



<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 43, 47-48.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>21</sup>From T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1934), p. 42; from Hamady, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 54-56, 57, 59.

#### Chapter IV

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>3</sup>Halpern, op. cit., p. 189.

<sup>4</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 163-77.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 166-67.

<sup>7</sup>From H. H. Ayrout, The Fellaheen, trans. by Hilary Wayment (Cairo: R. Shindler, 1945), p. 102, in Hamady, op. cit., p. 178.

<sup>8</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 153.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>From H. A. Faris, "The Arabs and Their History," Middle East Journal, VIII (Spring, 1954), p. 156; from Hamady, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>11</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 155-56.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 193.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 195-95, 197.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 218-19.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 201.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 59-60.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

#### Chapter V

<sup>1</sup>Lindgren, op. cit., p. 517.

<sup>2</sup>See especially Hamady, op. cit., pp. 209-212, and Berger, op. cit., pp. 158-160.

<sup>3</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 158.

<sup>4</sup>H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 64-65; from Berger, op. cit., p. 159.

<sup>5</sup>Berger, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 160.

<sup>7</sup>From Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1950), pp. 141-42; from Hamady, op. cit., pp. 209-10.

<sup>8</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>10</sup>M. R. Fleuler, "Rorschach's Ink Blot Test and Racial Psychology: Mental Peculiarities of Moroccans," Character and Personality, IV (1935), p. 113, in Hamady, op. cit., p. 212.

<sup>11</sup>H. H. Ayrout, The Fellaheen, trans. by Hilary Wayment, (Cairo: R. Shindler, 1945), p. 132, in Hamady, op. cit., p. 132.

## Chapter VI

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 35, 36.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 206.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>4</sup>From A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "Social Sanction," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XIII, p. 531, from Hamady, op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>5</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>8</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 152.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>10</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 122-24.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

## Chapter VII

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 114, 115.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 118-19.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 116-17.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 230, 115-16.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 124.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 125-26.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 126-27.

<sup>11</sup>Quoted from Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), p. 50, from Hamady, op. cit., p. 147.

<sup>12</sup>Quoted from Carlo Landberg, Proverbes et dictons du peuple arabe, (Leide: E. J. Brill, 1883), p. 45 in Hamady, op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>13</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 118.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 70-71.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 135, 137.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 135-38.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 138-39.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 133-34.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>25</sup>Quoted from E. R. Fryer, "The Resources and Their Potentials: Manpower", H. P. Hall (ed.), Middle East Resources: Problems and Prospects (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1954), pp. 51-52; in Hamady, op. cit., p. 144.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., in Hamady, op. cit., p. 145.

<sup>27</sup>Hamady, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

#### Chapter VIII

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 109

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 34, 38, 39.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>5</sup>Quoted from H. H. Ayrout; op. cit., in Hamady, op. cit., p. 138.

<sup>6</sup>Hamady, op. cit., p. 187-88.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 141-42.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 215, 216.

#### Chapter IX

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 141.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 222, 181, 184.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 192.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 187-88.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 205.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 213-14.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

#### Chapter XI

<sup>1</sup>White, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>2</sup>Lindgren, op. cit., p. 12.

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A MODERNITY-MATURITY CONTINUUM

WHERE STAND THE ARABS?

by

Gaynel Ann Beckwith

B.A., University of Iowa, 1964

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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National or cultural groups often may be said to have a unique "character" - one which is separably and peculiarly their own. This uniqueness derives not from the variety of attributes which are included, but from the pattern that these attributes assume.

Eighty per cent of the Arab peoples may be said to have such a unique character. These people are the peasantry, the "fellaheen"; and they share a common mode of thought, a common religion - and distinctive traditions.

The separability of their character from that of other peoples is somewhat qualified, however, by an abstracted similarity that exists between the Arabs, and traditional peoples the world over. It no longer seems a matter of doubt that traditionalism on the one hand, and modernism on the other are real and definable entities, and that a set of recognizable links exists between the "traditional" and the "modern".

Further links appear to exist between traditionalism and immaturity (the minimization of human potential and maximization of defense mechanism utilization); and between modernism and maturity (the maximization of human potential and minimization of defense mechanism utilization.) These links are forged through a set of general psychological characteristics, applicable to national groups as well as individuals. These combined characteristics represent frames of reference: ways of looking at the world and relating to it. They may then be placed on a continuum: the modern-mature spectrum on one side; the traditional-immature on the other, and the transition point in the center; the relevant variables appropriately subsumed.

Looking more closely at these characteristics, we find that the modern and mature individual or group generally exhibits a rational attitude toward authority, accepts both personal and public responsibilities, and adjudges the outside world in rational fashion. These people look to reality, rather than fictionalized accounts of it for their understanding - and have a high regard for truth. The

mature modern does not leave his life in the hands of "fate", but sees the world, or any given situation as capable of being changed. People of this type can deal with abstractions and understand logical thought processes - they see, and can understand relationships between what, to their opposites, seem to be isolated incidents. Furthermore, they are tolerant of others and of change, and draw their identity not from a group, but from their own individuality.

The traditional and immature, on the other hand, usually exhibit irrational attitudes toward authority and are very slow to accept any responsibility - either personal or private. They see the world in terms of emotions rather than reason; and often show a marked propensity to myth and/or falsehood. They are both fatalistic and atomistic - and generally intolerant of difference or change. They seldom perceive themselves as individuals - their identity is drawn from primary or secondary groups. This frame of reference is generally symbolic of intolerable reality; as its opposite is of a livable environment.

Discussing the Arabs in light of these concepts leads to the conclusion that they should be considered of the traditional and immature group. This cannot be thought surprising when one becomes aware of the environment in which they live: it is indeed, most of the time, intolerable reality. It is characterized by repression, of the natural, political and social varieties - and almost demands a heavy use of defense mechanisms. Their traditionalism and immaturity are partially societally created - their society is partly attitudinally created. Society preceded attitudes, but attitudes help maintain the society as it is.