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POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL SUPPORTS:
A STUDY OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICER RETENTION

by

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A.B., The Citadel, 1959

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A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree


MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1972

Approved by:


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INTRODUCTION

David Easton has described a political system "as a dynamic system of action that is a living part of society."¹ The United States Army is an integral, viable, and dynamic subsystem of the American political system. Easton cites two basic forms of input into a political system which gives the system its dynamic character -- demands and supports. Demands cannot keep the system operating; energy in the form of support inputs must enter the system if demands are to be met and the system is to function.² This applies also to the subsystem of concern. To meet the nation's demand for security, support inputs are required. This study focuses on support in the form of manpower, manpower to provide leadership for the security establishment.

A political system is always immersed in a specific setting or environment and the manner in which that system functions is largely dependent on that environment.³ There is a direct relationship between the environment and the support input which provides energy to the system and gives it its dynamic character. This study examines this relationship between political environment and one facet of support input -- officers commissioned in the Regular Army. These officers voluntarily accept commissions and after a specified period are faced with the decision to continue or terminate

their active duty service.

Problem:

To determine retention rates of officers commissioned in the Regular Army in 1950, 1955, and 1959, to examine the effects of commission source, branch of commission, and an officer's geographic origin on retention, and to explore the relationship between these findings and the apparent military requirements of the relative political environment in existence during each year group's initial years of military service.

The Regular Army Officer

In discussing the officer corps, certain parameters must be drawn. There are two categories of commissioned officers currently serving on active duty, the Reserve officer and the Regular Army (RA) officer. The basic difference between these categories of commissions concerns tenure. The active duty tenure of the officer who holds a reserve commission depends on the nation's perceived security and manpower requirements. Many officers who hold this type of commission are currently being eliminated from active service as the Army reduces its size. On the other hand, the RA officer has guaranteed tenure as long as his performance of duty is considered acceptable.

It is the Regular Army officer who advances to the Army's highest ranks. The Department of Army explains RA

officer advancement in this manner:

...as a result of assured career tenure, the RA officer is likely to get the nod over his equally qualified Reserve contemporaries for important personnel actions which can be described as long term career investments. In other words, when 'all things are equal' it is only common sense to invest in the career officer who is likely to be around longer. The Army's positions of highest responsibility and the promotions that accompany them usually go to officers who are nearing or have passed their 20th year of service. In light of the Reservist's lack of guaranteed tenure, it stands to reason that preparation for these positions goes to the RA officer most of the time.⁴

The Samples, Identification and Explanation

The populations selected for this study are the United States Military Academy (USMA) and Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) officers commissioned in the Regular Army in 1950, 1955, and 1959. These year groups were selected on the basis of the variation in political environment during each year group's initial years of active duty service when the voluntary decision to continue service had to be made. These year groups had also been commissioned early enough to trace their retention over a ten year period. Data reflect a total population of USMA graduates, and a 70 per cent sample of ROTC/RA graduates; for ease of reading, the term "sample" is used throughout. (Appendix 1, Population and Sample Research Methodology).

Common Characteristics of USMA and ROTC Regular Army Inputs.

Officers of both populations were obligated to serve three consecutive years on active duty following graduation. At the end of that time, and any time thereafter, they could elect to continue or terminate their service. After commissioning, officers of each population were required to attend the Officers Basic Course (OBC) of the branch in which their commission had been awarded, e.g., Infantry OBC, Artillery OBC, Signal Corps OBC. After branch training, they were required to attend either Airborne or Ranger School. For the 1959 input this option was expanded to include Army Aviation School.

USMA Classes. The cadets' years at the Academy are characterized by military regimentation, and, for the most part, academic regimentation. The classes of 1950, 1955, and 1959 followed a prescribed curriculum which, while aimed at providing a broad and general education, was firmly rooted in math and engineering. The American taxpayer bore the full costs of the USMA cadet's education. While the exact cost of producing one officer from West Point for each of the selected classes could not be determined, data per officer based on fiscal year 1971 experience shows the four-year USMA course to cost \$56,829.⁵ During their stay at the Academy, cadets are paid one-half of the base pay

of a second lieutenant on active duty. This payment amounted to a little over \$100 for the sample groups.

ROTC, RA Samples. Those commissioned from the ROTC program were and still are free to select their academic course of instruction. Those composing the ROTC samples, for the most part, financed their own education. Exact production costs for ROTC, RA officers for these years could not be determined. However, current cost estimates provide some basis for comparison with West Point. In fiscal year 1971 the course cost for one non-scholarship cadet was \$5,824. The two-year scholarship program cost was \$8,202. The cost for the full four-year scholarship was \$13,637.⁶ The costs for the fifties would be lower since they preceded the 1960's scholarship program. The ROTC cadets of the fifties were paid a small subsistence allowance which amounted to approximately \$27.00 a month during their last two years of college. Like the Academy classes, they too received one-half of the base pay of a second lieutenant during a six week summer training encampment between their junior and senior years in college. Cadets in the ROTC program of the fifties and today, attend instruction in military science once or twice a week.

Salient Aspects of the Political Environment

1950-1954: Conflict, Frustration and Changing Strategy.

The Korean war (1950-53) and the preeminent role of the Army, the principal ground force, dominated much of this period. The war years were years of frustration and uncertainty for the American people. The decision to commit U.S. forces to combat in Asia, the periods of retreat-advance-retreat, the rising casualty rates, the Truman-MacArthur controversy, and the eventual lack of a decisive victory nurtured the apprehensions of the period. These too were the years of Senator Joseph McCarthy, of expanding suspicion and fear of communism. Labor strikes and lockouts set new records but the nation's economy had shown recovery from the recession of the late '40's. With Eisenhower's victory in the election of 1952 and the end of conflict in Asia in 1953, increased emphasis was placed on the use of strategic weapons to meet future threats to international security. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Convention, SEATO, the election of a Democratic Congress, and McCarthy's censure were dominant events in 1954. The nation's military strength remained high from the Korean build-up but a reduction in force would soon be initiated.

1955-1958: Peace, Recession, and Technological Advances.

The cold war continued but U.S. forces were not committed to combat during this period and the Air Force and Navy

grew, almost in zero-sum relation to the Army's decline. The Hungarian revolution had taken place in 1956 and there was continued trouble in the Middle East, but for the United States the more bitter battles were being fought on the domestic front. Eisenhower had begun his second term in 1957, and was faced with an economic recession which would last well into 1959. The stock market dropped sharply and by 1958 there were 5,437,000 Americans on the unemployment lists. The Army's list of unemployed also expanded as a result of a reduction in force. In 1957 Federal troops were committed in Little Rock to enforce Supreme Court desegregation decisions. The most dramatic event of the period, however, and the one which had marked impact on the political environment, also occurred in 1957 with the launching of Sputnik I. In January 1958, the United States placed her first satellite into outer space. The space race was underway as the U.S. entered a new era of technology.

1959-1964: Cold War, Prosperity, and Mounting Tensions.

Cold war tensions increased as the United States entered the 1960's with ambiguous force requirements in a "flexible response" capability. In 1960 the Soviet Union downed an American U-2 reconnaissance plane. The following year saw the construction of the Berlin wall and the abortive Bay

of Pigs invasion. However, cold war tensions reached their peak in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis. The world waited anxiously as the Soviet Union and the United States, the two super powers, neared the brink of open hostilities. Domestically, the civil rights movement continued to occupy a position of prominence. Economically, the nation entered a new era of expanded prosperity. The space race continued and the U.S. was now placing manned satellites in earth orbit. President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 and, in Vietnam, President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown. In 1964 an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin saw the United States begin a military build-up for its longest and most controversial war.

Apparent Military Requirements of the Political Environment

This examination of retention rates of the voluntary elite, the Regular Army officer corps assumes an association between retention and the apparent military requirements of the political environment. The apparent military requirements of the political environment reflected a general decline from the early through the mid-fifties. The requirements of the early 1950's were high based upon armed conflict; the mid-fifties were low, particularly for the Army, based upon changing national strategy and efforts to economize. The possibility of armed conflict and military salience generally rose as cold war tensions

between East and West mounted in the early 1960's but the rise was mixed with highs and lows; 1963 and 1964 saw a new trend toward accomodation rather than confrontation.

1950-1954, High Military Salience. While the Korean conflict was shrouded in controversy and clearly became an unpopular engagement, the nation's elected officials had decided to react positively to counter the aggressive acts of the North Koreans. A period of general conflict, the early fifties can be characterized as a period of high military salience. The initial years of service for those commissioned in 1950 were years during which the perceived requirement for their service was high.

1955-1958, Low Military Salience. Unlike the early 1950's, the mid-fifties was a period of relative peace for the United States. The nation's defense strategy of massive retaliation created an apparent increase in military requirements in fields of technology, but a declining requirement for conventional ground forces. The emphasis in national defense was on missiles, strategic bombers, and early warning and reaction systems. This, too, was a period of general economizing and a reduction in the Army's force structure. The mid-fifties can be generally characterized as a period of low military salience, particularly for the Army. Except for those who were directly

involved in fields of military technology, the political environment of the period reflected a general decline in the apparent military requirement for officers commissioned in 1955.

1959-1964, Mixed or Ambiguous Military Salience. The apparent military requirements of the political environment during the late fifties and early sixties fluctuated with the high and lows of cold war confrontation. This was the period during which "flexible response" was used to describe defense strategy. Conventional manpower as well as strategic weapons were in greater demand during this period. The armed forces were busily engaged in preparing for conflict which was often near, but was not to fully materialize until the mid and late sixties in Southeast Asia. One can posit that the highs and lows in cold war tensions contributed to an increasing weariness among the American citizenry and those who had recently entered the Regular Army officer corps. These were years during which many began to tire of international strains and "brinkmanship". Armed conflict for the United States was now ten years past. Following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, new efforts were being exerted to improve East-West relations; economic growth and rising concern for domestic problems were moving to the forefront on the national scene. This period of tension and cold war

weariness may be characterized as a period of mixed or ambiguous military salience, a period during which apparent military requirements were being tempered by the experiences of the previous decade. The highs and lows in threat of open hostilities created a corresponding need for the talents and skills of those officers commissioned in 1959. The general rise in tensions and the flexible response strategy created an increased demand for military manpower but the skills and talents of those commissioned in the early sixties were being devoted to fighting a cold war which was beginning to become the object of increasing disenchantment.

Ten Year Retention Test Controlling for Political Environment

To elicit an association between the variations in perceived military requirements of the three relative environmental periods and the RA officer's decision to voluntarily renew his support, retention rates were computed for the 1950, 1955, and 1959 officer inputs. Rates were established based on ten year retention, with the assumption that those officers remaining on active duty for a ten year period were fully committed to a military career and were not likely to terminate their service except in cases of personal or family crisis. The findings disclosed that retention was highest for the 1950 sample.

The retention rate of the 1955 sample declined slightly; a further, and more pronounced, decline was noted for the 1959 input (Table 1).

These findings, however, were based solely on raw retention and did not take into account those officers whose service had been terminated by involuntary causes. To gain a more precise picture of the effects of the perceived environmental requirements on support inputs, we identified those losses which were beyond the officer's control (losses to death, discharge, and retirement) and adjusted the retention rates to exclude these involuntary losses. The adjusted retention rate for the 1950 sample was 82.4 percent; the 1955 sample had retained 75.9 percent of the total input and the 1959 sample reflected a further retention decline to 71.0 percent (Table 2).

Retention varied with the apparent military requirements of the political environment. The decline in retention rates from the 1950 sample to the 1955 sample corresponds to the perceived military requirements of the political environment. With the high military salience of the early 1950's, retention rates were highest. When the political environment of the mid 1950's visualized a lower requirement for military manpower and a lower profile for the Army, retention rates were lower. The political environment which dominated the early years of service for the 1959 sample has been operationalized as

Table 1
TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY,
1950, 1955, and 1959.

Class/Year	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1959</u>
Number Commissioned/Identified	893	738	1210
Remain Active Duty Ten Years	659	536	793
Loss to Active Army	234	202	417
Percent Loss	26.2	27.4	34.5
Percent Retention	73.8	72.6	65.5

Table 2

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,*
OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY,
1950, 1955, and 1959.

Class/Year	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1959</u>
Number Commissioned/Identified	893	738	1210
Remain Active Duty Ten Years	659	536	793
Plus: Involuntary Losses*	77	24	66
Adjusted Retention	<u>736</u>	<u>560</u>	<u>859</u>
Adjusted Percent Retention	82.4	75.9	71.0

* Losses to death, discharge, and retirement.

a period of mixed or ambiguous military salience, a period largely dominated by high-low cold war tensions, a period of flexible response to new aggressions, a period of increased concern with domestic issues, and, following the Cuban missile crisis, a period of renewed efforts toward East-West accomodation. The low retention rate of the 1959 sample may indicate that the lack of continuity and clarity in the apparent military requirements of the political environment has the most adverse effect on retention. With the relative clarity in perceived military requirements of the early and mid-fifties there was a response in retention to correspond to the environment. When environmental demands were mixed and flexible, officers responded to the uncertain demand by terminating support in greater numbers. When the perceived need for the officers' service was high, retention was high. When the need was low, retention was low. When the true need was unclear, retention was lowest.

Other Variables Which Could Account for Variations in Retention

Only a suggestive correspondence between military salience and political supports, as expressed by officer retention, has been established. An analysis of three structural variables of the Army itself which could account for the differences in retention rates may further support

or invalidate what has thus far been posited. Three variables were selected for analysis: commission source, branch of commission, and geographic origin.

Commission Source. The primary sources of Regular Army commissions are the United States Military Academy and selected products of the Reserve Officers Training Corps. An analysis of retention controlling for source of commission should determine what, if any, effect the access route of support has on an officer's decision to continue or terminate his military service. Of greater significance, the findings in controlling for the source variable will be compared with the retention patterns that appeared in controlling for the three relative environment periods.

Branch of Commission. Officers are awarded their commissions in specific branches or general fields of occupational specialization. The branches of the Army may be divided into two general categories: combat and combat support. The traditional combat branches, or arms, are Infantry, Armor, and Artillery; however, the Corps of Engineers has a secondary mission to fight as Infantry, and is generally included among the combat branches. The combat support branches have the mission of providing administrative, logistic, or technical support or service to the combat arms. Included in this general category are the Signal, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation,

Chemical, Medical Service, Adjutant General, Finance, and Military Police Corps. An analysis of retention, controlling for branch, will provide some insight regarding the effects of occupational specialization on support inputs. These findings will be compared with the association between the environmental variable and officer retention.

Geographic Origin. The Army draws upon a cross section of the populace to meet its manpower requirements. With the ROTC program operating in all 50 states and with Congressional appointments accounting for the principal route of entry to the Academy, one might expect the regional orientation of the RA officer corps to be equally distributed among the various regions of the United States. Yet Morris Janowitz observed in a 1950 study that the top Army leadership possessed a strong Southern orientation and was primarily from a rural background.⁷ John Lovell, too, noted in the 1960's that the majority of the West Point Corps of Cadets were of rural or small town backgrounds but the eastern coastal region, rather than the South, was slightly over-represented.⁸ Computation of RA officer retention rates controlling for geographic origin, and comparison of these findings with those noted in controlling for political environment, may provide further evidence to support the suggested correspondence between environmental requirements and political supports.

The remainder of this study will focus on these three variables. Having established a suggestive association between variation in military salience and political supports, a separate chapter is devoted to an analysis of each variable and its effects on officer retention.

CHAPTER II

COMMISSION SOURCE AND REGULAR ARMY OFFICER RETENTION

The primary sources of RA commissions are the United States Military Academy and selected products of the Reserve Officers Training Corps, although some reserve officers on active duty are annually integrated into the Regular Army. The Academy, since its founding in 1802, has for more than one hundred and fifty years produced some of the United States' most distinguished RA officers. The ROTC as a source of Regular Army commission is more recent. The earliest account of commissions being awarded in the Regular Army from educational institutions other than the Academy dates back to the period following the Spanish American War. The Land Grant, or Morrill, Act of 1862 inaugurated military training on the civilian college campus but this training was oriented toward providing manpower for the state militia and, after passage of the Dick Act, the National Guard. After the war with Spain, a practice of designating the top ten land-grant and military colleges as "distinguished institutions", based on federal inspections, was established. One student from each of these colleges was recommended for a commission in the Regular Army.⁹

The National Defense Act of 1916 formally established the Reserve Officer Training Corps. It provided that officers commissioned as reserve lieutenants might serve

for short training periods with the Regular Army but RA commissions were not awarded through the program.¹⁰ It was not until 1935, with the passage of the Thomason Act, that opportunities for a limited number of ROTC graduates to receive Regular Army commissions was instituted. That act stated that:

[t]he President is hereby authorized to call annually, with their consent, upon application to and selection by the War Department, for a period of not more than one year for any one officer, not to exceed at any time 1,000 Reserve officers of the combatant arms and Chemical Warfare Services in the grade of second lieutenant, for active duty with the Regular Army.

...the Secretary of War is authorized to select annually, in addition to graduates from the United States Military Academy, 50 officers who shall be commissioned in the Regular Army.¹¹

On a competitive basis, based upon short-term active duty performance, the Reserve officer commissioned from ROTC might now be awarded an RA commission.

In 1948 the doors to Regular Army commissions for members of the ROTC were fully opened with the establishment of the Distinguished Military Graduate (DMG) program. To meet the needs of the expanded post war standing Army the nation could no longer solely rely on the Academy to provide its career officer force. In discussing the expanded role envisioned for the post war ROTC, General Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff in 1948, told the annual convention of

the Association of American Agricultural Colleges that:

[o]ur need for this program has not diminished. We still need 22,000 reserve officers each year as a minimum base for Army leaders. But we look to this program to do even more. We are hoping that some of your outstanding graduates will be interested in a professional soldier's career and will come into the Regular Army...We hope that the ROTC program will eventually furnish 600 distinguished graduates annually for the Regular Army.¹²

The DMG program has continued to expand. In 1965 a peak output of 1316 Regular Army officers were commissioned from American universities and colleges. Since 1950 the number of officers awarded RA commissions as ROTC Distinguished Military Graduates has far exceeded the number commissioned from USMA (Table 3).

Previous Studies

Several scholars have examined the question of career commitment in relation to source of commission. Kurt Lang, using 1960 Department of Defense data, reported that 88.2 percent of Academy graduates continue on active duty beyond their obligated tour of duty while only 34.3 percent of those commissioned from ROTC remain in the Army.¹³ Mayer N. Zald and William Simon have also examined the effects of commission source on career commitment. Using data extracted from a 1961 sample survey of active duty personnel conducted for the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding attitudes of officers and enlisted men toward retirement, they found that

Table 3

NUMBER OF OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY
FROM USMA AND THE ROTC PROGRAM, 1950-1959.

<u>Year</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC(RA)</u>
1950	497	644
1951	352	819
1952	394	968
1953	375	696
1954	446	375
1955	324	526
1956	525	563
1957	406	657
1958	427	712
1959	445	1088

SOURCE: 1950-1954: Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 246.

1955-1959: James M. Danley, "Retention of Junior Officers," Infantry, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January-February, 1965), p. 41.

NOTE: Data for ROTC(RA) 1955-1959 is cited as ROTC,DMG's and represents fiscal year input. Original Source: Manpower Branch, Officer Personnel Directorate, Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army. ROTC (RA) data 1950-54 does not indicate whether input is for fiscal or calendar year and DMG is not identified as the source of commission. Original Source: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, Department of the Army.

82 percent of Academy graduates (sample size 662), compared with 58 percent of ROTC graduates (sample size 2,623) indicated a preference to remain on active duty indefinitely or until retirement. Thus, they concluded that "ROTC personnel are less committed than Academy personnel."¹⁴

These findings are misleading. In each case, those commissioned from an institution whose mission is to produce officers for a lifetime career in the Regular Army were compared with the products of a program designed primarily to produce reserve officers. Most ROTC officers have no intention of making the Army a career. They are awarded reserve commissions and, after a two year active duty obligation, return to the civilian community. ROTC Reserve officers who accept a limited tour commitment cannot usefully be combined with a smaller number who have expressed interest in pursuing a military career by accepting RA commissions, and then be compared with an all RA population of Academy graduates. The only comparable populations are those who accept a career commitment implied by a Regular Army commission.

Ten Year Retention Test

Having identified two comparable populations, USMA and ROTC Regular Army officers, the ten year retention test was conducted to determine what effect the access route of support had on retention, and how retention in each population

corresponded to changes in the political environment. The wide variation in production costs of West Point and ROTC officers might suggest that retention for the Academy population would be higher. Presumably those whose education had been financed by the American taxpayer and who had been subjected to the military training, discipline, and regimentation characteristic of Academy life would be more insulated, or less influenced, by the perceived military requirements of the political environment than those commissioned from the university campus. The West Pointer has generally been stereotyped as the career officer and, as noted earlier, for over a century the Academy was the principal source of entry to the Regular Army officer corps. But with the broadening of the officer recruitment base, during the post-World War II period, is the traditional assumption regarding the West Pointer and career commitment valid?

The ten year retention test, controlling for source of commission, did not alter the retention pattern that appeared when controlling for the relative political environments and the highest variation between the USMA and ROTC samples for any year group was less than two percent (Table 4). The access route of support for the 1950, 1955 and 1959 inputs had little effect on retention. Retention rates for both populations were highest during the period of high military salience (1950 inputs); retention rates

Table 4

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY
FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM,
1950, 1955, and 1959.

Class/Year	1950		1955		1959	
	USMA	ROTC DMG	USMA	ROTC DMG	USMA	ROTC DMG
Source of Commission						
Number Commissioned/Identified	497	396	324	414	445	765
Remain Active Duty Ten Years	363	296	238	298	290	503
Loss to Active Army	134	100	86	116	155	262
Percent Loss	26.9	25.3	26.5	28.0	34.8	34.2
Percent Retention	73.0	74.7	73.5	72.0	65.2	65.8

rates were lower during the period of low military salience (1955 inputs); the lowest retention occurred during the period of mixed-ambiguous salience (1959 inputs).

The ten year retention rates are also of significance when one considers them from the perspective of costs and rewards. Recalling the wide difference in monetary cost of producing an officer from West Point and one from the ROTC program (approximately ten ROTC officers produced for the cost of one West Pointer) the lack of significant variation in retention rates is striking.

The declining retention rates of the fifties indicate an increasing dissatisfaction with military life, which may be attributed to changes in the political environment. The high retention rate of the 1950 samples indicates that war may have a favorable effect on retention. The class of 1950 was bloodied in Korea soon after commissioning. During their initial years of service, officers of this year group were providing a service for which there was a recognized need. They were practicing a profession which was actively engaged in performing its most basic function. The apparent military requirements of the political environment were high and retention rates were high for both populations.

For the young surgeon who spends his time in the operating room there is the satisfaction of practicing the basic skills of his profession. One who has trained for years but has

yet to operate would likely lose interest. Based upon the findings it appears that the same applies to the young officer, regardless of commission source. This is not to say that "soldiers like war." However, the satisfaction of having practiced the profession to the fullest, and survived, undoubtedly has a positive effect on an officer's decision to continue his support.

This proposition also offers an explanation for the decline in retention during the fifties. The 1955 officer inputs were performing peacetime missions during their initial years of service. They were training and preparing but they were not practicing the art of war. The national strategy of massive retaliation during this period reflected a declining need for their services. The Army's strength was being reduced and funds were being redirected. The apparent military requirements of the political environment were low and retention was low.

The early years of service for the 1959 samples were characterized by a lack of conflict and mixed military salience. The construction of the Berlin wall and the Cuban missile crisis contributed to mounting cold war tensions and units were engaged in extensive preparations for combat. Training was intensified, inspections and practice alerts were more frequent. New and more extensive maintenance programs and readiness reporting systems were instituted. Tours of duty for bachelor officers serving in overseas

commands were involuntarily extended for one year. The threat of war was often near but war did not come. The environment of the early 1960's also reflected an expanding economy and civilian employment, presumably, become more attractive. This attraction, too, is possible justification for the lower retention rates of the 1959 USMA and ROTC samples.

Identification of Losses

Resignation, the voluntary termination of support, was the major source of loss in all samples. (For a detailed analysis of loss for each sample see Appendix 2, Tables 15, 16, and 17.) It is significant that resignations rise uniformly for each source of commission and the greatest variation in USMA and ROTC losses for any class differs by only two percent (Table 5).

Table 5

TEN YEAR LOSS TO RESIGNATION AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL OFFICERS COMMISSIONED FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Class/Year</u>	<u>Percent Resigned</u>	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>
1950	18.5 (N=497)	16.4 (N=396)
1955	24.4 (N=324)	23.9 (N=414)
1959	28.3 (N=445)	29.3 (N=765)

Involuntary losses (deceased, discharged, retired) also reflect common trends between the year group inputs. Death rates in particular show patterns which can be directly attributed to changes in the political environment. The high death rate for the 1950 inputs are, for the most part, a result of the Korean War. The West Point class of 1950 has often been cited as "the class the cross fell on" due to its high losses in Korea. The decline in the 1955 death rates reflects the absence of armed conflict in the middle and late fifties. A rise in deaths for the 1959 populations show the impact of the Vietnam war (Table 6), with its renewed casualties among young officers.

Table 6

TEN YEAR LOSS TO DEATH AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED FROM USMA AND THE ROTC, DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Class/Year</u>	<u>Percent Deceased</u>	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC, DMG</u>
1950	6.8 (N=497)	5.3 (N=396)
1955	1.5 (N=324)	1.2 (N=414)
1959	5.2 (N=445)	3.0 (N=765)

Analysis of Resignation

Since resignation accounts for the largest source of loss, it warrants closer investigation. Recalling that each sample was committed to a three year active duty obligation, analysis of loss to resignation by year reveals that most resignations occurred within two years of obligation completion (Table 7). This finding suggests the importance of an officer's initial years of service in relation to career commitment and implies that the nature of an officer's initial assignment is important in his retention. (For a detailed analysis of loss to resignation for each sample during a ten year period see Appendix 2, Tables 18, 19, and 20.)

Table 7

PERCENT OF TOTAL RESIGNATIONS OCCURING WITHIN TWO YEARS OF OBLIGATION COMPLETION, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Class/Year</u>	<u>Percent of Total Resignation</u>	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC, DMG</u>
1950	59.8 (N=92)	66.1 (N=65)
1955	65.9 (N=79)	81.8 (N=99)
1959	62.8 (N=126)	67.4 (N=225)

The 1955 populations were more than eager to terminate their service; greater than 50 percent of all resignations occurred within one year of obligation completion or in 1957-58. The previous discussion regarding the lack of conflict, the changing national strategy, and the reduction in force which characterized this period apparently had marked impact on the USMA and ROTC samples. The depressed economy of 1957 and 1958 had little effect on the decision to terminate active duty. The higher losses among the ROTC sample (81.8% of all losses to resignation within two years of obligation completion) may be a result of academic specialization. The space race had begun. With increasing demands for specialists, particularly in the technical sciences, the young ROTC officers, who had been afforded the opportunity to select an academic major in college and had concentrated his studies in technical fields, would be most attractive to private industry or a government supported agency. The broad engineering background of the West Pointer would also apply in this regard, but due to his lack of specialization, not to the same intensity.

Adjusted Ten Year Retention

To portray a more precise retention picture, the raw retention rates initially computed were adjusted by excluding involuntary losses from total losses. The involuntary losses did not reflect a desire to terminate support.

Recognizing only those losses which were based on the officer's expressed desire to leave the Army (resignation), all samples reflected retention rates higher than 70 percent (Table 8). (For a detailed analysis of adjusted retention see Appendix 2, Table 21). The greatest difference between the USMA and ROTC samples for any year was only 2.1 percent and the retention rates show a uniform decline from 1950 to 1955 and from 1955 to 1959.

Table 8

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Class/Year</u>	<u>Adjusted Percent Retention</u>	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC, DMG</u>
1950	81.5 (N=405)	83.6 (N=331)
1955	75.6 (N=245)	76.1 (N=315)
1959	71.7 (N=319)	70.6 (N=540)

The adjusted retention rates suggest that retention does not vary significantly by source alone; the USMA and ROTC, DMG distinction apparently has little affect on an officer's decision to involuntarily terminate or continue his support. The high, medium, and low retention rates of

the respective 1950, 1955, and 1959 inputs correspond to the retention pattern that was noted when controlling for the three relative political environment.

Summary

Retention rates during the 1950's decline. Resignation (the voluntary termination of support) was the major source of loss; however, greater than 70 percent of those officers commissioned in the Regular Army either continued their support for a ten year period or were lost to the Army due to involuntary reasons. While there were variations in the apparent military requirements of the political environment during the initial years of service for officers commissioned from USMA and the ROTC, DMG program in 1950, 1955, and 1959, retention rates reflect a common response to those changes. The greatest variation in adjusted retention rates of the two sources of commission, for the three year group inputs examined, was only two percent. The access route of support, regardless of the perceived military requirements of the political environment, apparently has little effect on retention. The findings suggest that retention rates of officers commissioned from USMA and the ROTC, DMG program will correspond to the perceived environmental demand for their service. When the demand was high both sources evidenced the highest retention rates. When demand was

low both populations reflected medium retention rates. During an environmental period of mixed-ambiguous military salience and uncertain demand, retention rates were low for both populations.

CHAPTER III

BRANCH OF COMMISSION AND REGULAR ARMY OFFICER RETENTION

In this chapter the effects of branch assignment on retention of officers commissioned in the Regular Army from USMA and the ROTC, DMG program will be examined and the probable association between apparent military requirements of the political environment and officer retention will continue to be explored. What effect does branch assignment have on retention? Are there variations in branch retention rates which correspond to the perceived environmental requirements for officers of specific branches or general fields of military specialization? Based upon the analysis of retention to this point, one might presume that when environmental demands for a selected branch are high, retention in that branch would be high, or conversely, when the apparent requirements for a specific branch is low, officers of that branch would be more prone to terminate their service.

Branches may be generally divided into two broad categories: combat and support. In its simplest form, the mission of the true combat branches (Infantry, Armor, and Artillery) is to neutralize or destroy the enemy. All other branches are functionally organized to provide a specific administrative, logistical, or technical service

to assist the combat branches in accomplishing their mission. Those commissioned in the combat branches, for the most part, may be characterized as generalists; they lack the technical expertise in a specific field that is normally associated with officers of the support branches. This does not imply that officers of the combat branches are divorced of administrative, logistical, or technical responsibilities. However, unlike those of the support branches, they are not specialists in any of these areas.

West Point and ROTC cadets submit a branch preference statement to Department of the Army during their senior year. Branch assignments are awarded based on Army needs, the cadet's preference, and his class standing. Those commissioned from West Point are commissioned only in Infantry, Armor, Artillery, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps. Only in recent years have the Military Police Corps and the Military Intelligence branch been added to the list of West Point possibilities. The ROTC officer is commissioned within the full spectrum of branches (excluding the Medical Corps, Judge Advocate General's Corps and the Chaplains Corps). Those officers who are commissioned in Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, Chemical, Adjutant General, Finance, Military Intelligence and Military Police are "detailed" to serve in Infantry, Armor, or Artillery branch for a specified period, i.e., an officer commissioned in the Transportation

Corps is required to serve two years in Infantry prior to serving in his basic branch. The purpose of this program is to enhance the officer's understanding of the operations and problems of the basic combat arms in order that he might better serve them on transferring to one of the branches engaged in support missions. While selected aspects of those branches available only to the ROTC officer will be discussed, the following analysis focuses on those branches common to the USMA and ROTC populations: Infantry, Armor, Artillery, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps.

Ten Year Retention Test

The ten year retention test, controlling for branch, disclosed that there are wide variations in branch retention rates (Table 9). (For a detailed summary of ten year retention for all branches see Appendix 2, Tables 22, 23, and 24.) Retention rates among the five branches common to the USMA and ROTC populations differ in some cases by more than 30 percent for a given year group. For the West Point samples the Corps of Engineers had the highest retention rate in each of the three classes. The Signal Corps had the lowest retention rate. The ROTC samples do not reflect similar patterns. Within the ROTC population the Signal Corps had the highest retention rate among the 1950 and 1955 inputs. These rates then declined sharply and the Signal

Table 9

SUMMARY OF BRANCH INPUT AND TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC, DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM,
1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Branch</u>	1950		1955		1959	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>
Infantry	*217 <u>72.4</u>	126 <u>74.6</u>	142 <u>76.1</u>	132 <u>74.2</u>	134 <u>67.9</u>	211 <u>72.0</u>
Armor	48 <u>75.0</u>	27 <u>74.1</u>	34 <u>73.5</u>	21 <u>61.4</u>	53 <u>62.3</u>	43 <u>60.5</u>
Artillery	127 <u>76.4</u>	91 <u>74.5</u>	85 <u>69.4</u>	65 <u>72.3</u>	159 <u>66.0</u>	125 <u>62.4</u>
Engineer	68 <u>80.9</u>	28 <u>71.4</u>	41 <u>80.5</u>	33 <u>69.4</u>	55 <u>72.7</u>	57 <u>56.1</u>
Signal	37 <u>48.6</u>	25 <u>76.0</u>	22 <u>59.9</u>	19 <u>78.9</u>	44 <u>47.7</u>	54 <u>50.0</u>

* Number Assigned
Percent Retained Ten Years

Corps became the lowest retainer in the 1959 sample. These ten year rates reflect raw retention and include involuntary losses. To get a more accurate picture of support requires identification of losses and computation of the adjusted retention rates for each branch.

Identification of Losses

Resignation, based on earlier findings in controlling for source of commission, would clearly account for the largest percentage of loss. But how are these voluntary losses distributed among the various branches. As indicated by the ten year retention test, there are marked variations in resignation rates among the branches common to the USMA and ROTC populations (Table 10) and even greater differences are noted in examining the full branch spectrum. Resignation rates of the branches common to both populations in some cases vary as much as 25 percent for a specific year group; examination of rates for all branches reflect variations greater than 50 percent. (For a detailed summary of losses to all branches for each year group see Appendix 2, Tables 25, 26, and 27.)

Some plausible explanations for variations in resignations may-be traced directly to changes in the political environment and to source of commission. The Signal Corps has the highest resignation rates for each of the West Point classes. More than 40 percent of each class' input

Table 10

TEN YEAR BRANCH LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL OFFICERS
 COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
 MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM,
 1950, 1955, and 1959.

Branch	1950		1955		1959	
	USMA	ROTC	USMA	ROTC	USMA	ROTC
Infantry	15.6 *(34)	13.5 (17)	21.8 (31)	19.8 (26)	26.1 (35)	22.3 (47)
Armor	18.8 (9)	14.8 (4)	20.6 (7)	28.6 (6)	26.4 (14)	23.3 (10)
Artillery	17.3 (22)	16.5 (16)	28.2 (24)	24.6 (16)	25.8 (41)	33.6 (42)
Engineer	16.2 (11)	28.6 (8)	19.5 (8)	27.3 (9)	25.5 (14)	42.1 (24)
Signal	43.0 (16)	24.0 (6)	40.9 (9)	21.5 (4)	50.0 (22)	44.4 (24)

* (Number Resigned)

to the Signal Corps was lost to resignation. Kurt Lang has said that, "the transfer of military experience to civilian employment is, of course, responsible for many retention problems, with the heaviest losses among personnel assigned in the electronics field."¹⁵ The increase in resignation rates between the 1955 and 1959 samples (from 40.9 and 50.0 percent) may be attributed to the expanding employment opportunities for electronic specialists in civilian industry and the expanding economy of the early 1960's. The marked increase in resignations for the ROTC Signal Corps input in 1959 (from 21.5 in 1955 to 44.4 percent) supports this assertion. The higher ROTC losses may be explained as a function of commission source. As discussed earlier, the opportunity to specialize in college would make the ROTC officer more attractive to private enterprise, particularly with additional training and experience which the officers of both populations gained in the Army. Harold Wool, in "The Armed Services as a Training Institution," estimated that over one-third of all electronic specialists employed in civilian industry were trained in the armed forces.¹⁶

With the space race fully underway and the demand for technologists rising in the late 1950's, one might have expected a sharp increase in resignations among the 1955 Signal Corps officers. However, while the resignation rates of the other branches increased, resignations by

both the USMA and ROTC Signal Corps officers declined. The increased emphasis on technology, as a part of the national strategy of the mid-fifties, offers a plausible explanation for this decline. The demands for military technologists was high and retention in the Signal Corps, a technically oriented branch, increased. Conversely, the declining role envisioned for ground combat forces during this period may account for the increased resignations in the basic combat arms (Infantry, Armor, and Artillery). The apparent military requirements of the political environment for the combat arms was low and retention rates declined. These variations can also be attributed to the conflict/non-conflict environments of the early and late fifties. Resignations for the combat arms increased as conflict decreased. On the other hand, Signal Corps losses to resignation decreased as the environment became more peaceful.

Morris Janowitz has written that early in his career a young officer learns that, "the road to the top, at least to the level of one or possibly two stars, is not through assignment to the specialized technical services, but by being an unrestricted line officer" and "the aspiring young officer believes that the prescribed career is in the combat arms."¹⁷ The cadet who requests assignment to the Signal Corps, thereby reducing sharply his chances for elite rank, presumably is not so highly motivated to pursue a

full twenty or thirty year career as are his contemporaries who request the combat arms assignments. A 1959 Signal Corps officer who resigned his commission said:

...Thinking back over my classmates who went into the Signal Corps, I think that the majority of us had plans for either civilian or at least very specialized careers even before our selection of Signal Corps...I think those who went into the Infantry and Armor and so on, the true combat arms, had a much more specific goal in mind and that goal dealt strictly with the Army.¹⁸

Within the expanded branch possibilities afforded the ROTC officer, there are marked variations in resignation. Only some of the more striking findings which can be related to environmental change will be mentioned. One such finding is the high loss to resignation for the Adjutant Generals (AG) Corps' 1959 input; 47.4 percent of total officers assigned were lost to resignation, a sharp increase from 11.1 percent in 1955. While there was a lack of armed conflict during the initial years of service of the 1959 inputs, there was a marked increase in administrative requirements. Almost every action required some written report; to a large degree, this increased administrative burden fell heaviest on the AG officer. The obvious reaction to the expanded work load was dissatisfaction and termination of support.

While most branches show a gradual increase in resignations during the 1950's, resignations in the Ordnance Corps

declined for the 1955 input. Similar to the findings regarding the Signal Corps inputs for the same year group, this reduction in resignations may be related to the changing national strategy. The Army's missile efforts were concentrated in the Ordnance Corps. The skills of the Ordnance officer were in demand to support the new strategy.

Adjusted Ten Year Retention

In adjusting the branch retention rates to exclude those officers whose support had been terminated involuntarily, the ROTC Infantry input has the highest retention rate in each of the three year groups (Table 11). (For a detailed summary of adjusted rates for all branches see Appendix 2, Tables 28, 29, and 30.) The raw retention rates which reflected the ROTC Signal Corps inputs as high in 1950 and 1955 were offset by the high number of involuntary losses, particularly losses to death, within the Infantry. As would be expected, based on the analysis of resignation, the Signal Corps' inputs are consistently low within the USMA population. The sharp decline in retention of the ROTC Signal Corps inputs (from 78.9 percent in 1955 to 52.9 percent in 1959) has previously been explained as a result of academic specialization; civilian demand for electronic specialists, and the expanding economy.

Table 11

BRANCH TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,
OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC,
DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Branch</u>	1950		1955		1959	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>
Infantry	82.0 *(191)	84.7 (111)	77.7 (139)	79.0 (124)	72.2 (126)	76.4 (199)
Armor	80.0 (45)	83.3 (24)	78.1 (32)	68.4 (19)	70.2 (47)	72.2 (36)
Artillery	81.5 (119)	80.9 (84)	71.1 (83)	74.6 (63)	71.9 (146)	65.0 (120)
Engineer	83.2 (66)	71.4 (28)	80.5 (41)	71.9 (32)	74.1 (54)	57.1 (56)
Signal	52.9 (34)	76.0 (25)	59.9 (22)	78.9 (19)	48.6 (43)	52.9 (51)

* (Number Retained Ten Years)

The adjusted retention rates of the three basic combat arms (Infantry, Armor, and Artillery) are high in all samples. While there are some variations between these branches, the Infantry ROTC inputs show the most stable retention pattern. This is significant in considering the support-environment relationship. The Infantry rate was highest in the early 1950's, a period dominated by the Korean war. It was lower during the mid-fifties with the change in national strategy and the declining economy. It continued to decline as cold war tensions mounted and the economy rose in the earlier 1960's. But Infantry shows no marked deviation in retention for a specific year group. It was least affected by the changing political environment. The lack of specialization and high motivation best explain these findings. While there are wide variations in the academic backgrounds of Army officers, for the most part the Infantrymen were liberal arts majors in college. Unlike the Artilleryman, the Engineer, or the Signal Officer, they had not concentrated their studies in the technical sciences. They were therefore least influenced by the technological advances of the late 1950's and early 1960's. Regarding motivation, Janowitz was cited earlier as indicating that the officer who aspires to reach the positions of greatest responsibility selects assignment to the combat arms. That the ROTC officer would request assignment to Infantry, "the Queen of Battle," the branch

traditionally highest in casualties and lowest in comforts, would indicate that he was motivated to pursue a military career. He had chosen a branch which afforded the opportunity to advance to the top.

The Armor ROTC input of 1955 reacted most violently to the change in national strategy in the mid 1950's. This branch, greatly endowed with the "fighter spirit" or as Janowitz defines it, "a psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety"¹⁹ showed greatest dissatisfaction with the peacetime Army and the new emphasis on missiles and long-range bombers. The similar decline in retention for the USMA Artillery input of 1955 may also be related to the changing strategy, not so much as regards the "fighter spirit" but rather a dissatisfaction with the increased emphasis on missiles and long range bombers which were foreseen as the replacements for the traditional howitzer. It is significant that the ROTC, Armor and USMA, Artillery inputs were the only branches to show increased retention rates in the 1959 samples. As cold war tensions mounted those with the "fighter spirit" were once again (or would soon be) in demand and the Artillery had realigned its sights and were now missile men as well as canoneers.

The ROTC Engineers follow a retention pattern quite similar to the USMA Engineers'; however, the ROTC retention rates are considerably lower. While there are no ready

data to support such claim, one can speculate that the strong Academy orientation of the branch may have some influence on the ROTC officers decision to terminate support. Janowitz says that: "In the Army the Corps of Engineers occupies a special position. It has high prestige, offers interesting work in peace time, selects the top graduates from West Point, and enables an officer to find increased employment opportunities after retirement."²⁰ While academic specialization and civilian employment opportunities may account for the lower ROTC Engineer retention rates, one must emphasize that the ROTC officer is also competing with West Point's top men. As Janowitz noted, only those cadets who are academically and militarily in the upper percentiles of their classes are assigned to the Engineers. Understandably, those who have excelled at the Academy would perform well in the Army and remain on active duty. Yet, consistent high retention of the Academy's finest in a single branch would undoubtedly result in strong ties between the Corps of Engineers and West Point. These ties date back to conception; the Corps of Cadets and the Corps of Engineers were born as twins. In March 1802, Congress "authorized a Corps of Engineers, set its strength at five officers and ten cadets, and provided that it be stationed at West Point in the State of New York and constitute a Military Academy."²¹

Among the smaller branches the Medical Service Corps'

adjusted retention rates (1950 - 100 percent, 1955 - 64.3 percent, and 1959 - 86.4 percent) can be directly related to changes in the political environment. Apparently, contentment and job satisfaction were greatest during the years of the Korean war; the relative peace of the mid-fifties reflected a declining need for the medics and a decline in retention. As cold war tensions mounted and the probability of conflict increased, the retention rate of the Medical Service Corps rose. For the 1959 inputs this branch reflected the highest retention rate among the USMA and expanded ROTC populations.

Summary

There are wide variations in retention rates among officers of different branches. Basically, the branches reflected variations in retention which parallel the variations observed when controlling for political environment. Generally, branch retention rates were highest during the early 1950's, a period of high military salience. There was a decline in retention during the mid-fifties, a period of low military salience. A further general decline appeared in response to the mixed-ambiguous salience of the early sixties. However, there were sharp variations from this general pattern when examining the retention rates of specific branches. Unlike the findings in controlling for source of commission alone, there were distinct variations in the USMA and ROTC response to the branch variable. There

were marked variations in the retention rates of the two populations in the Corps of Engineers, with the USMA Engineer inputs consistently the highest retainer for the Academy populations in each sample. The USMA Signal Corps inputs were consistently low in retention, while the ROTC Signal Corps inputs fluctuated sharply for each sample. The highest retainer for the ROTC population for each year group examined was the Infantry. These trends are evidenced regardless of the environmental period and have been attributed generally to commission source, and specifically to the heavy concentration of the Academy's elite in a single branch, pre-commission motivation, and the presence or lack of academic specialization.

There are significant variations in branch retention rates which correspond to changes in the political environment. In the early fifties, a period dominated by conflict, retention for all branches was generally high. This was particularly so among the combat branches; the services of those commissioned in the combat arms were in high demand. With the change in national strategy of the mid-fifties and an increase in the apparent military requirement for the talents and skills of those commissioned in the technically oriented branches, i.e., Ordnance and Signal Corps, there was a corresponding rise in retention for the technical branches. The decline in demand for the services of those commissioned in the combat arms evidenced a

corresponding decline in retention. This response was most apparent in the Armor and Artillery retention rates. The period of mixed-ambiguous military salience of the early 1960's, displayed a further decline in retention for most branches. However, of significance, officers commissioned in the technical branches, or those who possessed civilian oriented skills terminated their support in greater numbers. While most of the explanation in this chapter continue to be largely speculative, the findings are more than coincidental. There are strong indications from the data assembled that there is an association between the apparent military requirements of the political environment and branch retention.

CHAPTER IV

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS AND REGULAR ARMY OFFICER RETENTION

Morris Janowitz, analyzing data on 761 general and flag officers of the armed forces between 1910 and 1950, concluded that "the place of birth of military leaders indicate that they are overwhelmingly of rural and small town origin."²² He also observed that, while there has been a broadening of the military recruitment base, "using the formal definition of the United States Census, there was still in 1950, an over-representation of southern-born officers in the Army."²³

To what extent do Janowitz' findings apply to those officers who will compose the military elite of the future? Is there still an over-representation of officers with southern origins within the Regular Army officer corps. In this chapter the effects of geographic origin on RA officer retention will be examined and the apparent association between the military requirements of the political environment and officer retention will be further explored.

Geographic Inputs and Ten Year Retention

An analysis of the geographic origins of Regular Army officers commissioned in 1950, 1955, and 1959 indicate that the South provided the greatest input to the Regular Army officer corps (Table 12). (For an analysis of regional composition and detailed input data by year group see Appendix

Table 12

SUMMARY OF REGIONAL INPUT AND TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC, DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Region</u>	1950		1955		1959	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>
Northeast	141 <u>71.6</u>	105 <u>75.2</u>	88 <u>71.6</u>	102 <u>73.5</u>	138 <u>58.7</u>	228 <u>60.8</u>
South	174 <u>81.0</u>	159 <u>74.8</u>	103 <u>80.6</u>	171 <u>73.1</u>	133 <u>69.2</u>	290 <u>68.6</u>
North Central	113 <u>65.5</u>	83 <u>75.9</u>	89 <u>70.8</u>	91 <u>67.0</u>	121 <u>65.3</u>	166 <u>72.2</u>
West	56 <u>69.7</u>	38 <u>76.3</u>	30 <u>56.7</u>	46 <u>71.7</u>	45 <u>68.8</u>	70 <u>55.6</u>

* Number of Officers Commissioned
Percent Retained Ten Years

2, Tables 31, 32, 33, and 34.) Input from the Northeast for the 1959 USMA sample was slightly higher than that from the South. John Lovell, in his 1964 study of the regional backgrounds of USMA cadets, noted a similar variation. He suggested that this deviation was a result of appointments, authorized to the Academy to fill vacancies not filled through competitive channels, being used "to attract promising athletes, mostly from the East Coast."²⁴

Why does the South provide the greatest input to the Regular Army officer corps? There are several plausible explanations for this phenomenon. Economic and industrial growth in the South has been slow and as Janowitz has written, the military profession "was an alternate channel of mobility for the ambitious, wherever there was a relative absence of economic opportunity."²⁵ In addition to offering economic opportunities, the Army also afforded a means of social mobility. The Army has traditionally been an institution of social engineering. For both black and white citizens, the Army provided a route of social advancement. Significantly, in this regard, Tuskegee Institute in Alabama (a predominantly black university), graduated 187 men in the classes of 1956 and 1957 (combined class totals) and 62 graduates, or one-third of the total output, accepted either Regular or Reserve Commissions in the Army.²⁶ The rural and small town culture of the South, with its "out-of-doors existence, the concern with nature, sport, and

weapons!"²⁷ may also account for the larger input from the region. However, one cannot overlook the precedent and tradition which is firmly rooted in the South. W. F. Cash in The Mind of the South wrote:

The mind of the section is continuous with the past and its primary form is determined not nearly so much by industry as the purely agricultural conditions of the past. So far from being modernized, in many ways it has always marched away, as to this day it continues to do, from the present toward the past.²⁸

The South which Cash described in 1940 has undergone considerable change in the past decades. However, ties to the past remain strong. A region rich in tradition and low in economic opportunities would presumably support an institution which retains equally strong ties with custom and provides an opportunity for economic and social advancement. The disproportional Southern input may also be related to the heavy distribution of military installations in the South. For those of Southern origin, the probability of serving in or near their home state is high.

These same factors which have been used to explain the disproportion of Southerners in the Army will presumably affect the Southern officer's decision to continue or terminate his support. Regardless of the apparent military requirements of the political environment, one might assume retention rates would be high among officers of Southern origin. Presumably, officers from the South would be least

affected by variations in environmental demands.

With regard to the effects of political environment on geographic inputs, the Korean war apparently had a negative impact on USMA recruitment. While there was no change in authorized strength of the Corps of Cadets (2,500) during the war years, the USMA inputs to the Regular Army from all regions declined sharply in 1955. The exact number of cadets who entered the Academy in 1950, 1951, and 1952 could not be determined; the number graduated (including those commissioned in the Air Force) in 1954, 1955, and 1956 were 633,470, and 480. The class of 1954 was not formally admitted to the Corps of Cadets until July 1950 (one week after the North Korean invasion of South Korea). However, with the exception of taking the formal cadet oath, those of this class had fully committed themselves to the Academy and a Regular Army commission upon graduation. The 1955 ROTC sample did not reflect a similar decline in input. For the young men who entered college in 1951, the ROTC program, based upon the provisions of the Universal Military Training Act of 1951, provided a means of deferment from conscription during his college years.

In examining the regional inputs for raw retention, the high, medium, and low retention pattern of the 1950, 1955, and 1959 year groups that was observed when controlling for political environment is not present for all regions. The South's USMA officer inputs had the highest retention rate

for each of the three year groups. The rates for the ROTC population were not consistently high; however, with the highest input for each year group, the South's retention for all samples was greater than 68 percent. Of greater significance, both populations reflected a general retention pattern which proximates the pattern observed when controlling for political environment. Retention rates were highest during the period of apparent high military demand. Rates were lower during the period of low military salience and they declined further during the period of mixed-ambiguous military salience. However, there was little decline in retention from 1950 to 1955 (81.0 to 80.6 percent for the USMA samples and 74.8 to 73.1 percent for the ROTC samples). Apparently, officers of Southern origin were only slightly affected by the low military requirements of the political environment. The depressed economy of the mid-fifties and the relative deficiency in employment opportunities in the South may partially account for these findings.

The Regular Army officer inputs from the Northeast reflected a corresponding pattern of high, medium, low retention and, again, there was little variation between the 1950 and 1955 retention rates. A sharp decline in retention occurred from 1955 to 1959. With the economy rising in the early sixties and the concentration of big business enterprises in the Northeast, it is understandable that retention

rates for the region might be lower.

The retention rates of officers from the North Central region and the West vary sharply from the high, medium, low retention pattern observed when controlling for the political environment. While other regional samples reflected a general decline in retention from 1950 to 1955, the North Central's USMA samples rose from 65.5 to 70.8 percent. During a period of low military salience retention rates had increased. While all other regional samples reflected a decline in retention from 1955 to 1959, the retention rates for the West's USMA and the North Central's ROTC inputs increased. During a period of mixed-ambiguous military salience, there was an ambiguous response to the regional variable. Possibly, the identification of losses and computation of adjusted retention rates will clarify these variations.

Identification of Losses

Resignation rates for the Northeast and South rose from 1950 to 1955 and from 1955 to 1959 for the USMA and ROTC populations (Table 13). (For a detailed summary of losses to all causes see Appendix 2, Tables 35, 36, and 37.) However, resignation rates for the Northeast's 1959 officer inputs rose more sharply than the South's. Presumably, those factors which have been discussed regarding the disproportion of Southerners in the Army are related to this variation. During a period of mixed-ambiguous military salience and a

Table 13

TEN YEAR LOSSES TO RESIGNATION BY REGIONAL ORIGIN AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

<u>Region</u>	1950		1955		1959	
	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>USMA</u>	<u>ROTC</u>
Northeast	23.4 (33)	16.2 (17)	25.0 (22)	23.5 (24)	33.3 (46)	35.1 (80)
South	12.1 (21)	15.1 (24)	19.4 (20)	22.2 (38)	25.9 (35)	26.9 (78)
North Central	22.1 (25)	16.9 (14)	27.1 (24)	26.4 (24)	27.3 (33)	21.6 (36)
West	19.6 (11)	15.8 (6)	40.0 (12)	28.3 (13)	24.4 (11)	40.0 (28)

(Number Resigned)

period of increasing national prosperity, the Southern officer was more inclined to continue his support than his contemporary from the more economically prosperous Northeast. He was apparently less affected by the uncertain demand for his service. This reduced effect becomes clearer when one considers the officer's regional ties. Through friends and relatives an officer is informed of civilian employment opportunities and he is frequently advised of the advantages or disadvantages of continuing his military service. An officer from the Northeast may well have been influenced by these contacts to terminate his service and pursue a more financially lucrative civilian occupation. Conversely, the Southern officer of rural or small town origin may well have been advised of the limited attractive employment opportunities at home and influenced to remain on active duty.

Unlike the general pattern observed when controlling for political environment, the resignation rate of the ROTC input from the North Central region declined in the 1959 sample (from 26.4 percent for the 1955 samples to 21.6 percent) and the USMA resignation rate increased by only two-tenths of one percent. This variation may be attributed, in part, to a change in the political environment. While the early 1960's were years of uncertain military demand and of improving economic conditions, there were still unemployment problems. In 1962 and 1963 there were increased labor

disputes and work stoppages in the steel and automobile industries which are concentrated in the eastern portion of the North Central area. These labor problems may have influenced officers from this region to renew their support. However, one must also recognize that a large portion of the North Central area, specifically the mid-West, is predominantly a rural-agrarian region. Not unlike the findings regarding the South, in response to uncertain military demands for their service, officers commissioned in 1959 who were from mid-America's rural areas were presumably less affected by expanding economic conditions than their contemporaries from areas of business and industrial concentration.

The West's losses to resignation among the ROTC samples reflected an increase for the three year groups but the USMA resignations were erratic. The West Point resignations rose for the 1955 sample and then declined sharply in the 1959 sample. One might expect the 1955 increase to be a result of expanded civilian employment opportunities in technology, particularly in the West's aviation and electronic industries. However, of the twelve officers who had resigned, only two could be identified as having specifically attained civilian employment in technical fields. The more typical occupational choice was education (three educators or 25 percent of the total resignation loss). Only one of the twelve officers who resigned was not in the upper half of his West

Point class and only one officer had been commissioned in the Corps of Engineers.²⁹

Adjusted Ten Year Retention

The adjusted ten year retention rates revealed that the South had not only provided the largest input to the RA officer corps but, with the exception of 1959, it was the highest retainer for both the USMA and ROTC populations (Table 14). (For a detailed summary of adjusted ten year retention see Appendix 2, Tables 38, 39, and 40.) In 1959 the adjusted retention of the West, with its low input, slightly exceeded the South's retention among the Academy sample. The North Central region, with the next to lowest input, was the high retainer for the 1959 ROTC sample. These retention rates for the 1950, 1955, and 1959 inputs into the Regular Army officer corps indicate that the Southern over-representation cited by Janowitz continues to exist. The Army continues to provide a tie to rich southern tradition and for many persons offers a route of economic and social mobility.

Of greater significance, the adjusted rates for Southern officers corresponds to the retention pattern observed when controlling for the political environment. Retention was highest in the early fifties, a period of high military salience. It declined in the mid fifties, a period of low military salience. There was a further decline in the early

sixties, a period of mixed-ambiguous military salience. There was no marked deviation in the retention pattern exhibited in controlling for the political environment. With high inputs and high retention for each of the three year groups, presumably officers of Southern origin, were least influenced by changes in the apparent military requirements of the political environment.

The same general retention pattern (high-1950, medium-1955, and low-1959) emerges for the Northeast's RA officer inputs from both the USMA and the ROTC, DMG program. The expanding economy and employment opportunities are plausible explanations for the sharp decline in retention among the 1959 officer inputs. During a period of uncertain military demand and rising economic prosperity, officers from the Northeast terminated their support in greater numbers.

The North Central's adjusted retention rates for the USMA population also correspond to the pattern observed in controlling for political environment. The increase in retention during the mid-fifties, a period of low military demand, that was noted when discussing raw retention, was placed in proper perspective by the high number of involuntary losses in the 1950 sample. The adjusted retention rates of the North Central's 1950 and 1955 ROTC samples correspond to the perceived high-low military requirements of the political environment. However, while there was a further general decline in retention for the 1959 inputs

when controlling for the political environment, retention for the North Central's ROTC sample increased. This variation is possibly a result of labor disputes in the industrial areas of the region and a relative deficiency in employment opportunities in the regions rural-agrarian areas.

The West, which provided the lowest input to the Regular Army officer corps for both populations in each of the three year groups, exhibited the most erratic adjusted retention rates. The ROTC officer inputs in 1950, 1955, and 1959 follow a high, medium, low retention pattern (82.9, 71.7, and 58.4 percent respectively). However, in 1950 the West's retention rate was surpassed only by the South's; in 1959, it had declined to the position of lowest retainer. While the West's retention rates of the early and mid-fifties generally corresponds to the rates of the other regions, there was a sharp deviation from the other regions in 1959. In response to the mixed-ambiguous military salience and rising economy, ROTC officers from the West apparently found the Army least attractive. The USMA officer inputs from the West exhibited the opposite retention pattern of their ROTC contemporaries. The sharpest deviation from the retention rates of the other regions occurred among the West's 1955 USMA inputs. Retention declined from 80.8 percent in 1950 to 58.6 percent in 1955; in 1955 the USMA samples was the lowest retainer of all samples. During the period of low military salience, officers

from the West responded most strongly to the apparent low demand for their service and they were, presumably, least affected by the depressed national economy. With an increase in the West's input to the Academy class of 1959, retention rates rose sharply and among the 1959 regional samples, the West had the highest adjusted retention rate. This finding directly opposes the findings among the ROTC sample.

The adjusted retention rates indicate clearly that there are factors other than an officer's geographical origin which affect his decision to continue or terminate his support. While there is generally a correspondence between the apparent military requirements of the political environment and regional retention rates and this correspondence was particularly strong in the South, there are variations in retention which indicate that officers of different regions respond differently to variations in the political environment. Presumably, the availability and attractiveness of civilian employment opportunities weighs heavily on the support decision.

Summary

The geographic origin of officers commissioned in the Regular Army has significant impact on retention. With the ROTC program operating in all 50 states, and with Congressional appointments accounting for the principal route of entry to the Academy, one might expect the regional

orientation of the RA officer corps to be equally distributed among the various regions of the United States. However, wide variations in regional inputs and retention rates occur. The analysis of geographic origin of officers commissioned in the Regular Army in 1950, 1955, and 1959, revealed that the South provided the greatest input and reflected high retention rates. The over-representation of officers of Southern origin cited by Janowitz continues to exist. For officers of Southern origin, the Army apparently remains attractive as a route of economic and social mobility. The Northeast generally provided high inputs and had high retention rates. The North Central region ranked third with regard to inputs and displayed relatively stable retention rates, which never dropped below 70.5 percent or rose above 81.8 percent for the USMA or ROTC officer inputs. The low officer input from the West is most striking; in each of the three year groups the West had the lowest input for both populations and the highest input for any year was 115 officers in 1959 as compared to 423 officers of Southern origin. With low inputs, the West generally reflected low retention; however, there were variations in retention rates of Academy and ROTC officers. This difference was most apparent in the 1959 samples, with the USMA sample reflecting the highest retention rates among the Academy regional inputs and the ROTC

sample exhibiting the lowest retention rate among the ROTC regional inputs.

Generally, the regional retention rates correspond to the high, medium, low retention pattern observed when controlling for political environment. Retention was highest for all regions among the 1950 officer inputs or during a period of high military salience. Retention among the 1955 officer inputs declined for all regions; during a period of low environmental demand retention was lower. While there were variations in the intensity of retention rates of officers commissioned in 1950 and 1955, the high-low retention pattern for all regions corresponds directly to the apparent military requirements of the political environment. The retention rates of the West's 1959 USMA sample and the North Central's 1959 ROTC sample do not correspond to the low retention response observed when controlling for the political environment. However, all other regional samples had lower retention rates which correspond to the previous findings.

These variations in retention rates and variations in retention intensity for other year groups are in some manner related to economic factors. Presumably, the availability and attractiveness of civilian employment and the general status of the nation's economy affect the support decision; presumably, officers from regions and areas characterized primarily by rural-agrarian economies, speci-

fically the South and Mid-West sector of the North Central region, are more inclined to renew their support. These social-economic circumstances may, in part, account for the high retention of officers of Southern origin and the relative stability in the North Central's retention pattern. Conversely, officers from regions characterized by economic growth, industrialization, and expanded employment opportunities would presumably be less inclined to renew their support, particularly during periods of low or ambiguous military salience.

Many factors influence the officer's decision to terminate or continue his support; the findings suggest that the aggregative variable of geographic origin is definitely one of those factors. Of greater significance, the findings further suggest an association between environmental demands and officer retention.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In analyzing political supports as expressed by officers commissioned in the Regular Army in 1950, 1955, and 1959, it has been established that the military salience of the political environment is apparently associated with rates of officer retention. The early years of service for officers of each of these three year groups were characterized by variations in the apparent military requirements of the political environment. The Korean War dominated the early 1950's and military salience was high. With a change in national strategy, a reduction in the Army's force structure, and general efforts to economize, the mid-fifties were years of low military salience. The early years of service for those officers commissioned in 1959 were years of mixed-ambiguous military salience; the apparent military requirements of the political environment fluctuated with high-low levels of cold war confrontation. In examining retention rates of officers who entered active military service during these three relative environment periods, high retention was associated with high military salience (1950 input), medium retention with low military salience (1955 input), and low retention with mixed-ambiguous salience (1959 input). These findings suggest that retention rates of the Army's voluntary elite, the Regular Army

officers corps, will vary positively with apparently military requirements of the political environment.

In analyzing other variables which could account for variations in retention rates, source of commission (the United States Military Academy or the Reserve Officers Training Corps) had little effect on the officer's decision to continue or terminate support. For each of the three year groups examined there was near negligible variation between retention rates of the Academy and ROTC populations. The retention pattern noted in controlling for commission source corresponded to the high (1950), medium (1955), and low (1959), retention pattern observed when controlling for the three relative political environment periods. Retention rates among officers of both populations were high during the period of high military salience; rates were medium during the period of low military salience and they were low during the period of mixed-ambiguous salience. The retention rates of officers commissioned in the Regular Army from the Academy and the ROTC, DMG program varied positively with the apparent military requirements of the political environment.

Presumably, previous studies which have suggested that retention was higher among Academy graduates than those commissioned from the ROTC program were not truly valid because of the Reserve-RA officer mix in ROTC samples. In analyzing retention during the first ten years following

graduation, the findings in this study suggest that the access route of support has little effect on RA officer retention. The lack of significant variation in Academy and ROTC Regular Army retention rates for the 1950's support the extension of the West Pointer's active duty obligation to four years in 1962 and to five years in 1968. These findings would also provide justification, from the Army's standpoint, in the establishment in 1964 and expansion in 1971 of the ROTC scholarship program.

The analysis of retention controlling for the branch variable suggested that branch assignment has significant impact on retention rates. Generally, the branches reflected retention rates which paralleled the high, medium, low retention pattern observed when controlling for political environment; however, in examining the rates of specific branches there were variations from that pattern which are presumably related to changes in the political environment. During the early fifties, a period of high military salience, retention for all branches was generally high, and particularly high among the basic combat branches. During the mid-fifties, the national defense strategy of massive retaliation created a declining need for conventional ground forces and an increasing requirement for military technologists. Retention rates for most branches declined during this period; however, among the technical-oriented branches there was a sharp rise in retention rates.

During the early 1960's, a period of mixed-ambiguous military salience, retention rates for most branches reflected a further decline; however, the sharpest declines were observed among the officers commissioned in the technical-oriented branches. With uncertain military demands and an expanding national economy, those officers who possessed civilian-oriented skills were more inclined to terminate their service than their contemporaries who were serving in the non-technical branches; this was particularly so among ROTC officers who, unlike their West Point contemporaries, had specialized college careers. These findings suggest that branch retention rates are apparently associated with changes in the political environment. Officers of selected branches are inclined to renew or terminate their support based upon the apparent military requirement for their service.

In examining the effects of geographic origin on officer retention, wide variations were noted in regional input and retention rates. Generally, regional retention rates corresponded to the high, medium, low pattern observed when controlling for political environment; however, input and retention variations between the respective regions were conspicuous. The South provided the greatest input to the RA officer corps and reflected high retention rates. Presumably, for those of Southern origin the Army remains attractive as a route of economic and social mobility. The

Northeast provided the next highest input and had comparatively high retention rates. The North Central region generally ranked third in input and displayed relatively stable retention rates which were never below 70 percent. However, the West's input was extremely low in comparison with other regions and retention rates were erratic among the USMA and ROTC populations.

Retention rates for all regions, for both USMA and ROTC inputs, corresponded to the high-low military requirements of the political environment of the early and middle fifties. Yet during the period of mixed-ambiguous salience there were deviations from the lower retention level exhibited when controlling for the political environment. Retention among some samples rose while others declined sharply. Officers from selected regions responded differently and in varied intensity to the apparent military requirements of the political environment. Presumably, variations in regional input and retention are to some extent related to the availability and attractiveness of civilian employment opportunities and it has been suggested that officers from rural-agrarian areas will be more inclined to renew their support, regardless of the apparent military requirement for their service.

Each of the three structural variables examined exhibited variations in retention which generally correspond to variations in military salience but, presumably, each

variable affects retention in different degrees of intensity. Source of commission, apparently, has little effect on retention and there were variations in retention rates controlling for geographic origin which suggest that, regardless of military salience, officers from selected regions will respond differently and in varied intensity to changes in the political environment. The apparent association between military salience of the political environment and officer retention was clearest when controlling for branch. When the environmental requirement for officers of a selected branch was high, there was a positive response in retention. During periods of declining branch salience, there was a corresponding decline in retention. These responses were most apparent in examining the variations in retention among the combat and technical-oriented support branches of the 1955 samples. The findings strongly suggest that officers are most inclined to renew their support when the environmental demand for their talents and skills is high. When the apparent military requirements for their service is low or ambiguous, officers tended to terminate their service in greater numbers.

While this study has not focused on more strictly internal, organizational variables, this is not to imply that these variables do not play a role in influencing the support decision. There are clearly many factors which affect officer retention and the internal variables, such as pay,

housing, and assignment turbulence which are now receiving special attention as the Army moves to an all-volunteer force structure. However, the apparent association between military salience of the political environment and officer retention, which has been established in this study, suggests that there are other factors, simple yet elusive, over which the Army has little or no control, which affect an officer's decision to continue or terminate his military service.

FOOTNOTES

1. David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," in American Politics, Research and Readings, ed. by S. V. Monsma and J. R. Van der Slik, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 5.

2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Ibid., p. 7.

4. U.S., Department of the Army, Commander's Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 601-4 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 9-1.

5. United States Military Academy cost estimates provided on request by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1972.

6. Reserve Officer Training Corps cost estimates provided on request by Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1972.

7. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 87.

8. John P. Lovell, "The Professional Socialization of the West Point Cadet," in The New Military, ed. by Morris Janowitz (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 139-140.

9. Gene M. Lyons and John M. Masland, Education and Military Leadership (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 34.

10. Ibid., p. 35.

11. U.S. Congress, House, Amendment to the National Defense Act, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1935, p. 14659.

12. James E. Pollard, Military Training in the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1960), p. 117.

13. Kurt Lang, "Technology and Career Management in the Military Establishment," in The New Military, ed. by Morris Janowitz (New York: Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 64.

14. Mayner N. Zald and William Simon, "Career Opportunities and Commitments Among Officers," in The New Military, ed. by Morris Janowitz (New York: Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 267.

15. Lang, op. cit., p. 59.

16. Harold Wool, "The Armed Services as a Training Institution," in The Nation's Children, ed. by Eli Ginzberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 158-185.

17. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 147.

18. Comments extracted from personal letter to author in response to request for information regarding reasons for resigning commission..

19. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 147.

20. United States Military Academy, Catalogue, 1967-1968 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 4.

21. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 32.

22. Ibid., p. 86.

23. Ibid., p. 87.

24. Lovell, op. cit., p. 140.

25. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 85.

26. Lyons and Masland, op. cit., p. 251.

27. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 85.

28. W. F. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1941), pp. x-xi.

29. One might speculate that revised selection criteria for admission to the Academy was the result of the 1959 samples decline in resignation. But it was not until 1957 that West Point adopted the "whole man" candidate evaluation system. Under this system various weights are assigned to academic performance, physical aptitude, high school participation in extra-curricular activities, and evaluation reports from former high school instructors.

APPENDIX I

Appendix 1

Population and Sample Research Methodology

Those officers composing the West Point classes for the selected year groups were cited in the 1970 Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the US Military Academy. Identification of the ROTC, RA samples was more difficult. The author requested outside assistance from various agencies of the Department of the Army and Congressman William Colmer in providing rosters of officers commissioned in the Regular Army from the ROTC program for the selected years. These sources were unable to provide the desired information. The Adjutant General's Office, which indicated that such information might be available, stated that it was administratively impractical to compile and furnish the information requested and compliance with the author's request would demand the same courtesy be extended to all similar requests, regardless of the number.

The ROTC, RA samples were subsequently identified by the author by searching Department of Army Special Orders for the years of concern which were available at the United States Army Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On finding individual orders, which designated ROTC cadets as Distinguished Military Graduates, it was necessary to then cross-reference those cited with the appropriate US Army Register to determine

which cadets had actually accepted RA commissions and had entered active duty in the year of designation.

Data regarding an officer's branch and state of birth was extracted from US Army Registers. To establish retention data, the author searched the appropriate US Army Register to identify those officers who were still on active duty ten years following the year of their entrance on active duty. This task also resulted in identification of ten year losses. It was then necessary to identify the year and source of loss for each officer who had not served ten years. This was accomplished by searching the "Active Duty" lists in the US Army Registers for a ten year period. When the officers' name no longer appeared on the "Active Duty" list, the year of loss was identified and the source of loss could be determined by referring to the "Losses to Active Duty" tables in that volume.

APPENDIX II

Table 15

TEN YEAR LOSSES, BY CATEGORY AND AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL LOSS AND TOTAL
NUMBER COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

	USMA			ROTC, DMG		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total Loss</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total Loss</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>
Resigned	92	68.6	18.5	65	65.0	16.4
Deceased	34	25.2	6.8	21	21.0	5.3
Discharged	6	4.5	1.2	8	8.0	2.0
Retired	2	1.5	.4	5	5.0	1.3
Unidentified in Research	<u>0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>.3</u>
Total	134	100.0	26.9	100	100.0	25.3

Table 16

TEN YEAR LOSSES, BY CATEGORY AND AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL LOSS AND TOTAL
NUMBER COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

	USMA			ROTC, DMG		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total Loss</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total Loss</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>
Resigned	79	91.9	24.4	99	85.3	23.9
Deceased	5	5.8	1.5	5	4.3	1.2
Discharged	2	2.3	0.6	10	8.6	2.4
Retired	<u>0</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>.5</u>
Total	86	100.0	26.5	116	99.9	28.0

Table 17

TEN YEAR LOSSES, BY CATEGORY AND AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL LOSS AND TOTAL
NUMBER COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

	USMA			ROTC, DMG		
	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total Loss</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total Loss</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>
Resigned	126	81.3	28.3	225	85.9	29.3
Deceased	23	14.8	5.2	23	8.8	3.0
Discharged	2	1.3	.43	7	2.7	.9
Retired	2	1.3	.43	2	.8	.3
Missing in Action (De- clared Dead)	2	1.3	.43	0		
Unidentified in Research	<u>0</u>			<u>5</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>.7</u>
Total	155	100.0	34.8	262	100.1	34.2

Table 18

ANNUAL LOSS TO RESIGNATION, BY NUMBER AND AS PERCENT OF TOTAL LOSS TO RESIGNATION, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

<u>Year</u>	USMA		ROTC, DMG	
	<u>No. Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Loss To Resignation</u>	<u>No. Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Loss To Resignation</u>
1952			1	1.5
53	18	19.6	14	21.5
54	37	40.2	28	43.1
55	11	11.9	5	7.7
56	9	9.8	10	15.4
57	4	4.3	4	6.2
58	5	5.4	1	1.5
59	1	1.1	2	3.1
60	<u>7</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Total	92	99.8	65	100.0

Table 19

ANNUAL LOSS TO RESIGNATION, BY NUMBER AND AS PERCENT OF TOTAL LOSS TO RESIGNATION, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

<u>Year</u>	<u>USMA</u>		<u>ROTC, DMG</u>	
	<u>No. Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Loss To Resignation</u>	<u>No. Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Loss To Resignation</u>
1957	1	1.3	1	1.0
58	38	49.4	54	54.5
59	12	15.2	26	26.3
60	10	12.7	6	6.0
61	6	7.6	1	1.0
62	0		2	2.0
63	4	5.1	2	2.0
64	4	5.1	2	2.0
65	<u>4</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5.0</u>
Total	79	101.5	99	99.8

Table 20

ANNUAL LOSS TO RESIGNATION, BY NUMBER AND AS PERCENT OF TOTAL LOSS TO RESIGNATION, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

<u>Year</u>	<u>USMA</u>		<u>ROTC, DMG</u>	
	<u>No. Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Loss To Resignation</u>	<u>No. Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Loss To Resignation</u>
1960			1	.4
61			2	.9
62	46	36.6	74	32.9
63	33	26.2	75	33.2
64	19	15.1	32	14.2
65	11	8.7	16	7.1
66	1	.8	5	2.2
67	3	2.3	7	3.1
68	9	7.1	6	2.7
69	<u>4</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3.1</u>
Total	126	100.0	225	99.8

Table 21

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,*
OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950, 1955, and 1959.

Class/Year	1950		1955		1959	
	USMA	ROTC DMG	USMA	ROTC DMG	USMA	ROTC DMG
Total Commissioned/Identified	497	396	324	414	445	765
Remain Active Duty Ten Years	363	296	238	298	290	503
Plus: Involuntary Losses*	<u>42</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>37</u>
Adjusted Retention	405	321	245	315	319	540
Adjusted Retention Rate	81.5%	81.1%	75.6%	76.1%	71.7%	70.6%

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

Table 22

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, BY BRANCH, OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC
DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

<u>USMA</u>			
<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Infantry	217	157	72.4
Armor	48	36	75.0
Artillery	127	97	76.4
Engineer	68	55	80.9
Signal	<u>37</u>	<u>18</u>	48.6
Total	497	363	

<u>ROTC, DMG</u>			
<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Infantry	126	94	74.6
Armor	27	20	74.1
Artillery	91	58	74.6
Engineer	28	20	71.4
Signal	25	19	76.0
Military Police	13	10	77.7
Transportation	27	22	81.4
Quartermaster	28	22	78.6
Ordnance	18	10	55.6
Chemical	3	3	100.0
Medical Service	1	1	100.0
Adjutant General	0		
Finance	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	77.8
Total	396	296	

Table 23

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, BY BRANCH, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED
IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Infantry	142	108	76.1
Armor	34	25	73.5
Artillery	85	59	69.4
Engineer	41	33	80.5
Signal	<u>22</u>	<u>13</u>	59.9
Total	324	238	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Infantry	132	98	74.2
Armor	21	13	61.4
Artillery	65	47	72.3
Engineer	33	23	69.4
Signal	19	15	78.9
Military Police	16	8	50.0
Transportation	30	24	80.0
Quartermaster	41	30	73.2
Ordnance	18	13	72.2
Chemical	4	4	100.0
Medical Service	14	9	64.3
Adjutant General	9	7	77.8
Finance	<u>12</u>	<u>7</u>	58.3
Total	414	78	

Table 24

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, BY BRANCH, OFFICERS COMMISSIONED
IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

<u>USMA</u>			
<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Infantry	134	91	67.9
Armor	53	33	62.3
Artillery	159	105	66.0
Engineer	55	40	72.7
Signal Corps	<u>44</u>	<u>21</u>	47.7
Total	445	290	

<u>ROTC, DMG</u>			
<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Infantry	211	152	72.0
Armor	43	26	60.5
Artillery	125	78	62.4
Engineer	57	32	56.1
Signal	54	27	50.0
Military Police	28	23	82.1
Transportation	55	36	65.5
Quartermaster	54	35	64.8
Ordnance	57	37	64.9
Chemical	23	17	73.9
Medical Service	22	19	86.4
Adjutant General	19	10	52.6
Finance	<u>17</u>	<u>11</u>	64.7
Total	765	503	

Table 25

SUMMARY OF TEN YEAR BRANCH LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AND OTHER CAUSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Resignation</u>		<u>Loss to</u>		
	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Other Causes*</u>		
		<u>Assigned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>
Infantry	34	15.6	22	2	2
Armor	9	18.8	3		
Artillery	22	17.3	5	3	
Engineer	11	16.2	2		
Signal	16	43.0	2	1	
Total	92		34	6	2

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>UID*</u>
		<u>Assigned</u>				
Infantry	17	13.5	12	2	1	
Armor	4	14.8	1	1	1	
Artillery	16	16.5	3	3	1	
Engineer	8	28.6				
Signal	6	24.0				
Military Police	1	7.6	2			
Transportation	2	7.4	1	1	1	
Quartermaster	3	10.7	2			1
Ordnance	6	33.3		1	1	
Chemical	0					
Medical Service	0					
Adjutant General	0					
Finance	2	22.2				
Total	65		21	8	5	1

- * D - Deceased
 Dis - Discharged
 Ret - Retired
 UID - Unidentified in Research

Table 26

SUMMARY OF TEN YEAR BRANCH LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AND
OTHER CAUSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR
ARMY FROM USMA AND ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY
GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Resignation</u>		<u>Loss to Other Causes*</u>		
	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Assigned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>
Infantry	31	21.8	1	2	
Armor	7	20.6	2		
Artillery	24	28.2	2		
Engineer	8	19.5			
Signal	<u>9</u>	<u>40.9</u>	—	—	—
Total	79		5	2	0

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Resigned</u>		<u>Loss to Other Causes*</u>		
	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Assigned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>
Infantry	26	19.8	4	4	
Armor	6	28.6			2
Artillery	16	24.6		2	
Engineer	9	27.3	1		
Signal	4	21.5			
Military Police	8	50.0			
Transportation	4	13.3		2	
Quartermaster	10	24.4		1	
Ordnance	5	27.8			
Chemical	0	0			
Medical Service	5	35.7			
Adjutant General	1	11.1		1	
Finance	<u>5</u>	<u>41.7</u>	—	—	—
Total	99		5	10	2

* D - Deceased
Dis - Discharged
Ret - Retired

Table 27

SUMMARY OF TEN YEAR BRANCH LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AND
OTHER CAUSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR
ARMY FROM USMA AND ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY
GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Resignation</u>		<u>Loss to Other Causes*</u>			
	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Assigned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>MIA(DD)</u>
Infantry	35	26.1	8			
Armor	14	26.4	4			2
Artillery	41	25.8	10	2	1	
Engineer	14	25.5	1			
Signal	<u>22</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>
Total	126		23	2	2	2

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Assigned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>UID</u>
Infantry	47	22.3	8	1	2	1
Armor	10	23.3	4	1		2
Artillery	42	33.6	4	1		
Engineer	24	42.1	1			
Signal	24	44.4	1	1		1
Military Police	5	17.9				
Transportation	17	30.9	2			
Quartermaster	16	27.8	1	2		
Ordnance	18	31.6	1	1		
Chemical	6	26.1				
Medical Service	3	13.6				
Adjutant General	9	47.4				
Finance	<u>4</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	225		23	7	2	5

- * D - Deceased
 Dis - Discharged
 Ret - Retired
 MIA(DD) - Missing in Action (Declared Dead)
 UID - Unidentified in Research

Table 28

BRANCH TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE
INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR
ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY
GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. Assigned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Infantry	191	157	82.0
Armor	45	36	80.0
Artillery	119	97	81.5
Engineer	66	55	83.2
Signal	<u>34</u>	<u>18</u>	52.9
Total	455	363	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. Assigned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Infantry	111	94	84.7
Armor	24	20	83.3
Artillery	84	68	80.9
Engineer	28	20	71.4
Signal	25	19	76.0
Military Police	11	10	90.9
Transportation	24	22	91.7
Quartermaster	25	22	88.0
Ordnance	16	10	62.5
Chemical	3	3	100.0
Medical Service	1	1	100.0
Adjutant General	0		
Finance	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	77.8
Total	361	296	

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

Table 29

BRANCH TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE
INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE
REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. Assigned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Infantry	139	108	77.7
Armor	32	25	78.1
Artillery	83	59	71.1
Engineer	41	33	80.5
Signal	<u>22</u>	<u>13</u>	59.9
Total	317	238	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. Assigned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Infantry	124	98	79.0
Armor	19	13	68.4
Artillery	63	47	74.6
Engineer	32	23	71.9
Signal	19	15	78.9
Military Police	16	8	50.0
Transportation	28	24	85.7
Quartermaster	40	30	75.0
Ordnance	18	13	72.2
Chemical	4	4	100.0
Medical Service	14	9	64.3
Adjutant General	8	7	87.5
Finance	<u>12</u>	<u>7</u>	58.3
Total	297	298	

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

Table 30

BRANCH TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO EXCLUDE
INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE
REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

USMA

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. Assigned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Infantry	126	91	72.2
Armor	47	33	70.2
Artillery	146	105	71.9
Engineer	54	40	74.1
Signal	43	21	48.6
Total	416	290	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. Assigned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Infantry	199	152	76.4
Armor	36	26	72.2
Artillery	120	78	65.0
Engineer	56	32	57.1
Signal	51	27	52.9
Military Police	28	23	82.1
Transportation	53	36	67.9
Quartermaster	51	35	68.6
Ordnance	55	37	67.3
Chemical	23	17	73.9
Medical Service	22	19	86.4
Adjutant General	19	10	47.4
Finance	15	11	73.3
Total	728	503	

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

Table 31
GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

<u>Northeast:</u>	Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
<u>North Central:</u>	Ohio, Indian, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas.
<u>South:</u>	Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.
<u>West:</u>	Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Pocket Data Book, U.S.A. 1969, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 338-339.

Table 32

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, BY REGION OF BIRTH, OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC
DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number Commissioned</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Northeast	141	101	71.6
South	174	141	81.0
North Central	113	74	65.5
West	56	39	69.7
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>13</u>	<u>8</u>	61.5
Total	497	363	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number Commissioned</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Northeast	105	79	75.2
South	159	119	74.8
North Central	83	63	75.9
West	38	29	76.3
Other (Foreign Born)	10	6	60.0
Region Unidentified	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	
Total	396	296	

Table 33

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, BY REGION OF BIRTH, OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC
DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number Commissioned</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Northeast	88	63	71.6
South	103	83	80.6
North Central	89	63	70.8
West	30	17	56.7
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	85.7
Total	324	238	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number Commissioned</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Northeast	102	75	73.5
South	171	125	73.1
North Central	91	61	67.0
West	46	33	71.7
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	100.0
Total	414	298	

Table 34

TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, BY REGION OF BIRTH, OFFICERS
COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC
DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number Commissioned</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Northeast	138	81	58.7
South	133	92	69.2
North Central	121	79	65.3
West	45	31	68.8
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	87.5
Total	445	290	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number Commissioned</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Percent Retention</u>
Northeast	228	138	60.8
South	290	199	68.6
North Central	166	121	72.2
West	70	39	55.6
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	54.9
Total	765	503	

Table 35

SUMMARY OF TEN YEAR REGIONAL LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AND OTHER CAUSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Resignation</u>		<u>Loss to</u>		
	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total</u> <u>Commissioned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>
Northeast	33	23.4	6	1	
South	21	12.1	10	2	
North Central	25	22.1	11	1	2
West	11	19.6	4	2	
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>2</u>	15.4	<u>3</u>	—	—
Total	92		34	6	2

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total</u> <u>Commissioned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>UID</u>
Northeast	17	16.2	5	1	3	
South	24	15.1	9	4	2	1
North Central	14	16.9	4	2		
West	6	15.8	2	1		
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>4</u>	40.0	—	—	—	—
Total	65		21	8	5	1

- * D - Deceased
 Dis - Discharged
 Ret - Retired
 UID - Unidentified in Research

Table 36

SUMMARY OF TEN YEAR REGIONAL LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AND OTHER CAUSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>Resignation % of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>Loss to Other Causes*</u>		
			<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>
Northeast	22	25.0	2	1	
South	20	19.4			
North Central	24	27.1	1	1	
West	12	40.0	1		
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>1</u>	7.1	<u>1</u>	—	—
Total	79		5	2	0

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>
Northeast	24	23.5	2		1
South	38	22.2	2	5	1
North Central	24	26.4	1	5	
West	13	28.3			
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>0</u>		—	—	—
Total	99		5	10	2

* D - Deceased
 Dis - Discharged
 Ret - Retired

Table 37

SUMMARY OF TEN YEAR REGIONAL LOSSES TO RESIGNATION AND
OTHER CAUSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN THE REGULAR
ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED MILITARY
GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>Resignation % of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>Loss to Other Causes*</u>			
			<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>MIA(DD)</u>
Northeast	46	33.3	8	2	1	
South	35	25.9	6			
North Central	33	27.3	8			
West	11	24.4	1		1	2
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>1</u>	12.5	—	—	—	—
Total	126		23	2	2	2

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>Resigned</u>	<u>% of Total Commissioned</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Dis</u>	<u>Ret</u>	<u>UID</u>
Northeast	80	35.1	7	1	1	1
South	78	26.9	5	3	1	4
North Central	36	21.6	8	1		
West	28	40.0	2	1		
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>3</u>	27.3	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	—	—
Total	225		23	7	2	5

* D - Deceased

Dis - Discharged

Ret - Retired

MIA(DD) - Missing in Action (Declared Dead)

UID - Unidentified in Research

Table 38

REGIONAL TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO
EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED
IN THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1950.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. Commissioned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Northeast	134	101	75.4
South	162	141	87.0
North Central	99	74	74.7
West	50	39	78.0
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	80.0
Total	455	363	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. Commissioned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '60</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Northeast	96	79	82.3
South	143	119	83.3
North Central	77	63	81.8
West	35	29	82.9
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	60.0
Total	361	296	

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

Table 39

REGIONAL TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO
EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN
THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1955.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. Commissioned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Northeast	85	63	74.1
South	103	83	80.6
North Central	87	63	72.4
West	29	17	58.6
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	92.3
Total	317	238	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. Commissioned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '65</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Northeast	99	75	75.8
South	163	125	76.1
North Central	85	61	71.8
West	46	33	71.7
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	100.0
Total	397	298	

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

Table 40

REGIONAL TEN YEAR RETENTION RATES, ADJUSTED TO
EXCLUDE INVOLUNTARY LOSSES,* OFFICERS COMMISSIONED IN
THE REGULAR ARMY FROM USMA AND THE ROTC DISTINGUISHED
MILITARY GRADUATE PROGRAM, 1959.

USMA

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. Commissioned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Northeast	127	81	63.9
South	127	92	72.5
North Central	112	79	70.5
West	42	31	73.8
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	87.7
Total	416	290	

ROTC, DMG

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. Commissioned Minus Involuntary Losses*</u>	<u>Active Duty '69</u>	<u>Adjusted % Retention</u>
Northeast	218	138	63.6
South	277	199	71.5
North Central	157	121	77.1
West	67	39	58.4
Other (Foreign Born)	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>	75.0
Total	728	503	

* Includes all causes of loss other than resignation.

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POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICAL SUPPORTS:
A STUDY OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICER RETENTION

by

ARTHUR E. RICHARDS III
A.B., The Citadel, 1959

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
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1972

David Easton posits that energy in the form of support inputs must enter a political system if it is to function and the manner in which the system functions is large dependent on its environment. The United States Army, as an integral, viable, and dynamic subsystem of the American political system, requires support inputs if it is to meet the nation's security demands. This study establishes an association between variation in military salience of post-World War II political environments and political supports as expressed by Regular Army (RA) officers who continue service beyond their minimum obligatory tours. The effects of the environmental variable on retention are then compared with the effects of three more proximate variables in retention: source of commission (Academy or ROTC), branch specialization, and regional origin. Findings came from populations of RA officers commissioned in 1950, 1955, and 1959 and accompanying political environments during the first ten years following graduation.

The military salience of the political environment, particularly as it affects land force doctrine and career expectations, is apparently associated with rates of Regular Army officer retention as follows: high retention with highest military salience (1950 input); medium retention with low military salience (1955 input); and

low retention with mixed-ambiguous military salience (1959 input). Conflict, changes in the nation's economy and differences in regional economies, changes in national strategy and, in turn, the change in demand for the officer's skills in the service or in the civilian community impact heavily on his decision to terminate or continue support.

The Academy or ROTC RA source of commission has little effect on the officer's decision to renew or terminate support. The greatest variation in retention between the two sources for the three year groups examined was two percent. The retention rates of both populations reflected a gradual decline which may be attributed to variations in the political environment during each year groups initial years of service.

Officers are awarded commissions in various branches, or fields of specialization. An analysis of retention controlling for branch, indicated that certain variations in retention rates, particularly between the technical and non-technical branches, correspond directly to commission source and changes in the political environment. Retention rates for the basic combat arms (Infantry, Armor, and Artillery) reflected a gradual decline. The technical branches, e.g., Signal Corps and Ordnance, were most affected by environmental changes. This effect was particularly strong among the ROTC officers who, unlike their West Point contemporaries, had specialized college careers.

An analysis of the geographic origins of officers comprising each year group input indicated that the South, whose environment is to a large extent dominated by its rural-agrarian economy, provided the greatest input and generally reflected the highest retention. For southern officers, the Army remains attractive as a route of economic and social mobility. The West, with its economic growth and more attractive civilian employment opportunities, had the lowest input and retention.