

REPRESENTATIVE ROLE BEHAVIOR AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
REPRESENTATIVE AND CONSTITUENT

by

DOUGLAS KENT CRANDALL

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
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CHAPTER I

1583 TO 1973: THE PROBLEM REMAINS

Introduction

When an American thinks of representation, he most generally thinks of his vote. With his vote he can slay any dragon that may emerge from the depths of political intrigue. From the vote, he supposes, comes his democratic government, and from his democratic government comes actions generally congruent with his wishes. But if he stops to think, he will remember feelings of frustration at certain acts of his representatives; he will realize that his weapon, though readily available, cannot, and often does not, assure his control of the government. Hence, he witnesses a paradox, perhaps the oldest and stormiest quarrel of academician and practitioner alike in respect to the basis of democratic government -- the relationship between the representative and his constituents.

The purpose of this study is to shed some light on the concept of representation as it exists in a democratic form of government. In this respect, an intensive empirical examination and analysis of the relationship between the representative and his constituency was conducted. The influence of the constituent on the representative's decision-making function was the focal point in an attempt to isolate, reveal, and amplify the important rationalizations, influences, and "other variables" that are brought to bear upon,

and are born by, the individual representative on the local (i.e., city and county) level.

Chapter one will deal primarily with the historical, evolutionary controversy centered around the relationship of representative and constituent. In addition, the wishes and desires of the majority of the people, the avenue of constituent control upon the representative, and the limits of this control will also be evaluated. Chapter two will deal primarily with the definition of role and role orientations, a historical analysis of roles (previous literature on the subject), the characteristics of special role orientations pursued by representatives, and a detailed research design for the study in question.

Chapters three and four depart from the format of chapters one and two and delve respectively into the query of the specific role orientations with respect to the relationship between representative and constituent, and a detailed examination of the role characteristics ascribed to by individual representatives. Chapter five will serve to summarize, analyze, and draw conclusions specifically from the data presented in chapters three and for the study as a whole.

History of the Problem: The Controversy

Whether an elected legislator is in fact a representative chosen by his constituency to exercise his own judgment on the issues debated or simply a delegate whose electors never suspend the operation of their own sovereignty and who

rightfully expect him without modification to execute their mandates is a question that has never been finally settled. An examination of the historical views and developments of representative style may be of service in leading to a clearer understanding of our representative culture and enable us to better relate to representative government as it exists today.¹

Representative government, as we know it, was unknown to the ancients and but dimly foreshadowed by the writers of the Middle Ages. During the thousands of years we call antiquity, monarchies, despotisms, dictatorships, tyrannies, democracies, and aristocracies rose, flourished, and fell. Nowhere, at any time, did representative institutions appear, at least on any impressive scale. It would not be correct to say that representation was utterly foreign to Greek and Roman politics, but practical illustrations of it were few and must be strained to make any case worthy of serious attention. Modern legislative bodies, then, have no historic connections with Greek and Roman representative agencies. The beginning of representative government occurred during the Middle Ages in England.²

The first parliaments were called by monarchs primarily for the purpose of voting taxes for the royal treasury. Parliament did not represent the people as free and equal members of society, but rather the estates of the realm (i.e., the nobility, clergy, landed gentry, and burgesses of the towns). There was some talk, of course, in these early assemblies about ways and means of raising revenues,

but discussion was an outgrowth and not a primary intention.³ On the whole the first three centuries (thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth) of parliamentary representation in England was characterized merely by delegated tax-voting.⁴

In time the tax-voting body became a law-making body. The members of the estates, who were being consulted and taxed, had grievances of a practical nature, and nothing was more natural than that the representatives of the estates, when assembled for purposes of voting taxes, should consider their grievances and come to agreement about them. Hence, parliaments soon began to list their protests in the form of petitions to the king for redress. If he approved a petition, it became a law, binding on his officers and subjects alike. Since parliament held the power of the purse, it could often compel the king to consent even against his own will. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the petition was dropped for the bill. Thus, the tax-voting body gradually became a legislature of immense powers.⁵

Finally, through a gradual process culminating in the abolition of the Crown's powers in 1649,⁶ the people formerly asserted the right of being governed by their own delegated representatives. The struggle concerning the relationship that should exist between a representative and his constituents had already begun, however. As early as 1643, John Winthrop, countering the existing practice and general opinion that "the greatest power is in the people, therefore it should be in their deputies," replied: "Originally and virtually it is; but when they have chosen their judges,

etc., their judiciary power is actually in those to whom they have committed it, and those are their magistrates in such order as before is declared."⁷

A short time later (1649), the Levellers announced in opposition to the views of Winthrop. They felt true representation could be realized only in a relationship of delegation, tight control, and ready recall.

Eventually, representatives cast off the delegate role, but no date can be cited with any precision. It would be reasonable to estimate the time, however, as that of the disappearance of wages, since members, being looked upon as agents, were originally and long afterward paid as such by their principals who sent them. The last member known to have received wages regularly was Andrew Marvell. Around 1670 he is cited as asking for instructions as to how he should act:

I desire that you will, now being the time, consider whether there be anything that particularly relates to the state of your town, or of your neighboring country, or of yet more public concernment, whereof you may think fit to advertise me, and therein to give me your instructions, to which I shall carefully conform.⁸

In the meantime, the dispute over representation that so characterized the seventeenth century continued. Authoritative writers of the time, however, began to declare against the doctrine of agency.⁹ John Locke expressed this attitude well in 1689 in his Two Treatises of Government:

...the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives...could

do it for no other end but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act and advise as the necessity of the commonwealth and the public good should, upon examination and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing.¹⁰

While seventeenth century England had been in heated turmoil over the mandate-independence controversy, England of the eighteenth century witnessed a toning-down of the problem. The generally accepted view of parliamentary representation of that century was exemplified by Algernon Sidney in his Discourses on Government (1698).¹¹ Sidney wandered into a kind of compromise. He felt delegates should be restricted and controlled, but if they believed firmly in a view contrary to that of their constituents, they could uphold their own view and take the consequences in the election to follow.

Although the eighteenth century is noted for toning-down the mandate-independence controversy, the controversy was far from dead. The middle of the century saw a brief surge toward the idea of instructions. The Society of the Bill of Rights and men like Daniel Dulany were responsible for this brief flicker of life for the mandate theorists. In 1765 Dulany insisted on the legal enforceability of instructions and left the path open for an insistency on instructions under real circumstances:

It would now, be an unfashionable Doctrine, whatever the ancient Opinion might be, to

affirm that the Constituent can bind his Representative by Instructions; but though the obligatory Force of these instructions is not insisted upon, yet their persuasive Influence, in most cases, may be; for a Representative, who should act against the explicit Recommendations of his Constituents, would most deservedly forfeit their Regard and all Pretension to their future Confidence.¹²

Arthur Onslow, Speaker of the House of Commons from 1727 to 1761, expressed the conservative viewpoint of the controversy at the time: "Instructions...from particular constituents...are or can be only of information, advice, and recommendation (which they have an undoubted right to offer, if done decently; and which ought to be respectfully received, and well considered), but are not absolutely binding upon votes, and actings, and conscience...."¹³

In his famous speech to his Bristol constituents in 1774, Edmund Burke, opposing the rising tide of Radicalism which carried with it the idea of instructions, further and most eloquently expressed the views of the independence theorists:

It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative, to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitting attention...But his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, in any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable.

My worthy colleague says, his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the

thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decides, and where those who form the conclusions are perhaps...distant from those who hear the arguments? To deliver an opinion, is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear; and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But authoritative instruction; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote and argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience; these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenour of our constitution.¹⁴

The Radicals and the idea of instructed representatives seemed strong indeed for a brief time, and it seemed as if Burke's ideas against instructions to representatives would lose out and that the idea of delegation would win. After 1790, however, the Radicals met the full force of hostility in reaction to the French Revolution from the conservatives and nationalists, and the movement came to a sudden stop.¹⁵ Accordingly, the first half of the nineteenth century saw the masters of English political thought united on the side of Burke.¹⁶

In the meantime the mandate-independence controversy had been transposed to America along with England's basic representational system. Consideration should now be given to a brief review of the controversy as it evolved in America, somewhat along the same lines as in England.

Complete independence for the representative seems to have originally been the practice in America, if we may judge by a passage from the Body of Liberties in 1641. It declared: "All Freemen called to give any advice, vote, verdict, or sentence in any Court, Council, or Civil Assembly, shall have full freedom to do it according to their true Judgments and Conscience, So it be done orderly and inoffensively for the manner."¹⁷

Nevertheless, along with this came the beginning of instructions. The idea of direct democracy, which had such a difficult time in the English social and economic system, found the going easier in America. Conditions in the colonies (e.g., the absence of nobility, general freeholding, and a small population) were such that direct democracy could prosper. As early as March 14, 1652, at a town-meeting of Boston, it was ordered: "That the Commissioners for the Town and the Select men are desired to draw up instructions for the deputies...." Beginning in 1661, Boston gave instructions to its representatives in forty-five different years before the adoption of a constitution in 1780. But Massachusetts was not alone in giving instructions; most of the other colonies did likewise. Thus, in America there was a trend prior to the Revolution away from independence and toward a system along the lines of the Levellers and English Radicals.¹⁸

The theory of instructed representatives was accepted in the colonies with very little protest until the advent of the Revolution. It was at this time that the mandate-

independence controversy first erupted in America, instigated by men like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.¹⁹ Many capable and aggressive American leaders did not regard the practice of instructing representatives as humiliating up to that time, and men like John Adams and Samuel Adams defended instructions.²⁰ In 1776 John Adams asserted that "The people choose attornies to vote for them...reserving always the fundamentals of the government, reserving also a right to give their attorneys instructions how to vote...."²¹

It was on the 15th of August, 1789, during the First Congress, that the issue of instructions was directly confronted on a national level in America. The House was in Committee of the Whole on amendments to the Constitution when Thomas Tucker of South Carolina moved to insert: "to instruct their representatives." After a general debate in which nearly a score of the members took part the motion was defeated, 10 to 41.²² As such, the doctrine was rejected by the leaders of national constitutional opinion and a decline of instructions to representatives followed.

Abraham Lincoln, when seeking reelection to the Illinois Assembly in 1836, seems to have characterized the mood up to that time:

If elected, I shall consider the whole people...my constituents, as well those that oppose as those that support me. While acting as their representative I shall be governed by their will on all subjects upon which I have the means of knowing what their will is, and upon all others I shall do what my own judgment teaches me will best advance their interests.²³

Thus, instructions continued to decline until about the time of the Civil War.

The Civil War so changed the economic, communicative, ethnic, and cultural composition of the United States, however, that a readjustment in ideas of representation was inherently necessary and practically inevitable. The period brought strident popular demands for "more democracy" and "responsibility to the people's will."²⁴ As Parke Godwin stated in his Political Essays: "A representative [should be] but the mouthpiece and organ of his constituents. What we want in legislation as in other trusts, are honest fiduciaries, men who will perform their duties according to our wishes."²⁵ As a result, an increase in instructions to representatives again appeared, but dissipated shortly thereafter.

Certainly the mandate-independence controversy is not dead, although recurrences of the question have not been of great consequence. However, consideration should be given to a few men of more recent authorship to understand the typical modern point of view. Henry Cabot Lodge viewed the controversy in this manner:

The use of instructions has died out... simply because improved means of communication...have made other modes of reaching the same result quicker, easier, and more practicable. But this fact does not impair the rights of a constituency in the least, and any constituency can avail itself of this right if it so desires, for it is one of which no constituency could be deprivedEvery constituency, I repeat, has the right now, as always, to issue instructions to its representative....²⁶

Striking a compromise, Carl J. Friedrich, in his Constitutional Government and Democracy, emphasized the existing dual nature of representation:

...it is quite impossible to draw a hard and fast line between agents with definite instructions or mandates and representatives empowered to attend to a general task. An elected body may and usually will be both a set of agents...and a representative group determining the common interest.²⁷

John F. Kennedy articulated the Burkean view of independence when he said:

The voters selected us...because they had confidence in our judgment...[to] determine what were their own best interests....This may mean that we must on occasion lead, inform, correct, and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion, if we are to exercise fully that judgment for which we were elected.²⁸

It is clear, then, that the mandate-independence controversy continues. What is most striking is how long the controversy has continued without coming to a definite solution. Scholars take a position -- promandate or pro-independence -- but the dispute is never settled. The two sides seem to talk past each other with their arguments never meeting. Each seems convincing when read in isolation, but not when considered simultaneously; nor do the compromise solutions seem satisfactory.

The position that the representative is free to act on his own judgment is the legal position in most modern constitutions.²⁹ Less than one-third of the state constitutions

today recognize the right of instructions,³⁰ and there has been little attempt to instruct representatives recently. But the relationship between the representative and the represented is a two-way process. Not only does the representative influence his constituents, but they influence him. Therefore, any study of the relationship between representative and constituent demands a look at the relationship of the constituent toward the representative in reference to the style of representation. In other words, now having some familiarity with the controversy pertaining to how the representative should represent his constituents, let us see how constituents expect to be represented.

Constituent Expectations

The public has expressed in increasing intensity the desire to be represented on the national level in a direct mandate type relationship between representative and constituent. In November, 1938, in response to the question, "Do you believe that a Congressman should vote on any question as the majority of his constituents desire or vote according to his own judgment?" 37.4 percent of the respondents felt they should vote according to their own judgment. However, by August, 1939, and April 1940, the pendulum had swung in the opposite direction. In response to the common question, "Should Members of Congress vote according to their own best judgment or according to the way the people in their districts feel?" 61 percent and 66 percent of the respondents respectively (August, 1939, and April, 1940) felt a Congressman

should vote according to the way the people feel, while 39 percent and 37 percent respectively felt a Congressman should vote according to his own judgment.³¹

Contemporary electorates seem to mirror the same feelings. In a 1967 constituent survey, one Congressman asked how he should decide to vote on issues. Of the 7,474 constituents who replied, 69 percent said Congressmen should "vote according to the majority wishes of their district, while 31 percent felt they should "vote according to...conscience and judgment."³²

On the state level the public again demonstrates a desire for direct delegated representation. In response to the statement: "A [state legislator] should find out what his district wants and always vote accordingly," 72 percent of the sample favored the statement, and only 27 percent opposed it. In response to the statement: "A [state legislator] should decide what he thinks is best and always vote accordingly, even if it is not what his district wants," 55 percent of the respondents opposed the statement, while only 43 percent were in favor. Therefore, while not as adamant in response to the last statement, it is clear that on the state level, as on the national level, a majority of the respondents plainly desire a direct, mandate type of representation.³³

A study of the desires of the public on the local level reveals results similar to those on the national and state level. In response to the question: "A [city councilman] should find out what his district wants and always vote accordingly," one study found that 76 percent of the respondents


favored the statement, and only 22 percent opposed it. In response to the statement: "A [city councilman] should decide what he thinks is best, and always vote accordingly, even if it is not what his district wants," only 41 percent of the sample was in favor of the statement, while 57 percent opposed the statement.³⁴ In other words, the results of both statements indicate the tendency of the majority of the people on the local level to expect a mandate type relationship to exist between representative and constituent.

Unless the above cited studies are completely unrepresentative of constituent desires then, there is an obvious desire by the majority of the people on all levels of government to be represented in a direct, delegated manner. Roger Davidson characterized constituent expectancy in this manner:

There is a clear implication that the citizen expects some degree of personal representation from his [representative]. In describing [representatives], the citizens reflect...their own...self-images as persons worthy of being heard... Qualitative inspection implies [that the people want] a delegate style of representation. While there [is] usually tacit recognition that [representatives] must exercise their own judgment, they are expected to consider their constituents' opinions uppermost. The fiduciary morality of the elected agent...is well understood by the average constituent. It should be stressed, however, that it matters not which constituents the [representative's] ear should be attuned to, nor how he should ascertain their interests. The sole requirement is that the citizen consider the legislator a spokesman for the people.³⁵

Despite the decades of debate and the desires of the people, however, the avenue by which the representative is controlled by his constituency has been suggested. Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, with the help of Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, have indicated the route of this control.³⁶ They found that the representative's behavior is a direct result of the effects of the representative's attitude and the representative's perception of the constituency's attitude, which is influenced directly by the constituency's attitude (see Figure I-1). The authors are therefore able to conclude that: "Although the conditions of constituency influence are not [wholly] satisfied, they are met well enough to give the local constituency a measure of control over the actions of the representative."³⁷

FIGURE I-1. -- Representative Control Avenue



^aThis chart is derived from the initial work by Warren D. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March 1963), 50, with modifications contributed by Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone in "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, LX (March 1966), 67.

Limits on Constituency Control

Though related to the avenue of constituency control, the amount of actual control the constituent has over the representative is dependent on several overt societal variables. Joseph Schlesinger has written: "The desire for election and, more important, for reelection becomes the electorate's restraint upon its public officials."³⁸ However, a fact too often overlooked by theorists who emphasize elections as a sanction held by the electorate over the representative is that a very sizeable group of officeholders retire from office voluntarily; men simply decide to leave public office.³⁹

Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau checked the frequency of city councilmen retiring from office for reasons other than election defeat.⁴⁰ They found that in 82 cities over a ten year period (five elections per city), more than half of the councilmen retired voluntarily from office. Although a few were found to leave the council to seek higher office, survey data indicated this number was not large; and though a few retired out of threat of election defeat, survey data also indicated that this occurred very infrequently. This high and persistent rate of voluntary retirement from elected office certainly should caution one against assuming that "elections make public officials responsive" and thus guarantee representative government.⁴¹

The amount of overt control the constituency potentially has over its representative is also influenced by another and more dreadful variable: active alienation, or its more

passive counterpart, political apathy. It is abundantly clear that the changes which have occurred in the relative size and shape of the active electorate in this country have not only been quantitatively enormous, but have followed a directional course which seems to be unique in the contemporary universe of democratic polities. In the United States these transformations over the last century have involved "devolution," and dissociation from politics among a growing segment of the eligible electorate.⁴²

Very substantial portions of the potential electorate either exclude themselves altogether from the political system or enter it in an erratic and occasional way. At the present time only about 44 percent of the American electorate vote with any regularity, another 16 percent or so vote sporadically, and about 40 percent are outside the political system altogether.⁴³ The average voter turnout for presidential elections since 1960 has been only 59.6 percent,⁴⁴ and various other studies have shown political activity among Americans in general is surprisingly low.⁴⁵ Marvin Harder and Carolyn Rampey described the situation in this way:

The democratic ideal of a viable interaction between those who govern and those who are governed is in reality reduced to an interaction between those who govern and those who are politically involved. And the evidence indicates that the number of persons who are not political participants is greater than the number of persons who are.⁴⁶

Conclusion

It becomes apparent, then, that the so-called "American Representational Democracy" is in reality not American at all, but British, and our inherited representative tradition is submersed in controversy as to the proper relationship that should exist between the representative and the represented. A majority of the American people obviously express the desire to be represented in a direct, mandate relationship, and the mechanism is there for obtaining this relationship. Certain characteristics of our system limit constituent control, however, and the actual relationship between representative and represented remains unresolved. But the problem is more complex and merits further investigation.

Footnotes

1. An excellent analysis of the theoretical basis for the mandate-independence controversy may be found in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, "The Theory of Representation" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1961); also Pitkin's The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), chapter 7.

2. An excellent review of representation and how it related historically to legislation may be found in Benjamin Akzin, "The Concept of Legislation," Iowa Law Review, XXI (May 1936), 713-50.

3. Charles A. Beard and John D. Lewis, "Representative Government in Evolution," American Political Science Review, XXVI (April 1932), 223-40.

4. Alfred de Grazia, Public and Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 15.

5. Beard and Lewis, "Representative Government," p. 232.

6. John A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation, I," American Political Science Review, XXXIV (April 1940), 239.

7. Life and Letters of John Winthrop, Vol. II, n. 1, quoted in Robert Luce, Legislative Principles (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), p. 36.

8. Luce, Legislative Principles, p. 434.

9. Ibid., p. 435.

10. John Locke, Of Civil Government (London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1924), pp. 229-30.

11. Fairlie, "Political Representation, I," p. 240.

12. Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Vol. XIV, n. 54, quoted in de Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 75.

13. Luce, Legislative Principles, p. 437.

14. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in Works of Edmund Burke, II (1st rev. ed.; Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1865), pp. 95-96.

15. The English Radicals, n. 104, cited by de Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 48.

16. Luce, Legislative Principles, p. 441.

17. Ibid., p. 448.
18. Ibid., p. 451.
19. de Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 55.
20. Luce, Legislative Principles, pp. 448-59.
21. Correa M. Walsh, The Political Science of John Adams (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), pp. 145-46.
22. Luce, Legislative Principles, p. 460.
23. Abraham Lincoln: A History, Vol. I, n. 34, quoted in de Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 127.
24. de Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 146.
25. Political Essays, n. 27, quoted in de Grazia, Public and Republic, p. 124.
26. Luce, Legislative Principles, p. 481.
27. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (1st rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and Co., 1937), p. 263.
28. Louis W. Koenig, Toward A Democracy (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 269.
29. John A. Fairlie, "The Nature of Political Representation, II," American Political Science Review, XXXIV (June 1940), 465.
30. Today, only 16 states (32 percent) provide in their constitutions for the right of the people "to instruct their representatives." These states are: California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.
31. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 133; and "Fortune Survey," Fortune Magazine, November 1938, p. 96.
32. Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 115.
33. Carl D. McMurtry and Malcolm B. Parsons, "Public Attitudes Toward the Representational Roles of Legislators and Judges," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IX (May 1965), 169-71.
34. Ibid., p. 170.
35. Roger H. Davidson, "Public Prescriptions for the Job of Congressman," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIV (November 1970), 653-55.

36. Charles P. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, LX (March 1966), 67-69; and Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March 1963), p. 50.

37. Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," p. 55.

38. Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966), p. 2.

39. Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CLIX (January 1938), 30; and William H. Dutton, "The Political Ambitions of Local Legislators: A Comparative Perspective" (paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, May 3-5, 1973).

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42. Walter D. Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review, LIX (March 1965), 10.

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44. This percentage figure was derived by averaging the voter turnout for the last four presidential elections as recorded in Luman H. Long, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1968), p. 36; Harry Hanson, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts (New York: New York World Telegram, 1965), p. 40; and "Nixon Preparing Stage for Shuffle in Cabinet," Wichita Eagle, November 9, 1972, p. 1A. The turnout for presidential elections in Missouri has been only slightly better, 59.8 percent, while Kansas turnout has been 83.2 percent of the eligible voters. Roster of State, District and County Officers (Jefferson City, Mo.: James C. Kirkpatrick, 1973), p. 52; "Secretary of State Worksheet," distributed by Missouri Secretary of State (Mimeographed); State of Kansas Election Statistics (Topeka, Kansas: Elwill M. Shanahan, 1973), p. 80; and "State of Kansas Registration and Party Affiliation - by Counties," distributed by Kansas Secretary of State (Mimeographed).

45. Burnham, "Changing Shape," p. 22-28; Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," p. 45-46; Donald R. Mathews, U.S. Senators and their World (Raleigh: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 222; Julian Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens," American Political Science Review, XLIV (December 1950), 872-85; Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," American Political Science Review, LIX (June 1965), 333; Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett, "On Measuring Inequality," Behavioral Science, IX (July 1964), 207-18; and Marvin Harder and Carolyn Rampey, The Kansas Legislature (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1972), p. 164.

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CHAPTER II

THE BOUNDARIES ARE DRAWN

Introduction

Obviously legislators in a democratic system ought to be representative. As was discussed in chapter one, just how the representative should stand for his constituents in the legislative body is far from clear. The two dominant theories of representation have counseled the representative to act in diametrically opposing ways.¹

The problem of representation, however, is central to all discussions of the functions of legislatures or of the behavior of legislators. For it is through the process of representation, presumably, that legislatures are empowered to act for their constituency and that these acts are legitimized. And because, by virtue of representation, they participate in legislation, the represented accept legislative decisions as authoritative. It is obvious, therefore, that representation and constituency are closely related and merit examination as to the extent of their relationship. But this relationship has of late gone beyond the conventional philosophical approach into empirical analysis.

As early as the mid-1890's, researchers were looking into the age, place of birth, education, occupation, public office experience of legislators, etc. Since then, Congress and the legislatures of the various states have been studied with considerable rigor.² Unfortunately, however, little

systematic attention was given to legislative role studies until around 1959.³ Role was the basic unit of analysis, however, in the study of four state legislatures by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson.⁴ Although empirical evidence remains somewhat limited,⁵ the purpose in this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the background, setting, and existing literature relative to the relationship of the representative and his constituents, thus enabling him to associate similarities and dissimilarities between levels and systems.

Role Defined

When considering the relationship between the representative and his constituents, the role of the representative is most often indicated. Thus, it may be helpful, indeed necessary, to understand what is meant by role.

The concept of role is crucial to the study of social systems. Talcott Parsons explained that "Role is the point of contact between the system of action of the individual actor and the social system."⁶ The term helps to define an actor's functional position in a system of action.⁷ Roles consist of clusters of norms.⁸ Further defined, role is "...the total pattern of expectations, including the person's own expectations, having to do with the tasks, demeanors, attitudes, values and reciprocal relationships that the actors have with respect to a position in the social structure."⁹

It should not be assumed that each position has

associated with it one and only one specific role. In complex social structures a particular position (e.g., that of the representative) will involve a whole set of behaviors, which are more or less expected of individuals occupying that position.¹⁰ Allan Piellin characterized this point thusly:

Legislators can be better understood if we begin by conceptualizing what we know to be the case--that legislators are, among other things, a partially self-selected, socialized set of interacting adult politicians, successful in a variety of nearly given (i.e., not drastically subject to their control) recruitment processes, playing a variety of roles in a particular institutional setting for a variety of purposes.¹¹

Role Orientations

The term role is a very broad and ambiguous term and must be limited. Here I will be concerned with role orientations, that is, with the patterns of variability that have been observed in the role conceptions of representatives.¹² Role orientations refer to a representative's ideas and rationalizations as to how he ought to behave as well as to his actual behavior.¹³

Seven categories of legislative role orientations have commonly been found to exist in modern democratic legislatures.¹⁴ First, there are Constituency Role Orientations, in which the geographical entity of the constituency is the focus of representation. Second, there are the Interest-Group Role Orientations, in which the orientations of the representative toward political interest groups are categorized.

Third, there are Party Role Orientations where the representative's conception of his job is as a member of the political party to which he belongs. Fourth, there are Bureaucratic Role Orientations which are the representative's orientations toward the executive or toward the administrative apparatus. Fifth are the Purposive Role Orientations; the representative's orientation to the purposes and processes of the legislative institution. Sixth is the Structural Role Orientation; the representative's orientation toward other critical legislative roles or to critical structural features of the legislative institution. The seventh and final role orientation, Representational Role Orientation,¹⁵ is the category of primary concern for purposes of this study. This orientation is the representative's perception with regard to the way (style) in which decisions are made (i.e., the influence of constituency), regardless of whether his focus of representation is district, political party, interest group, administrative agency, or a combination of these.

The representational role orientation was chosen because of its controversial nature (as was seen in chapter one) and because of its tremendous impact both on and from the concept of representation. Wahlke et al. put it in this manner: "The relationship between the representative and the represented is at the core of representational theory."¹⁶

The representational role orientation may be broken down into trustee, delegate and politico. The trustee claims to rely on his own conscience, on what he thinks is right,

or on his considered judgment of the facts involved in the issue which he has to decide. The delegate claims that he seeks and follows instructions from his constituents or other clienteles. The politico claims that he will adopt one or the other orientations as conditions warrant and that he must balance one against the other.¹⁷ But these three orientations are not that simple and therefore demand a more comprehensive analysis.

The representational role orientation of trustee finds expression in two major conceptions of how decisions ought to be made. These conceptions may occur severally or jointly. First, there is a moralistic interpretation. The trustee sees himself as a free agent in that, as a premise of his decision-making behavior, he claims to follow what he considers right or just. He is guided by his convictions, principles, and the dictates of his conscience.

In pursuing this path of moral righteousness, the trustee may give different reasons for his interpretation of this role. First, he often feels his ideas, attitudes, or legislative objectives are in harmony with those of the represented, and because of this, he need not pay attention to instructions, for no instructions are forthcoming and he must follow the dictates of his conscience. Second, the trustee feels that he must rely on his own principles in making decisions because those from whom he might take cues (e.g., constituents, lobbyists, colleagues, etc.) cannot be trusted. Finally, the trustee feels that if he finds himself in conflict with the represented, as a man of

principle he should not submit to their wishes, but try to persuade them to his convictions. The trustee sees himself in this respect as "mentor". He is not in agreement with his constituents, but neither does he ignore them. Sticking by his ideas, he tries to persuade others to his point of view.

There is also a judgmental conception of the role of trustee. He feels he is not bound by a mandate because his decisions are his own considered judgments based on an assessment of the facts in each decision and his understanding of all the problems and variables involved. His decisions, he feels, are based on a thoughtful appraisal of all the sides at issue. Furthermore, the trustee may feel he must follow his own judgment because his constituents expect him to do so; or representation may be spontaneous in this conception, a product of agreement between representative and represented without any active communication of opinions or beliefs. The representative merely shares the outlook of his constituents.

The trustee may feel he must follow his own judgment because he cannot afford to allow himself to be influenced by persons who have prior interests or who are ill informed. The crucial point in this respect, of course, is that if his constituents had the facts, their judgment would be the same as that of the representative. But the contention that constituents are inept because they have no access to the facts in terms of which decisions must be made is common.

A related view characterizes the role of the trustee as

inevitable, not because the constituents do not understand the problems which the representative faces, but because the representative cannot find out the preferences of his constituents; even if he tried to do so, it would be an impossible task. He must, therefore, rely on his own judgment. But his own difficulty in ascertaining his constituents' preferences, or their lack of information, does not suggest that the trustee should ignore the ideas or opinions of others. He often listens before arriving at a decision.

It seems that the trustee orientation is not only derived from a normative definition of the role of the representative, but that it is often grounded in interpersonal situations which make it functionally inevitable. The conditions that the represented do not have the information necessary to give intelligent instructions, that the representative is unable to discover what his constituents want, that the preferences remain unexpressed, and that there is no need for instructions because of an alleged harmony of interests between representative and represented, are all recognized as sources of the role orientation of trustee: Oftentimes these are even forced on the representative against his own predilection for a mandate if that were possible.¹⁸

Delegates, on the other hand, agree that they should not use their independent judgment or principled convictions as decision-making premises. But this does not mean that they feel equally committed to follow instructions from just any source. Some merely say that they try to inform themselves

before making decisions by consulting their constituents. However, they seem to imply that such consultation has a mandatory effect on their behavior. Others frankly acknowledge instructions as necessary or desirable in making decisions. Many delegates also feel that not only should they follow instructions, but they should do so even if these instructions are explicitly counter to their own judgment or principles.

Delegates, it seems, have a simpler, more mechanical conception of the political process and of the function of representation in legislative behavior. Perhaps most noticeable, in contrast to the trustee orientation, is that the delegate generally feels he has no political responsibility for his decisions under conditions of strict instructions. Apparently, the problem is ignored by the delegate precisely because he rejects the possibility of discretion in his decision-making.¹⁹

Within the range called politico, the trustee and delegate role may be taken simultaneously, possibly making for role conflict, or they may be taken seriatim, one after another as legislative situations dictate. Both the trustee and delegate roles may be taken, depending on the character of the issue involved or the legislator's focus of attention. But no attempt is made to reconcile the two orientations. They coexist side by side and may be implemented as political circumstances require. Politicos do not feel that they are facing a situation which makes for conflict of roles largely because they succeed in avoiding conflict by not attempting

to reconcile the two orientations.

On the other hand, some politicians may be more sensitive to the potential conflict to which they may be exposed by the ambiguity of the representational relationship and seek to come to grips with it. These representatives are not only aware of the problem, but, instead of solving it by sometimes taking the trustee role and sometimes taking the delegate role, they seek to balance simultaneously the instructions or preferences of constituents against their own judgment. Finally, the politician may defend his independent judgment as the most important criterion in decision-making merely because instructions from particular groups must be integrated in the legislative process.

In general, then, the politician, as a representational role taker, differs from both the trustee and the delegate in that he seems to be more sensitive to conflicting alternatives, more flexible in the ways in which he tries to resolve the conflict among alternatives, and less stringent in his orientation toward legislative behavior as it relates to his representational role.²⁰

It should be remembered, however, that these role orientations are not at all rigid or inflexible. Malcolm Jewell wrote: "Very few legislators rely entirely on the views of constituents....The terms trustee...delegate (and politician) do not refer to consistent patterns of behavior but to general tendencies."

Historical Role Analysis

Historically, studies of representational role

orientations have not always been uniform and universally agreed upon. One of the first studies on this subject was conducted in 1914 by Francis E. Leupp.²² In this study Leupp indicated that the stylistic role of the representative assumes any one of four (not three) forms. The "envoy", for example, makes himself as nearly as practicable the mirror and echo of his sovereign, whose idiosyncrasies and passing whims he must reflect with equal faithfulness, whether they appeal to his common sense or revolt it. The "guardian", on the other hand, is bound to take that which, according to his own best judgment, will be for the peoples' greater eventual benefit. Then, there is the "attorney", who, while although mindful of his client's instructions and his retainer, feels he is nevertheless subject to the higher obligations of professional ethics and must be ever mindful that he is an officer of the court as well as a private practitioner. Finally, there is the "stockholder" who is assigned by proxy the right to vote on matters of vital importance with absolute freedom. He has advanced approval and validation on every step he takes.²³

Recent studies appear to be somewhat at odds with the findings presented by Leupp and others,²⁴ and more in line with the finding of the existence of three role styles (i.e., trustee, delegate and politico) as first presented by Wahlke et al. Table II-1 indicates the similarity in orientational typology findings and the variations of these findings in various studies. Although the findings are far from uniform, one recurrent theme is obvious: they all bear

TABLE II-1. -- Representational Role Orientations:
Previous Studies

Location	Trustee	Politico	Delegate
U.S. House of Representatives ^a	28%	46%	23%
Ohio ^b	56	29	15
New Jersey ^b	61	22	17
Tennessee ^b	81	13	6
California ^b	55	25	20
Michigan ^c	72	2	20
Pennsylvania ^{e,d}	33	27	39
Wisconsin ^e	21	4	66
Indiana ^k	20	60	19
Seven State Metropolitan Areas ^f	51	32	17
Marshall Islands ^g	69	25	6
Samoa ^g	46	31	19
Canada ^h	15	36	49
Columbia ⁱ	28	52	20
Korea ^j	22	0	78
Japan ^j	38	3	57

^aRoger Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 117.

^bJohn Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 751.

^cRobert S. Friedman and Sybil L. Stokes, "The Role of Constitution-Maker As Representative," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IX (May 1965), 160.

^dFrank J. Sorauf, Party and Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 124.

^eMalcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 398.

^fMalcolm Jewell, Metropolitan Representation: State Legislative Districting in Urban Counties (New York: National Municipal League, 1969), pp. 30-31.

^gNorman Meller, "Representational Role Types: A Research Note," American Political Science Review, LXI (June 1967), 475-76.

^hAllan Kornberg, "Perception and Constituency Influence on Legislative Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, XVII (June 1966), 286-88.

ⁱGary Hoskin, "Dimensions of Representation in the Colombian National Legislature" (paper presented at the 1970 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September 8-12, 1970), p. 9.

^jChang Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo, "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (November 1972), 628-50.

^kKenneth Janda, "Some Theory and Data on Representational Roles and Legislative Behavior," in Empirical Studies of Indiana Politics: Studies of Legislative Behavior, ed. by James B. Kessler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 132.

out the existence of three definite representational role orientations -- trustee, politico, and delegate. While numerical rank order varies considerably, taxonomically the studies yield the same results. However, different research techniques could conceivably yield more or different role orientations although existent research has failed to do so.

Numerous other studies, while falling short of definitely verifying the existence of three representational role orientations, indicate or suggest their predominance. Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, in their study of three issues confronting Congress,²⁵ distinguish three representational orientations corresponding roughly with delegate, politico, and trustee with respect to civil rights, social welfare, and foreign policy issues respectively.²⁶ Also, Robert J. Huckshorn, in his study of the Idaho Legislature distinguished two orientations: delegate and trustee.²⁷ Although he failed to recognize it, however, Huckshorn does indeed indicate the existence of a third role. Huckshorn said: "A cross-correlation of the affirmative responses to the two [question-

naire role orientation] statements reveals only 12 percent responded affirmatively to both [orientations]."²⁸ This overlooked finding serves to indicate the politico orientation and thereby inadvertently suggests the existence of the three classical orientations. In addition, studies of democratic government outside the United States also reveal similar findings.²⁹

Wilder Crane, on the other hand, in his study of the Wisconsin Legislature fails to uncover these three orientations, while at the same time recognizing their existence. Crane deviates in his findings by concluding that all representatives are really politicos.³⁰ Roger Davidson concurs with Crane's conclusion. While very definitely verifying the existence of the three orientations in the United States House of Representatives (see Table II-1), he ultimately comes to the conclusion that all representatives (at least Congressmen) "...play both roles as the circumstances demand. In this sense, they are all Politicos."³¹

Considering the evidence at hand, therefore, it seems relatively safe to conclude, although not definitively, that three representational orientations do indeed exist, at least at the state and national level of democratic representational government. The need for further empirical investigation, however, is clearly exhibited, especially on the relatively virgin local level.

Role Characteristics of Representatives

Studies verifying the existence of the three classical

representational orientations often look to the characteristics of representatives in the hope of identifying orientational determining patterns. Definitive results or conclusions from these characteristics are scanty and at best misleading. Considering the purpose of this study, however, it may be wise to at least be familiar with some of those variables found to be significant and insignificant in other studies, so that some indication as to the influential characteristics likely to be encountered in the present study may be known.

Among the legislative characteristics found to be significant in various other studies of legislators are: party affiliation, party loyalty, political experience, political activity, and electoral margin. On the other hand, those factors found to be insignificant are: occupation, community organization activity (e.g., Kiwanas, Rotary Club, Chamber of Commerce), and socio-economic background. In addition, certain characteristics have been found inconclusive or marginal, including tenure, education, age, income, and political ambition.³²

In one of the more significant studies, Wahlke et al. suggested that differences in representational orientation might occur by virtue of the legislator's belonging to the legislative majority or minority. He found that Ohio's majority Republicans included larger proportions of politicians than did the minority Democrats.³³ It has also been shown that Delegates score highest on the party index, while trustees display a weaker commitment to the norm of party

loyalty. Politicos have been shown to fall in the middle level of party loyalty.³⁴ As for legislative or political experience, a weak but statistically significant relationship has been found.³⁵ The trustee has been found to be more experienced in political or legislative affairs.³⁶ Without exception, trustees have been found to have a higher level of political activity than delegates, and trustees are more likely to previously have held some elective office; to have been active in other earlier campaigns; been members of a political organization; previously run for public office; been active in a political organization;³⁷ and finally, trustees are less likely to have been elected by a slim margin.³⁸

However, examples also exist that illustrate the ambiguity represented in the above mentioned generalized conclusions. In his study of the United States House of Representatives, Davidson found that Republicans are more apt to express delegate roles, while Democrats are more attracted to trustee roles.³⁹ Conversely, Jewell concluded that Democrats are more likely to be delegates or politicians, and Republicans are more likely to be trustees.⁴⁰ In either event, the findings clearly suggest that party affiliation is a determining factor in representational orientation. The most plausible and definitive conclusion to be drawn, however, is that while certain characteristics are agreed upon as to their deterministic value, many are indeterminate and ambiguous at the present time and merit further study and analysis.

Research Procedures

The purpose of this investigation is to shed some light on the concept of representation as it exists today on the local level in a democratic form of government. In this respect, an intensive analysis of the relationship between the local representative and his constituency was conducted. The influence of the constituent on the representative's decision-making function was the focal point of the analysis in an attempt to isolate, reveal, and amplify the important socio-economic background and political characteristics, as well as the orientational rationalizations of the representative.

The model used in this investigation was empirical and entailed seven governmental units. The seven governments were the County Commissions of Riley and Geary Counties in Kansas, the Jasper County Court in Missouri, and the City Councils of Joplin and Carthage, Missouri.⁴¹

The research population was composed of twenty-nine city councilmen/commissioners and ten county commissioners/judges. There were three members each from the Riley and Geary County Commissions and the Jasper County Court;⁴² five members each from the Manhattan and Junction City Commissions; and nine and ten councilmen respectively from the City Councils of Joplin and Carthage.

In order to establish a substantive study, the respondents must be truly representative of a rather wide variety of local officials. Accordingly, the sites used in this study were chosen with this consideration in mind. Ultimately,

there were four fundamental reasons for the selection of the designated study sites. The first and most obvious reason was the immediate proximity and availability of the governmental units; the Kansas governmental units are located near Kansas State University where the project was based, and the Missouri governments are situated in and near Carthage, the author's hometown.

The second reason for choosing these sites is that, in all probability, they are representative of the typical small or intermediate sized, agrarian, neighboring communities, with similar backgrounds, problems, and resources at their disposal. This may be exemplified by the fact that Carthage, Manhattan, and Junction City not only maintain their own city government, but, in addition, are the county seats respectively of Jasper, Riley and Geary Counties. The lone exception, Joplin, maintains the Jasper County Courthouse Annex,⁴³ the site of much county activity, and may in this manner also be looked upon as a county seat of sorts.

The desire to conduct a study of American "grass roots" democracy constitutes the third determining factor. A "grass roots" study alleviates any contention, real or imagined, that a lower house represents the people and an upper house represents the people's interests.⁴⁴ Such a contention has no basis on a local level study where such a distinction does not exist.

Finally, the dual nature of the study seemed desirable. The study sites chosen afforded the opportunity to incorporate the perceptions and characteristics of local officials

representing different levels of government (i.e., county and city), different forms of government (i.e., commission, council, and court) and even different states (i.e., Missouri and Kansas). It seems that these facts make for a more comprehensive local level study.

The boundaries of any study must be identified realistically and positively. It is therefore necessary to define and limit this study in accordance with certain assumptions. As was shown earlier, seven legislative orientations or perceptions have been identified. Therefore, it must first be assumed, for purposes of this study, that the representational role may be studied in isolation from the other orientations so that influences and modifications upon it and from the other orientations may be discerned.

Second, it is obvious that findings in local communities cannot automatically be generalized to other political units. The problem of inference -- in this case from political systems where contacts are intimate and informal to systems where they are discontinuous and formalized -- remains one of the many dilemmas. Therefore, in order to infer that the patterns found in local community governments will have equivalents in state or national bodies, one must further assume that actors in all political systems will behave at least partially in accordance with the expectations of others and that the tasks that political systems must perform (in order to continue to function as systems) will require that certain common roles be taken by individuals in some structure that is part of the system.⁴⁵ Consequently, this study

is meant to be suggestive rather than conclusive.

The methodological design utilized in this study was fundamental. It was felt that the only accurate means of determining the actual orientations of the several local representatives was to directly confront the source. In light of this, the technique employed was a sixty-two point questionnaire (see Appendix I) administered in February and March of 1973. The questionnaire was given orally by the author to the thirty-nine respondents in isolation (to promote sincerity) and lasted approximately one hour on the average.

The questionnaire included: 1) fourteen questions pertaining to the respondent's socio-economic background; 2) twenty questions on the respondent's adolescent and career politicization, activities, and aspirations; 3) twenty-six questions concerning various aspects of the respondent's conscious or unconscious representational orientations; and 4) two questions probing the respondent's actual representational orientation within a formal setting. In respect to number four, a study was made into the actual recorded voting behavior of each individual representative. Each respondent was then asked in the interview to defend, justify, and explain his motivation concerning his voting behavior in connection with his relationship with his constituents. It was felt that this would enable a broader insight into the undefended, candid, and true representational orientation of each individual representative (see the "individual issue questions" contained in Appendix I).⁴⁶

The tools used for evaluating the results of the questionnaire were various statistical techniques derived by means of computer analysis. Among the statistics utilized were descriptive statistics and a scaling technique somewhat resembling Guttman Scaling. When advantageous to the reliability and understanding of the study, various statistics will be noted in the text. In most instances, however, derivations are obvious.

Conclusion

Chapter two has served primarily to bring into perspective the impetus of this study. It should now be clear, before moving onto chapter three and a first-hand analysis of representational role orientations, that while role is a broad and complex concept and encompasses seven legislative orientations, it may be simplified or reduced for purposes of analysis. Furthermore, chapter two has exemplified the historical existence, in previous studies, of three representational role orientations, and their characteristics. An insight into the boundaries, study sites, intricacies, assumptions and methodology of the study have also been outlined. With this information well in hand, it is now practicable to continue with the determination of the representational role orientations of local representatives in chapter three.

Footnotes

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2. Rodney L. Mott, "Research Work of the American Legislator's Association," American Political Science Review, XXVI (April 1932), 311; Norman Meller, "Legislative Behavior Research," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (March 1960), 141-42.
3. Meller, "Legislative Behavior Research," p. 144; William S. White, Citadel, The Story of the U.S. Senate (New York: Harper, 1956); Jerry Voorhis, Confessions of a Congressman (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948); George Wharton Pepper, In the Senate (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930).
4. The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior, cited in Norman Meller, "Legislative Behavior Research Revisited: A Review of Five Years' Publications," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (December 1965), 783.
5. Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 387.
6. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 190.
7. Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 73.
8. John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 148; the various meanings of the concept and the resulting problems are surveyed in Lionel J. Nieman and James W. Hughes, "The Problem of the Concept of Role - A Re-survey of the Literature," Social Forces, XXX (December 1951), 141-49; a comprehensive review of the history and usage of the concept is found in Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, eds., Role Theory: Concepts and Research (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 3-63.
9. Malcolm E. Jewell, The State Legislature: Politics and Practices (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 83-85; John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 246; Chang Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo, "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (November 1972), 634; Roger H. Davidson, "Public Prescriptions for the Job of Congressman,"

Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIV (November 1970), 650; Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, pp. 17-18.

10. Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, p. 18.

11. Allan Fiellin, "Recruitment and Legislative Role Conceptions: A Conceptual Scheme and a Case Study," Western Political Quarterly, XX (June 1967), 284.

12. Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, p. 383.

13. Kim and Woo, "Political Representation," p. 629.

14. Jewell and Patterson, Legislative Process, p. 385.

15. Ibid., pp. 385-86; Wahlke, et al., Legislative System, chapters 11-15.

16. Wahlke et al., Legislative System, p. 268.

17. Ibid., pp. 285-86.

18. Ibid., pp. 272-76.

19. Ibid., pp. 276-77.

20. Ibid., pp. 277-80.

21. Jewell, State Legislature, p. 91.

22. Francis E. Leupp, "Do Our Representatives Represent?", Atlantic Monthly, CXIV (October 1914), 433-43.

23. Ibid., p. 433.

24. Two other partially ill-founded and mislabeled classification studies may be found in Robert J. Huckshorn, "Decision-Making Stimuli in the State Legislative Process," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (March 1965), 164-85; and Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), pp. 172-73.

25. Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March 1963), 45-56.

26. Ibid., p. 56.

27. Huckshorn, "Decision-Making Stimuli," pp. 164-85.

28. Ibid., p. 166.

29. Michael L. Mezey, "The Functions of a Minimal Legislature: Role Perceptions of Thai Legislators," Western Political Quarterly, XXV (December 1972), 687-701; Norman

Meller, "Representational Role Types: A Research Note," American Political Science Review, LXI (June 1967), 474-77; Allan Kornberg, "Perception and Constituency Influence on Legislative Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, XIX (June 1966), 285-92; Kim and Woo, "Political Representation," pp. 628-50.

30. Wilder W. Crane, Jr., "The Legislative Struggle in Wisconsin: Decision-Making in the 1957 Wisconsin Assembly," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1959), p. 695.

31. Davidson, Role of the Congressman, p. 181. Supportive evidence of this argument for Kansas State Legislators may be found in Marvin Harder and Carolyn Rampey, The Kansas Legislature (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1972), p. 164: "...it seems that most legislators play both [author's emphasis] roles [trustee and delegate] at one time or the other..."

32. Davidson, Role of the Congressman; Charles G. Bell and Charles M. Price, "Pre-Legislative Sources of Representational Roles," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (May 1960); Ronald D. Hedlund and H. Paul Friesema, "Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion," Journal of Politics, XXXIV (August 1972); Kim and Woo, "Political Representation"; Jewell, State Legislature; Wahlke, et al., Legislative System; and Malcolm E. Jewell, Metropolitan Representation: State Legislative Districting in Urban Counties (New York: National Municipal League, 1969).

33. Wahlke, et al., Legislative System, p. 394.

34. Davidson, Role of the Congressman, p. 161.

35. Kenneth Janda cited in Bell and Price, "Representational Roles," p. 257.

36. Jewell, State Legislature, p. 92.

37. Bell and Price, "Representational Roles," p. 267.

38. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf, ed., Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 478-83; Kim and Woo, "Political Representation," pp. 640-41; and Jewell, Metropolitan Representation, p. 31.

39. Davidson, Role of the Congressman, pp. 132-33.

40. Jewell, Metropolitan Representation, p. 31.

41. The Joplin City Council represents 38,500 people, consists of four zone councilmen and five at-large councilmen, and is elected on a nonpartisan basis for four year terms. The Carthage City Council represents 11,600 people, and

consists of ten councilmen, two elected from each of five wards, for two year terms. The Junction City Commission represents 19,018 people and the five at-large commissioners are elected on a nonpartisan basis. Three commissioners are elected in April of each odd numbered year; the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected for four year terms and the third commissioner serves a two year term. The Manhattan City Commission is elected on a nonpartisan basis. The five at-large commissioners are elected for four year terms to represent 25,575 people. The Geary and Riley County Commissioners are composed of three members each from designated districts. The commissioners represent 28,111 and 38,442 people respectively and serve four year terms. The Jasper County Court represents 79,852 people. The Court is composed of two district judges and one at-large, presiding judge. The district judges serve two year terms and the at-large, presiding judge serves four year terms. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC (1)-B27, Missouri, p. 27-144; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC (1)-B18, Kansas, pp. 18-113, and 18-122.

42. It should be pointed out that in order to expand the number of respondents a fourth Geary County Commissioner was interviewed. At the time the interviews were being conducted one novice was elected to the Geary County Commission. In order to give him the opportunity to adapt to his new office and gain in experience, he was not interviewed for approximately two months. The retiring commissioner was interviewed in the meantime.

In addition, it should be mentioned that it was impossible to conduct oral interviews with four respondents due to illness, schedule conflicts, etc. The four respondents were kind enough, however, to answer the questionnaire by mail.

43. The Jasper County Courthouse Annex has burned, however, since the research locations were selected and the interviews conducted.

44. Thomas R. Dye in "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," Western Political Quarterly, XIV (June 1961), 479, reflected James Madison's description of the function of the upper chamber: "...the function of the upper chamber... is to inject into legislative decision-making the influence of a body relatively more free from narrower constituency pressures than the lower chamber."

45. The author wishes to recognize Betty Zisk, Heinz Eulau, and Kenneth Prewitt for bringing this into perspective in their joint effort "City Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role Orientations," Journal of Politics, XXVII (August 1965), 621.

46. The two questions were picked on the basis of conferring with the city/county clerk of each community and going through the minutes of meetings in order to come up with one very controversial issue question and one quite routine issue question. The rationalization for this was to observe how the respondent reacted (how he based his decisions) when confronted with great public pressure on the one hand, and the total absence of public interference on the other.

CHAPTER III

THE REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS

Introduction

The previous two chapters have illustrated that although the existant controversy between representative and represented has historically oscillated between two representational extremes (i.e., mandate and independence), various studies have determined the actual existance of three representational orientations (i.e., trustee, politico, and delegate). In this chapter the goal is to determine, label, and illustrate the different orientations held by the respondents in this particular study. Prior to this determination, however, it may be useful to become more familiar with the research population so that inferences from this study may be accurately drawn with respect to other local governmental units. In the event that the research population is atypical or in some way uniquely different (e.g., elitist) any inferences or conclusions drawn would likely be erroneous. Familiarity with the research population in general is therefore warranted.

The Representatives: Who They Are

The respondents came from Depression period families of rather meager existence. Sixty-four percent of the respondents felt they were from lower middle or lower class families. Their fathers tended to be farmers by occupation; attended

only grammar school; and identified, in general, with the Republican party. In addition, while their families tended to be interested in politics, they were not on the average politically active.

Apart from their family background, the sample again resembled the average aggregate of people; there were representatives of both sexes and a minority group. Three females were included in the research population; one each from Manhattan, Joplin and Carthage. In addition, there were three blacks. Blacks were present in the governmental units of Manhattan, Carthage and Geary County (see Table III-1).

The age of the respondents ranged anywhere from the youngest of 31 to the oldest of 81. The majority of the respondents, however, were between the ages of 40 and 59. The governmental units of Manhattan, Joplin, and Junction City were composed of the youngest members, while the Jasper County Court comprised the oldest representatives.

Education among the respondents was pretty evenly dispersed. The Carthage City Council was composed of the least educated group, however, with only a high school education on the average. Conversely, the highest level of educational achievement was in Manhattan where the predominant educational level was college. Most of the respondents had at least some college, however.

Most of the respondents were professional or semi-professional by occupation (e.g., doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.). This classification was most prevalent among Manhattan City Commissioners and Riley County Commissioners.

TABLE III-1. -- Generalized Socio-economic Background Characteristics: All Respondents
(Cluster Tendencies)

Characteristic	County			City			
	Jasper	Riley	Geary	Carthage	Joplin	Manhattan	Junction City
Sex male female	3 0	3 0	4 0	9 1	8 1	4 1	5 0
Race white black	3 0	3 0	3 1	9 1	9 0	4 1	5 0
Age	70+	50-59	50-59	50-59	40-49	40-49	40-49
Education	Some college	Some college	H.S.	H.S.	College	College	Some college
Occupation	Prof.	Prof.	Farmer	Retired	Prof./Self. empl.	Prof.	Self. empl.
Income (thousands of dollars)	10-15	30-35	20-25	10-15	25-30	15-20	20-25
Class	U.M.	L.M.	U.M.	L.M.	U.M.	U.M.	U.M.
Political Party							
Democrat	0	2	4	4	2	1	1
Republican	3	1	0	6	5	4	4
Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
No response	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Memberships	Social	Social, civic	Social, civic	Social	Social	Church	Social
							51

The second most popular occupational identification was self-employed businessmen (e.g., automobile dealers, store owners, etc.). Only five respondents were retired, but it is interesting to note that four of this number were in Carthage, comprising 40 percent of its Council.

The average annual income of the respondents was from \$15,000 to \$20,000. However, two respondents made less than \$5,000 a year and, on the other hand, two respondents reported an annual income in excess of \$50,000. The representatives in Carthage and Jasper County reported the lowest governmental unit averages of \$10,000 to \$15,000 a year, and Riley County Commissioners reported the highest average annual income of \$30,000 to \$35,000. In other words, while there were extremes on each end of the income spectrum, the representatives appeared to live comfortably, but not extravagantly by American standards.

Correlating closely with income is socio-economic class. A majority of the respondents considered themselves upper middle class Americans. Somewhat curiously, in relation to other findings cited above, however, is the finding that while Carthage City Councilmen tended to classify themselves in the lower middle class, Jasper County Judges felt they were in the upper middle class. This may be explained by the difference of governmental level, but further investigation of this phenomenon would be required before any definitive statements could be made and this is outside the boundaries of this study.

The representatives, in general, were fairly active as

far as memberships. Only one of the respondents disclaimed membership in any political party. The majority of the respondents (59 percent) were Republicans, while a still significant proportion (36 percent) were Democrats. Only two governmental units (i.e., Jasper and Geary Counties) were composed of representatives from only one party. The Jasper County Court was entirely composed of Republicans and the Geary County Commission was made-up entirely of Democrats. In addition, party competition was evidenced to be the fiercest in the Carthage City Council, with four Democrats and six Republicans. One representative claimed he was a member of another party. However, other than political memberships were also taken; sixty-seven percent of the respondents were members of either social or civic clubs or organizations, or both (e.g., Kiwanis, Knights of Pythias, Chamber of Commerce, etc.). Manhattan City Commissioners were the only group that indicated church related memberships, however,

The respondents, in general, were also politically active and ambitious. Only 15 percent felt they were drafted for their present office. One third of them decided on their own to run for office, and almost 50 percent felt their decision was a combination of their own initiative and influence from outside sources. Once in office, however, only about half were satisfied enough to remain for more than one term (or were lucky enough to remain in some instances). Apparently the respondents had visions of moving up the "political ladder," but at some future date. Nearly 54 per-

cent said they were definitely planning on seeking reelection or were, at the time of the interview, undecided but leaning toward running again. In addition, although they had no immediate plans to seek a higher office, sixty percent of the respondents said they would accept an appointment to a higher office.

The respondents do not seem too different, then, from what could reasonably be expected from similar groups. Most of them came from rather meager Republican backgrounds; were middle aged; had average, but not excessive, educations; were well-to-do financially; had adequate employment; were fairly active both politically and socially; were Republicans, although a significant number were Democrats; and had some modest but relevant political ambitions. Representation on the local level, then, if it is possible to draw a conclusion from this sample, does not appear to be representation by any kind of well defined elite or unique group. The respondents in this study appear to be "average, all-American" individuals.

Representational Role Orientations Determined

Determining the representational role orientation of a representative is somewhat more difficult than it appears. Representatives, especially on the local level where they are in closer and more frequent contact with their constituents, hesitate to admit following either of the two polar conceptualizations of trustee or delegate. The role of trustee is not acceptable to many respondents because they feel their

constituents will have a feeling of abandonment, of being needed solely for their vote at election time. The delegate orientation is not readily acceptable because many representatives fear their constituents will perceive them as not intelligent enough to make any decisions on their own, even when instructions from the public never materialize. What is needed initially in this study, then, is to determine the existence of the orientations alluded to earlier.

The hesitancy of representatives to conform to either polar orientation may be witnessed by the response to the question: "Members of the (commission, council, court) should vote on issues before the (commission, council, court) according to their own best judgment; according to the way their constituents feel; or according to a combination of judgment and the way their constituents feel." Of the thirty-nine responses to this question, 74 percent insisted decision-making should be a combination of independent judgment and instructions. Only 3 percent and 23 percent felt decisions should be based solely on instructions and independent judgment respectively.

Continued analysis and questioning yielded somewhat different results, however. In response to the more direct question: "In cases when your opinion as a (commissioner, councilman, judge) is different from that of the majority of the people in your district, do you think you should usually vote according to your own best judgment or according to the way the majority of your district feels?" Well over half of the respondents (56 percent) felt their own best judgment was

the determining factor in their decision-making; 33 percent felt the way the majority of their constituents felt, as perceived by the representative, was the primary basis of decision making, and only 8 percent still insisted on a combination of the two extremes.

It becomes apparent from the responses to the above two questions that the three orientations (i.e., trustee, politico, delegate) may, in reality, be differentiated. However, responses to the above mentioned questions follow a structured format and therefore may encourage some degree of skepticism. In order to alleviate this possibility, candid comments by the representatives under questioning serve to illustrate the differentiated tendencies.

One respondent exemplified the trustee orientation when he said:

There is no "voice of the people." You can't indicate what the people want. There is usually one group for something, another group against, and everyone else in the middle. I think the role of the commissioner is leadership; he should be able to guide public sentiment toward positive goals.

I don't worry too much about what the people say. I try to find out what they want, but then end up using my own judgment. The most important aspect of the job is to provide leadership for the most efficient and equitable services for the constituency. I think the people want an aggressive commissioner who will work hard to get facts, have feelings, know ramifications and then go ahead and make decisions. The constituency, however, wants to be heard if they disagree and don't want to be talked down to. But if I solely voted the demands of the people, you would only need a robot.

Another representative expressed the Burkean perception more

abruptly:

I was elected by the people, but they elected me to make decisions for them. I don't agree with everything that happens. I have my own way of seeing things. If it is my conviction on something, I am going to stand up to my convictions. This is not a rubber stamp deal. I won't buy being told what to do by anybody. I don't like to be told to do something when I don't think it's right.

Finally, one representative voiced the trustee orientation when he said:

There is no possible way to know what the majority of the people want. I try to protect their constitutional rights. If you don't have enough guts to stand up for your own convictions, though, then you're in trouble.

The orientation of the politico was also outlined in conversation with the representatives. One respondent clearly characterized the hybrid politico orientation.

My decisions are made by a combination of my own judgment and what my constituents want. I might call twenty people to get a cross section of their views and interests. At other times I go completely by my own convictions. The general public is too complacent. I don't think they really realize about some issues. Often my decisions are a combination of my own judgment and orders at the same time.

Another representative characterized the politico orientation when he said:

My people elected me because of my judgment, but also because they thought I would listen to them -- and I do, although I don't always [respondent's emphasis] listen to them.

But you have to pay attention to them....
 It doesn't bother me though to vote against
 what they want if in my judgment it is right.
 This is where lack of education enters in.

Finally, one representative more cautiously displayed the politico orientation when he said:

I use mostly [respondent's emphasis] my own judgment on issues, but my judgment is affected by other people. I carry on a great amount of oral correspondence with my constituents. It takes many years to build this up. I get a hell of a lot more than I can handle.

The role of the delegate was likewise indicated in conversation with the respondents. One representative very bluntly put it in this way:

I think I put more weight on my constituents' expressed wishes than anything else. We are the spokesman for the people. In fact, my primary function, I would say, is to be the peoples' spokesman.

Another respondent indicated he identified with the delegate orientation when he said:

If I know the majority of the people want something, I'm going to vote for that, not what I want. I put my constituents' views above my own. Oftentimes [respondent's emphasis] I think about their instructions before making a decision.

And finally, one respondent very simply put it:

The way the...people...feel is more important than my own judgment.

The responses to the above mentioned questions and the conversation of selected representatives serve, then, to

exemplify and verify the existence of the three representational orientations of trustee, politico, and delegate on the local level. It must be remembered, however, that these orientations are only tendencies, they are not rigid, inflexible classifications. Therefore, the chances of any given representative fitting uniformly and perfectly into any one of these orientations is extremely remote. Determining which respondents fall within each orientation, therefore, is somewhat arbitrary and by necessity objective. There is no absolute and positive means of specifically identifying representational orientations, only judgmental determinations as to generalized tendencies. This orientational judgmental determination is the objective here.

The method of determining individual orientational tendencies in this study was adopted from Roger H. Davidson's study of the United States House of Representatives.¹ Davidson's method proved quite acceptable in his study and was therefore assumed to be adequate for the present investigation.²

It was assumed that representatives who held clear conceptions of their representational roles would reveal their conceptions by responding in a relatively consistent manner to opposing statements. Representatives who agreed with items favoring the delegate style of representation would demonstrate a relatively consistent response by disagreeing with the items favoring the trustee style, and vice versa. Representatives who were inconsistent in their responses, who changed according to different confrontations, could be

identified as falling into the politico category.

The orientations were specifically determined according to a scheme of turning quantitative information into mathematical symbols. First, values were assigned representing each orientation: trustee, 3; politico, 2; and delegate, 1. These values were then given in correlation with individual responses to each of twenty-one orientational determining questions (i.e., questions 36, 37, 39-55, 60, and the "controversial issue question"). The orientational character of each question was determined by objective judgment, in accordance with previous studies. The Style Index Factor (SIF) was then calculated by adding the orientational values of each respondent's response to each question. The SIF was then divided by the number of questions answered by each respondent, excluding questions of "no response," yielding the Individual Style Index (ISI). From this, final role orientations for each respondent were determined on the following basis: trustee, 2.26-3.00; politico, 1.76-2.25; and delegate, 1.00-1.75.³

The Style Index for All Respondents (SIAR) was calculated by adding together the ISI for all respondents (78.36) and dividing this sum by the number of respondents (39). Therefore, the SIAR is 2.00, directly on the politico orientation.

An example of how this scheme works for one respondent might be helpful. Assume that Commissioner X responded to ten orientational determining questions. He answered eight questions in accordance with the politico orientation, but

was inconsistent on two questions and answered in accordance with the delegate orientation. Representative X's SIF would be eighteen, the sum of the orientational values for all of the questions answered. Representative X's ISI would be 1.80, the SIF divided by the number of questions answered. Therefore, Representative X would be classified as identifying with the politico orientation, falling within the designated 1.76-2.25 range. Although this is a fairly complicated scheme, all indications are that it is a satisfactory method of orientational determination.

The greatest portion of the representatives in this study were found to be politicos (69.2 percent). Delegates, comprising 17.9 percent of the research population, were the second most plentiful, being only slightly greater than the 12.8 percent who tended to identify with the trustee orientation (see Table III-2).

TABLE III-2. -- Role Orientations: All Respondents

<u>Role</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Trustee	5	12.8
Politico	27	69.2
Delegate	7	17.9
Total	39	99.9

Role orientational identification for the county governmental units was quite uniform. The orientation of politico was unmistakably the most popular orientation. Only one respondent each for the trustee and delegate orientations

were found (see Table III-3).

TABLE III-3. -- Role Orientations: All Counties and Cities

<u>Level</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Counties:	Trustee	1	10.0
	Politico	8	80.0
	Delegate	1	10.0
	Total	10	100.0
Cities:	Trustee	4	13.7
	Politico	19	65.5
	Delegate	6	20.6
	Total	29	99.8

The city governmental units were somewhat more equitably distributed in orientational identification. The politico again remained the most popular orientation with 65.5 percent of the respondents identifying with it. The delegate orientation accounted for 20.6 percent, and the orientation of trustee attracted only 13.7 percent of the respondents.

Breaking orientational identification down into individual governmental units also yields some interesting results (see Table III-4). Again, the politico orientation was the most

TABLE III-4. -- Role Orientations: Individual Governmental Units (In Percentages)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Manhattan	0	60	40
Junction City	0	60	40
Joplin	0	77	22
Carthage	40	60	0
Riley County	0	100	0
Geary County	0	75	25
Jasper County	33	66	0

popular, ranging from a low of 60 percent in Manhattan, Junction City and Carthage, to a high of 100 percent in Riley County. Also, the politico orientation was the only orientation identified with in every governmental unit. The delegate orientation was the second most popular orientation; four of the seven governmental units had representatives following this orientation. The trustee orientation was found in only two governments (i.e., Carthage and Jasper County), comprising 40 percent of the respondents in Carthage and 33 percent in Jasper County.

Finally, it should be noted that in none of the seven governmental units did all three orientations appear. The only apparent explanation for this phenomenon seems to be that on the local level, where relationships are very informal and exist on a day to day basis, once the character of a particular governmental entity is established (i.e., either tending toward the Burkean conception or the delegate conception), there is much hesitancy to shift to the opposite extreme. With the politico orientation continuously the most popular, it is assumed that any shift is moderate, either between politico and delegate or between politico and trustee; not between the extremes of delegate to trustee or vice-versa.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the respondents included in this study do not differ substantially from what could reasonably be expected of representatives in similar positions on the local level throughout the United States. There was

a preponderance of middle class white males of intermediate ages, leaning toward a Republican political ideology. As was also expected there was a small proportion of females and minority group members (in this case blacks). Since there were no flagrant disparities, it seems reasonable to assume that the sample group in this study is typical of similar groups on the local level.

This chapter also serves to verify the findings of many academicians who argue that the "mandate-independence" controversy is far more than a two pronged confrontation. The issue may not be so narrowly defined. The respondents fell easily into three (not two) taxanomial divisions. The politico orientation was most frequently adopted, followed respectively by delegate and trustee. Therefore, it is obvious that while some representatives refuse to be controlled by constituency instructions, a slightly larger segment apparently prefers to follow the voice of the people. The majority of the respondents prefer, however, to interchange the basis of their decisions. Whether or not these three orientational divisions have certain background characteristics and rationalizations is of further concern and will be considered in the following chapter.

Footnotes

1. Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 116-17.

2. A similar approach to orientational determination was also employed by Kenneth Janda "Some Theory and Data on Representational Roles and Legislative Behavior" in James B. Kessler, ed., Empirical Studies of Indiana Politics: Studies of Legislative Behavior (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 132.

3. The reader will notice that the orientational determination range for politico is not as great as for the other two orientations. This was done intentionally because it was felt that a larger politico range would be inaccurate or inconsistent since it is characterizing a compromise, hybrid situation, while the other two ranges must entertain the very remote possibility of more perfect corresponding orientations.

CHAPTER IV

CHARACTERISTICS, COGNITIONS, AND RATIONALIZATIONS

Introduction

It was established in the preceding chapter that three representational orientations can indeed be discerned among representatives. Although these orientations should be described as tendencies rather than rigid classifications, individual representatives on all levels of government seem to cluster around one or another of them relatively consistently. At this point, one might ask the following questions: How do representatives who identify with one particular orientation differ from those who identify with one of the other two orientations? What causes representatives to choose a particular orientation? What variables enter into their orientational determination?

Specifically, the answers to these question are unclear. Generally, however, the answers seem to be threefold. First, representatives who identify with a particular orientation may differ as to their socio-economic backgrounds. Second, representatives may differ as to their political experiences, aspirations, etc. Third, representatives may differ as to their cognitive rationalizations of the various aspects of representation (i.e., how they reason or perceive their job, constituents, etc.). This chapter will be devoted to an examination of these three general categorical differences that exist within each of the three representational orientations

Socio-economic Background Characteristics

The men and women in any legislative body are subject to the influence of their own past experiences and present environmental conditions. Their perceptions and behavior have been shown in many relevant studies to be determined by various socio-economic background variables.¹ Decisions reached by some of them may reflect the influence of such things as occupation, religious affiliation, group association, educational levels, etc. Therefore, any study pertaining to the decision-making process (and this study is no exception) should not overlook the potential impact of socio-economic background characteristics. Socio-economic background characteristics may be divided into the respondent's familial background and the respondent's personal background and will be considered in that order.

The familial background characteristics of the respondents under study revealed some rather interesting results (see Table IV-1). Specifically, trustees' fathers tended to be the least educated; trustees unanimously insisted that their fathers possessed only a grade school education. While over 71 percent of the delegates' fathers possessed only a grade school education, several also indicated that their fathers possessed a high school education or had received an advanced degree (e.g., M.A.'s, J.D.'s, etc.). Politicos' fathers were mixed fairly evenly educationally.

Delegates tended to come from the lowest socio-economic background; nearly 72 percent of the delegates categorized themselves as coming from lower socio-economic class families.

TABLE IV-1. -- Tendencies In Respondents' Familial Background Characteristics
(Approximately 60 percent or above)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Father's education	Grade school	Mixed	Grade school, advanced degree
Socio-economic background	Mixed	L.M.	L.
Political interest	Interested	Somewhat interested	Very interested
Political activity	Least active	Most active	Active
Father's party identification	Republican	Mixed	Republican

The backgrounds politicos came from were somewhat brighter; they felt they came from lower middle class families. Trustees came from nearly every socio-economic class category.

All of the respondents came from families interested in politics. Delegates, however, came from the most politically enthusiastic backgrounds. Nearly 72 percent of the delegates insisted that their parents were very or somewhat interested in politics. Politicos indicated that nearly 60 percent of their parents were very or somewhat interested in politics. However, only 29 percent of the politicos felt that their parents were very interested, as compared to 43 percent of the delegates who insisted that their parents were very interested politically. Trustees, on the other hand, tended to come from the least politically interested families.

While 60 percent of their parents were interested, none were very interested.

Political interest, however, is obviously quite different from political activity. None of the respondents seemed to have come from overly politically active families. Nevertheless, politicians indicated that their families were the most active. Nearly 45 percent said that their families were active, as compared with 42 percent and 40 percent respectively for the families of delegates and trustees.

The political party affiliation of the respondents' fathers was predominantly Republican. Politicians represented the only near exception. Fifty-five percent of the politicians claimed that their fathers identified with the Republican party, but on the other hand 45 percent said their fathers had Democratic tendencies. Trustees were unanimously characterized by Republican fathers, and nearly 72 percent of the delegates had fathers whose political affiliation was Republican. It may be inferred, then, that the political party affiliation of the respondents' fathers may be significant in determining the polar orientations, but probably not the hybrid orientation of politician.

As interesting as the above findings are, several familial background variables that were examined in this study seemed to be of limited statistical consequence. Among those familial background variables found to be of almost no significance were religious affiliation and primary occupation of the respondent's father. Similarly, two of the personal background characteristics analyzed were found to

be only marginally important -- namely, race and sex. As was mentioned in chapter three, there were only three women and three blacks in the research population. All three women were politicos; two of the three blacks were delegates, and the third was a trustee. It might be suggested, given the data presented in this study, that women tended to be politicos and that blacks tended to be delegates. However, this assumption is questionable because of the limited number of applicable respondents. Primary attention, therefore, will now be focused on the more meaningful personal background characteristics since they are more likely to produce reliable tendencies.

Independence in decision-making may very well come with age for the representative on the local level. Possibly representatives grow numb to constituent demands over time, or they feel their advanced age affords them insightful experience. Whatever the reason, trustees tended to be the oldest group of representatives. All of the trustees were at least 60 years old or above (see Table IV-2). Politicos were intermediate in age. Most of them were between the ages of 40 and 59 years old. Delegates were split rather curiously. Nearly half were between the ages of 31 and 39 with the other half being between the ages of 50 and 59. These findings indicate, then, that independent minded trustees consistently tend to be the oldest representatives. However, there is a relatively large amount of delegate-politico oscillation among the younger representatives, eventuating finally in their identification with the polar

TABLE IV-2. -- Tendencies In Respondents' Personal Background Characteristics
(Approximately 60 percent or above)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Age	60 or above	40-59	31-39 50-59
Education	Some high school	High school, some college	Some college
Occupation	Retired	Prof., Self-employed businessmen	Prof.
Annual income	Less than \$5,000	Mixed	\$15,000-\$20,000
Socio-economic class	L.M.	U.M.	U.M.
Memberships	None	Social and/or civic	Social and/or civic

extremity of delegate. The politico orientation may be practiced by necessity or as an experiment of sorts by some middle-aged representatives before reverting back temporarily to the role of delegate and ultimately, of course, to trustee. Role orientation, then, seems to fluctuate with age groups.

Interestingly, education may alert local representatives to the public expectation of a mandate type of representation. Most studies verifying the existence of a relationship between representational orientations and education show trustees to be the most highly educated group and delegates to be the least educated group.² The present study revealed

findings quite to the contrary, however. Delegates were the most highly educated group; almost 72 percent had at least some college. Trustees, on the other hand, were the least educated group with only, on the average, some high school education. Politicos had either a high school diploma or some college, being rather evenly dispersed. Possibly, then, lack of education may inhibit any efforts by trustees to establish a working rapport with their constituents, thereby necessitating their independent type orientational identification. Delegates, on the other hand, may identify with their dependent type orientation because they have a higher educational attainment and are thus able to understand and articulate better the views and demands of their constituents. It follows likewise that politicians may be better able and/or willing to articulate constituent views and demands than trustees, while not as well as delegates, since educationally they fall between the polar orientations.

Corresponding with their advanced age, most of the trustees (80 percent) were retired. On the other hand, delegates seemed to be attracted primarily to relatively prestigious occupations; seventy-two percent were professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.). Politicos were fairly evenly distributed between professionals and self-employed businessmen (e.g., automobile dealers, store owners, realtors, etc.). It may be that professionals tend to be delegates because they function primarily within the public sector and are therefore more likely to perceive and/or

receive public sentiment and demands more readily than are those of the other orientations. Trustees, because they are retired, tend to be removed most generally from the public and may therefore revert to independence in decision-making simply because they have no alternative. The politico orientation, because it is arbitrary with respect to decision-making, probably cannot be accurately characterized occupationally.

Probably as a result of their advanced age and occupational status, trustees tended to have the smallest annual incomes; most earned less than \$5,000 a year. Predictably, because of their occupational status, delegates tended to have the greatest annual incomes, falling primarily between \$15,000 and \$20,000. Politicos were fairly evenly distributed within nearly all ranges of the designated categories. So while each of the polar orientations may be characterized as to income, politicians elude characterization not only occupationally, but with respect to income as well.

Trustees considered themselves the least socially prestigious. Eighty percent of the trustees felt that they fell into the lower middle socio-economic class. By contrast, both politicians and delegates considered themselves as falling into the upper-middle socio-economic class. In addition, politicians and delegates both felt they were very active in social and civic organizations (e.g., Kiwanis, Knights of Pythias, Chamber of Commerce, etc.). Seventy-eight percent of the politicians and 72 percent of the delegates had either social or civic memberships or both. Trustees

were the least involved; eighty percent of them insisted they had no memberships at all, excluding political parties of course. Probably correlating closely with the previously mentioned background characteristics, then, trustees were socially relatively introvertish or isolated, while politicos and delegates were relatively outgoing personalities.

This section falls short, of course, of definitely determining socio-economic background characteristics for each of the three designated orientations. However, several general tendencies surface relative to the trustee, politico, and delegate orientations. All of the respondents came from generally similar families, but there are obvious personal background disparities. Specifically, trustees stood out as the oldest, as the least educated, and as the politically and socially least active. Politicos tended to be intermediate in both age and education, and either professional or self-employed occupationally. Delegates were primarily noted as the youngest, most highly educated, professionals, and having the greatest annual incomes. So while being far from definitive, certain tendencies may nevertheless be discerned relative to the individual representational orientations.

Political Characteristics

Background characteristics do much to portray an individual, but they do little to depict the man as he presently exists and functions within society. The present study is concerned to a large degree with the political aspects of representatives. It seems necessary therefore to focus on

the political characteristics of representatives identifying with each orientation.³

It has been demonstrated that as far as political party affiliation is concerned, most of the respondents were Republicans. However, when party identification was isolated for each orientation different results emerged (see Table IV-3). Eighty percent of the trustees, and nearly 60

TABLE IV-3. -- Tendencies In Respondents' Political Characteristics (Approximately 60 percent or above)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Party identification	Republican	Republican	Democrat
Terms of office	Three	One or two	First
Seek reelection	No	Mixed	Yes
Seek higher elected office	No	Mixed	Yes
Accept higher appointed office	No	Maybe	Yes

percent of the politicos were Republicans. On the other hand, nearly 60 percent of the delegates were Democrats. In other words, there is a definite tendency for Republicans to identify with either the trustee or politico orientation. Democrats apparently tend to be delegates.

Apparently, the longer a representative holds his office, the more independent of his constituents he becomes. Trustees tended to hold office longer than did representatives of either of the two other orientations. Trustees held office for, on the average, three terms. Politicos tended not to

hold office as long. Seventy-four percent of the politicians had served either one or two terms. As has been indicated in previous, relevant studies, novices to political office tend to be more directly influenced by their constituency.⁴ Nearly 72 percent of the delegates were holding office for the first time.

Possibly out of fear of defeat at the polls because of their noncommitment to the wishes of their constituents, trustees unanimously expressed the decision not to seek reelection. Possibly, however, it is precisely because of their desire not to seek reelection that they adopted the trustee orientation. On the other hand, delegates expressed most strongly (58 percent) a desire to seek reelection. Exactly because they wished initially to seek reelection may have been the rationale behind adopting the delegate orientation. Possibly, however, they felt by painstakingly following the desires of their constituents, they were in their constituents' good graces and could therefore gain reelection. The politico orientation apparently represents indecision on the part of that particular group of representatives. Politicos were somewhat divided on whether or not to seek reelection; 56 percent indicated only that they probably were going to seek reelection.

It may have been a similar rationale to that cited above that led trustees to unanimously insist that they would not seek a higher office. Conversely, similar reasoning as that cited above for delegates may have also been responsible for the decision by nearly 60 percent of the delegates that

they would seek a higher office at some future date. Politicos again exemplified indecision by responding in a rather evenly divided manner with respect to this inquiry. This also gives rise to speculation that the politico orientation predominantly oscillates with respect to the decision-making criteria, depending on the individuals and issues involved.

Similar patterns of reasoning may again be exemplified by the reactions of the respondents to the possibility of accepting an appointed office on a higher level. Trustees again unanimously insisted that they would not accept an appointed office on a higher level. Politicos indicated that they might take an appointed office, and a significant 72 percent of the delegates indicated that they definitely would accept an appointed position. This again suggests that representatives believe the road to political success (i.e., reelection or possibly election to a higher office) is to closely adhere to the wishes of the people.⁵

The respondents indicated that there were primarily five influential sources in convincing them to seek their particular political office. These five sources of influence were state legislators, local party chairmen, local businessmen, other members of the governmental unit to which the respondent eventually gained membership, and the clergy (see Table IV-4). Politicos apparently had the most connections or associations with politicians on higher levels of government. Although not overly significant, nearly 23 percent of the politicians admitted being convinced to run for their

TABLE IV-4. -- Determining Factors in Respondents' Decision to Run for Office

<u>Determining Factors</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
State legislators		X	
Local party chairman		X	
Local businessmen	X	X	
Other governmental unit members	X	X	
Clergy			X

particular office by state legislators. This is particularly interesting because neither of the two other orientations even mentioned this source of influence.

The influence of local party chairmen on politicians was also rather significant in comparison to the responses of the other two orientations with reference to this factor. Sixty-three percent of the politicians said they were influenced by local party chairmen in their decision to run for their particular office. Again, neither of the other two orientations indicated any influence from this source.

Although it has been shown that delegates are rather strongly influenced by their constituents in general, they apparently hesitate to respond positively to the rather narrow influence of local businessmen. Over 57 percent of the delegates insisted they were not influenced by local businessmen in their decision to seek office, while the other two orientations were adamant in mentioning this source as influential. Politicians were most strongly influenced by

local businessmen. Nearly 75 percent insisted that local businessmen were influential in making up their minds to run for office.

Members of the governmental unit to which the respondents sought election were influential to all but the delegates in convincing them to seek election to that particular body. While almost 60 percent of the trustees and politicians were influenced by this source, nearly 72 percent of the delegates said they were in no way influenced, either positively or negatively, to run for office from other judges, councilmen, or commissioners.

Delegates were the only orientation that would acknowledge, albeit negligibly, that members of the clergy were in any way significant in convincing them to run for office. Almost 43 percent of the delegates admitted that the clergy was influential, as compared to only 15 percent of the politicians and none of the trustees.

Although one source in particular (i.e., the respondents' family) was found not to be influential in convincing individuals encompassed within the three orientations to seek office, five sources were determined to be at least partially significant. These five sources were in several instances statistically weak, but their existence as orientational tendencies was nevertheless present. These findings indicate, then, that politicians are influenced more by outside individuals in their decision to run for office than are trustees and delegates. This would also seem to be consistent with speculation that politicians are more responsive to

issues and individuals than the other two orientations.

The impact of political parties seems to have had some impact on at least one orientational group. Trustees, presumably because they were not as committed to constituency opinions as a basis for their decisions, were apparently more likely to get information from nonconstituency sources. Specifically, in comparison with politicos and delegates, trustees were more likely to seek information from party sources. Eighty percent of the trustees admitted to occasionally taking instructions from their party (see Table IV-5). Politicos, on the other hand, appeared to

TABLE IV-5. -- Political Party Impact on Respondents

<u>Option</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Instructions: Party	X		
Party instructions important	X		
Consult local political party officials	X		

shy away from instructions from party sources. Only 40 percent said they took instructions occasionally from their party, and over 71 percent of the delegates claimed to take instructions elsewhere. In response to two other questions, trustees further acknowledged the influence of the political party. Sixty percent of the trustees felt party instructions were important or very important in decision-making, while 70 percent and 57 percent of the politicos and delegates

respectively felt party was not too important or not important at all. In addition, all of the trustees cited local political party officials as likely or very likely to be consulted when facing issues. Politicos and delegates, on the other hand, were unlikely to consult this source. Seventy-four percent of the politicians and all of the delegates said it was unlikely or very unlikely that they would consult political party officials. This finding is particularly interesting when it is recalled that politicians cited local party chairmen as a determining factor in their decision to run for political office (see Table IV-4). This again may reflect the desire on the part of politicians to balance the demands of individuals and groups as different issues require, while at the same time removing the possibility of any obligation to narrow interests of any sort.

Trustees, as a general pattern of behavior, steer away from instructions from constituents and other outside sources. However, the data presented here indicates that in those instances when the trustee for one reason or another decides to take and/or follow instructions, the instructions are most likely to come from party sources. Politicos and delegates avoid instructive relationships with their parties.

When seeking advice on issues confronting them, the respondents noted five sources in particular. First, advice from constituents was readily sought (see Table IV-6). Nearly all of the respondents were interested in conferring with their constituents, but of course, this varied with respect to each respondent's orientation. Only 20 percent

TABLE IV-6. -- Respondents' Sources of Advice

<u>Source</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Constituents		Mixed	X
Interested participants	X	X	
Interest groups	X		
Friends			X
Family			X

of the trustees were very likely to seek advice from their constituents, while almost 43 percent of the delegates responded similarly. Politicos again fell in the middle range.

Second, the respondents indicated consulting interested participants. Delegates were somewhat hesitant in approaching this source (less than 50 percent), but all of the trustees indicated they might consult with interested participants for advice. In addition, nearly 93 percent of the politicos said they might confer with interested participants for advice.

The third source indicated by the respondents for soliciting advice on issues was interest group leaders. Sixty percent of the trustees admitted seeking advice from interest group leaders. However, 72 percent of the delegates avoided contacting this source. Politicos again fell in the middle range; about 51 percent acknowledged seeking advice from interest group leaders. Similarly, 40 percent of the trustees felt instructions from interest groups in general were important, while only 18 percent of the politicos concurred. All of the delegates said interest groups were

not too important or were not important at all as a viable source of advice.

The fourth source of advice solicitation was friends not on the governing unit to which the respondent belonged. Delegates appear to place more confidence in friends other than immediate political colleagues than either of the other two orientations. Nearly 72 percent of the delegates felt it was very likely that they would seek advice from friends not on the court, council, or commission when making decisions on issues. Only about 40 percent of the trustees and politicians bore similar sentiments.

The fifth source utilized by respondents for seeking advice was members of their family. Delegates were most likely to seek advice from this source. Nearly 58 percent of the delegates said their family was a likely or very likely source for advice. Trustees and politicians, on the other hand, said family members were an unlikely source of advice. Sixty and 56 percent respectively said they did not solicit advice on decision-making from members of their family.

Previous investigation has indicated that delegates will normally arrive at a position through fewer consultations than would be necessary for the politician or trustee.⁶ This study indicates that just the opposite may in fact be true. Delegates were shown to seek advice from more sources than did either trustees or politicians. Delegates on the local level are probably more conscious of their decision-making orientation and thus try to obtain overall constituent

sentiment as the basis for their instructions. Trustees probably feel less necessity in approaching sources because they vote in most instances in accordance with their own judgment anyway. Politicos probably oscillate in accordance with the issues and the individual personalities in question.

Orientational Rationalizations

It was shown in the previous section that each orientation has certain discernible political characteristics. All three orientations have, in addition, certain rationalizations (i.e., methods of rational or realistic explanation) concerning corresponding representational behavior. The purpose of this section is to explore these rationalizations and attempt to indicate those characteristic of each orientation.

One particularly novel characteristic that seems to be especially pertinent to representatives on the local level is the extreme importance they place on some sort of communication or contact with their constituents. Very few of the respondents were truly fond of taking instructions or professed to adhering strictly to them. A rather high proportion of the respondents, however, encompassing all three orientations, consulted their constituents at least part of the time. Interestingly, only 10 percent of the entire research population insisted that they never consulted their constituents.

Consulting constituents is quite different, of course,

from actually heeding or paying sincere attention to constituent instructions. Nevertheless, nearly all of the respondents insisted that they heed or pay attention to their constituents' instructions. Predictably, the group most closely associated with instructions was most adamant in that respect. Eighty-six percent of the delegates insisted that they pay sincere attention to their constituents' instructions, while only about half of the trustees and politicians concurred (see Table IV-7).

The lack of concern for constituent instructions was exemplified by trustees in their interpretation as to the usefulness of governmental meetings. Trustees unanimously felt that meetings of their respective governmental units were merely formalities and served no worthwhile purpose. Trustees apparently felt that since they made their decisions primarily according to their own judgment, they did not need to listen to the views of conferees, etc. because their minds were made up prior to meetings. Conversely, nearly 60 percent of the delegates never felt that meetings were merely formalities. Delegates felt they needed to listen to the instructions of their constituents and the conferees before arriving at a decision. Politicians were again evenly divided on this point, indicating that the issues or individuals involved may be most important to them in coming to a decision.

As was indicated earlier, nearly none of the respondents would dispell entirely the influence of constituent instructions. However, independent judgment in decision-

TABLE IV-7. -- Respondents' Orientational Rationalizations

<u>Rationalization</u>	<u>Trustee</u>	<u>Politico</u>	<u>Delegate</u>
Heed constituent instructions	Some	Some	X
Meetings merely formality	X	Mixed	
Independent judgment important	X	Mixed	
Feel need to consult constituents		Mixed	X
Feel when in disagreement, persuade constituents	X	Mixed	
Conscience important		X	X
Morality basis for decisions	X	X	
Representative-constituent differences in job perception	X	X	
Feel public needs people to make political decisions for them	X	Mixed	

making remained important. Trustees; of course, overwhelmingly advocated (100 percent) the use of independent judgment in integrating group interests into the legislative process. Both politicos and delegates agreed to some extent that independent judgment was important, but not nearly with such extreme intensity. Furthermore, 80 percent of the trustees came to a decision on particular issues facing them by using their own judgment in the final analysis. Only 48 percent

of the politicos utilized independent judgment with the other 52 percent being distributed more or less evenly between constituency instructions and a combination of constituency instructions and individual judgment. None of the delegates came to grips with particular issues by relying on their own judgment, while the greatest number, predictably, relied on constituency instructions.

The representatives' dilemma between instructions and independent judgment was emphasized further by the respondents when asked how they should vote when their opinion was different from that of the majority of their constituents. Eighty percent of the trustees said they felt they should follow their own best judgment. Politicos felt loyalty to both polar positions. Fifty-five percent of the politicos felt they should use their own judgment, while the remainder did not. Nearly 60 percent of the delegates felt that they should not use their independent judgment when their opinion was different from that of the majority of their constituents.

Responses to the controversial issue questions once again verified established orientational decision-making criteria.⁷ Eighty percent of the trustees insisted that they had relied on their own independent judgment in making the final decision relative to the particular issue question posed to them. By way of contrast, none of the delegates relied on their individual judgment. Politicos were fairly evenly divided, as to the decision-making basis, between individual judgment and instructions from constituents. This

again indicates the apparent importance to politicians of the particular issues or individuals involved.

Confidence, or the lack of it, in their ability to "read" their constituents' minds seems to be in large part responsible for representative orientational identification. Apparently delegates had the least confidence in their ability to intercept silent communication from their constituents. Delegates felt unanimously that they needed to consult their constituents because the representatives' views might be different from those of his constituents'. On the other hand, trustees demonstrated extreme confidence in this "sixth sense". All of the trustees felt their views were so in line with their constituents' that they knew how to react to almost any proposal without constituent consultation. Politicians were again about evenly split on the query, giving rise to continued speculation that the issues and individuals involved are probably primarily responsible for their outlook. Similarly, 67 percent of the politicians and 57 percent of the delegates felt they did not know just what the people in their districts wanted them to do in most instances, whereas 60 percent of the trustees, on the other hand, felt that they knew what their constituents wanted and thus how to vote.

Trustees appear to have a sense of self-righteousness, a feeling that if their constituents fully understood issues, they would comply with the trustees' decisions. When in disagreement with constituents over an issue, trustees felt very strongly (80 percent) that they should try to persuade

their constituents to their point of view. Delegates strongly disagreed. They felt that the representative should submit to the feelings of his constituents since it was the constituents who put him where he is. Only 14 percent of the delegates concurred with the trustees that the representative should attempt to dissuade his constituents.

Trustees again exhibit the feeling that their policy decisions have been well thought out, in that they are little concerned with conscience in decision-making. Politicos and delegates, on the other hand, being more susceptible to instructions from their constituents, feel that conscience in decision-making does play an important part. One respondent put it this way: "I just wouldn't feel right if I went against my people. I guess you might say it's my conscience." Delegates are not as enthusiastic in respect to this factor as are politicians, but it is particularly important to both orientations. Although more politicians than delegates replied that this feature was very important, in excess of 95 percent of each orientation mentioned it as at least important.

Although conscience was not too important to trustees, morality apparently was. Trustees unanimously agreed, with 74 percent of the politicians concurring, that decisions on most issues could be arrived at by asking oneself if the proposal is morally right. On the other hand, nearly 60 percent of the delegates insisted that decisions could not be arrived at on the basis of morality, but rather through constituency consultation. The apparent contradictory

answer by trustees relative to conscience and morality as important in decisions may be explained rather simply. Trustees may feel that in utilizing their own judgment in decision-making they have not yielded to the gamut of various cross-pressures confronting the representative -- they have done what is morally right -- and are therefore at ease with themselves and thus little concerned about their conscience bothering them.

Commenting on differences that existed between representatives and their constituents with respect to the way in which representatives approach their job, delegates predictably felt strongest (nearly 72 percent) that there were none, i.e., that they represented their constituency in much the same manner that their constituents desired since they adhered primarily to constituent instructions. Politicos and trustees were more likely to perceive some differences, however. Fifty-two percent of the politicians and 60 percent of the trustees perceived definite differences in the way they represented their constituents as compared to the way their constituents wished to be represented. Trustees, in other words, apparently felt most strongly that their actions best served the interests of the majority of the people, and they therefore could not understand any disagreement with their style of representation. Delegates felt there were few, if any differences, because they followed instructions from their constituents.

Reflecting on the competency of the public in governmental matters, delegates strongly maintained that the

people know what they want and should be represented accordingly. Trustees, on the other hand, had less confidence in the public. Trustees felt that members of the public do not know what is best for themselves and need qualified people to make governmental decisions for them. As could be expected, politicians were divided on this subject. Similarly, 80 percent of the trustees agreed or strongly agreed that the public needed qualified people to make political decisions for them. Only 55 percent of the politicians expressed the same sentiment, while less than 30 percent of the delegates felt that the public was incapable of making intelligent politically oriented decisions. All respondents agreed, however, that in certain instances the public needs to be protected against its own will. However, trustees unanimously agreed, while only 71 percent of the delegates and 74 percent of the politicians agreed.

In all likelihood, delegates felt that regardless of the policy impact (positive or negative) of constituent desires, the role of the representative is to represent the people in accordance with their desires. Conversely, trustees apparently thought that the public did not have adequate insight into the specifics of issues. Therefore, representatives who are familiar with the issues should make decisions and protect the public. Politicians again reflected the fluctuating influence of various intervening variables, such as particular individuals and issues.

Trustees, politicians, and delegates apparently all differ to some degree with respect to their legislative rationali-

zations. Trustees reflect their independence from constituents in decision-making while delegates, on the other hand, emphasize their reliance upon as well as a high regard for their constituents. Politicos display a rather curious combination of feelings. They reveal a rather high preponderance of mixed emotions, concerning various legislative rationalizations, apparently oscillating in accordance with the different individuals and issues involved.

Conclusion

It has been shown in this chapter that trustees, politicians, and delegates may be generally categorized in accordance with certain socio-economic background, political, and rationalizational characteristics. More specifically, although these characteristics are only tendencies, three rather distinct personalities emerged correlating with the different representational orientations. Trustees were found to be the oldest, least educated, Republicans, politically and socially inactive, with few political aspirations, but with the longest tenure in office. Their policy decisions, as was anticipated, were based primarily on their own independent judgment. However, in the rare instances that trustees chose to follow instructions, they came primarily from political party sources.

Politicos tended to be intermediate in both age and education, either professional or self-employed, Republicans of intermediate tenure, and with possible future political aspirations. They primarily decided how to vote on issues,

as was expected, according to a combination of independent judgment and instructions from constituents, depending on the issues and individuals involved.

Delegates were the youngest, most highly educated, primarily professionals, of high income, with Democratic political aspirations. They primarily made their decisions on issues, as was expected, in accordance with constituency instructions in general.

The value of any academic endeavor is the contribution it makes to past, present, and future research. Therefore, the data assembled and presented thus far in this study are of little value if no substantive conclusions can be drawn. In this light, the final chapter is devoted to the presentation of several general conclusions as well as to an evaluation of the present study and suggestions for future research.

Footnotes

1. For instance, see Allan Fiellin, "Recruitment and Legislative Role Conceptions: A Conceptual Scheme and a Case Study," Western Political Quarterly, XX (June 1967), 271-87; Frank Sorauf, Party and Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 63-64; Norman Meller, "Legislative Behavior Research Revisited: A Review of Five Years' Publications," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (December 1965), 776-93; Donald R. Mathews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 11-46; Chong Lim Kim and Byung-Kyu Woo, "Political Representation in the Korean National Assembly," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (November 1972), 636; Robert J. Huckshorn, "Decision-Making Stimuli in the State Legislative Process," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (March 1965), 164; and Malcolm E. Jewell, Metropolitan Representation: State Legislative Districting in Urban Counties (New York: National Municipal League, 1969), p. 30.
2. Two such studies are Charles G. Bell and Charles M. Price, "Pre-Legislative Sources of Representational Roles," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (May 1960), 269-70 and Malcolm E. Jewell, The State Legislature: Politics and Practices (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 92.
3. As might be expected, if for no other reason than that they were energetic enough to run for political office, all of the respondents were quite active politically. Nearly all of the respondents, regardless of orientation, voted in elections most of the time, attended rallies, dinners, and political meetings, gave money and promoted campaigns, wore campaign buttons and displayed bumper stickers, and campaigned actively for others. However, the results to the questions probing this area were deleted from the main text because of the fact that the city commissioners in three researched cities were elected on a nonpartisan basis. Nearly all of these respondents, however, insisted that while they were not supposed to have overt political ties, most of them in fact did. For example, all but one of the respondents claimed active membership in one of the two political parties.
4. See for example Roger H. Davidson's, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 132-33; and Huckshorn, "Decision-Making Stimuli," p. 168.
5. For similar findings on this subject see Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," American Political Science Review, LXIII (June 1969), 432; and William H. Dutton, "The Political Ambitions of Local Legislators: A Comparative Perspective" (paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, May 3-5, 1973), 1 and 15.

6. Wayne L. Francis, "The Role Concept in Legislatures: A Probability Model and a Note on Cognitive Structure," Journal of Politics, XXVII (August 1965), 578.

7. As was briefly outlined in the research procedures section of chapter two, the controversial issue questions were based on the respondents' formal voting records relative to extremely controversial community issues. The various issue questions were selected after extensive background research of each particular issue and upon recommendation of, and consultation with, the city/county clerk in each community. The respondents were asked to comment on and explain why they voted the way they did, what considerations were pondered what pressures were brought to bear upon them, etc.

CHAPTER V

CONTROVERSY RESOLVED?

Introduction

Almost every individual and group want political representation, and every government claims to represent. Very simply, representation means, as the word's etymological origins indicate, "re-presentation," a making present again, or more generally, the making of something that is not literally present.¹ But the concept is not simple; it is extremely complex, and there are obvious rival and incompatible interpretations concerning its nature. However, this study has been concerned with only one aspect of the concept. The present study has traced the controversial question of whether an elected legislator is in fact a representative chosen by his constituency to exercise his own judgment on the issues debated or simply a delegate whose electors never suspend the operation of their own sovereignty and who rightfully expect him, without modification to execute their mandates. In this chapter I shall review the main findings of the study, evaluate these findings, offer some retrospective reflections, and make some suggestions for future research.

Summary of Findings

The mandate-independence controversy has obfuscated the concept of representation almost from its inception. The

issue has evolved over several hundred years and has encompassed basically the same three actors. Nearly all of the studies on the subject have replicated the existence of three unresolvable orientations. The arguments justifying each of these opposing orientations seem legitimate and at times very convincing. The fact remains, however, and this study serves to verify, that three clear representational orientations exist relative to the decision-making criteria available to the representative.

This study has gone beyond verifying the existence of the three representational orientations however. While admittedly being far from conclusive, this study has indicated certain distinct personality tendencies which seem to correlate closely with the trustee, delegate, and politico orientations. While these are only tendencies, they at least establish a foundation for the determination, and possibly even the prediction, of how a particular individual (or candidate) does, or is likely to, represent his constituency. At any rate, this gives the public one further, albeit remote, means of candidate screening on the basis of the decision-making criteria. From the information presented in this study, it seems possible to make several retrospective reflections.

Retrospective Reflections

Representatives, even on the local level, are extremely busy individuals able to cover neither adequately nor completely the whole gamut of their responsibilities to their

constituents. They are frequently torn by various cross-pressures, by the uncertainties of politics, and by the many legitimate functions that seek their attention. Their primary function is to effectively legislate; however the clearly meritorious demands of constituents may severely limit their ability to do so. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the less legitimate requests may be far more important to success at the polls than the careful scrutiny of legislation. The representative's dilemmas are not easily resolved and many conflicts thus arise.

Although a majority of the people pay lip service to the notion that a representative should not use his independent judgment, the fact, in general, is that most people are unable, or do not care, to give instructions to their representatives.² Constituency control over the representative's activities is increasingly thwarted by the intricacy and obscurity of contemporary governmental issues. For example, taxation and finance, education and public welfare, legal reform, licensing and regulatory problems, transportation, etc. are topics more often than not beyond the comprehension of the average citizen.

As issues of public policy become forbiddingly complex for the citizen, however, so do they also for the only slightly more experienced local representative. He may be increasingly desirous of accepting the cues and thus leadership of an all-knowing constituency. Since the average local representative seeks to maximize his own occupational aspirations, however, and legislates only as a part-time represen-

tative, competing policy alternatives may confuse and confound him just as readily as they do his constituents. The point, then, is that the local representative may wish to represent his constituents as a delegate, but is unable to do so because of the generally prevailing political ignorance and/or apathy of the people themselves.³ Therefore, it would not be proper to go as far as Wahlke et al. when they suggested:

Under modern conditions, the trustee orientation is probably more realistic. Given the complexity of governmental problems, on the one hand, and the difficulty of finding out what clienteles may want, the delegate orientation is probably least functional from the point of view of effective representation.⁴

The present study, rather, indicates that the role of the trustee is least acceptable to local representatives. Local representatives want to represent their constituents in a mandate type relationship, but their constituents in general would apparently rather leave the governmental process, except in the most emotional of issues, up to their elected representatives. It therefore seems likely that the politico orientation was adhered to most frequently because representatives make decisions most readily according to constituent instructions when they are forthcoming, but in the vast majority of cases in which instructions are not offered, representatives go with public sentiment as they perceive it, according to their own judgment of it. It is precisely because representatives do not ordinarily hear from the public that they must rely on their own judgment. Thus if

one assumes that the extent to which any role is taken is a function of that role's difficulty, it would seem that the role orientation of trustee is indeed the most difficult orientation to hold, followed in order by delegate and politico, the politico orientation being by far the easiest to adopt.

It follows from the above reasoning, and should be understood clearly given the findings of this study, that seldom does any representative fit all aspects of either ideal, i.e., trustee or delegate. While it has been shown that most representatives verbalize important and persistent variations in emphasis concerning representational orientations, the exigencies of the representative's environment constrain him to play off his own initiatives against the demands others make of him, acting on instructions in one instance and according to his own judgment in the next. Representatives often oscillate from instructed delegate to trustee eventuating in the compromise role of politico. The author therefore agrees, although somewhat reluctantly, with the generalization expressed by Wilder W. Crane, Jr. that:

...regardless of how legislators may answer questions concerning normative concepts of style of representation, all [my emphasis] of them are politicos. Whether they say they are trustees voting on the merits of bills... [or] delegates voting in accordance with demands..., they are actually all politicos, who vote on differing bases depending on the issues confronting them.⁵

The findings of this study heavily underscore the fact that neither of the polar traditions of representation fully

accord with the realities of local legislative politics. While it has been shown that all three representational orientations may in fact be discerned, the local legislative system seems to be a mixture to which the Burkean and instructed-delegate models can be said to have contributed. Moreover, variations in the representative's relationship with his constituents are most likely to occur as one moves from one policy domain to another. No single generalized configuration of attitudes and perceptions links representative with constituency, but rather several distinct patterns, and which of them is invoked depends very much on the issues and individuals involved.

It has been suggested that identification with a particular representational orientation may also be partially influenced by the level of government involved. Wahlke et al. argued that "it is likely...that the representative has become less and less a delegate and more and more a trustee as...government has become...less locally centered."⁶ The present study only qualifiedly and very cautiously accepts Wahlke's conclusion. It has been shown that although local representatives attempt to place reliance on their constituents, most constituents avoid governmental responsibility and force the local representative in most instances to adopt the orientation of politico or perhaps even trustee. At this point it is worthwhile to recall the similarity of orientational identification found in the present study and in Davidson's study on the national level.⁷ Both this study and Davidson's study reveal foremost identification

with the politico orientation followed in order by delegate and trustee. It appears, therefore, that representatives on the national level, because of various factors (e.g., extensive franking, staffing, and traveling privileges, etc.), are able, as are local representatives, to keep in better contact with their constituents than are state legislators, thereby somewhat alleviating the necessarily assigned orientational identification of trustee.⁸ In other words, the concept of "low visibility of government" on the state level may enter in.⁹ Since Wahlke et al.'s study was based on the state level, this conclusion appears to be reasonable.

Limitations of the Present Study and Suggestions for Future Research

The present study only represents the representational orientations of a designated number of particular representatives and governmental units at a specific point in time. A similar study conducted on representatives of the same or similar governmental units at some future date could conceivably yield very different results. Therefore, the present study may only be properly viewed as suggestive of local governmental and representational tendencies and not conclusive for local governments and representatives as a whole.

It seems only proper to conclude, considering the data presented and analyzed, that studies such as this one are at least in part heuristic -- that is, valuable for empirical research, but incapable of definite proof. This study does verify the existence of three stylistic orientations at

the local level of representation and is reasonably definitive in that respect. To claim the determination of an established numerical rank relation for every study of this nature, however, is impractical. It seems more likely that the ratio or percentage of respondents identifying with each orientation is likely to vary according to the different variables involved. For example, orientations are likely to be influenced by the character of politics at a given time and by the demands of contemporary political circumstances impinging upon the representative as a decision-maker. Therefore, even though the nature of the data does not justify further inferences about the effects on legislative processes in relation to possible distributions of the various representational role orientations, the differences are at least suggestive of the kinds of effects which might be found in research specifically designed to investigate them.

The utility of such a role analysis investigation as conducted in this study rests upon the assumption that legislators' role orientations influence their legislative behavior. Orientational analyses may help explain why political representatives act as they do in the legislative arena. They may be useful in understanding how legislators translate demands which are placed upon them and may also explain how they combine these translated demands with their personal goals into some kinds of legislative decisions.

Several interesting possibilities for research along the lines of this study seem worthwhile. For example, one

such study would be to interview all of the city commissioners or councilmen in one or more states in an attempt to determine representational orientations and the various interacting independent variables. Needless to say, this would be a difficult and challenging task. The less ambitious researcher, however, could conduct a similar study of the county commissioners or judges in one or several states. Another possibility would be to make a similar study of the House of Representatives and/or Senate in a particular state, along the same lines as Wahlke et al. and compare and contrast the findings in the hope of producing further relevant conclusions.

The interested researcher, of course, would not have to be limited by the parameters of the present study. The scope of the study could be expanded extensively. For instance, the researcher could analyze all seven of the previously determined legislative role orientations in the hope of uncovering new and significant findings, or possibly even undetermined orientational categories. In addition, such factors as constituent background variables and constituent attitudes toward representation could be measured for each community, county or state in question, as well as for the particular representatives involved. In brief, the possibilities for future research are numerous; the ideas reviewed here are merely suggestions of a few interesting and available alternatives.

Footnotes

1. Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 9.

2. This notion is exemplified in Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," American Political Science Review, LXIII (June 1969), 434.

3. Ronald D. Hedlund and H. Paul Friesema, in "Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion," Journal of Politics, XXXIV (August 1972), 742, uncovered an interesting finding. When they classified Iowa legislators by their representational role orientations, delegates were least able to predict constituency opinion. Only 50 percent of the delegates were reasonably accurate in predicting their districts' responses to four constitutional issues. Over 78 percent of the trustees and 63 percent of the politicians were able to predict constituency response. This indicates that half of those legislators who indicated that their voting behavior should be determined by what their constituents wanted did not accurately know what their constituents wanted.

4. John C. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 286.

5. Wilder W. Crane, Jr., "The Legislative Struggle in Wisconsin: Decision-Making in the 1957 Wisconsin Assembly," in The Representative: Trustee? Delegate? Partisan? Politician?, ed. by Neal Riemer (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1967), p. 84.

6. Wahlke, et al., Legislative System, p. 281. Similar sentiments were also expressed by Carl D. McMurry and Malcolm B. Parsons, "Public Attitudes Toward the Representational Roles of Legislators and Judges," Midwest Journal of Political Science, LX (May 1965), 171.

7. Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 117.

8. Norman Meller in "Legislative Behavior Research," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (March 1960), 148, demonstrates this point by indicating the rather large number of Congressmen who conduct their own polls in a conscious effort to keep in touch with their constituents.

9. James W. Fesler, The 50 States and their Local Governments (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967), pp. 202-03.

APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRE

- 1) Observations
 - a. Sex
 1. male
 2. female
 - b. Race
 1. white
 2. black
 3. other (specify)
- 2) What is your age?
- 3) How much formal education have you completed?
 - a. some grade school
 - b. grade school
 - c. some high school
 - d. high school
 - e. trade school
 - f. some college
 - g. college
 - h. advanced degree
 - i. no response
- 4) If you earned an advanced degree, what was it?
 - a. M.A., M.S.
 - b. Ph.D.
 - c. LLB, J.D.
 - d. M.D., D.D.S., D.V.M.
 - e. other
 - f. no response
- 5) What do you consider to be your primary occupation?
(specify)
 - a. professional or semi-professional
 - b. self-employed businessman
 - c. clerical or sales
 - d. skilled or semi-skilled
 - e. unskilled
 - f. protective service
 - g. farmer
 - h. housewife
 - i. retired or semi-retired
 - j. unemployed
 - k. student
 - l. no response

- 6) Do you have other economic interests from which you receive income? If so, what are they?

What percentage of your total income would you say you derive from these outside sources?

- 7) What do you think will be your approximate total (gross) income this year for yourself and your immediate family?
- a. less than \$5,000
 - b. \$5,000 to \$10,000
 - c. \$10,000 to \$15,000
 - d. \$15,000 to \$20,000
 - e. \$20,000 to \$25,000
 - f. \$25,000 to \$30,000
 - g. \$30,000 to \$35,000
 - h. \$35,000 to \$50,000
 - i. \$50,000 or more
- 8) What is your religious affiliation?
- a. Protestant
 - b. Roman Catholic
 - c. Jewish
 - d. other (specify)
 - e. no response
- 9) What social, fraternal, professional, business, etc., memberships do you have? (specify)

Which of these is most important?

- 10) In what socio-economic class would you say you belong?
- a. upper
 - b. upper middle
 - c. lower middle
 - d. lower
 - e. no response
- 11) What do you consider to be your political party affiliation?
- a. strong Democrat
 - b. Democrat
 - c. independent-Democrat
 - d. independent-Republican
 - e. Republican
 - f. strong Republican
 - g. other (specify)
 - h. no response

- 12) How much formal education did your father complete?
- a. some grade school
 - b. grade school
 - c. some high school
 - d. high school
 - e. trade school
 - f. some college
 - h. college
 - h. advanced degree
- 13) What was your father's primary occupation when you were growing up? (specify)
- a. professional or semi-professional
 - b. self-employed businessman
 - c. clerical or sales
 - d. skilled or semi-skilled
 - e. unskilled
 - f. protective service
 - g. farmer
 - h. retired or semi-retired
 - i. unemployed
 - j. student
 - k. no response
- 14) What socio-economic class would you say your family was in when you were growing up?
- a. upper
 - b. upper middle
 - c. lower middle
 - d. lower
 - e. no response
- 15) How interested and/or involved were your parents in politics when you were growing up?
- a. very interested
 - b. somewhat interested
 - c. indifferent
 - d. not interested
 - e. no response
- 16) Were your parents or other members of your immediate family active in politics besides voting?
If yes, specify how.
- 17) What did your father generally regard as his political party affiliation?
- a. strong Democrat
 - b. Democrat
 - c. independent-Democrat
 - d. independent-Republican
 - e. Republican
 - f. strong Republican
 - g. other (specify)
 - h. no response

- 18) What elective and/or appointive offices have you held?
- 19) How many terms, including the present one, have you held the office you now hold?
- 20) Were you initially elected or appointed to this position?
- elected
 - appointed
- 21) When you were first nominated for public office, were you
- self-recruited
 - recruited from outside sources
 - both
 - no response
- 22) Before you ran for public office for the first time, did any of the following people try to convince you that you should run?
- | | Yes | No | NR |
|---|-----|-----|-----|
| a. state legislators | () | () | () |
| b. chairman of a local party unit | () | () | () |
| c. local businessmen | () | () | () |
| d. members of your family | () | () | () |
| e. other (city commissioners, city councilmen, county commissioners, county judges) | () | () | () |
| f. members of the clergy | () | () | () |
| g. others (specify) | () | () | () |
- 23) Generally speaking then, would you say that your decision to run was pretty much
- your own idea
 - drafted
 - half and half
 - no response
- 24) Do you plan to seek reelection to the office you now hold?
- 25) Do you plan to seek an elective office on, say, the (county), state or national level at some future date? If yes, specify.
- 26) Would you accept an appointed office on, say, the (county), state or national level?
- 27) Approximately how many hours per week, including meetings, do you spend on (city commission, city council, county court, county commission) work?
- over 40 hours per week
 - 31 to 40 hours
 - 21 to 30 hours
 - 11 to 20 hours
 - 5 to 10 hours
 - under 5 hours

- 28) Approximately how many days of the year do you devote at least some time to (city commission, city council, county commission, county court) work?
- a. more than 300
 - b. 200 to 300
 - c. 100 to 199
 - d. 50 to 99
 - e. 25 to 49
 - f. less than 25
- 29) Do you vote in local, state and national elections?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response
- 30) When they take place in your community or the surrounding area, do you go to political meetings, rallies, dinners, and things like that?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response
- 31) Do you give money or buy tickets to help pay the campaign expenses of a political party or candidate?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response
- 32) In your support of one particular political party, have you worn campaign buttons or have you had campaign stickers on your car?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response
- 33) Do you campaign actively for others?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response
- 34) To your knowledge, to what extent are (commission, council, court) meetings merely formal procedures, with the real decision making on policy being decided or determined outside the (commission, council, court) meetings?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response

- 35) Of the political clubs or organizations that exist in (Manhattan, Carthage, Joplin, Junction City), which ones do you belong to?

Of these, which is the most important?

- 36) Members of the (city commission, city council, county commission, county court), should vote on issues before the (commission, council, court).
- a. according to their own best judgment
 - b. according to the way their constituents feel
 - c. according to a combination of judgment and the way their constituents feel.
- 37) In determining how you will vote on certain issues do you consult your constituents?
- a. always
 - b. most of the time
 - c. some of the time
 - d. never
 - e. no response
- 38) Have you ever knowingly voted against what you thought the majority of the people in your district wanted?
- 39) Do you think it is easy or difficult to vote against the wishes of the people in your district?
- a. very easy
 - b. easy
 - c. difficult
 - d. very difficult
 - e. no response
- 40) The trouble with our democratic form of government is that people don't know what is best for them. They always need a few strong and able people to make political decisions for them.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 41) Most of the public knows what it wants, and anyone representing them should vote according to the public's expressed wishes.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response

- 42) The public knows, in general, what it wants and should be represented accordingly. Occasionally, however, what the public wants is not in its best interest and in these instances the public should be protected against its own will.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 43) The job of a (commissioner, councilman, judge) is to work for what his constituents want even though this may not always agree with his personal views.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 44) A (commissioner, councilman, judge) can decide how to vote on most issues by asking himself if the proposed (ordinance, resolution) is morally right.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 45) I seldom have to sound out my constituents because I think so much like them that I know how to react to almost any proposal.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 46) My district includes so many different kinds of people that I often don't know just what the people there want me to do.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response

- 47) If his views are in harmony with those of his constituents, a (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) need not pay attention to their instructions.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 48) The views of constituents, lobbyists, interest group leaders, or colleagues cannot be trusted.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 49) If a (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) finds himself in conflict with his constituents, he should try to persuade them to his convictions.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 50) (City commissioners, City councilmen, County Commissioners, County judges) should not use their independent judgment or principled convictions as decision-making premises.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response
- 51) A (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) should follow his constituents' instructions even if these instructions are explicitly counter to his own judgment or principles.
- a. strongly agree
 - b. agree
 - c. indifferent
 - d. disagree
 - e. strongly disagree
 - f. no response

- 52) Political responsibility for policy decisions lies ultimately on the constituents, not the (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge).
- strongly agree
 - agree
 - indifferent
 - disagree
 - strongly disagree
 - no response
- 53) A (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) should follow his constituents' instructions in certain matters and his own convictions in others.
- strongly agree
 - agree
 - indifferent
 - disagree
 - strongly disagree
 - no response
- 54) A (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) should follow his party's instructions in political matters, although on other matters he can be a free agent.
- strongly agree
 - agree
 - indifferent
 - disagree
 - strongly disagree
 - no response
- 55) Independent judgment is important in decision-making pertaining to (commission, council, court) issues, because instructions from particular groups have to be integrated in the legislative process.
- strongly agree
 - agree
 - indifferent
 - disagree
 - strongly disagree
 - no response
56. How important to you are the following features in making decisions on policy?

	Very Imp	Imp	Not Too Imp	Not Imp At All	NR
a. basis of con- science	()	()	()	()	()
b. principles	()	()	()	()	()
c. what is morally right	()	()	()	()	()
d. own judgment and under- standing	()	()	()	()	()
e. considerations of facts	()	()	()	()	()

	Very Imp	Imp	Not Too Imp	Not At	Imp All	N	R
f. appraisal of interests	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
g. basis of instructions or orders by constituents	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
h. basis of instructions or orders by interest groups	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
i. basis of instructions or orders by party	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
j. by weighing own judgment and/or conscience	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
k. combination of own judgment and instructions from constituents, interest groups or other outside sources.	()	()	()	()	()	()	()

57) If you are seeking advice on some issue facing the (commission, court, council), how likely is it that you will ask the following people?

	Very Like	Like	Unlike	Very Unlike	NR
a. friends not on the (commission, court, council)	()	()	()	()	()
b. both or all of the interested participants to the issue	()	()	()	()	()
c. one or a few interested participants to an issue	()	()	()	()	()
d. local political party officials	()	()	()	()	()
e. interest group heads	()	()	()	()	()
f. union leaders	()	()	()	()	()
g. constituents	()	()	()	()	()
h. members of your family	()	()	()	()	()

58) How would you describe the job of being a (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) - what are the most important things you should do here?

- 59) Are there any important differences between what you think the job of (city commissioner, city councilman, county commissioner, county judge) entails and the way your constituents see it? What are they?
- 60) In cases when your opinion as a (commissioner, councilman, judge) is different from that of the majority of the people in your district, do you think you should usually vote according to your own best judgment, or according to the way the majority of your district feels?

Controversial Issue Questions

Manhattan: You are on record December 5, 1972 as voting Yes/No on the motion for appropriating funds to purchase the Payne property for use as a city park. The Commission vote on this motion was 3-2. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular motion?

Carthage: You are on record July 24, 1972 as voting Yes/No on Council Bill 5659 pertaining to lowering the occupation licenses for advertising agencies from \$50 to \$25. The reconsideration vote by the Council on this bill was 7-3. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mine, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular ordinance?

Joplin: You are on record May 1, 1972 as voting Yes/No on Council Bill 27042 pertaining to a contract with Homer Carr Construction Company for the open space development and construction of a swimming pool, bath house and parking area adjacent to Parr Hill Park. The Council vote on this bill was 7-2. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular ordinance?

Junction City: You are on record December 26, 1972 as voting Yes/No on the motion to purchase landfill equipment from the Revenue Sharing Funds as opposed to the utilization of Landfill Construction Project funds for that purpose. The Commission vote on this motion was 3-1 (Commissioner Goad absent). What thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that motion?

Jasper County: On January 21, 1972, February 7, 1972 and March 17, 1972 the Court approved emergency orders for withdrawing \$612 from the Emergency Fund in the General Revenue Budget to contribute to the cost of the Food Distribution Program of the Division of Welfare. Can you tell me what considerations influenced your individual position on that particular matter?

Geary County: You are on record December 13, 1971 as voting Yes/No on the motion not to renew the services of Claude Frese as Welfare Director for another year. The Commission vote on this motion was 2-1. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular motion?

Riley County: You are on record February 19, 1971 as voting Yes/No on the motion that the rezoning for Dave Sullivan for a Mobile Park be denied. The Commission vote on this motion was 2-1. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular motion?

Routine Issue Questions

Manhattan: You are on record December 19, 1972 as voting Yes/No on Ordinance No. 3109 dealing with rezoning Kimball Sub-division, Unit 3, from residential (R) to residential single-family (R-1). The Commission vote on this ordinance was 5-0. What thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that ordinance?

Carthage: You are on record May 22, 1972 as voting Yes/No on Council Bill 5660 pertaining to the construction of a concrete overlay on Chestnut Street from Orner to Baker Boulevard. The Council vote on this ordinance was 10-0. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular ordinance?

Joplin: You are on record January 15, 1973 as voting Yes/No on Council Bill 27232 (Ordinance No. 26797) authorizing the employment of additional employees for the Joplin Police Department and authorizing the expenditure from the Federal Revenue Sharing Trust Fund for their salaries and other personal services expense. The Council vote on this ordinance was 9-0. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular ordinance?

Junction City: You are on record December 26, 1972 as voting Yes/No on Ordinance No. G-348 establishing a Junction City-Geary County Joint Economic Development Commission. The Commission vote on this ordinance was 5-0. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that particular ordinance?

Jasper County: On March 8, 1973 the Court approved the re-appointment of Dr. E. W. Millenbruck by the Carthage Special Road District to be a Commissioner on the Carthage Special Road District. Can you tell me what thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your individual position on that particular matter?

Geary County: You are on record April 3, 1972 as voting Yes/No on the resolution for a change to be made in the boundaries of Jefferson and Smoky Hill Township in light of the reapportionment and changing of the boundaries of the 64th Representative District. The Commission vote on this resolution was 3-0. What thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that resolution?

Riley County: You are on record March 1, 1971 as voting Yes/No on the resolution to vacate the road shown on the map in Sherman Township. The Commission vote on this resolution was 3-0. What thoughts crossed your mind, or what considerations influenced your decision to vote the way you did on that resolution?

APPENDIX II

CODE BOOK

CARD NUMBER: 1

<u>COLUMN NUMBER</u>	<u>CODE</u>
1-2	1. Study number: 47
3-4	2. Respondent's identification
5-6	3. Card number
7	4. Sex of Respondent 0. male 1. female
8	5. Race of Respondent 0. white 1. black
9	6. Age of Respondent 0. 31-39 1. 40-49 2. 50-59 3. 60-69 4. 70 and above 5. N.R.
10	7. Formal Education of Respondent 0. grade school 1. some high school 2. high school 3. some college 4. college 5. advanced degree 6. professional 7. N.R.
11	8. Primary Occupation of Respondent 0. professional or semi-professional 1. self-employed businessman 2. clerical or sales 3. skilled or semi-skilled 4. farmer 5. housewife 6. retired or semi-retired 7. unemployed

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

12-13

9. Other economic interests of respondent
0. none
 1. real estate and investments
 2. business owner
 3. white collar work
 4. blue collar work
 5. farming
 6. retirement income
 7. N.R.
 8. does not apply

14

10. Percentage of respondent's total income derived from outside sources
0. none
 1. under 20%
 2. 20% to 39%
 3. 40% to 49%
 4. 50% and above
 5. does not apply

15

11. Respondent's income for himself and immediate family
0. less than \$5,000
 1. \$5,000 to \$10,000
 2. \$10,001 to \$15,000
 3. \$15,001 to \$20,000
 4. \$20,001 to \$25,000
 5. \$25,001 to \$30,000
 6. \$30,001 to \$35,000
 7. \$35,001 to \$50,000
 8. \$50,000 or more
 9. N.R.

16-17

12. Respondent's social, fraternal, professional, business, etc. memberships
0. none
 1. social
 2. civic
 3. professional
 4. veteran
 5. church
 6. N.R.
 7. does not apply

18

13. Respondent's most important social, fraternal, professional, business, etc. membership
0. none
 1. social
 2. civic
 3. professional
 4. veteran
 5. church
 6. N.R.
 7. does not apply

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

- | | |
|----|---|
| 19 | 14. Socio-economic class of respondent |
| | 0. upper |
| | 1. upper middle |
| | 2. lower middle |
| | 3. lower |
| | 4. N.R. |
| 20 | 15. Respondent's political party affiliation |
| | 0. strong Democrat |
| | 1. Democrat |
| | 2. independent-Democrat |
| | 3. independent-Republican |
| | 4. Republican |
| | 5. strong Republican |
| | 6. other |
| | 7. N.R. |
| 21 | 16. Formal education of respondent's father |
| | 0. grade school |
| | 1. some high school |
| | 2. high school |
| | 3. some college |
| | 4. college |
| | 5. advanced degree |
| | 6. professional |
| | 7. N.R. |
| 22 | 17. Primary occupation of respondent's father |
| | 0. professional or semi-professional |
| | 1. self-employed businessman |
| | 2. clerical or sales |
| | 3. skilled or semi-skilled |
| | 4. unskilled |
| | 5. farmer |
| 23 | 18. Socio-economic class of respondent's family when growing up |
| | 0. upper |
| | 1. upper middle |
| | 2. lower middle |
| | 3. lower |
| | 4. N.R. |
| 24 | 19. Political interest of respondent's parents when growing up |
| | 0. very interested |
| | 1. somewhat interested |
| | 2. indifferent |
| | 3. not interested |
| | 4. N.R. |

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

- | | |
|-------|--|
| 25 | 20. Activity of respondent's parents or immediate family in politics
0. very active
1. active
2. not too active
3. not active at all
4. N.R. |
| 26 | 21. Political party affiliation of respondent's father
0. strong Democrat
1. Democrat
2. independent-Democrat
3. independent-Republican
4. Republican
5. strong Republican
6. N.R. |
| 27-29 | 22. Elective and/or appointive offices held by respondent
0. school board
1. local party office
2. county party office
3. local elective office
4. local appointive office
5. county elective office
6. county appointive office
7. state elective office
8. state appointive office
9. does not apply |
| 30 | 23. Respondent's present office
0. county judge
1. county commissioner
2. city council
3. city commission |
| 31 | 24. Number of terms present office held by respondent
0. one
1. two
2. three
3. four to five
4. six to seven |
| 32 | 25. Respondent initially elected or appointed to present office
0. elected
1. appointed |

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

- | | |
|----|--|
| 33 | 26. When respondent was first nominated for public office he was
0. self-recruited
1. recruited from outside sources
2. both
3. N.R. |
| 34 | 27. Convince respondent to run: state legislators
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 35 | 28. Convince respondent to run: chairman of local party unit
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 36 | 29. Convince respondent to run: local businessmen
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 37 | 30. Convince respondent to run: members of family
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 38 | 31. Convince respondent to run: other (commissioners, councilmen, judges)
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 39 | 32. Convince respondent to run: members of the clergy
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 40 | 33. Convince respondent to run: others
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 41 | 34. Respondent's decision to run
0. own idea
1. drafted
2. half and half
3. N.R. . |

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

- | | |
|----|--|
| 42 | 35. Plan to seek reelection
0. yes
1. no
2. undecided
3. N.R. |
| 43 | 36. Plan to seek county, state or national office
0. no
1. county
2. state
3. national
4. N.R. |
| 44 | 37. Would respondent accept appointed office on county, state or national level
0. yes
1. no
2. N.R. |
| 45 | 38. Hours per week respondent spends on (commission, council, court) work
0. over 40 hours
1. 31 to 40 hours
2. 21 to 30 hours
3. 11 to 20 hours
4. 5 to 10 hours
5. under 5 hours |
| 46 | 39. Days per year respondent devotes to (commission, council, court) work
0. more than 300
1. 200 to 300
2. 100 to 199
3. 50 to 99
4. 25 to 49
5. less than 25 |
| 47 | 40. Respondent votes in local state and national elections
0. always
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. never
4. N.R. |

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 48 | 41. Respondent goes to political meetings, rallies, dinners, and things like that
0. always
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. never
4. N.R. |
| 49 | 42. Respondent gives money or buys tickets to help pay the campaign expenses of a political party or candidate
0. always
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. never
4. N.R. |
| 50 | 43. Respondent has worn campaign buttons or had campaign stickers on his car
0. always
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. never
4. N.R. |
| 51 | 44. Respondent campaigns actively for others
0. always
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. never
4. N.R. |
| 52 | 45. To respondents knowledge, (commission, council, court) meetings are merely formal procedures with the real decision making on policy being decided or determined outside the meetings
0. always
1. most of the time
2. some of the time
3. never
4. N.R. |
| 53-54 | 46. Political clubs or organizations to which the respondent belongs
0. none
1. Republican Party
2. Democrat Party
3. local party affiliation group
4. county party affiliation group
5. state party affiliation group
6. N.R.
7. does not apply |

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

55

47. The most important political club or organization to which the respondent belongs
0. none
 1. Republican Party
 2. Democrat Party
 3. local party affiliation group
 4. county party affiliation group
 5. state party affiliation group
 6. N.R.
 7. does not apply

56

48. Respondent feels (commissioner, council man, judge) should vote on issues
0. according to their own best judgment
 1. according to the way their constituents feel
 2. according to a combination of judgment and the way their constituents feel

57

49. In determining how he will vote on certain issues respondent consults constituents
0. always
 1. most of the time
 2. some of the time
 3. never
 4. N.R.

58

50. Has respondent ever voted against what he thought the majority of the people in his district wanted
0. yes
 1. no
 2. N.R.

59

51. Does respondent feel it is easy or difficult to vote against the wishes of the people in his district
0. very easy
 1. easy
 2. difficult
 3. very difficult
 4. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

60

52. The trouble with our democratic form of government is that people don't know what is best for them. They always need a few strong and able people to make political decisions for them.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

61

53. Most of the public knows what it wants, and anyone representing them should vote according to the public's expressed wishes
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

62

54. The public knows, in general, what it wants and should be represented accordingly. Occasionally, however, what the public wants is not in its best interest and in these instances the public should be protected against its own will.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

63

55. The job of a (commissioner, councilman, judge) is to work for what his constituents want even though this may not always agree with his personal views.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

64

56. A (commissioner, councilman, judge) can decide how to vote on most issues by asking himself if the proposed (ordinance, resolution) is morally right.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

65

57. I seldom have to sound out my constituents because I think so much like them that I know how to react to almost any proposal.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

66

58. My district includes so many different kinds of people that I often don't know just what the people there want me to do.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

67

59. If his views are in harmony with those of his constituents, a (commissioner, councilman, judge) need not pay attention to their instructions.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

68

60. The views of constituents, lobbyists, interest group leaders, or colleagues cannot be trusted.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

69

61. If a (commissioner, councilman, judge) finds himself in conflict with his constituents, he should try to persuade them to his convictions.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

70

62. (Commissioners, Councilmen, Judges) should not use their independent judgment or principled convictions as decision-making premises.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

71

63. A (commissioner, councilman, judge) should follow his constituents' instructions even if these instructions are explicitly counter to his own judgment or principles.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

72

64. Political responsibility for policy decisions lies ultimately on the constituents, not the (commissioner, councilman, judge).
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

73

65. A (commissioner, councilman, judge) should follow his constituents' instructions in certain matters and his own convictions in others.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

74

66. A (commissioner, councilman, judge) should follow his party's instructions in political matters, although on other matters he can be a free agent.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

75

67. Independent judgment is important in decision-making pertaining to (commission, council, court) issues, because instructions from particular groups have to be integrated in the legislative process.
0. strongly agree
 1. agree
 2. indifferent
 3. disagree
 4. strongly disagree
 5. N.R.

76

68. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: basis of conscience
0. very important
 1. important
 2. not too important
 3. not important at all
 4. N.R.

77

69. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: principles
0. very important
 1. important
 2. not too important
 3. not important at all
 4. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 1

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

78

70. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: what is morally right
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

79

71. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: own judgment and understanding
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

80

72. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: consideration of fact
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 2

1-2

1. Study number: 47

3-4

2. Respondent's identification

5-6

3. Card number

7

73. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: appraisal of interest
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

8

74. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: basis of instructions or orders by constituents
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 2

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

9

75. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: basis of instructions or orders by interest groups
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

10

76. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: basis of instructions or orders by party
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

11

77. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: by weighing own judgment and/or conscience instead of instructions
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

12

78. Importance to respondent in policy decision making: combination of own judgment and instructions from constituents, interest groups or other outside sources
- 0. very important
 - 1. important
 - 2. not too important
 - 3. not important at all
 - 4. N.R.

13

79. Asked by respondent for advice on issue friends not on the (commission, council court)
- 0. very likely
 - 1. likely
 - 2. unlikely
 - 3. very unlikely
 - 4. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 2

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

- | | |
|----|--|
| 14 | 80. Asked by respondent for advice on issue both or all of the interested participants to the issue
0. very likely
1. likely
2. unlikely
3. very unlikely
4. N.R. |
| 15 | 81. Asked by respondent for advice on issue one or a few interested participants to an issue
0. very likely
1. likely
2. unlikely
3. very unlikely
4. N.R. |
| 16 | 82. Asked by respondent for advice on issue local political party officials
0. very likely
1. likely
2. unlikely
3. very unlikely
4. N.R. |
| 17 | 83. Asked by respondent for advice on issue interest group heads
0. very likely
1. likely
2. unlikely
3. very unlikely
4. N.R. |
| 18 | 84. Asked by respondent for advice on issue constituents
0. very likely
1. likely
2. unlikely
3. very unlikely
4. N.R. |
| 19 | 85. Asked by respondent for advice on issue members of family
0. very likely
1. likely
2. unlikely
3. very unlikely
4. N.R. |

CARD NUMBER: 2

COLUMN NUMBERCODE

20

86. How respondent describes the job of (commissioner, councilman, judge) - and the most important things he feels he should do
0. represent all of the people
 1. represent majority of people
 2. represent particular district
 3. represent whole city/county
 4. regulate tax money in best possible manner
 5. follow constituents' instructions
 6. follow combination of instructions and judgement
 7. use own judgment
 8. N.R.

21

87. Differences between what respondent feels the job of (commissioner, councilman, judge) entails and the way his constituents see it.
0. none
 1. should be concerned more with individual interests
 2. want me to be more of a spokesman for the people
 3. want me to utilize my own judgment more
 4. N.R.

22

88. In cases when the respondents opinion as a (commissioner, councilman, judge) is different from the majority of the people in his district, he feels he should vote:
0. according to his own best judgment
 1. according to the way the majority of his district feels
 2. equal importance
 3. N.R.

23

89. Routine individual issue question
0. no contact from constituents
 1. contacted by constituents - followed constituent desires
 2. contacted by constituents - used combination of constituent desires and own judgment
 3. contacted by constituents - used own judgment
 4. N.R.

CARD NUMBER: 2

COLUMN NUMBER

24

CODE

90. Controversial individual issue question
- 0. no contact from constituents
 - 1. contacted by constituents - followed constituent desires
 - 2. contacted by constituents - used own judgment
 - 3. contacted by constituents - used combination of constituent desires and own judgment
 - 4. N.R.

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REPRESENTATIVE ROLE BEHAVIOR AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:
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by

DOUGLAS KENT CRANDALL

B.A., Baker University, 1972

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

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MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

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Probably the oldest and stormiest quarrel of academician and practitioner alike in respect to the basis of democratic government is the relationship between the representative and his constituents. Whether an elected legislator is in fact a representative chosen by his constituency to exercise his own judgment on the issues debated or simply a delegate whose electors never suspend the operation of their own sovereignty and who rightfully expect him without modification to execute their mandates is a question that has never been finally settled. In this respect, a historical review and intensive empirical analysis of the relationship between the representative and his constituency was conducted. The influence of the constituent on the local representative's decision-making function was the focal point in an attempt to isolate, reveal, and amplify the important socio-economic background and political characteristics, as well as individual orientational rationalizations.

In attempting to realize the objectives of this study, thirty-nine local representatives were extensively interviewed. The respondents included: the county commissioners of Riley and Geary Counties in Kansas, the county judges of Jasper County in Missouri, the city commissioners of Manhattan and Junction City, Kansas, and the city councilmen of Carthage and Joplin, Missouri. The interviews revealed the existence of three representational role orientations relative to the decision-making criteria (i.e., trustee,

politico, and delegate), as well as certain rather consistent personality tendencies that seem to closely correlate with these orientations.

While this study verifies the existence of the three representational orientations and correlating individual characteristics and rationalizations, to claim the determination of an established numerical ranking for every representative body was concluded to be impractical. The present study indicates, rather, that the ratio or percentage of respondents identifying with each orientation is likely to vary according to the different variables and governmental units under consideration. In addition, considering the variation of individual orientational identification, the conclusion that all representatives in the final analysis are politicos is probably a valid assumption.