JIMMY CARTER'S 1976 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ELITIST, MYTHICAL AND SUCCESSFUL

by

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-DEDICATION-

To my parents,

Norma and Edgar Hines

and my daughter

Lisa

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INTRODUCTION

There is a growing interest among political scientists in what is known as elite theory. During the first decades of the twentieth century elite theory was developed by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels. Their ideas were used to critique Fascist ideology on the extreme right and western bourgeois democracy as well as socialism.

World War II ended the power base of Fascism in Europe, but the war did not terminate elite theory. It has, however, taken new form. After World War II, and especially with the writing of Joseph Schumpeter and C. Wright Mills, elite theory has been proposed as a corrective to traditional or overly idealistic views of democracy. These scholars believed they offered a more accurate interpretation of the operation of western political systems than are offered by more traditional explanations.

In recent years (especially the last two decades) increasing numbers of political scientists have become interested in this field of scholarship. Some examples of popular American government textbooks using this theme have been Irony of Democracy by Thomas Dye and Harmon Zeigler and Michael Parenti's Democracy for the Few. Also many book-

length analyses of elite theory have been published.

Examples include the following: Kenneth Prewitt and Alan
Stone, The Ruling Elites; Geraint Parry, Political Elites;

T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society; G. William Domhoff's
Who Rules America? and Who Really Rules?; Robert D. Putnam,
The Comparative Study of Elites; William A. Welsh, Leaders
and Elites; Michael Parenti, Power and the Powerless; Peter
Bachrach, Political Elites in a Democracy; Philip H. Burch,
Elites in American History and many others.

In examining elite theory, this report deals more specifically with the elitist relationships of a recent president. Jimmy Carter presented a particular image to the American public when he campaigned for the presidency, 1973-1976, claiming he was an "outsider" to Washington politics. This image he chose to present to the voters was one the electorate wanted and needed to see. To fully understand the import of this image one must also discuss the significance of imagery in politics as related to elite theory and the place it has in our political system. Ιn examining such imagery, a review of the classical and contemporary writers of elite theory is important. This report will review Jimmy Carter's "outsider" image and seek to find the reasons that particular image was chosen and why it was so successful in 1976.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF ELITE THEORY

Three authors of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who are generally considered to be the classical writers of elite theory are Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Vilfredo Pareto. They researched and presented what they considered were the realities of political life. Basically this reality was that in every society there are two groups, the elites (those who ruled) and the masses (those who were ruled).

Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) was an Italian political scientist who was born in Palermo, Sicily, and his Sicilian background was reputed to be responsible for his hostility toward democratic ideology and the parliamentary system. Mosca first presented his ideas on elitism in the The
Ruling Class (1896), which stated that whatever the form of government, power is always in the hands of an organized minority. He held that two opposite tendencies are inherent in society: (1) the aristocratic tendency toward keeping power in the hands of those who govern; and (2) the democratic tendency toward renewal by means of elements derived from the governed. 2

The concept of political elites originated with Mosca, if not the exact terminology. The term"political elite" is not found in Mosca's writings. He preferred "political class," "ruling class," and "governing class." That elitism did negate democratic theory and the accepted classification of political systems into monarchies, aristocracies and democracies was Mosca's central theme. Mosca analyzed the conditions that made for stable conditions in any government and those conditions that created unrest and turmoil. Mosca believed a society will be characterized by stable rule where the ruling class is well-organized, possess the necessary technical skills and is generally perceived to embody highly valued qualities and is willing to use force to support its rule.

Another writer who agreed with Mosca's evaluation that rule by the masses was not possible was Robert Michels. Active as a student in socialist politics in Europe in the early 1900's, Michels is best known for his theory of the "iron law of oligarchy." He concluded that all large organizations—political parties, labor unions and governments—develop oligarchies. He felt that all organizations come to be ruled by self-perpetuating elites with mass participation limited to ritualistically ratifying the action of the oligarchy. In 1910 he completed Political Parties, and it was within this work the Michels developed

his theory. In brief, it states that in organizations committed to the realization of democratic values, there inevitably arise strong oligarchic tendencies which give birth to the domination of the elected over the electors.

Michels also discussed the degree of responsiveness of (stable) leadership to the expectation and desires of the constituency. 5 In contrast to the popular theory of representative democracy, where leaders lose their positions through the election process if they are not responsive, Michels contends that leaders are in reality responsive to the interests of the organization rather than to their constituents. He says "this lack of responsiveness does not result...from a divergence between the interests of the leaders and those of their constituents, but from the apathy and ignorance of the constituents," and that this results from what he called the incompetence of the masses. As a result, he says that although the majority grumbles and complains, it is really delighted to find persons who will take the trouble and responsibility to look after its affairs.6

Although he achieved prominence as a founder of mathematical economic theory, Vilfredo Pareto, the third classical elitist, is remembered today primarily for his writings about the influence of elites in all human organizations. Pareto believed that every phase of society had its elite; there were elite soldiers, artists, gamblers, musicians, Some elites enjoyed more importance or "social weight" than others because their activities had greater social significance. His views are most clearly explained in The Treatise of General Sociology. This theory has been called the grandest of all classical elitist doctrines, a gargantuan retort to Marx. Pareto's elite is much wider and more comprehensive than the elites described by Mosca and Michels. Elites are seen by Pareto not as the product of economic forces nor as building their dominance on their organizational ability, but as the outcome of what he believed to be human attributes constant throughout history. 9

These three elite theorists established the study of elites as part of political science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Along with a trend toward a stronger executive in government, the state was entering into areas of society which it had previously ignored. Mass participation in politics was increasing, and political systems seemed to be opening up to popular control. There were some, however, who questioned whether this participation was reality or merely a tactic to insure control by elites. Scholars of political science were researching two diverse sets of circumstances. One was the advent of the masses into politics, and the other was the surprising fact that power seemed to be concentrated more and more into the hands

of a few. The writers of this period were especially concerned about a single, cohesive elite organizing. Because of this fear, they "aimed to inquire about the techniques of leadership, the relations between leaders and the led and what sort of people attained positions of leadership."10

Most early writers did not concern themselves with the morality of elitism; some, like Michels, said that the laws of elitism were "beyond good and evil," and he was simply reporting what existed. 11 But writers of elite theory were very concerned about unveiling the illusions around the distribution of political power; they were trying to present the reality of the political world. Mosca summed up this reality as follows:

In all societies...two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first. 12

Elite scholars considered the slogans of the day such as equality and government by the people as myths and sought to refute them by presenting their research; they felt these myths were merely hopes of those who originated them. Mosca's intent in writing The Ruling Class was to refute Rousseau's myth of popular sovereignty. To Mosca, government in a democracy was certainly of the

people, it might even be for the people, but it was never by the people but only by the ruling class. $^{\dot{1}3}$

The classical elitists believed that a ruling group or elite was necessary to all societies; however, they differed somewhat in their estimations of how the elite gained its power. Mosca and his disciple, Michels, held that an elite owed its power predominately to its organizational abilities. Pareto and his followers, by contrast, traced the elites' positions to the psychological make-up of both elite and non-elite.

Mosca drew his conclusions from his study of history. His conclusion was that neither one man nor the whole mass of people can rule. In his mind, the elite minority's ability for organization was the key to control. Organization was easier with a small number of individuals; information could be transmitted much more quickly and a small well-organized group could respond rapidly to any change.

Mosca's elite or ruling class was divided into two parts. The innermost part were the "bosses" who directed political life; in fact, Mosca believed they picked the candidates from which the masses could make a "choice." Even in a "liberal-democratic" system, elections were not offering the masses complete freedom in choosing their representative. The masses were given the right to choose

between elite-approved candidates.

When Mosca first proposed his elite theory, he insisted that the top elite was a cohesive elite and a conspiracy. In later writing, he modified his views, and his ruling class became closer to being defined simply as the "top people." He believed elites would use the aspirations and needs of the masses to offset the balance between other ruling groups.

As already mentioned, Robert Michels was responsible for coining the phrase, the "iron law of oligarchy." 15 He set out to study the socialist parties of Europe in order to prove his hypothesis. He felt that the masses were interested in a political matter only when it infringed on their own private interests. The same was true for the masses in any society; they were generally uninformed and uninterested in anything political until it included them personally.

Although some writers insist on using the term elitism in a negative connotation, the classical writers did not intend the word to be used in that manner. Rather, they were simply describing circumstances that existed and that would be interesting to research. Elitism, to them, was not a conspiracy to oppress, or to exploit the masses. Elitism does not mean that the masses never had any impact on the attitudes of elites; only that elites influence

masses more than masses influence elites.

Moving now to a review of contemporary elite theory, we find the term strategic elites being used frequently. This term is used to define those groups which, because of their position, power or actions, have affect on many members of society. As societies became more complex and specialized, elites did, too, and a hierarchy among elites developed. Traditionally, strategic elites were those leaders in politics, economics and the military as well as moral, cultural and scientific leaders. The essential definition of a strategic elite is based on the duration and depth of impact its actions have upon society and its members. Many of the contemporary writers deal to a large extent with researching which elites are the most powerful and influential. One of the most forceful writers in this area was C. Wright Mills.

Mills is described as a man who felt totally alienated from the American system because of the perversion which a profit-oriented society brought to his country's power, technology and industrial strength. This opinion is reflected in his book The Power Elite (1956); the book has been praised and criticized by political scientists. Here Mills sets forth his economic-elite dominance hypothesis. His general thesis is that a national power elite exists which forms a self-conscious integrated unity. Mills tried to

find what and who was responsible for the condition which America faced in that era.

Mills explored the structure of power in the United States in the 1950's, writing that elites were those individuals who hold leading positions in the dominant hierarchies -- the military, the large corporations, and the political executive. He felt that "elite is the product of the 'institutional landscape' of the society." 16 He was interested in establishing that there was a cohesive elite operating because of the interlocking positions among these three groups mentioned above. Individuals at the top in one group found it easy to move to a top position in another group. Not only that, but the leaders of these groups were constantly in touch with each other in formal and informal ways. Although these individuals used power, Mills believed the actual power resided in the institutions themselves. He defined the power elites as those who control the great organizations; they were the men who headed the great corporations, the armed forces, the state, and the mass media. They had the power to make sure the rest of society accepted their decisions, if indeed, they bothered to secure assent at all. Mills did not define the power elite as an economic class based on ownership of property. And yet he did state that the group was unified in a number of ways. It was united with a

similarity of outlook, programs, and values. The elite had similar interests, first of all in maintaining itself in power and then in substantive matters of policy.

Unity of the elite group was also based on the similarity of the types of men who make up the elite. As heads of large-scale organizations, they had a great deal of experience in common. They had similar educational and occupational careers. They tended to come from the same religious, ethnic and occupational backgrounds. Mills has been criticized for identifying the power elite with the upper class too closely, His critics state this led "him to overemphasize the importance of those social background factors which the two have in common and to minimize or ignore their differences." 17 Whether these criticisms are true or not, Mill's observations about the unity of the elite groups is still of primary importance to contemporary elite literature and research.

Mills felt that because the elite were the same type of men, and because their interests coincided at many points, they found it easy and profitable to interchange positions. Mills found that below this elite of powerful men there were the middle levels of power where various special interest groups struggled among themselves for advantageous positions. These groups represented labor unions, farm organizations, Congress, and other private groups which vied

with each other to interest elites in their affairs.

The classical elite theorists -- Mosca, Pareto, and Michels--treated the unity of the ruling elite as axiomatic. The task of research recently has been to measure the dimensions of integration such as social homogeneity. recruitment patterns, personal interaction, value consensus, group solidarity and institutional context. 18 To Mills, one of the keys to understanding the U.S. "power elite" was to study its social homogeneity. The upper social strata has provided a disproportionate number of its members to the power elite. Elites are generally alike in education, ethnicity, religion, geographic origin and six. The most common description in the United States of an elite, in general, has been "WASP" or white, anglo-saxon, Protestant and male. If perchange one or more of these basic elements was missing, the other qualities had to be outstanding to make up the loss.

One common denominator in the social milieu of the elites has been the elite educational institutions. In the United States this includes private prep-schools, the military academies and the elite universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. Even if individuals did not attend the schools during the same years, their common experiences provided a basis for recognition. Elite individuals have received similar training and have established common personal

contacts and friendships.

The unity of an elite can also be established by reviewing the individuals who have held top positions in each of the elite areas—in business, the military and the government. The best example is Dwight D. Eisenhower, who moved from the post of Army chief-of-staff, later to the presidency of Columbia University, and from there to the top political position in the country. 19 Such overlapping of positions presents the opportunity to be understanding and cooperative toward each of the elite sectors. Cooperative attitudes shown during public office may result in a top corporate position later.

Interest in the cooperation among elite sectors led

Thomas Dye, a contemporary political scientist, to research
the idea of power and where it resides in a complex, technological society. He believes that within American society
major national power resides in the economic, the political
and the military domains. In his book The Few and the

Many (1972) he presents his views.

Early in United States' development the economy was a scattering of small productive units in autonomous balance; this situation has changed. The economy is now dominated by giant national and multi-national corporations. These entities are interlocked in many ways; in personnel, in policies and politics and they hold the key to many economic decisions which have tremendous affect on the lives of the American people.

Dye feels that the political order and the military order have also become centralized over the years. The political order has become a centralized, executive establishment, which has absorbed many powers previously scattered, and now enters into each and every segment of the social structure. As for the military, it has become the largest and most expensive feature of government. As each of the domains becomes enlarged and centralized, the consequences of its activities become greater and its traffic with the others increases. One feature of centralized hierarchies of corporations, the government and the military establishment is that their top positions increasingly become interchangeable In fact, this means that they help each other; they are so interchangeable that if one element was affected adversely, they would all suffer.

Dye defines elites as those individuals who have a greater share than other people of the things and experiences that are most highly valued such as money, power and prestige. By the powerful he means those who are able to realize their will even if others resist it. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions, for it is the institutional positions men occupy that determine in large part their chances to have and to hold these valued attributes. Power, to Dye, is the capacity or the potential of persons in certain roles to make decisions

that affect the conduct of others in the social system.

Thus, elites are people who occupy power roles in society.

In a modern complex society, these roles are institutionalized the elite are individuals who occupy positions of authority in the large institutions.

Another important contributor to the literature of elite theory is Professor Suzanne Keller. In <u>Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society</u> (1963), she discusses in depth the differences between the term "ruling class" and "strategic elites." She defines strategic elite parameters by contrasting the definitions of the two term

Keller defines a ruling class as (1) being more diffuse and more permanent than a strategic elite. In contrast, a strategic elite is more concentrated, it fluctuates in activity and has relatively certain limits. (2) The membership of a ruling class is less voluntary than the membership of a strategic elite and (3) whereas the activities of a strategic elite are specific and specialized, the scope of the ruling class is wide. (4) The members of a ruling class share occupational and functional positions, habits, customs, and culture, where this does not necessarily happen within a strategic elite. (5) In principle there is only one ruling class, but there are a number of strategic elites. (6) The ruling class is probably numerically larger than a strategic elite. (7) Because of the differentiation of

tasks, a strategic elite is less likely to become despotic than the ruling class. (8) Strategic elites are selected on the basis of individual motivation and skill; the recruitment to the ruling class is based on groups of families which have access to the most important positions and transmit their rewards and opportunities to their descendents.²⁰

Professor Keller also has written extensively about the process of recruitment of elites. A review of her ideas will better explain the route Jimmy Carter traveled to become a member of the Trilateral Commission and the "Georgia Elite."

Keller writes that historically there have been two predominant methods by which individuals were recruited to elite positions. One is based upon supposed superiority of biological and social inheritance. Ascriptive criteria includes lineage, ethnicity, religion and sex. The other method stresses expertise or achievement in the skills needed in each position. Ascriptive criteria are supposed to be found more often in traditional societies; however, in reality, achievement and ascriptive criteria are blended in almost every recruitment system in every society. 21 Both of these principles are active in elite recruitment.

Potential candidates for elite membership are selected by several methods; (1) Biological reproduction, (2) Cooptation--whereby an elite chooses its successors, as in the case of governing boards of many corporations, (3) Election,

- (4) Selection by rote, (5) Purchase of elite positions,
- (6) Forcible appropriation, (7) Training and formal preparation for elite positions—a mechanism found in both earlier and present—day societies.²²

Selection by merit plays a large part in the recruitment of individuals in industrial societies.

People who make their way in life by self-help are frequently men of new ideas and values, men of initiative and mental alertness, whereas conservative groups, which for generations have mainly upheld and preserved what others have achieved, are less likely to produce men willing to take risks and receptive to new ideas...the self-made man making his way from "rags to riches" often develops a keeness most desirable in a society bound to change. If these mental traits are discouraged or neutralized by over-assimilation, society loses resources for change and adaptation.²³

However, selection by merit has problems. How does one ascertain "the best?" Also, individuals recruited in this manner are more likely to represent the narrow field in which they are an expert and lack an overall or broader view of situations.

The problem of defining elites is an important one. Criteria are difficult to establish which represent the broad spectrum of elites. Most studies center on specific elites such as, senators, cabinet members, the business elite, scientific elite. None of these studies define all the aspects of even one elite. There is great difficulty in comparing studies because no precise list of items has been published.

Data received from several studies seem to indicate that social class factors play a significant part in the recruitment of elites. No social class in excluded, however. "The lowest social stratum of manual workers is minimally represented among most elites."24 The studies indicate the (1) majority of elites are predominately middle class and college educated; (2) a minority are from the lower class and lack a college education; (3) sparse data on trends suggest that the proportion of lower-class recruits to these elites may be increasing. 25 The trend seems to support an American social structure which is best represented in the following manner: MM. Each peak represents an elite which is achieved by specialized methods according to the group. Although some forms of hereditary privilege still exist in the industrial world, the emphasis tends to be one's skills and knowledge.

A potential candidate must agree with the ideological orthodoxy of the group he is seeking to enter or to represent. He must adhere to the belief system of the dominant minority if he wishes to join their inner circle or to represent their interests as a political candidate. Family ties still play a significant role in political recruitment even in non-hereditary systems. Patron-client affiliations and personal recommendations are used in every society as part of the process of recruitment. The interlocking relationship

of big business, the military and the elite government positions rely on such patron-client affiliations for establishing themselves as the dominant minority.

The reward system is very important in the attraction and the selection of elite members. Rewards play a twofold role in the recruitment of elites. They motivate individuals to assume the responsibilities of elite positions and they maintain the high value placed on these positions. ²⁶ As the elites have become specialized, so have the rewards. Some rewards are tangible material benefits such as money, or land; other rewards are power, prestige and influence depending on the elite group.

The first part of this report has reviewed several classical and contemporary elite theory writers and their views concerning the distribution of power in society. There are several basic assumptions in the elitist doctrine; one is that there may exist in any society, and probably does, a minority which makes the major decisions of the society. In addition, it is assumed that this minority's dominant position results from means beyond an ordinary election. According to elite theory the assumption that a democratic majority can control the minority is misleading; a well-organized minority is strong enough to manipulate the majority. The majority is allowed to choose from the minority's candidates. The strongest elitest argument

is that a dominant minority will not be controlled by a majority no matter what democratic mechanism is used. No mechanism for ensuring the accountability of the leaders to the public, no ideology which enshrines the principle of majority rule can prevent the elite from imposing its supremacy over the rest of society.²⁷

CHAPTER II

IMAGERY IN THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

As we have seen, elite theory supports the idea that elections are dominated by a select group rather than by the masses. Mosca wrote that this control is accomplished by the elites selecting those candidates from which the masses can choose. The actual selection and recruitment process occurs long before the public participates in the election process. A candidate must appeal to and be approved by the elite minority. This approval affords him access to the expertise of the members, a substantial network of acquaintances for future reference, access to money and the security these items symbolize.

In an article entitled "From the Many are Chosen the Few," Kenneth Prewitt discusses Mosca's plitical formulae. The result is a "test which the aspirant for office must take...which identifies the degree to which he shares the political formulae by which the ruling group legitimates its rule." Prewitt indicates that trusteeship seems to be an important element of the political formulae in the United States. In addition to this test, another selection criterion is critical: "is the candidate acceptable to the

organization and to the constituency on whose support the organization depends?"²

After the candidate is approved by the elite, he must gain the approval of the masses in order to win the election. Robert Michels observed that the masses develop a genuine cult for leadership; they want an authority figure to take responsibility for them. The image presented to the masses is very important.

Certain items are necessary for success such as experience, education, access to money, visibility and the desire to win; however, one element seems to occur more often and that is the importance of presenting the right image to the voters at the right time. Imagery is a major factor in the illusionary world of politics. Many individuals without any substantive political acumen find the key to success to be contained in presenting to the public the image it wants and needs at a specific time. Public relations firms now seem to be a necessary adjunct of political campaigns for the higher offices, and they are particularly necessary and omnipresent in presidential campaigns recently.

More and more candidates conduct their campaigns with an eye to their image on the media; this fact is a result of our times and our electronic world. A candidate must seem to be many things to many people in order to be elected to an office. This problem or circumstance multiplies for any presidential candidate. He must organize very diverse

elements within the country into a cohesive electorate.

He must appeal to such diverse groups as labor, business, educators, agriculture and minority groups; all need to see the candidate in a positive way. They need to evaluate the presidential candidate as someone who is understanding and supportive of their particular needs. If he cannot present this image, he may not be elected.

To be a successful candidate an individual must present an image to the electorate that fits these traits: political and professional knowledge, experience in public office, voter appeal and eloquence, moral qualities such as honesty and reliability, and party loyalty. Not all leadership criteria, affiliations and traits occur with the same regularity or in the same degree among candidates or even within the same candidate all the time. So called deficits can be overcome by having strengths in other categories and capitalizing on them during the recruitment process and the electoral process.

Americans have long been influenced by what Thomas Cronin calls the "text-book presidency." Political socialization has resulted in the public expecting more of a president than any one human being is capable of accomplishing. Presidents are expected to be activists, to have enough personal appeal to unify the country, to be moral leaders and to deal effectively with all the myriad prob-

lems of a complex society.

The office of the presidency serves as a visible national symbol and one that can cope with all the major crises of the present and the future. A superman image has prevailed, even though realistically it is impossible for one man to have all these qualities. The American public has developed an almost cult-like response to the office of the presidency; it consists of hero-worship of an authority figure. The president has become a symbolic and unifying entity and Americans look to their Presidents to articulate national goals, unify the nation, explain the state of the nation, forecast the future and protect citizens from alien ideologies. Many Americans have come to expect a spiritual leader in their presidents and this image is often projected in their pre-election campaigning. James Reston observed that the White House is the pulpit of the nation and the President is its chaplain. 5

Presidential candidates have been forced to oversell themselves because of the public's expectations. They frequently have to promise either the impossible or the unlikely. The very frenzy of the campaign itself, including the excessive overselling, leads to heightened expectations of the presidency. The American public often seems to want and to expect a messiah rather than a President.6 Anthony Howard of the London Observer writes:

For what the nation has been beguiled into believing ever since 1960 is surely the politics of evangelism: the faith that individual men are cast to be messiahs, the conviction that Presidential incantations can be substituted for concrete programs, the belief that what matters is not so much the state of the nattion as the inspiration-quotient of its people...

Fred Greenstein states that "citizens seem to perceive and evaluate the President as a person, rather than in terms of his policy commitments or his skill in the specialized tasks of leadership. The majority of people generally judge the President by personal attributes or the image he projects. He is judged on his sincerity and integrity, his conscientiousness, his warmth or coldness, his physical vigor, his religious background and practice. There are much fewer references to his policy positions and his leadership qualities.8

Americans look to their president to satisfy at least three sets of needs; James Barber discusses these in his article, "The Presidency; What Americans Want." The first need is for reassurance that everything is going to be alright; people want to be taken care of. They demand a sense of serenity from the President. In addition, he must portray a moral idealism and he must be a master politician. And lastly, as a contradiction to the image of serenity, the public wants a man of action; they react negatively to a president who seems to be too passive, especially

in times of crises. 9

A presidential candidate is likely to portray himself as a spiritual leader who is untouched by corrupt politics, a surrogate father-figure, a great man, a charismatic leader who has all the answers and is the emodiment of all the "best" qualities of the public. Thus, the American public gets what it wants, at least, it gets the image it thinks it wants.

A very real problem of imagery presented itself to James Earl Carter, Jr. in 1972. At that time he was Governor of the state of Georgia and in September of that year he made a decision to run for the presidency of the United States. He and his staff knew that an appropriate image would be important for success and the image should satisfy the demands of the country at that particular times. In an address he made while he was Governor of Georgia, Carter made a statement which gives us a clue to the image he had decided to make for himself as an outsider-a "non-elite."

In general, the powerful and the influential in our society shape the laws and have a great influence on the legislature or the Congress. This creates a reluctance to change because the powerful and influential have carved out for themselves or have inherited a privileged position in society, of wealth, or social prominence or higher education or opportunity...10

As a candidate for the presidency, Jimmy Carter needed to appeal to the emotional needs of the American public. His political strategist, Hamilton Jordan, astutely sensed this need in the country after Watergate and Vietnam. He accurately judged the public's reaction to an "imperial presidency"; the mood of the country was definitely against Washington and all of its "establishment" politicians. Many of these politicians, under the cloud of Watergate and the misjudgements of Vietnam, were perceived to be immoral and corrupt and Carter's political advisors shrewdly counselled their candidate to establish himself as a man of integrity and as an "outsider" from Washington politics. Because he had not held a political position in Washington, Mr. Carter would claim he was not a member of the established political elite. He was an "outsider"; he was untouched by the scandals of recent years.

Mr. Carter was appealing to the American electorate because he did, indeed, present to them the image they wanted to see. In the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, the American public wanted a leader who embodied certain qualities. First of all, many wanted to see a genuinely religious president who would be a spiritual leader, a man whose sincerity was apparent, a man of warmth and compassion, a man of action and also a father-figure. As a "born-again" Christian, Carter could present himself as a religious

man. He had an attractive smile and an open face-a welcome change from the "loner" image of Nixon.

The main strategy of the Carter campaign was to take advantage of the public's low regard for the Washington elite. The "outsider" image was the key ingredient in his successful campaign. His advisors accurately predicted that the country wanted a return, at least symbolically, to traditional values and away from the blatant power-brokers in Washington. Writing about Carter's populism, Betty Glad, in her book <u>Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House</u>, says it was mostly stylistic—"a reliance on the rhetoric of the "outsider" and the outsiders' resentment of those in power." 11

Very early, as early as the fall of 1972, Carter and his advisors had decided what was needed in order to win the primaries and the delegates to the presidential nomination convention. "Wherever he went, he talked of love, truth and God..." 12 It was a campaign style that dwelt on themes rather than specific issues. To a country wracked by Vietnam and Watergate, he said that the evils of the past were not the fault of the American people, but of their leaders who had excluded them from the decisions of government. Carter's populism stressed that the masses should have a larger voice in government but he provided no mechanisms for guaranteeing it. Another instance

where the populist image was stylistic only--not substantive. 13

Rather than presenting specific issues and programs, Carter asked the voters "to trust him" to make the right decisions in the White House. By appealing to the voters' need for a father-figure, someone to take care of them, he was simply presenting what they needed. And also... "by keeping the discussions general, he...offended relatively few people." Betty Glad suggests that Carter's anonymity was an asset; he sent out so many diverse signals that each segment of the electorate could pick at those they identified with and ignore the rest. 15

As a candidate, Carter emphasized his "outsider" image. On Februrary 17, 1976, in Boston, Massachusetts, he strengthened that image further:

The people of this country know from bitter experience that we are not going to get these changes merely by shifting around the same group of insiders. 16

Again, in his acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention on July 15, 1976, he stated:

Too many have had to suffer at the hands of a political economic elite who have shaped decisions and never had to account for mistakes nor to suffer from injustice. 17

Alone among the candidates, he "talked about character, morality, faith in God, a system of values. The American people are good...decent...honest...open." 18
Other candidates spoke to problems outside of this philo-

sophical context; Carter dealt with the context itself and his words symbolize a whole system of values, a moral, ethical and spiritual framework within which the "issues" can be solved. 19 The inference was that Carter, as an outsider, would clean up Washington, restructure it, and make it work again. His campaign rhetoric stressed his leadership, integrity and managerial competence as well as the pledge to return truth and decency and compassion to the government. 20 Betty Glad sums up the Carter Phenomenon in this manner:

In short, Carter's anonymity at the beginning of the race, his ability to forge out of that situation an idealized self-presentation that most people bought, a complex set of values and issue stances that could be variously interpreted, his personal power manifest in his ability to weave a spell over the people as well as over the elites, and the final proof of his extraordinary ability in the miracle he pulled off--those were all elements in making him the subject of so many fantasies.

Mr. Carter ended the longest primary season in history with 39 percent of all the votes cast. In 26 presidential preference primaries, Carter finished first in 17 and second in eight. 22 He had presented an image of what most voters wanted to see. The "outsider" image was the key ingredient in his campaign. As an outsider, he was free from association with the problems of Washinton and the professional politicians. He portrayed himself as a non-elite, a man who was of and from the

people. Even his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention on July 15, 1976, upheld these suppositions:

...When unemployment prevails, the political and economic elite never stand in line looking for a job. When deprivation results from a confused and bewildering welfare system they never do without food or clothing or a place to sleep. And when the bureaucracy is bloated and confused, the powerful always manage to discover and occupy niches of special influence and privilege. 23

CHAPTER III

THE "GEORGIA ELITE" and the

TRILATERAL COMMISSION

Carter professed to be an "outsider" during his campaign; he was not--as evidenced by his membership in two economic elite groups. Although one of these groups was loosely organized, it was highly successful in attaining its goals. We shall call this group the "Georgia Elite." This group was led by Charles Kirbo, an Atlanta attorney, who had influential ties with the business sector of Georgia as well as nationally. He was a senior partner in one of the most prestigious law firms in Georgia and had served as general counsel to the Coca-Cola Company. Other large corporations were also represented by Kirbo's firm which helped to give Carter his access to corporate interests and influence. Coca-Cola's board chairman, J. Paul Austin. provided Carter with access to other corporations' on a national scale. "In fact, according to one source, before the 1976 election the influential Austin spent

the better part of a year, a sizable block of time for any major corporate executive, allaying big businessmen's fears about Jimmy Carter and his alleged populist tendencies. "1 Although Carter campaigned as an anti-Establishment figure, as an outsider from Washington's inner circle, he actually had strong ties with major corporations and specific economic elites early in his career.

J. Paul Austin was a member of the Trilateral Commission and through this contact Carter was able to enter the membership of this important economic elite group. Carter's membership in the Trilateral Commission and its long-ranging influence on his adminstration is a key to his success in the 1976 presidential election. He was recruited by the economic and business elites and supported their ideology so strongly that, "in retrospect, it may be said that the Carter administration was, for a post-New Deal Democratic regime, rather remarkable for its representation for elite interests."²

The Trilateral Commission influenced the Carter administration to the extent that not only did it introduce Carter to a trans-national economic elite, he borrowed heavily from the membership of the Commission to staff his administration. The Commission is a powerful elite group which is responsible for articulating much public policy. Such a powerful elite needs to be discussed in detail to realize fully the extent of its influence.

The Trilateral Commission has been pictured as a mysterious cabal of international financiers, businessmen, politicians, and theoreticians. It actually is something much more concrete than this description portrays. It is, rather, an elitist international forum for discussion and decision-making; it also has served as a recruiting organization for political elites who are placed in top federal government jobs.

The Trilateral Commission developed as result of post-World War II foreign policy. The United States financed the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan and as a result, the countries became more and more intertwined and interdependent. This trend was noted early by David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

Broad human interests are being served best in economic terms where free market forces are able to transcend national boundaries. It is indeed time lift the siege against multinational enterprises so that they might be permitted to get on with the unfinished business of developing the world economy.

At the beginning of the reconstruction activities, the United States dollar was the strong international money but as the economies of Western Europe (particularly the Federal Republic of Germany) and Japan grew faster than the economy of the United States, problems began to develop. The German mark and the yen began to challenge the dollar, and it became clear that reform was needed in the international exchange. Reformers

agreed that a move toward freer trade relations was necessary. For a weakened U.S. economy especially, the EEC's relative protectionism, once a condition for European reconstruction, seemed unwarrented in view of Western Europe's considerable economic strength.

The New Economic Policy brought criticism from many people. C. Fred Bergsten resigned his post as Assistant for International Economic Affairs and returned to the Brookings Institution to embark on a campaign to point out the destructive nation of the Nixon shocks. The Nixon "shocks" were unilateral attempts to reassert U.S. economic dominance over Japan and Western Europe. But the economies of the countries were so intertwined that the multinational corporations and banks were very skeptical of the policy. So, in a series of articles and conferences, representatives of the transnational interests began to assert themselves. Individuals such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Rockefeller, George Ball, C. F. Bergsten, Cyrus Vance, M. Blumenthal plus representatives from the other countries agreed that the Nixon shocks were not the answer to such an important global situation. Against this turbulent background, the Trilateral Commission was established in 1973. It was organized by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The initiative for the Commission came entirely from Rockefeller. According to George Franklin, the Commissions' executive secretary, Rockefeller "was getting worried about the deteriorating relations between the U.S., Europe and Japan." ... Mike Blumenthal said he thought things were in a very serious condition in the world and couldn't some kind of private group do more about it? ... So then David again made his proposal..." Then Brzezinski, a close friend of Rockefeller funded ball and organized the Commission. 55.

The Commission began with 200 members and the list reads like a who'who of the industrialized world. Members and close advisors of the Trilateral Commission from its founding in July 1973 to the present include representatives of the world's most prestigious banks, corporations, communications conglomerates, and international organizations.

Banking and investing Trilaterlaists include major figures in Chase Manhattan, Lehman Bros., Bank of America, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, Belgium National Bank, German Banking Federation, Lloyds of London, Bank of Tokyo, Sumitomo Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Compagnie Financiere Holding (Rothschild), Barclays Bank International, Federation Francaise des Societes D'Assurances, Teh Sanwa Bank, Fuji Bank and Nikko Securites.

Other corporations represented include Coca-Cola, Bendix, Pan Am, IBM, Texas Instruments, Caterpillar Tractor, Hewlett-Packard, FIAT, Tyssen Vermogensverwaltung, La Rinascente, Dunlop, Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, the Federal Union of German Industry, Mitsubishi, Nippon Steel, Nissan Motor, Atsushita, Electric SONY, Toyota, Mobil, Merck and Co., Exxon, Cie Saint-Gobain-Point-a-Mousson, and Japan Air Lines.

National and international organizations and think-tanks are also well represented;

the Brookings Institution, the Commission of the European Community, the Italian Institute for International Affairs, the Asian Development Bank, the RAND Corporation, the Foreign Policy Association, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) and GATT.

A few trade unions and trade-union federations are also included: the AFL-CIO, the United Steelworkers of America, the United Automobile Workers, the Belgian Confederation of Christian Trade Unions, the German Metal Workers' Union, and the German Federation of Trade Unions.

The 200-240 members of the Trilateral Commission meet about once a year having an Executive Committee of 32 members which meets about every six months. One aspect of the Trilateral Commission work is that its task-force reports on various subjects. Three recent reports are titled as follows: "Toward a Renovated Monetary System," "The Crisis in International Cooperation," and "A Turning Point in North-South Relations." These are detailed analyses of the current world situation and possible alternatives and solutions.

Although not much has been written about the Commission, it is not a "secret" organization; its member-ship is published, and its members are quite openly appointed to a variety of elite positions cross-linking the three dominant minorities in America today--the military,

business and government elites.

A quick glance at a few members of the Commission reveals the social, economic and political aspects they share with one another.

DAVID ROCKEFELLER. Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman of Board and Chief Executive Officer, Chase Manhattan Bank. A Director or trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, Museum of Modern Art, Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and Rockefeller Center, Inc.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. Special Assistant to President Carter for National Security Affairs. Professor of Government at Columbia University and Executive Director of the Trilateral Commission.

CYRUS VANCE. Secretary of State during the Carter Administration. Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior partner in New York law firm. A director of Pan American World Airways, American Life Insurance Co., IBM, American Red Cross, University of Chicago and the Rockefeller Foundation. Former Secretary of the Army and Under-Secretary of Defense and a U.S. negotiator at the Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, during the Johnson Administration.

W. MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL. Former Secretary of the Treasury. President of the Bendix Corporation. Former director of Crown Cork Company and special representative on trade negotiation under President Kennedy. A trustee of Princeton University.

The Trilateral Commission fits the criteria of an elite group. It is a minority which is not controlled by the majority and it attained its position from means other than ordinary elections. It is in a position to make and influence major decisions of the society. The

interlocking of positions between the Commission and the business world and the political world provides a lot of latitude to deal with major decisions in a way that is compatible with the Commission's goals. Because it is a non-elective body, the Commission tends to have more continuity within its membership and the membership is homogeneous in its philosophies and goals.

Carter was invited to join the Trilateral Commission in 1973. At that time Dean Rusk suggested the South was not well represented and mentioned Carter as a possible member. Through the efforts of J. Paul Austin and with the support of Rusk's comments, Carter was brought to the attention of David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Not only did Jimmy Carter appeal to the elite membership of the Commission but he seemed to be the right person at the right time to unite the Democrats, rescuing them from the pitfalls of the Wallaceites on the Right and the McGovernites on the Left.

Carter's lineage, although modest, was respectable and other criteria balanced out this fact. He met the criterion of belonging to the right ethnic group, also, as a "born-again" Christian he was very acceptable, particularly after the Watergate era. His achievement record more than met the criteria standards of the Trilateral Commission. He attended an elite institution of higher learning, Annapolis,

and, later in life, took a non-paying peanut farm and turned it into a large successful business enterprise. He proved he had the talent and ability to win elections, to get positive legislation passed, to organize, and to sustain a certain amount of public visibility. He was definitely the type of individual who fit in well with the Commission.

Mr. Carter joined the Commission and received not only a very considerable foreign-policy education, but also he met several of the principal figures in his future administration. There have been seventeen former Trilateralists in the Carter administration including Mr. Carter and Vice-President Walter Mondale.

Cyrus Vance--Secretary of State
Harold Brown--Secretary of Defense
Michael Blumenthal--Former Secretary of the Treasury
Zbigniew Brzezinski--National Security Advisor

AMBASSADORS:

Andrew Young, Gerard Smith; Richard Gardner, Elliot Richardson

Henry Owen--White House economic aid
Warren Christopher--Deputy Secretary of State
Paul Warnke--Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Richard Cooper--Under-Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs
Lucy Benson--Under-Secretary of State for
Security Assistance
Robert Bowie--CIA
Richard Holbrooke--Assistant Secretary of State

Although coming from a background much different
from David Rockefeller's Carter's record was noteworthy.
He attended an elite school--he received an appointment
to Annapolis--and was successful in both his business and
public service endeavors. This drive to succeed also made

him attractive to the Trilateral Commission.

Carter took over the family farm in Georgia in 1953. The first year his profits were less than he expected. Eventually, the farm proved to be a success under Carter's guidance and he turned this same desire to succeed toward politics.

In 1962 Carter ran for the Georgia Senate and won; he was re-elected to the state senate in 1964. In 1966 Carter decided to run for the U.S. House of Representatives against Howard H. Callaway, the Republican incumbent. When the front runner for the governor of the state of Georgia became ill and quit the race, both Calloway and Carter switched to that political race. But the former governor Ellis Arnall and segregationist Lester G. Maddox finished first and second in the primary.

The next time around for governor Carter was successful. As in the presidential campaign, his was a populist style. He ran on the populist slogan--"Isn't it time someone spoke up for you?"

Carter won the gubernatorial campaign and then, through the influence of Charles Kirbo, and J. Paul Austin and others, became visible to the Trilateral Commission and was approved by them as being a vialbe presidential candidate. It is not the purpose of this report to prove that Carter became president solely because of the Commissions's backing. Rather, its support eased his way

a great deal; it provided access to money, personnel for his future administration, and visibility to the national elites.

The myths and fallacies of the American presidency continue to exist. A candidate must be acceptable to the elite to become a candidate and yet, he must appear to be a non-elite to win votes. Carter was able to fulfill both roles successfully.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this report was to examine elitist tendencies in Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign and to examine the populist image he presented to the voters. As a basis of discussion, this writer reviewed elite theory. Also included is information about imagery in presidential campaigns and specifically the image Mr. Carter created to help win the election. Carter's "outsider" image should be discredited because he was a member of two powerful, inter-related economic elites. Both the "Georgia elite" and the Trilateral Commission have been described in detail.

Lending support to an elitist interpretation of the American presidency, Beth Mintz, a sociologist, published a study of Presidential cabinets from 1897-1973. She found that in this 76 year period, 90 percent of Cabinet officials were either part of the "social elite" or the "business elite" (and sometimes both). She defined social elite as someone who was a member of a high status club or attended an exclusive preparatory academy. A cabinet

member was classified as a business elite if at any time before or after service in the cabinet he or she and served on a board of directors or as a lawyer for a corporation-oriented law firm.

She found that 60 percent of all cabinet officials from 1897-1973 were members of a "social elite," and 78 percent were part of a business elite. These figures are especially significant because only .3 percent of the general population ever served in a cabinet post. 1

An exhaustive study of the elite status of America's cabinet, diplomatic and Supreme Court Officers by Philip Burch further reveals the elitist tendency in American Government. In Elites in American History, Professor Burch carefully researched and documented elite ties and multiple elite ties of our top government officials. One method was to identify the top corporations during a particular presidential adminstration and then to trace memberships on various corporation boards and banks and other elite institutions. His figures show that "in terms of the top appointive posts, the United States has certainly not been a land of equality of political opportunity. Rather, it has been an elitist-dominated nation except for certain brief periods such as the New Deal years, the earlier Wilson regime and the years immediately after the 1937 Supreme Court."2

Mr. Burch also traced intersecting family ties with corporate positions and top government jobs. He found these occurred much more often than previous research had shown. "Indeed one of the most striking findings to emerge from this study of American politico-economic history is the extent to which elite family ties have, contrary to our democratic precepts, played an important role in the federal recruitment and policy making process. ... great family wealth, as well as corporate wealth has long exercised more influence in American government than has generally been realized." 3

In his book Philip Burch concludes that two administrations stand out as being extremely elitist; one was the Eisenhower adminstration (1953-1961): "About 81 percent of the top adminstrative and ambassadorial posts were occupied by elite figures, a total unmatched since the 1920's. Indeed the Eisenhower government was, in one sense, the most staunchly elitist regime since the early days of the Republic, for it had a higher proportion of Cabinet and diplomatic officials with multiple elite ties than any administration since George Washington."4

The Carter administration is the other outstanding example of an administration with a high proportion of its officials having elitist ties. The Carter Presidency, although it initially claimed to represent political "outsiders," turned out to have one of the two highest

percentages of elite figures holding major Cabinet and diplomatic posts of any Democratic regime since the turn of the century. This was due in part to President Carter's close ties with the Trilateral Commission.⁵

Because of the network of corporations and banks, national and multi-national businesses represented among the members of the "Georgia elite" and the Trilateral Commission, vast influence was concentrated in these two groups. They were certainly not the only two representative economic elites in the nation, but they were particularly successful in reaching their goals in 1976. They recruited, and supported a presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, who would, in-turn, support their views. He was an elitist candidate in a system of purported popular elections.

In this manner an elite minority dominated the majority. Jimmy Carter was the elite's candidate. We have seen that Carter's image as an "outsider" and a non-elite was a myth, born of the necessity to win the election. He presented an image which the public wanted and needed at that particular time. With the support of elites and the votes of the public, Carter won the presidency.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, V. 10, "Mosca, Gaetano," by Mario Delle Piane.

²Ibid., p. 504.

3 Ibid.

4Kenneth Prewitt, The Ruling Elites, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 20.

5 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, V. 10, "Michels, Robert," by Juan J. Linz, p. 267.

6 Ibid.

7 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, V. 11, "Pareto, Vilfredo," by Talcott Parsons, p. 26.

⁸Geraint Parry, <u>Political Elites</u>, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 45.

9_{Ibid}.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹Ibid., p. 22.

12Gaetano Mosca, <u>The Ruling Class</u>, (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50.

13Geraint Parry, Political Elites, p. 25.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 52.

7 Ibid., p. 68.

8Fred I. Greenstein, "Popular Images of the President," In Stanley Bach and George T. Sulzter, Perspectives on the Presidency, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p. 138.

9James D. Barber, "The Presidency: What Americans Want," In Stanley Bach and George T. Sulzter, Perspectives on the Presidency, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p. 145.

10Wesley G. Pippert, The Spiritual Journey of Jimmy Carter, (New York: MacMillan, 1978), p. 97.

11Betty Glad, <u>Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great</u>
White House, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1980)p. 31!

12U. S. News and World Report, May 1976, p. 17.

13Ibid.

14Betty Glad, <u>Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House</u>, p. 476.

15U. S. News and World Report, p. 17.

16Betty Glad, <u>Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great</u> White House, p. 362.

17 James R. Wagner, "Carter Profile," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 34, (July 1976), p. 1988.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 1981.

19John R. Coyne, Jr. "Nice Guyin' His Way to the White House?" <u>National Review</u>, May 1976. p. 502.

20_{Ibid., p. 503}.

21Peter Goldman, "Mr. Outside in Stride," Newsweek,
November, 1976, p. 30.

²²Betty Glad, <u>Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great</u> White House, p. 365.

23 James Wagner, "Carter Profile," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, p. 1979.

²⁴Ibid., p. 1981.

17 Suzanne Keller, <u>Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society</u>, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 108.

18Robert D. Putnam, <u>The Comparative Study of</u>
Political Elites, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 107.

19 Ibid.

20 Suzanne Keller, <u>Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society</u>, p. 57.

21Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 56.

²²Suzanne, Keller, <u>Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society</u>, p. 179-180.

²³Ibid., p. 190.

²⁴Ibid., p. 206.

²⁵Ibid., p. 207.

26 Ibid.

27 Geraint Parry, Political Elites, p. 31.

CHAPTER II

1Kenneth Prewitt, "From the Many are Chosen the Few," American Behavioral Scientist, January 1971, Vol., 13, p. 182.

²Ibid., p. 183.

Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, p. 64.

⁴Thomas Cronin, "The Textbook Presidency and Political Science," In Stanley Bach and George T. Sulzter, Perspectives on the Presidency, (Lexingon, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p. 61.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 67.

CHAPTER III

¹Philip H. Burch, Jr., <u>Elites in American History:</u>
The New Deal to the Carter Administration, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980), p. 314.

²Ibid., p. 342.

³Jeff Friedan, "The Trilateral Commission: Economics and Politics in the 1970's," Monthly Review, December 1977, p. 3.

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

⁵Ibid., p. 10.

⁶U.S. News and World Report, May 1978, p. 74.

7 Jeff Friedan, "The Trilateral Commission: Economics and Politics in the 1970's," Monthly Review, p. 9,

CHAPTER IV

1Beth Mintz, "The Presidents Cabinet," The Insurgent Sociologist, 5:3, Spring 1975, p. 131-148.

2Philip H. Burch, Jr., Elites in American History: The New Deal to the Carter Administration, p. 382

³Ibid., p. 399.

⁴Ibid., p. 382.

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JIMMY CARTER'S 1976 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ELITIST, MYTHICAL AND SUCCESSFUL

bу

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ABSTRACT

A study of the 1976 presidential campaign provides an opportunity to explore the difference between campaign rhetoric and the underlying political realities. During his campaign, James Earl Carter, Jr., relied heavily on his "outsider" image to win the presidential office. The term "outsider" encouraged the voters to assume that he was not a member of any political elite group. This image was particularly effective after the revelations of Watergate.

In assessing the Carter campaign this report deals with the myth of mass participation in popular government and the apparent reality of elite control. As a basis of discussion this report reviews the literature of elite theory. Elite theory suggests that a small cohesive group will usually dominate events in any political system.

This report seeks to establish that Mr. Carter was definitely a member of a political elite and was influenced primarily by two economic elite groups. One group, based in Georgia, was loosely organized but highly

effective and led by the president of the Coca-Cola
Corporation. The other group, based in New York, was
formally organized and also highly effective in achieving
its goals. This elitist organization was the Trilateral
Commission. Membership in these groups discredits
Carter's claim of being an "outsider."