

UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION
THE CASE OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is threefold: The first purpose of the report is to present an historical overview of the intervention problem, various definitions, and United States policy. The second purpose is to examine military intervention during the Eisenhower Administration in support of foreign policy designed to maintain the status quo. The third purpose is to look at the evidence to infer a future direction for United States intervention.

Recognition of the all encompassing nature of intervention and the interrelated effect on international stability has been the driving force behind the research reported in this paper. The inquiry was conducted by means of library research in order to develop the basis leading to a qualitative conclusion. Research was accomplished primarily in the United States Army, Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with planned reinforcement from primary sources from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. However, review of available sources from the Eisenhower Administration listed in the bibliography and assistance from the library staff revealed limitations to this approach. Records of the Eisenhower Administration that deal with military intervention compiled by the intelligence agency, and the departments

of state and defense are still closed to research. In addition, meaningful discussion on military intervention has been deleted from the Eisenhower office file, and from the diary written by James C. Hagerty during his years as press secretary to the President. In addition, permission was requested and received from Mrs. C. D. Jackson to review her husband's papers. C. D. Jackson served as special assistant to the President for international affairs 1953-54, and his papers are open to research with permission. Based on his position in the Eisenhower Administration it is logical to assume that his papers would contain some information on Guatemala and Indochina, however, nothing was found that would contribute to this report.

In conclusion this paper will move from a broad discussion of the intervention problem to an analysis of military intervention during the Eisenhower Administration in order to arrive at an inferred direction for United States intervention.

Chapter 2

THE PROBLEM OF INTERVENTION

An Historical Overview

With the turn of the century, the United States saw itself in a new position as a world power. The country had just annexed the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Wake Island, Puerto Rico, and the Phillipines. By 1900 with the election of William McKinley over the anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan, the new imperialism was firmly established. Public approval of an aggressive foreign policy was evident with the election favoring the Republican Party in 1900. The party platform had called for an ambitious expansionist program. When Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901 following the assassination of McKinley, an aggressive foreign policy was certain. Roosevelt was aggressive by nature. This, combined with his belief in the writings of a friend and confidant, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was bound to have a great influence on American foreign policy. In the Twentieth Century intervention can be considered as a combination of four basic problems: territorial expansion, stopping or forestalling European intervention in Latin America, preserving the balance of power in the Far East and Europe, and influencing the internal policies of other countries. The four basic problems were not new, but the

emphasis changed in the Twentieth Century. With the exception of the Panama Canal Zone as an example of territorial expansion, intervention in the Twentieth Century involved the other three problems.¹

The Spanish-American war had proved further the necessity of a canal. Roosevelt, as a strong advocate of sea power, was determined to build the canal as his principal accomplishment. In the national interest Roosevelt used American military force to insure a favorable outcome in the Panama Revolution and recognized the Panamanian government on November 6, 1903, one day after the rebels had seized power. Roosevelt paid a high price in Latin American good will, but his heavy-handed intervention built a canal that was to prove its worth in the future. With the canal problem solved and the Caribbean treated as an American lake, it was to be expected that the United States influence would be exercised without hesitation in Latin America. The Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which announced in no uncertain terms American intent to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries, established the policy of intervention that continues until the present.²

In general, the United States did not interfere in Europe until the outbreak of World War I. Intervention was practiced in the Far East under the flag of the Open Door Policy. Intervention, both in the Far East and the

Caribbean, took a new turn under the Taft Administration in the form of economic intervention. This intervention became known as Dollar Diplomacy. With the arrival of President Woodrow Wilson and the Diplomacy of Morality, intervention tended to increase. Wilson condemned economic intervention and invented the moral intervention method that is used to this day. In his concern with morality Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta government of Mexico, which he felt did not represent the people. He hoped that his moral intervention would assist in the downfall of Huerta. When this failed, Wilson took action to intervene under the guise of protocol to prevent delivery of German arms shipments.³

With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, the United States was forced to direct attention to that area as the traditional area of primary interest. Wilson proclaimed neutrality, but the ties with Europe were too deep for such a policy to be realistic. The consensus in the United States was that the Germans were the aggressor. Even before American lives were lost at sea in submarine attacks, the sympathy was toward the allies. The United States found itself unable to stay out of the war and on April 6, 1917, became a belligerent.⁴

The United States was in a position of power and influence after World War I. Millions of people all over the world were hoping for a new day of liberty. In spite

of these great hopes the United States turned its back on the world and assumed a policy of isolation. This turn of events was unfortunate since the United States had developed into the greatest industrial power in the world. As a result of its leadership in the field of industrialization and international economics, the United States was firmly committed throughout the world. The failure of American statesmen to recognize the role of world leadership denied direction to the free world in a time of need. The difficulty between nations was further complicated after World War I by the question concerning payment of war debts. It is doubtful that the United States cared about the European economic situation. Perhaps the first realization of the economic dependence that had been created in Europe was the depression corresponding to the stock market crash in the United States. The United States had attempted to avoid international problems and failed to assume the leadership that it acquired with its position as an economic giant.

In spite of peace efforts attempted by American diplomats in the two decades between the wars, World War II began in Europe with a declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France on 9 September 1939 following the German invasion of Poland on 1 September. The United States tried to maintain a policy of non-intervention but at the same time it had to face the realities of a major

shift in the balance of power in Europe. The serious situation that was developing in the Far East was also taken into consideration by the government. United States involvement was inevitable and when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came, the surprise was more in spite of events than because of deception.

After 1945 the balance of power shifted to become a balance of terror. Polarization brought all nations under a United States perceived accounting that would place them in one of two camps. Nations were considered to be part of the free world with close ties to the United States, or they were considered to be communist with close ties to the USSR. The United States recognized the inevitability of its international involvement and took the lead to defend the free world against communism. The policy that was developed during that period set the stage for the evolving world balance of power. The Truman Doctrine, announced in March, 1947; the Marshall Plan, started in April 1948; the North Atlantic Alliance, launched in April, 1949; and the Organization of American States, established in the Spring, 1949, provided the machinery that drew the line between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. With this machinery, the United States was committed to the maintenance of the status quo. The policies and alliances developed by 1950 served the needs of Western Europe and the two Americas. In Asia the line between the

Communist and non-Communist world remained less certain. In spite of the uncertainty the United States was unable to avoid conflict in the Far East. Since 1945, confrontation occurred in other areas of the world but the shooting wars fought by the United States were fought in Asia.

The significance of this brief historical overview as a lead-in to discussion of intervention in this report is that the United States has been involved with increasing regularity in the affairs of other nations all over the world. The complexities of the international environment leave little room for domestic action by the United States that would not have an affect on the international situation. This is a matter of special note when we recognize the interdependence of nations in economic and military activity as a result of post World War II agreements.

Intervention or Non-Intervention

Intervention can be used as an instrument of foreign policy in many ways. The problem has been discussed by many authorities on foreign policy. The view of three well known authorities will be useful at this point to introduce the problem.

Hans J. Morgenthau would agree that both the United States and the Soviet Union are officially opposed to intervention. Both nations voted in December 1965 for a U.N. General Assembly resolution entitled, "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic

Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty." According to this resolution, "no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state" and "no state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversion, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the violent overthrow of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state."⁵ Morgenthau goes on to say that both superpowers are committed to the principle of nonintervention, provided no overriding principle justifies intervention. He used the words of Professor Percy H. Winfield, an authority on international law who said, "Intervention is justifiable if its aim is to check or to undo the effects of an illegal intervention on the part of another state."⁶ He would also point out the dilemma that must be faced by a democratic government. De Tocqueville was referring to the United States when he said, "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy, they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient."⁷ For example, no single voice can speak for the United States without fear of public contradiction. Morgenthau recognizes the reality and inevitability of intervention as an instrument of foreign policy, and the impact of domestic politics on the future use of intervention.

Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer present intervention in another light in an essay titled, "Entrepreneurial Politics and Foreign Policy".⁸ This essay presents an entrepreneurial theory of politics in which political leaders of states, and political sub-leaders inside states, are viewed as individuals who profit by providing goods outside of a market context. Two basic assumptions are the key to this theory. The chief assumption being that individuals behave rationally. Rational behavior meaning that an individual will choose the preferred alternative from the set available. It is also assumed that individuals will act in their own best interest.

Starting with the above assumptions the authors present a discussion on military intervention based on the plus and minus factors leading to a profitable result. This theory is useful as a basis for explanation of a rational model of intervention. The theory would support a notion that government action is the result of many rational decisions by individuals in their own best interest. If government decisions are bad with a resulting loss to the individuals concerned it is a result of poor or erroneous data. In conclusion, the authors would support a need for more and better data in order to support better decisions. This is most important concerning intervention since the impact and risk is great in terms of domestic and international interaction.⁹

The third view of intervention is described by J. J. Servan Schreiber in his book, *The American Challenge*. It is difficult for the average American to look at the problem described by Schreiber and accept it as a case of economic intervention. Generally speaking, intervention is viewed as a negative action accomplished as a last resort. In this case economic intervention is accepted willingly and for the most part actively encouraged.

The intangible nature of the intervention described by Schreiber is of great concern not only to the European countries. It is also an area for investigation by the United States government. According to Schreiber American based management is gaining control over European industry at an increasing rate. Since the management of the corporations concerned are motivated by profit rather than a perception of the national interest it is doubtful that decisions would favor future development of the country concerned.¹⁰ The subtle intervention accomplished by multinational corporations will be discussed later in this chapter.

In a more conventional approach to intervention, Roland J. Stanger describes five types. First, there is unilateral intervention by which one nation intervenes in the internal affairs of another. The Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and United States actions under the Monroe Doctrine are examples of this type. Second, there

is counter-intervention where one state intervenes in the affairs of a second state to offset the influence of a third state. United States intervention in Southeast Asia was justified as necessary to prevent Communist intervention. Third, there is collective intervention when a number of states join to intervene in the affairs of a target state. The intervention in Korea by the United Nations is an example of this type. Fourth, there is regional intervention when a group of states form a juridical entity which then imposes the regional will on the dissenting member. An example of this type is the action taken by the Organization of American States against Cuba. Fifth, there is universal intervention under the sponsorship of the United Nations. The Congo operation in 1960 is the clearest example of this type of intervention.¹¹

Stanger defined intervention as conduct with an external animus that intends to achieve a fundamental alteration of the state of affairs in the target nation.¹² Basically, intervention is the interference by a foreign state in the affairs of another independent state. But it is difficult to distinguish intervention from diplomatic pressure on one hand and war on the other. The line of division between intervention and other forms of pressure is difficult to assess in theory and practice. It is generally accepted that coercion is an important element in intervention. The problem is to determine where strong diplomatic or economic pressure becomes coercion.¹³

The five types of intervention described above are easy to recognize. A sixth type most used by the United States, and also the hardest to recognize, is the more subtle form of economic intervention. The question remains as to whether economic assistance should be classified as intervention because it is voluntarily accepted. In order to get an idea of whether this economic assistance can be called intervention, it is necessary to look at the purpose for which it was made and the controls that were exercised on the state that accepted it. Generous amounts of economic, technical, and military aid are sent to other nations under programs that permit the United States government to meddle in the affairs of those nations. The practice of exacting conditions has led the United States, in the words of Ernest A. Gross, then the legal advisor to the Department of State, to "burrow deep into the internal economy"¹⁴ of each participating country. Such a mechanism of donor control has been characterized as coercion of the milder degrees of intensity, but still a form of intervention. The reasons given for foreign aid are numerous, but in the final analysis the basic reason is to advance or support the interest of the United States.

Following foreign aid is an American presence in the nation that receives the aid. This American presence in a foreign country provides for American intervention to a degree that far exceeds the small number of Americans

present in the country in question. Nearly one percent of the citizens of the United States lives outside the United States. About one-third of the overseas Americans are civilians. The rest of the close to two million persons are members of the United States armed forces and their dependents. All of the overseas Americans are involved in the affairs of the countries they locate themselves in.¹⁵

Rare insight into the problem is reported by J. J. Servan Schreiber in his book, *The American Challenge*. Schreiber predicted in his book which was written in 1967, that the world's third greatest industrial power, just after the United States and Russia, would not be Europe, but American industry in Europe.¹⁶ In 1967 American capital investment in Europe was about fourteen billion dollars. According to the 1976 World Almanac this investment had grown to about thirty-seven billion dollars by 1973.

Union Carbide set up its European headquarters in Lausanne in 1965. IBM directs all of its European activities from Paris. The Celanese Corporation of America has headquarters in Brussels.¹⁷

Standard Oil of New Jersey has its European oil headquarters in London, and its European chemical command in Brussels. For Esso, Europe represents a market larger than the United States.¹⁸

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., explains in the forward to Schreiber's book, that the problem is not the result of a

managerial gap in Europe; the real gap is institutional and cultural. Economic intervention is not the result of a United States government or industry conspiracy. It is more the result of dynamic application of free enterprise.¹⁹

United States economic intervention in Europe is a subject that could be given more effort than this short paper will allow. In addition, the problem can be extended to include most of the nations in the world. For this paper it is only necessary to recognize the problem and the potential effect of economic intervention on world order.

The emergence of the United States as a major political, military, and commercial power has coincided with the blurring of traditional distinctions between internal and international affairs. At state department press conferences and in formal diplomatic statements, there is much talk about noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. But when one looks at the nature of American overseas operations, this ancient principle does not fit reality. Any powerful nation affects the internal affairs of less powerful neighbors, and the involvement of overseas Americans in the internal affairs of other nations directly affects the other nations politically, economically, militarily, and in the case of our overseas missionaries, morally.²⁰

The problem is that all states have their own accepted definition of intervention. From the legal

viewpoint intervention is a dictatorial interference with the freedom of action of another state or direct, unsolicited interference by one state in matters which are traditionally left to the jurisdiction of another state. States are often accused of intervention, and it is just as often denied. When it does occur, the intervening state seldom admits to being guilty of intervention and resorts to legal definitions to prove that they are not guilty of intervention. It is generally accepted that intervention is legal under certain circumstances.

Public acceptance of intervention has historically been more dependent on domestic conditions that existed at the time of the intervention rather than a clever explanation of legalities.

United States Intervention Policy

The United States is officially opposed to intervention. In December 1965 the United States voted for a U.N. General Assembly resolution entitled Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.²¹

On the other hand, the United States is committed to intervene against any attempt to change the political status quo by outside violence. Secretary of State Rusk declared on August 25, 1966, before a Senate subcommittee

that "no would-be aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defense treaty, congressional declaration, or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression.... The United States, as an important and responsible member of the U.N., may be required in the future, in accordance with established Charter procedures, to take action that cannot now be anticipated with any precision."²²

Both the United States and the Soviet Union say they are opposed to intervention as a matter of general principle. In short, both superpowers say they are committed to the principle of nonintervention, provided no overriding principle justifies intervention.²³

It is essential that the United States policy concerning intervention be clearly stated both for the American public and foreign peoples. It must be clearly stated by the President that the United States, like most other nations, does not accept the rule of absolute non-intervention. In accordance with international law, the United States claims a limited right to intervene when its vital interests are at stake. It also claims the right to counter-intervene to stop illegal intervention. As a member of the United Nations, the United States policy is to avoid armed intervention except as a collective measure or in an emergency, pending collective action. A general and realistic clarification of the United States policy for conducting permissible intervention under international law,

would significantly help to avoid the misunderstanding where East and West accuse each other of illegal intervention.

The problem in the modern international political environment is that the United States continues to operate as if it had a policy of non-intervention, when in fact the policy of non-intervention is obsolete. In the modern world it is inevitable that the United States would have a policy of intervention, since it is difficult to think of any activity in the present world that would not affect the national security of the United States.

Since 1945 the United States has maintained a more diversified and powerful military force than any other country. This fact alone would support the notion of heavy reliance by the United States on military force as an instrument of diplomacy. Given this reliance on military force it is essential to closely examine the military intervention experience of the United States during a recent time frame.

Chapter 3

MILITARY INTERVENTION DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

This chapter will examine evolution of policies that led to military interventions during the Eisenhower Administration.

The Eisenhower Administration inherited a foreign policy that was formulated in the spring of 1947. The policy of containment, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan served as the basis for American foreign policy.¹

In January 1950, the National Security Council began work on a document known as NSC-68. The document was being implemented by the Truman Administration when Korea burst into war. NSC-68 viewed the international arena as split, with the United States and the USSR at either end. The document urged a policy of containment at whatever cost necessary. According to Walter LaFeber, NSC-68 is one of the key historical documents of the Cold War.²

Inheritance of the strategy outlined in NSC-68 committed the Eisenhower Administration to significant increases in military expenditures. At the direction of President Eisenhower a new strategy was developed that

reflected an Eisenhower Administration approach to national defense. This Eisenhower containment strategy was contained in NSC-162, and balanced forces recommended by the previous administration were retained; therefore, a reduction in military force did not take place. By the end of October 1954, political pressure forced a change in policy that led to a reduction of defense expenditures.

The key strategy document approved by President Eisenhower on 20 October, 1954, was NSC-162/2. This paper abandoned the assumption that large-scale limited wars might be fought without nuclear weapons. The military was given authority to plan on using nuclear weapons based on a military perception of need. The paper was the implementing document for the policy of massive retaliation voiced by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in January, 1954. The assumption was that the threat of massive retaliation would be sufficient to deter Soviet aggression. This policy eventually led to a 25 percent drop in military manpower, and a reduction in the Fiscal Year 1957 defense budget to under \$35 billion from a prior year cost of \$50 billion. The notion that followed was one based on increased involvement in defense by indigenous forces. The United States would provide economic support and a nuclear back up, while any fighting to be done would be accomplished by foreign forces. Feverish building of alliances took place to

support this notion.³

The Case of Military Intervention

Military interventions during the Eisenhower Administration were part of a United States containment policy backed by a massive retaliation strategy. The second element of the Eisenhower Administration strategy as seen by Dulles was the insistence that lesser threats to the United States national interest would be met by local forces. Dulles viewed the strategy as a division of labor. The United States would provide the nuclear shield while other nations, tied on the United States through defense treaties and military assistance programs, would provide the conventional forces needed to meet local threats. The strategy did not call for military intervention by United States forces, however, the Eisenhower Administration did use military intervention in an attempt to maintain the status quo as shown in the examples that follow.

Guatemala, 1954.

The United States was a party to regional Organization of American States agreements, and had accepted the OAS Charter which states in Article 15, "No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another state."⁴

When the Eisenhower Administration saw a possibility for Communist takeover in Guatemala by political means, the Dulles strategy was to gain an exception to pledges of nonintervention. This was accomplished by the "Declaration

of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention", adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela, in March, 1954. Dulles would have preferred collective action against the Arbenz regime; however, he was satisfied with a consensus that labeled Communist political subversion as intervention. The Eisenhower Administration took unilateral action to encourage and assist the June, 1954, invasion of Guatemala from Honduras by Castillo Armas.⁵ Intervention was denied by the United States, and the record reflects a local solution to a local problem.⁶

In fact, Guatemala received 1900 tons of arms from Czechoslovakia on 15 May 1954. The United States stepped up its opposition by airlifting arms to Nicaragua and Honduras. On 18 June, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a former Guatemalan officer who was in exile, led a small army over the Honduras-Guatemalan border. With the aid of the Central Intelligence Agency and the American Embassy in Guatemala City, Armas overthrew the Arbenz regime. The American aid was decisive.⁷

Secretary of State Dulles pledged that the United States would alleviate conditions in Guatemala and elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the hemisphere. After working for three years with large amounts of American aid to stabilize

the fall of Indochina would threaten Burma and Malaya and bring added risks to East Pakistan, South Asia, and Indonesia.¹⁰ In early April, 1954, President Eisenhower outlined what was at stake by presenting his domino theory to a news conference. According to Eisenhower, the struggle in Indochina was crucial because the area contained tin, tungsten, and rubber, and if France lost, many human beings would pass under a dictatorship. President Eisenhower then described the falling domino principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, and you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences. Eisenhower especially worried about the economic and political effects upon Japan, which he considered the key to the containment of Russia and China in the Far East.¹¹

Although the Eisenhower Administration perceived a Viet Minh victory as a clear gain for the Soviet-led Communist enemy, the administration was not enthusiastic about sending air or ground forces into Indochina. President Eisenhower told his advisors on January 1954, that he didn't think it worthwhile to put United States ground forces in Indochina since ground forces were there already.¹² The President also was not convinced that air strikes alone would be enough to stop the Communists.

United States Congressional leaders were reluctant to authorize the United States to act alone. Intervention in Indochina was perceived to be feasible only in concert with other free nations.¹³ The Administration intensified the pressure on the British. At the height of the crisis, April 20 to 24, Dulles flew to London to ask for the go-ahead from Churchill so the President could send Congress the intervention resolution. The Prime Minister refused to commit his government to the lost French effort, particularly during the forty-eight hours before the interested powers were to meet in Geneva on April 26 to negotiate the Indochina problem.¹⁴

In spite of grave concern voiced by the United States over the loss of Indochina to Communism, in 1954 it was not deemed possible from a political point of view to become involved in the Far East in order to restore French control over a colony. This was also the first of many crises that would later prove the great danger of a massive retaliation strategy. The decision by the Eisenhower Administration against further intervention to assist the French would also serve as the milestone for massive military intervention by the United States a decade later.¹⁵

Formosa, 1954.

In November 1951, Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, had urged the further organization of security in the Pacific area.

Dulles brought Rusk's idea into reality in a treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954 by the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines. These nations agreed that any armed attack would endanger the peace and safety of each of the signatories.

After an intense debate, the defensive zone of SEATO was not extended to either Taiwan or Hong Kong, but did include Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. As part of the discussion on the treaty, Dulles announced that the Monroe Doctrine was being extended to Asia. He declared that an intrusion in the Far East would be dangerous to our peace and security. The first test of whether the United States could enforce that Doctrine came in 1954 when the Chinese Communists threatened the offshore islands of Quemoy, Matsu, and the Tachens which lay between the mainland and Taiwan.¹⁶

Dulles flew to Taiwan in December and signed a mutual defense pact with Chiang Kai-shek, pledging the United States to defend Chaing in return for his promise not to try to invade the mainland without American approval. In January, 1955, Eisenhower asked Congress for authority to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores, and if necessary, closely related localities. Congress passed the resolution by a vote of 409 to 3 in the House and 85 to 3 in the Senate. The resolution was questioned at the time as a dangerous precedent for less responsible Presidents who would demand open-ended authorizations from Congress

to use force against Communism.¹⁷

During the period 1954-1958 the United States Seventh Fleet remained in position to maintain the status quo. This was a clear case of unilateral intervention by the United States since no other government was involved. The crisis subsided after United States threats were made and after the Soviets, who were in the midst of a political upheaval, urged the PRC (People's Republic of China) to acquiesce. The United States show of force was successful in that it deterred an invasion of Taiwan (if in fact that was the Communist intent). By late 1958 containment had become a fact of life in the Far East.

Lebanon, 1955-1958.

During the period 1955-1957, the United States was very much involved in the Middle East. For many reasons, not the least of which was oil, diplomatic pressure was applied against all parties to achieve peace in the area.

On January 5, 1957, Eisenhower asked Congress for authorization to extend economic and military cooperation and, if necessary to employ American military forces in the Middle East if any nation in that area requested help against Communist instigated armed aggression. The Middle East Resolution, or the Eisenhower Doctrine as it came to be known, sailed through the House. With the help of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, the Senate passed the resolution in March. It passed in spite of little public support.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was an extension of the dogmas of 1823 into the Middle East in the same sense that, as Dulles observed, SEATO extended the original Doctrine into South-east Asia.¹⁸

For a year following passage of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Middle East continued to simmer. This was not an unusual situation in the Middle East. The United States did not resort to military intervention until it was requested by Lebanon on 14 July 1958. The United States had hoped to avoid intervention in the crisis. In May, at the beginning of the crisis, the United States decided to give moral and limited material support to the Lebanese Government. Police weapons, such as tear gas and small arms ammunition, were airlifted following a request from the government of Lebanon. Between May and July, the military buildup offered proof that the United States would intervene if the situation worsened. During this period, the Sixth Fleet was reinforced, and American forces in Germany were placed on alert.

The decision to enter Lebanon was made on 15 July 1958, following the news of the revolution in Iraq on 14 July in which the monarchy was overthrown and members of the royal family were killed. President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon called the American, French, and British Ambassadors during the morning of 14 July and requested immediate intervention.

The actual decision to land a United States force was made by a small group who met in President Eisenhower's office after a formal meeting of the National Security Council. Secretary Dulles described the situation, summarized the intelligence reports and the commitment of the United States Government under both the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact. He concluded by recommending that the commitment be fulfilled.¹⁹

Within 20 hours after the request for military intervention, United States Marines were ashore at Beirut. The initial landing force consisted of 3600 Marines of the Sixth Fleet. In the days that followed, American military strength reached approximately 15,000 men. The entire Sixth Fleet, in support of these men, consisting of about 70 ships and 40,000 men moved into the East Mediterranean.²⁰

According to Steven E. Ambrose, the intervention in Lebanon was a unilateral action that risked general war in support of a less than democratic government.²¹ In fact, British troops landed in Jordan on July 15, therefore, this intervention can best be described as collective intervention since more than one state responded in the region.

The overall purpose of the operation was to influence containment and return the Middle East to a status quo condition. Two objectives appear to have been met by military intervention in this case. First, it warned Nasser that there were limits beyond which the United States

could not be pushed. Second, it made clear the fact that the Soviet Union had limits in how far it would go. Soviet threats of counter-intervention did not materialize, and the United States and British military intervention came to a close with troop withdrawal in October.

Berlin, 1958.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1958, while the United States was involved in Lebanon and Formosa, pressure was applied by the Soviet Union in Europe. In this case military intervention could not be avoided since United States forces were present in Europe on a continuous basis since World War II. The most serious aspect of this problem was the United States prior commitment to massive retaliation as a cost effective strategy. This strategy served to limit the options available to President Eisenhower. The forces on the ground in Europe were inadequate to support a conventional strategy. The worst fears expressed by critics of massive retaliation were realized. The United States found itself spread all over the world with insufficient power in evidence to back up national interests as expressed in commitments to defend the free world against Communism.

The Berlin crisis of 1958 closely followed public concern over the findings and recommendations of a committee headed by H. Rowan Gaither Jr. of the Ford Foundation. The Gaither Report was similar to National Security Council

recommendations reported in NSC-68. As a starter, the Gaither Report urged an increase in defense spending to \$48 billion. As a result of Central Intelligence Agency produced information President Eisenhower was convinced that the United States had a substantial lead in strategic weapons.²²

Both sides had indicated a desire to keep the threshold of conflict low. The years of Eisenhower's second term marked the height of bipolarity, for as the British, French, Israelis, and Egyptians could testify, what the Big Two wanted they got.²³

The test of whether Eisenhower and Khrushchev could control the hard-liners in their own countries came on 10 November 1968. Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union was ready to turn over control of Berlin to East Germany.

Raymond Tanter refers to Berlin, 1958 as the "non-crisis." According to Tanter, it is uncertain whether Khrushchev's speech of 10 November, was actually intended to initiate a confrontation.²⁴

Regardless of Soviet intentions, the West responded by reaffirming its determination to hold the Western position in and the rights to Berlin. Subsequent bargaining reduced the level of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, the fact remains that the risk of World War III was very real and as long as American troops are on the scene in Europe the risk remains as a present danger.

In an attempt to provide a cost effective defense for the United States, the Eisenhower Administration relied on a strategy of massive retaliation at the expense of general purpose forces. In effect this reduced the capability of the United States to a limited option strategy. In the final analysis, the Eisenhower Administration found itself limited to the defense of national interest issues that could be credibly defended by an all out threat of nuclear war. Review of this strategy by subsequent Administrations revealed the unacceptable risk associated with a policy of massive retaliation. This risk is as real today as it was in 1961.

Chapter 4

THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

This chapter will look at the evidence from the Eisenhower Administration to infer a future direction for United States Intervention.

The military interventions discussed in chapter three took place in Latin America, Asia, and Europe. The intervention was unavoidable in light of United States agreements to provide assistance as necessary to achieve containment and maintain the status quo. The remainder of this chapter will look at the areas of the world where intervention was accomplished by the Eisenhower Administration to infer a future direction for intervention.

The basic unstable nature of Latin American politics will help to keep the door open for possible intervention. The intervention in Guatemala during the Eisenhower Administration continues to this day as evidenced by continued economic and military aid. Given the potential for unrest in Panama over the Canal; and in Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile over inflation, and unemployment; it is logical to assume that Communist exploitation will increase in Latin America. Following the example of Guatemala from the Eisenhower years the future will see an increase in United

States intervention in this area. The alternative to increased intervention would be United States withdrawal from the region and a reversal of the principles set forth in the Monroe Doctrine. It is unimaginable that this alternative could be pursued by the United States in the foreseeable future.

In the Far East, the United States is committed to agreements and policy that can only lead to increased intervention. The unfortunate experience in Vietnam that began under Eisenhower and terminated in 1973 with a success for communism has reduced current involvement in the Far East. However, the potential for increased intervention has increased. The United States presence in Korea and Formosa is at a high level today as it was during the Eisenhower Administration. Following the success by communist inspired nationalists in Vietnam a second round is sure to follow. The United States has close economic and military ties with Formosa and Korea and if tension increases in the area it can be assumed that intervention by the United States to maintain the status quo will follow.

The Mideast remains as the area of greatest danger for the United States and probably the world. There is no solution to the problems that exist in this area and as history has shown the problem has grown since the Lebanon crisis of 1958. The greatest danger in this area is the close proximity of the United States and the Soviet Union to

the battleground. Escalation to include a superpower involvement can only be avoided as long as a clear victory by one side over the other can be avoided. The end result in the Mideast is that the situation has not improved since the Eisenhower years. In many ways the situation has moved from bad to worse. In particular, the potential for destruction had multiplied on both sides by a factor of ten or more. Foreign intervention has increased in the Mideast since the 1950's and there is no sign that it will decrease in the foreseeable future.

The case of Berlin, used as an example of United States intervention in Europe earlier in this paper, remains an illustration of the complexity of world affairs today. The United States is as committed to European defense today as it was during the Eisenhower Administration. An additional complication is the fact that a significant part of the United States defense potential is on duty in Europe. In fact, intervention is very real in Europe today in terms of economics, military presence and overseas business involvement. There is little hope for a change in this state of affairs.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger referred to the problem in an essay published in 1969. According to Dr. Kissinger, "The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a gargantuan increase in power had eroded its relationship to policy. The major nuclear powers are capable of devastating each other. But they have great difficulty

translating this capability into policy except to prevent direct challenges to their own survival - and this condition is interpreted with increasing strictness. The capacity to destroy is difficult to translate into a plausible threat even against countries with no capacity for retaliation."¹

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

A great power intervenes in the affairs of other states when it responds to stimulus in the international environment. As a world power, with military bases and economic involvement all over the globe, the effect of United States policy can be felt to some degree by all other nations.

The purpose of chapter two was to provide a macro-view of intervention in the twentieth century as the United States grew to a position of power in international affairs. In addition, chapter two identified six definitions of intervention, and related the United States position to these definitions. It is apparent that intervention is a bigger problem than the tip of the iceberg evidenced by overt military activity. Evidence is beginning to emerge that may show extensive covert intervention by the United States.

For the most part information on covert operations, many of which were military in nature, remains to be confirmed or denied by official sources. After World War II a systematic weaving of economic threads occurred that bound much of the non-Communist world to the United States. By the

time Eisenhower took office in 1953, the commonly accepted view was that of a bipolar world split between the Soviet-led bloc and the Western Alliance led by the United States. The United States perceived the challenge of a Communist conspiracy of world domination directed from Moscow against the "free world". Intervention as described in chapter two was recognized as a necessary evil to prevent world domination by Communism; however, the United States publicly rejected intervention as a means for influencing world affairs.

Chapter three provided a micro-view of overt military intervention conducted by the Eisenhower Administration in spite of an overall United States policy of non-intervention. It is possible to see from the examples of intervention discussed in chapter three that the high ideals of non-intervention are quickly overcome by pressure to do something.

The Eisenhower Administration found itself in a difficult position with a policy of massive retaliation as a primary means for cost effective defense of the national interest. With this policy in effect it was only natural that some effort would have to be exerted to head off any threat to the national interest in order to prevent development of a head on collision with the Soviet Union.

United States activity to defeat Communism in Guatemala was easy to justify. It is obvious that a Communist foothold in what has commonly been accepted as the

United States sphere of influence could lead to a direct threat to United States national security. This notion was later proven following the Communist takeover of Cuba and the subsequent placement of missiles in that country by the Soviet Union. The direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October, 1962, is the closest the two superpowers have come to a shooting war. In order to discourage unfavorable political evolution in Guatemala, the United States provided direct support to forces led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. The result was the defeat of Communist supported forces. It has been alleged that significant amounts of covert manpower support was provided by the United States to support the national interest by defeating Communism in Guatemala. Official records to prove or disprove these allegations remain closed to research.

United States involvement in the situation in Indochina was significant in 1954 in terms of money and equipment. The Eisenhower Administration was prepared to order increased involvement to include overt military intervention; however, collective intervention was the game that Eisenhower would support. He stopped short of unilateral intervention since that would have placed the United States in a clear position for unilateral retaliation by Moscow.

Intervention in 1954 to prevent takeover of Formosa by Communist China can also be viewed as a stability

operation. The threat of nuclear war helped to keep the lid on this situation in that the United States was satisfied to serve as a buffer between Nationalist China and Communist China in order to maintain the status quo.

The United States found itself in the position of an international fireman that would run around the world as a reaction to Communist activity in order to reduce tension by taking the heat off of threatened governments.

Direct military intervention by the United States in Lebanon from July thru October of 1958 was accomplished under the shield of a massive retaliation strategy. The assumption was that the Soviet Union would not interfere by counter-intervention. It was later revealed that some of the military supporters of massive retaliation actually viewed the possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union as a problem that must be faced and 1958 was as good a time as any to get on with it. Later review of this kind of thinking moved the United States toward a strategy of flexible response.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union put pressure on the United States by threatening Berlin. By his application of pressure on West Berlin, Khrushchev had pinpointed the fulcrum that could change the European power structure. It was feared that a United States withdrawal from West Berlin would lead to a West German-Russian agreement.

With this background in mind, how can the United States intervention policy be explained within the context

of an overall defense strategy?

Following World War II the national strategy was based on a notion of superpower cooperation. The United States for all practical purposes headed for disarmament. The US Army reduced from over eight million men in 1945 to about a half million in 1948. Having barely enough forces to occupy the conquered territory, a change in strategy was necessary when major power cooperation was recognized as a losing proposition.

In June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced his plan for US assistance to all countries in Europe willing to cooperate in multinational recovery efforts. President Truman also announced his policy in the same year that committed United States support to Greece and Turkey. This was the start of a strategy of containment through economic and military assistance with a corresponding internal intervention represented by controls attached to assistance.

Containment through military intervention was implemented on a large scale in Korea. A reevaluation of this approach in 1952-53 led the Eisenhower Administration to adopt massive retaliation as a cost effective national strategy.

Massive retaliation from the early years of the Eisenhower administration changed to a strategy of strategic deterrence and flexible response following a change in political leadership in 1961. As a result of public

reaction to flexible response and the military intervention accomplished under this strategy, a gradual change in strategy took place and was announced in 1969 as local reliance on indigenous resources backed by US flexible response.

United States strategy appears to have changed several times since World War II. Throughout the entire post World War II period the United States was involved in intervention ranging from diplomatic pressure to that which was just short of military occupation.

Looking to the future, I believe that the United States will continue to become involved around the globe since a major trading nation is always in search of raw materials and markets for industry. In order to represent United States interests in international commerce it will be necessary to show the flag around the world, and as the evidence in this report demonstrates, it is frequently necessary either to protect or withdraw the flag when threatened.

In the final analysis it would appear that continued United States intervention is inevitable. However, I feel that military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union will occur through third world surrogates.

NOTES

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¹⁴Stanger, p. 43.

¹⁵Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone and John Clarke Adams, The Overseas Americans (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 2.

¹⁶Schreiber, p. 35.

¹⁷Schreiber, p. 37.

¹⁸Schreiber, p. 37.

¹⁹Schreiber, p. xi.

²⁰Cleveland, p. 127.

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²Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and The Cold War, 1945-1971 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972) pp. 90-91.

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⁸LaFeber, p. 160.

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¹¹LaFeber, p. 162.

¹²Eisenhower, p. 341.

¹³Eisenhower, p. 347.

¹⁴LaFeber, p. 162.

¹⁵LaFeber, p. 166.

¹⁶LaFeber, p. 168.

¹⁷LaFeber, p. 168.

¹⁸LaFeber, p. 198.

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²⁰Bodron, p. 74.

²¹Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (London: The Penguin Press, 1971), p. 254.

²²Ambrose, p. 257.

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²⁴Tanter, p. 62.

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¹Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy - Three Essays. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969) p. 59.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION
THE CASE OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this report is threefold: First, it presents an historical overview of the intervention problem, various definitions, and United States policy. Second, it examines military intervention during the Eisenhower Administration in support of foreign policy designed to maintain the status quo. Third, it looks at the evidence to infer a future direction for United States intervention.

The inquiry was conducted by means of library research in order to develop the basis leading to a qualitative conclusion. Research was accomplished in the United States Army, Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

The research shows that in spite of a declared policy of non-intervention, the United States has practiced and will continue to practice some form of intervention in the future. The inference in conclusion being that the United States as a superpower and a major trading nation will be involved in intervention as an unavoidable reality. It would appear that confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union will occur in the future through third world surrogates.