

THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN:  
PROSPECT FOR PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION WITH THE PRC

by

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## NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION OF CHINESE NAME

In this study, the older Wade-Giles system of transliteration has been used for Chinese names and places. Where possible, the newer, Pinyin equivalents have been provided in parentheses following the first use of a name. For convenience, the following equivalents may be helpful.

	<u>Wade-Giles</u>	<u>Pinyin</u>
Names:	Chao Tzu-yang	Zhao Ziyang
	Chou En-lai	Zhou Enlai
	Hua Kuo-feng	Hua Guofeng
	Lin Piao	Lin Biao
	Liu Shao-chi	Liu Shaoqi
	Mao Tse-tung	Mao Zedong
	Teng Hsiao-ping	Deng Xiaoping
Places:	Fukien	Fujian
	Lanchow	Lanzhou
	Nanking	Nanjiang
	Paotuo	Baotou
	Peking	Beijing
	Sinkiang	Xinjiang
	Taching	Daqing
	Tibet	Xizang

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## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

"We should be concerned with the future because we have to spend the rest of our lives there."

—— Charles F. Kettering

" 'Two Chinas' is a dirty phrase in Taipei and Peking."

—— John K. Fairbank  
Atlantic Sept. 1976 p. 6

The purpose of this report is to examine the possible future of Taiwan after the United States normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The author will try to discuss the specific options of peaceful negotiation between Taipei's Nationalist government and Peking's Communist government - where the possibilities exist and where the difficulties lie.

In December, 1978, the United States established diplomatic relations with Peking by accepting three conditions which the RPC requested in the Shanghai Communique: break diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Republic of China (ROC), terminate the US/ROC mutual defense treaty and withdraw all U.S. forces from Taiwan. In this present U.S. China policy, the U.S. has switched her recognition from Taipei to Peking. De jure, the United States recognizes the PRC as the sole entity, but continue to maintain de facto relations with Taiwan.

Can Taiwan survive without a U.S. defense commitment? Today, Taiwan keeps official relations with only 20 countries in the world.<sup>1</sup> Does the ROC in Taiwan have any other choice or should it just wait for the PRC to reunify it? On the issue of Taiwan, Peking insists upon its own viewpoint, such as stated in the Shanghai Communique, that: 1) "Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland"; 2) the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere."; 3) The Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas" and "an independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

One could argue that there has been no dramatic change in the status of Taiwan since the United States cut off official relations with ROC. Today, the PRC still claims legal sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan still works hard and tries to survive. The United States still reaffirms its concern in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. The only problem is that both governments in Peking and Taipei insist that "There is only one China and Taiwan is part of China." This one China ideology makes Taiwan's problem still unresolved, and needs to be settled some time in the future.

In seeking the reunification of Taiwan, Peking seems to have set a timetable as demonstrated by PRC Vice Premier Teng

Hsiao-ping's statement that the reunification of Taiwan is one of the major diplomatic goals for China in the 1980's.<sup>2</sup> Also, though Peking did not rule out a military attack, PRC leaders have repeatedly said that they prefer peaceful negotiation in achieving this goal. The ROC government still closes the door to any direct contact with the PRC. Is it possible continually to ignore the PRC's new soft attitude? How the ROC government evaluates the prospect for peaceful negotiation is one of the crucial factors determining the future of Taiwan.

The author believes this subject is worth studying. First, it could be treated as a case study of "divided states" seeking peaceful unification. Taiwan-China fits broadly into the category which has been labelled "divided states", a legacy of WW II and its immediate aftermath. Taiwan's case, however, is different from the situation of Germany, Korea and Vietnam. Taiwan was separated from China in a civil war, not forced by the occupation by foreign powers; also, there is a big gap between Taiwan and mainland China with respect to population, land and development. What has happened to these "divided states" to date? The German issue has been settled peacefully, at least for this era.<sup>3</sup> The problem of Vietnam was resolved by force. Korea remains a thorny and potentially dangerous problem, as does China and Taiwan. In none of these cases has peaceful unification been achieved. This report tries to examine whether or not "diplomatic negotiation" can work out a peaceful unification of China and Taiwan.

Second, Taiwan's problem, as Doak Barnett simply stated,

"is that of a divided country, resulting from an incompleting civil conflict which became internationalized in fundamental respects after the outbreak of war in Korea and the height of the worldwide cold war between the Communist and noncommunist nations. Since then, Taiwan has maintained a separate existence, which the United States has supported, while Peking has remained committed to asserting its sovereignty and control over it."<sup>4</sup>

There are no simple answers to this problem. From the viewpoint of US-PRC normalization, the Taiwan problem had postponed it for almost 30 years and has prevented the PRC from entering the United Nations until 1971. Even though both governments in Peking and Taipei assert that "there is only one China", there are still many disputed viewpoints extant in the political and academic area. For instance, the question "Who owns Taiwan?" still appears in an international law book when discussing the sovereignty of this island.<sup>5</sup> Also, political scientist Robert Scalapino has proposed a "one-China, one-Formosa" solution, and Harvard professor John K. Fairbank has offered a "one-and-a-half-China proposal."<sup>6</sup>

Third, any change in Taiwan's status will affect the way of life for 17 million people,<sup>7</sup> a population which is larger than that of more than 100 United Nations members. The people in Taiwan created a national per capita income of \$1400.00 in 1978 and ranked 8th in trade with the U.S. The people living in Taiwan should have the right to decide their own fate even though PRC Premier Chou En-lai ruled out self-determination as a solution

to the Taiwan question.<sup>8</sup> In deciding the future of Taiwan, not only their voice should be heard, but they should also play an active role.

Taiwan's question is not easy to solve. In 1958, Chairman Mao said it would take ten, twenty or even one hundred years to solve Taiwan's problem; Vice Premier Teng also shared the same viewpoint, Teng believed that the Taiwan problem might be solved in ten years, or in a century, or certainly be settled in 1000 years.<sup>9</sup> In this report, there are three important considerations: — ROC, PRC and the environment. The author prefers to analyze and discuss the problem rather than to make a prediction of what will happen, just because any one of these considerations could change the result completely.

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1. Relatively, of these 20 countries, only South Korea, South Africa and Saudi Arabia, have a little influence in the international community.
2. New York Times, March 15, 1980, p. 46.
3. In June, 1974, the two Germanys completed the official "Normalization of relations" between them. The two states exchanged, not ambassadors, but "permanent representatives".
4. A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in the East Asia (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 235.
5. G. Von Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), p. 282.
6. Before the PRC/U.S. normalization, Fairbank suggested the recognition of Chinese Communist suzerainty over Taiwan. In return of this recognition, the Peiking government would make Taiwan an autonomous area with full rights to handle its own foreign affairs. He thought, the PRC should get both seats in the U.N. Security Council and in the General Assimbly, whereas the ROC should be limited to the General Assembly.
7. Central Daily News (Taipei), August 22, 1980. The population of Taiwan was 17,647,929 in July, 1980.
8. New York Times, December 19, 1978, p. 14.
9. Nathaniel B. Thayer, "China: The Formosa Question", Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1974), p. 120.

## Chapter II

### THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION

Indeed, it might be said that the Republic of China, inaugurated at Nanking in 1911, had born in Formosa in 1895.

—— W.G. Goddard. Formosa  
(Michigan State University  
Press, 1966) p. 157

All territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China.

—— Cairo Declaration, December  
1, 1943

This chapter attempts to assess the historical evolution of Taiwan from a little-known and uncultivated island to one of the most modern and developed areas in Asia today. It will emphasize and deal only with the most significant and salient aspects of Taiwan's development in the last three centuries.

#### A. The Historical Record and the Name of Formosa

Geographically, Taiwan is a small island with an area of 13,884 square miles, lying from 89 to 124 miles east of the mainland of China. It is about twice the size of New Jersey or slightly larger than Holland.<sup>1</sup> There is no exact record of when the island was discovered, but in the third century A.D. it was referred to in Chinese geographical records as "I Chou", signifying a barbarous region in the east. Then, from the year 607 (Sui Dynasty) until 1570 (Ming Dynasty), it was known to the Chinese

as Little Liu Chiu. Why it was called Taiwan, the name by which it has been known among Chinese since then, is not clear.<sup>2</sup>

During the 16th and 17th century, mainland Chinese began crossing the strait from Fukien in larger numbers. During the same period, in 1590, Linschotten, a Dutch navigator on a Portuguese vessel, sailing along the west coast of the island, was so impressed with the lush beauty of the coastal plain that he located the island on the chart as "Ilha Formosa", the beautiful island.<sup>3</sup> This Portuguese name has been adopted by the west ever since.

By the early 1600's, there were small Spanish and Japanese trading colonies on the north of the island. In 1624, the Dutch invaded Taiwan, eventually ousted the Spanish, and set up a fortified colony of several hundred people in the southeast, called Fort Zeelandie, near present-day Tainan. The Dutch used Taiwan as a base for trade with China and Japan, but their rule was shortlived.

#### B. From Koxinga to the Republic of Taiwan

In 1662, Koxinga (Cheng Cheng-kung) forced the Dutch out of Taiwan. His takeover had an enormous impact on Taiwan, because since that time no more foreigners set foot in Taiwan thus keeping the language, religion and culture intact. Koxinga died at age 39 in 1663. Today, after three hundred years, his two year rule in Taiwan is respected by both governments in Peking and Taipei, and he is treated as the founder of Taiwan for the Taiwanese



people by Taiwan independent movement supporters. As Prof. Parris Chang has mentioned, the ROC government respects him as a national hero, because Koxinga provided a refuge for opponents of the alien Manchu conquerors, then struggled relentlessly to recapture the mainland. The ROC government has been in a similar situation ever since its move to Taiwan in 1949. For native Taiwanese or independence movement supporters, Koxinga's movement of the Chinese people into Taiwan and his nation-building undertakings, which laid the foundation for Taiwan's future development, distinguished him as the founder of Taiwan. Finally, the PRC has thought Koxinga's liberation of Taiwan from the Dutch colonial yoke was a splendid achievement against the imperialism China has suffered in modern times.<sup>4</sup>

From 1683 until 1895, Taiwan was ruled by the Manchu Dynasty. In 1885, Taiwan became one of the provinces of the Chinese Empire. This was the first time the Chinese Empire recognized the strategic importance of Taiwan.

After being defeated by Japan in 1894, the Manchu government ceded Taiwan to Japan according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed on April 16, 1895 by both parties. The Shimonoseki Treaty stimulated the people in Taiwan to proclaim Taiwan an independent republic. The "Republic of Taiwan" was born on May 23, 1895. The Governor of Formosa, Tang Ching-sung, became the president, with a declaration as follows:

#### Declaration of Independence of the Republic

of Taiwan.

The Japanese have insulted China by annexing our territory of Taiwan. The People of Taiwan, in vain, have appealed to the Throne. Now, the Japanese are about to arrive.

If we, the People of Taiwan, permit them to land, Taiwan will become the land of savages and barbarians. If, on the other hand, we resist, our state of weakness will not be for long, as Foreign Powers have assured us that Taiwan must establish its independence before they will assist us.

Therefore, we, the People of Taiwan, are determined to die rather than be subdued by the Japanese. This decision is irrevocable.

The leaders of the People of Taiwan, in Council, have decided to constitute Taiwan, a Republic State, and all administration, henceforth, will be in the hands of officials, elected by the People of Taiwan.

T'ang Ching-sung, Governor of Taiwan, has been appointed President of the Republic of Taiwan.

The official ceremony of inauguration of the Republic will take place on the second day of the fifth moon at the ssu hour, at which, all persons, those of rank, merchants, farmers, artisans, and tradesmen, will assemble at the Tuan Fang Hall.

This is a Declaration of the People of Taiwan.<sup>5</sup>

Although this first Asian Republic was defeated by Japan within a few months, this story helped to spread the flames of revolt throughout south China by the Taiwanese refugees in the mainland, thus making possible the victory of 1911 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. As one scholar stated: "Indeed, it might be said that the Republic of China, inaugurated at Nanking in 1911, had been born in Formosa in 1895."<sup>6</sup>

#### C. Japanese Occupation and the Cairo Declaration

For 50 years from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was occupied by

Japan. At first, Japan treated Taiwan the same as the colony of Korea under its occupation, but later Japan helped Taiwan to develop the system of transportation, irrigation and education and also set up the basis for light and heavy industry. Through the "Japanization" policy, Japan hoped the natives would embrace the unique and divine culture of Japan.<sup>7</sup> During World War II, Taiwan was Japan's main staging base for the southward surge of imperial forces after Pearl Harbor.

After WW II, Taiwan was returned to China by the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 which was jointly signed U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. It stated that "All territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores (Penghu Island) shall be restored to the Republic of China."<sup>8</sup>

In 1945, the Taiwanese people opened their arms to welcome the Nationalist army who came to Taiwan, but in only two years, on February 28, 1947, the Taiwanese people in the whole island raised arms against the Nationalist authority in Taiwan. This incident was crushed by more Nationalist army troops sent by the ROC Nanking central government, and about 10,000 Taiwanese natives were killed. Most of them were educators, doctors, businessmen, publishers and politicians. Prof. Chang mentioned that "a whole generation of leaders was lost".<sup>9</sup> The U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer concluded that the Nationalist government lost "a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at

large its capacity to provide honest and efficient administration."<sup>10</sup> On December 7, 1949, the Nationalist government moved its headquarters to Taipei because the Communists took over the whole of mainland China; from that time Taiwan has been de facto separated from mainland China and has continued as such to this day.

#### D. Taiwan in the Era after the Korean War

Taiwan became an issue between the United States and the PRC because of the Korean War. Early in 1950, U.S. President Truman, seeking to disengage the United States from entanglement in the Chinese civil war, declared:

The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa (Taiwan) at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.<sup>11</sup>

This "let the dust settle" China policy was a hands-off policy, which completely changed with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. Truman reversed this policy toward Taiwan and announced that the status of Taiwan in international law was undetermined. He stated that:

- The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces

performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.... The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace treaty with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.<sup>12</sup>

From that time, the United States has limited its Asian policy to "containing Red China, supporting the free world" to fight with PRC's policy of "supporting wars of national liberation" and "opposing American imperialism and its 'running dogs'".<sup>13</sup> In this way, Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam became the confrontational area between the PRC and the United States.

During this period, the United States supported the Nationalist government as a legal government representing the whole of China in the United Nations; in 1958, the PRC took an action by a massive artillery bombardment aimed at interdicting the resupply of the island of Quemoy (Chinmen) just off the China coast occupied by the ROC. The United States helped Taiwan break the attempted blockade, making it clear to Peking that the U.S. would not allow the islands to fall into the PRC's hands.

#### E. Taiwan and U.S./PRC Normalization

Ever since Nixon entered the White House in 1968, American China policy has gradually shifted. Through "Ping Pong diplomacy", Kissinger's secret visit to Peking, the PRC's entry into the United Nations, President Nixon's historic trip to mainland China, and the signature of the Shanghai Communiqué on February

27, 1972, the United States has moved closer to Communist China.

The Shanghai Communiqué is different from most other communiqués. Instead of listing the areas of agreement between the principal participants and ignoring the areas of disagreement, the Shanghai Communiqué directs its attention principally to the areas of disagreement and slights the areas of agreement. It stated the U.S. position on Taiwan - one scholar thinks it is the best public statement of current U.S. policy.<sup>14</sup>

The U.S. stated it as follows:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.

The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

This is the new policy defining the status of Taiwan - as part of China, and that the Americans should seek a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. The U.S. seems to support the new hands-off policy and expects the Chinese on both sides to settle the issue.

For the PRC, this is different from the former Taiwan policy. The PRC compromised its position on Taiwan by receiving President Nixon and signing the Shanghai Communiqué prior to a U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, which clearly implies that the PRC leaders were more interested in U.S. help against the Soviet Union than

U.S. policy over Taiwan. Taiwan became a second priority; the PRC Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan told a group of foreigners that "the Taiwan issue is not the most important problem in U.S./China relations". Instead, he suggested that "China's dominant concern regarding the United States was American ability and will to resist the advances of the Soviet Union."<sup>15</sup>

On January 1, 1979, the United States established official relations with the PRC, recognized the Peking government as the sole legal government of China, and cut official relations with the Nationalist government in Taipei. For the United States, this derecognition of the ROC ends official American involvement in the Chinese civil war.

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11. Dept. of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 79. For interesting background on U.S. China policy during this period, see Ross Y. Coen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1960)
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### Chapter III

#### THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION

"It does not matter, whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice"

—— Teng Hsiao-ping  
The New Leader, January  
 1, 1979, p. 3

"I know of no change in policy, only of circumstances".

—— John Quincy Adams  
 U.S. Secretary of State,  
 1823

#### A. The PRC's Overtures to Taiwan

Since normalization with the United States, the PRC has changed its Taiwan policy from a hard line to a soft one. The Peking government no longer calls the Taipei government "imperialist lackeys" but rather, the "Taiwan authority".<sup>1</sup> The Peking government also has praised the "Taiwan authority" for upholding the principle that Taiwan is an integral part of China, not an independent state.<sup>2</sup>

These changes in PRC's Taiwan policy have been followed by a series of actions that clearly express the willingness of the PRC to seek peaceful negotiation with the ROC. The facts include the following:

Earlier of 1979, Peking announced the celebration of National Tree-Planting Day on March 12. The PRC leaders, including Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping took part in widely publicized

tree-planting ceremonies. The significance lies in the fact that in 1930, the Nationalist government decreed March 12 as National Tree-Planting Day in memory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuo-mintang (The Nationalist Party, also called the KMT) and the Republic of China. The holiday is observed to this day in Taiwan, but has not been celebrated for the last years on the mainland.<sup>3</sup>

From January 1, 1979, the PRC ended 30 years of firing "propaganda shells" against Nationalist-held offshore islands, Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu. The Peking government shifted the Chinese troops in Fukien (The province facing Taiwan) to the Vietnamese and Russians borders.<sup>4</sup> This is a big change for the PRC's Taiwan policy since 1949.

The PRC Minister of Culture, Huang Chen, publicly invited actors from Taiwan to take part in a theatrical festival in Peking to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on Oct. 1 1979.<sup>5</sup> Also, the PRC published a new collection of 22 novels and short story by 16 Taiwanese writers for nation-wide sale.<sup>6</sup>

PRC appeals to Taiwan to begin trade with the mainland and to allow direct postal service, shipping and personal visits as a first step toward the reunification of Taiwan with China.<sup>7</sup> Also, aviation officials suggested that Taiwan's airline establish a route to Peking and Shanghai.<sup>8</sup>

Besides all of the evidence listed above, the most important policy delivered by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping was that after reunification, Taiwan could retain full autonomy within the PRC, including its own security forces. According to U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Teng was quoted as saying "The social system in Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan..... we will

not change the society by force".<sup>9</sup> But, Teng still insists that the ROC government should give up sovereignty of Taiwan and change its national flag.

Also, in terms of trade, the Peking government is seeking to buy various products directly from Taiwan. The PRC asked one Japanese trade company to sound out the possibility for Taiwan of selling China electrical, chemical and textile products, and machinery.<sup>10</sup> Today, it is known publicly not only that the PRC's department store in Hong Kong has advertised, displayed and even sold Taiwanese goods, but also that in a Canton fall trade fair, a Taiwan-made Toshiba refrigerator has appeared.

The trade between Taiwan and mainland China is very widely known. As Business Week reported, the items imported to the PRC, which were made in Taiwan, included TV sets, radios, house appliances, clothing and digital watches. For Taiwan, a lot of items are imported from mainland China, such as Chinese foodstuffs, including the so-called Shanghai hairy crabs, and traditional Chinese medicines, such as dried turtle, the root of white ginseng, deer antlers and mummified toads.<sup>11</sup> The trade between the two parties has increased dramatically; a Hong Kong statistician estimated that Peking exporters sold 43.8 million dollars worth of goods to Taiwan in 1978 compared with 28 million in 1977,<sup>12</sup> and that Taiwan proposed to export to China goods worth 3 million in the first six months of 1980.<sup>13</sup> Hong Kong has become the point of contact for this trade.

For Taiwan, the government continues to ignore Peking's overtures, but its anti-Communist policy has changed quietly. Today, widespread reports about China are commonplace in the newspapers. The government now refers to "Chinese Communists", a replacement of the "Communist Bandits" term which was used for a long time. Like the PRC, the Nationalist army in the offshore islands (Chinmen and Matsu) have ceased their shelling of the mainland, and now only send out balloons loaded with anti-Communist propaganda.<sup>14</sup> The most important change for ROC in Taiwan's position of diplomatic isolation since its derecognition by the U.S. has been to open trade with East European countries, including Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.<sup>15</sup> This new trade policy deviates from the original ROC anti-Communist policy and may open up the possibility of further contact with PRC in the future.

#### B. Pragmatic Policy and New Smooth Moves

In the previous discussion, it is pointed out that the governments in Taipei and Peking have shifted their policy. The significance of these changes is that the "hatred mood" has reduced dramatically and policy today is more pragmatic and less ideological.

Entering the 1980's, the mood in China after the consolidation of a post Mao line has been one of cautious hopefulness. Of all the differences since Chairman Mao died in 1976, there are some important ones which stand out: First, the moderate faction

won power after they captured the Gang of Four - the radical faction. The moderates are headed by Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping. This is a pragmatic political faction and strongly committed to modernization. For example, the new Premier Chao Tzu-yang is a western trained economist and is expected to inject new ideas into China's crusty bureaucracy; Chao is especially influenced by the Yugoslavian self-management economic system. In general, the current leadership recognizes the need for higher levels of both material incentives and intellectual freedom more than has prevailed in the past. On the other side, the military factions have played an important role during the cultural revolution till the arrest of the Gang of Four. Even so, the military has, since that time, been a dominant stabilizing force for Chinese society, and the direction and proportion of military support has become a decisive factor in the outcome of factional struggle. According to one specialist, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is now determined to become more modernized and professional, and thus it will be less-prominent in the handling of everyday politics.<sup>16</sup> It is clear that the moderates are different from other factions in both their ideology and in their political concerns.

Second, the people high and low see economic growth as China's highest priority. During Mao's day, "Politics in Command" was an unquestionable doctrine, but that saying has been replaced today by "Production in Command". In most rural areas political pressures on farmers have been eased, spurring them to produce

more by growing what they want to grow. In towns and villages alike, hard work and initiative (as well as birth control) are being rewarded in cash; one-sixth of an industrial wage can hinge on a bonus, and one-fourth of a farm income can come from private cultivation. The government encourages the citizens to work hard and to reach for material rewards; as Ross Terrill described it, "Under Mao, China as a nation stood up. In these post-Mao years the Chinese individual is trying to stand up and claim a place in the Sun."<sup>17</sup> "Four Modernizations" is the guide post emphasizing the current Chinese leader's concerns.

Third, ideology is on the decline in Chinese politics today. During or before the Cultural Revolution, "politics in command" could be interpreted as stressing political purification and egalitarianism. They put extreme emphasis on the importance of "redness," or ideological dedication and purity, rather than "expertness" or technical skill.<sup>18</sup> Today, "class struggle" is emphasized less discussed or believed; the decline of slogans and banners free the eye to notice more of the architectural and social ways, both the harmonies and chaos of Chinese daily life. Today, "Seek truth from facts" replaces "It is right to rebel" as the essence of Maoism. The separation of the party system from bureaucratic administration could be an explanation of this change.

Fourth, there is a relatively wider opening of the door to non-Chinese ideas or presence, not only in diplomacy but also in economics. In the period of Mao, China stressed "self-reliance" as her basic independent policy. The PRC usually denounced

foreign values and style as corrupting.<sup>19</sup> Now, there is a new mood of openness to international economic forces and to foreign cultural influences. Export zones, foreign advertising, foreign bank offices and joint ventures have all suddenly come into existence; this new attitude spurs the PRC to look outside China for some of the ideas for development and modernization.

All of these changes will obviously influence the future of Taiwan - the prospect for solving Taiwan's problems. It is certain that the PRC's current leaders will consider Taiwan's problems more pragmatically than before.

#### C. The ROC in a Transition Period

The Republic of China on Taiwan is also in a transitional period. Since Chiang Kai-shek moved his Nationalist government to Taiwan in 1949, some political scientists has classified the elites as security - military factions, and civilian - technocrats.<sup>20</sup> Some have divided elites into a young faction and an old faction or mainlander and Taiwanese. Because the percentage of Taiwanese in the central government and National Congress<sup>21</sup> is very low--the Taiwanese are active primarily in local government and provincial assemblies--it is not appropriate to categorize Taiwanese as a faction of ROC elites. For many years, there was a continual tug-of-war between those who place prime emphasis on the goal of recovering the Chinese mainland and those who favor concentrating on the development of Taiwan. For convenience, the two groups were dubbed the "ideologues" and the "pragmatists."



As one political scientist pointed out, the distinction between them has not always been clearcut, for the two groups overlap to some extent. The pragmatists did not openly reject the goal of mainland recovery; they argued that the best hope of achieving this goal was to develop and modernize Taiwan as rapidly as possible in order to improve its capacity to serve as a base for the future recovery of the mainland, rather than to divert attention and resources to quixotic attempts to act before the time is ripe. The ideologues did not oppose the development of Taiwan, but deprecated allowing it to detract from the struggle with the PRC. Both groups strongly opposed accepting domination by Peking.<sup>22</sup> It is clear that the ideologues lost most of their political influence long before Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975. The return-to-the-mainland theme persisted in official rhetoric but carries little weight today, as Brian Crozier notes, "It had begun as a fierce resolve; it became an aspiration, then a myth, then a liturgy."<sup>23</sup> It might be said that the civilian-technocrats are pragmatists who shaped policy toward the PRC in the past, and will take the realistic and reasonable approach to face the challenge of the PRC regarding the Taiwan problem.

As mentioned before in this chapter, the governments in Peking and Taipei have shifted to a soft policy towards each other in the past two years. For non-governmental relations, sports and intellectual endeavors will help to bring the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait closer and closer. In 1956, the PRC disagreed with the two China policy and bolted the



Olympics, vowing not to return until the Taiwanese were expelled.<sup>24</sup> After 30 years, in 1979, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suggested using the name "China-Taipei" rather than the ROC name and refraining from using its own flag or anthem. The PRC agreed this was "extremely realistic and reasonable".<sup>25</sup> In this attempt to unify Chinese sports, Peking has not only responded enthusiastically, but has also offered Taiwan a position in its sports federation and invited the athletes from Taiwan to join in its 4th national games.<sup>26</sup> For the ROC side, since the diplomatic isolation has become worse and worse, the earlier policy which insisted upon never joining the athletic organization with the PRC has been given up; the ROC government today has established a new priority to keep the membership first. In this new environment, the athletes from both sides obviously have more freedom to get together. In the United States, it is reported that athletes from both Chinas have been invited to participate in sports. This face-to-face contact could be treated as a foundation for official negotiations in the future.

For the intellectual of Taiwan today, it is popular to apply the IOC formula in international academic meetings. It means that the ROC and the PRC should compete together. In the scientific conference, the scientists from Taiwan are told ahead of time how to behave at such a conference, as one officer pointed out:

If a Taiwan physicist, for example,  
delivers a paper, and a mainland physicist

raises scientific questions, the questions should be answered. But if the questions are of a political nature, they are to be ignored. Scientists from Taiwan are allowed to take part in social functions also attended by mainland scientists, but they are warned not to toast their mainland colleagues for fear that some enterprising photographer may capture the moment for the newspapers, leading to speculation that the two sides are engaging in a dialogue.<sup>27</sup>

Although there is no political dialogue in this kind of conference, one western educated officer, Dr. Robert Lee, the Chairman of Taiwan's Council for Agricultural Planning and Development, expresses the active desire to help PRC agriculture: "If the Chinese Communists want to 'Taiwanize' their agricultural reforms, then our council is willing to contribute information on a humanitarian basis to improve the living conditions of our fellow countrymen".<sup>28</sup> Western educated intellectuals who work in government generally have a more open attitude toward the PRC. In addition to direct communication between the scientists and open policy from some government officer who received western education, the students and scholars in foreign countries also could serve the function of bridge for mutual contact. The ROC government has encouraged their students study in a foreign country to open their minds and to try to help the students, those who come from mainland China, if needed.<sup>29</sup> All of these contacts probably will contribute to peaceful negotiation.

#### D. Nationalism and the Concept of Unification

The one-China doctrine is a sacred tenet in Taipei and

Peking as an inheritance from two thousand years of Chinese history. As professor John K. Fairbank of Harvard points out "Whoever has aspired to rule in China has usually found himself compelled to try to rule all China, not just part of China".<sup>30</sup> This is a basic concept for the rulers of China.

In modern history, especially in the 19th century, the Chinese Empire has suffered from imperialism. Nationalism and the concept of unity has arisen among the Chinese people, as the need for unity became obvious as a means for saving China from foreign domination. From this standpoint, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung are the same in theories of nationalism, and in support for one unified and strong China.

Both governments in Taipei and Peking insist that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The understanding of this common ideology about the status of Taiwan, considering it is not a fact, could be a good precondition for unifying the mainland and Taiwan.

The PRC is seeking and urging the ROC to peaceful negotiation by stressing nationalism rather than communism, with an appeal to join a new, powerful China. An example of this is the message addressed to Taiwan from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the PRC on new years day, January 1, 1979.

If we don't quickly set about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, how can you answer our ancestors and explain to our

descendants?<sup>31</sup>

Likewise, this concept of a unified state deeply influences the leaders of Taiwan. They share the viewpoint that it is difficult for them to conceive of the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.

The pragmatic leadership of both governments today, and the greater possibilities for direct contact or communication in sports competition, scientific conferences and students study abroad, increases the chance for the Chinese people to get together. These trends, plus nationalism and the concept of the unity of China, should combine to influence the possibility for peaceful negotiation before the final decision on the future of Taiwan.

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## Chapter IV

### THE BARRIERS TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION

"Any contacts or ties would just be a tool by the Chinese Communists to undermine our psychological defenses against Communism"

—— ROC President Chiang  
Ching-kuo  
TIME, May 28, 1979, p. 24

In 1956, PRC Premier Chou En-lai's first suggestion for peaceful negotiation was rejected by the ROC's Chiang Kai-shek. The Peking government has sounded Taiwan on this theme many times, but Taipei has never accepted it. Why does the ROC government ignore and reject peaceful negotiation? What are the barriers that exist? This Chapter will discuss possible barriers to peaceful negotiation from various viewpoints.

#### A. The Different Political Cultures of Taiwan and the Mainland

Ethnically, culturally and linguistically, Taiwanese are Chinese as one with the people across the strait, but politically they are alienated from the mainland. Thus, the people in Taiwan have developed a different political identity. It might be said that this situation is much like the British in the 13 American colonies two centuries ago - the Chinese and Taiwanese on the island of Taiwan want to shape their own destiny.<sup>1</sup> The briefness of the four year contact (1945-1949) between the mainland and Taiwan in eighty five years (1895-1980) is one of the important reasons for developing a different political culture.

For the PRC, it is a communist country. Although the current leaders of PRC are more pragmatic and less ideological, Communism and Marxism still are the guide posts of political culture, economic development and social life.

For the ROC, the official ideology is 'Sun Min Chu I' or 'Three Principles of the People' as suggested by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (the founder of the ROC in 1911). Although it was criticized by Chinese intellectuals and by outside critics, it had by 1945 been worked into a fairly well standardized and organized basis for legitimizing the Nationalist government, providing goals for the people, and enabling Mainlanders and Taiwanese alike to identify with the Chinese state.<sup>2</sup> Since 1949, the Nationalist government in Taiwan has insisted that the ROC is the only legal government and that it's legal status should not be challenged, even though the people and the territory of mainland China have been outside the ROC's jurisdiction for more than thirty years.

It is not easy for two governments with different political cultures to achieve peaceful unification, especially when each claims to be the sole and legal government. The Peking government does not rule out the use of force to solve the Taiwan question, and Taipei still hopes to return to mainland China.

#### B. Living Standards and Ways of Life

There is a big gap in living standards between Taiwan and the mainland. On the mainland, fifty percent of the population lives on the edge of survival;<sup>3</sup> the average Chinese buys only six



dollars worth of goods per month, excluding food.<sup>4</sup> The PRC's per capita income was \$379 in 1978<sup>5</sup> and they are trying to reach \$10000.00 after comprehensive modernization by the year of 2000.

While most mainland Chinese are looking for a transistor radio, watch and bike....., etc., most families in Taiwan have owned a color TV and motorcycle for a long time. The number of telephones in Taiwan, for example, has reached three million and ranks 20th in the world today. In other words, one out of every six people owns a telephone.<sup>6</sup> Per capita income was over 1400.00, which was three times that of the PRC. The following are living standard comparisons given by a journalist reporting about village life:

In the rural areas of China, sowing, transplanting, and harvesting are all done collectively by peasant families organized into teams, which form production brigades that make up communes. The labor is hard, with little machinery to ease the load. Even beasts of burden are scarce in many localities: Scenes of peasants pulling heavy carts are common. Although each peasant family is allotted a private plot, and liberalized agricultural policies now permit peasants to sell their own produce at rural fairs, the vast majority of the 800 million rural-dwelling Chinese find it difficult to get ahead. Most, in fact, still have a very low standard of living, even for Asia. Families who own radios, bicycles, or sewing machines are few and far between.<sup>7</sup>

Regarding the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the author writes:

On Taiwan each farming family works its

own privately owned land. Agricultural output ranks among the highest in the developing world. The rural areas bristle with signs of new prosperity: Small motorized tractors, motorbikes, pickup trucks, and even television sets are common. Farm work is hard on Taiwan, but is not as hard as it is in China, and there is more incentive on Taiwan: the more one grows, the more one makes.<sup>8</sup>

Also, the ways of life are quite different between Taiwan and the mainland. The young generation in Taiwan rejects old Chinese social traditions, such as arranged marriages. They are somewhat more "Western" in their dress and life style. Blue jeans are popular, hit songs and American movie stars are well-known among young people. This "Western" life style can explain much of the difference between the two societies. There are a lot of university graduates who leave for the United States seeking advanced study, and it is easier for them to adjust to the American way of life. Taiwan is a relatively open society if compared to the more closed society of the mainland.

#### C. Education and People's Identification

According to the U.S. State Department Bulletin, it is estimated that the literacy rate in PRC is just over 50%. For Taiwan, even in 1942 during the Japanese occupation, over 90% of all elementary school age children were enrolled.<sup>9</sup> Today, the population is well-educated with 99% of all elementary school age children enrolled; there are nine years of compulsory education, and nearly 300,000 students in colleges and universities.<sup>10</sup>

The big gap in educational attainment, and the different ways of life, create the big barrier of ideology. As mentioned before, virtually all of both groups regard themselves culturally as Chinese, but most Taiwanese see themselves as a distinctive kind of Chinese.<sup>11</sup> Native Taiwanese never think mainland China is their home nor that they should return to that homeland. The children of mainlanders, according to the last U.S. Ambassador to the ROC, Leonard Unger, with a few exceptions, have not inherited their parents' point of view. They support neither a continuation of the near-monopoly of the Kuomintang, nor the goal of regaining control of the mainland.<sup>12</sup> Even for those mainlanders who have escaped to Taiwan, most of them were regarded by Communist China as capitalist, reactionary or at least bourgeois. There is no reason for them to identify with communism.

It is sure that, if a group of people have higher education and see themselves as a distinctive people, there is little chance for them to identify with those with lower education who are different. This is a psychological barrier of the Taiwanese to accepting unification with China.

#### D. The Different Economic Systems and the Difficulty of the PRC's Modernization

One political scientist in an article stated that the "two Germanys" problem has become part of the much larger issue of capitalism versus socialism. He concluded that "German reunification therefore is not likely to occur, if it ever will,

until this larger issue of confrontation has been resolved".<sup>13</sup>  
 The economic system plays a critical role in reunification of East Germany and West Germany.

Generally speaking, the economy of the PRC is ruled by social-minded bureaucrats instead of profit-motivated businessmen. This is a "command economy" which stresses a 'self reliance' policy. In contrast to this, Barnett points out that Taiwan's system is a "dynamic and strong economy;"<sup>14</sup> compared with the PRC, Taiwan has an open economic system. It is closely linked to the world economy in that it is quite vulnerable to international market forces, and to the broad political, as well as economic, factors that affect them.

From another viewpoint, it is useful to understand the different levels of industrialization through the discussion of economic structure, not only per capita income. One criterion is to judge industrialization and modernization through the relative Gross National Product (GNP) in agriculture, industry and services. The comparison is as follows:<sup>15</sup>

a) Distribution of Taiwan's GNP.

	1958	1978
Agriculture	30.8%	12.0%
Industry	23.7%	40.3%
Service	45.5%	47.7%

b) Distribution of the PRC's GNP.

	1956	1975
Agriculture	48.1%	37.0%

Industry	36.16%	38%
Service	15.50%	25%

c) The ratio of agricultural labor in Taiwan and mainland in 1978.

Taiwan	25% (it was 40% in 1968)
Mainland	75%

Through use of these tables, it can be concluded that Taiwan is more developed than Mainland China in general. While Taiwan's economic structure has apparently changed from agriculture to industry, there has been no big change for the PRC's economic structure, the agricultural labor still keeps 75% of the total forces as it did in 1950.

The success of Taiwan's economic growth depends on many factors, such as U.S. aid, the basic development set down during the Japanese occupation,<sup>16</sup> peaceful land reform, and an industrious people. All of these factors contribute to Taiwan's economic prosperity, and have turned Taiwan into a big trader. Exports constitute 44 per cent of its GNP.

For a long time, the PRC has insisted and believed in the superiority of the socialist system. In 30 years, the PRC has achieved three basic goals: 1) building up its heavy and defense industry; 2) relocating and redistributing industrial zones and 3) providing the basic food needs of its people.<sup>17</sup> But, in general, the PRC has not made big progress in its economy. The following are the reasons suggested by one commentator: 1) the

economy was run by the administrative method; economists can not join into the decision-making; 2) PRC follows the USSR's economic model in that it ignores light industry; 3) the central planning used functions poorly for China, a big, under-developed country with few management skills.<sup>18</sup>

Entering 1980, there are still a lot of problems for the PRC's Four Modernizations;<sup>19</sup> as Ross Terrill points out, "on the negative side, one notes a shortage of capital, a massive population which is the main task of the economy simply to feed, an inability to raise the present proportion of cultivated land (11 percent) except at exorbitant cost, weak transportation and other infrastructure, and the bureaucratic rigidities of a planning system that is still basically Marxist."<sup>20</sup>

The problem of population is really a barrier for the PRC's modernization. According to the New York Times, the population of mainland China is 958 million.<sup>21</sup> It will increase 17 million per year. In other words, there are 47,000 babies born in China everyday.<sup>22</sup> The mass population not only creates shortages of food, but also makes the PRC government face a dilemma. As Barbara Spinelli points out, the government would like to modernize the agriculture-structure, but can't go beyond a certain limit in introducing new technology for fear of putting masses of farmers out of work and risking very serious social upheaval.<sup>23</sup>

#### E. The Potentiality of PRC's Politics and the Nature of Autonomy

Ever since the PRC was founded in 1949, it has not had a

stable structure of elites. The cases of former head of State Liu Shao-chi, former Minister of Defense Lin Piao, the Gang of Four, and Teng Hsiao-ping's movement in and out are good examples stressing the difference of ideology (or line) and "power struggle" which are uninterrupted in Chinese politics. Even today, there are still arguments between anti-Mao and pro-Mao policy. It might be said that the PRC leadership still is in a period of transition. Also, in the viewpoint of openness in a democratic society, it is impossible for the PRC to attract the people of Taiwan. According to a study by Jean Chesneaux:

The Chinese authorities have deliberately taken their own history in hand. It is they who control its rhythm and stages as options develop and change occurs: the five year plan, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. It is they who decide which aspect of the past should be made public for political consideration and which aspect of their experience should remain hidden as a state secret."<sup>24</sup>

For example, they delayed the trial of the Gang of Four; the Lin Piao affair was only belatedly and incompletely made known to the public - it remains a dark and confusing incident. The questions of who reinstated Teng Hsiao-ping in 1972-1973 and why have never been answered.

As to the future of Taiwan after reunification with the PRC, the PRC just asks Taiwan to give up its sovereignty and change its flag; it does not attempt to change the social, economic and political order by force (details in Ch.3). Taiwan

would retain the status of "full autonomy". According to the past example of the Inner-Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Kwangsi Autonomous Region, and Tibet, it is virtually impossible to conceive of PRC allowing true autonomy for any considerable period of time. Under the control of the PRC, Dalai Lama has concluded that "my people are not at all happy. Tibet is a vast prison."<sup>25</sup>

It doesn't matter what kind of relation would exist between Taiwan and the mainland after they are unified; the people in Taiwan firmly believe that a rapid decline in their living standards and sharp restrictions in personal freedom would occur. It is difficult for the Taiwanese to imagine how Peking could permit direct foreign investment, freedom of travel and communication with foreign countries, or private ownership of industry that exists in Taiwan today. It is through fear of becoming a second Tibet, and fear of change in living standards and restrictions of freedom, that the Peking government's overtures still do not attract the people of Taiwan. As for the ROC government, it will deny the legitimacy of their government if they start to negotiate peacefully with the Peking government. As one historian said, "any person who studies Chinese politics should know that changing a flag means total capitulation, which, if history is any guide, is no guarantee for peace".<sup>26</sup>

The Taiwan question still is not easy to solve by peaceful negotiation. There still are too many barriers against reunification of Taiwan and mainland China.



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## Chapter V

### THE PROSPECTS OF A PRC MILITARY INVASION OF TAIWAN

"Taiwan province is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan. When and how is entirely China's internal affair, which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever."

—— PRC Premier Hua Kuo-feng.

Aug. 12, 1977, Political Report to 11th National Congress.

The former chapters have reviewed the possibilities and barriers to peaceful negotiation between Taipei and Peking. If peaceful negotiation can not be worked out, as Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasize, Peking might try seeking unification by military invasion. In this chapter, the author will try to analyse some variables which might influence the PRC's decision to use force, namely, the PRC's capability to carry a military attack, the ROC's defense, the USSR's role in the PRC's decision and possible reaction by the U.S. and Japan if the PRC should use force.

#### A. The PRC's Military Capability

Two days after President Carter declared normalization between the PRC and the United States, an official in the Defense Department said: "China will not have the capability to invade Taiwan for at least five years".<sup>1</sup> With similar viewpoints, President Carter, in an interview, emphasized that the PRC does

not have the capability of launching a 100-mile attack across the ocean against the resistance of Taiwan's well-trained armed forces.<sup>2</sup> Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona), good friend of the ROC government, even said that "the PRC will not have the military strength to attack Taiwan for at least 20 years."<sup>3</sup> Today, the quality of military equipment is not adequate to carry out a successful attack mission. As Secretary of Defence Brown said, after he visited mainland China: "In general, Chinese military equipment corresponds to the best equipment of the U.S. and the Soviet Union a dozen years ago."<sup>4</sup> After the PRC-Vietnam war, which the PRC stressed was to teach Vietnam a lesson, one analyst explained that the PRC paid a heavy price because of the lack of sufficient motor transportation and tactical communications and particular difficulty in delivering enough ammunition to their artillery units.<sup>5</sup> All of these comments point to the fact that the PRC still lacks enough strength to accomplish a mission to invade Taiwan.

If one compares military strength, at first glance, the disparity in size and strength between China and Taiwan makes it appear unlikely that the island could survive the loss of American protection. But the actual and prospective military situation is not as it appears on the surface.<sup>6</sup> An attack on Taiwan would not be an easy thing for several reasons: 1) Any attack across the 100 mile-wide Taiwan Strait would demand a logistic build up, more shipping and sophisticated planning. This was supported by the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in October

1949 when the PRC sent 10,000 Communist troops to attack Chinmen (Quemoy), but 3000 were killed and the rest were captured. It is obvious that crossing 100 miles of water and attacking Taiwan would not be easy. Also, typhoons are a hazard between June and December, often leaving the water impassable for days. The winter monsoon which lasts until March raises a high sea which could debilitate troops during the long rough passage; 2) At present the PLA lacks the capability to transport and sustain more than 75,000 troops in an amphibious attack over this distance. Another 20,000 might be airdropped, although Taiwan's mountainous terrain presents a hazard. These forces would face at least 240,000 troops with an immediate reserve more than twice as large,<sup>7</sup> who would be familiar with the terrain and would be fighting for their home and family against an enemy whose ideology and lifestyle is seen as antithetical to that enjoyed on Taiwan. The relative political relaxation and economic prosperity of the past fifteen years have strengthened Taiwanese loyalty.

### B. The Soviet Union and the PRC

Relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union also weigh heavily in any decision by the PRC to take Taiwan by force. First and foremost, Peking's PLA faces more than forty Soviet divisions positioned along thousands of miles of frontier stretching from Korea to Afghanistan. Superior Soviet fire power rings north and northwest China with airfields and nuclear-

tipped missiles,<sup>8</sup> which is a big threat to China. A large-scale attack on Taiwan is improbable so long as the PRC feels seriously threatened militarily by the Soviet Union. One specialist stressed that the Soviet threat will continue for a period of time, because of the construction of barracks, road and rail facilities and deployment of air defenses; it seems that these 44 divisions will be stationed near the border permanently.<sup>9</sup> The fact is, for many years China's most capable and modern units have been deployed along that same border to face the Russian buildup. The reasons are that the PRC's uranium deposits and missile test facilities are highly vulnerable because they are located in Sinkiang. Also its major nuclear production plants at Lanchow and Paotow lie within easy striking range of Soviet airfields in the Mongolian People's Republic. In the northeast, Taching, China's main oilfield, is equally indefensible against surprise attack. It appears that the PRC is not prepared to take military action against Taiwan, because it thinks the threat of a military attack from the USSR is a more important concern.

It seems that the conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union will continue to exist in the near future. The sources of such conflict are diverse and deepseated. As John K. Fairbank has stated, "Since the Chinese and Russian peoples have very different histories, self-images, needs and goals, it is not surprising that a major split developed between them on several levels at once."<sup>10</sup> Put in the broadest term, as Robert A. Scalapino wrote:

The USSR and the PRC currently represent two nation-states which seek to share a common ideology but have profound differences with respect to the timing of their revolution, the stage of their economic development, and degree of their military power. These differences make inevitable very different interpretations of what policies, foreign and domestic, constitute the national interest - interpreted, of course, by each state's political-military elite.<sup>11</sup>

Also, in recent years, there are two facts that might make the USSR-PRC relation worse. First is Soviet support of Hanoi's reaffirmation of Vietnam's claim to sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel islands.<sup>12</sup> Through 1978, the USSR supported the Vietnamese politically, economically and militarily in their confrontation with China. Second, just as Germany encouraged the Ukrainians to break away from Russia and set up their own state during the two World Wars, the Soviet Union has encouraged a separatist movement among the six million non-Chinese people of the Chinese province of Sinkiang as a means of weakening Peking's position in their border dispute.<sup>13</sup> These are also the reasons why after 30 years, the PRC chose not to continue the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union which was signed on March 14, 1950, which expired in 1980. Although the possibility of improved USSR-PRC relations remains present prospects appear strong for continued enmity.

### C. A Blockade and the Nuclear Option

From the former discussion, it is clear that there is only a slight possibility of a PRC conventional military attack

against Taiwan because the PRC might not have an advantage by crossing the Taiwan Strait. It is true that a blockade of the island is less risky in military terms and more promising in its potential economic and political impact. But such a blockade is not a simple task nor is it without serious international complications. Not only because the ROC anti-submarine capability has been strengthened and will continue to improve,<sup>14</sup> but also because it would raise a serious reaction in Japan and the United States, as well as the countries of Southeast Asia.

Japan and the U.S. both have considerable trade and investment interests in the island's stability. The blockade would remove good relations with both countries and, hence, force the PRC to abandon her program of modernization. The PRC's dependence on Japan for technology transfers, and on the United States for a common front against the Soviet Union, acts as a strong deterrent against any provocative action by the PRC.

It is also unlikely that the PRC would choose the "nuclear option" to solve the Taiwan question. Not only has the PRC repeatedly foresworn the first use of nuclear weapons since its initial detonation in 1964, it also regards the island's population as "fellow kinsmen" and "brothers and sisters" who are to be "liberated", not obliterated. The Taiwan economy is far superior to that of the mainland in many respects, and the well educated people of management and the skillful workers might help the PRC in their modernization if peaceful unification occurs, but the PRC would get nothing if Taiwan were to be destroyed



by nuclear weapons.

However there is a sentence in the PRC's new constitution (adopted by the Fifth National People's Congress on March 5, 1978) expressing the PRC's determination to liberate Taiwan and to complete, in this way, the task of national unification.<sup>15</sup> But in real politics, it is not an easy goal for the PRC to liberate and unify Taiwan in the near future.

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## Chapter VI

### SOME OTHER OPTIONS FOR TAIWAN

"Most people on Taiwan don't identify with the mainland, they have far higher living standards, they don't want to be ruled by Communists."

—— Donald Zagoria, Professor  
at Columbia University.  
Newsweek, February 5, 1978,  
p. 56.

"Republic of China would not establish ties with any Communist countries whether near or far, big or small."

—— ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo  
Asian Survey, July 1978,  
p. 764.

"Taiwan have no choice but to establish a self sustaining defense industry."

—— ROC Premier Y.S. Sun  
The Wilson Quarterly, Autumn  
1979, p. 86.

Since some barriers still exist for a peaceful negotiation between the ROC and the PRC, and it is also unlikely for the PRC to take military action at this time, "Where should Taiwan go?" is the question that still remains. This chapter will discuss three options which Taiwan could decide by herself.

#### A. Development of Nuclear Weapons

On September 23, 1975, the ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo was quoted as reporting to the Legislative Yuan saying that "We have both the facilities and the capacity to make nuclear weapons

and actually considered building up a nuclear arsenal last year; but when I broached the idea to the late President, he rejected it flatly on the grounds that we can not use nuclear weapons to hurt our own countrymen."<sup>1</sup> This was the first time that it was publicly known that the leaders of the ROC had considered manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Considering the possibility of a PRC attempt to invade Taiwan, and the United States's derecognition and the termination of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, developing nuclear weapons may be one of the best options. Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons would not permit Taiwan to threaten an attack against Peking, the ability to make a retaliatory strike would obviously enhance Taiwan's ability to deter any attack by Peking. In other words, Taiwan might use nuclear weapons for bargaining and negotiation with Peking rather than for fighting.

Technologically, it is not difficult to develop a nuclear weapon, because Taiwan has a substantial number of nuclear physicists, engineers and other technicians trained in various aspects of nuclear technology, especially after nuclear power plants had been built. But Taiwan's possession of nuclear weapons might appear to be self-defeating, since it is probable that all the major powers would react strongly against it.<sup>2</sup> The incentive would clearly increase for these powers, including the United States to disengage completely from Taiwan. Taiwan's international position might become even more isolated and it could find itself totally "on its own" to face the dangerous situation

of confrontation with Peking alone. Also, the ROC is a signatory to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which pledges not to produce such weapons. There is also the rationale that the U.S. might cut off the supply of uranium for nuclear power plants if the ROC were to build nuclear weapons.

#### B. The Possibility of A Taipei-Moscow Alliance

A case based on strategic and geopolitical considerations can be made for the possibility of an alliance between Moscow and Taipei, although Chiang Ching-kuo expressed clearly that "The ROC would not establish ties with any Communist countries whether near or far; big or small."<sup>3</sup> This possibility is still considered because of historical considerations. In the 1920's, the Russian Mikhail Borodin helped Sun Yat-sen to organize a central, strong KMT (Nationalist Party).<sup>4</sup> Also, Chiang Ching-kuo had personal links with the Soviet Union - he lived for twelve years in the Soviet Union and married a Russian woman.

There is some evidence that the ROC has changed its strongly anti-Soviet policy over the last twenty years. During the mid-1960's, the anti-Soviet posters that once adorned Taiwan's landscape were gradually and quietly removed from billboards throughout the island. In the Spring of 1968, the ROC described USSR/PRC border incidents as "invasions" by the Chinese Communists.<sup>5</sup> Since then, the ROC government has ceased their claims that the Russians illegally grabbed large areas of China in the

19th Century. Also in October 1968, a Russian journalist, Victor Louis, a Moscow correspondent for the London Times, visited Taiwan and talked to Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo regarding the possibility of improving ROC-Soviet Union relations.<sup>6</sup> He visited Taiwan again in the summer of 1973.

The Soviet Union also did something favorable for the ROC government. They printed the ROC flag at various times, and their press has referred to Taiwan as a country or state and has carried favorable coverage of Taiwan. They also have hosted many conferences in which the ROC delegations have participated.<sup>7</sup>

These occurrences make it seem possible for the ROC and the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations, but its presumed advantages could hardly outweigh the damage it would do to Taiwan's vital economic and other relations with the United States and Japan. Both countries are very important as trade partners to Taiwan, and would be highly suspicious of a significant and expanding relationship between Taiwan and the Soviet Union. Also, the ROC is inhibited from pursuing a relationship with the Soviet Union in three respects: first, the ROC's leaders are deeply suspicious of the Soviet government, they do not wish to incur the risk that Moscow might use a foothold on Taiwan as a trump-card in dealings with the PRC in the future that might lead to a Soviet policy of sacrificing Taiwan in exchange for the gains to be obtained from Peking.<sup>8</sup> So far, the Soviet Union has shown no evidence that it would like to develop a significant

and lasting relationship with Taiwan. On the contrary, after Mao's death, the Soviet Union probed the possibility of improving relations with Peking. China also explored improved state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union in 1979, but these effort were largely aborted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup> An alliance between Taiwan and the Soviet Union would throw the population of Taiwan into confusion, because the government's propaganda for the last 30 years has called for unrelenting opposition to all forms of Communism. Also, the PRC might use force to attack Taiwan if the ROC developed relations with the USSR.

Thus, under the present circumstances, seeking to establish relations with the Soviet Union does not seem to offer the ROC leaders a promising counter to PRC efforts to isolate Taiwan. It would only damage Taiwan more than before especially because Japan and the United States might cut off relations completely with Taiwan, and it would force Taiwan towards a dead end.

### C. Taiwan's Independence

A Professor at Columbia University, Donald Zagoria, once said that "Most people on Taiwan don't identify with the mainland, they have far higher living standards, and they don't want to be ruled by Communists."<sup>10</sup> This viewpoint was shared with many other scholars, such as one who stated that "Apart from the mainland refugees, the people of Taiwan have had no particular commitment to the mainland, and it has generally been acknowledged

that if they could have a free choice, they would choose independence."<sup>11</sup> Taiwan Independence seems an alternative for the future of Taiwan, although the ROC government rules it out completely. Where this Taiwan nationalism comes from, and what theory it was derived from, are important facts to understand when considering Taiwan's future.

Chapter II, which covered the history of Taiwan, clearly stated that the ideology of Taiwan independence came from the people of Taiwan who felt that they were betrayed. In 1894, the Chinese Empire agreed to cede Taiwan to Japan as part of a price to be paid for Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria and the continental road to Peking. This made the Taiwanese leaders feel that the island people had been betrayed and that the obligation of loyalty to China had been dissolved by such betrayal. There was no call for a "return to China",<sup>12</sup> but rather for "The Republic of Taiwan". In this war of resistance against the Japanese occupation of Taiwan in 1895, the Chinese Empire did not support the people of Taiwan because Peking did not wish to be involved in another war against Japan.

During the period of the Japanese occupation, although Japanese authorities worked hard for the "Japanization of Taiwan", they still were foreigners from the Taiwanese viewpoint. After WW II, Taiwan was returned to China, according to the Cairo Declaration. At first, the Taiwanese initially welcomed the arrival of the new Chinese government in 1945. Their enthusiasm was soon spent. Although the Chinese had spoken of Taiwan as a lost pro-



vince, the Nationalist administration treated it as occupied territory. By 1947, conditions had become so bad that the Taiwanese revolted. There are estimates that from 5,000 to 20,000 Taiwanese were killed,<sup>13</sup> as Parris Chang wrote: "A whole generation of leaders was lost".<sup>14</sup> After this Feb. 28 1947 incident, most of the island's inhabitants were about as "Chinese" as the majority of American colonists were "English" at the time of the Revolutionary War.

With respect to political development, John K. Fairbank's theory of "Maritime and Continental China" might be an important theory of Taiwanese independence. According to Fairbank, the difference between Maritime China and Continental China is as follows:

Continental China is today a nation of farmers crowded upon the arable land. It has inherited the great Chinese imperial tradition of government by a bureaucracy controlled from the capital. It is an agrarian-bureaucratic empire busily engaged in updating itself..... Maritime China is younger and yet its history goes back to the beginning of the Christian era. For almost 2,000 years Chinese merchantmen, or junks, have plied the coast water of East Asia. For the last 1,000 years, they have left a considerable record of trade and contact with South Asia..... Today, Chinese foreign trade is conducted once again at Canton. Maritime China has grown. It now includes Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and millions of other ethnic Chinese in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Manila, who have given their allegiance to various newly independent states of Southeast Asia.<sup>15</sup>

Fairbank also pointed out that the paradox of Taiwan today is that its economy is part of Maritime China but its political

ideology is still that of Continental China.<sup>16</sup> It is important that the one China ideal on Taiwan has kept the island locked into a position of unresolved civil warfare against the Communist China.<sup>17</sup>

Actually, ROC in Taiwan has functioned as an independent country since 1949. On the basis of population, geography and political development, Taiwan confronts absolutely no problems in becoming an independent country. As one specialist in an article "What Taiwan can do?" suggests, the best alternative of the ROC government is to give up its claim to be the only legal China, to forego challenge of the legitimacy of the PRC government, to withdraw the military forces from Chinmen and Matsu, and to aim at peaceful co-existence with the PRC.<sup>17</sup> In other words, some preconditions for independence need to be established.

From the viewpoint of Taiwan's present leaders, however, there are few advantages to a declaration of independence from China and several serious disadvantages. First, Taiwan might become more isolated in the international community. It is highly questionable how many countries would recognize the newly created state, particularly at the cost of losing diplomatic relations with the PRC. Few, if any, of the states, having broken diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in order to establish them with the PRC, would be willing to reverse that process. For example, the U.S. would probably not support Taiwan Independence, because the U.S. has recognized "there is but one China" and "Taiwan is part of China". If the U.S. supports the

independence of Taiwan, it would hurt the PRC/U.S. relations as well as making ROC government unhappy. Officially, the ROC still claim to be the only legal China, and the ROC would be hurt itself by the loss of its legitimacy if it declared itself to be an independent country. Also, if the ROC is declared an independent country, the mainlanders would lose their dominance in national government because they could not represent all of China any more. Third, the independence of Taiwan could create a dangerous situation in which the PRC might abandon all alternatives but the use of military force to gain possession of Taiwan. "Territorial issues" are of deep concern to the Peking government; as Barnett wrote:

Peking's decision makers have been deeply concerned, like the leaders of every modern nation-state, with all matters relating to China's national security, and they have been extremely sensitive on matters relating to sovereignty and national integrity. Since 1949, China has repeatedly been involved in clashes with other nations - both major powers and small countries - over territorial issues.<sup>19</sup>

It is clear that if the ROC declares Taiwan an independent state, it would appear to Peking to eliminate any possibility of peacefully resolving the Taiwan problem.

Taiwan, according to John K. Fairbank, could have been easily achieved as an independent republic in 1950's by renouncing any claim to the mainland and entering the United Nations on its merits.<sup>20</sup> Today, the thought of Taiwan independence not only creates a dangerous situation, but it is also

unrealistic. Although the non-Communist Taiwanese independence movement still exists, mostly abroad, it is disunited and there is little evidence that it can become a force capable of decisive political action.

#### D. The U.S. New Taiwan Policy and the Stability of Taiwan

Although the U.S., the Soviet Union and Japan are important environmental factors to be concerned with in consideration of the future of Taiwan, it is obvious that the United States has the most influence. So far, there is no official relationship between the ROC and the Soviet Union. Also, only economic relations exist between Japan and Taiwan through two non-governmental organizations, i.e., Japanese "Interchange Association in Taipei" and ROC's "East Asian Relation Association". There has been no public statement by a Japanese leader, such as the one made by U.S. President Carter: "I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of relations between our country and the People's Republic of China will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan".<sup>21</sup>

As replacement of the U.S./ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. has created the Taiwan Relations Act (S. 245, H.R. 2479), signed by President Carter on April 10, 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act authorized creation of an unofficial but government-funded "American Institute in Taiwan" to carry on business in Taiwan - in effect, to perform most of the functions previously carried out by the embassy in Taipei, including the provision of

passports and visas issued on the authority of the U.S Consulate in Hong Kong. The Taiwan Relations Act makes clear that many commercial, cultural, and technological ties between the United States and Taiwan, are not affected by the absence of diplomatic relations. It also stresses the abiding interest of the U.S in Taiwan's security and continues the sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan after the Mutual Defence Treaty terminates. This act implies that the U.S hope is to achieve a delicate balance; according to Clough's study, that balance would provide 1) enough support to Taiwan to ensure that the use of force against the island would entail high political and military cost for the PRC, and 2) enough momentum in Washington - Peking relations to keep mainland China satisfied with the arrangement.<sup>21</sup> Psychologically, this Taiwan Relations Act reassures the people of Taiwan that the U.S. is still concerned with the security of Taiwan and emphasizes American interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by Chinese themselves. It is an environmental factor to help the stability of Taiwan.

But, there are still some domestic factors which could influence the future stability of Taiwan. First is the problem of legitimacy of the ROC government and mass political participation. The government of ROC is structured as if it governs all of China, even though it effectively controls only one province, Taiwan. The vast majority of the members of the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan (National Level Congress) were elected on mainland China more than 30 years ago to

represent districts on the mainland. The aging mainlanders still dominate these bodies in which the Taiwanese hold only the handful of seats accorded "Taiwan province". The ROC government claims that there will be no comprehensive elections for the national office until the mainland has been recovered. Recently, there have been strong challenges from the young generation in Taiwan; they question the ROC government about whether or not there should be only one legal government to represent China, questioning the representation by those aging mainlanders congressmen. Second, the political attitudes of Taiwanese and mainlanders are quite different.<sup>23</sup> The Taiwanese not only have been excluded from participation in the top decision-making, but also have protested their lower social status. In the viewpoint of the Taiwanese, the mainlanders are carpet baggers interested only in returning to the mainlands, they refuse to invest in the Taiwan economy, they occupy the best jobs in the society, and they control the military and police.<sup>24</sup> Although the ROC government tries hard to eliminate this difference, it is still perceived by the majority of Taiwanese. Third, the selection of an equally able leader to replace Chiang is essential for continued stability and development. But there is no recognized heir apparent; Chiang himself has not indicated whom he considers most suitable and competent to carry on after him. It might be said that there is a power struggle, because there is no potential leader as popular as Chiang Ching-kuo and there is none who has his family lineage as son of the late President Chiang Kai-shek.

Fourth, the increasing world-wide trade protectionism is evidenced through the increasing competence of international market with South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. Most importantly, Taiwan almost completely depends on imported oil. These factors could significantly influence Taiwan's economic situation, something which is one of the important bases for political stability.

In summary, none of these alternative options for the Republic of China appears likely a feasible.

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23. Nathaniel B. Thayer, op. cit., p. 102.

## CONCLUSION

"History is full of unanswerable 'ifs', and one can not be certain how the relationship might have developed if either or both sides had acted differently at critical points."

—— A. Doak Barnett  
A New U.S Policy Toward  
China (Washington D.C.:  
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1971), p. 4.

"Asian peace and world progress and certainty need positive contribution by China...."

—— Richard Nixon  
An Annual Report Submitted  
to congress entitled, U.S  
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1970's.

The previous chapters show that there is no easy answer for the Taiwan question. Although it is impossible to predict the full circumstances under which the ROC and the PRC can or can not unify through peaceful negotiation, some conclusions maybe reasonably made thus far in regard to the future of Taiwan:

First. Although the post-Mao leadership of PRC repeatedly has expressed the PRC's determination to liberate Taiwan and to complete the task of national unification by peaceful negotiation.<sup>1</sup> The PRC seems to have put the Taiwan issue aside in their list of priorities. Today, the threat of Russia has deeply concerned the PRC's decision-makers. According to Chinese Communist's logic "An enemy of one's main enemy must be one's ally,"<sup>2</sup> the PRC has normalized relations with the United States as China's dominant concern is American ability and will to resist the advance of the

Soviet Union. Compared with the threat of the USSR, China believes Taiwan is of secondary concern and presents no threat to security presently.

Apparently, the PRC is not in any hurry to seek a solution to the Taiwan question; this attitude is similar to the manner in which the PRC deals with Hong Kong and Macao. At least, the current occupation of Chinmen and Matsue by ROC, constitutes a link between Taiwan and the mainland, symbolizing the "one China" position maintained by both governments. In fact, there are big differences in political culture, people's identification and economic system, including the gap of living standard between the two Chinese societies. No doubt, these differences represent the greatest difficulty for PRC/ROC's unification by peaceful means.

At present, it is unlikely that the PRC will engage in a military invasion of Taiwan, not only because of the Russian threat, but also because of excessive cost. If the PRC used force today, it might push ROC's declaration as an independent country or it might even create a possible alliance between ROC and Soviet Union. The PRC would rule out peaceful negotiation and seek to unify Taiwan by force, no matter what happens, when the ROC tries to develop relations with the USSR or declare its independence. To face this hot potato - Taiwan question, the best way for PRC to save face is just wait and use the means of peaceful negotiation.

Second. The ROC government will continue to face the

challenge of its legitimacy, not only from the PRC, but also from the Taiwanese people. The derecognition by the United States and the principle of "one China" raise the questions "Can Taiwan survive?" and "How long?" There exists the possibility for peaceful negotiation between the two Chinas, as discussed before, but it is impossible, at least while Chiang Ching-kuo still maintains power, for official contact. Negotiation could only go through the non-governmental channel. The Taiwanese will feel betrayed by its government if the ROC government supports the negotiation officially and publicly.

According to the advertisement in Washington Post on January 30, 1979, sponsored by the Federation of Overseas Chinese Association based in Taipei:

"Peace and unification are common aspirations of the Chinese people. How we Chinese people vote will depend on the meaning of unification. We will vote yes for unification which: Renounces world revolution; Ends communist dictatorship; Gives land and property back to the people. We will vote no for unification which: Continues Marxism-Leninism; Suppresses human rights and freedom; Denies decent life to the people."3

From this advertisement, it is clear that the ROC authority tries to postpone the issue of peaceful negotiation with the PRC. It is unrealistic for the ROC to expect the PRC to give up communism before peaceful negotiation.

The possibility of peaceful negotiation also depends on the stability of Taiwan. Any domestic instability, no matter

what the reason, just offers the PRC a chance of military attack. As long as stability continues in Taiwan, it should not be an easy way for the PRC to acquire Taiwan by means of force. Obviously, the ROC has had experience in facing shock-waves, -- expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the defeat of Taiwan's anti-Communist ally South Vietnam, and derecognition by the United States. After these shocks, Taiwan's foreign policy has become more flexible, adjusting to isolation and hostility. This new policy works well and has helped Taiwan survive so far; there is no domestic power to push the ROC government toward the peaceful negotiation with the PRC.

Third. For the United States and Japan, the status quo of Taiwan is the best situation for them. Both governments are highly involved in Taiwan's economy under the non-governmental relations. Since Japan had no defense relationship with Taiwan before the diplomatic relations were severed, Japan can not effectively influence the relations between Taiwan and the Mainland. On the other hand the United States could play an important role in Taiwan's future, especially based on the principle of "one China", and unification by a peaceful means. The best policy for the United States is to insist on these peaceful means and to let the Chinese decide themselves. If the United States gets too involved, it just might push Taiwan into a Communist community, such as in the case of South Vietnam, or push Taiwan to seek the alliance with the USSR and develop the nuclear weapons. Either way, it will make the West Pacific an unstable area.

It is also presently impossible for the United Nations to solve the Taiwan question. The United Nations could request or claim to use peaceful means only; yet it has very limited power to deal with these kinds of political disputes. For example, Israel occupied a lot of more land in 1948 than the 1947 United Nations' Resolution allocated to it, but the United Nations did not work to have Israel return the extra territory. Also, the PRC does have veto right in the United Nations right which makes Taiwan's self-determination seem even more impossible. The case of Taiwan is similar to the case of Tibet in the PRC, and of Puerto Rico in the United States today.

In summary, there is clearly no pat formula for a quick solution to the problem of Taiwan. Like many of the most difficult international problems, it is one that all parties concerned will have to live with for years to come, allowing time for gradual changes to occur. The problem is that current trends suggest that obstacles to the reintegration of Taiwan with the mainland are likely to grow rather than diminish. The increasing influence of the Taiwanese will tend to weaken ties with mainland China. So long as Taiwan is able to maintain its extensive trading relations with the rest of the world, the gap between living conditions on the mainland and those on Taiwan will probably widen or, at least, remain as wide as it is now. The future of Taiwan still seems uncertain. There is no precedent of peaceful unification in Chinese history. It may happen that several generations will pass before the two Chinas are united through peaceful negotiation.

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THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN:  
THE PROSPECT FOR PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION WITH THE PRC

by

WEN-CHIEN WU

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT

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Since the US/PRC normalization has been established, the PRC has changed its rigid and extreme attitude to a softer and more moderate policy regarding Taiwan; the leaders of the PRC repeatedly stress and expect the reunification of Taiwan through peaceful negotiation. Yet, on the other side, the ROC in Taiwan keeps ignoring the PRC's suggestion for peaceful negotiation. The third party--the United States--still reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Question by the Chinese themselves.

The purpose of this report is to discuss this special option of peaceful negotiation between the PRC and the ROC--where the possibilities exist and where the difficulties lie. The author examines the PRC's option of a military invasion of Taiwan and Taiwan's alternatives in case peaceful negotiation does not work out. The author also discusses the historical background of the Taiwan Question, including the evolution of Taiwan from a little-known and uncultivated island to one of the most modern and developed areas in Asia today.

The possibilities for peaceful negotiation exist on the basis of: (1) The governments of both the PRC and the ROC are more pragmatic and realistic than before. Since Chairman Mao died in 1976 and the capture of Gang of Four, the moderate faction has gained power; they see economic growth as China's highest priority and are trying to achieve the "Four Modernizations" by 2000. On the other side, the ROC has changed its long-time anti-Communist policy. Not only have they opened doors to Eastern European

countries, but they have also placed less emphasis recently on the goal of "recovering the Chinese mainland". (2) The increase of oversea Chinese, international conferences, and international athletic activities all increase the chance of communication between the two societies. (3) Nationalism and the concept of unification also may bring Taiwan and the Mainland together, for both governments agree there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China.

In contrast, some barriers still exist for peaceful negotiation: (1) The two Chinese societies possess far different political cultures and economic system. (2) Between the two societies, there persists a big gap in living standards, education levels, life style and the people's identification with their country. (3) Furthermore, there is no attraction among the people on Taiwan for "full autonomy", something which the PRC promised to respect and which would maintain the status quo on Taiwan ostensibly without any loss to the people of Taiwan. (4) The difficulties of the PRC's "Four Modernizations" and the potentiality of the PRC's unstable politics present yet another barrier to peaceful negotiation.

In conclusion, the author believes that there is no easy answer to solve the Taiwan Question in the near future. First, the PRC seems to have put the Taiwan issue aside in its list of priorities. At present, it is also unlikely for the PRC to engage in a military invasion of Taiwan, not only due to the Russian threat, but also due to the excessive cost that would be involved. Second,

the ROC government will continue to face the challenge of its legitimacy, especially from the Taiwanese people. During this time, it is unlikely to have official communication with the PRC; and there is not much possibilities for the ROC to develop nuclear weapons, to seek an alliance with the USSR, or to declare itself an independent country. In short, it is likely that several generations will pass before a united China is brought about through peaceful negotiation.