

COMPARING VERBAL AND NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR  
IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTES, 1963-1964

by

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## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

In behavioral perspective, what nations say can be classified as verbal behavior, and what they do, as nonverbal behavior. One of the problems of explaining international politics is the uncertain consistency between verbal and nonverbal behavior, or between words and deeds. Here, traditional views and behavioral views of diplomacy seem to be at odds, at least on the surface. The traditional, practical view of diplomacy assumes that verbal exchanges among nations are ritual and rhetoric designed as often to disguise national intentions as to reveal them. The behavioral view insists that beneath the disguises of protocol and diplomatic language, one can find a patterned, predictable relationship between words and deeds.

This relationship between words and actions, or verbal and nonverbal behavior, is particularly obscure when analyzing Sino-Soviet behavior. The Marxist-Leninist roots of both sides allow for certain "contradictions" in behavior, which may transcend the obvious complexities found in any diplomatic maneuvering, i.e., inconsistency itself is a mark of sophisticated diplomacy.<sup>1</sup>

The Sino-Soviet dispute has occupied the international community for almost two decades. Taking a period of intense verbal and nonverbal relations between the two sides, 1963 and 1964, this paper examines the consistency between verbal and nonverbal behavior in order to define the so-called Sino-Soviet split more precisely in terms of its roots, its real issues, and its more highly probable outcomes.

The inherent interdependency between verbal and nonverbal behavior is the basis of this research. Their patterned relationship asserts that there may be a tendency for states to do what the official organs of government policy say they will do. This assumption can simplify analysis by seeking solutions directly from the data that are most available: the published words contained in statements, addresses and interviews, and the documented actions taken by both sides.

The Sino-Soviet dispute displays to many analysts the ideological persuasions of the two sides, as articulated in 1963 and 1964 by Mao tse Tung and Nikita Khrushchev. The fundamentalist, orthodox persuasions of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) were at odds with the revisionism of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Mutual vituperations pointed up ideological as well as concomitant differences which were evidence that relations between the two sides were indeed strained and not likely to improve.<sup>2</sup> This situation was particularly aggravated by issues of their common borders,

old territorial questions that demanded resolution.

On the surface, verbal and nonverbal behavior about their common borders were inconsistent during 1963 and 1964. That is to say that, from the apparent hostility level of China's demands for resolution of border issues, it would seem likely that USSR responses, verbal as well as nonverbal, would either approximate that level of hostility or attempt to quash the dispute as not fitting communist unity. Given all the elements of the dispute, as well as the fact that China had "initiated" all demands during this period, the USSR was somewhat on the defense at this time and her range of options included ideological rapprochement with the CPR.

The words employed, particularly by the Chinese, articulated grievances and demands which were tantamount to threats of aggression. However, nonverbal behavioral responses, particularly from the USSR, tended toward conciliation, or at least toward amicable negotiation of the dispute, feigned or real. Some examples of these differences can be found in exchanges which took place in 1963 and 1964.

## CHAPTER II

### Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior: 1963-1964 in Overview

The highlights of verbal and nonverbal behavior involving common borders between the Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union during 1963 and 1964 (see Figure 1), display various moves and countermoves short of armed conflict.

In attempts at ironing out differences, talks were initiated on July 5, 1963, in Moscow. The Soviet delegation was headed by Mikhail A. Suslov, secretary of the Central Committee, and the Chinese delegation by Teng Hsiao-ping, who held the equivalent post in the Chinese party. In Moscow, China introduced her so-called "25 Points," a 60,000 word statement which constituted the hitherto most comprehensive statement of the Chinese side of the dispute.<sup>3</sup> The issues raised were an across-the-board reproach of the USSR's revisionism, with a strongly worded threat, contained in Point 12, to remove "non-revolutionary line" groups from the party. The Soviet Union refused to publish the letter containing the "25 Points," and demanded the recall of three Chinese Embassy officials who were accused of distributing copies of the letter in the USSR.<sup>4</sup>

On July 13, 1963, the Peking Daily had reported a breakdown in negotiation and accused the Soviets of undermining

FIGURE 1.--SINO-SOVIET BEHAVIOR RELATED TO BORDER ISSUES, 1963-1964

1963		1964		1964		1964		1964		1964	
July		Dec.		Jan.		Feb.		May		Oct.	
Moscow talks "25 Points" of CPR		USSR proposes conference		USSR proposes conference		USSR proposes conference		USSR repeats proposal for talks		USSR repeats proposal for talks	
Talks end, no result		CPR rejects		CPR rejects		CPR rejects		CPR rejects latest proposal		CPR rejects latest proposal	
Nuc test treaty (USSR-US-GB)		CPR signs border treaties w/Burma, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan		CPR signs border treaties w/Burma, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan		CPR signs border treaties w/Burma, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan		CPR signs border treaties w/Burma, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan		CPR signs border treaties w/Burma, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan	
USSR's Open Letter attacking CPR		Khrushchev's appeal to end differences		Khrushchev's appeal to end differences		Khrushchev's appeal to end differences		Khrushchev's appeal to end differences		Khrushchev's appeal to end differences	
CPR rejection from official press		CPR rejection from official press		CPR rejection from official press		CPR rejection from official press		CPR rejection from official press		CPR rejection from official press	
Soviet press attacks vs. CPR		Soviet press attacks vs. CPR		Soviet press attacks vs. CPR		Soviet press attacks vs. CPR		Soviet press attacks vs. CPR		Soviet press attacks vs. CPR	
7 letters from CPR outlining differences		7 letters from CPR outlining differences		7 letters from CPR outlining differences		7 letters from CPR outlining differences		7 letters from CPR outlining differences		7 letters from CPR outlining differences	
USSR re-quest for UN settle-ment		USSR re-quest for UN settle-ment		USSR re-quest for UN settle-ment		USSR re-quest for UN settle-ment		USSR re-quest for UN settle-ment		USSR re-quest for UN settle-ment	

relations. The following day, July 14, 1963, Russia responded to China's "25 Points" in an 18,000 word statement of her own. The USSR summarized grievances toward the CPR by charging that the Chinese leadership was swayed by "nationalist and racialist" objectives rather than communist principles.<sup>5</sup> At the same time Russia was attempting to work out a nuclear test-ban treaty with the U.S. and Great Britain. Eventually the treaty was signed on August 5, 1963, a move which further distressed the CPR and prompted even harsher claims of revisionism.

Thousands of border incidents were said to have occurred during 1963,<sup>6</sup> yet the first public mention of violations did not come until September 6, 1963 with specific charges from Peking.<sup>7</sup> What was termed China's "white paper" on Sino-Soviet relations was published as a joint editorial by the People's Daily and Party Theoretical Journal.<sup>8</sup> The editorial charged the Soviets with subversive activities aimed at enticing minority groups in the Ili (northwest) sector of the Sino-Soviet common border, and with a refusal to repatriate them.<sup>9</sup> Charges of this nature had been made before.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, the very nature of China's argument was at question, for the Kazakh minorities in the region had in all likelihood been simply exercising their long established nomadic rights.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the Soviets saw fit to respond a few days later, on September 20, 1963, with a verbal attack of their own in a TASS information source publication.<sup>12</sup> The USSR alleged border violations by the Chinese and a failure to negotiate the issues, and

warned that China was on a "dangerous path."

The Soviet leadership entered the verbal foray with a speech by Khrushchev on January 3, 1964. Although intended purportedly for Communist heads of state, the speech served to initiate talks between China and Russia the following month. These talks were later described as procedural,<sup>13</sup> but nonetheless did initiate discussion between the two sides in what could be termed concessional, nonverbal, behavior quite apart from the rhetorical exchanges which had preceded them. It is significant that prior to the talks, China had signed boundary agreements with Burma, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but had failed to come to any agreement with the two remaining border states, India and the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup>

Six days following the start of the talks the Chinese resumed charges. On February 29, 1964, in a letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, China sought combined attempts at keeping the talks open, but for the most part continued to lambast the USSR for "age-old" disputes they called a legacy from the past. Either as a direct result of this broadside verbal attack, one of seven such letters that had been exchanged, or difficulties not made public, the talks were broken off in May, 1964 without substantive or even procedural results.<sup>15</sup> No further negotiation sessions were even attempted until October, 1969, following the actual border

clashes which occurred that year. It was reported that following the abortive talks in February, China had moved additional troops into Sinkiang and "had cleared and fortified a security zone twenty miles in depth along hundreds of miles of the border."<sup>16</sup>

Possibly the most significant verbal behavior was that of Mao tse Tung himself, in an interview with a Japanese Socialist delegation in July, 1964.<sup>17</sup> Mao addressed his remarks to Sino-Soviet border issues, citing the "unequal treaties"<sup>18</sup> which combined to cede territory to the USSR. Mao said that China had "not yet presented (her) account for this list" of territories. Alternatives were again presented to the leadership of the Soviet Union, either to reply in kind, back down, or express dissatisfaction with nonverbal behavior of a threatening nature.

On July 15, 1964, the Soviet Union proposed a world Communist meeting. The CPR unequivocally rejected such a meeting on July 28th. The Soviet Union tried again, for Pravda announced on August 10, 1964 that the Soviets had invited twenty-five Communist party states to attend a meeting December 15, 1964 as preparation for substantive talks on Sino-Soviet relations. On August 30th the CPR again rejected the proposal.

Khrushchev, in an interview with a delegation of Japanese Socialists on September 19, 1964, stated that the borders of the Soviet Union were sacred, and anyone who dared violate these



borders would meet with a most decisive rebuff. Even more alarming to the CPR, Khrushchev asserted that Sinkiang did not even belong to China.<sup>19</sup> The strength of this verbal behavior by Khrushchev may have been at odds with concurrent policy decisions by the USSR, for four days later, on September 23, 1964, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko wrote United Nations Secretary General U Thant requesting that the question of "renunciation by states of the use of force for settling territorial and frontier disputes" be included on the agenda of the next UN general assembly meeting.<sup>20</sup>

On October 14, 1964 the Soviet Union announced that Nikita Khrushchev had resigned as Premier and First Secretary of the Communist Party. Two days later, on October 16, 1964, Communist China successfully tested its first nuclear device at Lop Nor, ending a period of intense verbal and nonverbal behavioral exchanges, whose consistency this paper examines.

## CHAPTER III

### Hypotheses and Methodology

The case for hypothetical consistency between verbal and nonverbal behavior in relations between two totalitarian regimes, the CPR and USSR, rests partly on the rigidity of totalitarianism itself. A state whose words and deeds never matched--a condition of negative consistency--would be no less consistent than a state whose words and deeds always matched, a condition of positive consistency. Only if words and deeds randomly matched could a case for true inconsistency be made. Given totalitarianism's dependence upon doctrinal and behavioral conformity, and upon the carrying out of pre-ordained moves, the assumption of consistency is plausible.

Accounts of verbal and nonverbal behavior published in official media of a totalitarian state are for the most part all that analysts have to work with. The organs of official positions in both the USSR and CPR are fairly well identified,<sup>21</sup> and analysis of such sources as Peking Review or Current Digest of the Soviet Press can be counted upon to provide information sanctioned by the political leadership.<sup>22</sup> More to the point in Sino-Soviet affairs, the published documents constituted the majority of what was known about the two sides' views of the

dispute. In sum, if the political hierarchy had an axe to grind, a legitimate medium would be through the "official" press, transmitted by leadership spokesmen or the actual heads of state themselves. Thus, verbal attacks upon one side can be viewed as fairly substantial evidence of official policy positions in the hierarchy of a totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union or the Chinese People's Republic.

Nonverbal behavior, or action which would constitute the rational assertion of policy, could be expected to closely align itself with verbal enunciation of issues.<sup>23</sup> For example, if statements by Mao tse Tung, or other official Chinese spokesmen, signal the desire for diplomatic relations with the U.S., it should follow that unless other variables are injected, the course of events would lead to at least procedural talks for purposes of establishing such relations.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, nonverbal behavior, such as troop movements or actual border negotiations provide less ambiguous evidence of intentions by sides to a dispute.

Relations between the USSR and CPR offer analysts a myriad of alternatives in assessing why events have unfolded as they have, and what the dispute between the two sides offers for future peace and stability. Analysis of territorial issues, from a review of both verbal and nonverbal behavior, may suggest that the verbal behavior was simply rhetoric that embraced hyperbole by both sides, with attempts to obfuscate the real issues. This leads to some obvious questions: (1) can the

rhetoric exchanged during dispute be counted upon to lead to certain other events, or nonverbal behavior; and (2) are the actual issues made apparent in behavior, both verbal and non-verbal, by both sides? If the evidence is viewed objectively and without sole reliance on the ideological persuasions for explaining the dispute, the conclusions can be drawn that the behavior which eventually led to actual border clashes between Russia and China, if not until 1969, were manifestations of the true nature of an extremely serious side of the dispute and pointed to issues which could conceivably constitute the stimulus for more conflict in the future.<sup>25</sup>

Throughout the early years of Sino-Soviet dispute, in some instances, there were those professional and lay analysts who insisted that the flow of rhetoric from the two sides, and particularly from Peking, was so much talk; although it held some basis for displeasure for the other side, the rhetoric never constituted any real threat of conflict or even hinted at extensive differences. After all, the argument proceeded, the two camps were based on Communist models, however refined, and any differences, ideological or otherwise, were certain to be resolved over time.<sup>26</sup> As related to border issues, such was not the case. Hypotheses thus emerge from an inquiry into the various facets of Sino-Soviet border disputes during this specific period:

(1) In Sino-Soviet border disputes during 1963 and 1964, the more conciliatory the verbal and nonverbal behavior by one

side, the greater the tendency for matching behavior from the other side.

(2) In Sino-Soviet border disputes during 1963 and 1964, verbal and nonverbal behavior of the Chinese People's Republic tended to match more consistently than did verbal and nonverbal behavior by the Soviet Union.

This investigation compared nonverbal response behavior by the USSR and CPR with verbal stimuli rated according to hostility along a harshness-meekness continuum. Several factors, not examined here, could effect the relative hostility of Soviet Union and Chinese behavior. For either side to demand, for example, resolution of the dispute would either require that the side had the capability or the will<sup>27</sup> to enforce such demands, or that there were some irrationality to the behavior,<sup>28</sup> operating from a distorted value, or belief, system, and therefore not to be taken seriously.

Determinants of risk-taking. Hannes Adomeit, in an Adelphi paper, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence?"<sup>29</sup> posits three determinants of Soviet risk-taking as ideology, military power, and domestic factors. Including the personality traits of the decision-makers themselves, there are various factors which could be considered as restraints on behavior, both verbal and nonverbal, by the CPR and USSR respectively. Factors related directly to Sino-Soviet behavior would include: operational codes, or belief systems of the elites;<sup>30</sup> international law, primarily in terms of jus gentium

pactitium, or dyadic treaties and alliances;<sup>31</sup> perceptions of the schism in an historical context;<sup>32</sup> and military capabilities. Capabilities of both sides to enforce demands in the restricted arena of common borders were viewed as about equal to each other in a comparative analysis of one measure of capability: military forces that were specifically committed to these areas. The USSR had a strategic advantage in terms of weaponry.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, China's "will" to exert her "permanent interests" in territorial issues, and her quantitative equivalency to the Soviet side in ground troops,<sup>34</sup> suggest that there was an overall balance in forces opposing each other over the common borders.

Limits of Content Analysis. First-hand accounts of observable behavior in the Chinese People's Republic or Soviet Union are scarce. Such participant observers as Edgar Snow or George F. Kennan are the exception, and analysts must rely on secondary source material for the most part. There is the tendency to skeptically treat that which is verbally articulated by international actors and only respect overt action, or nonverbal behavior, as significant indicators of intent. Additionally, in analyzing verbal behavior the analyst is prone to speculate as to why what was said appears in print. Conjecture can at times represent analysis in terms of "vicarious problem solving," or putting oneself in place of an actor, and attempting to state with some degree of assurance that Actor A really meant thus-and-so in addressing remarks to Actor B.<sup>35</sup> This assumption, that content in itself does not allow full meaning

or intent by the respective author, is reinforced by the view, shared by many, as expressed by Edward Hull in The Silent Language: ". . . a political figure makes a speech which is supposed to be reassuring. Yet the total message as delivered is not. Why? . . . (because) sentences can be meaningless by themselves."<sup>36</sup>

Consequently, if words are limited in attempting to answer the questions of behavioral research, content analysis of words by themselves may not be enough.<sup>37</sup> As Bernard Berelson asserts, content analysis "proceeds in terms of what is said, not in terms of why-the-content-is-like-that."<sup>38</sup> Thus, analysis of verbal behavior and a concurrent analysis of more tangible variables, i.e., nonverbal behavior, may provide the concise indicators required to more accurately explain the "why's" of international dispute.

The 1963-1964 Data Base. Turning specifically to Sino-Soviet relations during 1963 and 1964, and that side of the dispute which involved border issues, it is evident that verbal and nonverbal behavior were well documented by the official press. Analysts could read the various positions taken by each side and attempt, for example, to predict if any prior characterization of each, e.g., conservative, threatening, etc., would stand up under close examination. Certainly the border issues provided a very real area for conflict. Unlike the gambits of ideology, economic advances, or even personality clashes, the borders held the potential for head-to-head confrontation



involving thousands of pre-positioned armed forces.

The behavior evidenced by both sides formed the basis of analysis, and as such takes on operational definitions of the real world. Verbal behavior could be viewed as (1) being "harsh" in nature, or a provocative stimulus to the other side; (2) seeking "conciliation," or some degree of agreement for resolution of the issues; or (3) being "meekly" assertive in trying to simply get the facts into the open. In this investigation, the verbal behavior was assumed to be rational assertion of policy. Action that could be anticipated, either as an extension of verbal behavior, or in response to verbal, or nonverbal, behavior by the other side, would also be expected to conform to one of the three attitudinal categories of "harsh," e.g., threatening or hostile maneuvers, such as troop displacement; "conciliatory," e.g., negotiation meetings; or "meek," e.g., no action, or a continuation of the status quo.

The framework for analysis follows the general suggestions of two models: the "two-step, two-stage" formula for the interaction model,<sup>39</sup> utilized by Robert North, Robert Jervis, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard Brody in similar studies;<sup>40</sup> and the "rational actor model," developed by Graham T. Allison in Essence of Decision.<sup>41</sup>

Simply stated, the "two-step, two-stage" formula for analyzing interaction between two international actors to a stimulus (S) and response (R) relationship, requires two additional fac-



tors inserted in the formula: the actors' intentions (s) and perception of the stimulus (r). In terms of the specific question under study, this would presume that for whatever stimulus is created by behavior, a response will be generated only after the intermediate evaluation is made of the other sides' intentions, as well as an overall perception of the stimulus itself, i.e., is it a credible assertion of policy involving real issues?

Allison's rational actor model defines rationality as "consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints."<sup>42</sup> This study applies narrow criteria of straightforward value maximization. As Allison illustrates from a 1965 study by Morton H. Halperin and Dwight Perkins, the "Chinese Communist leadership pursues its objectives in a systematic and logical way, given its perception of the world."<sup>43</sup> This same criterion is used to judge behavior by the Soviet Union. In sum, the behavior by both sides is considered to be rational assertion of policy as it applies to the dispute over border and territorial issues.

The Peking Review and Current Digest of the Soviet Press are considered to be valid source materials for official Chinese and Soviet views respectively.<sup>44</sup> Additionally, major secondary source authors, e.g., Thomas Robinson, Richard Lowenthal, Dennis Doolin, William Griffith, G.F. Hudson, Donald Zagoria, have utilized these documents in analysis of border issues. The sample specifically utilized consists of seven documents which pertain to

Sino-Soviet behavior from the fall of 1963 to the fall of 1964. This period is considered representative of behavior by both sides during 1963 and 1964. This assertion is substantiated by an objective appraisal of available documents and a review of secondary sources which specifically dealt with this period.<sup>45</sup>

Only portions of documents which are available, and relate solely to territorial, or border, issues were sampled.<sup>46</sup> As an example, the first document analyzed is from the Chinese side, outlining the "origin and development of the differences (between the two sides)." This document, as it appeared in the Peking Review for September 13, 1963, contained a total of 195 paragraphs with three appendices. The portion of the document devoted specifically to border issues can be highlighted by two paragraphs, and thus are the only ones analyzed.

The verbal behavior was compared with journalistic reports of nonverbal behavior to determine stimulus-response relationships. The specific unit of analysis for each document is the paragraph, while the category of concern is "attitude" toward the opposing side, related to border issues. Each paragraph of the document was analyzed and coded according to attitudinal scores of "harsh," "conciliatory," or "meek," on a nine-point scale, as follows:

Scale 9-7:	"harsh"
Scale 6-4:	"conciliatory"
Scale 3-1:	"meek"

These codings are acquired by analyzing what is stated in terms of "degrees of hostility," i.e., nine-to-one point scale. As examples:

a. does the paragraph imply a hostile, or "harsh" warning to the other side, and if so to what degree?

9 - threatening in tone with few options provided the opposing side for whom the words are intended.

8 - threatening, yet providing options to the opposing side, e.g., time lapse may reduce the tension.

7 - hostile in tone, with apparent attempt to perpetuate the dispute.

b. is the paragraph "conciliatory" in nature, e.g., does it attempt to resolve differences by negotiation or arbitration by international tribunal, and if so, to what degree?

6 - conciliation or resolution of issues is demanded.

5 - conciliation or resolution of issues is sought, with specific timetable (as an example) for working out differences.

4 - conciliation or resolution is apparently desired, with no procedural or substantive proposals.

c. is the paragraph merely related to border, or territorial, issues, and is it of such nature ("meek") that the opposing side would not be compelled to respond, and again, to what degree?

3 - the presentation of factual evidence that the mutual borders and age-old territorial disputes are serious issues which represent one cause of

the Sino-Soviet split.

- 2 - the presentation of factual evidence that borders and territorial issues are questions of concern to the initiating source of verbal behavior.
- 1 - the paragraph is not directly associated with the elements of dispute between the two sides.

Coding of the documents was conducted at intervals by the author during the months of April, June, and August, 1974. Due to the fact that only one judge evaluated the behavioral data the three coding sessions, at approximately two-month intervals, were used to minimize bias. Additionally, during the second session, in June, identifiers were masked. For example, "The Soviet Union," or "The People's Republic" was blanked out, or masked, as an additional measure to eliminate bias of judging, and also to assist in reliability of the coding procedures. The documents analyzed and detailed coding results are at Appendix 1 and 2, respectively.

## CHAPTER IV

### Findings

The interdependency between verbal and nonverbal behavior in international dispute is apparently far more evident when issues tend to be clearly defined by the parties involved. A test for consistency during an intensive period of documented behavior is greatly assisted when the actors treat the issues openly and there are no apparent attempts at feigning real intentions and response to stimulus. Such is the case with this sampling of Sino-Soviet behavior during 1963 and 1964. A detailed analysis of the available data produced the following findings.

Coding results of the seven documents analyzed are shown in Table 1. Document one, a joint editorial by the People's Daily and Party Theoretical Journal, was published September 6, 1963, following the breakdown in negotiations between the two sides in the summer of that year. China's "white paper" on the specifications of the dispute clearly demonstrated a hostile intent by the CPR to resolve "subversive activities" by the USSR. In stating that repeated attempts had been made to have the "Chinese citizens" in the Ili region repatriated, the implied intent is that other means, possibly nonverbal

TABLE 1  
CODING RESULTS

DOCUMENT	NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS	T <sub>1</sub>	T <sub>2</sub>	T <sub>3</sub> *
		CODING AVERAGES		
#1 (CPR)	2	7	6	7 (7)**
#2 (USSR)	4	7	6.5	7 (7)
#3 (USSR)	19	5	4.7	5 (5)
#4 (CPR)	3	6	6	6 (6)
#5 (CPR)	6	7.5	7	7.5 (7)
#6 (USSR)	20	5	4.4	5 (5)
#7 (USSR)	2	4.5	5	5 (5)

\* T<sub>1</sub> - April coding

T<sub>2</sub> - June coding

T<sub>3</sub> - August coding

\*\* overall average of three sessions, i.e., final coding assignment of entire document

For referral purposes, summary of coding is as follows:

9: "threat" with no options	5: "conciliation" sought
8: "threat" with options	4: "conciliation" desired
7: "hostile"	3: "facts" of serious issue
6: "conciliation" demanded	2: "facts" of concern
	1: not directly associated

behavior, would be forthcoming. Troops were stationed in the immediate region, violations had been recorded by both sides, and the capability clearly existed for armed force. When identifiers are masked, as in the second coding session, the intent of the CPR is obscured to the extent that conciliation (code 5) may well have been the intent of the words used in paragraph two. Yet the overall results of the three coding sessions clearly establish a hostile (code 7) intent on the part of the CPR.

Document two, released September 20, 1963, was the Soviet Union's response to the charges contained in the first document. Variance was evidenced in the second and fourth paragraphs from the overall coding results, i.e., the two paragraphs implied that conciliation was demanded (code 6) while the strength of the first and third paragraphs (code 7 and code 8 respectively) promoted an average which evidenced hostility on the part of the USSR. The key phrases in these paragraphs are found in paragraph one, where charges are made against the CPR of developing Russian territory "without permission," and paragraph three, with a warning to the Chinese that they are on a "dangerous path."

Document three, a statement by Khrushchev in January, 1964, is cited as initiating talks between the two sides. However, the words employed tended to impart inconsistency throughout, i.e., varying from threatening remarks in paragraph five, to

an apologetic observance of border disputes between neighboring states throughout history. The primary thrust, and thus the overall average, of the document was an attempt at conciliation (code 5).

Document four, initiated by the CPR during the time when negotiation between the two sides was still in progress, in February, 1964, fell short of China's previously hostile polemics. Except for paragraph two it fairly consistently called for specific negotiation between the two, and in effect demanded conciliation in the dispute (code 6). It appears from this verbal behavior by China that although procedural talks were being held, China had wanted to initiate any substantive negotiation, thus placing the USSR in a position of having to respond. The Soviet Union did in fact respond with a follow-up proposal for talks, in July, 1964, which was rejected by the CPR, as were subsequent proposals in August of that same year.

Document five, of August, 1964, is cited as a most significant document in that Mao tse Tung was talking. Coding was fairly consistent during all three sessions. The tone was threatening in nature (code 7 and code 8) even when masking techniques were used. The document is summarized in the key phrase, "we have not yet presented our account for this list" of territories seized by Russia. Mao tse Tung was voicing disapproval of the Soviet Union's seizure of territory, while at the same time threatening that an account for the inequities was forthcoming.



Khrushchev's reply to these hostile statements came in mid-September, 1964. Document six did vary somewhat in the tone of Khrushchev's remarks, yet taken as a whole the statements indicated that conciliation was sought (code 5) and a cooling-off period would be in the best interests of both sides.

Document seven, an appeal by the Soviet Union for United Nations' resolution of the dispute, came less than a week after Khrushchev's interview. The words clearly indicated the least ambiguous verbal behavior of any document analyzed, although there are some variances between the two paragraphs, i.e., with codes of 6 and 4. However, the appeal for third-party, i.e., UN, resolution of disputes constituted a conciliatory tone.

The documents which constitute verbal behavior, when matched against nonverbal behavior, are for the most part supportive of the original hypotheses. The three documents from the Chinese side (documents one, four and five) tend to support the fact that in projecting hostility in the overall tone of this verbal behavior, the CPR was acting consistently as opposed to the Soviet Union, in documents two, three, six and seven. This consistency in verbal behavior by the Chinese side was similarly matched in nonverbal behavior by actions which consistently held to thwarting of any real negotiation of issues.

Although the Soviet Union initially responded to verbal stimulus with equally hostile remarks, the USSR then tended to actively seek peaceful settlement, or conciliation, of the

issues. Nonverbal behavior by the Soviet Union was consistent in at least attempting to promote actual negotiation. This desire for negotiated solution as evidenced by both verbal and nonverbal behavior is viewed as a consistent policy aimed at maintaining the status quo, and in effect rejecting the demands of the CPR to accept settlement on their terms, with the undercurrent of "or else."

The hypothesis which asserts that conciliatory behavior by one side, in this case the USSR, will tend to be matched by the opposing side, i.e., the CPR, was not validated in this sampling of behavior. The urging by the USSR for negotiation and settlement met with fairly consistent levels of hostility from the CPR.

The consistency of behavior hypothesis, which suggested that the CPR was more consistent than the USSR is marginally proved in that the verbal behavior of the USSR did initially evidence hostility, i.e., document two, while eventually seeking attempts at conciliation. On the other hand, the CPR did in fact evidence fairly consistent behavior throughout.

A sub-hypothesis may have been developed which points to the tendency that the behavior, both verbal and nonverbal, was consistently intended to resolve border disputes, as opposed, for example, to polemics of an ideological persuasion. It should be considered significant that throughout the period sampled, the unambiguous behavior by both sides continued to

evolve around border issues with no apparent attempts at diverting the issues or terminating the dispute by full concession.

## CHAPTER V

### Summary and Conclusions

Examining the consistency of verbal and nonverbal behavior during two years of intense Sino-Soviet dispute can be of value in assigning meaning to enigmatic events. The consistency of verbal and nonverbal behavior on the parts of both the CPR and USSR during 1963-1964 shows that border issues were a genuine issue of the so-called split, and that China was at that time unrelenting in her pursuit for resolution of the issue. The Soviet Union, although allowing the rhetoric of Nikita Khrushchev initially to obscure real intentions, was equally resolute in favor of peaceful settlement, although certainly not willing fully to concede to China's demands. Thus, it can be concluded that if verbal behavior by either side points to actual differences and indicate at what level of hostility these differences are to be treated, it may be presumed that nonverbal behavior will approximate that level of hostility.

The verbal behavior by Russia and China was not merely rhetorical abuse, with aimless intentions. Rather, it pointed specifically and consistently to genuine issues and a desire for resolution. Against the argument that the words exchanged are tied only to ideological differences, this matching analysis

should provide evidence that the words may well yield valid indicators of the direction nonverbal behavior may take.

The leadership and official spokesmen of the Chinese People's Republic, from these events, display fairly consistent behavior, which implies that analysts should seek evidence of verbal behavior when attempting to predict actions by the CPR, and not solely as regards Sino-Soviet border disputes.

The inconsistencies demonstrated in behavior by the USSR may well be attributed to the personality of Nikita Khrushchev. However, the casualness of verbal behavior, compared with the consistent nonverbal behavior, may indicate that rhetoric is not always the signal for the conservative nonverbal behavior which typifies USSR policy to date.

The broadness of these conclusions may beg more detailed analysis, yet the matching of verbal with nonverbal behavior appears to be a legitimate method for probing the questions raised by international disputes.

## APPENDIX 1

### Document 1\*

Excerpts from a joint statement by the editorial departments of Jenmin jih-pao and Hung-ch'i, "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," September 6, 1963. Reprinted in Peking Review (18 f) Number 37, September 13, 1963, pp 6-23. Entire document contained 195 paragraphs with 3 appendices.

- (1) "In April and May 1962, the leaders of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) used their organs and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry-out large scale subversive activities in the Ili region and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union.
- (2) The Chinese government lodged repeated protests and made repeated representations, but the Soviet government refused to repatriate these Chinese citizens on the pretext of the "sense of Soviet legality and humanitarianism." To this day, the incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in the relations between socialist countries."

\*Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 31-32.

## Document 2\*

Excerpt from Soviet Government statement, TASS Information Service, Moscow, September 20, 1963.

- (1) "Beginning with 1960, Chinese servicemen and civilians have been systematically violating the Soviet border. In the single year of 1962, more than 5,000 violations of the Soviet border from the Chinese side were registered. Attempts are also being made to develop some parts of the Soviet territory without permission.
- (2) The Soviet Government has a number of times suggested to the PRC Government that consultations be held on the question of determining separate actions (sections) of the border so as to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding. However, the Chinese side evades such consultations, at the same time continuing to violate the border. . .
- (3) However, the artificial creation of any territorial problems, especially between socialist countries, would be tantamount to embarking on a very dangerous path. If states now begin to make territorial claims on one another, using as arguments some ancient data and the graves of their forefathers, if they start fighting for the revision of historically developed frontiers, this will lead to no good, merely creating feuds among all the peoples, to the joy of the enemies of peace.
- (4) It must not be forgotten that in the past the question of territorial disputes and claims have often been the source of acute friction and conflicts between states, a source of the flaming of nationalistic passions. It is common knowledge that territorial disputes and frontier conflicts were used as a pretext for wars of seizure. This is why communists consistently work for the solution of frontier problems through negotiations. The socialist countries guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism in their relations should show other peoples an example of friendly solution of territorial problems."

\*Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 32-33.

## Document 3\*

Excerpts from a message initiated by Khrushchev to the other heads of Communist states regarding the settlement of territorial disputes; text broadcast by TASS International News Service, Januray, 1964.

- (1) "I am sending you this message in order to draw your attention to one of the problems which, in my opinion, is of particularly great significance for strengthening peace-the question of territorial disputes between countries and the ways of settling them.
- (2) I think that you will agree with me that if we try to pick out the questions which most often give rise to dangerous friction between states in different parts of the world, these will undoubtedly be territorial disputes, the problems of frontiers between states, mutual or unilateral claims of states to each other's territory.
- (3) The questions of boundaries, or, to be more specific, of territorial claims and disputes is not new, of course. It has existed practically through the entire history of humanity and not infrequently caused sharp conflicts between states, mutual distrust, and now enmity among peoples . . .
- (6) There exist, however, other territorial claims and border disputes, and they are perhaps the more numerous. These disputes have nothing to do with the post-war settlement. To justify their claims, the parties to these disputes advance arguments and considerations relating to history, ethnography, blood affinity, religion, and so forth . . .
- (10) Unfortunately, disputes about borders take place not only between historians and ethnographers but also between states, each of which possesses armed forces- and quite big ones sometimes . . . This means that one has to display due understanding of boundaries as they have been formed in the course of history . . .
- (13) In all current frontier disputes between states, the sides must of course study the matter thoroughly in order to settle these issues. We are wholly for this. The only thing we are against is the military method of solving territorial disputes. That is what we should agree upon, precisely this.



## Document 3 (Continued)

- (14) Considering this, the Soviet Government, guided by the interests of strengthening peace . . . is submitting the following proposal . . . to conclude an international agreement, or treaty, on the renunciation of the use of force by states for the solution of territorial disputes . . . "

\*Full excerpted text, Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies, 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 33-36.

## Document 4\*

Excerpt from the "Letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of February 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Peking Review, Number 19, May 8, 1964.

- (1) "The government of the People's Republic of China has consistently held that the question of the boundary between China and the Soviet Union, which is a legacy from the past, can be settled through negotiation between the two governments. It has also been held that pending such a settlement the status quo on the border should be maintained . . . With the stepping up of anti-Chinese activities by the leaders of the CPSU in recent years, the Soviet side has made frequent breeches of the status quo on the border, occupied Chinese territory and provoked border incidents . . .
- (2) Among all our neighbors it is only the leaders of the CPSU and the reactionary nationalists of India who have deliberately created border disputes with China . . .
- (3) The delegations of our two governments started boundary negotiations in Peking on February 25, 1964. Although the old treaties relating to the Sino-Soviet boundary are unequal treaties, the Chinese government is nevertheless willing to respect them and take them as a basis for a reasonable settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question . . . We now propose talks between the Chinese and Soviet Parties be resumed in Peking from October 10 to 25, 1964 . . . "

\*Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 37-38. The February 29th letter contained 71 paragraphs. A total of seven letters had been exchanged during this period, ibid., Peking Review, pp. 7-27.

## Document 5\*

Excerpts from "Chairman Mao tse Tung Tells the Delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party that the Kuriles Must be Returned to Japan," Sekai Shuhu, Tokyo, August 11, 1964.

On July 10, a five-man group of parliamentary deputies, headed by Kozo Sasaki, from the Japanese Socialist Party had a lengthy talk in Peking with Mao tse Tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of this talk, Mao tse Tung declared that "he supported the position of Japan on the question of the return of the Kuriles." After arriving in Hong Kong on July 12, the group told this to a group of Japanese correspondents who are accredited here . . .

Chairman Mao tse Tung bitterly criticized the Soviet Union for its territorial ambitions. In appraising this statement, however, we must keep in mind that it was made amid circumstances that have brought diplomatic relations between the two countries to the point of rupture.

The Sino-Soviet dispute: touching upon the so-called Sino-Soviet dispute, Mao spoke about the question of Soviet military assistance to India, the recall of Soviet specialists and technicians from China (in July of 1960), etc. Having pointed out that "relations between us and the Soviet Union have become worse and worse since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956," he then declared:

- (1) "We have been challenged and we are resisting. It has been proposed to us that we stop the open discussion, if even for three months. We have told them we will not stop even for so many days. We have waged war for twenty-five years. Of these twenty-five years, twenty-two years were taken up by the Civil War and the war against Japan, three years by the Korean War. In the past (although) I was a teacher, I did not know what war was. Three teachers taught me what war was. The first was Chiang Kai-shek, the second was Japanese imperialism, and the third was American imperialism. War is a well-known thing; when it is waged people die. During these twenty-five years of war, the Chinese people lost several tens of millions of dead and wounded. As regards war on paper, there are no dead in such a war. We have been waging such a war for several years now, and not a single person has died. We are prepared to wage this war for another twenty-five years. The Rumanian delegation (that recently visited China) proposed that we end the dispute. However, as soon as the delegation

## Document 5 (Continued)

returned home, Rumania started fighting with the Soviet Union. What is the crux of the matter? The crux lies in the fact that certain large countries are trying to control a number of smaller countries. When one country tries to control another, the latter will resist without fail. Now two large powers, i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union, are trying to become friends and take over control of the whole world. How can we approve of such a development?

- (2) There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed the country under its domination. Mongolia takes up an area which is considerably larger than the Kuriles. In 1954, when Khrushchev and Bulganin came to China, we took up this question but they refused to talk to us. They (i.e., the Soviet Union) also appropriated part of Rumania. Having cut off a portion of East Germany, they chased the local inhabitants into West Germany. They detached a part of Poland, annexed it to the Soviet Union, and gave a part of East Germany to Poland as compensation. The same thing took place in Finland. The Russians took everything they could. Some people have declared that the Sinkiang region and the territories north of the Amur River must be included in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is concentrating troops along its border.
- (3) The Soviet Union has an area of 22 million square kilometers and its population is only 220 million. It is about time to put an end to this allotment.
- (4) Japan occupies an area of 370,000 square kilometers and its population is 100 million. About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of (Lake) Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been made Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list. In regard to the Kurile Islands the question is clear as far as we are concerned-they must be returned to Japan."

\*Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 42-44.

## Document 6\*

Excerpts from a dispatch from TASS International Service, Moscow, September 19, 1964, quoting Nikita Khrushchev's reply to Mao tse Tung's statements in an interview with a Japanese Parliamentary Delegation on September 15, 1964.

- (1) "It can only be regretted that some statesmen sow not the seeds of peace, but seeds of strife and enmity when they meet representatives of other countries. One such "sower" recently talked to Japanese socialists and sowed precisely such seed during his talk. In connection with this, I should like to avail myself of this meeting with you, as members of Parliament and representatives of the Japanese people, to share my views on Mao tse Tung's pronouncements.
- (2) It hurt to read these pronouncements, not only because they are directed against the Soviet Union, against our peoples, our country, but also because Mao tse Tung calls himself a Communist. But the philosophy which he propounded in the conversation is alien to the working people; it cannot be a philosophy representative of the most progressive, revolutionary teaching-Communism. I am not telling you this to impress my ideas upon you; you know that our party firmly abides by Marxist-Leninist principles and is sincerely dedicated to this teaching.
- (3) Japan and Russia have waged war against each other repeatedly in the past. Japan inflicted a defeat upon Russian Czarism. This was a war between two imperialist powers. During World War II the Soviet Union, together with her allies, inflicted a defeat on the warlike imperialist clique which ruled Japan at that time.
- (4) This was the past. What are we to do in the future? We live next door to each other and are neighbors. How are we to cultivate relations between our two countries, between our peoples? Can we follow the old "practice," in which states having finished one war, immediately started preparations for the next? As a matter of fact, Mao tse Tung is pushing Japan into this absolutely incorrect road, which will not bring happiness to the Japanese people.
- (5) When the Japanese socialists raised the question of the Kurile Islands, Mao tse Tung found nothing better to say than that Japan has such and such a territory and its population is such and such, while the Soviet Union has



## Document 6 (Continued)

much more land per capita than Japan and other countries. All the world evaluated this as a provocative discourse. Even the Japanese Government is known to have rejected this reasoning of Mao tse Tung. Such pronouncements do not contribute to the creation of correct, good relations between the peoples and cannot bring anything good to the peoples.

- (6) The theory of overpopulation of countries and the shortage of living space, if it can be called a thoughtful theory, as you well know has been widely preached by many conquerors and in the fullest aspect was expressed by (the) raving (of) Hitler. Under the cover of this "theory" he unleashed World War II. Calling the Germans to war, Hitler reiterated that the German people . . . are crowded on the territory they occupy, that they must conquer-"Lebensraum." Pointing to the East, he asserted that the territory at least to the Urals must belong to the fascist masters, that it is needed by the German people as "Lebensraum."
- (7) Given up-to-date weapons of annihilation, it is now particularly dangerous and, I would say, criminal to search for wealth through the extension of "Lebensraum."
- (8) In the Soviet Government's message of December 31, 1963, we proposed that states should not violate existing frontiers and should not resort to forcible methods of solving territorial problems. War must not be a means of changing frontiers. Only in this condition can peace be safeguarded. The only acceptable way of revising frontiers is talks. Any other way, as a rule, leads to war.
- (9) This is the truth and not my discovery. It has been confirmed by history. In general, I lay no claims to the role of prophet solemnly uttering the truth, as some people do.
- (10) Mao tse Tung hints that the Soviet Union is too big a country. They like to emphasize in Peking that the Czarist government of Russia had acquired too many territories and included them within its boundaries. We do not want to defend Russian Czars. Like other Czars, they were plunderers, waged wars of aggression and sought to seize other people's property and increase their possessions. But there must be one approach to all aggressors of the past, whether Russian Czars or Chinese Emperors.

## Document 6 (Continued)

- (11) The Russian Czars waged wrongful wars of aggrandizement. And what were the Chinese Emperors doing? They also waged wars of aggrandizement and plunder as the Russian Czars did. Chinese Emperors tried to conquer Korea, and they seized Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang.
- (12) Let us take Sinkiang for example. Have the Chinese been living there from time immemorial? The Sinkiang indigenous population differs from the Chinese ethnically, linguistically and in other respects. They are Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz and other peoples. Chinese Emperors conquered them in the past and deprived them of their independence.
- (13) Thus, if one turns to history and recalls how states took shape, one will see that in all states, big and small, Czars engaged in plunder, the only difference being that the stronger aggressors grabbed more and the weaker ones grabbed less.
- (14) What are we after? We want no war, we champion peace. But if we are attacked, we shall defend our borders with all means at our disposal. The frontiers of the Soviet Union are sacred and he who dares violate them will meet with a resolute rebuff from the peoples of the Soviet Union.
- (15) The territory of the Soviet Union took shape as a result of historical processes. The October Revolution granted all peoples of Russia the right to self-determination, up to and including secession, and they used this right. Some peoples seceded from Russia, others voluntarily united to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The peoples of the Soviet Union do not want foreign lands, but they will allow nobody to encroach on their land.
- (16) The Chinese state is also a multinational state. It also took shape as a result of historical processes. Chinese Emperors were in no less a degree robbers than the Russian Czars and accumulated big wealth by robbery. The independent Mongolian People's Republic was formed and is developing as a result of the national liberation struggle, while another part of the territory populated by Mongols forms part of the Chinese state.
- (17) The bulk of the Kazakh people live in the USSR, and most of the territory on which the Kazakh people live forms part of the Soviet Union. On this territory, the Kazakh people set up the Kazakh Soviet Socialist

## Document 6 (Continued)

Republic. This is the sovereign state of the Kazakh people and, according to the Constitution, the Kazakh people have the right, if they wish to, to secede from the Soviet Union. Some of the Kazakhs and the territory they occupy form part of China.

- (18) The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic forms part of the Soviet Union and is the sovereign state of the Kirghiz people. Under the Constitution of the USSR, it also has the right to secede from the Soviet Union if the Kirghiz people wish this. Some of the Kirghiz and the territory they occupy form part of China.
- (19) Territorial and national questions in the land of the Soviets have been settled in conformity with the expression of the will of the peoples. We speak only for ourselves and are not going to interfere in the affairs of other states. In other words, issues arising between states with regard to frontiers can be settled only on the basis of mutual agreement between these states.
- (20) And so we say: Let us not engage in incitement, let the people settle their destiny themselves. This is how disputes should be settled. One must respect the existing frontiers; we are in favor of self-determination of peoples.

\*Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 68-72.



## Document 7\*

On September 23, 1964, the acting permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations, P.D. Morozov, handed to the UN Secretary-General U Thant, a letter from the USSR's Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, with the following comments.

- (1) "On behalf of the USSR Government, I hereby request the inclusion in the agenda of the Nineteenth Session of the UN General Assembly as a separate important question the item, "On the Renunciation by States of the Use of Force for Settling Territorial and Frontier Disputes. . .
- (2) The considerations which prompted (the Soviet) Government to display initiative in advancing the proposal to conclude an international agreement on the renunciation by states of the use of force for solving territorial and frontier disputes are exhaustively clarified in the message addressed by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita Khrushchev, on December 31, 1963, to the heads of state and governments of the countries of the world . . . "

\*Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, Hoover Institution Studies: 7 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 72-74. Doolin answers the obvious question in his footnote, p.74, " . . . as of February, 1965 no action had been taken by the General Assembly because of the controversy over the voting rights of members (such as the USSR) who are delinquent with regard to peace-keeping assessments."

## APPENDIX 2

### CODING RESULTS (Detailed)

DOCUMENT		PARA AVG	DOC AVG
1 (CPR)	7 7 7 5 7 7	7 6 7	7
2 (USSR)	7 6 8 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 8 6	7 6.5 7	7
3 (USSR)	3 3 2 4 8 2 7 4 3 7 5 6 6 6 5 8 7 6 6 3 3 2 4 8 2 5 4 2 5 5 6 6 6 5 7 6 6 6 3 3 2 4 8 3 7 4 2 7 6 6 6 6 5 7 6 6 6	5 4.7 5	5
4 (CPR)	6 7 6 6 7 6 6 7 6	6 6 6	6
5 (CPR)	7 7 8 8 7 7 7 8 7 7 8 8	7.5 7 7.5	7
6 (USSR)	2 3 1 7 7 7 8 6 2 8 7 7 3 8 8 7 3 3 6 5 2 3 1 3 5 7 7 5 1 7 7 3 2 7 6 7 3 2 5 5 2 3 1 7 7 7 8 6 2 6 7 7 3 8 6 7 3 3 6 5	5 4.4 5	5
7 (USSR)	6 3 6 4 6 4	4.5 5 5	5

#### PARAGRAPHS

Key: Each document block, by paragraph, represents three coding sessions, April (top number), June (middle number) and August (bottom number).

Summary of codings, for reference:

- |                             |                              |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 9: "threat" with no options | 5: "conciliation" sought     |
| 8: "threat" with options    | 4: "conciliation" desired    |
| 7: "hostility"              | 3: "facts" of serious issue  |
| 6: "conciliation" demanded  | 2: "facts" of concern        |
|                             | 1: "not directly associated" |

## RELIABILITY

A composite reliability coefficient was derived from the following ("n" being the number of paragraphs):

$$\frac{n(\text{avg. inter-judge agreement})}{1 \text{ plus } ((n-1) (\text{avg. inter-judge agreement}))}$$

There was a total of 54 paragraphs, and average inter-judge agreement (demanding 100% agreement for all three sessions) was 58%. Thus,  $\frac{54(.58)}{1 \text{ plus } 53(.58)}$  which equals 1.00, which provides an acceptable composite reliability coefficient.

A coefficient of reliability (C.R.) was utilized which provides the simplest expression of reliability:

$$\text{C.R. equals } \frac{2m}{N_1, N_2} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{("m" being the number of coding} \\ \text{decisions in which judging is} \\ \text{in agreement, and } N_1, N_2 \text{ referring} \\ \text{to the number of decisions made} \\ \text{judging)} \end{array}$$

Factor "m" in the results totalled 31, while the number of decisions made in judging totalled 164, thus  $\frac{2 \times 31}{164}$  equals .37

The formula can be utilized to reflect a stronger C.R. by not demanding 100% coder agreement which would derive  $\frac{2 \times 46}{164}$  or .60. This is achieved by allowing for agreement where coding varies by only one digit, e.g., 7,8,7, and rejecting those of greater value variance, e.g., 7,3,6, which provides agreement in 46 cases. An even more significant C.R. is derived from complete omission of the intermediate session, i.e., the "masking" technique used in June, and would still constitute a valid method, with over three month intervals between codings (April to August). This would produce a C.R. of 1.84, with 99 cases of agreement.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The contributions of Lenin, Stalin and Mao tse Tung to the explanation of "contradictions" which are allowed to exist in socialist societies is detailed in Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao tse Tung (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), Chapter 5, pp. 139-167.

<sup>2</sup>A summation of factors which constitute the split between the USSR and CPR can be found in Howard C. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely, Benjamin Schwartz, Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963); William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964); Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). A chronology of events during 1963 and 1964, as well as a full discussion of the split is contained in Sino-Soviet Conflict, Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications by U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on the Far East and the Pacific, with Committee on Foreign Affairs, with hearings held March 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 and 31, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).

<sup>3</sup>William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964), pp. 259-288.

<sup>4</sup>"China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1967" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1967), p. 123.

<sup>5</sup>Entire letter published in Pravda, July 14, 1963.

<sup>6</sup>Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Number 1312, vol. XIV, 1963-1964 (London: Keessing's Publications Limited, 1964).

<sup>7</sup>Document 1, Appendix 1.

<sup>8</sup>Editorial was reprinted in Peking Review, Number 37, September 13, 1963, pp. 6-23.

<sup>9</sup>The USSR-CPR common border extends for 4,150 miles, the longest two-nation border in the world.

<sup>10</sup>The minorities in the region have caused challenges to both sides for centuries.

## FOOTNOTES (Continued)

<sup>11</sup>C.P. Fitzgerald, "Tension on the Sino-Soviet Border," Foreign Affairs, vol. 45, Number 4 (July, 1967), pp. 692-693.

<sup>12</sup>Document 2, Appendix 1.

<sup>13</sup>New York Times, February 26, 1964.

<sup>14</sup>Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965).

<sup>15</sup>From the Chinese side of the issue any substantive negotiation would have demanded acceptance of their version of maps, as well as concessions concerning the 19th Century treaties, which were the basis of dispute in China's view.

<sup>16</sup>Edmund O. Clubb, China and Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 497.

<sup>17</sup>Document 5, Appendix 1.

<sup>18</sup>For a detailed account of treaties prior to 1728, Mark Marcall, Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); and for specific treaties Mao refers to i.e., Ili (1858), Aigun (1881), and Peiping (1860), see Dennis J. Doolin, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup>This was poor timing in that Lop Nor, where China conducted her first successful nuclear test in October, 1964, is located in Sinkiang.

<sup>20</sup>Document 7, Appendix 1.

<sup>21</sup>For example, for the USSR: Pravda, Red Star; for the CPR: Red Flag, People's Daily.

<sup>22</sup>The Peking Review provides English-language coverage of China, as Current Digest does for the USSR. Both offer the major articles and news stories from the "official" press of the respective sides.

<sup>23</sup>Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 28-29. Allison here asserts that rational behavior brings consistency to behavior, viewed as the Hobbesian definition of value-maximizing behavior within certain constraints.

<sup>24</sup>For a review of how the breakthrough in relations occurred in 1971, "China and U.S. Foreign Policy," Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1971).

## FOOTNOTES (Continued)

<sup>25</sup>For a discussion of the 1969 clashes, Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the March 1969 Clashes," American Political Science Review, vol. LXVI (December 1972), pp. 1175-1202.

<sup>26</sup>Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 2. Zagoria cites this proposition as one of three schools of thought concerning the split.

<sup>27</sup>This ingredient is particularly specified by Harrison Salisbury, War Between Russia and China (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969).

<sup>28</sup>This is a charge that has been made primarily against the CPR, and Khrushchev had alluded to such behavior in referring to Mao tse Tung.

<sup>29</sup>Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence?" Adelphi Papers Number 101 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973).

<sup>30</sup>Alexander George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, Number 12 (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, June 1969).

<sup>31</sup>For discussion of alliances see Howard C. Boorman, et al., op. cit., and Robert North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963).

<sup>32</sup>Sources useful here as cited in fn 2.

<sup>33</sup>Some 200 ICBM's as reported by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964).

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Thomas Schelling's "vicarious problem solving," discussed by Graham T. Allison, op. cit., pp 13 and 35.

<sup>36</sup>Edward Hull, The Silent Language (New York: George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949), p. 94.

<sup>37</sup>For problems in the sole use of content analysis, Robert Jervis in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Editors), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 177-217.



## FOOTNOTES (Continued)

<sup>38</sup> Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications Research (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), p. 16.

<sup>39</sup> Robert C. North in The Journal for Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, 1962), p. 199.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., also Robert C. North, Robert Jervis, Ole R. Holsti and Richard Brody in Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., chapter 1, pp. 10-38.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 30. Adapted here, in that Allison's study is devoted to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 30-32

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., fn 22.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., citations listed in fn 2, in addition, Dennis J. Doolin, op. cit., Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968); Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs Peking (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1963); G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Morton H. Halperin (Editor) Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967); John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

<sup>46</sup> Documents utilized, Dennis J. Doolin, op. cit.

COMPARING VERBAL AND NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR  
IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTES, 1963-1964

by

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## ABSTRACT

The complexities of comparing words with deeds, or verbal with nonverbal behavior by two sides in a dispute are compounded when analyzing aspects of the modern Sino-Soviet schism. The ambiguities in both forms of behavior are increased when such behavior is associated with closed societies with common Marxist-Leninist roots. Signals between two ideological cohorts can be expected to be at least as ambiguous as diplomatic exchanges among other nations. On the other hand, Marxist-Leninist dialectic and the commitment of both socialist regimes to announcing and fulfilling their intentions suggests a demonstrable consistency between what they say and what they do in some issue areas.

The dispute over common borders and territories provides one aspect of Sino-Soviet behavior in which to measure verbal-nonverbal consistency of the two sides. The border clashes which occurred between the two sides in 1969 climaxed the tension that had been building since the earlier part of that decade. An analysis of verbal and nonverbal behavior by the two sides in two peak rhetorical years, 1963 and 1964, suggests that verbal and nonverbal behavior were fairly consistent on the part of the CPR. The USSR, although consistently pursuing a conservative approach to the issues and attempt-

ing to resolve differences amicably, was somewhat inconsistent in matching verbal behavior to nonverbal behavior.

This study supports the assertion that a matching analysis of verbal and nonverbal behavior between the two sides in this particular dispute is a valid means of unraveling a basis of dispute, and perhaps indications as to where the dispute may be heading.