

PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS
1947-1960

by 4589.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	page
I. TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION.	1
II. EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION.	20
III. EISENHOWER: LATER YEARS	53
IV. CONCLUSION	86
BIBLIOGRAPHY	90

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CHAPTER I

TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

Pakistan was created in 1947 when British India was divided into two separate independent countries, Pakistan and India. The relations between the two countries from the beginning were bad, to say the least. This unhappy state of relations between Pakistan and India has been the most important single factor which made or marred the relations between Pakistan and the United States.

Pakistan's foreign policy since its independence, can be divided into two main phases:

- (1) The phase of alignment (1947-1960) with the Anglo-Saxon powers in which the United States figured most prominently.
- (2) The post 1960 phase of building an independent, though not necessarily neutral, image of Pakistan in special relationship with the Afro-Asian region.

The years 1947 to 1960, when the Pakistan-United States friendship was at its best, covered the Presidents Truman and Eisenhower administrations. From 1947 to 1952 Pakistan, proclaiming an independent policy, was following a Western oriented foreign policy. From 1953 to 1956 Pakistan and the United States bound themselves into a number of bilateral and multilateral defense pacts and their partnership was at its zenith. The period from 1957 to 1960, although of continued friendship, was conspicuous by the frustrations of hopes on which that friendship was built. This period was also the base on which the post 1960 edifice of an

independent foreign policy of Pakistan was built.

America enjoyed great prestige in Pakistan as independence dawned on that country in August 1947. President Roosevelt's efforts with Prime Minister Churchill to give India freedom -- which meant freedom to Pakistan too -- at an early date, won great esteem for his country. United States had just defeated Germany and Japan. It was not surprising, therefore, that General Eisenhower and General MacArthur were household names in Pakistan. The United States was the country of Presidents Washington and Lincoln. It was the country which had beaten the British to win its freedom, a fact in which people of the East took pleasure because none of them had done this for a long time. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan spoke for the Pakistani mind in respect to the United States on his visit to the U.S. in May 1950 when he declared:

I have been an admirer of the vigour of your enterprise, your indefatigable spirit of inquiry, your optimism, your high respect for individual effort, your belief in equal opportunity for all and the firmness of your speech and manner. Above all, I have admired your zealous and uncompromising regard for the supremacy of people's will.¹

The United States was considered to be the epitome of above-mentioned qualities in Pakistan.

On the negative side, suspicions existed that the United States was opposed to the partition of British India and was sympathetic to the Congress demand for an undivided India because "Western interests required a united India in order to face the Soviet Union more effectively

¹Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan, the Heart of Asia, (Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 4.

and retain large markets for economic exploitation."² Such fears were confirmed by the writings of writers like Richard P. Stebbins who wrote that "The partition of the subcontinent between these two mutually antagonistic nations (India and Pakistan) had disrupted its economic and politico-strategic unity and aggravated beyond measure the task of governing its discrete fragments."³ Suspicion exists to this day in Pakistan, not without reason, that the intellectuals in the United States were and still are opposed to the partition of India and, thus, creation of Pakistan. As Pakistan became independent, other points of suspicion were that the United States was a Western power which was too tied to imperialist powers like Britain and France. It was a white country where blacks were not treated rightly, and it had just used atomic weapons on Asians. It had emerged as the strongest nation from World War II and had to prove to the nations which had just won freedom that it is not going to do to them what other powerful countries had done in the three preceding centuries. In other words, the United States had to prove to the new nations that it was not an imperialist power, interested in colonies.

On the whole, Pakistan and the United States had the distinction and opportunity of creating from the beginning a new international relationship, their feelings towards each other were not burdened by an unhappy relics of the past, by any bitter memories or misunderstandings, by any rivalries of jealousies or frictions. "We have here an opportunity," said George F. Kennan, "which does not often come to nations: an

²Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Myth of Independence, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 38.

³Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1950, (New York, 1951), p. 317.

opportunity to shape a new international relationship, to shape it in such a way as to avoid those things which have troubled relations between nations in the past, to make it a well-founded and solid structure, a structure designed for the future."⁴

Pakistan was Western-oriented at the time of its birth and anxious to improve relations with the United States, the new leader of the Western world after the World War II. As early as October 1947, Fazalur Rehman, the Commerce Minister of Pakistan, declared that the United States and Pakistan shared the same ideological out-look and that Pakistan would never tolerate communism. Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad expressed Pakistan's need of American technicians for industrial development.⁵ Iskander Mirza, Secretary of Defense in Pakistan, visited the U.S. in 1949 and made it clear that he viewed American military power as the guarantor of peace in the world. "We in Pakistan hope that there will be peace in the world and there will be peace if the United States forces are kept in a state of preparedness."⁶ As far as the United States was concerned, the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, sent a congratulatory message to the Constituent Assembly of the newly created Muslim State and expressed confidence that the constitution it would present to the people of Pakistan, and the world, would reflect the steadfast devotion of the leaders of Pakistan to the principles of democracy and peace.⁷ President Truman not only pledged friendship at the time of

⁴Liaquat Ali Khan, p. 137. (Address of Welcome by George F. Kennan on behalf of Foreign Policy Association for Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, P.M. of Pakistan, Town Hall, New York, May 8, 1950)

⁵The New York Times, 13 October 1947.

⁶Ibid., 24 July 1949.

⁷Ibid., 10 August 1947.

creation of Pakistan, but also stressed it again when the first Pakistani Ambassador presented his credentials. "We stand ready," said President Truman, "to assist Pakistan in all appropriate ways which might naturally benefit our two countries and the world."⁸ In spite of all this the relations between Pakistan and the United States, for the first six years, were correct but not close. The story is told that when an American congressman who visited Karachi soon after independence was asked by a Pakistani correspondent what Americans thought of Pakistan, he replied that they had never even heard of it. This was unpolitic but true. For most Americans, Pakistan still remains, perhaps, the least known of American's major allies -- it is doubtful though that it can be called a "major ally" in the former sense of the word any longer.

It was to "Assist America discover Pakistan"⁹ that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, and his Begum visited the United States in response to President Harry S. Truman's cordial invitation in May 1950. In a month-long stay in the United States he fulfilled his mission commendably. He spoke wherever the opportunity presented itself. In the Senate and the House of Representatives, in New York, Chicago, Kansas City, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, and Cambridge in Massachusetts, he introduced Pakistan to the Americans, told them of its struggle for freedom, its historical background, its aspirations and interests, its culture and need for economic development. Pakistan's need for economic development can be considered to summarize to a large extent the burden of his message to the United States. Pakistan,

⁸Ibid., 9 October 1947.

⁹Pakistan News, (Embassy of Pakistan: Washington, D.C.), 13 May 1950.

like many other countries of Asia, he said, was underdeveloped and backward, but was anxious to develop her resources at the greatest possible speed. For this, she needed the good will and cooperation of all the peace-loving nations of the world. "We cannot make up for the backwardness of one or two hundred years sufficiently quickly without the cooperation of the more advanced countries who possess advanced technical knowledge. . . . We assure the great pioneers of this and other advanced countries of the warmest welcome and the greatest good will and cooperation in return."¹⁰ The United States, he said, was one of the first countries with whom Pakistan established friendly and diplomatic relations.¹¹ It was the first country with which Pakistan had trade relations. Assuring that Pakistan was most anxious to promote trade between America and Pakistan, he invited the cooperation of American investors again and again. The slogan of the Foreign Trade Committee of Houston, Texas, "world peace through world trade -- dollars spent abroad always come home," pleased him because it proclaimed his mind. He encouraged investment by talking about things which are so dear to the American heart:

We believe in democracy, that is, in fundamental human rights including the right of private ownership and the right of the people to be governed by their own freely chosen representatives. We believe in equality of opportunity and equality before law. We believe that each individual has the right to the fruit of his labours.

¹⁰Liaquat Ali Khan, pp. 30-31, (Speech before Foreign Policy Association, Town Hall, New York, May 8, 1950.)

¹¹The United States on the other hand did not show a significant interest. The first American Ambassador to Pakistan, Paul H. Alling, presented his credentials only in February 1948. After five months he returned to the U.S. for reasons of ill health. It was only in the beginning of 1950 that Avra M. Warren was posted as the second Ambassador to Pakistan.

Lastly, we believe that the fortunate amongst us, whether in wealth or knowledge, have a moral responsibility towards those who have been unfortunate.¹²

Pakistan, being an underdeveloped country needed capital and the utterances, very clearly, were to please the investor.

The visit of Liaquat Ali Khan, on the whole, achieved what he intended it to. It was an impressive success. His eloquent views of Pakistan's determination to oppose aggression, of Pakistan's devotion to encouragement of private enterprise, and its conviction that Islamic way of life was better than communism evoked a very favorable response from the American Congress, the public and the Press. The New York Times described his views as "heart warming." Vice President Alben Barkley declared after Liaquat finished his address to the Senate that no foreign dignitary had been more inspiring and more appreciated in the Senate than the Pakistan Prime Minister.¹³ "The visit expressed, and was meant to express publicly, what the two governments had long believed -- that though Pakistan and America are far apart in space, though they are very different in their ways of life, each has great responsibilities for the peace and welfare of mankind, which it cannot hope to meet fully without the advice and help of the other."¹⁴ Liaquat's avowed adherence to path of free democracy and to defend it at all cost won a very favourable response from the New York Times, which commented editorially on 5 May 1950:

¹²Liaquat Ali Khan, p. 33.

¹³Congressional Record, Vol. 96, 1950, p. 6403.

¹⁴Walter Lippmann in Preface of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan, the Heart of Asia, (Harvard: 1950).

Liaquat Ali Khan, prime minister of Pakistan, spoke with fervor... when he declared that no threat or persuasion no material peril or ideological allurements, could defect his country from its chosen path of free democracy. These are strong words and... they are a pledge that the Pakistanis will stand and be counted among those who are devoted to freedom regardless of the cost.... Freedom for young nations is an ideal to which we (Americans) are devoted.... The Pakistanis understand their peril and are determined to defend it. This is bold resolution and gives all of us encouragement.

Prime Minister Liaquat's message to the United States is important in two other aspects. He emphasized the need of "international cooperation without exploitation....for this century is a century of great awakening and....exploitation is now twice accursed -- blighting him that gives and him that takes."¹⁵ This warning note continued in Cambridge, Massachusetts, "I do not ask for charity -- I do so, not for the sake of my country alone, but also for the sake of America; for the sake of the world. Democracy in world cannot remain isolated and flourish. Prosperity too cannot remain isolated. It must go ahead and spread itself or else it cannot go on gaining strength."¹⁶ These utterances are important in the sense that they represent the typical thinking of Afro-Asian nations which have won independence after World War II, after centuries of sufferings under the colonial rule. The new emerging nations were and still are very touchy about exploitation. They react very strongly to it when, and if, they feel they are being exploited. Economic aid they do not ask as charity. They ask for the "help" of the more experienced countries of the world to put their "own men to work" and to make their "own resources" yield their wealth. There is a very strong and

¹⁵Liaquat Ali Khan, p. 99.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 110.

genuine feeling among Afro-Asian nations that the West owes it to them.

Liaquat Ali Khan was well received and given enthusiastic reception wherever he went. On the whole, it pleased the people in Pakistan. Pakistan was better known now.

The speeches of Liaquat left no room for doubt that Pakistan was pro-West and pro-U.S. to say the least. All tenders for large Pakistan government orders, he informed the American public, were published in the U.S. newspapers and quotations from American firms were treated with equality with others. A Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, as well as one on double taxation, was already being negotiated.

During Liaquat's stay in the United States, the Korean question came before the United Nations. He completely backed America by declaring North Korea guilty of aggression and lent support to any moves which the Council might deem fit.¹⁷ In this particular case, this meant sending military force to fight against North Korea under the United Nations. For a country like Pakistan, sending troops to Korea in 1950 would have been a wilder gesture than the statement itself.

The U.S. State Department was very happy about Liaquat's statement because it meant one more convert to its way of thinking and one more country supporting President Truman's unprecedented action of first striking and then going to the United Nations. The State Department approached Pakistan for a follow-up of the statement of her Prime Minister. By then, the mood in Karachi had sobered. The Pakistan Government asked in return if the United States would guarantee India's behavior and would come to Pakistan's aid if India attacked Pakistan. The United States gave no

¹⁷The New York Times, 28 June 1950.

such assurance and Pakistan shook herself clear of an ugly situation. But the fact remains that the Government of Pakistan was ready to send a token force if the United States had given them some assurance. The support of the U.S. policy was reiterated by Sir Zaffarullah Khan, the foreign minister of Pakistan, when the General Assembly met in Autumn. Branding North Korea as an aggressor he declared:

In these circumstances the duty of the Security Council was clear, and for the first time in its history the Council gave an immediate and bold reply to the challenge so grave and impudent to its authority.¹⁸

Pakistan's support for United States' views on Korea went out of the way when Sir Zaffarullah Khan declared in Ottawa, Canada, that the thirty-eighth parallel was not something sacred and inviolable, it should be crossed, and the whole of Korea brought under the United Nations forces.¹⁹ Pakistan was not in a position to send any military forces but contributed five thousand tons of wheat: Popular opinion was generally, though not unanimously, behind the government's Korean policy.

Further proof of Pakistan's pro-United States policy is furnished by Liaquat's cold-shouldering an invitation from the U.S.S.R. in 1949. Even before the two countries had exchanged diplomatic representatives, the Pakistan Prime Minister received and accepted an invitation to go to Moscow. There was a great enthusiams in Pakistan for the prospective visit to Moscow but Liaquat never went. Again and again he was questioned and criticized by the Pakistan press and in the Pakistan Constituent-Assembly about his visit to the U.S.S.R. He always got out of these

¹⁸General Assembly Official Records (G.A.O.R.), 5th Sess., 283 Plenary Meeting, 25 September 1950, p. 95.

¹⁹The Dawn (Karachi), 3 October 1950.

situations with adroitness which was his specialty. According to some writers, Liaquat Ali Khan angled for an invitation from the Soviet Union. He engineered the said invitation because, a few months earlier, Prime Minister Nehru of India, received an invitation from the United States and Pakistan felt slighted. It was, therefore, natural to turn to the other big power. The gambit was to get an invitation from the United States. It worked.²⁰ While there is a possibility of this view being true, it should also be kept in mind that the United States in the Spring of 1947 ended the period of "Attempted Cooperation" with Russia and started the foreign policy of containment, deliberately designed to check the expansion of Communism. Pakistan, with its strategic position and fifth largest population in the world, could not be neglected. Moreover the invitation to Pakistan's prime minister after Nehru's visit appears like an attempt to deal with both countries even handedly.

Beginning in 1947, the United States entered on a foreign policy of containment designed to check the expansion of Communism. This policy involved bolstering the economy of nations, giving pledges of military support to nations threatened by Communist aggression, building a series of military alliances and sometimes actually fighting shooting wars of huge proportions like Korea and Vietnam.

In the spring of 1947, a few months before the emergence of India and Pakistan, the foreign policy of the United States decisively changed direction. The Truman Doctrine with respect to Greece and Turkey proclaimed the policy of containing Communism. In a somewhat shrill message

²⁰Arif Hussain, Pakistan, Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, (London: Frank Cass & Co. 1966), p. 90.

to Congress in March 1947, Truman declared:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppressions. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.²¹

President Truman asked for 400 million dollars for military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey, the dispatch of military supplies, and the sending of civilian and military missions to supervise aid and to help train the Greek and Turkish armies. The Truman Doctrine was followed, on June 21, 1947, by the Marshall Plan to bolster the nations of Western Europe against the threat of the Soviet Union. Exactly one year later, in June 1948, the United States Senate, in the Vandenburg Resolution, went on record as favoring association of the United States with regional and other collective defense arrangements. Though the Vandenburg Resolution aimed at International cooperation through the United Nations, it committed the United States to

- (a) progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense;
- (b) association of the United States, by Constitutional progress, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are

²¹U.S. President, House Miscellaneous Documents, No. 171, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4.

based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affects its mutual security; and

- (c) contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual and collective self-defense . . . should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.²²

This was regarded as an invitation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a measure "which would authorize and direct the president to pronounce what, in effect, amounts to a Monroe Doctrine to the whole Atlantic area."²³ North Atlantic pact negotiation continued till its final signing in April 1949. The organization was established to strengthen the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union's military threat. The principal purpose of the United States' foreign policy, to contain Communism, had taken definite shape.

The young states of India and Pakistan came into contact with the United States for the first time when the United States was fully entrenched in Great Power politics. The South East Asia policy of the United States at this time was to obtain the participation of India and China in the promotion of her interests in Asia. The Monroe Doctrine had long been extended to the Pacific where the United States had just finished a war with Japan. The old interest in the Pacific, coupled with the new policy of containment of Communism, reiterated itself in the Foreign Assistance Act of April 1948 which committed the United States

²²A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Senate Doc. 123, 81st Cong. 1st Sess., Washington, D.C., 1950, p. 197.

²³Sen. Baldwin (Connecticut), Cong. Record, Vol. 95, Part 7, p. 9769.

officially to Chiang Kai-Shek's war against the Communists. In spite of United States help, Chiang Kai-Shek could not hold on and China, one of the edifices of the United States Asian policy, was removed by the Communist revolution when, in October 1949, Mao Tse-Tung emerged victorious.

After the loss of China, the original conception of India and China as the twin pillars of the United States' South East Asia policy was re-constituted, with Japan replacing China. It also made India doubly important in United States policies and America, which previously had to contain Russia, now had to worry about containment of China too. The strategy used in Asia was the same as in Europe, i.e., the strategy of economic aid, maintenance of a large number of military, naval and air bases in different countries, intensive armament preparations and a network of military alliances. The Vandenburg Resolution, which was an invitation to the creation of NATO, was extended to Asia and a series of bilateral and multilateral pacts were signed. This time it was known as the concept of the "Defensive Perimeter." Such was the fear of Communism in American minds, especially after the experience of the Korean war, that pacts to contain it sprang up like mushrooms. So many pacts were signed that, in the words of Dr. Henry Kissinger, it seemed "America was suffering from a disease called PACTITUS."²⁴

India, as the second most populous country in the world and the world's largest democracy, became more important in the United States' Asian strategy after the victory of Communism in China. The United States made consistent efforts to win India over to her side. A "Point

²⁴Quoted in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, p. 61.

Four" agreement was signed with India in 1950 and Chester Bowles was sent to that country to appraise the Indian situation and offer assistance for India's First Five-Year Plan. In 1951 a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement for the establishment of an Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund was signed at the beginning of 1952. Earlier in 1951, when India faced a desperately critical food shortage, the United States had shipped two million tons of wheat to ease the situation.

During all what looked like unilateral American overtures, India remained steadfast in her independent foreign policy and sought to maintain a balanced policy between China, the Soviet Union and the United States. Prime Minister Nehru called it "enlightened self-interest" with a "touch of Indian idealism."²⁵ In spite of many disappointments, the United States continued its endeavors to extend its influence into India but Pandit Nehru resisted every attempt to throw India into the United States camp. As a Western nation the United States could never wholly free itself from the taint of inherited and unchangeable suspicions of Western motives.

India's determination to pursue an independent and neutralist foreign policy, despite the allurements held out by the United States, brought growing disenchantment which started manifesting itself in a number of pronouncements in the United States. President Truman stated on Feb. 1951:

²⁵K. P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs, Feb. 1950-Dec. 1953, 1958, pp. 238-239.

I recognize that there are important political differences between our Government and the Government of India in regard to the course of action which would most effectively curb aggression and establish peace in Asia.²⁶

The New York Times reported that:

Jawaharlal Nehru is fast becoming one of the great disappointments of the post-war era...to the West, he seemed a logical champion of a free democratic, anti-Communist Asia, and the India he directed was the obvious candidate for the leadership of Asia... instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for its good, Nehru turned aside from his responsibilities, proclaimed India's disinterestedness and tried to set up an independent Third Force India, suspended in the mid-air between the two decisive movements of our day -- the Communism that Russia heads, and the democracy of which the United States is the champion.²⁷

India's refusal to be drawn into the cold war forced the United States to change its attitude towards the subcontinent. Once it came to the conclusion that India was unwilling to collaborate in the United States' Asian strategy, the U.S. began to look for alternatives in the subcontinent. Pakistan was the obvious choice. Just as Japan had replaced China, so was Pakistan going to replace India. The then Vice President, Richard M. Nixon, urged that the United States extend arms aid to Pakistan as a counter-force to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India.²⁸

Other members of the Congress and especially Senator Knowland, leader of the majority party in the Senate, who had strong anti-Nehru feeling, had the same kinds of opinions. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles called neutralism "immoral" and came out openly against the actions of the Indian Government in the international field. Opposing India's

²⁶Keessing's Contemporary Archives, (London: Keessing's Publications, 1950-52), Vol. VIII, p. 11538.

²⁷The New York Times, (Editorial), "The Lost Leader," 28 August 1951.

²⁸Ralph Toledino, Nixon, (New York: Henry Holt, 1956), p. 164.

representation at the conference on Korea, he said that exclusion from such a conference was the price she should pay for her policy of neutralism.²⁹

So in the early 1950's, India's unpreparedness to give its allegiance to the United States' Asian and global objectives made it imperative for the United States to look towards Pakistan -- provided Pakistan was willing.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in October 1951. In spite of its strong pro-West inclinations, Liaquat always insisted that his foreign policy was independent. Speaking on March 8, 1951, he said:

Pakistan was neither tied to the apron-strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was it a camp follower of the Communist bloc. It steered clear of the inter-bloc rivalry and had an absolutely independent foreign policy. Pakistan had all along been uninfluenced by the inter-bloc struggle going on in the world, and had supported the cause which it considered to be just Sometimes we agreed with the Western bloc and sometimes with the Communist bloc, as the situation and the matter under discussion demanded.³⁰

Khawaja Nazimuddin, who succeeded Liaquat, declared that Pakistan will continue the foreign policy pursued by Liaquat Ali Khan. Although

²⁹In spite of these hostile attitudes in some quarters, the United States continued to entertain the hope that India might change her attitude. Efforts were continued to please her. American aid for her five-year plan was continued and President Eisenhower not only gave an assurance to India that military aid to Pakistan would not be used against her but also made an offer of military aid to India too. "In making this suggestion," declared Nehru in answer to the offer of military aid to India, "the President (Eisenhower) has done less than justice to us or to himself. If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept it ourselves." See "Keesing's Contemporary Archives." (London: Keesing's Publications, 1952-54), Vol. IX, p. 13461. Also The Washington Post, 2 March 1954.

³⁰The Dawn, (Karachi), 9 March 1951.

Nazimuddin was the prime minister, the effective control of Pakistan passed from the (Muslim) League and the politicians to Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and a group of new men who can aptly be called "the hierarchs" -- the senior army officers and the civil servants. Internally it started an era of bossism of a blatantly corrupt and ruthless nature and externally Pakistan changed its Western-oriented foreign policy to complete alignment.

In July 1951, about three months before Liaquat's assassination, India moved its entire military strength to the Pakistan borders. The threat of invasion made Pakistani statesmen think that an invasion by India was not beyond the range of possibility. This feeling of insecurity became more pronounced as the economic situation of the country also deteriorated. After a temporary boom because of demand for Pakistan's raw material during the Korean war, the economic situation faced a real crisis as the commodity prices came plunging down after the war. Another reason of frustration was the attitude of the Muslim countries of the Middle East towards Pakistan. In the spirit of romantic Pan-Islamism, Pakistan made advances in foreign policy towards fellow Muslim countries. But religion, it seems, was not the basis of nationalism in them. The advances made by Pakistan were cold-shouldered.

With relations towards India strained so badly, an acute economic crisis in sight and rebuffs by fellow Muslims of the Middle East leaving a bitter taste in the mouth, Pakistan seemed urgently in need of friends. There were few signs of more than casual acquaintances. To counter-balance this situation it was necessary to strengthen Pakistan vis-a-vis India, secure outside economic and military aid, and find new friends. With these aims, the new leaders of Pakistan began to put out feelers to

the U.S.

A change in the United States administration occurred in 1953. The new administration was even more keen than the previous one to sign up more supporters for its defense arrangements. Pakistan was already willing.

CHAPTER II

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION (Pakistan and the Alliances)

The geographical setting of Pakistan places it both in the Middle East and South East Asia. Its proximity to the Middle East, the Central Asian territories of the U.S.S.R., to Tibet and Sinkiang on the West Pakistan side, and to China and the whole of Indo-China on the East Pakistan side, attaches great strategic importance to the country.

The foreign policy of Pakistan has been dominated continuously by two main preoccupations: that of ensuring her security and independence from her neighbour India and of acquiring support for her case regarding Kashmir. Any judgement on the affairs of Pakistan which is not based upon the recognition of this fact would be absolutely unreal. It is against this background that Pakistan's policy in respect of regional alliances should be understood.

Although fear of India was the main concern of Pakistan, yet the effect of a distrust, if not fear, of Russia also went a long way in helping Pakistan decide to join the regional pacts with the United States. Middle of the 19th century Russian expansion into Central Asia had alarmed the British Viceroy in India beyond proportion and after a series of ill-conceived and disastrous campaigns into Afghanistan, the British accepted an independent Afghanistan which would serve as a buffer state between India and Russia. The wisdom of the British alarm and policy in that region was questioned many a time but phobia of a Russian

invasion remained alive in the British minds down to 1947. One of the greatest exponents, in the last days of British Raj in India, of the theory of a Russian push towards the south to reach the Indian Ocean was Sir Olaf Caroe, the foreign secretary in India under Lord Wavell and the last governor of the Northwest Frontier Province. As a great authority on Central Asia, he had a very profound and far-reaching effect on the thinking of Pakistan leaders, who had been brought up in the traditions of the British anyway. No less was his effect on Pakistani bureaucrats, many of who were his former colleagues.¹ While over-emphasizing the role of Sir Olaf Caroe, we should not lose sight of the long-standing distrust of the Muslims in India towards Russia because of her long struggle with the Caliphate in Turkey with whom the Muslims had a close religious affinity. Russian conquest and maltreatment of the Muslim states of Central Asia and a natural fear and distrust of Communism helped convert them of Sir Olaf's point of view. Russia was also not in good standing with Pakistanis because she disapproved of partition as this measure, by the Russian argument, was a result of the British policy of "divide and rule."

Pakistan at its birth was not in a position to pretend great power status. Many doubted that it would even survive. Considering the odds she had to work against and the feeling of insecurity she had, it is not surprising that her foreign policy amounted to a frank bid for attachment to some government strong enough to shore up her economy and political structure and protect her, if attacked. The sense of insecurity -- a

¹One of Sir Olaf Caroe's great friends was Iskander Mirza, the first defense secretary and later on, Governor General of Pakistan. Mirza was greatly instrumental in signing the Defense Pacts with the U.S.

Maginot Line Psychosis -- led Pakistan at the very onset of independence to go forthrightly in search of dependence. After World War II and under the circumstances, the United States was the logical choice.

The policy line to look towards the United States goes back to the time of partition. An American journalist reported a conversation with Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder and the first Governor General of Pakistan, soon after partition:

'America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America,' he (M.A. Jinnah) confided. 'Russia is not very far away ...America is now awakened.' Since the United States was bolstering up Greece and Turkey, she should be more than interested in pouring arms and money into Pakistan. 'If Russia walks in here, the whole world is menaced.'

In the weeks to come I was to hear the Quaid-i-Azam's thesis echoed by government officials throughout Pakistan. 'Surely America will give us loans to keep Russia from walking in.'²

The same line of argument was continued by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on his tour of the United States. The New York Times of 5 May 1950 reported Liaquat as saying that his country needed arms and technical aid. If he got it in the United States, then the interests of both Pakistan and the United States would be served. When asked by a reporter how large a standing army he wanted, he replied: "That depended on this great country of yours, if your country will guarantee our territorial integrity, I will not keep any army at all." He did not forget to remind the Americans that "divided in two parts Pakistan, in the northwest, is not far from the Communist territories of Russia and China."

The Pakistan leaders continued expressing such sentiments till early

²Margaret Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), pp. 92-93.

sixties when confidence and maturity in foreign policy, changing needs of the nation, and changing conditions of the international relations brought a change in their outlook ultimately. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Bogra described international communism as a great danger to South Asia at the meeting of the Colombo Powers in April-May 1954, and again declared Russia as an imperialist power at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. As a student of "War and Strategy," President Ayub Khan believed in "the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warmer waters of the Indian Ocean," as late as 1960.³ Ayub Khan clearly had his schooling from the British. "War and Strategy" are not the only touchstones by which to measure one country's intentions towards another and more invaders attacked India after the Fifteenth Century through the "warm waters" he talked about than from the north.

The Pakistan leaders on the whole have been rather naive regarding Russia's intentions for a push towards the south. There is little evidence that the Russians thought in these terms. An invasion of Pakistan on Russia's part would be a very expensive campaign with little gains. It would be very expensive militarily because it could easily lead to much larger conflicts and they would have to pay a heavy political price. This would drive India firmly into the Western bloc and shift the international balance disastrously against Russia. To pay the price of war just to seek almost no material gains, and few strategic ones, would be a very bad bargain for the U.S.S.R. There was one circumstance, however, which could bring about a conflict between Pakistan and Russia, i.e.,

³Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan Perspective, (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Pakistan, 1962), p. 15. This article first appeared in Foreign Affairs, July 1960.

Pakistan's involvement in the alliances with the United States. This was the course Pakistan chose.

The fact, however, remains that although the defense against India was the main concern of Pakistan, yet a distrust and fear of Russia also went a long way in helping Pakistan decide to join the Regional Pacts with the United States.

When Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan fell to an assassin's bullet in October 1951, Khawaja Nazim-ud-din succeeded him just at a time when economic depression after an earlier Korean boom was beginning to appear on the horizon. He was the person who felt the full impact of this depression. There was also an unsatisfactory yield of grain crops. Food shortage and fall in the raw products prices was not Nazim-ud-din's creation, but this was used by his opponents to oust him. He had to leave because of a dictatorial action of the governor general. Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan's ambassador to Washington and a protege of the United States, was installed as the new premier.

It was in the early days of Bogra's premiership when the real impact of food shortage was felt. Being a friend of the United States, Bogra, who had spent much time in the United States and was much impressed by her economy, wealth, and way of life, turned to her for help. The United States announced its offer of 700,000 tons of wheat plus another 300,000 if it was necessary. As the ships, laden with wheat, started arriving, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who had a flare for showmanship and was rather flamboyant, staged a procession in Karachi of decorated carts laden with American wheat, hauled by camels from whose necks were suspended placards with the words "Thank You America." This did not please some sober Pakistanis but the nation on the whole felt grateful. From that time

onwards, Pakistan shifted more and more into the United States camp and ended the thin veil it had kept between an independent foreign policy, which it had professed, and of complete alignment, which it now intended to follow.

In retrospect, one wonders whether the fact of wheat shortage in Pakistan was not built up and magnified out of all proportion in order to create a favorable climate of opinion for an alliance with the United States. It appears that the actual shortage and the role of the United States aid in averting it was much less than what was claimed at the time. "The overall shortage was estimated at no less than 1.5 million tons in 1951-52 as the stocks were considered by experts to be low and in need of replenishment. As the crop for the following year, i.e., 1952-53, was estimated to be lower still, a deficit of 2.5 million tons was predicted. This was rather surprising, for 1950-51 had been the third straight year of bumper crops, and this should have ensured ample stocks."⁴ The real impact of the shortage was felt in September 1952. About 150,000 tons of wheat from Australia and Canada was received in time, but there were no processions for these countries saying "Thank You Australia and Canada." The timely help from Canada and Australia must have gone a long way to ease the food situation and averting the crisis if it existed. The fact that help from these countries was not played up as much as that from the United States left a shadow of doubt on the whole deal. The United States wheat did not begin to arrive until twelve months after the crisis started.

⁴Hamza Alavi and Amir Khusro, Pakistan: The Burden of U.S. Aid, (Boston: New England Free Press), p. 25.

There had been no starvation although the prices of the wheat had skyrocketed because of hoarding. Senator Theodore F. Green, reporting on the foreign aid in January 1956, said that "more than half of the wheat supplied was still in storage in Pakistan by mid-summer of 1954, by which time a new and bumper crop was available."⁵

The wheat agreement, as publicized by the Government of Pakistan, helped in creating tremendous goodwill for the United States.⁶ The aid, it appeared, had saved the country from total starvation. The Pakistanis, who are a fairly emotional and sentimental people and like to stand by a friend, did not object very much when the decision to have an alliance with the United States was announced. Moreover, the advantages of such an alliance could be many-fold. It would strengthen the country's position vis-a-vis India, would get support from the United States for Pakistan's case regarding Kashmir in the United Nations and probably would enhance Pakistan's aspirations to the leadership of the Muslim world.

Although the negotiations were being held for some time, Pakistan formally requested the U.S. for military aid on 22 February 1954. President Eisenhower announced three days later that the decision to give military aid to Pakistan had been made.

John P. Callahan, the Karachi correspondent of the New York Times, reported on 2 November 1953, that discussions of a military alliance between the United States and Pakistan were about to begin. Pakistan,

⁵Quoted in Hamza Alavi and Amir Khusro, p. 25.

⁶Following this grant of wheat in 1954, of the many bills introduced in the U.S. Congress, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance ACT (commonly known as P.L. 480) was enacted into law on 10 July 1954.

he reported, was willing to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment.⁷ "This might be," he said, "the first phase of what may become the most hopeful development for peace in Asia."

The decision by the United States government to align and give aid to Pakistan, according to the well-known American journalist Selig S. Harrison, goes back to the writings of Sir Olaf Caroe, eminent British civil servant, Foreign Secretary in India under Lord Wavell and a world-renowned authority on Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East.⁸ The American policy makers, like their Pakistani counterparts, were greatly impressed by the writings of Caroe, who foresaw a great role for Pakistan in the Middle East and in checking the Russian designs in that area:

"The Mesopotamian campaigns of the first war and the strategic movements of the Allies in Iraq and Persia in the Second World War were made possible from the Indian base...In this quarter as on the Northwest Frontier, Pakistan has succeeded to much of India's responsibility, for the gulf opens directly on Karachi, in real sense its terminus...The importance of the gulf grows greater as the need for fuel expands, the world contracts, and the shadow lengthens from the North. Its stability can be assured only by the closest accord between the states which surround this Muslim Lake, an accord written by the great powers whose interests are engaged."⁹

The United States policy makers had great respect for the British who seemed to have great insight about those faraway places. America leaned

⁷Pakistan was willing to permit the use of military bases and possibly permit the construction of new ones with Maripur and Malir airfields and the Khyber Pass as the possible sites was again reported in a front page story by the New York Times, 17 November 1953.

⁸Sir Olaf Caroe's books include (1) Soviet Empire, (2) The Pathans, and (3) Wells of Power: The Oilfields of Southern Asia.

⁹Quoted in Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the U.S. -- I, Case History of a Mistake, The New Republic, 10 August 1959, p. 12 (This is the first of the three articles which appeared in The New Republic, Aug.-Sept 1959)

on England for some years for advice and diplomatic initiative after the Second World War and "for a time Britain became to the United States what Greece had been to Rome."¹⁰ Caroe's arguments won a lot of converts immediately.

It would be wrong to imply, as Harrison rather naively has, that Caroe was solely responsible for the American policy towards Pakistan. Caroe visited the United States in 1952 on a "lecture tour" and met the officials in the State Department in Washington. He confirmed what they must have already believed. The American diplomats and the military strategists, specially the air-power enthusiasts, were already aware of the usefulness of the area which was now Pakistan. During the war they had used the Persian Gulf and Iran as base of operations to supply aid to Russia. Karachi had been an American air base. The United States aircraft had taken off for flights into China from what is now East Pakistan. The assumption that the policy makers in Washington had to be told by Caroe, the importance of Pakistan for West Asian defense and as a base for operations against the Sino-Soviet landmass, looks very flimsy. Caroe himself, in an interview in November 1964 in London, expressed amusement over Harrison's evaluation of his impact on American diplomatic and military leaders.¹¹

The objectives of the United States in offering military aid to Pakistan can best be understood in terms of American global strategy, namely the containment of the U.S.S.R. and the communist world generally.

¹⁰Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, p. 35.

¹¹M. S. Venkataramani and H. C. Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution & Course of an Uneasy Partnership," International Studies, Vol. VIII, July-October 1966, p. 84.

This attitude hardened considerably after the Korean War, which was a great shock to the American public, the State Department, and the Pentagon. Almost everybody believed that it was the start of a great conspiracy on the part of the Soviet Union, which had triggered the first of a series of Communist military aggressions throughout Asia and the Middle East. Russia, it was argued, menaced all the countries on its southern borders: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. This aim of the U.S.S.R. must be counteracted by two moves in American policy:

- (1) The acquisition of deterrent air bases from which Soviet southern part could be bombed if the Soviet Union stepped out of its borders; and
- (2) Building of alliances to gain this aim.

It was also in this atmosphere of conspiracy psychosis that the idea of "Massive Retaliation" was born and neutrality became immoral.

The weak link in the Western chain of military alliances had been the Middle East. Between Turkey and Thailand lay a power vacuum -- oil-rich and populous countries whose governments to a greater or lesser extent had shown a reluctance to become embroiled in the cold war. Viewed in the terms of geopolitics, this area included the bulk of the immensely strategic rim of Eurasia contiguous of the Soviet heartland. "The geographic fact of Pakistan's proximity," wrote Michael Brecher, "to Soviet Central Asia is important. Air bases in Gilgit, northern part of Kashmir, would provide an ideal vantage point for crippling attacks on that vast area of concentrated Soviet industrial power a few hundred miles away across the Himalayas."¹² Pakistan and Turkey

¹²Michael Brecher, "Pakistan Pact - I," The Nation, 23 January 1954, p. 68.

constituted the two pivots upon which a viable Middle East alliance might be possible.

The Korean War affected the United States policy in another way. The war caused the United States a very heavy loss in manpower. Very few things hurt the American public opinion more than American boys dying in far off lands in wars, especially if the motives are not very clear. Eisenhower promised to voters to bring the boys home and to "avoid the kind of bungling that led us into Korea and could lead us into others. The young farm boys stay on their farms; the student must stay in the school.... We do not want Asian to feel that the white man of the West is his enemy. If there must be a war there, let it be Asians against Asians, with our support on the side of freedom."¹³ The idea of "Asians against Asians" drew criticism from all over Asia but the promise of a policy of gaining security through Asian manpower pleased the American public. Pakistan has a long tradition of producing excellent men for the armed forces. Able fighting men of Pakistan who could be recruited to the U.S. standard by giving military aid and entering into defense pacts with Pakistan became not only a national but partisan political issue. Moreover the cost for the upkeep of a Pakistani soldier was only \$485 a month whereas the cost to pay, feed and house a United States soldier was \$3,515.¹⁴ The next most hated thing with the American public, to Americans killed in far off lands in wars, is to waste dollars.

¹³Speech at Champaign, Illinois, 3 October 1952.

¹⁴Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States - I, Case History of a Mistake," The New Republic, 11 August 1959, pp. 15-16.

While talking about America's interest in Pakistan, mention must be made of the shift in American interests from a preoccupation with the Far East to added interest in the Middle East. Oil and the Suez Canal were the two most vitally specific interests of the West in the Middle East. It was Iran's nationalist revolution, under Premier Mohammad Massadegh, which, for the first time, seriously challenged the West's monopolization of Middle Eastern oil by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Backed by the army, the British and the Americans, the Shah was able to depose Massadegh. The shares for fourteen American oil companies, in the consortium that followed, were 40%. This was for the services rendered to the Shah to depose Massadegh. In the postwar years the American companies made great inroads into Middle Eastern oil. By mid-1950 America had 100 per cent of the Sudi Arabian oil, 50 per cent of the Kuwait oil, 25 per cent of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and 40 per cent of the consortium operating in Iran.¹⁵ The Massadegh episode in Iran and the new pattern of control of Persian oil was very significant as far as Pakistan was concerned. America had a political, economic and strategic stake in that part of the world. Pakistan, geographically, was so situated as to be considered important. A military alliance with her could guarantee political stability in these areas and provide military resources to crush any movements to threaten the oil interests. This becomes quite clear when we consider that the pact with Pakistan was being negotiated in late 1953 whereas Massadegh was overthrown in August 1953.

Pakistan's ability to play an important role in any scheme for the

¹⁵William G. Carlton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 82.

defense of the Middle East and the resources of its oil was highlighted by William Barton who, writing in the Foreign Affairs Journal in January 1950, called attention to the cause of erecting a belt of Muslim countries as a barrier against communism and its designs on the Middle East oil.¹⁶

The military in the United States saw the soundness in this strategic scheme but the politicians were slow to be converted to the idea because this was certain to alienate India. There were strong sentiments for a defense alignment with Pakistan in the Pentagon but little enthusiasm in the State Department where, Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, was rather cool. Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, was strongly opposed to any military aid to Pakistan. In December 1951, Henry Byroad became Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asia and African affairs. Pakistan's case won strong support from him. Other strong advocates of military aid to Pakistan included Theodore Tennenwald, deputy to Mutual Security Administrator, Averell Harriman; and Major General George Olmstead, Director of the Office of Military Assistance. Major General Shahid Hamid of the Pakistan Army paid a visit to the United States in March 1952, and got very definite assurances that an aid program would be undertaken. In November 1952, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chief of U.S. Naval Staff, held discussions with the Governor General Ghulam Mohammad of Pakistan and the Army Chief, General Mohammad Ayub Khan. A lot of groundwork for closer military relations with Pakistan was prepared in the closing years of the Truman Administration. The common idea that it all was a brainchild of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is not true.

¹⁶ Sir William Barton, "Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir," Foreign Affairs Vol. XXVIII, 28 January 1950, pp. 299-308.

Dulles, in fact, carried out to its logical conclusion, a policy, which had been started by the previous administration.

The political changes in the United States and in Pakistan in 1953 quickened the pace of negotiations between the two countries. The victory of the Republican Party brought into the White House an outstanding soldier in the person of General Dwight Eisenhower for whom there was a lot of respect in Pakistan from the war days. The most powerful member of his cabinet was a man who had a single-minded commitment to the Collective Security System and the containment of Communism -- John Foster Dulles. The Pakistani leaders and Dulles had profound mutual admiration which they had acquired during the Japanese Peace Treaty in San Francisco in September 1951. "If I may say so without impertinence," said Zafrullah Khan in the United Nations General Assembly in 1953, "I have long admired the lofty views and noble concepts of Mr. Dulles...with which he inspired us in San Francisco two years ago."¹⁷ Secretary Dulles reciprocated these feelings in similar terms. He toured Pakistan along with Henry Byroad in the Spring of 1953 (Dulles arrived in Pakistan on 22 May and left on 24 May 1953), and in his radio broadcast on 1 June 1953 to the American people on his return told of his conviction about the "strong spiritual and martial spirit" of the Pakistanis which could "make them a dependable bulwark against communism." He spoke of his friendship with the leaders and government of Pakistan expressing appreciation of Pakistanis before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

¹⁷GAOR, Sess. 8, Plenary Meetings, p. 44, Quoted from M. S. Venkatramani and Harish C. Arua, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Revolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership," International Studies, (Combay), Vol. 8, No. 1-2, July-Oct. 1966, p. 87.

Pakistan is a country which is very friendly to the United States and we are very friendly to Pakistan. The reason is that we take a common view about very many basic questions....Pakistan is a leading Muslim country. Its people are strong in their faith... which puts great emphasis upon dignity and work of human individuals...and is opposed, just as our faith is, to the view of Soviet Communism...People of Pakistan...have the spirit and physical will to back up that faith...and have always had a splendid military tradition...We have stood together nationally on all major issues and are on the same side when it comes to the United Nations. During Japanese Peace Conference when we needed support we got it from the leadership which Pakistan gave and...which brought a very substantial number of Asian States in support of our position.¹⁸

From his trip to Pakistan Dulles also came back convinced with a Pakistan anchored pact including Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

Earlier a Middle East Defense Organization attempt had failed. The new "Northern Tier" alignment was to replace M.E.D.O.

In October 1951 the Western Powers and Turkey put forward a proposal for an Allied Middle East Command. Egypt rejected it. The proposal for a Middle East Defense Organization a year later also fell off, because of Britain's disputes with Egypt over Suez, and with Iran over nationalization of its oil. The hostility of the Arab nations towards the West for its close collaboration in creation of Israel and latter its support, also went a long way in defeating the idea of the proposed organization. The United States which wanted some defense arrangements in the region started looking for an alternative. Pakistan, which was willing and Turkey, which was already an ally, could provide a substitute for the abortive Middle East Defense Organization. It was hoped that Iran and

¹⁸U.S. Senate, Testimony of Dulles, 83rd Cong. Sess. 1, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings, 12 June 1953, (Wheat for Pakistan), pp. 4-5.

Iraq would also join.

Vice President Richard M. Nixon toured Pakistan in December 1953, when the negotiations for a pact were already underway. On his return to the United States he added his influence and strong voice in favor of aid to Pakistan.

The Turco-Pakistan Pact was announced on 19 February 1954. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali announced three days later that Pakistan had formally requested the United States for assistance under the Mutual Security ACT "for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of the United Nations Charter."¹⁹ It does not look like a coincidence that three days later again, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would respond to Pakistan's request.

India looked at the proposed U.S.-Pakistan alliance with great disfavor. Prime Minister Nehru first commented on developments in his press conference of 15 November 1953 in New Delhi, indicating strong disapproval of any Pakistani military alliance with an outside power. He described the reports of a prospective military pact between the U.S. and Pakistan as "a matter of the most intense concern to us." Such developments would have "very far reaching consequences in the whole structure of things in South Asia and especially in India and Pakistan....It is open to Pakistan to give up its independence by joining a pact, if it so chooses. But we are concerned with the consequences of these actions." Earlier in January 1953, referring to reports that Pakistan

¹⁹New York Times, 23 February 1954.

might join the proposed Middle East Defense Pact, sponsored by the United States and United Kingdom, Nehru declared that such a step would bring the possibility of war "Right up to our doors." He said his views had been conveyed informally to the United States.²⁰ On 3 January 1954 he again declared: "It is a step not only towards war, even world war, but one that will bring the war right up to our door steps."²¹ Pandit Nehru also expressed his fears that American military aid "might possibly be used against India."²²

Nehru's attitude reflected India's strained relations with Pakistan more, than his fascination for a neutralist course for South and South-East Asia. The war, even world war, had reached India's door steps already, if we judge it by Nehru's arguments, when China under the communists emerged as a modernized, an industrialized, a unified and a highly nationally conscious state. For the time being this aroused giant was backed by the Soviet Union. Red China had asserted its sovereignty over Tibet, interfered in Korea and had taken the lead in the Communist movements in Asia. China's sovereignty over Tibet in 1950 joined its borders with India. The United States and China were at war with each other in Korea long before military aid was given to Pakistan. But it was aid to Pakistan only, by Nehru's arguments, which had brought war right up to India's doors.

Nehru's protests against the Pakistan-United States alliance gained lots of weight when on 11 December 1953, China and the U.S.S.R. also

²⁰Ibid., 16 Nov., 1953.

²¹The Statesman (New Delhi), 4 January 1954.

²²The Dawn (Karachi), 24 January 1954.

joined in formal protest to Pakistan, concerning the proposal to accept military assistance. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Pakistan, in order to flatter the United States, rejected the Chinese and the Russian protests in stronger words than was necessary. "It is the duty of the Pakistan government to take every step to safeguard the security of Pakistan," he replied to the Russian protest, "and in discharge of this paramount duty and all other duties that fall upon the government, to adopt and take such measures as may appear appropriate and adequate."²³ He denied that Pakistan was granting military bases to the United States of America.

Mohammad Ali most probably was trying to convey to the United States that Pakistan had the courage to stand up to the Soviet Union. In his effort to achieve this, his undiplomatic over-reaction to the Soviet protest was certainly uncalled for.

India also sought to rally the world opinion to her view-point to block the agreement. Nehru said that he intended to bring up the subject of the United States-Pakistan pact at the next meeting of the Asian prime ministers, proposed by the prime minister of Ceylon on 23 December 1953. "During the last week in December, India circulated a memorandum to friendly governments in the Middle East and the Commonwealth setting forth its objections to American military assistance for Pakistan. There is reason to believe that at the same time Indian diplomats throughout the world were instructed to exert their influence against aid for Pakistan. An attempt to persuade Canada to intercede with the United States was reported and...Indian officials in the United States and the United Nations began to put our urgent private warnings to their friends that

²³ New York Times, 20 December 1953.

military support to Pakistan would cause permanent loss of India's friendship and push her into the Soviet bloc."²⁴ Next, Prime Minister Nehru resorted to the tactics which had proved so successful before 1947 against the British. He ordered his nation-wide Congress party to organize demonstrations in all of India's twenty-eight states against the proposed United States-Pakistan pact. He asked to condemn the pact and not the United States or Pakistan.²⁵ The distinction was too subtle for the unsophisticated masses. The government in Kashmir encouraged anti-American propaganda, ordinance workers at Kaunpur called for a boycott of American imports and the expulsion of all American technical advisers from India, and a big procession in New Delhi held anti-United States demonstrations with "hands off Asia" placards. In an attempt not to alienate America to a point of no return, the Congress leaders explained that they had been forced to initiate the agitation, to prevent the communists in India from seizing initiative in exploiting the issue in the elections, which were due in a year. This could convince American thinking which is generally anti-communistic, but the Congress leaders in India failed to see that the tactics they were using would help the communists more, and they were playing into their hands by creating a hatred for the United States among the masses. Another very dangerous aspect was the hatred that the demonstrations would create towards the Muslims in India. Commenting editorially on 22 December 1953 the New York Times rightly observed: "Indian Congress party and the government that it sustains are playing with fire of the worst sort....Demonstrations

²⁴James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLVIII, September 1954, p. 740.

²⁵New York Times, 17 December 1953.

against a Muslim state (Pakistan) will turn against muslims. Demonstrations against the United States would be insignificant compared to the human targets close at hand." The paper also urged Nehru to see reason because of a reported threat of a "suggested invitation of Soviet military aid to India" because such aid is usually followed by "colonialism far worse than Asia has known." "It is to be hoped," it wrote, "that Nehru will realize this danger and act to abate it before more Asian lands are delivered in communist slavery." (Editorial, 25 December 1953).

Pundit Nehru used the American aid issue to his advantage in India's long outstanding dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir. Negotiations on Kashmir were going on remarkably well when Nehru remarked that the whole context of events would change if American military aid went to Pakistan. President Rajendra Prasad of India stated that American military assistance had "come in the way of pending negotiations on Kashmir" (James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan," The American Political Science Review, September 1954, p. 742) and Nehru announced that: "American military officers serving as United Nations observers in Kashmir could no longer be treated by India as neutrals, in view of the American military aid to Pakistan, which was foreign intervention in Pakistan-Indian Problems."²⁶

Pundit Nehru's warning to break off negotiations on Kashmir was an attempt on his part to arouse the anti-pact feelings among people of Pakistan who usually judged all important policy issues with success in Kashmir as their touchstone. This seemed to be a shrewd move and for a time had the Pakistan government worried. But Nehru failed to understand

²⁶The Dawn (Karachi), 5 March 1954.

the public mind in Pakistan. With each outburst against the United States-Pakistan alliance by Nehru, the common man in Pakistan rallied behind his government. "There must be something good in the proposed alliance for Pakistan, otherwise it wouldn't make India so mad" became the argument with the man in the street. Gunnar Myrdal has rightly observed that: "The Mutual Defense Treaty concluded with the United States in 1954 might well have encountered serious opposition in Pakistan, especially in East Bengal (East Pakistan) if Indian reactions had not been so shrill and hostile."²⁷ Pakistan's foreign minister, Zafrullah Khan answered the Indian contentions regarding Pakistan's military aid pact with the United States. Considering the strict limitations that the aid could not be used for aggression, he argued, it was wrong to say that it would be used against India, and that it had brought the cold war any nearer. India was getting large scale economic assistance from the United States and there was hardly any difference in military aid and economic aid. Referring to Nehru's statement, that military aid was obtained by a country "either for making war or for preparation for war" Zafrullah Khan said that, if this argument were correct, then the mere maintenance of any defense force could be considered as preparation for war and making war. Regarding the United Nations observers from the United States, "who were discharging their duties with absolute impartiality," the foreign minister said that Pundit Nehru was merely "seeking excuses, however flimsy, for not proceeding with the implementation of the international agreement with regard to the settlement of the Kashmir problem."²⁸

²⁷Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. I, (New York: Pantheon, 1968, p. 321).

²⁸K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 63-64.

Nehru's announcement, that if the aid went to Pakistan, the whole context of things would change in Kashmir, was strange logic. Nobody understood why the people of Kashmir should be denied their right of self-determination, which Pakistan and India had pledged in the United Nations, if Pakistan accepted aid from the United States.

The United States decided to go ahead in its proposed pact with Pakistan in spite of strong objections by India. This proved a number of points:

- (1) The "tying-in" of Pakistan with the world-wide scheme of defense was perfectly consistent with the established United States policy of regional groupings to ensure security against aggression.
- (2) The emphasis to achieve this end was on regional alliances rather than the United Nations.
- (3) The fear of Russia was greater than the fear of alienating India.
- (4) The pact with Pakistan indicated an end to United States patience with neutralism as exemplified by prime minister Nehru of India, a neutralism, which had so often embarrassed the United States.
- (5) With less historical reasons than European nations, the United States took over the Middle East defense responsibility.
- (6) America did not believe that the aid would encourage Pakistan, as argued by Indian leaders, in attacking India. With one fifth in population as compared to India, without natural fuel and heavy industry, Pakistan would never

consider going to war with India, her bigger neighbor.

- (7) Last but not the least, the United States showed a greater independence than before in relations to India and dealt a severe blow to her aspirations for leadership of Asia.

The Mutual Security and Assistance Agreement²⁹ was signed between Pakistan and the United States on 19 May 1954. The Agreement aimed at fostering "International peace and security within the framework of the charter of the United Nations" and promoting "individual and collective self-defense" in support of the charter of the United Nations. The government of the United States would make "such military aid available to Pakistan as the government of the United States may authorize." The government of Pakistan could not use the assistance thus given, without the prior permission of the United States, for any other purposes other than those for which it was furnished. The government of Pakistan was obliged to receive the United States government personnel, and to give them facilities to observe, what was done with the aid furnished. Provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 of the United States were to govern the assistance to Pakistan. This meant that the aid provided was to be used for the "internal security" and "legitimate self-defense" of Pakistan. Pakistan had to participate in the defense of the area of which it was a part, and must undertake that it would not commit an act of aggression against any other country.

There was not much in the agreement which was "mutual." The agreement

²⁹Text in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. MMII, No. 2736, (New York: United Nations, 1954-55), p. 301.

imposed too much obligations on Pakistan and very little on the United States, except that it was going to supply aid. The Pakistan government issued a press note the same day as the agreement was signed that the agreement did not establish a military alliance. The press note added that it involved no obligation on the part of Pakistan to provide military bases for the use of the United States forces. This, however, proved false later.

Pakistan became a full-fledged member of a military alliance, when on 8 September 1954, less than four months after the Mutual Security Agreement was signed, it joined six other countries in a pact with the United States. The United States initiated South East Asia Treaty Organization,³⁰ was a much more comprehensive military alliance than the defense-perimeter concept, followed so far. SEATO sought to protect Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific against spread of communism which could take the "form of open aggression, subversion or indirect aggression." Participants in SEATO were the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. The territories of the Asian members were to be protected from communist aggression. Although Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were barred by the Geneva Armistice from entering into such alliance, the United States included these countries with the area to be protected against an "armed attack." Each member recognized that an armed attack in the area designated would threaten its own peace and safety and agreed to act in that event "according to its constitutional processes." In case of subversion, the signatories were to consult what measures were to be

³⁰Text of SEATO in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, pp. 393-6.

taken to meet the emergency. All countries pledged cooperation for economic and technical assistance.

Lord Birdwood writing in defense of South East Asian Treaty Organization stated that it was a fairly comprehensive alliance, "even if the action taken by a state is governed only by the rather nebulous condition that it must be 'in accordance with its own constitutional processes.' The teeth of SEATO may not be very sharp. But at least they are there.... NATO had been established on the foundation of unity and a common heritage over decades. In contrast Asia is a continent of drifting purposes and conflicting interests. The most which could be expected would be a common 'Declaration of intentions'."³¹

Lord Birdwood in retrospect seemed to be right only in one thing, i.e., the SEATO teeth were not very sharp. NATO was established possibly, as he said, on a common heritage, but certainly not "on foundation of unity over decades." One has to cast a glance on NATO members to see how much "drifting purposes and conflicting interest" they had, although Lord Birdwood has blamed only Asia for it. He also forgot that, only three countries in SEATO out of seven, were Asian.

In addition to having a number of other weak points SEATO did not satisfy its signatories at the very outset. The sponsoring power, the United States, in spite of various pressures put on it by other members, was willing to provide only against aggression from communist countries. In SEATO negotiations Pakistan insisted on resisting any kind of "aggression" instead of "communist aggression." It was a mistake, Pakistan

³¹ Lord Birdwood, "The Defense of South East Asia," International Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, January 1955.

insisted, to imply that one kind of aggression was worse than the other or, for that matter, better than the other. The New York Times of 3 September 1954 reported that all delegates, except the United States delegation, desired a pact against aggression in more general terms.

To add insult to injury, the United States made a unilateral declaration, which accompanied the Treaty in the form of an "understanding," that the United States adherence to the pact was directed against communist aggression. In event of other aggression it would consult other members. Unlike NATO partners, the United States did not bind itself to regard automatically any attack on SEATO members as an attack on itself. Pleas by Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines for a NATO-type alliance were politely brushed aside. The irony is that these three were the only Asian countries which were members of SEATO.

The South East Asian Treaty was received in Pakistan without enthusiasm. There was no harsh criticism of the government, but a feeling of disappointment. It was generally felt that Pakistan had committed itself to a pact which, from the point of view of defense against aggression, brought it nothing. Pakistan had pledged to: "lend a hand" as M.A.H. Ispahani wrote, "in resisting communist expansion in South East Asia even though our own sovereignty might be challenged and threatened by a powerful neighbor like India, which had not...reconciled itself to the existence of Pakistan."³²

Pakistan also joined the United States sponsored Baghdad Pact along with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq on 25 February 1955. The United

³² M.A.H. Ispahani, "Pacts and Aid," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 2nd Quarter, 1966, p. 118.

States did not formally join the pact with the thought that it would make her extremely unpopular among the Arab countries, but the meetings of the pact were attended by observers of the United States, and she joined the Baghdad Pact in all but name, establishing military and economic liasons with the pact, and agreeing to share the expenses of the permanent secretariat, in April 1956.

The pact was a brainchild of Dulles who wanted to put his name on a pact which could replace the unsuccessful attempt at Middle East Defense Organization. There was no great advantage gained. Turkey was already in the NATO and Pakistan in the SEATO. A bilateral military agreement had existed between the United States and Iran since 1947. The pact was considered in Arab countries as an instrument of imperialism and status quo and of course the United States was blamed for it. The inclusion of Iraq made it more unpopular because more than any other country she was considered to be a puppet of the West. The Baghdad Pact caused great commotion. President Nasser saw in it a machine to destroy Arab unity, and insert and protect Western imperialist interests in the Middle East. It is very doubtful if anything was gained through the Baghdad Pact and certainly a high price was paid for it.

The Baghdad Pact, which was renamed CENTO or Central Treaty Organization after the 'coup d'etat' in Iraq in July 1958, was more popular in Pakistan because it had Iran and Turkey in it. These were two Muslim states for which Pakistanis had great affection. But disappointment was also shown because the United States did not join it and Britain was considered to be a lame duck for defense purposes. The pact made Pakistan fairly unpopular among the Arab countries and this caused lot of heart burning.

Pakistan was covered by another commitment on the part of the United States by virtue of the Montreal Defense Pact of 1956. The Pakistan-United States Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation,³³ signed in May 1959, was the most important pact, so far, from Pakistan's point of view. To compensate for not joining the Baghdad Pact officially, the United States signed bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. "Desiring to strengthen peace" the governments of Pakistan and the United States "agreed to cooperate for their security and defense" in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter and affirmed their determination to "maintain their collective security" and to "resist aggression direct or indirect." The government of the United States regarded as "vital to its national interests" and to the world peace the "preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan." The government of Pakistan reaffirmed its determination to resist aggression, and "in case of aggression against Pakistan" the government of the United States of America, in accordance with the constitution of the United States, undertook to take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon. The government of the United States reaffirmed its determination to furnish the government of Pakistan such military and economic assistance, as mutually agreed for the independence, integrity and the effective promotion of its economic development. Unlike its obligations to the NATO allies, the United States did not bind itself to regard any attack on Pakistan as an attack on itself. For the first time in the Bilateral Agreement of cooperation, the word 'aggression'

³³For text see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 10, Part 1, (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1959), pp. 317-319.

instead of 'communist aggression' was used. The United States did not commit itself still as much as to the NATO, by promising "appropriate action," but it was much more satisfactory from Pakistan's point of view.

Thus, by entering into a series of military agreements Pakistan completely aligned itself with the United States. Pakistan, it was often said, became "United States' most allied ally in Asia." The motive of the United States was to counter the spread of communism, and occupying a key position, Pakistan became the eastern anchor of the Baghdad Pact and the western anchor of SEATO."³⁴ While genuine fear of Russia existed there is no doubt that Pakistan accepted the aid to strengthen itself not so much against Russia and China as against India. The Pakistani leaders never made any secret of their intentions. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali consistently talked about the "defense of Pakistan" not mentioning Russia at all. Prime Minister Suhrawardy openly stated in February 1957 in the National Assembly of Pakistan that Pakistan had entered the alliances in order to counter the threat from India and claimed that they have succeeded in that aim. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister from 1963-1966, said in the National Assembly that "the motive force in her (Pakistan's) foreign alliances was to counteract India's assiduous and planned tactics to isolate Pakistan in order to finally strangle her."³⁵ The policy of the Pakistan government was closer to the desires of its own people. It can safely be assumed, in spite of criticism in some quarters, that the pacts were backed by a great majority of Pakistanis. A newspaper like The Pakistan Times which had definite

³⁴Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States Policy, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 30.

³⁵The Times, (London), 28 November 1962.

leftist leanings supported the pacts and so did The Dawn. There was criticism in Pakistan of the military alliances because the approval of the Constituent Assembly was never gained. Strictly speaking this criticism was of the constitutional process rather than of the alliances. It was in 1956 that the National Assembly of Pakistan held its first ever debate on the country's foreign policy. When a voice vote was taken in the National Assembly of Pakistan about Pakistan's alignment with the West in foreign policy debate in February 1956, only one member shouted in the negative. It can also be assumed with equal certainty that the United States government decided to go ahead with the alliance in spite, of the knowledge that Pakistan's principal aim was to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India.

Few Americans opposed the idea of giving military aid to Pakistan. Such a move, after all, was consistent with the overall objectives of the American policy. The New York Times fervently advocated aid to Pakistan:

There are many factors that make a closer association with Pakistan desirable from our point of view. First of all the young nation is developing rapidly along the sturdy democratic lines that we admire. It is solving its constitutional problems with genuine zeal...economic and social progress is also made a rapid rate. Moreover, Pakistan has an important military potential. It is the most populous of the Muslim states and has a long and 'honorable' martial tradition...We and the Pakistanis would be associating ourselves in the common cause of freedom's defense and the defense might well be as vital to India, in the long run, as to Pakistan.³⁶

Again it wrote on 2 January 1954 that "It has been the contention of this newspaper that military aid to Pakistan would be a good policy," and

³⁶The New York Times, (Editorial), 5 November 1953.

"military aid to Pakistan could mean the beginning of...a new and more direct and vigorous approach to all the problems of the Indian subcontinent and of Southeastern Asia." (20 December 1953) Many other newspapers supported it while others took the view that though the course might not be ideal, it was the best and most practical under the circumstances.

The years 1953 to 1957 were the zenith of Pakistan-United States relations. These were the years when the cold war was at its hottest point; there was a genuine fear in America of a surprise attack by Russia on the United States; America's adherence to the defense pacts was at its height; and American leaders were convinced that Soviet Russia was deterred from launching an attack on the United States only by the fear of massive retaliation from the American bases around the world. To most Americans, rightly or wrongly, the issue was the struggle between the forces of good and evil and of national survival. No wonder that countries like Pakistan, which were prepared to stand up to communist designs and were ready to be counted as friends of the United States, were appreciated. Pakistan went out of the way to show its loyalty and was more loyal than the United States itself in expressing sentiments against communism. Its representatives in the United Nations and in the meetings of the SEATO and CENTO made speeches and moved resolutions which could have done credit to John Foster Dulles. Pakistan's prime minister declared international communism as a danger to South and Southeast Asia in the meeting of the Colombo powers in 1954 and praised the United States in the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung: "The United States desires only peace and its efforts should be appreciated: it is

activated by a great good."³⁷ In early 1956 the U.S.S.R. made some overtures to Pakistan. Premier Bulganin hinted that Russia would extend economic aid if Pakistan broke ties with the West and stated that relations between the two countries "should be based on mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and other principles."³⁸ Deputy Premier Molotov said that the Soviet Union hoped for good relations with Pakistan,³⁹ and Deputy Premier Mikoyan declared that Bulganin and Khrushchev were ready to visit Pakistan if they were invited.⁴⁰ The answer Pakistan's representative in SEATO conference on 6 March 1956 in Karachi gave to these Soviet overtures was reported in the New York Times the next day:

The hardest attack of all the members of SEATO against the Soviet Union came from M.S.A. Baig, permanent Under Secretary in the Pakistan Foreign office. Baig said that Moscow was trying to destroy Pakistan as a center of resistance to Communism in the area. Soviet Union was playing power politics in Kashmir and is supporting Afghanistan's claims against Pakistan territory. He urged SEATO members to stand firmly and publicly behind Pakistan in her disputes with Afghanistan and India.

Suhrawardy as prime minister of Pakistan, during the military phase of the Suez crisis, convinced the West by his official actions that Pakistan was a friend who could be depended upon. The sentiments of the people of Pakistan were entirely in support of Egypt, a fellow Muslim country. There was a widespread demand to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact but Suhrawardy kept a cool detachment and once even blamed Egypt for the

³⁷Quoted in Arif Hussain, p. 97.

³⁸New York Times, 7 February 1956.

³⁹Ibid., 21 February 1956.

⁴⁰Ibid., 25 March 1956.

crisis. "The Arab world is divided among themselves," he said before students' meetings in December 1956, "and even if they were united, zero plus zero is after all equal to zero."⁴¹ Again he stated that "Pakistan would not desert her friends, i.e., the United Kingdom nor Egypt, at the time of their need."⁴² It took a long time for Pakistan to undo the bad blood he created among the Arab states for Pakistan.

The attitude of the United States during the Suez crisis won great prestige for her among the masses of Pakistan and her stock was high. The United States had come out boldly against her allies, Britain and France, and what was considered to be her 'protege,' Israel, in support of a Muslim country. Although Bulganin's threat to use rockets against London and Paris won great publicity and was considered one of the major causes for stopping the war, yet the United States stood before the masses in Pakistan as the impartial champion of peace.

The year 1956 ended with Pakistan and the United States at the pinnacle of friendly relations. Disillusionment was to come soon.

⁴¹Quoted in Arif Hussain, p. 144.

⁴²Pakistan News, 15 December 1956.

CHAPTER III

EISENHOWER: LATER YEARS

The Second term of President Eisenhower, or the years 1957 to 1961, reflect an era of continued friendship between Pakistan and the United States. This friendship, however, did not have the unflinching support of the people of Pakistan as in the previous years. It can easily be stated without fear of contradiction that the governments in Pakistan, one after the other, supported the continued Pakistan-United States friendship, whereas, the masses gradually lost confidence in the utility of the defensive pacts. There was a general disillusionment and frustration directed against the commitments which Pakistan had undertaken without any surety of defense against aggression from India; restrictions put on freedom of action in international affairs; lack of total support on Kashmir from the United States; unpopularity gained in the Afro-Asian bloc because of the policy of alignment; involvement in the cold war; and alienating China and the U.S.S.R. There was no doubt that Pakistan gained advantages in getting military and economic assistance because of being in the Pacts, but the neutral countries which had not committed themselves to carry any burden of defensive responsibilities were also getting the same assistance. In many cases this assistance to the uncommitted nations was more than the committed ones. India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, three torch-bearers of neutralism during the nineteen fifties, were among the highest recipients of American aid in their respective continents. America's military allies were definitely incensed that

neutral countries got more American aid than they did. It was a sore point with the allied Pakistanis that neutralist India got more than twice as much economic aid. The explanation given that, "India received larger economic aid because next to China it was the most populous of the under-developed countries and was a testing ground of democracy's ability to compete with totalitarian systems in industrializing large underdeveloped societies in a short time,"¹ was not very convincing to the people of Pakistan. Before October 1958 Pakistan too was a democracy and Pakistanis felt that their country was being prepared militarily against China and Russia, whereas, India was being made a testing ground for economic development. Things were not made easy by the fact that India was getting economic aid in spite of being China's great friend. Other arguments for aid to India that, it was only economic aid, and that Pakistan was getting more aid per capita, were also not satisfying. Pakistanis believed that ultimately there was no great difference between the economic and military aid because economic aid released more money for military expenditure. Moreover, the problem was emotional and the United States tried to deal with it intellectually on a non-emotional level.

The Pakistanis were inclined to think that the disadvantages of alignment with the United States had outweighed the advantages. It was felt generally that Pakistan could have gained everything it had gotten through alignment, without getting involved and having the responsibilities. The obvious question was: "Why should a country take on the risks of a military alliance with the United States while other countries which

¹William G. Carleton, p. 305.

did not assume these risks get better treatment than America's allies?"

There had never been a popular opinion in Pakistan on the subject of entering into military alliances. The National Assembly of Pakistan discussed the issue and put it to vote for the first time in February 1957. The secrecy attached to the alliances made them targets of suspicion. Prime Minister Suhrawardy observed that "the decision to enter into military alliances was the business of a few ministers sheltered by secrecy. The result has been a set of commitments in the legal sense, yet not sufficiently felt as commitments in the consciousness of the people themselves...The very secrecy with which our engagements have been entered into, the lack of thorough public airing in debate, has left them vulnerable to suspicion that they have somehow rendered us subservient and have drained our autonomy."² The way Pakistan leaders towed the United States line between 1953 and 1956 and even up to 1960, confirmed that suspicion very much. The political leaders in Pakistan, naturally, faced the problem of justifying constantly the policy of alignment in terms that Pakistanis could understand and accept.

Ghulam Mohammad stepped aside in 1955 and Iskander Mirza became the new Governor General of Pakistan. Mirza was known for his views on friendship with Britain and the United States and was, from the very beginning, greatly instrumental in convincing the political leaders of Pakistan for a policy of alignment with the West. As a bureaucrat, he also was known for his often openly expressed views in contempt of the politicians and for the democratic institutions which were instrumental

²H. S. Suhrawardy, "Political Stability and Democracy in Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, April 1957, p. 431.

in bringing those politicians to the forefront. Democracy and the democratic institutions were gradually buried fathoms deep by him. From 1955 to 1958, he appointed prime ministers who towed his line obediently and finally in 1958 put the country under a martial law and a dictatorship. He was himself turned out of office by Mohammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Pakistan and the martial law administrator. Ayub later on assumed the office of the President of Pakistan.

The foreign policy of Pakistan under Iskander Mirza became so much pro-United States that it looked like a policy of complete surrender to the dictates of the United States. The people of Pakistan who got their independence after two hundred years of British rule were not ready to follow, what looked like the dictates of any foreign power. The feeling of being led by the nose made the alliance between Pakistan and the United States unpopular among the masses.

Iskander Mirza during his term of office changed four prime ministers one after the other. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali was appointed in August 1955, Suhrawardy in September 1956, Chundrigar, who had little more credentials to become Pakistan's prime minister than being Mirza's bridge partner, in October 1956 for a mere 59 days, and then Feroz Khan Noon. All of them followed Mirza's orders humbly and obediently. The first two with great fervor, the others with a bit of reserve. Possibly by late 1957 and early 1958, even the official circles in Pakistan were having second thoughts about the alliances with the United States.

The official position of Chaudhri Mohammad Ali's ministry can well be understood by the utterances of Major S. M. Hassan, a mere deputy secretary in the ministry of foreign affairs, who was allowed to speak for the whole government. Major Hassan remarked that Pakistan was "the

only country on which the United States may rely." Pakistan, he said, was United States "closest friend" in the Middle East and South East Asia. In spite of the fact that Pakistan was allied to the West through the Manila Treaty, the British sponsored Baghdad Pact and the Turkish-Pakistani defense pact, the Soviets also would like to have friendlier relations with Pakistan. "But," Major Hassan said, "Pakistan feels it should be with the United States."³ Coming a few days before the SEATO Conference, which was to be held in Karachi in March 1956, his utterances were naturally interpreted as an official indication that Pakistan was prepared to play a key role in the SEATO structure. On the same day Mohammad Ali, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, speaking in the Yale Club of New York, declared: "The only reason the world has peace is that the Western Powers enjoy a definite superiority in arms." He criticized the nations that "profess to be neutral," because it was "immoral and wrong to sit on the fence" and by blackmailing tactics "get something from both sides."⁴ Pakistani statesmen and spokesmen, it seemed, even no longer were using their own words.

None of the prime ministers of Pakistan was more pro-West during his term of office than Suhrawardy, who proved his loyalty at the time of the Suez crisis in no ordinary terms. Suhrawardy toured the United States in July 1957. The New York Times editorialized on 10 July 1957, i.e., the day Suhrawardy started his visit:

Pakistan's prime minister...is warmly welcome as a good friend and a staunch ally...Within the past few weeks he has won a smashing vote of confidence within his own

³New York Times, 22 January 1956.

⁴Ibid.

party against an internal opposition that was critical of the steps previously taken in Karachi. Actually, Mr. Suhrawardy's strong endorsement of the attachment of Pakistan to Baghdad Pact, and the defense commitments to the United States, was the real issue...He declared that Pakistan would abide by its pledged words and those words were a bond. He carried this to the camp of his opponents and defeated them.

Suhrawardy, speaking separately before the House of Representatives and the Senate, declared that "Peace is safe" in American hands. Praising the "moral integrity" of the United States, without which the world might have been shaken during the period when the United States alone possessed the atomic bomb, he said: "You showed to the world that peace was safe in your hands." He also praised the "great new philosophy" of the United States aid, which was accomplishing much in opposing the new "colonialism of communism." Vice President Richard Nixon observed to the Senate before Suhrawardy's speech that : "The United States has no closer friend or ally than the country represented by our visitor today."⁵

There was very little fanfare and attention paid to Suhrawardy's visit in the United States. The New York Times noted this and tried to make some amends when it wrote editorially on 14 July 1957, that visits between friends need no fanfare or pomp and show. Again the paper wrote when Suhrawardy left:

He was here as the representative of one of our good friends and staunch allies in a critical area at a critical time. Pakistan is a member of the South East Asia Treaty Organization and likewise a member of the Baghdad Pact. It is, in a sense, a bridge between Far East and the Middle East. It is a strong anti-communist bastion and we and the Pakistanis are jointly determined to keep it so. This was the focal point in the several addresses that Mr. Suhrawardy

⁵New York Times, 12 July 1957.

made in this country, and he spoke boldly and without reservations. The cause of democracy and freedom is going forward through joint effort, and Pakistan's prime minister is one of its symbols.⁶

Suhrawardy, "one of Asia's shrewdest leaders and a dependable friend of the West," prime minister of "closest friends and staunch allies," representative of the "anti-communist bastion," liked to have some stiffening of the United States support for a plebiscite in Kashmir. He was under very strong pressure from his party and the people of Pakistan because Russia had completely come out openly against Pakistan since its membership in SEATO and CENTO. The public opinion in Pakistan naturally expected complete support from the United States. After all it was because of the alliances with the United States that Russia had changed its position on Kashmir from indifference to complete support of India's position. Figuring, that such support as asked by Pakistan, would raise anti-American feelings in India, the United States was not willing to offer it to Pakistan. The joint communique issued during Suhrawardy's visit "indicated no change in the United States policy which was essentially to keep hands off the dispute and accept the United Nations lead. President Eisenhower expressed the hope that such regional disputes may be solved speedily, equitably and permanently in accordance with the principles of the United Nations."⁷

There was a growing feeling in Pakistan that the United States was taking Pakistan too much for granted; that the United States was not ready to alienate neutral India by giving support to ally Pakistan

⁶ Ibid., (Editorial), 28 July 1957.

⁷ Ibid., 14 July 1957.

regarding Kashmir and the pacts were more harmful than they were helpful. Prime Minister Suhrawardy speaking in London on his way home said that his visit to the United States had succeeded in "cementing friendship" between the two countries, which diplomatically means that it achieved nothing.

In a fit of exuberance or overconfidence Suhrawardy, on another occasion, declared that if Pakistan were attacked by any power, implying India too, it would appeal to its SEATO and Baghdad Pact partners to come to its aid. London and Washington quickly refuted any such commitment. The unfavorable attitude of the two major powers confirmed that they did not want Suhrawardy's statement to go unchallenged and alienate India, to whom the West had always told that the pacts were against Communism and the military aid would never be used against her. "At that moment," according to M. A. H. Ispahani, Pakistan's first ambassador to the United States and one of the most bitter and outspoken critics of the policy of alignment, "it dawned upon some wise men and all fools that the much advertised and talked about pacts were not instruments of assistance to us in case of a threat to or an attack upon our sovereignty, but were, in fact, totally worthless to us. But what was the reaction of our government leaders at that time? Complete and abject silence. They had received the hob-nailed boot squarely in their mouths without even a groan."⁸

It should go without saying that Ispahani's writings represent the bitterness and frustration towards which Pakistanis were gradually moving

⁸M. A. H. Ispahani, "Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1947-1964," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XVII, No. 3, third quarter 1964, p. 242.

after experiencing the agony of unfulfilled hopes.

Another reason, why Pakistanis were having second thoughts about their alignment with the United States, was the absolute hostility it brought on Pakistan from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union made a friendly gesture in inviting the first prime minister of Pakistan even before the United States did. It seemed that the Soviet Union was anxious to befriend Pakistan which was its immediate neighbor. The Soviet leaders must have felt irritated because Liaquat did not go to Moscow. He went to the United States in spite of the fact that the invitation from that country was received later than Russia's. In the United Nations, the Soviet Union usually followed a policy of indifference and calculated detachment regarding Kashmir, by abstaining from voting on the issue. Russian stand underwent a complete change after Pakistan joined the military alliances with the United States. The Soviet leaders made no secret of the fact that they were against Pakistan because it had joined the Baghdad Pact which, according to the Soviet Union, was an aggressive pact designed against Russia. Khrushchev, while touring India in 1955, condemned Pakistan for joining the pact and said that:

If relations were bad between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Pakistan, it is entirely Pakistan's fault. Baghdad Pact is directed against the Soviet Union and the construction of military bases in Pakistan and on the borders of our country is frankly worrying us. We shall never support the participants of the notorious Baghdad Pact. We do not like it. But we have patience and we are confident that it will burst like a soap bubble, leaving behind some unpleasant memories.⁹

In spite of Pakistan's protests that Bulganin and Khrushchev should not visit Kashmir, which was a disputed area between India and Pakistan, the

⁹New York Times, 11 December 1955.

Soviet leaders went to Kashmir. They went a step further. Khrushchev declared in Kashmir that the people of Kashmir should decide the future of the state, and "they had already decided to join the Indian Union." He was referring to the decision taken by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly in 1953. This decision was accepted neither by Pakistan nor the United Nations. Khrushchev even went so far as to denounce the very existence of Pakistan by criticizing the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, "which was because of a third state in pursuance of its policy of divide and rule." In Kashmir Khrushchev also disclosed that Pakistan had asked him and Premier Bulganin, through the Soviet ambassador in Pakistan, not to visit Kashmir or Afghanistan, which they were going to visit later. He said it was an unfriendly act and stated that Pakistan appeared to be taking upon herself "too much responsibility." He called it "an unprecedented interference on Pakistan's part" in another country's affairs. "No other power in the past" he said, "dared to tell us what we should do and whom to choose as our friends."¹⁰

Pakistan was probably right in asking Khrushchev and Bulganin not to visit Kashmir. The case was before the United Nations Security Council and the Soviet Union, a permanent member of the Security Council, seemed to be taking sides. But Pakistan definitely appeared to be taking upon herself "too much responsibility" when it asked the Soviet leaders not to visit Afghanistan. True, Afghanistan had disputes with Pakistan but still it is a sovereign country. In the first instance Pakistan protested against the visit to a disputed territory and not a visit to India. In the second it protested against the visit to a sovereign

¹⁰ibid., 15 December 1955.

country and not any disputed territory. The semi-official correspondent of the Bakhtar News Agency of Afghanistan commented: "It is certainly ridiculous in the extreme for Pakistan's foreign minister to consider objectionable, visits paid by the national leaders to one another's countries and brazenly consider himself competent to object officially."¹¹

Pakistan's fears, however, came true when Bulganin, the Soviet Premier, during his visit hailed good relations with Afghanistan along with the Afghan neutrality and "to further punish Pakistan, extended support to Afghanistan on its irredentist claim on Pakistan's territory."¹² That was not enough. In January 1957, after a lapse of five years, the Security Council once again discussed the Kashmir question. On 24 January the council adopted a draft resolution with ten votes in favor and one abstention (USSR) reaffirming that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be made in accordance with the will of the people, expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It declared that any action taken by the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with that principle. Another draft resolution on 14 February 1957 by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States noted, that Pakistan's proposal for a temporary United Nations force for demilitarization in Kashmir deserved consideration. The Soviet Union objected to this. Arkady Sobolev, the Soviet representative, declared that his government considered that "the Kashmir question had in actual fact already been

¹¹Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan and the Alliances, (Lahore: New Kamran Printers, 1969), p. 55.

settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves, who consider their territory an integral part of the Republic of India. The introduction of a United Nations force into Kashmir would be completely at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and would be an outright insult to the national sentiments of the people of Kashmir."¹² The Soviet Union vetoed the Four-Power resolution when it came for voting.

It was quite evident to the people in Pakistan that the Soviet Union extended its support to Afghanistan and India because of Pakistan's alignment with the military Pacts. Taking CENTO to be an affront to its security, the Soviet Union punished Pakistan by declaring Kashmir as an integral part of India, and with its veto in the Security Council. Taking advantage of Soviet Union's hostility of the Western alliances, India developed relationship with her, which were of great value to India and detrimental to Pakistan. Close cooperation developed between the Soviet Union and India in the United Nations and international affairs, generally to elevate India to the leadership of the non-aligned nations. This cooperation extended to economic and military help. The Soviet Union, it was generally felt in Pakistan, ignored Pakistan, its more proximate neighbor, only after Pakistan became a member of CENTO.

The complete and outright support which the Russians gave to India, whether it was conscious or not, was a shrewd move. It created lots of uneasiness in Pakistan-United States friendship. The Pakistanis expected the United States to come out openly for their case on Kashmir as the Soviet Union had done for India. This was not forthcoming. The United States' economic aid at least, the Pakistanis thought, should be used to

¹²Security Council's Official Records, 12th year, 770th meeting, 18 February 1957, pp. 38-39.

press India for a settlement of the Kashmir problem. The United States, on the other hand, the Pakistanis thought, was continually strengthening India's military potential because American economic aid enabled India to divert its own resources to military purposes. Thus, according to Pakistan's point of view, the United States was indirectly helping India to assume an aggressive posture towards Pakistan and keep Kashmir in its possession. The American policy of, "hands off the dispute on Kashmir," and the "hope that such regional disputes should be solved in accordance with the principles of the United Nations," did not mean much to the Pakistanis. Pakistanis lamented that the United States, in spite of the military alliances, was not pressing India to solve its disputes with Pakistan, whereas Russia was backing India completely.

Russia was not the only country which Pakistan antagonized by joining the alliances. The alliances caused resentment in every non-aligned neighbour of Pakistan. Burma, anxious to retain neutrality, was disturbed over Pakistan's association in SEATO. Afghanistan capitalized on Pakistan's commitments to further its interest both with the communist states and non-aligned nations. She was also getting aid from the United States. Indonesia, one of the leaders of the non-aligned nations, demonstrated its disapproval of Pakistan's policy by fraternizing with India. Led by Gamal Nasser, the Arab states of the Middle East took Pakistan's membership of CENTO to be a threat to the security of the Arab countries. SEATO was primarily directed against China. It was difficult for Pakistan, naturally, to cultivate friendship with a country threatened by that alliance. This meant, that with the solitary exception of Iran, the relations of Pakistan with all its neighbors were bad. This was because of Pakistan's membership of CENTO and SEATO. Never, it seemed,

had Pakistan stood so alone. The country's initiative in world affairs, and along with it a large measure of its freedom of action, was gone.

Enough frustration and anger had been caused by 1958 is evident from Feroz Khan Noon's speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan, during debate on Kashmir, on 8 March 1958. Noon, a man rarely given to emotions, having a life-long devotion to the West and pro-West feelings, warned that "Pakistan will revise its policy towards the West" unless it aided in settlement of Kashmir dispute. He denounced the West for failing to stand by Pakistan in its disputes with India. "The time was coming," he said, "when Pakistan might have to revise her policy towards the West." Despite the United States aid to Pakistan, India then had four or five times the armed strength of Pakistan. "If Pakistan feels her independence in jeopardy," he told the cheering Assembly, "we will break all pacts in the world and shake hands with those whom we have made enemies for the sake of others." Stressing, that the more people in Asia were oppressed the more they would go communist, he said, that if India kept Kashmir under oppression, the people would go communist. It was wrong to think that a Muslim could not become a communist. "If Muslims were given the choice between living under Hindu domination or communist, they would prefer communists."¹³

On the face of it, the prime minister seemed carried away by emotions, but his out-burst clearly showed that anti-Westernism had become politically attractive in Pakistan. The New York Times of 9 March 1958 also reported that Pakistanis were distressed at the alienation from the Middle East Nationalism. They were distressed because not only they were termed

¹³ New York Times, 9 March 1958.

as the lackeys of the West, but appeared so.

Earlier, bitterness was caused by dispatches from Karachi under the byline of C. L. Sulzburger in the New York Times in February 1957. Although Sulzburger stressed Pakistan's geographical role across Asia blocking potential Soviet expansion, he dismissed Pakistan as an absurdity in having two wings which have nothing in common except religion and fear of India. Sulzburger felt that Pakistan was shaky economically, politically and socially. Writing about East Pakistan he said that it is "a green delta of highly un-military people, moonsoons, jute plantations and burlap mills, where the diet is fish and rice, and the language is Bengali. Its inhabitants are decendants of low-caste Hindus converted to Islam." Sulzburger seemed to have poor knowledge and grasp of things. The so-called absurdity has ethnic and historical validity. No province gave more in blood and sacrifices as well as intellect, for India and Pakistan's eventual freedom, than Bengal. Bengals role in the fight against the British in 1857, its vital role in the merchant marines in the World War II, and Subash Chandra Bose's leadership in the Indian National Army should be enough contradiction of the ideas people like Sulzberger have about Bengal's non-military traditions. Sulzberger, moreover, did not understand Islam. There is no denying that casteless Islam made converts in low-caste Hindus, but he should know Islam spoke and speaks to all--not just the low caste.

The views of one writer, however eminent, did not constitute sufficient reason to jeopardize friendship between two friendly countries but such writings and ideas, one by one, contributed towards creating bad blood. Sulzburger's report was definitely not liked by the friends of the United States in Pakistan.

Hundreds of Americans sent to Pakistan to help early projects and their technicians tended to live like many of the characters in The Ugly American, isolated and aloof from the people. What was needed were specialists plus "persons who were thoroughly at home in their specialities but who also had a sense of social diversity and popular feelings, were able to appreciate the histories, cultures and aspirations of the people with whom they worked, were friendly, earthly, practical, inventive, spontaneous, and willing to share the hardships of the country."¹⁴ The American specialist though competent, often looked otherwise. The Americans in Pakistan also had a passion for peddling second hand goods. They freely indulged in the lucrative but politically dangerous practice of selling household goods at exorbitant prices to Pakistanis. The import restrictions prevented Pakistanis from getting those things any other way. They were ready to pay because of the strict ban on Western goods which were considered luxuries. The United States officials all over the country and especially in Karachi, winding up their tour of duty, had been able to realize thousands of dollars by selling their goods, which were brought in duty free with transport paid by the United States government. The things included everything from used rock 'n' roll records, to freezers and automobiles. Besides flouting the laws of Pakistan, the practice was regarded cheap and undignified and presented Americans as money-grubbers. The whole custom contributed to a deep cynicism about officials. Pakistanis did not think high of their bureaucracy. The Americans did not look to be much better. These were the days when anti-West and anti-American sentiments were growing. Peddling of second hand goods

¹⁴William C. Carleton, p. 306.

by Americans not only embarrassed the Pakistan government but it also fanned the anti-American feelings in Pakistan.

The American Embassy, realizing the gravity of the situation, banned the practice on 4 April 1958, but lots of damage had already been done.

Such was the condition of the Pakistan-United States relations when martial law was imposed in October 1958 and Mohammed Ayub Khan emerged as the country's strong man. Naturally new forces played their part in the subsequent happenings.

Ayub's administration followed the familiar pattern of all new administrations in Pakistan by drawing closer to the West in general and the United States in particular. Even since January 1951, when he took over as the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Ayub had been very close to the political situation of the country. Some of the politicians relied very heavily on him and he influenced their way of thinking in internal as well as external policies. It would be too much to say that Ayub Khan was the author of the policy of alignment with the United States, but he was certainly one of the strong voices which influenced the government of Pakistan.

Ayub's administration started with a pledge to adhere to the military commitments Pakistan had with the United States. In fact Ayub's regime in some ways was even more pro-West than the previous ones. Only four months after Ayub's coming to power, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of Buddhist theocracy in Tibet, fled to India, when China tightened its sovereignty over Tibet. Instigated by the United States and Britain, Malaya and Ireland introduced a resolution at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, to discuss Tibet. The resolution was adopted on 21 October 1959. The votes cast were 45 for, 9 against, 26

abstentions and 2 absent. Pakistan supported the resolution with a strong speech. India the concerned country opposed it and did not take part in the voting. Here was Pakistan taking too much upon herself again.

Ayub also belonged to the school of thought which believed in "push of the north" in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. China's domination over Tibet worried him. One month after the Dalai Lama with his band of courtiers and disciples reached India, Ayub made an offer of joint defense to India, on 24 April 1959. In case of external aggression, he thought, both India and Pakistan should come together to defend the sub-continent. For a long time bad relations between Pakistan and India had been embarrassing to the United States and limited its freedom of action. The United States always liked to see close collaboration between India and Pakistan. President Eisenhower immediately welcomed Ayub's proposal but Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 4 May 1959: "We do not propose to have a military alliance with any country, come what may. I am all for settling our troubles with Pakistan and living normal, friendly and neighbourly lives -- but we do not want to have a common defense policy which is almost some kind of a military alliance -- I do not understand against whom people talk about common defense policies?"

Pundit Nehru's declaration of "joint defense against whom" put Ayub on the defensive. Writing in his autobiography afterwards he explained in 1967:

A few days later I clarified my position, explaining that it did not mean any special type of pact about which India needed to be perturbed. What I had in mind was a general understanding for peace between the two countries. I emphasized that the prerequisite for such an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir and the Canal waters. Once these were

resolved, the armies of the two countries could disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers. This would give us the substance of joint defense; that is, freedom from fear of each other and freedom to protect our respective frontiers."¹⁵

It was quite clear even in 1967 that his explanation of what he called "the substance of a joint defense" was very poor. Moreover it was quite evident that still the "respective vulnerable frontiers," he was talking about, were the frontiers with Russia and China. Pundit Nehru, however, by rejecting his proposal allowed him to get out of a very tricky situation. Ayub would have been more embarrassed if Nehru had accepted it, because the Pakistanis, as a nation would never have accepted a joint defense with India. There was some criticism of the United States too among the masses because it was generally felt that some "hidden hand" made Ayub make that offer.

The same pro-West and anti-Chinese and Russian tone continued during President Eisenhower's visit to Pakistan in December 1959. Ayub when asked by newsmen if he had briefed Ike on the question of Soviet threat in Afghanistan and Chinese threat in Kashmir, replied that he had, and President Eisenhower realizes the gravity of the threat. James C. Hagerty, White House Press Secretary, also stressed in his communique that "the United States and Pakistan were military allies and there was not one iota of difference between them on the question of Chinese communist aggression."¹⁶

Writing in the Foreign Affairs Journal of July 1960, Ayub, as a

¹⁵Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, (London: Oxford, 1967), pp. 126-127.

¹⁶New York Times, 9 December 1959.

"student of war and strategy," again warned against the "inexorable push of the North." He advised that the only chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past - which was that whenever the sub-continent was divided some outsider stepped in - was disengagement between India and Pakistan and squabbling with each other. During the trouble in Laos in 1960, Ayub nonchalantly announced that if the United States envisioned a role for SEATO in the conflict, Pakistan would send a military contingent. When China's admission was considered in the Credentials Committee of the United Nation's General Assembly of 1960, Pakistan supported China's admission, but under pressure from the United States, changed its position again when the matter was raised in the Plenary Session.

There is no denying the fact that the policies of the Ayub Regime from 1958 to 1960 were completely pro-United States. Certain facts were, however, causing doubts and making Pakistanis think twice.

In July 1958, a coup d' etat in Iraq under Kassim removed the Hashimite dynasty, which was considered a British puppet in the Middle East. Kassim immediately withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which was denounced by the Arab states as a western plot to undermine Arab nationalism as well as neutralism. With Iraq's withdrawal the only Arab country, which was a member of the Baghdad Pact, was removed. The Baghdad Pact, after Iraq's withdrawal was renamed Central Treaty Organization popularly known as CENTO. Thus the Baghdad Pact lost its name and gradually its meaning too. Step by step it moved towards socio-economic cooperation and understanding, and lost its military character. Only a shadow of its defensive wall against communism remained.

Membership of the Baghdad Pact had caused lots of hatred for Pakistan

in the Arab countries. Arabs' attacks gradually ceased after Iraq withdrew. On the other hand the revolution in Iraq considerably undermined the military pacts. It became clear to Pakistanis that in the time of attack it would be very difficult for Western powers to interfere. At the same time it became clear to the Western powers that it would be very difficult on the part of Pakistan or any other nation to interfere in case of an internal revolution. It seemed the whole idea of a military pact in defense of the Middle East crumbled in the face of the revolution in Iraq. Khrushchev, it seemed, was right when he had predicted that the Baghdad Pact would burst like a soap bubble, leaving behind some unpleasant memories.

Spectacular advances were being made during these years in military technology. Of these, the development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, was very significant. With its development the United States had the ability to fire a missile from its own soil in case of a threatened attack or if a vital interest was threatened. This had the virtue of reducing dependence on allies who, on account of the American military bases in their territory, tended to compromise the United States' freedom of action in the service of its interests in international relations. As the importance of military allies lessened the neutral nations gradually started becoming more important. The United States started shifting towards a new policy of 'Containment' of Communism through a ring of economically strengthened, free, and neutral nations, supported by United States' military might against communist encroachment. The emphasis began shifting from military support to economic support. Pakistan, naturally, looked at these new developments or rather, 'winds of change,' with apprehension.

A military regime took over the political power in Pakistan under General Mohammad Ayub Khan, who also declared himself President of Pakistan soon after. This was a signal for American intellectual circles, who had never supported the American policy of befriending Pakistan at the expense of alienating India, to criticize Pakistan more and more. A natural ambivalence of Americans towards military dictatorships was creating good ground for spreading the new anti-Pakistan sentiments. Uneasiness was voiced by many American newspapers concerning the military alliance with Pakistan. The Wall Street Journal typified these sentiments when it wrote: "Perhaps the alliance will continue, but the Pakistan the United States is allied with this morning, the day after the 'coup', is certainly not the Pakistan it has been relying on for the defense of democracy."¹⁷

These sentiments, in fact were working both ways. The intellectuals in Pakistan, who molded the public opinion more in a less educated country like Pakistan than intellectuals in the United States, hated and criticized the United States for the military 'coup' and end of democracy. The United States' military aid, after all, had strengthened the armed forces which now ruled the country. According to their arguments the machinery of military aid and alliances served to prop up rightwing military regimes, which could hardly survive or think of ruling the country, on their own, in face of the people. The natural result of aid, which fostered the unpopular military regime, was that the popular sentiments became more pronounced. The New York Times of 30 November 1958 represented this new bitterness in its magazine section: "The fact that

¹⁷Wall Street Journal (New York), 10 October 1958.

the Pakistan Army equipped by the United States, is rated the best fighting force east of Suez, did nothing to save the Parliamentary Democracy in the country. It was, in fact, the American equipped Army which did away with the Parliamentary system."

The Sino-Indian rift in the early part of 1959 had far reaching effects on American policy towards India and ultimate Pakistan-United States relations. On 31 March 1959, the Dalai Lama reached India and was granted asylum. The rift between India and China went on widening after the Dalai Lama's escape, and Chinese demands for demarcating the McMahon line. The post-Tibet hardening of Indian opinion and the Indian government's decision to upset communist control of Kerala in August 1959, was considered an opportune moment by the United States policy makers for a whole-hog revision of Policy in South Asia. In worsening Sino-Indian relation, the United States saw a great chance to make inroads into Indian neutrality.

Criticism of the South Asian Policy of the United States increased every day. The most bitter attack against Pakistan came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Fulbright, the prestigious Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the earliest critics of the aid to Pakistan. As early as March 1954, he was virtually the only Senator who had raised his voice in the Senate:

I wish to make a few observations about the recent decision of the administration to supply arms to Pakistan. I disapprove of this move, and I wish the Record to show very clearly my disapproval, because in the future, when the results of this policy are evident to all, I want it to be clear where the responsibility rests. . . .
When the investigating committees or the historians of

the future are trying to ascertain why we lost the friendship of India I want it to be perfectly clear where the responsibility should be placed. (Cong. Records, Vol. 100, Part 2, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. pp. 2481 & 2483.)

Towards the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, especially the Democratic majority had become very vocal in its attacks on aid to Pakistan. The names of the critics made an impressive reading: John F. Kennedy (Massachusetts), Senator Fulbright (Arkansas), Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota), Mike Mansfield (Montana), and Wayne Morse (Oregon). By 1959, the criticism was so loud that it not only put the Eisenhower Administration on the defensive but also made Pakistan very apprehensive of the United States future course of action. After the death of Dulles, who was considered to be a great friend, Pakistan's feeling of apprehension intensified.

The Pentagon went on vigorously defending the aid to Pakistan. But the Senators were not convinced. When Assistant Secretary of State, William Rountree, argued that Pakistan's role as an ally was valuable, Chairman Fulbright said: "I don't agree with you about Pakistan. I think the military aid given there has been a great mistake. I think you would be better off to admit that it probably is, than to try to justify it."¹⁸ Senator Morse not only attacked the military dictatorship in Pakistan, but also aid to Pakistan and its effect on the relations of the United States with India, in one of the most bitter attacks on the floor of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Senator Morse asked Secretary of Defense McElroy:

¹⁸U.S. Senate, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, (The Mutual Security Act of 1959), 6 May 1959, pp. 481, 637-639.

Does Pakistan maintain a democratic form of government?
 Isn't it...that Pakistan has suspended most of the
 democratic processes that previously existed and is be-
 ing operated under...a totalitarian form of government?

When McElroy replied that "totalitarian form of government" was too harsh
 a word and Ayub expected to return to a democratic form of government,
 Morse said:

Would you like to go through the Bill of Rights to tell
 me what corresponds with it in freedom that exists in
 Pakistan...and you do know, don't you, that it is a
 pretty common practice of dictators to hold out the bait,
 that a day will come in the future; while they exercise
 at the present time a suspension of Civil Rights and those
 rights that determine whether or not a population is free
 or living under a police state?

Sec. McElroy:

I am inclined to believe well of our friends.

Sen. Morse:

I am raising the question whether or not they are
 friends. Do you think that our military support of
 Pakistan has strengthened our diplomatic relations
 with India. They have to be weighed, as a matter
 of policy...The Administration, in our opinion, is
 supporting too much dictatorships around the world
 and not enough freedom...You are not going to streng-
 then America by supporting a bunch of dictators...
 I am going to take a long hard look at the recommen-
 dations (in aid) for Pakistan, because it isn't
 creating goodwill for us in that part of Asia. I
 think it is one place where there can be a cutback.¹⁹

Senators Gore (Democrat, Tennessee) and Fulbright asked, and General
 White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, replied that Pakistan was keeping
 more forces than the United States felt they ought to have because of a
 fear of India which the United States did not share with Pakistan. "In
 giving military aid, the military," said Fulbright, "has over-ridden the

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 205.206.

State Department's better judgement and Pakistan has forces that are in excess of those which are regarded as militarily required by our Joint Chiefs of Staff in their appraisal."²⁰

The sentiments expressed and the statements made in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were significant in one more sense. Under the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, which governed the condition of aid to Pakistan, the United States saw to it that the allies maintained a level of armed forces the United States considered necessary. The eligibility for assistance was only if:

- (a) the recipient country fulfilled the military obligations which it had assumed under multilateral and bilateral agreements or treaties to which the United States was a part and,
- (b) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.²¹

It looked in Pakistan that the Senators were trying to prove that Pakistan was not fulfilling the conditions of the Mutual Security Act of the United States of 1951 and therefore should not be provided any military aid or at least a 'cutback,' as Senator Morse said, should be made. These views were being put in practice too. Only a last minute White House pressure in

²⁰Ibid., p. 188.

²¹U.S. Statute at Large, Vol. 65, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess. 1951, pp. 373 and 381.

the form of a special session threat, forced deletion in Conference Committee of the Senate, a provision specifically transferring \$200 million from less developed countries to NATO aid recipients. An actual cut of \$300 million was made in military aid appropriations for Asia. Selig Harrison wrote that: "Although the cuts which have been made in military aid appropriations carry no area directives and need not be applied to Pakistan in particular, but the Congress has, in effect, offered a very clear judgement on the Pakistan case."²²

What exasperated ally Pakistan was that, while all that criticism was levelled against her, aid to Pakistan by the fiscal year ending June 1959 had reached a total of \$1.5 billion. In comparison, in the name of countering the United States aid to Pakistan, neutral India had received \$1.7 billion. Of these \$500 million had been spent on Indian military which would have been insupportable without the United States aid.

Another very important factor appeared at this very time which had far reaching effects on general American attitude towards foreign aid. This was the behavior of the American economy itself. There was growing concern about the repeated recessions in the economy and about the slackening rate of economic growth in the United States, which had fallen close to 2 per cent. The alarming danger signal was the deficit in the international balance of payments running against the United States. By 1958 there was a "dollar gap in reverse." America's non-military exports fell from \$19.3 billion in 1957 to \$16.3 billion in 1958 and 1959. American imports for 1957 were \$13.3 billion, for 1958, \$12.8 billion and for

²²Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the U.S. - I, Case History of a Mistake," The New Republic, 10 August 1959, p. 11.

1959, \$15.2 billion. Thus by 1959 America's non-military exports only slightly exceeded its imports. Because of this narrow gap between imports and exports, America's military and economic aid abroad, along with some other factors, produced a balance-of-payments deficit against the United States of 3.6 billion in 1958, of 3.8 billion in 1959, and 3.8 billion again in 1960. As a result America's gold supply was shrinking at the rate of 6.5 per cent annually.

As a result there were more and more demands for cutting foreign military and economic aid and a new insistence that aid be spent in the United States, and the recipients buy their arms and machinery in the United States. There was a new 'buy American' insistence, but it was discovered that about three-fourths of economic aid had always been spent in the United States.

The balance of payment difficulties and the weariness of the people in the United States at the indefinite continuance of aid to the outside world produced a reaction against foreign aid. The internal situation required the United States government to turn inward. The diminishing importance of the alliances, the emergence of the new states in Africa and a need to concentrate on Latin America were the other factors which were affecting the United States policy towards aid. Pakistan, which was entering its Second Five Year Plan in 1960, needed aid and capital. The new trend in American thinking about foreign aid and new trends of international relations in Asia needed a reassessment of its own foreign policy. Two new incidents in 1960 set it on the policies which were totally different from what it had been following so far. The U 2 incident and the election of John F. Kennedy as President further shook the tattering edifice of Pakistan-United States friendship.

Nikita Khrushchev announced in the Supreme Soviet on 5 May 1960 that Russia had shot down a spying U-2 aircraft over Sverdlovsk. Its pilot, Gary Powers, admitted that it had flown from Turkey to Pakistan and had taken off on its last flight from the United States base in Pashawar in West Pakistan for a destination in Norway. The State Department immediately denied the flight of any spying mission. The Pakistan government denied with greater vehemence that the aircraft had flown from Pakistan. It also stated very strongly that there were no American military bases in Pakistan. The Pakistan government went on denying even after the United States newspapers and periodicals showed the route for the U-2, and Pashawar as a military base of the United States.²³ The denial was puerile and ill-conceived because the President of the United States admitted and shouldered the responsibility of the flight. The incident ended with the plea to the Soviet Union that Pakistan did not know there were spying flights from Pashawar, therefore innocent. A promise was given that no future flights would be allowed. A protest to the State Department was made with the demand that no future flights should be made. This assurance was readily given as President Eisenhower had already announced there would not be any flights over the Soviet Union.

The U-2 incident exposed to Pakistanis that they were taking too much part in the cold-war. All along they had believed their government and the government of the United States, that there were no military bases in Pakistan. As late as May 1959 Acting Secretary of State, Douglass Dillon, had told the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate that there were no military bases in Pakistan: "Our arrangements with Pakistan," he

²³See Time magazine and Newsweek of 16 May 1960.

stated, "are very definitely that we have no bases there and no base right there. . . . Pakistanis are extremely sensitive about this subject of bases. It has been stated that there are bases in Pakistan. There was a news article which caused great difficulty. There are no bases."²⁴ The belief in the righteousness of the two governments was badly shaken. It dawned on the people that governments go on lying conveniently when it suits their purpose. The popular feeling was: "If one cannot trust them in one thing, why trust them in others?"

The explanation of the Pakistan government, that it did not know about spying flights, also created lots of ill-will among the people. It was felt that the Pakistan government was playing an absolute second fiddle to the United States. So much so that the United States did not bother even to tell the Pakistan government that such flights were taking place. It created bad feelings against the United States because she did not care to tell the Pakistan government.

It also dawned on the Pakistanis that they could get involved into an atomic war because of the military alliances Pakistan had with the United States. Nikita Khrushchev in a function of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Moscow on 9 May 1960 singled out the ambassador of Pakistan and informed him that "Soviet rockets would be used to retaliate against bases in countries that permitted the United States planes to take off on intelligence missions over the Soviet Union. Pashawar had been marked on the map and a ring put around it by Soviet defense forces."²⁵ Naturally

²⁴U.S. Senate, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, (The Mutual Security Act of 1959), 6 May 1959, p. 483.

²⁵New York Times, 10 May 1960.

this threat made the Pakistanis very apprehensive and sick. In turn it made the involvement with the United States very unpopular.

The second incident, which made the Pakistanis think about the friendship with the United States, occurred in November 1960, when John F. Kennedy was elected the President of the United States. Kennedy had never made any secret of his pro-India feelings and was a critic of the United States aid to Pakistan. Consistently he talked about aiding India so that it could assume the leadership of all Asia. Speaking on the floor of the Senate on 14 June 1960 he declared: "It is vital that we aid India to make a success of new new five-year program -- a success that would enable her to compete with Red China for economic leadership of all Asia." He devoted a full speech in the Senate on 25 March 1958 advocating aid to India. "Our friendship should not be equated with military alliances" or "voting the Western ticket." To do so only drives these countries closer to totalitarianism or polarizes the world in such a way as to increase rather than diminish the chances for local war."²⁶ Kennedy criticized the policy of Dulles and alliances and showed appreciation of neutralism, in a discussion with John Fisher, Editor-in-Chief of Harper's Magazine:

Q: You are less disturbed than Mr. Dulles was, for example, by countries taking a neutralist foreign policy?

Kennedy: Oh, I think it is inevitable. That's the great trend. During the immediate years ahead this is likely to be an increasing trend in Africa and probably in Latin America. In Asia, however, there may be some movement away from a wholly uncommitted

²⁶John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 157.

neutrality as a result of the growing awareness of the Chinese threat. The desire to be independent and free carries with it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the United States.

Q: Do you think it was a mistake for us, under Mr. Dulles' administration, to try to force a good many of these underdeveloped countries into military pacts with us?

Kennedy: I would think that the Middle East and Asia were not the areas that Mr. Dulles was most successful in. . . . I would say that he was more successful in Germany. The Aswan Dam refusal, the concept of the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, which is being rejected in every country -- all these, I would think, are unhappy monuments to Mr. Dulles in the Middle East.²⁷

These were the views and utterances of John Kennedy when he contested for the Presidency of the United States. It should go without saying that Pakistanis, almost to a man, were pro-Nixon. They became very nervous when Kennedy was elected President. Their fears were to prove true very soon.

The years 1958-1960, i.e., the first two years of Ayub's administration, as far as Ayub was concerned, were very much pro-American. By his actions, his speeches and writings, Ayub left no doubt in anybody's mind that he was totally allied with the West and considered Russia and China as a threat. He was totally committed to the military pacts too and wanted to go through any obligation which was binding on Pakistan as a member. He offered India a joint defense, voted with the United States in the United Nations, talked and wrote about the threat from the North and was ready to send forces to Laos, as a member of SEATO. But the changing attitudes and conditions of the United States forced him to

²⁷Ibid., pp. 218-219.

reassess his own policies. Pakistan after 1960 became more and more neutral or as the phrase was, "normalized its relations" with other powers. There is no doubt that seeds of this new policy were sown from 1958 to 1960 in particular. While there was a lot of ground for a re-thinking on the policies of the past, i.e., the policy of alliances, the 'coup d' grace' was committed by the U-2 incident and the election of John F. Kennedy.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Pakistan was born in August 1947 with an acute sense of insecurity, economically as well as defensively. The Indian leaders, by their utterances as well as actions, more or less confirmed the fears of the people of Pakistan, that India would try its best to end the existence of Pakistan. There was a genuine fear in the minds of Pakistani leaders and military strategists, who had been brought up in the British traditions, that the Soviet Union would expand towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This fear of India and Russia created a Maginot line psychosis in Pakistan and its leaders from its very birth looked towards the West for help, economically as well as defensively. The United States, which had emerged as the leader of the Western nations and the most powerful country in the world after World War II, was the most obvious choice under the circumstances. By 1947 the policy of 'containment of communism' by the United States had taken a definite shape. This also made the United States a logical choice in Pakistani eyes.

Pakistan spent the first six years of its existence, following a Western oriented foreign policy, with a few insignificant exceptions. From 1954 it aligned itself completely with the Western nations in general and the United States in particular. By joining a number of military pacts with the United States from 1954 to 1959, Pakistan became the United States' "most allied ally" in Asia. By joining the pacts, Pakistan hoped that the United States would not only defend it against India, from

where Pakistan thought its main danger was, but also use its influence and thus solve the outstanding disputes between Pakistan and India. The main one among these disputes was Kashmir.

There is no doubt that Pakistan feared Russian expansion but it definitely overplayed the Soviet threat to impress the United States. The United States was not so naive, at the same time, not to know that Pakistan was arming itself against India. The United States' military help was certain to alienate India. Yet America decided to go ahead with the military pacts. From the United States point of view the tying in of Pakistan was worth the risk of alienating India. At least from the military point of view it was. Pacts with Pakistan could help a great deal in the defense of the Middle East, where the stakes had increased tremendously after American firms had made great inroads into the Middle East oil. But what was even more important, military aircraft from the bases in Pakistan could easily attack the industrial complexes in Southern Russia.

It almost seemed certain that the Pentagon, especially the air force, as happens so often, over-rode the judgement of the State Department.

For the first four years the Pakistan-United States friendship rode a high wind. Pakistan not only defended its right to have defensive pacts but also carried the banner of the United States along. Its representatives attacked the Communist countries with a vehemence which no other country did. But the cracks in the edifice appeared soon.

Nehru ended the negotiations on Kashmir and declared it an integral part of India. The Soviet Union turned completely against Pakistan. It punished Pakistan by supporting the Indian case completely and even vetoed the resolution on Kashmir in the Security Council in favor of

India. Pakistan lost the confidence of the Afro-Asian bloc, was considered a lackey of the United States, and lost the friendship of the fellow Middle Eastern Muslim countries. The United States, on the other hand, made it very clear that it was not ready to defend in case of an Indian attack and was not helping in solving the Kashmir problem. In fact it openly followed the policy of "hands off the dispute" because of a fear of further alienating the Indian sentiments. The Pakistanis naturally started feeling that they were being taken too much for granted and that the disadvantages of military alliances with the United States had outweighed the advantages.

With the creation of a military government in Pakistan in 1958, the policy of the country again became extremely pro-United States. Popular sentiments against the pacts were crushed, as were the freedom of speech and press. An offer of a joint defense was made to India to please the United States, pro-United States policy was followed in the United Nations and the President of Pakistan was again talking about the danger of "a push from the north." Whenever the sub-continent had been divided, the President advocated, there was a conqueror from the north who benefited. His argument went very close to attacking the partition and creation of Pakistan because it was the division of India which had created Pakistan.

Yet this loyal friend of the United States was soon as much frustrated as the earlier leaders. After the Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in 1959, the United States saw a chance to make inroads into India's neutrality. The attacks on Pakistan and its aid increased. Due to the invention of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the dependence on pacts and military bases decreased. The public in the United States became weary with continued foreign aid, and a bad balance of payment in the

United States economy made matters worse.

The U-2 incident made the Pakistanis feel very insecure and pro-India. John F. Kennedy's election to the presidency of the United States made Pakistanis very nervous. Earlier, in response to so much friendship and loyalty shown by Pakistan, President Eisenhower refused to ask Nehru to settle the Kashmir problem, when Eisenhower visited India and Pakistan in December 1959. The President of Pakistan sadly concluded that American interests were far greater in India than in Pakistan.

Pakistan started feeling the need for a change in its own attitude as the United States had. Border negotiations were started with China and Pakistan accepted Russian offer of oil exploration in 1960. This was a step towards neutrality or, as the phrase put it, "normalization of relations" with all countries.

Pakistan had embarked on the path of policies it followed through the 1960's.

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PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

1947-1960

by

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Pakistan became an independent country on 14 August 1947. From the very beginning it was anxious to have good relations with the Western nations in general, and the United States in particular. This thesis deals with the history of relations between the two countries from 1947 to 1960.

Because of a fear of India which, the Pakistanis believed, never reconciled itself to the existence of an independent Pakistan; fear of Communist Russia's expansion towards the south; and a natural desire to develop their country, the Pakistanis looked toward the United States for economic and military help. The United States was the logical choice because it had emerged as the leader of the Western nations after World War II, and from 1947 had started the policy of containment of Communism in Europe and Asia through economic and military aid to countries in proximity of the two Communist giants, Russia and China.

From 1947 to 1953, Pakistan and the United States worked towards the close friendship, which later became their hallmark. Under President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the policy of containment of Communism became more pronounced. Pakistan with its strategic position was worth tying in for the defense of the Middle East and air strikes on Southern Russia. The Mutual Security and Assistance Agreement concluded on 19 May 1954, between Pakistan and the United States was followed by a conference of eight countries at Manila in September 1954 and an agreement was reached on creating Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. One year later Baghdad Pact was concluded. Again, early in 1959, the United States signed a Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan and undertook to preserve its 'independence and integrity.' Pakistan thus became the United States' 'most allied ally' in Asia.

Pakistan expected that its ally, i.e., the United States, would defend it against Indian aggression as well as the Communist, in return of the commitments it had undertaken. Pakistan also hoped that the United States would help in solving its outstanding disputes with India, in which Kashmir was the most outstanding. The United States made it clear that the pacts were only against the Communist aggression and it would keep its hands off the Kashmir dispute.

The pacts made the Soviet Union turn completely against Pakistan; made the country very unpopular in the Afro-Asia bloc and the fellow Muslim countries of the Middle East, and Prime Minister Nehru of India chose them as an excuse to close negotiations on Kashmir. China, during these years, was also very friendly with India. Pakistanis naturally started feeling that the disadvantages of the pacts outweighed the advantages. A strong feeling of resentment against the pacts started taking shape.

During the second Eisenhower administration the changing policies of the United States outside and inside the country added to the feeling of resentment and apprehension in Pakistan. Criticism of Pakistan in the United States, weariness of the American public with continued foreign aid, worsening of Sino-Indian relations and America's pro-India attitude, a bad balance of payments in the United States economy and the election of John F. Kennedy -- who was considered outrightly pro-India -- as President made the feeling of apprehension very acute. The U-2 incident made Pakistan feel that it had been playing with fire and taking too much part in the cold war.

The change in the United States outlook towards the pacts made it necessary for Pakistan to change its own attitude towards the pacts.

The stage was set for the more independent foreign policy which Pakistan followed during the 1960's.