

THE EFFECT OF THE ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS OF
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
1950-1956

by

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
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PREFACE

Dwight David Eisenhower was closely associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) throughout the decade of the 1950's. As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), and as President of the United States he helped to bring NATO from its beginnings in December, 1950, as only a paper organization to a somewhat workable reality in the mid-to-late 1950's. Although Eisenhower was closely involved with NATO for over ten years, six of those years, 1950 to 1956, were most crucial. These years marked the period of the Alliance's formation and early development. During this time Eisenhower gave NATO a vast amount of attention, which was not the case after 1956.

The purpose of this thesis is to define Eisenhower's impact on the Alliance during these six years. This is accomplished through an examination of his public and private statements and a careful analysis of their consequences. Such a technique can be followed through an exclusive use of primary source material through 1955, but at that point the researcher increasingly confronts security classifications. Through a very selective use of memoirs and secondary sources an accurate study of the events of 1956 can be made.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Second World War, the United States began to assume active political leadership of the non-Communist world from the liberal democratic nations of Europe. The developing competition with the Soviet Union quickly brought the two new super-powers into conflict over the future of Europe. Americans reacted to the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe with programs like the Marshall Plan and Mutual Security Assistance. Such programs focused U.S. attention on the Continent, and American leaders gradually concluded that Europe had no means with which to defend itself from the apparent Soviet threat.

The Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade of 1948 intensified the desire of the U.S. to build an adequate defense against further challenges. The signing of the Brussels Pact in 1948 (the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 were seen as the groundwork for such a defense. The North Atlantic Treaty pledged all signatories to assist an attacked member with such action as they deemed necessary "to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."¹ Though considered satisfactory at the time, especially since the U. S. had a monopoly on the atomic bomb, this arrangement soon proved to be inadequate.

Surprisingly, the June, 1950, North Korean invasion of South Korea surfaced many fears for the security of Europe. President Harry S. Truman feared that the invasion was a Communist diversion to draw the U.S. away from Europe. He also feared that a Communist attack in Europe might also result in a Pusan-type of defense on the French coast. The Europeans feared that the U.S. would not be able to effectively respond to Soviet aggression in Europe since it was now pre-occupied in the Far East. These fears, combined with a desire by all to build a credible European defense with indigenous forces, favorably disposed all the members to the formation of a permanent NATO armed force.

The creation of such a force required cooperation by all NATO powers, and the leader of such a force needed to have the confidence of all. It was taken for granted in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that the United States, since it would provide most of the financial and material support, would provide the supreme commander. Truman had highly qualified generals from which to choose. Many had extensive experience in World War II, and nearly all were respected by the NATO leaders, but General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower's experience as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force placed him in a class of his own. While Supreme Commander, Eisenhower had gained the confidence and respect of most Allied leaders, and to

many Europeans he more than anyone else symbolized the Allies cooperation and their triumph over Germany. His experience in leading the multi-national Allied Army made him the logical choice to command the new NATO army.

Besides having the confidence and respect of the European leaders, Eisenhower enjoyed Truman's confidence. Not only did the Administration feel that Eisenhower could sell the U.S.-financed rearmament plan to the Europeans, it also hoped to transfer the General's prestige to an already harassed Truman.² A man of Eisenhower's public stature, the Administration believed, would keep the European situation on the public "back burner" while HST dealt with the explosive situation in the Far East.

Thus began Eisenhower's association with NATO, one which would require much of his attention for the next six years. The attention which he gave it greatly influenced the future of the Alliance. It is here that the focus of this thesis lies; his actions and statements were chiefly responsible for the strengths, and more importantly, the weaknesses of NATO.

CHAPTER I

EISENHOWER AS SACEUR

The creation of the post of Supreme Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was formally proposed for the first time by the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin at the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York City on September 12, 1950. There are indications that the idea had been informally considered earlier, at least by the United States,¹ and it was well-received by everyone at the meeting. It was stipulated in the discussion that the commander should be an American, thus symbolizing the American support for the Alliance. It was also hoped that such a move would give the European governments confidence and spur them on toward sound rearmament programs. Apparently Eisenhower was mentioned, informally if not publicly, as being the likely candidate for the post.²

The next NAC meeting scheduled for December 18-19, was to designate SACEUR. State Department staffers had worked out a complete scenario for this. So that no room would be left for error, actions by the NAC, Secretary of State Acheson, and President Truman were carefully orchestrated. Resolutions were written, draft telegrams proposed, and even debate by NAC members was anticipated, so as to insure the designation of Eisenhower as SACEUR, while at the same time allowing the Europeans to believe that they were choosing him on their own.³

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Through an invitation extended by the President on October 19, 1950, General Eisenhower, then serving as President of Columbia University, visited the White House on October 28. The discussion centered on one topic: Would the General accept the Supreme Commander's post? Eisenhower assented and returned to New York. On December 18, the NAC met and reorganized NATO according to the resolutions written months earlier by the State Department creating the post of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The NAC then passed a resolution asking Truman to appoint Eisenhower to the post. Truman formally told Eisenhower of his new job in a letter on December 19, and advised him of the great responsibility that came with it:

You are undertaking a tremendous responsibility. As President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I know that our country is wholeheartedly behind you. Indeed, you carry with you the prayers of all freedom-loving peoples. I send you my warmest personal good wishes for success in the great task which awaits you.⁴

General Eisenhower began his role as SACEUR by designating Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, as his chief-of-staff. General Gruenther gradually selected a staff of American officers to identify the problems to be encountered in organizing and commanding the yet-to-be-formed NATO army. Meanwhile, in January, 1951, Eisenhower toured the NATO countries in what was officially termed an inspection trip but in actuality was a campaign to gain

European support for increased defense spending.

It was during this tour that the European leaders became acquainted with Eisenhower's view of the Cold War. The General saw the East-West conflict as a moral struggle. The only way, he felt, that Communism could be effectively deterred was through united resistance in the West. This unity must not be troubled by internal bickerings:

Unreadiness by free nations for joint defensive action against an aggressor is only one of the evils that stem from (misunderstanding among neighbors.) Through these same misunderstandings there is certain to be suffered economic loss and therefore ineffectiveness in the satisfaction of human hungers. Worst of all, even the slightest misunderstanding among the nations not committed to communism is another chink in the defenses against an aggressive ideology which overlooks no opportunity to subvert and destroy.⁵

Believing that unity was essential, Eisenhower felt NATO was "about the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization."⁶ This was because the United Nations had proved ineffective due to "vetoes of hostile groups." Thus, he felt the failure of NATO would spell disaster for the West: "If we allow the whole plan to fizzle out into a miserable failure, it would seem to me that our future would be bleak indeed."⁷ Above all else, the General felt that the Supreme Commander should not bully the European nations into action. Instead, he should respect their pride and sovereignty and regard them as equal partners. But each member of NATO had to realize that only through his performance could the organization be effective.⁸

The campaign to raise forces for NATO was not limited to Europe. Concurrently a debate was taking place in the United States on how many U.S. troops should be stationed in Europe. As of December, 1950, there were only two full American divisions stationed in Germany. So far as the defense of Europe was concerned, this force could hope for immediate aid only from the two British divisions also in Germany. Backing up these four would be U.S. air and atomic power.⁹ Some, such as former President Herbert Hoover, argued that no American ground troops should be sent across the Atlantic. Europe, this faction felt, could be adequately defended with U.S. air and naval power.¹⁰ At the opposite extreme were those, such as New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who urged the dispatch of 100 American divisions to Europe.¹¹ Taking a more moderate stand were those, such as Eisenhower, who advocated an American commitment of ten to twenty divisions to Europe. This figure presupposed that the European nations would contribute thirty to forty divisions themselves. With the Korean War draining the American manpower pool, Congress only approved in January, 1951, an increase of four divisions to the U.S. contingent in Europe, thus disappointing even the Eisenhower moderates.¹²

The North Atlantic Council meeting of September, 1950, decided that the new NATO army would be comprised of troops

from all member nations, each contributing its "fair share." Though no formal plan was discussed, there was a general feeling that West Germany would somehow be included. Following the conference, plans were proposed to form a single European defense system.¹³ Eisenhower, however, could not rely on such speculations and attempted to get the Europeans to rearm. As mentioned above, he had only four divisions (two American and two British) with which to resist an invasion of Germany from the East. Opposing the Alliance divisions were twenty-five Soviet divisions supported by 6,000 aircraft. These units were in positions adjacent to West Germany, while the "massive bulk of the Red army and air forces" stood in reserve.¹⁴ Besides the Soviet forces, there were local units, like the East German 50,000-man "police force", which could be used in the event of hostilities.

Eisenhower argued that a minimum force of thirty Allied divisions was needed to resist a Russian attack effectively.¹⁵ But the NAC set an even higher goal of sixty divisions on December 18, 1950, thus reinforcing the Eisenhower request. By May, 1950, the Alliance forces had been increased to fourteen divisions, ten more than in January but still sixteen less than Eisenhower's minimum.¹⁶

Although there was much talk of forming a unified European army, it was not until October 24, 1950, that a plan was formally proposed. French Prime Minister René Pleven called

for "the creation of a European Army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe."¹⁷

The Pleven Plan, as it was known, proposed that a single European Army be formed from battalion or regimental-size units from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, and West Germany. This army would be financed by a common military budget overseen by a European Defense Minister. The Defense Minister would be chosen by and responsible to a supra-national parliamentary assembly of the participants. The Army would be placed at the disposal of SACEUR for the defense of Europe under the auspices of NATO. Key to the plan was the participation of West Germany. While the other five member nations would be allowed to retain their own national armies, West Germany could only have military forces as part of the European Army. This provision ruled out the possibility of a German Defense Ministry or General Staff. Thus, though the rest of Europe would still have national armies and defense establishments, it would be able to take advantage of the German manpower pool and technical know-how.

Pleven considered this plan to be part of a wider whole. Only a month before, the Schuman Plan had been proposed, providing for a unified European coal and steel industry. The success of it and the Pleven proposal meant Europe would begin unification of its economic and military might. This,

it was hoped, would be followed by a genuine political unification of Europe. Eisenhower called the unification of Europe a "favorite subject" of his. He regarded it as the only real hope for Europe:

... the economic and military strength of Western Europe cannot be fully developed as long as the region is just a hodge-podge of sovereign political territories.¹⁸

Without unity, Europe would sink back into the routine that had brought on two world wars. His desire to prevent further European conflict forced him to ignore, or at least de-emphasize, the power of nationalism. Beyond the development of a stronger economic and military system, Eisenhower viewed the unification of Europe as the vehicle for social and political reform which he felt was sorely needed.¹⁹

The Pleven Plan was presented to the North Atlantic Council along with two other plans by the United States and the Netherlands. The U.S. plan advocated the same NATO structure as then existed, but allowed for the formation of a West German Army which would be integrated into NATO. The Dutch plan called for the appointment of a NATO High Commissioner in West Germany who would be responsible for all armed forces stationed there including those of West Germany. All of these plans had one common denominator -- the formation of a West German military force. The logic was that if the Soviet Union invaded the West, it would have to strike Germany first. This being the case, a German Army could be used

effectively as a stumbling block, buying time for the rest of the world to mobilize.²⁰ The Plevén Plan finally won the consent of the NATO representatives of the European nations involved (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy), and on May 27, 1952, the treaty to implement its provisions was signed.

It is clear from the competing plans that basic assumptions about the defense of Europe had already been made. The major one was that Europe would be defended by American and European ground troops. Such an idea was directly opposed to the Hoover plan of defense which envisioned U.S. air power to make atomic and conventional strikes against any invading army. This assumption necessitated a decision on how and where to defend Western Europe against an attack from the east. The most likely place for such an invasion was the demarkation line between West and East Germany. Unfortunately, no major terrain barrier blocked the path of any invader east of the Rhine River. So, as SACEUR, Eisenhower argued for a defense-in-depth east of the Rhine without which:

... we might lose, by default, the considerable resources of Germany and suffer, at the same time, direct exposure of Denmark and the Netherlands. With Western Germany in our orbit, NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defense; in the restricted area of Western Europe, it is mandatory.²¹

He had no illusions that the NATO forces initially engaged would be able to defeat a Soviet assault. But he felt that they could perform two vital tasks: First, serve as a deterrent to Soviet aggression; and, second, if hostilities should break out, fight a delaying action while the NATO countries mobilized the necessary forces to meet the attack. One must remember that this doctrine was based on the premise that conventional weapons would be the mode of destruction, employed by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was still two years away and tactical atomic weapons were not part of the U.S. arsenal until May, 1953. The NAC's support of the Pleven Plan, now known as the European Defense Community (EDC), reinforced the Eisenhower plan.

While concerned with the EDC question, Eisenhower was also occupied with providing an effective organization for NATO's military arm. Though seemingly minor, the solutions provided to such problems had a lasting effect on NATO. The first of these problems was the organizing of a Supreme Headquarters. General Gruenther and his staff studied this problem in December, 1950, and January, 1951. Through their recommendations the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) was made operational on April 2, 1951. Eisenhower encountered several stumbling blocks in organizing

SHAPE, the main one being personnel. The Western Union, which was the military organization of the Brussels Pact, had laid much of the groundwork here which was adopted by SHAPE:

Western Union had also created the precedent of an international and inter-service staff, working together in time of peace and using ... two official languages ... French and English. In addition, they had bequeathed to SHAPE not only their many studies of the degrees of what was to be the central sector of the SHAPE Command, but, more important, a number of officers of different nationalities with the invaluable experience of working together as an allied team.²²

With such problems solved, SHAPE itself could be organized. Eisenhower used many of the same principles in staffing SHAPE as he did in staffing SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) in World War II. He named an American, General Gruenther, as his Chief of Staff. The SHAPE staff reflected the manpower contributions of the various nations.²³ As in SHAEF, Eisenhower named a British officer as his second-in-command--Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery. Montgomery had been the commander of the Western Union, and as Eisenhower himself admitted, was chosen mainly because of his performance in World War II.

General Eisenhower commanded the only organized NATO forces which existed at the time. Later other commands would be established, but as SACEUR Eisenhower had sole responsibility

for the defense of Western Europe against all outside attack. He organized his forces much the same as he had in the Second World War--into three commands (Northern Europe, Central Europe, and Southern Europe) which had responsibility for their respective geographical locations (Scandinavia, Germany, and the Mediterranean). As in World War II when Eisenhower commanded not only SHAEP, but also the Allied Land Forces,²⁴ he decided personally to serve as the crucial Central European Commander. Unfortunately, he never recorded his reasons for this move, but one can speculate that, as in World War II, he wanted direct control of that area of his primary command which he felt to be most crucial. It can be suggested as a related hypothesis that he wanted to guarantee that the organization of the Central European Command would be exactly as he wanted it.

While recruiting officers for SHAPE, Eisenhower and his immediate subordinates became increasingly aware, as they had in World War II, of the "great difficulty in finding staff officers qualified for key positions on [an] international staff ...²⁵ The main deficiencies were in knowledge of staff methods and procedures. To alleviate this problem, General Eisenhower proposed on April 25, 1951 to the NATO Standing Group the creation of a NATO Defense College. It was envisioned as similar to the United States Army's Command and General Staff College. Emphasis was to be placed on training

field grade officers from the NATO countries in SHAPE staff procedures and then on integrating them into the system. The Standing Group approved the proposal and the NATO Defense College was opened on November 6, 1951.

Logistical problems encountered during the Second World War by SHAEP undoubtedly encouraged the drive for the standardization of equipment in the NATO forces. One of the underlying advantages of the EDC proposal was that the European Army would be equipped uniformly without regard to nationality. There was a desire by the Alliance members to do much the same thing in all NATO forces. In January, 1951, the Standing Group created the Military Agency for Standardization to deal with the problem. Among the areas considered by the Agency were standardization of administrative materials, fuels, component parts, jet trainers, and ammunition. The most publicized of all the Agency's accomplishments was the adoption of the 7.62 mm cartridge to be used as the universal NATO small arms ammunition. Although Eisenhower's influence cannot be seen directly in this standardization, his feelings about the unity of the alliance and the need for the least amount of "red tape" would imply his approval of such an action.

Again, during the initial organization of the NATO forces, Eisenhower was confronted with the need to convince the NATO members to contribute more troops. As mentioned

above, in May, 1951, the Soviet forces outnumbered the Alliance forces by at least two to one. To investigate and propose plans for the raising of the needed forces, the NAC appointed U.S. Director for Mutual Security W. Averell Harriman to head the Temporary Council Committee (TCC). The TCC was given access to information on each member nation's financial, manpower, and natural resource capabilities. The TCC then set out to reconcile the military needs of the Alliance with each country's capabilities. The TCC proposed a specific force level of fifty divisions (twenty-five on active duty) for 1952, and provisional goals for 1953. General proposals were made for 1954 and beyond. Despite such an ambitious effort, General Eisenhower met continual resistance from the NATO members in achieving the fifty division goal. France proved to be the biggest problem of all. Since the end of World War II, the French had attempted to regain their lost colonies in southeast Asia known collectively as Indochina. The military campaign waged against the local insurgents proved increasingly costly, so that by 1951 and 1952 the French were in desperate need of troops for Indochina. Eisenhower later recalled:

France was deeply involved in Indochina and it was costing a lot to keep those forces out there, and they were getting no where ... the French were constantly taking troops that had been allocated to NATO to go out to Indochina.²⁶

As President, the General was again to clash with the French over Indochina. As SACEUR he never received the troops needed from France for NATO.

The North Atlantic Council met at Lisbon, Portugal, February 20-25, 1952, and endorsed the European Defense Community (EDC) plan. As mentioned above, the EDC Treaty was signed by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, and West Germany on May 27, 1952. For the treaty to go into effect, all the participants needed to ratify the document. By the end of 1952, nearly all parties, except France, had or were in the process of ratifying the treaty.

One of the main forces behind ratification was the United States. The Truman Administration backed it whole-heartedly from the first along two main lines of thought. First, the EDC would bring West Germany into the defense of Europe. "Without Germany," Truman later recalled, "the defense of Europe was a rear-guard action on the shores of the Atlantic Coast."²⁷ The second advantage of the EDC, Truman felt, was that the rearming of West Germany would be accomplished without "any revival of militarism."²⁸

General Eisenhower, however, seemed cautious about the EDC idea at first. Only in late 1951 and early 1952 did he begin to support it fully. His earliest statement as SACEUR on the subject was noncommittal. He would only say that "... the more people on my side the happier I will be."²⁹ This

statement is understandable since at that time Eisenhower had only four divisions to command and another four divisions promised. His desire to get any troops from anywhere would seem justified. By July, 1951, the official policy at SHAPE was support for the EDC along purely military lines. "We are convinced that there is no realistic defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany, without some form of German participation."³⁰ By the end of 1951, General Eisenhower had come out in support of the EDC proposal. As was typical of him, he saw EDC as part of a wider movement--European unity.³¹

Throughout the first half of 1952, Eisenhower continually emphasized, both in public and in private, that European unity and German rearmament complemented each other. A united Europe without Germany would be weak militarily, and a rearmed Germany without the supervision of its neighbors would also be highly undesirable. He even went so far as to announce in the spring of 1952 that he could not leave his post as SACEUR until France had ratified the treaty. Unfortunately for him, resistance to ratification was growing steadily in the French Assembly. The Government was preoccupied with the Indochina situation, and accordingly, the EDC agreement received little attention.

At the same time in the U.S., however, a faction in the Republican Party, represented by Henry Cabot Lodge, sought

Eisenhower as a Presidential candidate. The General acquiesced and formally requested relief from the SACEUR post. General Matthew Ridgway relieved him on May 30, 1952, and, in a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, Eisenhower summarized his year and a half in the position:

As of now, I consider that the specific purposes for which I was recalled to duty have been largely accomplished; the command has been formed, its procedures established, and basic questions settled. Moreover, a program of growth and development, based on early experience and searching re-examination, has been agreed at governmental levels. There are many difficulties to overcome but, given the whole-hearted support of the NATO community, this program will provide a reassuring degree of security in this region, despite the continual presence of the threat of Soviet Communism. There is every reason to believe that the NATO nations will continue to work together successfully, toward the goal of a secure peace.³²

Clearly omitted from this letter was any specific reference to the EDC controversy. Eisenhower apparently considered his leaving active duty, which took place on June 2, as being more important than the EDC Treaty. One wonders the effect such a move had on the French, who had been told differently only a few months earlier. The General may have felt that as President he could influence the EDC ratification more than he could as SACEUR. But, this hypothesis finds no support in his statements. He, also, may have considered any mention of the topic to be a possible political liability in the near future. He cannot, however, be accused

of supporting the EDC plan only in public, for his private correspondence reveals that he honestly felt that it was a vital step toward European unity.³³ Also, as will be shown below, he continued to support the plan.

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Eisenhower laid much of the groundwork of the NATO military structure without which the Alliance might well have failed. His organization of SHAPE and of the three European commands recalled his days as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. After his departure from SHAPE, some changes were made, notably giving the Central European Command its own commander. But most of Eisenhower's organization remained intact. While his departure from the SACEUR post ended his military career, it signalled the beginning of his new career in partisan politics. In this capacity, the views that he favored as SCAEF and SACEUR stayed with him. His support for European rearmament remained constant as did his support for European unity. These two ideas would control his relationship with NATO through his first term.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE OVER EDC

From June, 1952, to May, 1955, the fight for ratification of the European Defense Community treaty was the chief concern of NATO leaders, particularly Eisenhower. The Alliance suffered its first real internal conflict during the EDC debate, thus surfacing the impressions held by its members on NATO's nature. These impressions, and especially those of Eisenhower, did much to define the Alliance's stability and flexibility.

After Eisenhower's retirement from active duty in June, 1952, he quickly became embroiled in the contest for the Republican Party Presidential nomination. He succeeded in defeating the conservative Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, and took a young, Communist-chasing Senator from California, Richard Nixon, as his running mate. What followed in the "campaign" against the Democratic candidate, Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, was less a campaign than a hero's welcome. Eisenhower was elected by a margin of 6.5 million votes and received 442 of the 531 electoral votes. He would later refer to his victory as a "mandate for change." Where the change was to take place was unclear, but it did not seem to be in United States' relations with NATO.

As has been discussed above, Truman's policy was to lend the Alliance both moral and material support. The presence

of five American divisions in Europe symbolized the U.S. commitment to NATO. The Eisenhower Administration did not withdraw any of these units, nor did it give the Alliance any less moral support than had been received from Truman. Consequently, it would be incorrect to credit Eisenhower with any significant change of policy toward NATO.

Dwight D. Eisenhower began his Administration with a call for unity in Europe in order to achieve higher nonmaterial goals:

In Europe, we ask that enlightened and inspired leaders of the Western nations strive with a renewed vigor to make the unity of their peoples a reality. Only as a free Europe unitedly marshals its strength can it effectively safeguard, even with our help, its spiritual and cultural heritage.¹

Though neither in this speech, nor in the January, 1953, State of the Union Message did he make direct reference to the EDC; he kept his comments on a high symbolic plateau. In the 1953 State of the Union Message, he began to develop a new line of argument that would soon engulf the entire question:

Our policy will be designed to further the advent of practical unity in Western Europe. The nations of that region have contributed notably to the effort of sustaining the security of the free world. From the jungles of Indochina and Malaya to the northern shores of Europe, they have vastly improved their defensive strength. Where called upon to do so, they have made costly and bitter sacrifices to hold the line of freedom.²

The identification of the French colonial conflict in In-

port to the French Asian policy for the first time. Later in the message, he again referred to the need for unity in Europe and called for "a more closely integrated economic and political system."³ While not a drastic change in U.S. policy, this statement did tend to extend the line of official policy beyond purely military-economic definition of unification.

The first official pronouncement of the Eisenhower Administration on the EDC Treaty was made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles following a ten-day tour of the European capitals. He stated that though the EDC Treaty had not yet been ratified, it "was not dead but only sleeping."⁴ He continued by saying that the U.S. considered EDC vital to the future strength of NATO. Finally, Dulles emphasized that President Eisenhower had a "deep and firm ... interest in European unity--political, economic, and military."⁵

One month later, Dulles sent instructions to the American Embassy in Paris, describing Eisenhower's feelings on the EDC question:

EDC [is] not only vital because it provides [the] best means [to] obtain [the] German contribution without which no real defense of Europe can be undertaken but also because it provides [the] means for eventual European viability, also [it is] impossible [to] keep Germany under occupation status.⁶

Dulles concluded the message by inferring that the American government was becoming exasperated at the French procrastination in ratifying the EDC Treaty. Such dilatory tactics, Dulles intimated, could result in a cutoff of U.S. aid to France. This communication is crucial because it was the first suggestion that the U.S. would retaliate against a French delay or defeat of the EDC. The reference made to Eisenhower's desire to end the "occupation status" of Germany adds an interesting twist to the argument for EDC. One must remember that it was Eisenhower who proposed "The New Look" for the U.S. armed forces. This program to streamline the armed forces and make them more efficient required the end of the occupation of Germany.

While Dulles made such suggestions, Eisenhower himself continued in public to rely on a more philosophical approach. He spoke of liberty, unity of purpose, and vigilance, but refrained from the more earthly matters dealt with by his aides. The French continued to stall and indicated in May that more French personnel would leave Europe for duty in Indochina. The U.S. approach on this matter reflected a somewhat conciliatory stance as instructions were sent to the Embassy in Paris to support diversion of certain French Air Force personnel.⁷ This move was apparently meant to show the French that we wanted the EDC but would not forsake our ally for it.

The same arguments for EDC ratification were made throughout May and June, but in July a completely new line of thought emerged. At a press conference on July 8, the President spoke, as usual, of the high philosophic basis of NATO and the EDC. Surprisingly, however, he added a brief new touch to the old argument: "I believe that free elections as of now can be held whether Germany belongs to the EDC or whether it does not."⁸ This linking of German unification to the EDC question seems to have been a two-edged sword. On one side, Eisenhower appears to have been trying to assure the Russians that the EDC was not necessarily intended to oppose only them. The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany did not mean an end, for all time, to the principle of German unification. The other side of this argument would appear to be an unconscious slap in the face for France. The last thing that France desired was a unified and sovereign Germany which would be a potential opponent militarily and economically. The French defeat and German occupation in the Second World War were too recent for the French to forget so easily. This statement marked the beginning of the difficulties which the Eisenhower Administration would have with France throughout both terms.

Again, on July 25, the President brought up the question of German reunification. This time he elaborated

somewhat more on his logic:

It has long been my conviction that the strengthening of the Federal Republic, through adoption of the EDC, the contractual agreements and further progress in the integration of Western Europe, can only enhance the prospects for the peaceful unification of Germany, by increasing the attractive power of his prosperous Western Germany vis-a-vis the Soviet Zone ...⁹

Though this communication did not apply to the French, Eisenhower seems to assure West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that German reunification and participation in EDC are compatible. It would appear difficult, if not impossible, that such feelings were not being relayed to the French. Two months later a very important development took place. In conversations with French Prime Minister Laniel, W. E. Knox, President of Westinghouse Electric International Company,¹⁰ became aware that the French wanted to link the Indochina situation to the ratification of the treaty. Though Laniel personally approved of EDC, he felt "that politically it was impossible for France to ratify the treaty until the situation in Indochina was resolved."¹¹ He further observed that many Frenchmen were becoming increasingly wary of being in the same military organization as Germany, who had fought them three times within the last 83 years. The split between the U.S. and France over EDC had widened.

The first summit conference between Eisenhower and his Western European counterparts in the United Kingdom

and France took place in Bermuda on December 4-8, 1953. Not surprisingly, a main topic of discussion was the fate of the EDC Treaty. Though Prime Minister Laniel formally represented France, it is apparent that Foreign Minister Bidault did most of the talking. Bidault demanded certain pre-conditions before the treaty would be ratified. First, if Germany were to become a sovereign armed state as was proposed by the EDC agreement the Saar territory must be autonomous. Bidault argued that the Saar should only be returned to Germany by a formal peace conference. Second, the United States and Britain must agree to a twenty-year guarantee that their force levels on the continent would remain substantially the same. Finally, since France would be forced to make "the humiliating sacrifice of integrating its forces with those of another nation which had long been its enemy," the United States and Britain should be ready to make greater contributions "in other fields."¹² Though Eisenhower knew that French pride had much to do with such an argument, he was left astounded by the French demands. To be sure where Bidault stood, the President asked him whether France considered Germany or Russia as a potential enemy. Though the Soviet threat was obvious, French politicians, Eisenhower felt, were afraid of being identified too closely with any plan of cooperation with Germany. These

feelings, he felt, could well be sincere, but were outmoded, since the real danger was the "formidable aggregation of power [that was] at the command of the Communist Czars in Moscow."¹³

Eisenhower must have considered the Franco-German rift serious, for in his State of the Union message he specifically noted that:

Within [Western Europe] the building of a united European community, including France and Germany, is vital to a free and self-reliant Europe. This will be promoted by the European Defense Community, which offers assurance of European security.¹⁴

He returned to this in a more general way two weeks later by stating in his budget message that unity in Europe was "necessary for strength and security in the North Atlantic area."¹⁵

Slowly, but surely, the Indochina question seemed to become intertwined with the ratification of EDC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson reviewed the French setbacks in Indochina. One of the JCS proposals was to allow the French to revise their NATO commitment to enable them to deploy additional air force support personnel in Asia. This the JCS considered necessary in order to upgrade aircraft maintenance and performance, neither of which were satisfactory at the time by American standards.¹⁶ Such a position

reinforced the earlier instructions sent by Dulles to the American Embassy on March 23, 1953, yet was not a clear statement in support of the French position in Indochina. At the same time, the French began to ask for direct aid from the U.S. in order to extricate themselves from the siege at Dien Bien Phu. At the time their requests were taken to be linked in any way with the EDC ratification fight. The Eisenhower Administration denied such aid for a variety of reasons, and on May 8, 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell. Although the Dien Bien Phu defeat did not necessarily spell total capitulation for the French, it did inflame French public sentiment against the war. The French government then began to seek alternatives to continuing the war.

Ambassador to France C. Douglas Dillon in a cable to Dulles on May 19, estimated the chances for EDC in the light of Dien Bien Phu.

Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before [the] Indochina crisis has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postponement or defeat of EDC. While [the] pro-EDC members of [the] French Government originally saw no connection between EDC and Geneva, the fall of Dien Bien Phu and [the] present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed [the] situation. EDC is for the moment inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and France-U.S. negotiations regarding united action in Indochina.¹⁷

Dillon continued by stating that there were two key elements in the situation. First, the French wanted a solution to the Indochina problem, which while granting independence,

would not force the French to publicly proclaim their withdrawal from the area. Second, the French wanted the assistance of U.S. Marines in controlling the situation. Dillon ended the message by bluntly stating:

Unless we can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come.¹⁸

This direct connection between the Indochina situation and EDC gained little sympathy from Eisenhower. He later said that he "was never happy in tying the fate of EDC to our willingness to do things in Indochina as the French government desired."¹⁹ Eisenhower's refusal to introduce U.S. troops into the Indochina conflict made clear the U.S. position on the issue. In August the French made good on this threat.

In the months before the final decision the rhetoric exchanged became increasingly heated. Throughout March and April, official Presidential statements on the subject were concise and to the point: The U.S. position was complete support for EDC ratification. Statements were made to the effect that no U.S. troop reductions would be made if the EDC came into being. By June, Eisenhower's impatience with the procrastination of France was beginning to show in the official statements. A joint statement issued by Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on June 28,

referred to a deterioration of relations between Alliance nations that could result from a failure to bring the EDC agreement into force.²⁰ This suggestion was reinforced during Secretary of State Dulles' trip to Paris in July. Upon his return to the United States, Dulles reported to the National Security Council that, in his meeting with the new French Prime Minister Mendes-France, he

... had pointed out that the U.S. public was getting a trifle short-tempered on the EDC topic and that if Mendes was not careful, the U.S. Congress might terminate aid to NATO which would be detrimental to the military effort of all Europe, especially France.²¹

Such diplomatic intimidation was designed to convince the French government that the U.S. considered EDC vital to its own national interests and to those of Europe. Whether this was a last ditch effort to save EDC or whether Eisenhower honestly felt that such tactics would call the French bluff is not clear. Whichever, the result of this action came on August 29, 1954, when the French Assembly rejected the Treaty.

Hubert S. Parmet has attempted, in his book Eisenhower and the American Crusades, to explain the divisions in the French Assembly. He points out that government of Prime Minister René Mayer, which had succeeded the Mendes-France government, was dependent upon the Gaullist Party which was strongly opposed to EDC. Their main fear was that EDC would deteriorate in the future and France would be left vulnerable

to a rearmed Germany. This fear was one which all U.S. efforts had failed to alleviate. References to a united, rearmed Germany by the Eisenhower Administration did little to increase French confidence in the EDC concept. This fear, when combined with the U.S. refusal to give France the aid requested for Indochina, resulted in a general lack of confidence on the part of the French in the NATO alliance system.²²

Reaction to the rejection of EDC was predictable. The day after the vote in the French Assembly, President Eisenhower spoke on the subject in Des Moines, Iowa:

This was a device, my friends, whereby the free world could establish, without indulging in the traditional fights among themselves in Western Europe, security from any threat from without.²³

But others did not react so calmly to the "setback." Ambassador to Italy Claire Booth Luce wrote to the President: "Today an 'integrated Europe' is dead and the strength of NATO may be greatly damaged."²⁴

Eisenhower's commitment to the principle of a rearmed, sovereign West Germany spurred the Administration to seek an alternative solution to the problem. In cooperation with the United Kingdom, the United States proposed a nine-power conference for the discussion of a new proposal.²⁵ This met in London September 28- October 3, 1954. There the difficulties with the old EDC proposal were identified and alternatives were discussed. All nine powers realized

the need to use the West German manpower, but they could not agree on the exact method of implementation. The statement issued at the end of the conference referred to a compromise based on "most of the values inherent in the original European Defense Community proposal."²⁶

A second conference was held in Paris October 20-22, to approve the London compromise. The Paris Agreements, as the compromise was known, specified:

- 1) Though the occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany would be formally ended, foreign forces, in strengths equal to those then stationed there, would be allowed to remain.
- 2) The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would be invited to join the Brussels Pact.
- 3) The Western European Union would be created and would establish maximum force levels for the member nations.
- 4) The United Kingdom pledged to maintain four divisions and the 2nd Tactical Air Force on the Continent.
- 5) The Federal Republic of Germany would be invited to join NATO.
- 6) Only SACEUR would command the forces of the West European Union.
- 7) France and West Germany signed agreements resolving cultural and economic difficulties, in addition to the question of the Saar.²⁷

Though the Paris Agreements did not achieve the level of unity envisioned by the proponents of the EDC, they did restore complete sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, thus enabling her to rearm.

President Eisenhower appears to have viewed the Paris Agreements as evidence that cooperation among the European nations was possible but that his hope for a totally unified Europe was not. Throughout late October and early November, he mentioned the "working together in Western Europe" and the placing of West Germany "on a basis of full equality with other states."²⁸ He referred no longer to the "unity of Europe," which had dominated his statements earlier in the year.

Christian A. Herter, then Under-Secretary of State, would later refer to the Paris Agreements as "an Atlantic solution that replaced a European solution."²⁹ This explanation, though a gross over-simplification, is generally accurate. It is apparent that throughout the entire EDC fight the U.S., and particularly Eisenhower, was interested mainly in using the German manpower resources for self-defense. The European Defense Community, as proposed in 1950 by Plevin, seemed the easiest way of accomplishing this task. Eisenhower looked upon a unified Europe as being the best guarantee against another intra-European war. Having served in two wars that were primarily the result of European quarrels, his desire for a permanent peace in Europe is understandable. However, his apparent disregard for nationalism in the European nations, particularly France, contributed ultimately to the failure of EDC.

The EDC controversy was significant in that it was a direct conflict between Eisenhower's idealistic goal of a unified Europe and the realistic French fear of a militaristic Germany. The failure of the EDC proposal was to affect the Eisenhower Administration's relations with NATO. While for two years NATO had received close attention, it would now receive very little. This can be credited partially to Eisenhower's disenchantment with Europe, particularly France, which had caused the destruction of the EDC. Additionally, the West German entrance into NATO solved almost completely the Alliance's manpower problem that had persisted for four years. With this problem largely solved, Eisenhower was no longer required to devote so much attention to it. The result was that Eisenhower would, for the next few years, devote less and less attention to NATO.

CHAPTER III

CONFLICT WITHIN NATO

- While the problems of NATO manpower and German participation were solved by the end of 1954, the Alliance faced other problems at the same time. The necessity for the formation of a new defense strategy and the basic issue of the Alliance's applicability to specific situations occupied NATO's attention from 1952 to 1956. As had been the case with all other NATO matters, Eisenhower's position on these problems greatly influenced their development, and develop they did culminating in the Suez Crisis of 1956.

When NATO was formed in April 1949, the United States had a monopoly in atomic weapons. The sense of security provided by such a monopoly was jarred by the announcement on September 23 of that year that the Soviet Union had developed an atomic bomb. This development forced the Alliance to meet the possibility of an atomic exchange which presented many problems to the NATO planners. But no real change in strategy was made since most felt these weapons would be used strategically against cities, and this would not significantly affect the tactical planning.

Changes in the military environment came quickly. In 1952, the United Kingdom became the third power to develop an atomic device. That same year the United States

successfully tested a thermonuclear weapon. In May, 1953, the U.S. developed an atomic artillery shell, thus making the tactical use of atomic warheads possible. This U.S. advantage was soon eliminated as the Soviet Union announced in August that it had also exploded a thermonuclear device. These rapid advances in technology spelled the end of strategies valid in World War II and required the development of new strategies based on the reality of nuclear warfare.

The United States began the revision of strategy in January, 1954. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly announced that aggression aimed at the U.S. or its allies would be met by massive nuclear retaliation. This policy was adequate to deal with strategic problems since it was assumed that only the U.S. and Russia would be involved in such a nuclear confrontation. The problem arose when such a strategy was applied at the tactical level in Europe. Our allies, except for the United Kingdom, had little or no understanding of the effects and capabilities of nuclear weapons. To help alleviate this situation, President Eisenhower sought and received Congressional approval in 1954 to disseminate certain atomic information to NATO commanders in order that they could better understand the ramifications of nuclear warfare. Eisenhower himself attempted to clarify the U.S. position concerning the nuclear defense

of Europe:

Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without the devastation or occupation of any NATO country.

The key phrase here is "without the devastation or occupation of any NATO country." Such a statement at least committed the United States to a strategy of stopping aggression without devastating the area invaded. This would imply the use of strategic nuclear weapons, and possibly tactical nuclear weapons, but only against targets on enemy soil.

Though accepting the Eisenhower plan for the nuclear defense of Europe, the NATO partners were not in agreement on other matters. The United Kingdom, throughout the latter stages of the fight for the EDC, argued that as far as conventional forces were concerned it felt that plans for European defense should be

... tailored to the forces available, and that the forces should consist of what the country could make available regardless of the requirement.²

The United Kingdom's main complaint was that if war did come to Western Europe it would be defended primarily through nuclear forces, not conventional. Thus, the never-ending request by NATO for an ever-increasing number of men was ridiculous. Eisenhower viewed the situation differently

and let it be known that he felt a nation's manpower contribution to NATO was directly proportional to its belief in the Alliance. Again, as was common with him, he reduced NATO to idealistic principles which were not necessarily shared by the Europeans.

The French rejection of the EDC Treaty, when combined with this British desire for the revision of NATO troop commitments, produced in some American minds the fear that the Alliance was weakening. General Alfred Gruenther, then serving as SACEUR, wrote to Allan M. Wilson of the Advertising Council that he felt the Soviets were behind the growing rifts within NATO. What he feared most was that the Soviet actions would succeed in isolating the U.S. from its allies.³ The upper echelons of the President's staff shared this fear which permeated a letter from C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning, to Stuart Peabody of the Borden Company in April, 1955. The letter was concerned with guidelines for the forthcoming NATO advertising campaign in which Peabody was involved. Jackson described our European allies as being "tired and scared" and wishing "that Russia and the U.S. would just go away."⁴ Also included in the guidelines was a discussion of the Communist threat to Europe, but Jackson cautioned that

The European does not fear Communism as much as we do, and when somebody starts foaming at the

mouth on the subject, he knows that there is an American behind whatever is said or printed.⁵

Jackson reiterated that the advertising campaign was designed to gain European public support for NATO. "One of the images we have failed to create," he stated, "is that NATO is for the defense of Europe, not the United States."⁶

The problems of the Alliance were further compounded by the formation of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955. The Soviet Union and its seven East European satellites signed the twenty-year mutual defense pact feeling that they would be threatened by a rearmed West Germany. The rearming of West Germany was also interpreted by the signatories as a rejection of the 1954 Soviet proposal for the neutralization of a permanently divided Germany. Although the Russians had already begun privately to rearm the East Europeans, the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany gave them the justification to rearm openly. Though on the surface this could be considered somewhat disadvantageous, it was quickly pointed out in governmental circles that having West Germany as a full-fledged ally more than compensated for any such setback.⁷ These people felt that the utilization of German talent in science and weapons technology would more than counter-balance the negative impact of the Warsaw Pact.

In order to counteract the growing differences and problems within the Alliance, President Eisenhower resumed

his public campaign for a unified Europe. In a press conference on February 23, 1955, he referred briefly to the problem of a politically divided Europe:

They are a great power if united, 250 million highly educated people, a great productive capacity, great resources; but split up into contesting smaller governments and smaller economies, it is indeed failing to achieve the strength of which it is capable.⁸

This fleeting reference was made in the context of explaining the failure of EDC, but indicated that he still dreamed of a fully united Europe. His renewed campaign intensified in January, 1956. In his State Of the Union message, Eisenhower pledged the United States to increase the military strength of NATO and also to achieve "political cohesion and unity of purpose."⁹ He continued by calling on the Western European nations to renew their effort "to achieve a greater measure of integration."¹⁰ These references were general yet pointed reminders to all, especially Europeans, that he did not consider the idea of a united Europe to be dead.

The President's desire to restore confidence in European unity became apparent in a series of conferences with two European leaders. Following meetings between Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, a joint statement was issued on February 1, 1956. Although it appeared to be the typical bland summary of their talks referring

only to friendship between the two nations and their desire to exchange views, the statement broke new ground in the area of NATO relations.

We regard this association as far more than a military alliance. We welcome the increasing range of consultation in the Council on political and other problems.¹¹

The idea that NATO was more than a military alliance, and that political and "other problems" should be dealt with by the MAC was a new approach to the old debate over unity. Eisenhower's position became much clearer in meetings with Italian President Gronchi in February-March, 1956. In two joint statements made during the talks, direct reference was made to Gronchi's support of European unification and to the two leaders' desire for exploration of the framework in which European economic cooperation could be increased.¹² This tactic of international politicking seemed to lend a note of European support to Eisenhower's effort. Unfortunately the process appears to have ended with the Gronchi conference, as no other joint statement released in 1956 makes any reference, subtle or otherwise, to European unity.

The high point of Eisenhower's 1956 drive for European unity came May 25, 1956 in his commencement address at Baylor University. As he had in 1953 and 1954, he again used a philosophic justification for European unity. He began his remarks by stating that all the leaders of Western Europe

realized that their only guarantee of security was "broad and effective cooperation among the nations of that region."¹³ He then proposed that these leaders also realized that through a genuine unification of their nations their 250 million people would become "a mighty pillar of free strength in the modern world." He further emphasized that

A free United States of Europe would be strong in the skills of its people, adequately endowed with material resources, and rich in their common cultural and artistic heritage. It would be a highly prosperous community.

Such rhetoric reached new heights as Eisenhower warned of the consequences of a failure to unite:

... the history of the past half century in Europe could go on in dreary repetition, possibly to the ultimate destruction of all the values those people themselves held most dear.

If Europe unified, however, he predicted that "a new sun of hope, security and confidence would shine for Europe, for us, and for the free world." As a gloomy afterthought to all of these rosy predictions, even the President had to admit that his dream of "a united Western Europe may still be on the far-off horizon."¹⁴

The idealism with which Eisenhower apparently approached the issue of European unity was reminiscent of similar idealism with which Woodrow Wilson approached Europe thirty-seven years earlier. As was true then, Europe apparently had different ideas of what its future should be. This difference of viewpoint was graphically illustrated in the Suez

Canal Crisis of 1956. In this crisis Anglo-French national interests clashed directly with Eisenhower's conception of the function of NATO.. The result of this clash of interests had profound effects on the Alliance the least of which being a loss of confidence in it by all parties.

The Suez Crisis began when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser formally announced on July 26, 1956, that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal. This action was a direct challenge to the British and French, who considered the control of the Canal vital to their national security. Their reaction to Nasser's announcement was two-fold: first, they alerted their Mediterranean armed forces and secretly began studying the possibility of a joint military expedition to re-occupy the Canal; and second, they contacted their ally the United States in order to gain support. Although not clearly covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, any action taken by France and Britain would directly affect all NATO members. This was precisely what Eisenhower hoped to avoid. He opposed the British suggestion of a joint U.S.-British-French military move to bring "Nasser to his knees." Rather he felt non-military pressure should be applied by all maritime powers.¹⁵ The British and French did not share this view, and they contended that the Canal could not be

operated by the Egyptians. In siezing the Canal, they argued, Nasser had violated earlier agreements that guaranteed its international control and ownership. Finally, if Nasser were allowed to get away with such a direct affront to the West, the French and British feared he could become the Arab dictator of the Mediterranean.

Feelings such as these left little room for agreement. Eisenhower even went as far as later to describe the French and British as showing "impatience with the restraining influence of the United States."¹⁶ He proposed that the question be brought before the United Nations. He admitted that the UN would probably do little more than to administer "a slap on the wrist to Nasser," but to him force of any kind could not be justified while peaceful solutions remained unexplored.

The situation was further complicated on July 31, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced his support for Nasser. Eisenhower's reply to this statement cautioned the Soviets against acting in haste, since the U.S. was pledged through NATO to aid her allies. This exchange left no doubt that the U.S. considered NATO involved in the crisis. France and Britain let Eisenhower know that they were still determined to re-occupy the Canal forcefully unless Nasser retreated, and felt that the Soviets would protest such a move only verbally.

The British position was clearly revealed on August 4 in a discussion between U. S. Ambassador Robert Murphy and Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan. Murphy later recalled that he "was left in no doubt that the British Government believed that Suez was a test which could be met only by the use of force."¹⁷ Although Murphy himself thought the British position justified, he knew that the logic behind the American position was that support of any military action could have a disastrous effect on the President's chances for re-election that November.¹⁸ In a press conference four days later, Eisenhower qualified the U.S. opposition to the proposed Anglo-French expedition. He stated that, though he felt all questions should be negotiated, he did not advocate the surrender of any nation's rights "without using everything they can to preserve their rights."¹⁹ The objective of the United States, Eisenhower later said, was not to restore ownership of the Canal to the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company. It was to ensure access to the Canal for all nations as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1888. Unfortunately Egypt was denying access to its arch-enemy, Israel. Eisenhower wanted the Suez Crisis considered completely separate from the Arab-Israeli conflict, but others saw the two as inseparable.

While the public and diplomatic statements of the Eisenhower Administration proposed a peaceful solution to the

Suez crisis, privately Eisenhower believed that force might be justified.

The fate of Western Europe must never be placed at the whim of a dictator and it was conceivable that the use of force under extreme circumstances might become necessary. In this unhappy event, quick military action must be so strong as to be completed successfully without delay--any other course would create new problems.²⁰

With these conflicting opinions in the background, a conference was called in London August 16, to negotiate a settlement of the Suez problem. The U.S. proposal to form an international board to govern the Canal's operation was approved, but there was little hope for such a settlement to work. The Egyptian government had siesed the Canal mainly to use its profits to pay for the multi-million dollar Aswan High Dam project. So it was highly unlikely that they would be willing to give up control of the Canal.

Egyptian rejection of the London Conference plan scuttled Eisenhower's hope for a peaceful solution to the situation. On August 27, U.S. intelligence sources reported that French troops were beginning to arrive at the British base on Cyprus, where the British were already building up their forces. The significance was that the U.S. received no formal notification of this action from France or Great Britain, thus casting some doubt on their confidence in the U.S. position. On September 1, Prime Minister Eden, in a last attempt to gain U.S. support for military action, wrote to Eisenhower.

He equated Nasser's tactics with those of Hitler's and stated that any restraint shown by the allies, as was shown in Munich in 1938, would result in similar turmoil. He concluded his correspondence by plainly defining what the British felt their duty to be:

We have many times led Europe in the fight for freedom. It would be an ignoble end to our long history if we tamely accepted to perish by degrees.²¹

The presumption that Britain would once again have to lead Europe "in a fight for freedom" naturally involved the precarious U.S. position vis-a-vis NATO. Again the problem of supporting one's allies surfaced, as it had in reference to Indochina in 1954, with the United States failing to support or oppose the actions of Britain and France.

President Eisenhower replied to Eden the next day and warned them not to lose sight of the real danger. The Soviets, he wrote, were constantly engaged in schemes to weaken NATO. Accordingly, the West should present a united diplomatic front and pressure Nasser to negotiate without resorting to force.²² A second letter written by Eisenhower to Eden, dated September 8, further examined the situation. The President feared that unless Nasser could be clearly identified as an aggressor, all the Arab nations would stand with him against any action by the West.²³ He also feared that a serious misunderstanding between the U.S. and the United Kingdom would occur if any use of military force took

place. Eisenhower urged patience, since he too opposed any capitulation to Nasser. If the situation were allowed to cool down, Eisenhower felt more permanent and peaceful results would come about.

The Egyptian ability to operate the Canal was tested on September 14, as the Western pilots walked off their jobs. Contrary to the ill-founded Anglo-French predictions, the Egyptian pilots proved capable and the Canal remained open. In late September the French and British took the issue to the United Nations without first informing Eisenhower. This began the two-month diplomatic silence on Suez between Britain and France on one side and the United States on the other. Throughout this silence, it became apparent that Britain and France intended to act independently of the U.S. In an attempt to clarify the issue, Washington formally asked London and Paris why they had taken the issue before the UN.

Was it a sincere desire to negotiate a satisfactory peaceful settlement or was this merely a setting of the stage for eventual use of force in Suez?²⁴

On October 5, French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd answered that "they did not believe that any peaceful way existed." Only through the forced capitulation by Nasser "could Western standing in Africa and the Middle East be restored."²⁵

This blunt reply shocked Eisenhower who reiterated that the use of force by the West against Nasser would result in strong opposition from the peoples of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Although vitally concerned with any Anglo-French military action, Eisenhower refused to disassociate the U.S. from its allies publicly.

I do want to make this clear: our friendships with Britain are very, very important to us, not only sentimentally but officially, politically, economically, and militarily. The same goes for France.²⁶

This seemed to indicate that he wished to keep NATO, and the commitments involved therein, separated from any Anglo-French move in the Suez area. After this statement little happened, either publicly or privately, between the U.S. and her two European allies for the next seventeen days.

By October 28, it was clear to Eisenhower from U.S. intelligence information that the Israelis were preparing to launch an invasion against one or more of her Arab neighbors. It also became clear that the Anglo-French forces on Cyprus were being readied for action. Eisenhower expressed his shock and disbelief that day in a letter to his speechwriter Emmett John Hughes:

I just can't believe [the British] would be so stupid as to invite on themselves all the Arab hostility to Israel. Are they going to dare us - dare us - to defend the Tripartite declaration.²⁷

The Tripartite Agreement of 1950 had pledged France, Great Britain, and the United States to take joint action, within or without the United Nations, and to use force, if necessary, if the borders specified in the 1950 Arab-Israeli armistice were crossed or threatened. Apparently, Eisenhower feared that he would be forced into a position of having to choose between his allies and his treaty obligations.

On October 29, Israel struck across the Sinai Peninsula against Egypt. That same day the French government lodged a formal protest with the UN Security Council that insurgent forces in French Algeria were being supplied by the Egyptians. This, along with a publicly stated fear that the Egyptian-Israeli War would endanger the Canal, served as justification for British air strikes two days later on Cairo, Alexandria, and Ismailia. The Egyptians immediately retaliated by sinking concrete-filled ships in the Canal, thus hopelessly blocking it. The bombing had been preceded by a ten-hour ultimatum from Eden to the Israelis and the Egyptians to pull back from the Canal and to allow Anglo-French forces to enter the area. The ultimatum was, of course, ignored by both sides.

All the while, France and Britain maintained silence toward the U.S. about their intentions. Eisenhower was visibly concerned over the danger of the conflict

expanding into an all-out war. Both France and Britain declared the Tripartite Agreement void, since the Egyptians had allegedly accepted arms from the Soviet Union. Though Eisenhower felt this to be the easiest way to avoid direct confrontation with his allies, he thought the whole situation was being badly handled.

I've just never seen great powers make such a complete mess and botch of things. ... Of course, there's just nobody, in a war, I'd rather have fighting alongside me ~~than~~ the British. ... But -- this thing! My God!

The official silence was broken when the ultimatum was issued. French Premier Guy Mollet later admitted that the French and British had kept silence for "fear that if we had consulted [the United States], it would have prevented us from acting."²⁹ Such feelings seem to befit children doing something reckless which their parents would not allow them to do, rather than attitudes which allies should have towards one another. Likewise, Eisenhower's performance seemed to be one of a disgruntled parent trying to control the actions of his children. Unfortunately for him, France and Britain did not share this view, nor should it be expected that they would. Eisenhower expressed his dismay with the Anglo-French attitude in a letter to Eden on October 30.³⁰ He stated his confusion at their silence and queried the French

concerning their alleged shipment of arms to Israel. He concluded by requesting that each party inform the others of their intentions.

Once the British air strikes had been made on October 31, Eisenhower, in a speech to the American people, acknowledged that Britain, Israel, and France had all been subjected to "grave provocations." But he refused to condone the attacks and said that the three nations "were in error."³¹ Though not a condemnation of their actions, Eisenhower's statement showed his disapproval. Yet it also inferred that their disaffection was understandable. His true feelings soon surfaced, when on November 5, an Anglo-French airborne force landed at Port Said. Reports from the Central Intelligence Agency related that there was a

... fear around Nasser, and in Nasser himself, that his position, before a resolute Anglo-French action, might fast become hopeless. Dryly, Eisenhower commented: "Tell Nasser we'll be glad to put him on St. Helena and give him a million dollars."³²

Statements like this left little doubt of where the President's sentiments lay. He made his position formal in a reply to Soviet Premier Bulganin's letter of November 5. Bulganin had earlier sent messages to France, Britain, and Israel condemning them as aggressors and warning them that the USSR was willing to use force to restore peace, even at the expense of starting World War III. In his

letter to Eisenhower, he proposed a joint Soviet-American military force to intervene in the Mid-East war and stop the fighting. He argued that such measures were necessary in order to avert World War III. But Eisenhower replied that such a proposal was unthinkable and warned Bulganin that the entry of any new troops into the Middle East would be met with "effective counter-measures" by the UN, including the U.S.³³ The next day he elaborated upon this principle even further by stating that any Soviet attack on Britain and France would bring the U.S. to their defense.

Although the Anglo-French action had caused Eisenhower much embarrassment, he referred to the whole crisis as being "like a family spat."³⁴ He later commented that if the Anglo-French expedition had been a complete success and had toppled the Nasser government, the U.S. would have accepted the results and taken a wait-and-see attitude. However, he felt, "there'd have been no great crisis in the world."³⁵ Unfortunately for the British and French, hostilities ended between Israel and Egypt on November 5, one hour after the first paratroopers landed at Port Said, thus eliminating the acknowledged reason for the expedition. The fighting in the Port Said area was finally halted on November 7 due to the pressure from Russia, lack of specific support from the U.S., and sudden fiscal problems in Britain.³⁶

By December 22 all Anglo-French forces had been withdrawn and the United Nations Emergency Force was beginning to deploy. The officially ended the Suez Crisis for the NATO allies, but did not mark the end of the Alliance's problems.

Throughout the years of 1955 and 1956, Eisenhower attempted to breathe life into his old dream of European unity. He approached it by referring to "unity of purpose" and "increased cooperation." But ultimately he desired a "United States of Europe," which he felt would be a force for peace. The revival was abruptly halted when the Suez Crisis began and the Anglo-French-American split over actions to be taken seemed to threaten the most basic principles of the Alliance. The split widened until the French and British became silent about their intentions. It was this act that appears to have changed the U.S. attitude, or at least brought to the surface the basic feelings toward Britain and France. The opinions Eisenhower expressed privately brought back memories of his World War II days, still referring to the British as his right arm.³⁷ and wishing them by his side in time of war. This confidence in the British and the quandary in which he found himself as he faced re-election, as well as the delicate situation in Hungary, forced him to remain as neutral as possible during the Suez Crisis.

For NATO the Suez Crisis spelled the end of the naïve expectations that had permeated it during the previous six years. It killed, once and for all, any hope Eisenhower had for a unified Europe. It also marked the end of any European hopes that NATO could be used to support members' actions outside Europe. This left, for the first time, all the NATO members with the same conception of the Alliance -- it was purely a defensive alliance applicable only to the North Atlantic and selected Mediterranean areas.

CONCLUSION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had developed from virtually nothing in 1950 to a viable deterrent force in Europe in 1956. In reference to his tenure as SACEUR, Robert Jordan aptly described Eisenhower as "more than any other person or body ... the public embodiment of NATO."¹ As SACEUR, he represented the hope for a restored Europe. As President he became vitally involved in the EDC debate as did the whole Alliance. Finally in 1956, after efforts to achieve a unified Europe had failed, he was terribly torn between old loyalties and new realities, as was the Alliance itself.

The mark which Eisenhower left on NATO during the period examined here is hard to measure. He organized the Alliance in much the same way as he had organized SHAEF in World War II. His self-confidence was apparent in both cases as he accepted personal responsibility for his most crucial subordinate command. At the same time he also expressed confidence in his World War II associates.

While relying on his 1941-1945 experience in organization, he looked to his old enemy, Germany, for the solution to his most pressing problem -- manpower. In carrying out the Truman policy of supporting the EDC,

he too became convinced of the necessity to rearm Germany and utilize its manpower. His persistence on this point continued into his Presidency.

As SACEUR, he made few references to unifying Europe, but as President he made it a personal campaign. Whether unity was simply a vehicle for German rearmament or whether he actually viewed it as a viable alternative, Eisenhower backed the concept strongly during the EDC fight. His main mistake, however, was his disregard of nationalistic feeling in Europe. This is evidenced clearly by his statements concerning EDC and the unification of Germany. This implicit affront to the French was inexcusable although not necessarily fatal to EDC, it was definitely a poor argument for French ratification.

At this point, the chances for French ratification deserve consideration. It seems clear that the French, if they intended to ratify the EDC Treaty at all, wished to gain as many concessions as possible from the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany. These concessions would not only concern European security directly, but also deal with the French dilemma in Indochina. The Treaty might have had some chance for ratification if the Indochina situation had concluded more favorably for France. But once the Geneva Accords were signed the EDC was doomed, and nothing short of a miracle could have saved it.

Without some defense system like EDC, there was also little hope for any meaningful movement toward unification. True, the European Economic Community later unified Europe economically, but political unification had to be preceded by a military unification. Thus Eisenhower's constant push for a unified Europe was, in reality, a futile one after the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO. His rhetoric of 1955 and 1956 on European union only clouded this issue and probably concealed the growing splits with the Atlantic Alliance.

The independent action of France and Britain in the Suez Crisis spelled the doom for the Alliance system which Eisenhower had designed. Their complete refusal to consult with the U.S. prior to the outbreak of hostilities revealed that the Alliance was no longer based on the mutual trust and confidence which Eisenhower had sought to build. The crisis forced him back to his old dependence upon his World War II concepts and ideals of co-operation and assistance. This is tragic for he had attempted to take the NATO Alliance from its beginning as a collection of wartime friendships to the formation of an idealistic union of nations dedicated to the good of all men.

APPENDIX A: Chronology*

1948

March 12 - Brussels Pact signed

1949

April 4 - North Atlantic Treaty signed

May 23 - Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed in Bonn

July 21 - United States Senate ratifies NAT

August 24 - NAT comes into force

September 23 - USSR explodes first atomic bomb

1950

September 14-15 - North Atlantic Council meeting in New York

October 28 - Eisenhower visits Truman in the White House

October 30 - Truman informs North Atlantic Council of Eisenhower's designation

December 16 - Eisenhower granted leave of absence from Columbia University

December 19 - NAC designates Eisenhower as SACEUR

1951

January 12-23 - Eisenhower conducts inspection tour of Europe

February 2 - Eisenhower delivers address to the nation on NATO

April 2 - Allied Command, Europe becomes operational with SHAPE located at Rocquencourt at Paris

October 9-11 - Temporary Council Committee meets in Paris

November 19 - NATO defense College inaugurated in Paris

1952

January 30 - NAC appoints Admiral Lynde D. McCormick as SACLANC

February 18 - Greece and Turkey join NATO

February 20-25 - NAC holds Lisbon conference

February 21 - Channel Command established

March 12 - Lord Ismay appointed as Secretary-General of NATO

* Taken in part from: Robert I. Vexler. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1890-1969 (Dobbs Ferry, 1970). pp. 10-22, 22-23, 23-24.

April 16 - NATO opens provisional headquarters at the
Palais de Chaillot, Paris
May 27 - European Defense Treaty signed
May 30 - General Matthew Ridgway relieves Eisenhower as
SACEUR
June 2 - Eisenhower retires from active duty
November 1 - U.S. explodes its first H-bomb
November 4 - Eisenhower is elected President

1953

January 20 - Eisenhower inaugurated
March 5 - Joseph Stalin dies
May 25 - U.S. fires first atomic artillery shell
May 28 - USSR recognizes German Democratic Republic
July 27 - Korean armistice signed
August 8 - USSR announces test of its first H-bomb
December 4-8 - Bermuda Conference

1954

January 12 - Secretary of State Dulles announces policy
of massive retaliation
March 13 - Siege of Dien Bien Phu begins
April 17 - Vice President Nixon "floats" rumor of intro-
duction of U.S. troops to Indochina
May 8 - Dien Bien Phu falls
July 21 - Geneva Treaty ends Indochina War
August 29 - French National Assembly rejects European
Defense Treaty
October 23 - Paris Agreements signed -- Federal Republic
of Germany is invited to join NATO

1955

May 5 - Federal Republic of Germany joins NATO
May 14 - Warsaw Pact signed
September 24 - Eisenhower suffers heart attack
December 15-16 - NAC decides to equip NATO forces with
atomic weapons

1956


May 4-5 - NAC appoints Committee of Three to study
cooperation in NATO
July 26 - Nasser announces nationalization of Suez Canal
August 16 - Great Britain officially mobilizes
September 14 - Western pilots walk off Suez jobs

October 5 - United Nations begins debate on Suez question
October 23 - Hungarian revolt begins
October 31 - British bomb Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said,
and Ismailia. Egyptians retaliate by blocking Canal.
November 5 - British and French paratroopers land at
Port Said
November 6 - Anglo-French forces land by sea at Ports
Said and Fuad. Eisenhower re-elected to second
term as President.
November 7 - Cease fire declared
December 14-15 - NAC approves report of the Committee of
Three
December 22 - Last Anglo-French forces withdrawn from
Suez area

**THIS BOOK
CONTAINS
NUMEROUS PAGES
WITH DIAGRAMS
THAT ARE CROOKED
COMPARED TO THE
REST OF THE
INFORMATION ON
THE PAGE.**


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North Atlantic Treaty Organization Structure



APPENDIX C

SHAPE Command Structure



NOTES

INTRODUCTION

- ¹ North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5.
- ² "What's Behind the Eisenhower News," Newsweek, November 6, 1950, p. 17.

CHAPTER I

- ¹ Message from Acheson to Truman, 12:15 a.m., September 15, 1950. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II (Garden City, 1956), p. 257.
- ² Letter from General Alfred Gruenther to Eisenhower, September, 1950. Pre-Presidential File, Box #44, Alfred M. Gruenther folder, Eisenhower Library.
- ³ Memorandum from the State Department to Truman, undated. Official File 408 (1949-51), General Dwight D. Eisenhower folder, Truman Library.
- ⁴ Letter from Truman to Eisenhower, December 19, 1950. Official File 408 (1949-51), General Dwight D. Eisenhower folder, Truman Library.
- ⁵ Address at Columbia University, March 23, 1950. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Peace With Justice, Selected Addresses (New York, 1961), pp. 16-17. Hereafter cited as Eisenhower, Peace With Justice.
- ⁶ Letter from Eisenhower to Edward E. Hazlett, November 1, 1950, p. 1. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #51, Edward E. Hazlett folder, Eisenhower Library.
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 1.
- ⁸ Letter from Eisenhower to W. Averell Harriman, December 12, 1950. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #50, W. Averell Harriman folder #1, Eisenhower Library.
- ⁹ "Eisenhower Set to Shoulder the Burden of Bolstering Europe as Vital Frontier," Newsweek, December 18, 1950, p. 23.

- ¹⁰Public Statement #3358, November 7, 1951. Hoover Papers, Box #301, Statements of Great Debate folder, Hoover Library.
- ¹¹Memorandum from Harnell Hart to Herbert Hoover, undated, pp. 1-5. Post-Presidential Papers, Subject File, Box #81, Foreign Policy -- Opposition Speech, Feb. - Mar., 1951 folder, Hoover Library.
- ¹²Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, pp. 253-254.
- ¹³These plans are discussed in detail later in this chapter on pages 10-11.
- ¹⁴Lord [Hastings] Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years (Paris, 1955), p. 29. Hereafter cited as Ismay, The First Five Years.
- ¹⁵General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Henry Jackson, ed., The Atlantic Alliance (Washington, 1967), p. 134.
- ¹⁶Ismay, The First Five Years, p. 29.
- ¹⁷Ibid., p. 33.
- ¹⁸Letter from Eisenhower to Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, December 13, 1951. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #64, Robert A. Lovett folder, Eisenhower Library.
- ¹⁹Text of General Eisenhower's speech before the North Atlantic Council, November 27, 1951, NATO Information Service No. AP-82197, p. 5. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #163, North Atlantic Council Meeting, November 26, 1951 folder, Eisenhower Library.
- ²⁰For elaboration on this topic see: Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, p. 253. SHAPE Briefings for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July, 1951, p. 11. Pre-Presidential Papers, Box #139, Congressional Visits: 1951 (3) folder, Eisenhower Library. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Report to the Standing Group of NATO, April 2, 1952." Pre-Presidential Papers, Box #159, Speeches (9) folder (January, 1951-May, 1952), Eisenhower Library.

- 21 "Annual Report to the Standing Group of NATO, 2 April 1952." Pre-Presidential Papers, Box #159, Speeches (9) folder (January 1951-May 1952), Eisenhower Library.
- 22 Ismay, The First Five Years, p. 38.
- 23 United Kingdom - one Deputy Chief of Staff
 two Assistant Chiefs of Staff
France - one Deputy Chief of Staff
 one Assistant Chief of Staff
United States - one Assistant Chief of Staff
Italy - one Assistant Chief of Staff
- 24 In early September, 1944, Eisenhower assumed command of the Allied Land Forces after the creation of the 21st and 12th Army Groups on August 1, 1944. The position had previously been held by Field Marshal Montgomery.
- 25 NATO Staff draft reply to Colonel Russell V. Ritchey, USAF, October 29, 1956. Official File 116-H-2-A, NATO Defense College folder, Eisenhower Library.
- 26 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted by Philip Crowl, Dulles Oral History Project, Eisenhower Library, p. 24.
- 27 Truman, Memoirs, Volume II, p. 253.
- 28 Message to the Senate concerning Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty concerning the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, June 2, 1952. Official File 66, NATO (SHAPE Endorsements) folder, Truman Library.
- 29 Press Conference, January 20, 1951, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, p. 8. Pre-Presidential Files, John J. McCloy folder, Eisenhower Library.
- 30 General Gruenther, SHAPE Briefs for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July, 1951, p. 11. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #139, Congressional Visits: 1951 (3) folder, Eisenhower Library.
- 31 Speech before North Atlantic Council, November 27, 1951, NATO Information Service No. AP-82197, p. 6. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #163, North Atlantic Council Meeting, November 26, 1951 folder, Eisenhower Library.

- ³² Letter from Eisenhower to Lovett, April 2, 1952. Official File 66, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) folder, Truman Library.
- ³³ Letter from Eisenhower to General Lucius D. Clay, USA, (Ret.), March 28, 1952, p. 3. Pre-Presidential Files, Box #22, Lucius D. Clay (3) folder, Eisenhower Library.

CHAPTER II

- ¹ Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, 1958), p. 6. Hereafter the series will be cited as Public Papers.
- ² Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 1953. Public Papers, 1953, p. 14.
- ³ Ibid., p. 14.
- ⁴ Address by Dulles, February 12, 1953. Robert L. Branyan and Larsen (editors), The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961, A Documentary History, Volume I (New York, 1971), p. 176. Hereafter cited as Branyan and Larsen, The Eisenhower Administration.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 176.
- ⁶ Telegram from Dulles to American Embassy, Paris, March 26, 1953. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 9 (Washington, 1971), p. 17. Hereafter cited as US-VN Relations.
- ⁷ Telegram from Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith to the American Embassy, Paris, May 21, 1953. Department of Defense, US-VN Relations, Book 9, p. 43.
- ⁸ News Conference, July 8, 1953. Public Papers, 1953, p. 480.
- ⁹ Letter from Eisenhower to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, July 25, 1953. Public Papers, 1953, p. 519.
- ¹⁰ Mr. Knox was negotiating trade agreements with the French. He was a heavy contributor to the Eisenhower campaign and later became very active in international finances.

- 11 Letter from W. E. Knox to Eisenhower, September 14, 1953, pp. 3-4. Official File 115-I, Box #570, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, 1952-1953 (2) folder, Eisenhower Library.
- 12 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Volume I, Mandate For Change (Garden City, 1963), pp. 244-245. Hereafter cited as Eisenhower, Mandate For Change.
- 13 Speech in New York City, August 25, 1952. Branyan and Larsen, The Eisenhower Administration, Volume I, p. 34.
- 14 State of the Union Message, January 7, 1954. Public Papers, 1954, p. 9.
- 15 Annual Budget Message to Congress - Fiscal Year 1955, January 21, 1954. Public Papers, 1954, p. 126.
- 16 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, January 15, 1954. Department of Defense, US-VN Relations, Book 9, p. 215.
- 17 Telegram from Dillon to the Secretary of State, May 19, 1954, Department TEL 4130. US-VN Relations, Book 9, p. 472.
- 18 Ibid., p. 472.
- 19 Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 360.
- 20 Joint Statement by Eisenhower and Churchill, June 28, 1954. Public Papers, 1954, p. 599.
- 21 Secretary Dulles' Report on his trip to Paris, National Security Council meeting, July 15, 1954. US-VN Relations, Book 9, p. 644.
- 22 The United States and the European nations differed greatly in their expectations of NATO. The U.S. considered the Alliance applicable only to its members in the limited geographical area of Western Europe. The European nations, with France in particular, wanted NATO to apply to all situations encountered by its members inside or outside of Europe. Such great differences provided little clarity to an already confused relationship.

- ²³ Address at the Iowa State Fair, August 30, 1954. Public Papers, 1954, p. 789.
- ²⁴ Letter from Ambassador Luce to Eisenhower, August 31, 1954. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, p. 418.
- ²⁵ The nine powers invited were the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Canada.
- ²⁶ Statement on the Nine-Power Conference in London, October 9, 1954. Public Papers, 1954, pp. 888-889.
- ²⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels, 1971), pp. 56-57.
- ²⁸ See in Public Papers, 1954:
Joint Statement by Eisenhower and Adenauer, October 28, 1954, p. 978.
Remarks at the Cleveland Municipal Airport, October 29, 1954, p. 989.
Remarks at the New Castle County Airport, October 29, 1954, p. 1005.
Special Message to the Senate on the Protocols to the Treaties Relating to the Federal Republic of Germany, November 15, 1954, pp. 1048-1050.
- ²⁹ Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, May 5, 1966. Jackson, ed., The Atlantic Alliance, p. 118.

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- ¹ Statement by the President Regarding Relationship with the Proposed European Defense Community, April 16, 1954. Public Papers, 1954, p. 400.
- ² Testimony of General Lauris Norstad, USAF, before the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, May 6, 1966. Jackson, ed., The Atlantic Alliance, p. 140.
- ³ Letter from Gruenther to Wilson, April 10, 1955, p. 1. Staff Files, Files of Special Assistant Relating to the Office of Government Public Service Advertising (James M. Lambie, Jr.), Box #23, North Atlantic Treaty Organization - 1955 folder, Eisenhower Library.

- ⁴ Letter from Jackson to Peabody, April 15, 1955, p. 1. Staff Files, Files of Special Assistant Relating to the Office of Coordinator of Government Public Service Advertising (James M. Lambie, Jr.), Box #23, North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- 1955 folder, Eisenhower Library.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 3.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 2.
- ⁷ Letter from Tracy S. Voorhees to Herbert Hoover, June 15, 1955, p. 1. Post-Presidential Papers, Box #197, Tracy S. Voorhees folder, Hoover Library.
- ⁸ Press Conference, February 23, 1955. Public Papers, 1955, pp. 290-291.
- ⁹ State of the Union Message, January 5, 1956. Public Papers, 1956, p. 7.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.
- ¹¹ Joint Statement by Eisenhower and Eden, February 1, 1956, Public Papers, 1956, p. 215.
- ¹² Joint Statements by Eisenhower and Gronchi, February 28 and March 1, 1956. Public Papers, 1956, pp. 263, 279-280.
- ¹³ Address at the Baylor University Commencement Ceremonies, May 25, 1956. Public Papers, 1956, p. 531.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 534.
- ¹⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Volume II, Waging Peace (New York, 1965), pp. 36-37. Hereafter cited as Eisenhower, Waging Peace.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 38.
- ¹⁷ Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, 1964), p. 380.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 383-384.
- ¹⁹ Press Conference, August 8, 1956. Public Papers, 1956, pp. 670-671.

- ²⁰ Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 43-44.
- ²¹ Ibid., pp. 49-50.
- ²² Ibid., p. 666.
- ²³ Ibid., p. 669.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p. 52.
- ²⁵ Ibid., p. 52.
- ²⁶ Press Conference, October 11, 1956. Public Papers, 1956, p. 883.
- ²⁷ Emmett John Hughes, Ordeal of Power (New York, 1963), pp. 212-213.
- ²⁸ Ibid., pp. 216-217.
- ²⁹ Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 77.
- ³⁰ Ibid., pp. 678-679.
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 81.
- ³² Hughes, Ordeal of Power, pp. 223-224.
- ³³ Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 89-90.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 93.
- ³⁵ Eisenhower, Transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted by Philip Crowl, Dulles Oral History Project, Eisenhower Library, pp. 38-39.
- ³⁶ For an excellent discussion of these factors see Kennett Love's Suez: The Twice-Fought War (New York, 1969), pp. 609-616, 622-630.
- ³⁷ Hughes, Ordeal of Power, p. 220.

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- ¹ Robert Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat (London, 1967), p. 57.

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THE EFFECT OF THE ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS
OF
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
1950-1956

by

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B.A., Kansas State College of Pittsburg, 1972

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1973

Throughout the decade of the 1950's Dwight D. Eisenhower was vitally involved with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) both as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and as President of the United States. This thesis examines the effect his words and actions had on the Alliance for six of those years, 1950 to 1956.

Eisenhower's official association with NATO began with his designation as SACEUR by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on December 18, 1950. In this post, he was charged with organizing all NATO forces in Western Europe into a viable military force. The General began the task initially by forming a staff largely composed of Americans and headed by General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA. While his staff considered the problems of organizing an internationally staffed headquarters, Eisenhower campaigned in the NATO capitals for more troops. As of December, 1950, he commanded only four land divisions (two American and two British) which obviously could not offer any significant resistance by themselves to the estimated twenty-five Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe.

In response to this dilemma, many plans for the increasing of manpower were proposed. Among these was the Pleven Plan, which was a French proposal for the formation of a unified European defense establishment called the European Defense Community (EDC). Eisenhower indicated support

Throughout the decade of the 1950's Dwight D. Eisenhower was vitally involved with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) both as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and as President of the United States. This thesis examines the effect his words and actions had on the Alliance for six of those years, 1950 to 1956.

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for EDC as he was a great believer in a totally unified Western Europe. The EDC Treaty was accepted by the Western European nations on May 27, 1952, and was quickly ratified by all, save France.

The EDC proposal was debated for the next two years and many significant policy questions were raised. Eisenhower continually supported its ratification, as SACBUR and, after his election, as President, on the grounds that through it a unified Western Europe could be realized. A unified Western Europe, he felt, was the best guarantee for lasting peace in the area. His statements of this idea reflected an idealistic attitude toward Europe, one which considered Europeans as one people, united through a strong cultural heritage. He also indicated that EDC was the best means by which West Germany could be rearmed and eventually reunited with East Germany.

The French Assmebly, confronted with the possibility of an armed, united Germany and the disastrous results of the Indochina War, failed to ratify the EDC Treaty. This action disturbed Eisenhower, but he was successful in getting West Germany rearmed. The formal documents were known as the Paris Agreements, signed on October 23, 1954, and provided for West Germany's admittance into NATO.

For the next two years, President Eisenhower campaigned intermittently for increased European cooperation, which he felt would eventually lead to some type of unity in Western

Europe. His campaign became very active in early 1956, but was cut short by the Suez Canal crisis. This crisis pitted the United Kingdom and France against Egypt over control of the Suez Canal. Eisenhower wanted to keep the dispute out of NATO, but Britain and France felt otherwise.

The crisis was brought to a climax when the Israelis invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956, and were followed one day later by a British air attack on Egyptian airfields. This attack was followed, in turn, by an Anglo-French invasion of the Canal area on November 5. These actions were opposed verbally by Eisenhower, but when the Soviet Union threatened retaliation, he quickly sided with his NATO allies.

The six year period saw NATO start as a "paper organization" and end as one, though existing materially, that found it hard to act in most cases, except direct attack against Western Europe. Eisenhower contributed greatly to this ineffectiveness, however, it was primarily his actions that enabled the NATO forces to exist at all.