

PARTY COMPETITION IN RECENT JAPANESE ELECTIONS

by 884

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A MASTER'S THESIS


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PREFACE

This thesis, entitled Party Competition in Recent Japanese Elections, attempts to explore the interactions between political parties and elections in the recent scene of Japan. Why was this subject chosen? Before answering this question there will be a brief examination of the reasons why people study political parties.

President Ayub Khan of Pakistan is said to have once (in October, 1958) considered political parties the major source of the social "mess," and had decided to abolish all political parties in Pakistan. Several years after this decision, he joined a political party (in May, 1963), sadly saying:

Someone asked me the other day, 'Why have you joined a political party?' The reason is simply that I have failed to play this game in accordance with my rules, and so I have to play in accordance with their rules--and the rules demand that I belong to somebody; otherwise who is going to belong to me?¹

Not a modern or modernizing country in this century can escape from the existence of the political party. Indeed, in the politics of democracy, political parties are fought over, not only in election years but daily. In authoritarian countries although only the government-sponsored party is allowed to function properly, the political elite deem it necessary to cloak a facade of the existence of several "opposition" parties, euphemistically coining the official party as the "revolutionary party." In the totalitarian countries, such as in the Soviet system, parties deviate from their proper function in that the Communist party is, as a matter of fact, integrated into the state; yet to garb in party disguise is also regarded as

¹Lucian A. Pye, "Party Systems and National Development in Asia," in Joseph LaPalombara et al. (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 369.

indispensable. Today, the political party in one form or another is omnipresent in developed or developing nations, and may, as Sigmund Neumann has put it, be the "lifeline of modern politics."²

Japan has had almost a century's experience with political parties. Her model is different from the Western one, yet similar to that of most of the non-Western in that the idea of party and the ideologies of the parties are of Western origin; whereas the organizational structure and mode of operation reflect a flavor of its own traditional culture--a typical characteristic common in most of the non-Western party models. Thus, in a day of developing nations, an examination of the Japanese party model may serve as a clue to the over-all understanding of non-Western political processes.

Political parties can be studied in terms of their ideologies, organization, leadership, membership recruitment, political articulation, and/or competition in elections. The approach in this work is narrowed to the rivalry in elections chiefly because it is believed that to run a government is the primary *raison d'être* of the parties. And the road to government in a parliamentary democracy--Japan is one--is usually through the successful competition in the election process. It is primarily for this reason that this study is dedicated to the discovery of the relationship between parties and elections.

Moreover, this research will be confined to the discussion of the recent scene (particularly since 1960) because it is felt that Scalapino-Masumi's celebrated book has answered most of the questions of Japan's party

²Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 1.

experimentation up to 1960.³

This work will be divided into five major sections. Chapter I will introduce the Japanese parties, their origin, development, characteristics, and their present-day outlook. Chapter II will introduce the expansion of the electorate and the major election regulations. Chapter III will discuss the recent three elections for the House of Representatives analyzing their pattern of competition in the 1960-1967 period in order to establish a base for the discussion in the following chapters. Chapter IV will suggest some voting behaviors and explain their social determinism, using voting records and electorate opinion surveys as the major tools of analysis. The last chapter (Chapter V) will discuss the prospects of Japanese parties to see if a new party system can be suggested for the next decade. Meanwhile, the discussion will be broadened to include the nature of party competitions in the House of Councillors election and in local elections, integrating the whole system.

This writer would like to express his appreciation to Professor William W. Boyer, whose constant advice and encouragement have been the writer's guidance throughout his graduate study at the Kansas State University. Mr. Satoru Yamamoto of the Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan, has kindly provided the writer with official voting records together with a survey report on Japanese voting behavior, which otherwise would have been unavailable to him. Mr. Yujiro Macda of the Mainichi Shimbun has made suggestions on locating information to this research. To them both, the writer acknowledges his deep indebtedness. This writer's

³Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), 190 pp.

deepest thanks, however, go to Professor Louis H. Douglas, who has served as the writer's adviser, critic, and teacher. Finally, deep gratitude is due the writer's wife, Yoshi, for her constant encouragement. The mistakes which remain are, of course, the writer's own.

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CHAPTER I

JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES

Before one enters the realm of Japan's political parties, it is necessary to clarify the concept of political party.

A man is by nature partisan, which means that a man takes the side of a person or a group of persons. This inherent nature of the human being will, in the long run, form a partisan group, either in the traditional concept of a faction or in the modern sense of a political party. Thus, to become a "party" member one will always identify with his own and differentiate from others. In short, every party in its very essence signifies "partnership" in a particular organization and "separation" from others by a specific program, as Neumann has said.¹

The political party of present-day form is of relatively recent vintage. Even in the Western world, it dates back only some one hundred and fifty years, and in Asia it makes its appearance still later. In the earliest emergence, political parties appeared as what one now would call factions. It was organized as a tool of political protest and so at best played the role of subversion. No wonder George Washington looked with disfavor upon political parties in his time.²

Edmund Burke has defined the political party as a "body of men united for promoting the national interest upon some particular principle upon

¹Sigmund Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 395.

²Jerome G. Manis et al. (eds.), Man and Society: An Introduction to Social Science (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960), p. 464.

which they are agreed."³ In Neumann's mind, it is generally "the articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with other groups holding divergent views." As such, it is "the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action within the larger political community."⁴

The political party involves six salient characteristics. First, it is a group of persons united for the purpose of getting their leaders into positions of influence in the government. Second, although those who acquire office obtain material rewards, the party, as a whole, at least purports to embrace policies which will promote the interest of the public at large. Third, parties are not ephemeral or ad hoc organizations; they are relatively stable and enduring. Fourth, at least in democratic regimes, they open their membership to the public and must solicit and obtain support from important sectors of the public if they are to fulfill their aims. Fifth, they are quite often coalitions rather than monolithic organizations, and this feature sometimes enables them to effect compromises among conflicting interests in the society.⁵ Sixth, any party must have a party platform in one form or another depicting basic principles, policies, and so on.

The political party can only be created out of modern and modernizing political systems; it emerges whenever the activities of a political system

³Henry S. Commager, "The Functions of Political Parties," *ibid.*

⁴Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

⁵Nobutake Ito, "Political Leadership and Political Parties. A. Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 389.

reach a certain degree of complexity, or whenever the notion of political power comes to include the idea that the mass public must participate or be controlled.

Whenever the political party has emerged, it has appeared to perform some common functions in a variety of political systems at various stages of social, economic, and political development. First, the party is expected to organize public opinion and to communicate demands to the center of governmental power and decision. Second, the party must articulate to its followers the concept of the "broader community." Third, the party is likely to be involved in political recruitment.⁶ In order for a party system to function well, some preconditions should exist; the most important of which are the cessation of hereditary political leadership recruitment and the implementation of universal adult suffrage.

A. PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

The first political party, called the Patriotic Public Party (Aikoku Koto) was established by Taisuke Itagaki in Tosa (now Kochi Prefecture) in January, 1874. It was dedicated to the opposition of the successfully emerged oligarchy of the Meiji Restoration (1868).

The Meiji elites--primarily high ranking samurai--from the southwestern

⁶Joseph LaPalombara et al. (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 3. According to Finer, however, political parties in this century have seven functions: (1) bridging the distance between electors, (2) recruiting party members and combating voter apathy, (3) defining policies, (4) selecting leaders, spokesmen, and rank-and-file candidates for office, (5) educating the electors, (6) assuring the political authority and responsibility and exercising the popular mandate, (7) forming a two-way line of communication of authority and responsibility between the masses and the legislature and executive. See Herman Finer, The Major Governments of Modern Europe (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960), p. 9.

fiefs (han) of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen had no sooner overthrown the two hundred and fifty years' feudal rule of the Tokugawa military government (bakufu), than it split up into two rival cliques: the more powerful Satsuma-Choshu alliance (better known as Sat-Cho) and the less powerful Tosa-Hizen coalition. Being much more powerful, the Sat-Cho consistently dominated the Meiji government, forcing the latter group to constant dissidence. Being disaffected and disregarded, the Tosa-Hizen group, under the leadership of Taisuke Itagaki of Tosa and Shigenobu Okuma of Hizen, opposed in vain the supremacy of Sat-Cho in both internal and external affairs--the Korean expedition in particular. At another time they might have resorted to open military rebellion; however, the disaffected group resorted to a more fashionable weapon this time--the Western political beliefs. It was in the context when the whole country was enthusiastically engaged in absorbing the Western civilization with a view to "enriching the country and strengthening the army" (Hukkoku kyohei) that the new weapon (ideology) was considered to be more powerful. Three schools of political belief were introduced by the elites: the French liberalism, popular among the Tosa clan; the British parliamentarism popular among the Hizen clan; and the Prussian authoritarianism, popular among the Sat-Cho ruling oligarchy. It was against this milieu that the first party was born.

When the term political party (scito) was interpreted into Japanese in 1871 (three years before the establishment of the first party), there were no similar terms or concepts in the Japanese vocabulary. The prevailing concepts, such as faction (toha), connoted something associated with a bandit gang. Thus, when the first party was born, it did not receive popular support other than that of a few ex-samurais in the prefecture of Tosa. Although the Patriotic Public Party was euphemistically called a "popular

party" by the party men, it soon disappeared. In fact, this party was at most a local factional group.

The first "modern" party, the Liberal Party (Jiyuto), was established also by Itagaki in 1880 and dedicated, as before, to the opposition of the Sat-Cho power.⁷ The initial membership was almost exclusively composed of Tosa men. The other anti-government group, the Constitutional Reform Party (Rikken Keishinto), was formed in 1881 by Okuma. During the formative period, the two political parties had difficulty in cooperating with each other although they fought for the same cause: to oppose the Sat-Cho supremacy. Moreover, they had difficulty in attracting supporters from other regions into their organizations. As Scalapino said, "The early Japanese parties were in part sectional struggles for power, with democratic theories serving as a convenient weapon of attack."⁸ Therefore, one notes that political parties in the first stage of development appeared as a protest movement of the elite who engaged in subversive activity. This movement was euphemistically called the "civil rights" (jiyaminken) movement. During this stage, the official rule was "officials honored, people despised" (Kansen minpi); therefore, party escalation did not prove to be a success to power.

In 1900, however, Japan's party development opened a new leaf: the party began to share power with the elite. The parties, placed in a

⁷According to its party platform, this party was dedicated to the "expansion of the people's freedom and the protection and preservation of their rights, the promotion of national progress and the popular welfare, the achievement of equality among all Japanese, and the creation of constitutional government in Japan." See Ike, op. cit., p. 398.

⁸Scalapino, "Japan: Between traditionalism and Democracy," in Neumann, op. cit., p. 308.

position of opposition to the government, refused to vote appropriations bills in the first sessions of the Imperial Diet (i. e., parliament) in the early 1890's. Before long, some of the politically perceptive members of the elite, such as Hirobumi Ito⁹, concluded that since the parties had influence in parliament, it made more sense to work with them than to resist them wholly. Therefore, in 1900 he reorganized and renamed the Liberal Party the Constitutional Political Friends Society (Rikken Seiyukai)¹⁰, himself assuming its presidency.¹¹ Therefore, Ito began to recruit Itagaki and Okuma and to form a party Cabinet, paving a road for the political party to governmental position.

The strength of the two early parties--the Constitutional Political Friends Society and the Constitutional Reform Party¹²--has kept expanding from then on. Finally, during the Hara Cabinet, political parties acquired quasi-supremacy in Japanese politics (in September, 1918).

Takashi Hara was the first "commoner" prime minister, forming his Cabinet on September 29, 1918. At the outset, Yamagata, one of the three

⁹Hirobumi Ito was the chief drafter of the Meiji Constitution (1889) and was known as the "Father of the Meiji Constitution." From 1885 (the first cabinet was formed in this year) on, he assumed the Prime Ministership five times.

¹⁰The newly born party was composed of the old Liberal Party men and Ito's personal supporters.

¹¹Ito remained as Prime Minister in 1900 and 1901 and continued to be a member of the Imperial Circle.

¹²This party was reorganized in the 1913-1915 period under Takaakira Kato, a diplomat and student of the British government, who had married into the Iwasaki family (Missubishi). Under Kato's leadership, this party was renamed the Constitutional Association (Kenseikai) and expanded very rapidly.

surviving elder statesmen¹³, had suggested that a coalition government be formed in coalition with the bureaucratic forces. However, Hara rejected it in favor of a truly party government, and all the cabinet posts, with the exception of the Army, the Navy, and the Foreign Ministry, went to his party (The Constitutional Political Friends Society) men. From 1921 to 1932, cabinets alternated back and forth between the Constitutional Political Friends Society and the Constitutional Association¹⁴; thus arrived the heyday of the political parties.

The above-mentioned two major parties differed very little in their principle, program, and policies; both were conservative and represented the interests of the landowners, the educated (including the ex-samurai), and the wealthy classes except that the Constitutional Political Friends Society was comparatively rural-oriented; whereas the Constitutional Association was more urban. Since 1925, however, a third major party, the Farmer-Labor Party (Rodo Nominato), representing the interest of the right wing proletarian, has emerged, marking the beginning of the mass proletarian party movement. The antecedents may be traced as far back as 1882 to the founding of the Oriental Social Party which was ordered to disband two months after it was organized and did not actually have the chance to begin any political activity. The party had for its goal not only opposition against arbitrary clan government but the achievement of equality and the

¹³The elder statesman system is extra-constitutional. In the prewar period, however, the elder statesman often represented the "Imperial Mind" to wield (coordinating all the official organs such as the Cabinet, Diet, Imperial Household Ministry, Privy Council, and Supreme Command) the Emperor's decision-making power. It was they who had, in a real sense, nominated the succeeding prime minister.

¹⁴This party was reorganized and renamed the Constitutional Democratic Associates Party (Rikken Minseitō) on June 1, 1927.

greatest good of the social masses.

When the Farmer-Labor Party was launched in December, 1925, it was allowed an existence of only thirty minutes. But a reorganization movement was begun immediately, resulting in the appearance of the Labor-Farmer Party in March, 1926, excluding the whole left wing components.

Earlier (in 1922), the left wing proletarians formed an underground party, the Japan Communist Party (Nippon Kyosanto), only to find massive arrest of its members beginning in June, 1923. After a few years' disappearance, it was revived in 1927 through the efforts of the Comintern but was subjected to wholesale round-up by the police in March, 1928. Arrest after arrest followed, and the party organization was damaged beyond repair. After 1932, the central leadership of the party was completely destroyed.

The supremacy of political parties beginning in 1918 declined drastically after the assassination of Premier Tsuyoshi Inukai on May 15, 1932. The newly emerged militarists and "reformist" civilians after a long but futile resentment toward political parties began to attack them. All the difficulties of the nation were blamed upon the parties and the specially privileged classes. Japan's delegate to the League of Nations, Yosuke Matsuoka, for example, seriously advocated the disbanding of all political parties.¹⁵ There was no longer party government; and all the parties were finally liquidated in 1940.

Due to the blessing of the directive of the Supreme Commander for the

¹⁵Yosuke Matsuoka, "Dissolve the Political Parties," Contemporary Japan (March, 1934), pp. 661-667.

Allied Powers (SCAP) on October 1, 1945¹⁶, political parties mushroomed within a few weeks of Japan's surrender. First to appear was the Japan Socialist Party (Nippon or Nihon Shakaito) on November 2; it was followed on November 8 by the Japan Communist Party (Nippon or Nihon Kyosento), which was for the first time legitimately and openly organized. The Japan Liberal Party (Nippon or Nihon Jiyuto) and the Japan Progressive Party (Nippon or Nihon Shimpoto) emerged on the ninth and sixteenth, respectively. These parties were not new faces, however, in reality they were the revival of the old political forces and personalities and were direct descendants of the prewar parties. The Liberal Party was composed of most of the old familiar figures of the Constitutional Political Friends Society while the Progressive Party drew its membership largely from the prewar Constitutional Democratic Associates Party. They were both conservative in spite of their attractive labels. The ranks of the Socialist Party were filled by many prominent socialists of yesteryear drawn from the various factions representing ideas ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left.

For the past two decades, the Japanese political parties had undergone a long period of confusion--split after split, and merger after merger, either at the factional level or the party level. Finally, however, after a long road to maturity they have maintained--at least temporarily--a multiplicity of five major parties, i. e., the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Clean Government Party, and the Japan Communist Party.

To conclude, one may say that a century's party development in Japan

¹⁶This directive abrogated and suspended all laws, orders, and regulations restricting the freedom of thought, religion, assembly, association, and speech. See Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (First Science Editions, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 234.

has gone through the following five major stages¹⁷: preconditions for take-off (1874-1917), take-off (1918-1932), negative growth (1933-1944), drives to maturity (1945-1959), and "maturity" (1960-). Briefly they are (also see Figure 1):

1. Preconditions for take-off: This period was characterized by the formation of two bipolar conservative parties--the Constitutional Political Friends Society (Rikken Seiyukai) and the Constitutional Democratic Associates Party (Rikken Minseitō), representing the interests of the samurai (and the educated), the landowners, and the wealthy class. Parties were organized for the lust of power, opposing the permanent supremacy of the Meiji oligarchy (the Sat-Cho). From the point of view of the Government, however, political parties were at best "necessary evils." Consequently, parties were denied access to governmental power. However, this situation gradually changed after the turn of the century.

2. Take-off: This period was characterized by the formation of party government and the alternation of power between the two conservative parties. The latter part of this stage also witnessed the appearance of a weak proletarian mass party movement and the Communist activities at underground level.

3. Negative growth: At first, this period was characterized by the end of party government; later by the suppression of the parties; and finally, by the enforced dissolution of the parties.

4. Drives to maturity: This period was characterized by a great transition, namely, the mushrooming of hundreds of roughly formed parties

¹⁷The use of stages to explain historical phenomena is borrowed from W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 179 pp.

ranging from extreme right to extreme left: after a great confusion, three major parties emerged: the Liberal-Democratic Party (1955), the Japan Socialist Party (1955), and the Japan Communist Party (1945).

5. "Maturity": This period was characterized by the nonrecurrence of splits and mergers among the "older" parties. Also, it witnessed the emerging of two "middle-of-the-road" parties, the Democratic Socialist Party and the Clean Government Party, representing the interests of the "middle and lower middle" classes.


B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE PARTIES

1. First of all, Japanese law contains no definition of a political party, except in connection with elections. The Political Funds Control Law provides that any organization which wants to propose a candidate for an elective office or wants to campaign in elections must register. As of December 31, 1959, 10,390 political organizations were accordingly registered under the law, including 3,259 organizations established as political parties. Among the others, 4,373 were registered as political associations; 714 were ad hoc organizations, created solely for the purpose of electing particular candidates; and 2,044 were organized solely for the purpose of opposing a candidate or a political party in the elections. These political groupings were overwhelmingly locally organized, however.

2. The Japanese political scientist, Masao Maruyama, has said that power elites in Japan were traditionally characterized by extreme factionalism, with the groups engaging in endless disputes and schisms resulting essentially from differences in personal ties and loyalties of the boss

Figure 1

The Development of Political Parties in Japan



1941 All political parties dissolved; Imperial Rule Assistance Association founded.

Figure 1 (continued)




Figure 1 (continued)

Notes:

Aikoku Koto -----	Patriotic Public Party
Jiyu Minshuto -----	Liberal-Democratic Party
Kaishinto -----	Reform Party
Kensei Honto -----	Constitutional Real Party
Kensei Kai -----	Constitutional Association
Kenseito -----	Constitutional Party
Kokumin Kyodoto -----	People's Cooperative Party
Kokumin Minshuto -----	People's Democratic Party
Komei Seiji Renmei -----	Clean Government Alliance
Komeito -----	Clean Government Party
Minshu Jiyuto -----	Democratic Liberal Party
Minshu Shaksito -----	Democratic Socialist Party
Minshuto -----	Democratic Party
Nippon Jiyuto -----	Japan Liberal Party
Nippon Kyodoto -----	Japan Cooperative Party
Nippon Kyosanto -----	Japan Communist Party
Nippon Shaksito -----	Japan Socialist Party
Nippon Shimpoto -----	Japan Progressive Party
Rikken Kaishinto -----	Constitutional Reform Party
Rikken Kokuminto -----	Constitutional People's Party
Rikken Minseito -----	Constitutional Democratic Associates Party
Rikken Seiyukai -----	Constitutional Political Friends Society
Rode Nominto -----	Labor Farmer Party
Rodosha Neminto -----	Laborer Farmer Party
Saha -----	Left Wing
Shakai Taishuto -----	Social Mass Party
Shimpoto -----	Progressive Party
Uha -----	Right Wing

Sources: Adapted from Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p. 115; and Department of the Army, U. S. Army Area Handbook for Japan (Second Edition, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 436.

(leader) follower (oyabun-kobun) type.¹⁸ It is quite true, for in Japan all parties, past and present, are made up of factional coalitions or alliances, constituting the closed "mutual aid" society or club type taking precedence over party interest. Thus, Yukio Ozaki once asserted, "We have factions in Japan, but no parties."¹⁹ As a matter of fact, it is almost impossible for a member of an organization of any size not to identify himself with one of the factions in the Japanese society. Factions are, therefore, regarded as "natural" and "inevitable."

If faction (ha) is inevitable, one needs to understand it more clearly. Briefly, as Maruyama found, factionalism is the relationship of boss-follower loyalty. Then what is a boss (bosu) in the Japanese concept? According to

¹⁸Warren K. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 117.

¹⁹Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 18

Scalapino-Masumi, the ideal boss is

one possessing seniority, the personality and skill required to bring divergent elements together, and access to funds. He should be a man capable in effecting compromises, achieving a consensus--in these respects, a man adept at political tactics and strategy. Connections in the Japanese worlds of politics and business, or, if the leader be a socialist, in the worlds of labor and the intelligentsia, are essential. There is, finally, the quality of "sincerity" and, in a broader sense, of character. The Japanese ideal in these respects cannot be easily defined. It encompasses loyalty and steadfastness to one's friends and followers, courage, depth, and the possession of conviction Toward his followers, the leader (boss) has the primary responsibility to provide positions, funds, and the other necessities of a good life. This union represents a political enterprise for the mutual benefit of those concerned. The stakes are high party, Diet, or administrative positions, and ample funds for election and gracious living. The more positions and money a leader can control, the more followers he has attracted, the more pressure he can put upon the government, his party, and private interest groups for favors and contributions.²⁰

This statement implies that a boss should "feed" his followers in order to increase his political power. Then what kind of role should an ideal follower play? He should, in addition to service, give unswerving loyalty to his boss thus establishing an intimate relationship with his boss. Consequently, personal loyalty tends to override party discipline, creating a peculiar phenomenon. In other words, the political recruitment is made to "join SOMEONE rather than SOMETHING, to select a PROTECTOR and LEADER rather than a CAUSE."²¹

In speaking of the necessity of forming the informal factions in a parliamentary democracy of contemporary Japan, Langdon has explained that the "chief purposes behind the factions within the parliamentary parties in

²⁰Ibid., pp. 18-19. Similar statement was made by Frank Langdon, Politics in Japan (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 142-150, and by Tsuneishi, op. cit., pp. 147-149.

²¹Robert E. Ward, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 71.

the national Diet is the competition for offices and money." Thus, a Diet member needs to belong to a party faction as well as to a party in order to qualify for a post in the party, Diet, or Cabinet. For most Diet members even when they are given a party campaign fund as an endorsed candidate, it is insufficient to wage an election campaign²², let alone meet expenses throughout the year. This situation presents a need that is met by faction membership.²³ In this manner, parties are "personality centered" and "leader centered," placing loyalty primarily in persons rather than in principles and policies.

3. Factionalization of parties is caused by personal clashes rather than by policy issues as has been noted. As a result, splintering of parties follows as a matter of course if and when the leader of a faction bolts, causing the frequency of splits and mergers either at faction level or party level. Most, if not all, of these mergers have been effected by incompatible groups for expediency and have been marriages of convenience. Even members who bolted the party, as well as splinter parties, have been readmitted without much ado into the parties. Political parties change their labels with the greatest of ease and without changing their policies. More often than not, names are changed merely to accommodate the newly won members or simply to give the psychological effect and illusion that the party is making a fresh start.²⁴

²²Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), Modern Political Systems: Asia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 73, 76, 78. In the 1960 general election, for example, the LDP was estimated to have spent 10,000,000 yen (\$27,778) per candidate; the JSP, 2,500,000 yen (\$6,944); the DSP, 5,000,000 yen (\$13,888); and the JCP, 1,000,000 yen (\$2,778).

²³Langdon, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

²⁴Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

4. A politician in Japan is, as a rule, not so much interested in realizing his political assertion as his lust for power. The final desire of political power is understandably the Prime Ministership. But some are content to be Cabinet Ministers even if it is only for "three days."²⁵ Consequently, the competition in the pursuit of power tends to be an internal matter which takes precedence over interparty competition, resulting in greater internal cleavages of parties for one thing, and frequency of cabinet reorganization to accommodate more party members into cabinet posts.

5. Parties are shallowly rooted. They are organized from the top down, with power situated in large measure in their headquarters (all headquarters are located in Tokyo), disregarding the effectiveness of local organizations, especially among the socialists. Secondly, only a small percentage of the population is affiliated with parties. For instance, out of a population totaling approximately 100,160,000²⁶, only 2,391,155 persons, or two per cent, are estimated to be members of the five major parties.²⁷ As one source reveals, membership tends to include only officeholders, aspirants of office, and professional party workers. The leaders of the conservative parties feel no need to include the man on the street in the party roster as long as he delivers his vote. The leftist parties try to draft him but continue to be frustrated by his unwillingness to assume the obligations to active membership.²⁸

²⁵Yanaga, op. cit., p. 240.

²⁶Japan Report, Vol. 13, No. 9. May 15, 1967, page 3. (estimated as of 1967.)

²⁷Ibid., No. 6, No. 8. (March 31, and April 30, 1967). The Japan Report reveals that the Liberal-Democratic Party has 1,800,000 members; the Japan Socialist Party, 57,000; the Democratic Socialist Party, 38,155; the Clean Government Party, 200,000; and the Japan Communist Party, 300,000.

²⁸U. S. Army Area Handbook for Japan, op. cit., p. 438.

6. Money plays an important role in Japanese politics as elsewhere. It costs a great deal to be elected. Although the Political Funds Control Law of 1948 and the Public Offices Election Law of 1950 set a ceiling on the amount that a candidate may legally spend on any one election--around ¥ two million (approximately \$5,500)--it is rumored that the actual amounts expended are generally assumed to be five to ten times above the law limit.²⁹ With sufficient funds, a candidate not only gets himself elected, but he can assist others and thus acquire followers obligated to follow his political lead.

The Liberal-Democratic Party has the poor image of a captive of big business from which the party obtains main financial support. Other parties are less dependent upon big business; yet they can escape no support from the latter as long as the present election system prevails. Consequently, one can imagine that a strong bond may exist between "big business" and the political parties.

7. Factional lines are generally divided between the "bureaucrats" and the "politicians" among the conservatives. The bureaucrats are so-called from having been career officials before the war; included with them are younger men who share their outlook. The influx of bureaucrats into political parties took place after 1946 when it became apparent that these were to be effective vehicles for the exercise of political power. With most of the prewar politicians excluded from public life under the occupation surge, the bureaucrats were able to take over conservative leadership.

The other factional group, often identified as "pure politicians," did not start their careers in the bureaucracy but came from various walks

²⁹Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 138.

of life such as newspaper work, publishing, or business. While there has been antagonism towards the bureaucrats by the other group, most factions contain former bureaucrats as well as the pure politicians. Through the tie of the bureaucratic element, the conservatives have had a close relationship with the bureaucracy.

8. Party platform is supposed to represent the attitude and orientation of the party. In this sense, an ideal platform should be consistent with practice. Unfortunately, in Japan party platforms are very untrustworthy. A Japanese political scientist, Tsuneishi, has admitted that the parties' statements are, at best, mere slogans.³⁰

9. It is only in national politics that political parties and party labels play a significant role. Their importance decreases in prefectural politics, and no significance is attached to party labels in local politics except in some major cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, and Kita Kyushu. In fact, party activities have been concentrated in the Diet, particularly in the lower house (House of Representatives) reflecting the substance of popular sovereignty and local sovereignty as well as the centralization of political power and governmental system.

10. Since the Meiji modernization, the conservatives have dominated the political scene. The leftists have never been given a chance to form a cabinet except once.³¹ The result is that the opposition parties have permanently remained in opposition creating the image of permanent conservative dominance of power which has increased protest votes for the opposition parties with a surprisingly high speed. For instance, the conservative

³⁰Tsuneishi, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

³¹The socialists under Tesu Katayama had formed a short-lived coalition cabinet with the conservatives from 1947 to 1948.

advantage has been reduced from a three-to-one edge to a two-to-one margin and now to a one-to-one strength in both popular votes and number of lower house seats, although it was the conservatives who brought to Japan an accelerated growth of economic prosperity unmatched by any dynasty since Jimmu.³²

C. MAJOR PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

Parties in Japan are either locally organized or nationally formed. The focus of this study is rather on the national level. Therefore, one should briefly introduce the five most significant nationwide parties: the Liberal-Democratic Party, the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Clean Government Party, and the Japan Communist Party: their strength in national politics is in that order.

1. The Liberal-Democratic Party (Jiyu Minshu-to): The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), holding 277 seats in the House of Representatives and 140 in the House of Councillors and having 1,800,000 party membership (approximate number)³³, was established on November 15, 1955, through the merger of the Japan Democratic Party (Heippon or Nihon Minshu-to) and the Japan Liberal Party (Kiopon or Nihon Jiyu-to). The Japanese Democratic Party was the continuation of the former Constitutional Democratic Associates Party (Rikken Minsei-to) which made its first appearance as the

³²The Japanese accelerated growth rate of economy at 10 per cent or so annually is also unmatched by any country in the world. See The United Nations Statistical Handbook (1965).

³³Refer to No. 27 above. Four years ago, most commentators doubted that the accurate figures might exceed 200,000. See Ward and Macridis, op. cit., p. 72. But the figures of 1,800,000 may be reasonable due to the party's mass membership drive since 1964. See Langdon, op. cit., p. 155.

Constitutional Reform Party (Rikken Kaishin-to) in 1882 under the leadership of Okuma of Hizen, a disaffected elite of the Meiji Restoration. The Japan Liberal Party was the continuation of the former Constitutional Political Friends Society (Rikken Seiyukai), the appearance of which can be traced as far back as the Patriotic Public Party (Aikoku Ko-to) in 1874 under the leadership of Itagaki of Tosa, another disaffected Meiji elite. Thus, the LDP has continued the Heritage of representing the traditionally conservative interest of the Japanese society.

In 1959, the LDP's National Organization Committee claimed that the party had a total of 2,200 local branches covering about 54 per cent of the 1,104 political subdivisions of Japan plus some 12,000 to 13,000 "party organizers" scattered throughout Japan.³⁴ However, the heart of this party is found in Tokyo, where the vast majority of the party's business is transacted.

The party's ultimate authority is wielded by a party congress, which is composed of members of the Diet and one delegate from each prefectural federation.³⁵ The congress meets at least once a year to determine basic principles and policies and, every other year, elects its party president and vice-president. The general meeting of the party's members holding seats in the Diet is also influential in party councils. These two top decision-making bodies do not meet often, thus empowering a third organ--an executive board of 30 members; 15 of which are selected by the party's

³⁴ Ward and Macridis, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁵ Langdon, op. cit., p. 133. Another source reveals that each prefectural federation sends two delegations instead of one. See Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 133.

members in the House of Representatives, 7 by the House of Councillors, and 8 appointed by the prime minister.

The real party executive is not the executive board, however. It comprises the top officers: the president, vice-president, secretary general, chairman of the Executive Board, and chairman of the Policy Board.

Few persons would deny that the LDP has a close connection with big business, from which the party obtains major finance. But the details of this relationship and the extent of the influence over party policies by business interests are vague and imprecise.

It is difficult to describe accurately the leadership of the LDP. Superficially, the party is led by its president³⁶ who has been the prime minister since the establishment of the party. But when one looks more closely, one soon sees that the LDP really has no single leader. As Ward has said, "It is some ways more accurate to view it as a loose coalition of factions united for purposes of campaign and legislative strategy, rather than as a unified national party."³⁷ At the beginning of 1965, for example, the factional lineups of the 289 LDP members in the House of Representatives stood as follows: Ikeda, 48; Kono, 47; Sato, 45; Miki, 37; Funada, 29; Kishi-Fukuda, 21; Fujiyama, 20; Kawashima, 18; Ishii, 14; and Independent, 10. The 145 members of the party in the House of Councillors were grouped under the following factions: Sato, 50; Funada, 11; Ikeda, 18; Miki, 12; Kono, 20; Fujiyama, 12; and Independent, 11.³⁸ The balance of power within

³⁶The first president of the LDP was Ichiro Matsuyama, who was followed by Tanzan Ishibashi, Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, and Eisaku Sato in that order.

³⁷Ward and Macridis, op. cit., p. 73.

³⁸Mainichi Daily News, Monthly International Edition, January 1, 1965, p. 1.

the party and the immediate explanation of most party policies and appointments are determined primarily by shifting combinations and agreements among the leaders of these groups.

The factions of this party are usually classified by "ins" versus "outs," or as "main stream" versus "anti-mainstream." But according to Tsuneishi, these are not very useful classifications since the opportunistic factions do not appear to combine in any meaningful fashion.³⁹ Another source divides the factions into the "bureaucrats' factions" versus the "politicians' factions," or as the "ex-officials' factions" versus the "pure politicians' factions," represented by the group of the former governmental official Eisaku Sato on the one hand, and the faction of the long-time Dietman Takeo Miki on the other.⁴⁰

According to Scalapino-Masumi's finding, among the 298 conservatives in the House of Representatives in the 1958-1960 period, about 26 per cent were former career bureaucrats. Some 18 per cent had once served as prefectural assemblymen, and 26 per cent had held elective offices at the city, town, or village level. In all, 34 per cent had the backgrounds of public service in one form or another.⁴¹ This classification is again not very meaningful. For one thing, the bureaucratic factions, which have dominated the government to date⁴², do not necessarily combine against the politicians and vice versa. For another, six of the nine LDP factions may be described

³⁹Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 149.

⁴⁰H. H. Baerwald, "Japan: the Politics of Transition," Asian Survey, January 1965, pp. 33-42.

⁴¹Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 167.

⁴²All conservative prime ministers in postwar times have been former career bureaucrats, except Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Ishibashi.

as already being led by "pure politicians," Tsuncishi commented.⁴³ In fact, according to the 1958 general election (namely, House of Representatives election), the average successful LDP candidate had been elected 4.6 times to the lower house.⁴⁴ Thus, Tsuncishi has concluded that if there has been any pattern at all, it may be found in the frequent alignment of the Ikeda-Sato-Kishi bureaucratic group against the Kono-Miki-Ishii alliance of "politicians."⁴⁵

Scalapino-Masumi survey also reveals that a large number, 52 per cent, had business backgrounds, usually as presidents, auditors, or directors of firms. Although highly supported by the farmers, surprisingly few representatives professed agricultural backgrounds, only 19 per cent in fact. Only one individual had a labor-union background, and he had been associated with a farmer's union.

Eighty-one per cent of the group were college graduates; among whom 48 per cent were from the national or public universities or colleges and the remainder from private schools.⁴⁶ Ninety persons were the graduates of Tokyo University, which was followed by Waseda University (28), Kyoto University (23), Nihon University (15), Meiji University (12), Chuo University (11), Keio University (10), and Hitotsubashi University (5).⁴⁷ Their average age was 57.⁴⁸

⁴³Tsuncishi, op. cit., p. 149.

⁴⁴Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit.

⁴⁵Tsuncishi, op. cit.

⁴⁶Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit.

⁴⁷Kirotatsu Fujiwara, Kokkai Giin Senkyo Yoreh Survey of the Diet Elections, 1960, p. 325, citing Tsuncishi, op. cit., p. 98.

⁴⁸Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 73.

Thirty per cent had professional backgrounds such as journalist, lawyer, physician, dentist, or teacher. Among them, 11 per cent were journalists; 9 per cent were lawyers; 10 per cent were teachers; and there were no dentists.⁴⁹

Labeled by scholars such as Tsuneishi as mere "slogans," one cannot escape from studying an important item like the party platform. The LDP party platform includes: (1) creating a highly cultured and democratic state; (2) creating an independent Japan based on justice for all humanity; and (3) implementing an economic program aimed at the stabilization of the livelihood of the people and creating a welfare state based on the creativity of the individual and the freedom of business enterprises with emphasis placed on public welfare.⁵⁰

2. The Japan Socialist Party (Nippon or Nihon Shakai-to): The Japan Socialist Party (referred to hereafter as JSP) holding 140 seats in the House of Representatives and 73 in the House of Councillors and having 53,000 party membership (approximate number)⁵¹ was formed on November 2, 1945. However, its present form can only date back to October 13, 1955, when the right and left wing socialists unified after three years' split. This party was the continuation of the prewar Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishu-to) whose emergence traced back to the Labor Farmer Party (Rodo Nomin-to) of 1926. Therefore, theoretically, the JSP represents the proletarian or working class interest of the Japanese society.

A recent report indicates that the party's local organizations total

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 176.

⁵⁰Adapted from Japan Report, op. cit., No. 6, March 31, 1967.

⁵¹Refer to No. 27 above. Ward considered this figure to be inflated. See Ward and Macridis, op. cit., p. 75.

1,320 existing in less than one-third of Japan's political subdivisions.⁵²
The headquarters of the party is located in Tokyo.

The highest organ of the party is the annual congress composed of headquarters, officers, and delegates from local associations. The Congress elects the three principal officers, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee⁵³ who functions as the president of the LDP, the Secretary-General, and the Chairman of the Control Committee. Besides, the Congress debates such policy issues as whether the party should represent national interests or class interests, i.e., those of the proletarian and farmer; what attitude it should adopt toward Communists and the Japan Communist Party; and what relationship the party should maintain with the unions and federations of unions⁵⁴ which provide the bulk of its support. Like the LDP, the association of partymen holding seats in the Diet plays an important role in the party councils.

The twenty-one member Central Executive Committee, paralleled with the LDP's Executive Board, was intended to be the real governing body of the party. The Control Committee is the watchdog of the party. Outside the regular national-level organization, occasional national meetings of representatives of the prefectural federations or prefectural secretaries-general have sometimes been of importance in pressing new policies.⁵⁵

Unlike the LDP which relies for financial support mainly upon big

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³The chairmen of the party after its reunification were successively Masaburo Suzuki, Inejro Asaruma, Jotaro Kawakami, and Kozo Sasaki.

⁵⁴Ward and Macridis, op. cit.

⁵⁵Shigeru Sasada, Nihon Shakkito (Tokyo: Sanichi Shinsho, 1960) II, p. 248. Citing Langdon, op. cit., p. 136.

business, the JSP finds its chief support in its own membership and in the labor confederations such as the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Sohyo), with which the JSP is politically allied. Because the businessmen hope to maintain credit in this party as well as in the dominant LDP, they contribute also to this party.⁵⁶

Major party positions of the party are, unlike the LDP whose top officers are appointed by the president, open for election. In spite of this difference in organizational style, both parties are characterized by the traditional sort of boss-follower (oyabun-kobun) behavior in the struggles of the factions. Thus, Langdon has commented, saying "even if the Socialist politicians and factions are distinguished by much clearer ideological or policy goals than the conservatives, it is doubtful whether this makes the Socialists any more modern from a behavioral point of view."⁵⁷ Tsuneishi also supports this argument for he has said that the JSP is torn by factional disputes even more than the LDP. But the Socialists'

⁵⁶For better understanding, see the table below:

Selected Contributions to the LDP and JSP, 1963

<u>Firm</u>	<u>LDP</u>	<u>JSP</u>
	¥10 million	¥2 million
Yawata Iron and Steel	6	1
Japan Sugar Industry Council	3	1
Tokyo Gas	2.78	1
Nippon Steel Tube	.6	.15
Matsushita Electric	7	3
Fukuoka Bank	3.5	3
Asahi Glass	5	0
Bridgestone Tire	3	0
Idemitsu Kosen (oil)		

Source: Kokumin Seiji Nenkan (Citizen's Political Yearbook), 1964, pp. 716, 718. Citing Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 144.

⁵⁷Langdon, op. cit., p. 137.

differences between the two broad groups--the left-wing mainstream and the right-wing antimainstream--are based primarily on ideology. It is so because the Socialists "include broadly ranging reformist groups from the conservative former Socialist Democrats to the old Marxist Farmer Labor Party," says Tsuneishi.⁵⁸ In such circumstances, it is only natural that cliques arise out of ideological differences. Kona thus wrote that Socialist factions have the reputation of being "policy cliques" as against the "personality cliques" of the conservatives.⁵⁹

Before the Nishio group seceded from the JSF to form the Democratic Socialist Party, the factional distribution of strength of the party in the Diet was as follows:

<u>Faction</u>	<u>Representatives</u> ⁶⁰	<u>Councillors</u> ⁶¹
Nishio	27	17
Kawakami	29	10
Suzuki	39	20
Wada	29	10
Matsumoto	12	0
Nomizo	5	15
Kuroda	6	0

⁵⁸Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 150

⁵⁹Takao Kona, Seikai no Uchimakuru Inside Politics, Toyo Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo, 1963, p. 94, citing Ibid.

⁶⁰Tokyo Shimbun. May, 1958, citing Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit. Appendix, Chart 11.

⁶¹Japan Times, September 16, 1959, citing Allan B. Cole et al., Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 27.

Several months later, the distribution in the Central Executive Committee was reported as follows:⁶²

<u>Faction</u>	<u>Before March 1960</u>	<u>After March 1960</u>
Kawakami	2	2
Suzuki	15	7
Wada	3	3
Nomizo	2	2
Matsumoto	1	1

For many years the mainstream of the party was a right-wing alliance headed by Jotaro Kawakami. Since 1965 this alliance was challenged by adherents of Kozo Suzuki, whose leftist coalition has become the new mainstream.

Unlike the LDP, this party is mainly composed of the "politicians." According to Scalapino-Iasuni, among the 169 Socialists in the House of Representatives in the 1958-1960 period, only four per cent were former career bureaucrats (cf. the LDP, 20 per cent). However, some 27 per cent had served as prefectural assemblymen (cf. the LDP, 18 per cent) and 29 per cent had held elective offices at the city, town, or village level (cf. the LDP, 26 per cent). In all, 41 per cent had the backgrounds of public service (cf. the LDP, 34 per cent).

Only 18 per cent had business backgrounds (cf. the LDP, 52 per cent), and only 10 per cent had agricultural affiliations (cf. the LDP, 19 per cent). However, 50 per cent had something to do with labor or farmer unions (cf. the LDP, one person for less than 1 per cent).

Sixty-two per cent were college graduates (cf. the LDP, 81 per cent) whom the private school graduates were slightly higher than those of public counterparts--30 per cent were from public schools (cf. the LDP, 48 per

⁶²Cole et al., op. cit.

cent), whereas 32 per cent private schools (cf. the LDP, 33 per cent).⁶³ Tokyo University still took the lead (18 persons), which was followed by Nihon University (16), Waseda University (14), Chuo University (11), Kyoto University (6), Hitotsubashi University (4), Keio University (3), and Meiji University (1).⁶⁴

Their average age was 52 (cf. the LDP 57)⁶⁵, and the average time of being elected to that house was 3.8 (cf. the LDP 4.6).⁶⁶

Forty per cent had professional backgrounds (cf. the LDP, 10). Among them, 11 per cent were journalists (cf. the LDP, same percentages); 11, lawyers (cf. the LDP, 9 per cent); 20, teachers (cf. the LDP, 10 per cent); and 5, dentists (cf. the LDP, none).⁶⁷

According to the Japan Report, the party's platform includes: (1) materializing a socialist society by democratic and peaceful means, and (2) recovering the country's territorial sovereignty and abolishing the U. S.-Japan Security Treaty and Administration Agreement so as to recover independence in foreign policy.⁶⁸

3. The Democratic Socialist Party (Minshu Shakai-to): The Democratic Socialist Party (referred to hereafter as DSP), a splinter party of the Socialists, was formed by Nishio's right-wing followers and some of Kawakami's former followers on January 24, 1960, after futile confrontations

⁶³Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 167.

⁶⁴Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 98.

⁶⁵Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., p. 73.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 167.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 176.

⁶⁸Japan Report, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

with the leftist groups in their mother party, the JSP, over the basic assumptions such as "popular" party versus "class" party, "democracy" versus "socialism," and the attitude toward the conservatives, and so on. When the dissident group bolted from their mother party in December, 1959, they were supported by thirty-five socialists in the House of Representatives, which once increased to as many as forty. Later on, the party was confronted with frustration in general elections as well as the election for the House of Councillors. The party showed greater capacity of survival in the last general election, from which thirty seats of the DSP's were held. Today the party holds 36 seats in the national Diet (30 in the lower house and 7 in the upper house) and is supported by 38,155 party members.⁶⁹ The party's basic principle is the realization of parliamentary democracy, rejecting dictatorship of left or right, advocating a "popular" rather than a "class" party, upholding a "modified" socialism, and promoting "general" reforms so as to "place all people in the middle strata," say Cole and others.⁷⁰ The party's major strength is concentrated on some major cities and urban prefectures "where it has won more influence in the assemblies than at the National Diet level, and even gained a few executive offices," observed Langdon.⁷¹ Its regional and local organizations are very weak, thus being widely criticized as extremely top-heavy in its structure.⁷²

The organization of the party closely parallels that of its mother party, the JSP. At the head of the party is the Chairman of the Central

⁶⁹Refer to No. 27 above.

⁷⁰Cole et al., op. cit., p. 75.

⁷¹Langdon, op. cit., p. 138.

⁷²Cole et al., op. cit., p. 268.

Executive Committee⁷³, and a secretary-general is in charge of party administration. A party congress possesses ultimate authority and, in practice, the council composed of the party's members holding seats in the Diet wields great influence.

The party's members were for the most part experienced politicians; thus they individually and collectively had independent sources of financial support. Their main support came from the "moderate" Japan Federation of Labor (Domei), the All-Japan Trade Union (Zenro), and the All-Japan Seamen's Union (a component of the Zenro). A handful of business backers, led by Ueda Mining Company, also contributed to this party.

The party differs from its mother party in that the former includes a higher percentage of former prefectural assemblymen and elective local officials and a somewhat smaller proportion of former union leaders and college graduates in its leadership. They are older than the leftist Socialists and have been elected more times than they have.⁷⁴

In terms of party platform, the party "opposes capitalism and totalitarianism, whether extreme right or left," and "hopes to liberate all members of society from all forms of oppression and exploitation and to create a society in which the dignity of the individual is fully respected and where a man can fully develop his potentials." The party is not a class party but a national people's party. The party will "fight fiercely" against armed revolution and dictatorship. The party is in favor of a minimum self-defense force.⁷⁵

⁷³The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee has been Suehiro Nishio since the party's emergence.

⁷⁴Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit., pp. 173-174.

⁷⁵Japan Report, op. cit., No. 8, April 30, 1967.

4. The Clean Government Party (Komei-to): The Clean Government Party (referred to hereafter as Komeito) is a political arm of the Buddhist organization of Nichiren sect, known as Soka Gakkai,⁷⁶ out of which the

⁷⁶Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society, or Institute for the Creation of Value), which claims to be an organization of lay followers of the thirteenth century patriarch Nichiren, was originally organized by Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, a primary school teacher, in 1930 as the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (Institute for Education for the Creation of Value). The sect was suppressed during World War II and was reorganized by Makiguchi's disciple, Josei Toda, during the Allied Occupation as the Soka Gakkai.

According to Makiguchi, the attainment of happiness is the real purpose in life. Such attainment can come no way but through the creation of value. Value is the relationship between an object and an evaluation of that object. Value varies according to its relationship to the subject and according to its own substance.

Truth is not a value for truth does not change; whereas value changes with circumstances. Value can either be created or discovered; whereas truth cannot be created, but can merely be recognized. Value is relative and is definitely related to man's happiness; whereas truth is absolute and is not related to man's happiness.

Value can be categorized as (personal) advantage, (social) good, and (sensory) beauty. These categories can also be defined as (1) aesthetic value--a sensual value related to a part of human life; (2) economic value--an individualistic value related to the whole of human life; and (3) moral value--a social value related to group life. Economic value parallels personal advantage; aesthetic value, beauty; and moral value, good.

Value is often first thought of in economic terms and this is the only aspect of value that receives much attention.

Religion is the base which creates the values for the individual and for society. Religion has no reason for existence except to save mankind and the world.

There is not a fourth value called holy. However, religion is the base which creates the values for the individual and for society. Religion has no reason for existence except to save mankind and the world.

True religion must be scientific. Religion is analogous to science in that, like pure science, it is concerned with ultimate truth. It is concerned at the same time with the problem of how to make men happy in their daily lives in this world: in this aspect it is comparable to applied science. Only Nichiren Shoshu meets the requirements for a true scientific religion.

Religion should be followed, not because it is true--for truth is not a value--but rather because it works. Because of this utilitarian approach, the Soka Gakkai puts more emphasis on economic value than on moral value.

There are as yet no reliable statistics that show the composition of the Soka Gakkai membership. Most of the members seem to come from the urban lower middle class. Many of them are small merchants and businessmen attracted by promises of greater profits. As Toda told those gathered for the opening of the Osaka headquarters, "If we have good fortune, money comes to us I came here because I want to make the Osaka group rich. Keep your firm and make money" Labor and farm elements are well represented, as are teachers, policemen, and other civil servants. The Soka Gakkai seems to have a higher percentage of members who are very poor than any other major religious group. With the exception of Christianity, the Soka Gakkai is the only religion in Japan whose membership includes a large percentage of young people. About 60 per cent of all the members are women.

The biggest increases in membership occurred first in the Tokyo-Yokohama industrial belt, next in Osaka (particularly in the industrial wards), and then in the industrial and mining areas of northern Kyushu and Hokkaido.

The headquarters is located in Tokyo, under which there are seven large regional divisions: Kansai, Kyushu, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chugoku, Chubu, and Saitama. In May, 1960, there were 61 branches under these divisions.

When the organization was incorporated as a religious juridical person in 1952, its membership was reported to be 11,000 households. By 1956 the estimated membership had grown to 400,000 households. In June, 1959, the membership was given as 1,100,000 households; and by April, 1960, the figures had reached 1,500,000 households. In the first part of 1960, the Gakkai membership was increasing by 30,000 households per month. Many people predicted that the organization would disintegrate after Toda's death (Toda died in 1958, in fact). The present leaders seem to be well aware of the dangers and appear to have guarded against them successfully.

Adapted from Robert L. Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai: Militant Religion on the March," Richard K. Beardsley (ed.), Studies in Japanese Culture: 1 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 139-190.

party drew all of its members (approximately 200,000).⁷⁷ By this fact, one may call the Komeito a religious-political party. However, Yoshikatsu Takeiri, the Chairman of Komeito, has emphasized that the party has no intention of bringing religion into politics. "We have clearly drawn a line to separate one from the other while being engaged in state politics," he explained.⁷⁸

The true intention of the Soka-Gakkai of marching into lay politics is a myth. But according to a spokesman of the party, the establishment of Komeito was motivated by the "current corruption in the political sphere." In his words, because of the LDP's permanent stay in power, the current corruption in the political sphere has reached its limits and the Japanese people are, therefore, in misery. Not a single party is able or willing to carry out clean politics, so felt the Soka Gakkai believers. The LDP's "intra-party factions are rampant and the parties' selfish interests and strategies as well as the politicians' private gains and desires are given priority over the administration of national politics." Some politicians even go so far as to become spokesmen for big business. "The Liberal-Democrats have neither a positive ideology nor philosophy as to the direction in which to lead the nation," besides.

The JSP is supposed to be representative of labor; however, that party receives its political funds from big business, thus making it substantially little different from the conservatives. The intra-party factional strife in the JSP is even more confusing than that within the LDP.

⁷⁷Refer to No. 27 above.

⁷⁸The Mainichi Daily News, op. cit., March 1, 1967, p. 11.

The DSP is rather opportunistic and lacks ideology. "I know their party has always curried for the Liberal-Democrats. Is it not true, therefore, that the party's blatant opportunism and unrealistic ideology compelled it to lose the support of the people?" the Soka Gakkai President, Daisaku Ikeja, said.

The Soka Gakkai made its debut in local elections for the first time in 1955. The next year, it sent three members as independents to the national upper house. Another six joined them in 1959.

The Komeito was formed on November 17, 1964, with the dissolution of its forerunner, the Komei Seiji Renmei ("Clean Politics League"), which was formed three years before. This party's political strength now stands at 20 in the upper house, 25 in the lower house, and an estimated 1,300 in the local prefectural and city assemblies.⁷⁹

In the 1955 upper house election, out of the three successful nominees, one was a former professional baseball player; one a primary school teacher; and one former member of the House of Peers. Their average age was 43.3. In the 1959 election of the same house, out of six nominees (all were elected), one was a primary school teacher; one a ward councilman and concurrently primary school teacher; one a dentist; one a civil servant; one an editor of the Seikyo Shinbun (the Gakkai's paper); and one, chairman of the youth department of the Soka Gakkai. Their average age was down to 41.⁸⁰

The party's platform indicates that the Komeito will "save humanity from danger and lay the foundation for eternal peace on the world based on

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁸⁰Ramseyer, op. cit., pp. 179-183.

the principle of world racialism." The party promises to create a welfare state "in which the happiness of the individual and the prosperity of society can be realized based on the principles of respect for humanity and human socialism." The party claims to be a true political party for the masses and is willing to "advance with them, discuss matters with them, fight for and die with them." Besides it will create the foundation of a "real democracy." Finally, the party will "fight unrelentingly against corrupt elections and corrupt government in order to establish a clean parliamentary and democratic system of government."⁸¹

5. The Japan Communist Party (Nippon or Nihon Kyosan-to): The Japan Communist Party (referred to hereafter as JCP) holding only five seats in the House of Representatives and four in the House of Councillors but having a party membership totaling approximately 300,000 was formed on December 1, 1945;⁸² however, its underground organization can be traced as far back as July 15, 1922.⁸³

According to Ward, the party is probably the most tightly and effectively organized of any of Japan's political parties.⁸⁴ Ultimate authority within the party is theoretically vested in a party congress, "but actually is wielded by the Central Committee under the current leadership of Sanzo Nosaka, (the chairman of the committee)."

The party's finances are something of a mystery, but are reported to be in part Chinese and Russian in origin and in part derived from a party

⁸¹Japan Report, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸²Ibid., p. 6.

⁸³Sealapino, The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 18.

⁸⁴Ward and Maeridis, op. cit., p. 78.

operated smuggling operation between Japan and North Korea as well as from more normal sources.⁸⁵

Factional strife does not escape this party, although "formal organization and universal principles are more binding over the informal."⁸⁶ The factional strife of the party is, however, more doctrinal. Recently, there have been three large doctrinal factions: (1) pro-Chinese faction, led by Satomi Hakemada; (2) neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute faction, led by Kenji Miyamoto; and (3) pro-Russian faction, led by Shojiro Kasuga, who was expelled in 1961 for support of the structural reform theory. While such party divisions are based upon nominally ideological positions, personal leadership groups are also quite important. The China faction, for example, behind Keiji Fujii, the Budget Bureau Chief of the party, and Tsuyoshi Doki and Seiichi Ishida, editors of Akahata (Akahata is the organ periodical of the party), comprised those who fled to China when the party was forced underground during the Korean War, when a number of top JCP leaders were convicted by the Occupation authorities as guilty. Their position even on China may thus be based upon personal ties of a particular sort.

The platform of the party indicates that the party fights for four banners: (1) an anti-imperialism and anti-monopoly banner for a "democratic revolution by the people;" (2) a banner for a "unified racial and democratic front;" (3) a banner for the construction of a strong Japan Communist Party; and (4) a banner for "racial liberation and the creation of a peaceful international unified front which is against imperialism as represented by the United States."⁸⁷

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 79.

⁸⁶Langdon, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁸⁷Japan Report, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

CHAPTER II

JAPANESE ELECTIONS

In order to gain control of the government, a political party may resort to either political or legal mediums. The former is primarily concerned with the end or the goal, partially or completely ignoring the possible legal impact or effect, and uses illegal methods to change the status quo, such as coup d'état and military revolution or civil war. The latter is seriously concerned with the means in order to justify the end, using legal media, such as seeking an appointment from the sovereign or joining an election that a cabinet comprising its own men may be formed.

Not until 1920 did winning an election guarantee control in government for the political parties. Since Japan's enforced democratization (1945-1952), however, election has been officially adopted as the only medium to governmental power. As a result, political parties can resort only to the Japanese voters for their choice and support.

A. THE CONCEPT OF ELECTION

Election may be defined as a choosing of public policy makers or top (and, sometimes, including other high-ranking) policy implementors for office by vote. An election process is usually composed of an electorate, a representation system, and the election dynamics such as nomination, campaign, election finance, election administration, and balloting (voting).

1. Electorate: Election can be substantialized only when the citizens admittedly possess a right to vote. Beyond this basic recognition, ideally every citizen should only have one vote, equal in its weight and effect to the vote cast by every other person. This is the substance of the democratic slogan: "one man, one vote," and meanwhile the substance of universal suffrage.

However, the story of the development of suffrage has deviated from this ideal model. In the United States, for example, even after the adoption of the Constitution of 1789, only one man in fifteen was qualified to vote. In Great Britain, after the Great Reform Act of 1832, only one man in twenty-five voted, and, by the beginning of this century, one-third of the adult males were still ineligible. In most of the states of Western Europe and America, manhood suffrage was not established until near or after the turn of the present century.

Women's suffrage was granted in only a few American states before 1900, and not achieved nationally until 1920. Britain extended the vote with some qualifications to women over the age of thirty in 1918--ten years later they won equality with men, however.

The reason why some citizens were excluded from voting was that the suffrage, which is now widely acknowledged as a right of the citizen, was regarded throughout the nineteenth century by the government as a privilege. Only those who had status (economic and/or social) were entitled to participate in the electoral process. Property and education had been taken as the best yardsticks to measure status. Indeed, blood was counted in some instances. Today, universal suffrage is confirmed by most of the countries in the world. However, nations like Switzerland, Haiti, Honduras, still exclude women from the electorate.

Universal suffrage does not mean that all people are eligible to cast a ballot. Some qualifications are normally accepted as "inevitable." First of all, citizenship is essential in this nationalistic world. Second, all countries set minimum age requirements, although the age varies from country to country. Third, a residence is normally imposed; this again varies from country to country. Sex is no longer considered a requirement by a great

number of countries.

Some people are disqualified from voting. Most commonly, they are those convicted of serious crimes and the mentally incompetent. Some countries even disqualify those who are illiterate. Few countries any longer disqualify persons who own no property or pay no property taxes.

2. Representation System: "To represent" means "to serve with delegated or deputed authority," and "to give one's own impressions and judgments."¹ Two problems are involved in representation. One is concerned with "who or what" is to be represented; another with "how" representation is to be. The former compels a choice between two different concepts of representation: one which places the nation as a whole first and the local constituency second, the other which looks upon the local constituency as being of primary importance.

To resolve the latter problem, a decision must be made between geographical (territorial) and occupational (functional) representation, i.e., whether representation in the legislative body ought to be based on residence or on occupation. The advocates of occupational representation contend that specialized economic interests need direct representation. This is sometimes referred to as economic representation. However, almost all of the countries adopt the geographical school, referred to as political representation, either rejecting the economic representation completely or placing it in secondary position.

Among the geographical school, there are many types of representation: single-member district representation (S.M.D.) system, proportional representation (P.R.) system, and various modified types of the S.M.D. and P.R. The

¹J. A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham, Elements of Democratic Government (Third Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 393.

S.I.D. means that in a particular geographical segment of the nation, however many candidates participate in the election, only one can win a seat. The F.R. means that each area sends representatives to the legislature rather than just a single one. Such systems allow a transfer of votes which will ensure that each political group can send representatives to the legislative body in proportion to its share of the total votes cast in the electoral area in question.

3. Election

a. Nominations: An election offers the voters an opportunity to choose which persons will take office and conduct government. But voters are normally limited in an election to choosing between candidates who have been formally nominated. This procedure is commonly a function performed by political parties. There are usually some state regulations involved: legal qualifications for office, date for making nominations, payment of filing fee or election deposit, submission of nomination petitions, and so on.

b. Election Campaigns: From country to country, election campaigns vary in their length, elaborateness, and expense, but all involve variations of certain well-established techniques. According to Hitchner-Marbold, the most efficacious method of campaigning is through direct contact with the voters and to insure that supporters turn out at the polls. It is also most advantageous for a candidate, well in advance of the election, to establish a wide acquaintance in his area, join organizations, deliver speeches, and otherwise make himself and his views well known.²

During the formal campaign, the candidate holds meetings and rallies as

²Roll Gillette Hitchner and William Henry Marbold, Modern Government: A Survey of Political Science (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), p. 305.

widely as possible; even if attended only by the party faithful. Candidates usually distribute party literature and posters and buy what advertising space they can. In a number of European elections, the candidate is authorized to mail, post free, a copy of his "election address" or manifesto to each registered voter.

The local candidate for national office may anticipate some assistance from the national organization as well as the local association. This may take the form of literature, funds, and sometimes campaign speeches delivered by national party leaders on the candidate's behalf. The major parties might also conduct some nationwide publicity and perhaps make use of radio and television facilities. If these media are state owned, it is the practice to allot a limited amount of broadcasting time equally among parties, or in some ratio related to the number of their candidates, for use by the national leaders. In the United States, radio and television time has come to be one of the most important means of electioneering.³

c. Election Finance: Money talks in the political realm no less than in others. While parties make extensive use of the volunteered services of their leaders and workers, they also require funds, especially for election campaigns. A well-organized campaign requires money for salaries, office equipment, travel, printing, postage and telephone, rental of halls, purchase of advertising space and, where available, expenditures for radio and television time.

Parties are obliged to tailor their campaigns to fit their treasuries; but they are driven to expend sufficient funds to reach the mass of the electorate, and the costs of doing so are not purely a matter of choice.

³Ibid., p. 306

Those huge funds must come from somewhere. The most common sources are party dues, levies on candidates or officeholders, money-raising events such as banquets and social affairs, and from contributions. The use of contributions raises the particular concern of undue influence and corruption. Large contributors, interest groups, business firms, labor unions, and others may well expect favors and privileges in return.

d. Election Administration: Election administration begins with an electoral register which is essential to the conduct of efficient polling. Its preparation is a task for local government officials in most countries, and usually they revise it annually on the basis of local records and canvasses. For the election day, polling places are set up in town halls, schools and other accessible buildings. Elections are commonly held on Sundays.

There are several principle methods of voting. Where the "Australian" ballot is used, the voter makes an official ballot paper containing the names of all the candidates and deposits it in the ballot box. In many countries, the parties supply ballots which name their candidate or candidates; the voter encloses the ballot of his choice in an official envelope and places it in the ballot box. Where much of the electorate is illiterate, a ballot box displaying an identifying sign or symbol is provided for each party; the voter need only recognize the party box of his choice and deposit his ballot paper in it. Each country has, finally, in its particular electoral laws, provisions which make certain practices illegal; these are commonly forbidden: treating, intimidation, impersonation, and bribery. In summation, the essentials of effective election administration must insure that only the legally qualified participate, that their votes are secret, that the ballots are honestly counted, and that voting is free

of corruption.

3. Voting and Nonvoting: An efficient election needs the close cooperation of the voters. If a citizen merely possesses the right to vote and does not fulfill his duty as a voter at election time, such possession will not assure a responsible and responsive government. Thus, apathy is the Number 1 enemy to the eligible voters. In reality, no election in any country can expect a full percentage of voting turnout except when the voting is held under compulsion or coercion. Hitchner-Harbold have noted that "in recent national elections, the turnout of voters was on the order of 78 per cent in Great Britain, 80 per cent in France, and 87 per cent in West Germany." Compared with the United States these countries, nevertheless, achieve a high electoral participation. In recent U. S. Presidential elections, the proportion of potential voters participating was 51 per cent in 1948, 63 per cent in 1952, 60 per cent in 1956, 64 per cent in 1960, and 59.5 per cent average for the twelve year period. This is not a bad turnout, if compared with the figures of the local elections; for in local elections, participation sometimes drops to as low as 10 per cent.⁴

B. JAPANESE ELECTORATE

In Japan the franchise was first introduced in 1889, twenty-one years after the Meiji Restoration and fifteen years after the first "party" Public Patriotic Party emerged.

The suffrage in its earliest style was a very restricted one, limited to male citizens of twenty-five years or older who paid 15 yen or more in direct national taxes. When the first national election was held in

⁴Ibid.

July, 1890, to select representatives to the newly established Diet, it was reported that there were only 450,000 eligible voters out of a total population of 40,000,000--a little over 1.10 per cent. In 1919, Japan's suffrage law lowered the tax qualification to three yen.⁵ This increased the number of eligible voters to more than 3,000,000. The greatest extension of the suffrage came with the enactment of the universal manhood suffrage law in 1925.⁶ With the abolition of the tax qualification the number of eligible voters suddenly jumped to over 12,000,000, quadrupling the electorate. The number of voters increased thereafter in proportion to the natural increase in population. No appreciable increase in the percentage of voters took place in the next two decades.

Then came the final extension of the suffrage in 1946, the year after the end of World War II, when women were enfranchised. Thus, universal suffrage became an established fact even before the new Constitution went into effect on May 3, 1947. The postwar Constitution asserts that the franchise is an "inalienable right" of the people and universal adult suffrage is guaranteed.⁷

The current Public Offices Election Law of 1950 confers on all Japanese citizens who have reached their twentieth birthday the right to vote. This represents a lowering of the age qualification of the old system by five years. Residence of three months, as opposed to the six months under the old law, in the election district in a city, town, or village is required.

⁵The amount of direct taxes paid as a requirement for voting was lowered to 10 yen in 1900.

⁶Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (First Science Editions, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 281.

⁷Article 15.

Under the old system, literacy was a legal requirement; under the present laws, it is not.⁸ Also, the extent of disability has been narrowed down. Those who are adjudged incompetent, those who have been sentenced to heavy jail sentences, and those who are under conviction for election offenses are barred from voting. Table 1. shows the expansion of the Japanese electorate since 1890.

Table 1. Expansion of the Japanese Electorate

<u>Elections</u>	<u>Eligible Voters</u>	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Voters</u>
July, 1890	450,872	40,692,808 (est.)	1.10
May, 1920	3,069,787	55,963,053	5.49
Feb., 1928	12,405,056	59,763,822	20.76
April, 1946	36,878,420	73,114,136	50.44
Nov., 1960	56,554,475	93,418,000	60.54

Sources: From 1890 to 1946, see Yanaga, *op. cit.*, p. 282. 1960 eligible voters, see Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 157. Total population, see Encyclopedia Britannica (1966), Vol. 12, p. 920. Percentage of voters, calculated from the afore-mentioned data.

C. JAPANESE REPRESENTATION SYSTEM

According to the present election law (Law No. 132 of July 2, 1946), there are 486 members in the House of Representatives who are the elected policy makers of the 100,000,000 people. The administrative basis of representation is geographical with each prefecture composing from one to ten election districts depending upon population. The total number of constituencies is 123.

The antecedent of the present election law goes back to Law No. 47 of

⁸In the 1963 general election, some 212,039 illiterates were aided in casting their ballots. See Warren K. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 157.

May 5, 1925. That law established a system of 122 medium-sized election districts, each of which returned from three to five members to a lower house that numbered 466 seats in all. Each voter cast but a single ballot.

The system established in 1925 remained substantially unchanged until after Japan's surrender. Then in December, 1945, a very drastic revision of the Election Law was effected. Law No. 42 of December 17, 1945, changed the districting and balloting provisions radically. The existing 122 medium-sized election districts were replaced by 54 large districts returning from two to fourteen members apiece. The total membership was set at 468. The long-established principle of "one voter, one vote," i.e., the single-entry ballot, was replaced by what the Japanese called a "linked ballot" or "restricted list" system. This provided for three categories of voters ranked according to the number of seats to be filled in a given election district: electors casting their ballots in a district returning three or fewer members were entitled to cast only one ballot; those registered in districts returning from four to ten members could cast two ballots (i.e., vote for two candidates), while districts returning eleven or more members were entitled to three ballots. The ballots under this system were not transferable.

The "large district" law of 1945 was applied only once, to the election of members of the House of Representatives on April 10, 1946; then came the second revision in 1947. Law No. 43 of March 31, 1947, completely altered the system of election districts and the balloting system. In effect, the provisions of the 1925 law were reinstated and Japan returned to a system of medium-sized election districts. This time there were 117 districts (118 after November 16, 1953, when Law No. 267 established Amami Oshimi as an added special election district following its administrative retrocession to

Japan by the United States) instead of 122 as under the 1925 law, but for the most part their boundaries were identical. The total membership of the House was set at 466 (467 after the effectuation of the above-mentioned law of November 16, 1953). And, finally, multiple voting and the "linked ballot" system were discarded, and the country reverted to the single-entry ballot. Once more, each elector cast but a single vote.

With minor changes, this medium-sized multimember district, single-entry ballot system re-established by the 1947 law prevails in Japan today. On April 15, 1950, Law No. 100 consolidated all Japanese election laws into a single statute known as the Public Offices Election Law, but this was merely an administrative measure which did not affect the substance of the system. The only appreciable change occurred with the addition of 19 seats to the lower house by Law No. 132 of July 2, 1964, thus raising the total membership to 486.

The 1964 reform was mainly to reapportion the five large metropolitan prefectures: Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo, which had increased their urban population tremendously due to the perpetually onrushing job seekers from rural and less urban communities. For although the 1950 Public Offices Election Law required that reapportionment should be made every five years in accordance with the results of the latest census, this provision had been completely ignored. As a consequence, in 1964 seats in the House of Representatives were still apportioned according to the 1945 census and the pattern of population distribution obtained at that time. This created a nineteen-year gap between law and reality and the resulting inequities were numerous and gross. The new measure of representation was to add 12 seats to Tokyo, 1 to Kanagawa, 1 to Aichi, 4 to Osaka, and 1 to Hyogo, totaling 19 seats of net increase, thus temporarily easing the

apparent inequities of underrepresentation.⁹

The House of Councillors, composed of 250 Councillors, is represented on a different basis. One hundred Councillors who assume the representation of the national constituency are elected from the nation at large. This method was designed to secure the election of qualified, well-known leaders from all areas of endeavor. Other councillors (150) are elected from the 46 prefectures, each constituting an electoral district and returning from two to eight members.

The cities and countries are election districts for prefectural assembly seats although in sparsely populated areas several districts may be combined. Cities, towns, and villages are entitled to establish districts for their assembly elections, but this has been done only by the five major cities, which have established wards as electoral units.

D. JAPANESE ELECTION PROCESS

1. Introduction: There have been three types of elections in Japan since 1947: general elections to the House of Representatives held every four years, election to the House of Councillors held every three years, and local elections held every two years. From the point of view of the political parties, the significance of these three types of elections corresponds to the order above. But the voting patterns have been opposite to that order.¹⁰

⁹The above statement (regarding the development of representation) is drawn heavily from Ward, "Recent Electoral Development in Japan," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 10, Oct. 1966, pp. 547-567.

¹⁰The voting patterns of these three types of elections will appear more often in following chapters. Moreover, voting will be discussed systematically in Chapter IV.

The general election has been continued since 1890, a year after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution. The House of Councillors, which superseded the House of Peers under the old Constitution, became elective not until 1947. The local elections have been going on since prewar years except the election of (prefectural) governors which was first held in April, 1947.

The lower turnouts of the House of Councillors elections may be attributed to two major reasons: first, owing to the purposeful design of the present Constitution which turned the House into secondary position,¹¹ the parties are naturally less interested in the competition in such elections. Second, the elections to this House were held on weekdays as well as on Sundays, whereas the general elections have been held only on Sundays. The high turnouts in the local elections may be attributed to the persisting heritage of the long-established feudal style of living which began with the House of Minamoto in 1185 and ended with the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogun in 1868.

¹¹According to the new Constitution, the National Diet (Kokkai) is the "highest organ of state power and the sole law-making body of the state" (Article 41). It consists of the House of Representatives, with 486 seats, and the House of Councillors, with 250 seats. All members are elected by direct vote of male and female citizens who have reached the age of 20. Of the two Houses of the Diet, the House of Representatives plays the dominant role. It is the House of Representatives which, by a vote of no-confidence, can overthrow the Cabinet. Should the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors be unable to resolve disagreement between themselves over the budget through the offices of a joint committee, or should the House of Councillors fail to take final action on the budget within 30 days of receiving it, the decision of the House of Representatives is final. The same provision applies in the ratification of treaties. Most bills that become law have been approved by both Houses, but the House of Representatives by two-thirds vote of the members present can override an unfavorable vote by the House of Councillors. See Department of the Army, U. S. Army Area Handbook of Japan (Second Edition, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 399.

The term of office in the House of Representatives is four years, but only rarely do the members serve out their full terms, because it is subject to dissolution by the Cabinet. In the House of Councillors, the term of office is six years, but since the upper house of the Diet is not dissolvable, the Councillors serve the full term. Half of the members are elected every three years, however. The normal term of office in the local offices is four years, but biennial elections are held in April to elect approximately half of all locally elected officials and assemblymen.

Since Japan's defeat, a parliamentary democracy has been firmly maintained by ten general elections (1946, 1947, 1949, 1952, 1953, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1963, and 1967) and seven upper house elections (1947, 1950, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1962, and 1965). Meanwhile, a substantial local autonomy has been preserved with continuous holdings of elections at all local levels (prefectural, city, town, and village), including the selections of governors, prefectural assemblymen, city mayors, city assemblymen, town mayors, town assemblymen, village headmen, and village assemblymen.

2. Nominations: All elections in Japan are held within thirty days before the expiration of the term of office, and public notice of such contests is given for a specified number of days in advance of the polling date. When dissolution disrupts the normal tenure of the members of the House of Representatives or the local assemblies, an election takes place within forty days from the date of dissolution.

Party conventions and primary elections are not a part of the nominating procedures in Japan. A citizen desiring to become a candidate for public office must notify the district election authorities; the period of notification varies from twenty to five days in advance of the polling date, depending upon the level of the public office involved. An elector whose

name appears on the voters' list may name someone else as a candidate with the consent of the person named. At the time of notification either the candidate or his recommender must file with the election officials a prescribed form listing the name, birthdate, occupation, and political affiliation of the office seeker. In the case of nominations for executive posts in towns and villages, the office seeker must also accompany his filing application with the signatures of thirty or more electors who support his candidacy.

Except for contestants in elections below the city level, each candidate is required at the time of filing to present proof that he has deposited specified amounts of cash or its equivalent in bonds with appropriate financial officials. The size of the deposit varies with the level of the office sought.¹² Instituted in 1925 to discourage frivolous candidacies, the filing fee is forfeited by the government if the candidate receives fewer votes than the legally required minimum.

In the 1952 election, according to Quigley-Turner, the national treasury netted over four million yen from 42 Tokyo Aspirants for seats in the House of Representatives who forfeited their deposits. This system, however, has not solved Japan's problem of trivial candidacies. For some candidates, the loss of the deposit may be offset by gains. An election campaign is one method of self-advertising for business or professional reasons. A nuisance candidate who writes his name with the same characters (Kanji) as

¹²For example, a candidate competing the seats of Councillors, must file ¥200,000 (\$555), and ¥10,000 (\$28) for city assemblymen. In the general election, he must poll

$$\frac{1}{5} \times \frac{\text{Valid Votes Cast}}{\text{No. of Seats in District}}$$

a bona fide aspirant can afford to pay the deposits, demand a larger sum from his namesake whose electoral success is menaced, and then withdrew from the race with a handsome profit.¹³

The legal requirements for candidacy are minimal. The election law merely requires citizenship and a minimum age of 25 (30 or more for the House of Councillors and for prefectural governorships). There is no residence requirement, so that theoretically the best qualified statesmen that the nation can offer will run for office regardless of their place of residence (except the local assemblymen who are required to be electors in their own districts and hence must satisfy the three month residence requirement). But there is a tendency for local men to stand in their home constituencies, except perhaps in the great urban districts of Tokyo-Yokohama and Kyoto-Osaka where nationally known figures may be imported by the parties.¹⁴ Certain classes of public officials, e.g., civil servants and judges, are banned from seeking elective office unless they first resign and no candidate may campaign for two offices simultaneously, nor may a member of one assembly hold concurrent membership in another.

Despite the ease with which a person is entitled to herald his candidacy, the political parties nevertheless speak with a loud voice in the selection of candidates. In prewar elections each political organization commonly left the recognition of "official" candidates to an election committee in the Tokyo headquarters of the party. Thoroughly conversant with the political situation in the local districts, campaign strategists often accept the candidacies proposed by the leaders of the party

¹³Harold S. Quigley and John P. Turner, The New Japan Government and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 251.

¹⁴Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 152.

organization in the constituency. Party members who persisted in filing for an election race against the wishes of the national office were in serious danger of expulsion from the organization and of defeat at the polls. In the 1928 election, for example, 70.6 per cent of the official candidates of the Constitutional Political Friends Society (Rikken Seiyukai) were elected, while only 15 per cent of the unofficial candidates were successful; the corresponding Constitutional Democratic Associates Party (Rikken Minseitō) percentages were 72.5 and 24.6.¹⁵

In comparison with prewar elections, since the surrender there has been a marked increase in the number of candidates contesting seats in the House of Representatives; however, there has been a marked decline over the 1946 peak with each successive election. In the period from 1928 to 1938, an average of 1.7 candidates competed for each seat in the chamber.¹⁶ In 1946 the ratio had jumped to 5.9, thereafter declining to 3.4 in 1947, 2.9 in 1949, 2.7 in 1952, 2.2 in 1953, 2.2 in 1955, 2.0 in 1958, 2.0 in 1960, 1.96 in 1963, and 1.39 in 1967.¹⁷

In seeking people to run for office, the election committee, normally composed of local branches and national party leaders, is inclined toward candidates with national or local reputations, political connections, access to campaign funds, or a record free from scandal. Although the committee commonly accepts the candidates suggested by the local organizations, it

¹⁵Quigley and Turner, op. cit., p. 252.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 152.

¹⁷From 1946 to 1960, see Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 162; 1963, see Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 152; and 1967, see The Mainichi Daily News, International Edition, March 1, 1967, p. 3.

reserves the right to overrule the subordinate branches and assign stronger candidates.

3. Election Campaigns: Japanese laws governing the conduct of campaigns have been stringent. Fewer regulations placed restrictions upon the number and size of posters, frowned upon parades and demonstrations, prohibited house-to-house canvassing, and the transportation of voters to the polls. In the early days of the Occupation, election regulations were relaxed considerably, and the 1946 House of Representatives race was characterized by much unmolested campaigning on street corners, uncensored election bulletins, and vigorous press coverage.¹⁸

After 1949, the controls in elections became unprecedentedly rigorous. Rigid limitations were placed upon the speech-making activities of the office seeker, and his party was prohibited from circulating literature on behalf of his candidacy. During much of the campaign period, one section of the election law was interpreted by officials as forbidding newspaper support of, or opposition to, a given candidate or party. The election regulations were relaxed somewhat in 1952; although subsequent changes were made in nearly every session of the Diet, the election regulations have continued to place serious limitations upon certain forms of campaign activity accepted as commonplace in most countries.

This writer has little access to the recent publications about election campaigns in Japan. The latest information he has was written by Yanaga in 1956.

¹⁸Quigley and Turner, op. cit., p. 255.

In his work, Yanaga said:

In order to insure fairness and equality of opportunity to the candidates during the election campaign, the government makes certain facilities available to them without charge. Each candidate is given free time over the network of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation to present a recording of his five minute campaign speech for three separate broadcasts. In addition, he is allowed a recorded broadcast over the radio ten times to present to the voters of his district his name, age, party affiliation and biographical, educational, and professional background and political views. No additional radio broadcasts are allowed beyond those furnished gratis by the government.

Candidates are required to participate in compulsory joint meetings held under the sponsorship of the local election supervision commission.... One of these meetings is required for cities, towns, and villages for every 40,000 in the cities and for every 4,000 in towns and villages. No more than sixty individual campaign speeches may be given during the period.

Each candidate for the Diet and prefectural governorship is entitled by law to have a 1500 word public statement, which includes his name, party, biographical data, and political views, published and distributed in the form of an election bulletin to all the constituents in his election district by the Prefectural Election Supervision Commission. He is also entitled to 10,000 government postal cards free of charge, a 2" by 2 1/2" newspaper advertisement of candidacy usually displayed at not less than three nor more than five places where they can easily be seen by the public, 1,200 tabloid-type posters to be used in notifying the public of his campaign speeches, fifteen railroad and bus passes for the duration of the campaign, and the use of a school or public hall for a campaign meeting free of charge once. All these are provided at government expense.

Certain legal restrictions are imposed on electioneering with regard to personnel, methods of campaigning, and expenditures. Officials who help to administer elections, judges, procurators, police and tax officials, and school teachers engage in political activities. Specific actions are forbidden such as door-to-door soliciting of votes, circulating and obtaining signatures on petitions, offering food, drink, or money, and holding parades and demonstrations. Although face-to-face personal individual vote soliciting is illegal, the use of the telephone is unrestricted. The use of loud-speakers to announce political meetings and to publicize the names of the candidates

as well as the parties is banned except for authorized vehicles or boats used exclusively for campaign purposes and so licensed....¹⁹

The above statement seems to assert that election laws in the 1950's were very rigorous. This is still the case, for according to Time Magazine, "a candidate for the Diet must wade through a 200-page paperback manual of dos and don'ts before he dares to make a speech." The same source continued that if

he campaigns by car he is limited to a 'short, simple appeal' such as 'Please vote for me.' If he campaigns by sea or river, he is restricted to one boat. He may make only 60 speeches during the three-week campaign, no more than three of them on the radio. At his campaign headquarters he may serve nothing stronger than 'tea and light cookies.'²⁰

In Naki's view, however, the election campaign in contemporary Japan has been "truly free." He writes:

Postwar Japanese elections have been truly free. The government and police no longer control the administration of election or influence the results as under the old system. There are no restrictions on the freedom of the press or of the candidates to express their views, to discuss issues, and to make whatever appeals they wish to the voters.²¹

The rigorous limitations seem to aim at reducing the possible ascendancy of the "new faces." It was noted that this is the notorious design of the "old hands,"²² particularly the conservative government which is safeguarded by the least challenge from the strong newcomers. Since election campaigns should be kept at minimum levels, the new faces are rather difficult to fully expose their views to the voters, thus reducing the

¹⁹Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 288-289.

²⁰Time, Vol. 89, No. 5, February 3, 1967, p. 33.

²¹John M. Naki, Government and Politics in Japan: The Roads to Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 155.

²²Quigley and Turner, op. cit., p. 260.

probabilities of the voters' support. As a result, since 1946, the percentage of the successful new faces has been steadily declining (see Table 2.).

4. Election Finances: Election finances are regulated by two statutes, the Political Funds Control Law of 1948 and the Public Offices Election Law of 1950. Each in essence seeks to ensure fair and clean elections; the first by requiring the public reporting of political funds and their expenditures, and the second by spelling out rules for the election of all public officials, national and local.

The Political Funds Control Law requires the registration of all political organizations and the semiannual publication by local Election Supervision Commissions or by the Autonomy Ministry of all donations and expenditures. Fines and imprisonment are provided for violations. No limit is set on political contributions, but they must be reported.

The Public Offices Election Law is more detailed. Included are stipulations for the formal accounting, reporting, and publication of campaign fund expenditures. Of special significance is the formula that sets a ceiling on the amount that a candidate may legally spend on any one election. The formula, in its latest revision (1961), is meant to ensure that inordinate sums are not spent, but it has not noticeably curbed overspending. For lower house elections, for example, the maximum is calculated as follows

$$¥1,200,000 + \frac{\text{No. of registered voters in election district}}{\text{No. of seats in elections district}} \times ¥10.5$$

For the November, 1963, general election, this formula yielded a national average of about ¥2.54 million (about \$7,000) per candidate in legally allowable expenses.

Because of flagrant violations of the legal ceiling, and because of the need for more realistic limits on spending, the formula has been

Table 2. Types of Successful Candidates in the General Elections

	Prekar Average (Per cent)	1946	1947	1949	1952	1953	1955	1958	1967
New Members	29.4	81	48	41	23	14	11	14.1	21.0*
Former Service	10.8	11	1	6	46	13	22	13.7	7.6
Incumbents	59.5	8	51	53	30	73	65	72.2	71.4

Note: *The increase of new members in the 1967 election might be primarily due to the debut participation of the Komeito.

Sources: Figures before 1955, see Quigley and Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 261; figures of 1950, see Naoki Kobayashi et al., *Senkyo (Election)* (Tokyo: Iwanami Book Company, 1960), appendix, p. 8; and figures of 1967, see The Mainichi Daily News, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

revised upward from time to time during the past decade. Even so, the actual amounts expended are generally assumed to be substantially above the lawful limit, and in some cases they are rumored to be as high as ¥20 million (about 55,000). In both the 1952 and 1962 general elections, for example, a popular cynical view was that ¥20 million would ensure victory while ¥10 million would only lead to defeat.²³

Virtually all candidates report expenditures substantially lower than the limit in case later checks should reveal additions that must be made to the amount initially reported. In the 1960 general election, for example, when the legal ceiling in the Tokyo Third District was ¥1.35 million, the conservative candidate reported an expenditure of ¥677,788; his socialist opponent reported ¥925,423, and it was assumed that the actual spending came to be many times these amounts. Hence, one writer has estimated that a minimum of ¥5 million is required to conduct a modern campaign, while those with means spend from ¥10 to 20 million.²⁴

There is a pattern which parties follow in the distribution of campaign funds. Those who are officially approved as party candidates receive endorsement fees along with additional campaign funds. In addition, most candidates manage to get some money from their bosses. All this is still inadequate to meet necessary expenses, however. Candidates, therefore, endeavor to obtain additional campaign money on their own, usually by going directly to business firms. In the final stages of the campaign, the parties provide

²³Tsuneishi, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 139.

additional funds to these candidates whose election appears doubtful but still with fairly good chances of winning.²⁵

5. Election Administrations

a. Administering Voter Registrations: Primary responsibility rests not with the individual as in the case in the United States, but with the Election Supervision Commission, of each city, town, and village, which is required by law to prepare each year a basic list of electors. By September 15, the Commission distributes registration cards to every home. By this method they ascertain the name, address, sex, and birth date of each qualified voter who has been continuously domiciled in the area for at least three months.

A basic register of all qualified electors is prepared by October 31, and it is posted for public inspection for a fifteen-day period, commencing on November 5. During that time, a citizen may protest the omission of his name, and if the decision of the local election authorities is adverse, he is entitled to institute legal proceedings to secure his voting rights. The basic list becomes final on December 20 and is valid until it is superseded one year later.

b. Administering Polling: In Quigley-Turner's work (published in 1956), there were 43,000 polling districts in Japan, each accommodating an average of nearly 850 voters.²⁶ The polling place is usually an elementary school. Voting overseers, entrusted with the supervision of polling places, are appointed by the appropriate city, town, or village election supervision commission. To ensure fairness in the conduct of the balloting, each

²⁵Yanaga, op. cit., p. 293.

²⁶Quigley and Turner, op. cit., p. 261.

commission likewise selects from three to five poll witnesses (or watchers), no more than three of whom may belong to the same political organization. The witnesses assist the overseers in the identification of registered voters.

When the voter arrives at the polling place on election day, he displays a polling booth entry card which is checked against the voting register. In exchange for this certificate the voter receives an official ballot, and in a private booth he is entitled to vote secretly by writing the name of his favorite candidate in either phonetic script (kana) or Chinese characters (kanji).

In elections for the House of Councillors, separate ballots are required for national constituency and prefectural candidates. Physically incapacitated or illiterate persons may vote by proxy, and provisions are made for both braille or absentee balloting. The tabulation of votes begins after the polls are officially closed or on the following day.

The counterparts of the voting overseers and witnesses are ballot-counting overseers and ten ballot-counting witnesses, no more than three of whom may be of the same political party. The ballots are examined and counted in the presence of the witnesses. In collaboration with the witnesses, the overseers screen invalid ballots. When the results of the tabulation are compiled, the relevant documents are forwarded to the chairman of the "Election Meeting," an official appointed by the election supervision commission to collate the returns of the polling places within his jurisdiction. The work of the chairman is completed when he reports the result to the responsible election supervision commission, which notifies the successful candidates and gives public notice of the final returns.

c. Administering Violations and Disputes: Election violations have been quite common in Japanese politics. The election law has generally recognized the following categories of election offenses: (1) fraudulent registration and voting, (2) violation of campaign regulations, such as house-to-house canvassing and excessive use of posters or loud-speakers, (3) bribery or illegal contributions or solicitation thereof, (4) publication of false matter, (5) use of violence, intimidation, and methods obstructive of the electoral process, (6) failure or willful neglect of election authorities in the performance of their duties, and (7) negligence or fraud on the part of candidates, their managers, and parties in keeping financial records and in filing the required reports.²⁷

By far the most serious as well as frequent offense is vote-buying with all its ramifications. In the April, 1951, election, more than 80 per cent of the violations fell into this category. The offering, receiving, and even promising of benefits, positions, employment, gifts of money and goods, entertainment, and refreshments for the purpose of electing or preventing the election of candidates constitute a typical vote-buying violation. Fraudulent registration, intimidation, violence, and actual interference with the freedom of election occur at every election but do not constitute serious violations.²⁸

The election law does not provide for the investigation and prosecution of violators, nor has the Ministry of Local Autonomy been given the staff needed to conduct inquiries. Instead, the police and women's and youth groups which are organized to stop voting irregularities tend to concentrate

²⁷Ibid., p. 271.

²⁸Yanaga, op. cit., p. 299.

on the more visible forms of corruption such as outright vote-buying. In the 1963 general election, not a single instance of spending above the legal ceiling was reported. Few, if any, violators of campaign expenditures were prosecuted.²⁹

When an elector or candidate questions the validity of a local or prefectural election, an objection may be filed with appropriate election supervision commission within a specified period from the date of the election. An appeal from an adverse decision may be made to the prefectural election authorities, after which the dispute may ultimately be transferred to a higher court. An elector or candidate who disputes the validity of a Diet election may institute legal proceedings in a high court against the chairman of the responsible election commission within thirty days from the election date. A voter or defeated candidate may also challenge a questionable contest by suing the successful office seeker in the same court within the thirty-day period. The election supervision commission or the court is entitled to adjudge the election completely or partially invalid.

²⁹Tsuneishi, op. cit.

CHAPTER III

PARTY COMPETITION IN RECENT JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS*

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Conceptualization of "Party Competition": In the first chapter of this work it was noted that Japanese political parties have been unstable in that they are undergoing constant splits and mergers due primarily to the strong dominance of factionalism within the parties. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to make an analysis of party competition in elections precisely and accurately. Hence, in order to develop his statement consistently, this writer believes it necessary to categorize the parties according to their beliefs and commitments.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its postwar predecessors, projecting a "sponsored capitalistic society,"¹ have been advocating the

*This chapter is particularly concerned with the parties' competition in the general elections (i.e., House of Representatives elections) for two major reasons: First, it is the writer's belief that the present Constitution of Japan deposits the popular sovereignty in the House of Representatives resulting in the parties' focus of attention to that house. Second, data obtained are quite complete in that area. Data for other elections are too incomplete to make a parallel study possible. Despite this deficiency, the endeavor will be to integrate the study as much as possible by relating the discussion to the rest of the areas where parties compete; namely, the House of Councillors and the local governments, in the final chapter of this work.

¹Professor Lockwood has an excellent work on the sponsored capitalism of contemporary Japan. See William J. Lockwood, "Japan's New Capitalism," Lockwood (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 447-522.


principle of maintaining the "new status quo,"² thus being widely referred to as "conservative parties." The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), projecting a Fabian society, and the Japan Communist Party, committed to Marxism-Leninism, have been agitating for political and social change, thus being referred to as reformists or leftists. Aside from such identification, the JSP is also referred to as socialist, partly for the comparatively moderate thinking and strategies of its members, but more for their commitments to socialist goals. The members of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), committed to democratic socialism, used to identify themselves as "socialist" before they split from their mother party in 1959. However, since the latter part of the 1950's, they have been vigorously emphasizing the element of democracy rather than that of socialism and, in the meantime, the mass rather than the class basis of the party. These two principles have become more apparent since they formed their own party in 1960, thus being referred to as a "middle-of-the-road" party. The Clean Government Party (Komeito) "preaching middle-of-the-road government on the basis of the middle-of-the-road

²The new conservatism in postwar Japan is quite different from the old conservatism. The new conservatism wishes to maintain the following elements: a democratic, responsible political system designed to contribute to the development of the rights, freedoms, and well-being of the individual; an economic system characterized by private property and free enterprise; a social system that combines harmoniously the traditional concept of the worth and dignity of the individual and a general world order that will directly and indirectly support these systems and enable Japan and the rest of the world to exist without the threat of another destructive war.

In the meantime, the new conservatism does not stand for: the old practice of emperor worship; the subjugation of women; the omnipotence of the male head of the family, the concentration of economic power in the hands of the zaibatsu; a single-party system; the authoritarian state with its police suppression and denial of freedom; and, finally, militarism and aggression--all of these belong to the old conservatism.

John M. Maki, Government and Politics in Japan: The Road to Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 162-163.

principle of Buddhism"³ is naturally committed to the middle-of-the-road government as its basic idea,⁴ and may be properly referred to as another "middle-of-the-road party." For this analysis an additional category will be attempted, one arranging the political and social forces from right to center and to left. Therefore, all of the political forces and parties will be operationally categorized as follows:



2. A Brief Survey of Party Competition in General Elections,

1945-1959: In the period under consideration, Japan had held seven general elections: April, 1946; April, 1947; April, 1949; September, 1952; April, 1953; February, 1955; and May, 1958. The seats and the popular votes secured by the various parties were as follows (Table 3 and Table 4):

³The Mainichi Daily News, International Edition, March 1, 1967, p. 4.

⁴Both Yoshida Takeiri, Chairman of Komeito, and Hiroshi Hojo, Vice-President of the party, have said, "The Komei Party's ideal of middle-of-the-road government is one which encompasses all conflicting ideologies and which meets the demands of a peace-loving nation." In addition, they stressed, "Our party will build the future of new Japan with this middle-of-the-road government as its basic idea." See Ibid.

Table 3

General Elections of Japan, 1946-1958: Seats in the House of Representatives, by Party

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958</u>
Old Conservatives							
Minor Parties	38	25	17	7	1	2	0
Independents	81	13	12	19	11	6	13
New Conservatives							
Cooperative Party	14	29	14				
Progressive Party	94	121 ^a	69 ^a	85	76	185 ^a	
Liberal Party	140	131	264 ^b	240		112	
Liberal Party (Hatoyama Faction)					35		
Liberal Party (Yoshida Faction)					199		
LDP							287
Centrists	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Socialists							
Labor Farmer Party			7	4	5	4	
JSP	92	143	48				166
Left-wing JSP				54	72	89	
Right-wing JSP				57	66	67	
Communists							
JCP	5	4	35	0	1	2	1
Total	<u>464</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>467</u>	<u>467</u>

Notes: a-Democratic Party
b-Democratic Liberal Party

Source: Adapted from Department of the Army, U. S. Army Area Handbook for Japan (Second Edition, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 434.

Table 4

General Elections of Japan, 1946-1958: Share in Popular Vote
in Percentage, by Party

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958</u>
Old Conservatives							
Minor Parties	12	5	5	3	c	1	1
Independents	20	5	6	6	4	3	6
New Conservatives							
Cooperative Party	3	7	3				
Progressive Party	19	25 ^a	16 ^a	18	18	37 ^a	
Liberal Party	24	27	44 ^b	48		27	
Liberal Party (Hayayama Faction)					9		
Liberal Party (Yoshida Faction)					39		
LDP							58
Centrists	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Socialists							
Labor Farmer Party			2	1	1	1	
JSP	18	27	14				33
Left-wing JSP				10	13	15	
Right-wing JSP				11	14	14	
Communists							
JCP	4	4	10	3	2	2	2
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Notes: a-Democratic Party
b-Democratic Liberal Party
c-Less than 0.5 per cent

Source: Ibid.

From Table 3, one can secure the (political and social) force⁵
competition in seats as follows (Table 5):

⁵The term "force" is coined to make the analysis of party competition in this research possible. See pp. 67-69 of this work.

Table 5

General Elections of Japan, 1946-1958: Seats in the House of Representatives, by Force

<u>Political Force</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>Average</u>
(1)								
Rightists	367	319	376	351	322	305	300	
Old Conservatives	119	38	29	26	12	8	13	
New Conservatives	248	281	347	325	310	297	287	
Centrists	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Leftists	97	147	90	115	144	162	167	
Socialists	92	143	55	115	143	160	166	
Communists	5	4	35	0	1	2	1	
Total	<u>1464</u>	<u>1466</u>	<u>1466</u>	<u>1466</u>	<u>1466</u>	<u>1467</u>	<u>1467</u>	
(2)								
Rightists	79.1	68.5	80.7	75.3	69.1	65.3	64.2	71.7
Old Conservatives	25.6	8.2	6.2	5.6	2.6	1.7	2.8	7.5
New Conservatives	53.5	60.3	74.5	69.7	66.5	63.6	61.4	64.2
Centrists	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
Leftists	20.9	31.5	19.3	24.7	30.9	34.7	35.8	28.3
Socialists	19.8	30.6	11.8	24.7	30.7	34.3	35.6	26.8
Communists	1.1	0.9	7.5	0	0.2	0.4	0.2	1.5
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Notes: (1) is the competition in seats, whereas (2) is (1) in percentage.

Sources: (1) is calculated from Table 3. (2) is calculated from (1).

From Table 4, one can secure the force competition in popular vote as follows (Table 6):

Table 6

General Elections of Japan, 1946-1958: Share in Popular Vote
in Percentage, By Force

<u>Political Force</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>Average</u>
Rightists	78	69	74	75	70	68	65	71.3
Old Conservatives	32	10	11	9	4	4	7	11.0
New Conservatives	46	59	63	66	66	64	58	60.3
Centrists	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	----
Leftists	22	31	26	25	30	32	35	28.7
Socialists	18	27	16	22	28	30	33	24.8
Communists	4	4	10	3	2	2	2	3.9
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Source: Table 4.

The above two tables--Table 5, particularly section (2), and Table 6--may serve the purpose of comparing the disparity between seats and popular vote secured under the existing election district system--medium-sized multimember district, and single-entry system. However, if one asks what forces are benefited from this system and to what extent, one more table needs to be provided as follows (Table 7).

Table 7

General Elections of Japan, 1946-1958: Seat Turnouts vis-a-vis
Vote Turnouts, Both in Percentage

<u>Force/Seats Minus Vote</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>Average</u>
Rightists	1.1	-0.5	6.7	0.3	-0.9	-2.7	-0.8	0.4
Old Conservatives	-6.4	-1.8	-4.8	-3.4	-1.4	-2.3	-4.2	-3.5
New Conservatives	7.5	1.3	11.5	3.7	0.5	-0.4	3.4	3.9
Centrists	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Leftists	-1.1	0.5	-6.7	-0.3	0.9	2.7	0.8	-0.4
Socialists	1.8	3.6	-4.2	2.7	2.7	4.3	2.6	2.0
Communists	-2.9	-3.1	-2.5	-3.0	-1.3	-1.6	-1.8	-2.4
Total	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

Note: "Plus" means benefitted from the existing election system; whereas
"minus" means disadvantaged by it.

Sources: Computed from Table 5 (2) and Table 6.

Now let one see what may be learned from Tables 3 to 7. First of all, during the 1946-1958 period, the average political and social force was roughly 7:3 in favor of the rightists. However, the rightists have been steadily declining since 1949. The reverse was true of the leftists (see Tables 5 and 6). Secondly, the new conservatives dominated the political scene during the twelve year period. After them came the socialists, the old conservatives, and the communists, in that order. Their strengths, both in seats and popular vote, were roughly 62:26:9:3. There were no centrists during that period (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6). Third, the extremists, particularly the leftists, were negligible, except in the early period of great transition of the society (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6). Fourth, the old conservatives, particularly the minor parties, have been consistently decreasing in terms of both seats secured and votes gained. The independents seemed to be able to fluctuate around twelve seats and ten percent after their biggest

victory in the first postwar election, but their sister force--the minor parties--has lacked viability since the 1953 election (Tables 5 and 6). Fifth, although the whole period was dominated by the new conservatives, they have been steadily undermined by the socialists since the 1952 election. There was no sign of restoration of the new conservatives to their heyday which had arrived prior to 1950 (Tables 5 and 6).

Sixth, if there were any unusual competitions at all, they must be the 1947 and 1949 elections. The former election was featured by the unprecedented gain of the socialists, whereas in the latter the communists took a big leap. Besides, the independents' victory in 1947 and the victory of the Democratic Party in 1955 were no less unusual (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6). Seventh, the existing election district system seemed to be slightly in favor of the rightists, particularly in the former part of the period. The new conservatives benefitted much from it, followed promisingly by the socialists. The communists and the old conservatives, particularly the latter, were greatly disadvantaged by the system. Thus, one may conclude that the existing election district system was designed to discriminate against the small parties (Table 7). Eighth, the entire period was characterized by a trend of social development: from right to left with concentration upon the center; but, as was pointed out earlier, the centrists had not emerged yet in this period (Tables 5 and 6). Finally, splits and mergers were among the most typical features in this period. In terms of frequency of splits and mergers, one notes that the new conservatives were at the top; thus, one may assert that the new conservative parties did not have strong party ties among the members. The socialist parties seemed to be better than their conservative counterparts, but they also divided themselves between right and left wings, possibly on ideological bases. Fortunately, after

1955 both the new conservatives and the socialists were able to consolidate their strength by reuniting their splinter groups to form two big parties--the LDP and the JSP. The Communist Party might be most rigid in party organization and discipline, for they had never changed their party labels or split into several parties. (Tables 3 and 4)

B. PARTY COMPETITION IN SEEKING ELECTORAL SUPPORT

In any time and any place, the masses of people are ego-centered or realistic-minded. An election may be used as an example of this fact. The right candidates for the voters are not necessarily the wisest or the ablest, but those who will and can do the greatest good for them apparently. The same value applies to the selection of the right party. Consequently, any realistic party must not deviate from the perceived needs of the masses, unless some undemocratic restraints may be used to compel the people to follow the party will. Since the Japanese parties under the present government system cannot survive without the constant support of the people, they must adapt their party programs to suit the people's needs. Then, what were the needs of the Japanese people in the past few years?

First of all, the Japanese people needed a continuously stable and prosperous economy. The Second World War was an agonizing experience to the Japanese people, particularly to the older ones, for the war destroyed a large part of Japan's achievements accumulated since the Meiji era. It is estimated that Japan lost approximately 25 per cent of her national wealth as a result of that war.⁶ In 1945 she was a thoroughly defeated nation. Her major cities had been bombed out: her internal transportation was

⁶John Whitney Hall and Richard K. Beardsley, Twelve Doors to Japan (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), p. 577.

disrupted, and her merchant fleet was at the bottom of the sea. The former colonial possessions and the overseas investments had been stripped away, the assured sources of raw materials and captive markets were gone, and in their place several million repatriots flocked back to the Japanese homeland. After surveying this situation, one American economist doubted that Japan could ever regain her 1930-1934 living standard without foreign aid. Another expert described her as "ten men in a drifting boat, and only food for seven." In Lockwood's words, "Japan seemed at the end of her rope."⁷ In short, in the late 1940's Japan was featured by extreme poverty. Understandably, under this circumstance, a so-called hero is he who will and can bring "bread" to the hungry masses.

After several conservative governments and one socialist coalition government, the horrible picture was relieved, particularly after 1954, when her economy met the prewar ceiling (1934-1936) in terms of real income per head.⁸ From 1953 to 1960 the Japanese economy accelerated every year at 9.1 per cent annual growth rate and 10.3 per cent annually from 1960 to 1964 in per capita terms,⁹ unmatched by any country in the world, thus not only solving the problem of poverty, but bringing to Japan great economic stability and unprecedented prosperity. Although the masses are no longer threatened by dire poverty, they are, nevertheless, tempted by a new materialism, thus sticking no more to the once highly esteemed value of stoicism. As a result, today a continuous economic prosperity is restlessly

⁷Lockwood, "Political Economy," *The American Assembly*, Columbia University, *The United States and Japan* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 100.

⁸G. S. Allen, *Japan's Economic Expansions* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Appendix, Table 27.

⁹United Nations, *Statistical Handbook* (1965).

demanding by the masses, although the society has become relatively affluent, as has been pointed out. Having solved the basic economic needs--food, shelter, and clothing--they are beginning to demand the improvement of social overhead capital such as modern housing, traffic facilities, and welfare programs. Moreover, they not only demand increase, but also equalization of their income, whether by capitalistic or socialistic means.

Secondly, the Japanese people needed badly a peaceful world and maximum security. Prior to 1945, the Japanese people had never been threatened by outside attack, for her geographical location had protected her from any aggression under traditional weapons. In the thirteenth century, the powerful Mongolian fleet came twice only to find themselves disgraced. In 1853 Commodore Perry of the U. S. Navy came with his powerful fleet only to help Japan speed up her modernization. In the subsequent year, Japan first defeated China in 1895, next subjugated Russia in 1905, and finally established a huge empire covering Japan proper, Manchuria, Formosa, Korea, Indo-China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, New Guinea, and, above all, half of the Chinese mainland in 1942. Up to that time, Japan was permeated with an atmosphere of militarism, totally unaware of the values of peace and security.

Then came the announcement of unconditional surrender in 1945. From the very mouth of "deity," Emperor Hirohito, the Japanese for the first time in their long history expressed the desire to obtain peace and security at any cost. The aftermath was miserable: she was torn and became vulnerable to outside attack. Perhaps most meaningful of all was the insertion of an article into the new Constitution forever renouncing war as a sovereign right (Article 9).

Meanwhile, a strange new current of anti-war sentiment, perhaps the

spontaneous reaction of the outright militarism so pervasive in Japan's heyday, crept into the Japanese spirit, which called for Japan's adoption of a neutral and nonaligned foreign policy to compensate loss of military security. At last, the new pacifism called for full support of the United Nations, where they thought they had discovered their longed for treasures: world peace and security.

Third, the Japanese people needed imperatively to have a government independent from the pressure of foreign powers in general and the United States in particular. The unconditional surrender of 1945 compelled her to subordinate her will to the SCAP, the Supreme Command, Allied Powers. This was naturally a great insult. However, had MacArthur been a "modest" man, this insult might have been more tolerable. He was not that sort of man. This unfortunate fact, intertwined with some bad remnants of the Occupation armies such as the creation of thousands of "Occupation babies," finally aroused a new Japanese nationalism, aiming at getting rid of all restraints imposed on her government by big powers in general, and the United States in particular. Expediently, the United States was still considered by the government to be necessary for support and stability. For one thing, it seemed that only by allying with her could Japan secure maximum security in a thermonuclear war era. For another, how could Japan expect a continuous economic stability without an assurance of the steady and huge American market? For these two major reasons the conservative governments at last decided to risk possible alienation in maintaining a subordinate position toward the United States. Meanwhile, the leftists immediately grasped this weakness of the conservatives and exaggerated the danger of such policy, resulting in greater emotional reaction of the masses against the "in" party.

Fourth, Japanese people need to preserve a new value: a democratic way of life. Democracy was a new concept to the Japanese. Prior to 1945, democracy was totally alien to the Japanese thinking, except in the minds of a few Western educated scholars. In Japan's long history, she had experienced a long rule of feudalism (1192-1867), and a century's theocratic style of government (1868-1945). Throughout the whole history, however, she has been proud of the so-called "lineal succession" of the emperors "unbroken for ages eternal," and of a patriarchic family system of the Confucianistic concept: a code built around hierarchic relationships of inferior to superior (wife to husband, son to father, vassal to lord, and the like), and around the obligations or loyalty of the former to the latter: she had never invented a culture similar to democracy.

Then came the revolutionary change beginning on September 3, 1945, and ending April 28, 1952. The MacArthur Administration ordered that the Japanese emperors claim no prerogatives, but rather function as a titular head, or "symbol of the State and of the unity of the people" (Article 1, present Constitution), for sovereignty was compelled to be taken from the emperors and given to the "people" (Article 2). Moreover, an enforced policy called democratization aiming at creating a parliamentary democracy, localizing the police system, liberalizing the role of women, outlawing the zaibatsu, and implementing the land reform was thoroughly carried out. Included are the assertion of individual rights and the concepts of freedom and equality--the latter concept is both a political term and an economic term. No social changes in Japanese history paralleled the series of such imposed democratization, except perhaps the Meiji Restoration.

At the outset of enforcing this policy, the total Japanese culture was too alien to accept it. Before, long, however, the Japanese, who have been

well-known for possessing the characters of pragmatism and adaptability, accepted this queer value as natural--no less natural than their ancestors accepted the Confucian ethics and Buddhism. Perhaps the military Occupation was over, but the democratic spirit was firmly rooted in the soil of Japan and in the hearts of her people. It is this spirit that dominates the whole Japanese society today.

Aside from the common needs mentioned above (i.e., economic stability and prosperity, world peace and security, independent diplomacy, and democratic way of life), the various classes of people have special problems of their own. The housewife class has been greatly vexed at the continuously rising consumer prices. The working class has been annoyed at seemingly "institutionalized" perpetual temporary employment. The small businessmen have been fighting desperately for survival of their enterprises. The rural people have been anxious over the unavoidability of the so-called disguised unemployment. The old men have been concerned more and more with the insecurity of the elderly. The disabled were disturbed with inadequate pensions. The holding companies were eager to successfully cope with the business cycles and the vicious competition among themselves. The nationalists were pressing for the return of Okinawa; men of integrity, for a fair election and a clean government; the intelligentsia and the college students, against the tyranny of the majority, namely the present ruling party, which is said to have totally ignored the minority views for the past decade.

It is ironical that the younger people, particularly those in their twenties, are carefree in their living. For one thing, the starting wages and salaries of all walks of professional life have been moving upward steadily due primarily to the shortage of labor since the 1950's. For another, they are not clouded with the agony and humiliation of Japan's

loss of the last war.

All of the social needs described above may directly or indirectly control the electors' will when they cast their ballots at polling booths. Therefore, no party can deviate from the social pattern of its time. Only by constantly adjusting themselves to suit the needs of the changing society can the parties keep vigorous and strong.

Having presented the needs of the Japanese people in the past years, the programs that the major parties submitted to attract the greatest support of the people will be examined next.

Twelve years ago (1955), all parties could accurately grasp the needs of the people by emphasizing again and again the unique positions of the following values: antai (economic stability), heima (peace), dokuritsu (independence), and minshu-shugi or minshu-teki (democracy or democratic). Dore in his article, "Japanese Election Candidates in 1955," presented an interesting statistic which calculated the frequency of words the candidates spoke in the 1955 election. This statistic confirmed what has been stated above (Table 8).

Competing for Japanese politics, it is understandable that "Japan" should be the most frequently mentioned word. This word was followed either by "stability" (on the conservative side) or by "peace" (on the progressive side). In other words, the conservatives were confident that their pragmatic approach to an economic reconstruction program would receive the people's whole-hearted support. In contrast, the progressives put more emphasis on maintaining maximum security and peace. "Independence" and "democracy" were the two most important values in addition to "Japan," "stability," and "peace" in 1955 as indicated in the following table. As a matter of fact, these four pillars: stable economy, peaceful world,

Table 8
Most Frequent Words Spoken by the Candidates in 1955 General Election

Order	Conservatives		Right-wing Socialists	Progressives		Communists
	Liberals	Democrats		Left-wing Socialists		
1	Japan	Japan	Japan	peace	peace	peace
2	stability	stability	peace	Japan	Japan	Japan
3	independence	independence	stability	democracy	democracy	independence
4	democracy	peace	democracy	independence	independence	democracy
5	peace	democracy	independence	stability	stability	nation (race)
6	fatherland	nation (race)	fatherland	fatherland	fatherland	stability
7	nation (race)	fatherland	nation (race)	nation (race)	nation (race)	fatherland

Source: R. P. Dore, "Japanese Election Candidates in 1955," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (June, 1956), p. 175.

independent diplomacy, and democratic way of life have become the most fashionable values and controversies since Japan regained its independence.

Aside from the four big values, the conservatives were as zealous as the progressives to take up the people's welfare, thus moving the whole society leftward. The progressives' pacific feeling was again indicated in their campaigning to conserve the present Constitution which is characterized by the renouncing of war as well as the acceptance of popular sovereignty. Besides, their leftist thinking led them to restlessly condemning the so-called American "imperialism" (see Table 9).

Twelve years later, the same pattern as that of 1955 was in the main maintained. As before, people needed the four values as clearly indicated in the last general election held on January 28, 1967. This time, all parties seemed to be able to pinpoint the people's common goal in economic development: to improve the social overhead capital. The leftists were continuing to attack the one-sided diplomacy and to call to the people's attention how Japan's involvement in the defense system of America endangered her very security and brought her to the brink of another world war. As a result, they spoke up convincingly for the immediate scrapping of the current U. S.-Japan Treaty, and at the same time, opposed unconditionally the maintaining of even a "limited self-defense force." Besides, they expressed the apprehension that the conservatives may obtain enough votes to revise the Constitution to revive the traditionally authoritarian rule, such as a police system and centralization of the government system. Unfortunately, they were forced to defend fruitlessly the cultural revolution which is currently under way in China.

In contrast, the conservatives were compelled to defend the whole series of their administrative programs. Most unfortunate for the

Table 9

Most Frequent Contents Referred to by Candidates in 1955 Japanese Election

	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Democrats</u>	<u>Right-wing Socialists</u>	<u>Left-wing Socialists</u>	<u>Communists</u>
Social Services	99	80	92	84	36
Decreased Taxation	76	58	72	54	21
Increased Loan Facilities	64	46	75	42	8
Money Grants and Legisla- tion of Local Interests	52	39	18	18	22
Rearmament	35	42	88	96	100
Constitutional Revision	31	30	00	86	83
State Economic Planning (favorably)	31	44	39	34	7
America	30	39	63	84	100
Insurance for Unemployment	12	8	15	50	2
A Personal "Benefactor"	6	4	6	0	0
Atomic Bombs	6	7	28	36	76
Specifically War Pensions	6	7	0	0	0
Danger of War	3	13	24	30	60

Source: Ibid.

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In contrast, the conservatives were compelled to defend the whole series of their administrative programs. Most unfortunate for the

conservatives was perhaps the terrible list of "black mist" which greatly undermined the Sato government's reputation.¹⁰ However, Sato was lucky, for he was able to show convincingly how unrealistic it was to recognize Communist China. For instance, in his campaigning, Sato reminded the voters again and again of the stripping of human rights on the other side of the river, saying, "We must never become like our neighbors.... Over there, there's no freedom, and without freedom how could one find life worth living?" Then he went on, "You must never, never vote for such parties as Socialists and Communists." Consequently, the crowds cried: "Sato banzai!"¹¹ (meaning "Long live Sato").

The centrists, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which emerged in 1960, and the Clean Government Party (Komeito), which emerged for the first time in the lower house election, were most fortunate in campaigning. On the one hand, unlike the leftists who were charged as being the agents of

¹⁰The so-called "kuroi kiri" or "black mist of corruption" began with the arrest of Shoji Tanaka, the Liberal Democratic Chairman of the Japanese Diet's powerful Audit Committee, in August, 1966, charged with accepting nearly \$700,000 from businessmen in return for silence on spurious government contracts. Later, Seiijuro Arafune, Sato's Transportation Minister, was forced to resign for being charged with having taken two businessmen with him on his government-financed trip to South Korea and having ordered the Japan National Railways to make his home town an express stop. The next target was Eikichi Kameyashiyama, Director-General of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, being charged with ordering a lavish homecoming parade--complete with sake, flag-waving school children, and an official army band--when he returned to his prefecture in Kyushu in September. Then followed Raizo Katsuno, Agriculture Minister, charged with giving a \$7.5 million government loan to build a \$3.6 million glucose plant that turned out to be a sugar refinery. He was also charged with spending \$1,665 of the taxpayers' yen to have a private toilet built in his office. Finally, a banana scandal was uncovered, charging that government officials had accepted \$60,000 for favors to banana importers. As a result, the opinion polls conducted after this series of corruption indicated that only 26.2 per cent of the Japanese masses still supported Sato. See *Lewgreek*, August 29, 1966, and October 31, 1966, page 58; *Time*, Vol. 88, No. 19, November 14, 1966, page 37.

¹¹*Time*, Vol. 89, No. 5, February 3, 1967, p. 34.

the horrible red neighbor, China, the centrists were exempted from the charge of threatening freedom. On the other, they could join¹² the leftists to condemn Sato's maladministrations. The records below will show to what extent the new political force, the centrist, is growing with an unusual stride in Japanese party politics; also, to what extent it may sometime in the future threaten the older parties, or at least play a balancing role among them.

C. VOTERS' RESPONSE TO THE PARTIES SEEKING SUPPORT

After the parties' effort to seek electoral support in terms of making election campaigns, there must be a sizable response to it from the electorate as reflected in the number of ballots cast at each election. Some scholars regard this response as the sovereign people's use of their inherent right, while others argue that the act of voting is to fulfill their duty as citizens. No matter which school of thinking prevails, the fact is that a sizable response from the electorate in the form of voting may be expected.

The response of the electorate in recent Japanese general elections did not seem to deviate from the 1945-1959 pattern very much in that the conservative dominance is still the rule. The leftists, meanwhile, combined as the "loyal" opposition in the Diet to oversee, and occasionally give pressure to, the conservative government so that the Government may not be twisted as the conservative class's "private property" but continue as an efficient mechanism to serve all the people. Special attention is called to the

¹²Particularly the Komeito joined "Japan's Red Guards," i.e., the socialists and the communists, in changing Sato's cabinet "with everything from fraud and embezzlement to improper installation of a toilet." *Ibid.*, November 4, 1966, p. 37.

increasingly visible rising of two "middle-of-the-road" parties--the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the representative of the center-to-left social force, and the Clean Government Party (Komeito), the political arm of Soka Gakkai, or the "representative of the center-to-right" social force--emerged in 1960 and 1961, respectively. It is still too early to predict how viable both parties will be, but since the whole society of Japan seems to be moving toward the center,¹³ it is safe to assert that their combined strength will sometime in the future play an effective balancing role between the two much more powerful brother parties: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). This study will now turn directly to the statistics¹⁴ to see how the voters responded to the parties in the past three elections held on November 20, 1960, November 21, 1963, and January 28, 1967 on both the national and the prefectural (including regional) levels.

1. Voters' Response at the National Level: As usual, at the outset, one must present some tables that may be the basis for analysis (see Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13).

¹³The changing pattern of new Japanese society will be analyzed in detail in the last chapter.

¹⁴For convenience's sake, all statistics in this section will be given in percentage.

Table 10

General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967: Seats in the House of Representatives in Percentage, at National Level, by Party and Force

<u>Political Party or Force</u>	<u>1960^a</u>	<u>1963^b</u>	<u>1967^b</u>	<u>Average^c</u>
(a)--Party				
Minor Parties	0.2	0	0	0.07
Independents	1.1	2.6	1.9	1.87
Liberal Democratic Party	63.1	60.6	57.0	60.33
Democratic Socialist Party	3.6	4.9	6.2	4.90
Komeito			5.1	(1.70)*
Japan Socialist Party	31.1	30.8	28.8	30.23
Japan Communist Party	0.6	1.1	1.0	0.90
Total (by Party)	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.00</u>
(b)--Force				
Rightists	64.7	63.2	58.9	62.27
Old Conservatives	1.3	2.6	1.9	1.94
New Conservatives	63.1	60.6	57.0	60.33
Centrists	3.6	4.9	11.3	6.60
Leftists	31.7	31.9	29.8	31.13
Socialists	31.1	30.8	28.8	30.23
Communists	0.6	1.1	1.0	0.90
Total (by Force)	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.00</u>

*In more real terms, the average figure of the Komeito should be much more than 1.70, for had the Komeito participated in the general elections earlier, their average gain could be greater than that figure.

Sources: a--Computed from McNelly, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

b--Computed from Japan Report, Vol. 13, No. 2, January 31, 1967, p. 2.

c--Computed by the writer from the statistics of the 1960-1967 elections.

Table 11

General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967: Share in Popular Vote in Percentage,
at National Level, by Party and by Force

<u>Political Party or Force</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>Average</u>
(a)--Party				
Minor Parties	0.35	0.15	0.22	0.24
Independents	2.83	4.77	5.55	4.38
Liberal Democratic Party	57.56	54.67	48.80	53.68
Democratic Socialist Party	8.77	7.37	7.40	7.85
Komeito			5.38	(1.79)*
Japan Socialist Party	27.56	29.03	27.89	28.16
Japan Communist Party	2.93	4.01	4.76	3.90
Total (by Party)	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>
(b)--Force				
Rightists	60.74	59.59	54.57	58.30
Old Conservatives	3.18	4.92	5.77	4.62
New Conservatives	57.56	54.67	48.80	53.68
Centrists	8.77	7.37	12.78	9.64
Leftists	30.49	33.04	32.65	32.06
Socialists	27.56	29.03	27.89	28.16
Communists	2.93	4.01	4.76	3.90
Total (by Force)	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>	<u>100.00</u>

See the notes marked with () in Table 10.

Source: Computed from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto,
Director of Election Division, Election Bureau, Ministry of Local Autonomy,
Government of Japan, Tokyo.

Table 12

General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967: Seat Turnouts vis-a-vis Vote
Turnouts in Percentage, at National Level, by Party and Force

<u>Political Party or Force</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>Average</u>
(a)--Party				
Minor Parties	-0.15	-0.15	-0.22	-0.17
Independents	-1.73	-2.17	-3.65	-2.51
Liberal Democratic Party	5.84	5.93	8.20	6.65
Democratic Socialist Party	-5.17	-2.47	-1.20	-2.95
Komeito			-0.28	(-0.09)*
Japan Socialist Party	3.54	1.77	0.91	2.07
Japan Communist Party	-2.33	-2.91	-3.76	-3.00
Total (by Party)	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.00</u>
(b)--Force				
Rightists	3.96	3.61	4.33	3.97
Old Conservatives	-1.88	-2.32	-3.87	-2.68
New Conservatives	5.84	5.93	8.20	6.65
Centrists	-5.17	-2.47	-1.48	-3.04
Leftists	1.21	-1.14	-2.35	-0.93
Socialists	3.54	1.77	0.91	2.07
Communists	-2.33	-2.91	-3.76	-3.00
Total (by Force)	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.00</u>

See the notes marked with () in Table 10.

Note: "plus" indicates net gain, "minus," net loss.

Source: Computed by the writer by subtracting Table 11 (Percentage of
Vote Turnouts) from Table 10 (Percentage of Seat Turnouts).

Table 13

Size of Expansion of the Party and the Force: A Comparison Between the Marginal (1967) Turnouts and the Average (1960-1967) Turnouts of Seats and Votes in General Elections

Political Party or Force	Seat Turnouts (Per Cent)		Vote Turnouts (Per Cent)	
	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable
(a)--Party				
Minor Parties				0.02
Independents	0.03	0.07	1.17	4.33
Liberal Democratic Party		3.33		0.15
Democratic Socialist Party	1.30		3.59	0.27
Komeito	3.40	1.43		
Japan Socialist Party	0.10		0.36	
Japan Communist Party				
Total	<u>1.83</u>	<u>1.83</u>	<u>5.62</u>	<u>5.62</u>
(b)--Force				
Rightists		3.37		3.73
Old Conservatives		0.04	1.15	
New Conservatives		3.33		4.33
Centrists	4.70		3.14	
Leftists		1.33	0.57	
Socialists		1.43		0.27
Communists	0.10		0.36	
Total	<u>4.70</u>	<u>4.70</u>	<u>3.73</u>	<u>3.73</u>

Note: The size of favorable or unfavorable expansion of the party or force strength is determined by subtracting the average turnout of the 1960-1967 period from the marginal (i.e., 1967) turnout between the comparable sector and item.

Source: Change in seat turnout is computed from Table 10. Change in vote turnout is computed from Table 11.

Table 14

Rate of Expansion of the Party and the Force: A Comparison Between the Marginal (1967) Turnouts and the Average (1960-1967) Turnouts of Seats and Votes in General Elections

Political Party or Force	Seat Turnouts (Per Cent)		Vote Turnouts (Per Cent)	
	Favorable	Unfavorable	Favorable	Unfavorable
(a)--Party				
Minor Parties				9
Independents	2		21	
Liberal Democratic Party		6		10
Democratic Socialist Party	21			6
Komeito	67		67	
Japan Socialist Party		5		1
Japan Communist Party	10		10	
(b)--Force				
Rightists				7
Old Conservatives		6		
New Conservatives		2	20	
Centrists	12			10
Leftists		4	25	
Socialists		5	2	
Communists	10		10	1

Notes: This table will discover in what speed the parties and the forces in the 1967 general election favorably or unfavorably changed the average pattern of the 1960-1967 period. The formulae for computing the rate of expansion are:

$$\frac{R_t - A_t}{A_t} \text{ and } \frac{R_t - A_t}{A_t} \quad (\text{or } 1 - \frac{A_t}{R_t} \text{ and } 1 - \frac{A_t}{R_t})$$

R_t --Marginal Turnout (i.e., 1967 turnout), by seat
 A_t --Average Turnout (i.e., 1960-1967 period average turnout), by seat
 R_t' --Marginal Turnout, by popular vote
 A_t' --Average Turnout, by popular vote
 Sources: Table 10 and Table 11.

Discussion of the implications of Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 follows.

Party Level, by Seats: The whole period was dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was followed by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the independents, the Clean Government Party (Komeito), the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the minor parties. Their strength was roughly sixty, thirty, five, two, two, one, and zero (0.1, in fact), respectively (Table 10, section a).

Party Level, by Popular Vote: There is a slight difference from the above pattern. The pattern is still dominated by the LDP, followed by the JSP, the DSP, the independents, the JCP, the Komeito, and the minor parties. But their strength was fifty-four, twenty-eight, eight, four, four, two, and zero (0.24, in fact), respectively (Table 11, section a).

Force Level, by Seats: The period was dominated by the rightists, followed by the leftists, and the centrists. Their strength was roughly sixty-two, thirty-one, and seven, respectively. Within the rightists, the new conservatives (60.33) were thirty-two times greater than the old conservatives (1.94). Within the leftists, the socialists (30.23) were thirty-four times greater than the communists (0.9). The extremists, both right and left, were negligible, 1.94 and 0.9, respectively, concentrating the political force on the three more "moderate" classes of people: the new conservatives were the strongest, the socialists next, followed by the centrists. The comparative strength of the three big forces, was roughly sixty, thirty, and seven, respectively. From this statistic, one may conclude that the Japanese society is characterized by class consciousness: the conservative class against the socialist class, or vice versa. The centrists and the extremists were in the minor position (Table 10, section b).

Force Level, by Popular Vote: There was only a small difference in the extent of distribution of force, but no difference in the pattern from the one mentioned above. This pattern is characterized by greater social cleavage in that both extreme right and extreme left segments of the social force constituted a sizable threat to the "moderates." The new conservatives in this category were only twelve times, instead of thirty-two by the above category, greater than the old conservatives; whereas the socialists, seven times, instead of thirty-four times, greater than the communists (Table 11, section b).

Favorites of the Current Election District System, by Party: Both the two polar parties, the LDP and the JSP, benefited from the present election district system. The LDP was benefited much more than the JSP, three times more, in fact. The JCP suffered most from this system (3 percentage points), followed by the DSP (2.95 percentage points), the independent (2.51 percentage points), the minor parties (0.17 percentage points), and the Komeito (0.09 percentage points). The LDP increased its benefits with the passing of time; the reverse applied to the JSP. The JCP, the independents, and the minor parties suffered with the passing of time; the reverse applied to the DSP. No comparison can be made for the Komeito since that party participated only in the last election (Table 12, section a).

Favorites of the Current Election District System, by Force: While the leftists and the centrists were disadvantaged by this system, the rightists benefited from it. While the leftists and the centrists suffered from the system by three and one percentage points each, the rightists benefited by four percentage points. Both the new conservatives and the socialists were the favorites of the system: the former benefiting more by far (seven and two percentage points, respectively). The centrists lost 3.04; the

communists, 3.00 and the old conservatives 2.68 percentage points (Table 12, section b).

Size and Rate of Strength Expansion, by Party: Being dynamic in itself, the political party cannot stand still with the passing of time. Although all parties would restlessly endeavor to keep their strength expanding, it is only natural that some parties will expand, while others will decline. If one compares the turnouts of the last election with the average turnouts of the 1960-1967 period, one notes that the expanding parties increased by the following percentage points: the Komeito (3.1), the DSP (1.3), the JCP (0.1), and the independents (0.03) by seats, and the Komeito (3.59), the independents (1.17), and the JCP (0.26) by popular vote. These parties declined: the LDP (3.33), the JSP (1.43), and the minor parties (0.07) by seats, and the LDP (4.88), the DSP (0.45), the JSP (0.27), and the minor parties (0.02) by vote. In fact, by the same method of comparison (i.e., marginal turnouts versus average turnouts of the 1960-1967 period) the Komeito speeded up its strength with a growth rate of 67 per cent both in seats and in vote, far ahead of all the other parties. The DSP increased its strength with a growth rate of 21 per cent in seats, only to find itself still suffering from the popular support with a rate of 6 per cent. The JCP increased its strength with a growth rate of 10 per cent in seats and 16 per cent in votes. And the independents accelerated their growth with a rate of 10 per cent in seats but 21 per cent in vote! The LDP declined in strength by a rate of 6 per cent in seats and 10 per cent in vote; the JSP a rate of 5 per cent in seats and 1 per cent in vote; and the minor parties completely lost their strength in seats but only with a rate of 9 per cent decline in popular vote. This section gives a vivid picture: the Komeito was arising with an unbelievable speed, only to find the older parties,

particularly the LDP, were in drastic decline, except for the JCP (Table 13, section a and Table 14, section a).

Size and Rate of Expansion, by Force: If one uses the same method of comparison as mentioned above in comparing the size and rate of expansion of the political forces, one can obtain some points of interest. By seats, only the centrists increased their strength. With a growth rate of 42 per cent, they increased 4.7 percentage points of the force of the total. With a decline rate of 4 per cent, the leftists lost 1.33 percentage points. Most miserable of all were the rightists, who, with a decline rate of 6 per cent, lost 3.37 percentage points.

By vote, however, both the centrists and the leftists expanded their strength. The former with a growth rate of 25 per cent, increased 3.14 percentage points; the latter with a rate of 2 per cent increased 0.59 percentage points. As to the rightists, they, with a 7 per cent decline rate, decreased 3.73 percentage points.

For the other items, the old conservatives with a 2 per cent decline rate, decreased 0.04 percentage points of seats; but, with a 20 per cent of growth rate, they increased 1.15 percentage points of support from the voters in terms of ballots cast. The new conservatives, with a 6 per cent decline rate, decreased 3.23 percentage points of seat support, and with a 10 per cent decline rate, suffered 4.83 percentage points of vote support! The socialists, with a 5 per cent decline rate, decreased 1.43 percentage points of seat support; and, with a 1 per cent decline rate, suffered 0.27 percentage points of vote support. But the communists were happy for they increased both in seat support and vote support. The former support increased 0.1 percentage points, with a 10 per cent increase rate; the latter support

increased 0.86 percentage points, with an 13 per cent growth rate. In short, this section tells a story: the centrists' quick emergence greatly undermined the traditionally powerful new conservatives. The socialists suffered from this emergence, too, but comparatively lightly, particularly in terms of voter support. The old conservatives were not undermined much in seats; on the contrary, they were co-winners in terms of vote. The communists were another rising star, not only in vote, but also in seats (Table 13, section b and Table 14, section b).

Having discussed the pattern of the voter's support at the national level, the similar pattern at prefectural level will be presented.

2. Voters' Response at Prefectural (including Regional) Level¹⁵:

This discussion will begin with party competition (see appendices,

¹⁵Contemporary Japan is ordinarily divided into eight regions defined as follows: (1) Hokkaido, the northernmost island; (2) Tohoku, northeast Honshu, encompassing the prefectures of Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, and Fukushima; (3) Kanto, east and portions of central Honshu, including Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gumma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa; (4) Chubu, central Honshu, including Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi, and Mie; (5) Kinki, south central and eastern Honshu, encompassing Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama; (6) Chugoku, southern Honshu, including Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, Hiroshima, and Yamaguchi; (7) Shikoku, including all four prefectures of that island--Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, and Kochi; and (8) Kanshu, the entire southern island encompassing its seven prefectures Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima.

There are forty-six prefectures in Japan. Administratively, the prefecture of Hokkai is called Hokkai-do; the metropolitan Tokyo is called Tokyo-to, two most urban prefectures--Osaka and Kyoto--are called Osaka-fu and Kyoto-fu, respectively; other prefectures are called ken (for example, Aomori-ken, etc.). Regional classification is not adopted by official use.

Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.¹⁶

The average strength of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) during the period of 1960-1967 ranged as high as 70.31 per cent (Kumamoto-ken) to as low as 37.42 per cent (Osaka-fu). The party increased its strength only in twelve prefectures but decreased in thirty-four prefectures. (See appendices, Table 1 and Table 6.)

The average strength of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in the period ranged as high as 42.41 per cent (Hokkai-do) to as low as 13.01 per cent (Tokushima-ken). The party increased its strength in twenty-seven prefectures, maintained its original strength in one prefecture, and decreased in eighteen prefectures (see appendices, Table 2 and Table 7).

The average strength of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in the period ranged as high as 19.28 per cent (Osaka-fu) to as low as 0.23 per cent (Yamagata-ken); no vote was reported in Wakayama-ken. The party increased only in nine prefectures but decreased in thirty-six prefectures (see appendices, Table 3 and Table 8).

Since the Clean Government Party (Komeito) only participated in the last election, it is more appropriate to give the record of the party in that election than to give the average voting. By the record of that election, the strength of the party ranged as high as 18.0 per cent

¹⁶The discussion in this section will be confined to the statistics of popular vote instead of using the statistics of both by seats and by vote as presented in the last section, mainly because the statistics by seats at the prefectural level could not be obtained.

The primary target of discussion of this paper will focus on the records and competition in the prefectural level, rather than on the regional level. Moreover, the pattern of the minor parties and the independents will not be discussed when the competition by party is discussed, but it will be discussed as a part of the rightists when the pattern is analyzed by social (political) force.

(Osaka-fu) to as low as 3.3 per cent (Hokkai-do); no vote was reported in thirty prefectures (Aomori-ken, Iwate-ken, Miyagi-ken, Akita-ken, Yamagata-ken, Fukushima-ken, Ibaraki-ken, Tochigi-ken, Gumma-ken, Niigata-ken, Toyama-ken, Ishikawa-ken, Fukui-ken, Yamanashi-ken, Nagano-ken, Mie-ken, Shiga-ken, Nara-ken, Wakayama-ken, Tottori-ken, Shimane-ken, Yamaguchi-ken, Kagawa-ken, Ehime-ken, Saga-ken, Nagasaki-ken, Kumamoto-ken, Oita-ken, Miyazaki-ken, Kagoshima-ken) (see appendix, Table 4).

The average strength of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) in the period ranged as high as 12.27 per cent (Kyoto-fu) to as low as 0.95 per cent (Tochigi-ken). The party increased its strength in forty prefectures and decreased only in six prefectures (see appendices, Table 5 and Table 9).

Next, force competition is introduced (see appendices, Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15).¹⁷

The average strength of the rightists combined during the period of 1960-1967 ranged as high as 73.77 per cent (Kagoshima-ken) to as low as 39.26 per cent (Osaka-fu). The rightists increased their strength only in thirteen prefectures and decreased in thirty-three prefectures (see appendices,

¹⁷It was explained above that the neglected segments of social force (in the last section)--the minor parties and the independents--should be incorporated into the category of "rightists combined." This difference should be kept in mind in comparing the pattern in this section with the last section. Besides, as it will be inaccurate if the statistics of the 1967 election are used in the part of "centrists combined"--a combination of the Democratic Socialist Party and the Clean Government Party--there is a return to the same methodology applied to the competition at the national level, i.e., to use the average figures of the 1960-1967 elections when reference is made to the "centrists combined" as well as other social forces--the rightists combined and the leftists combined. Moreover, since the patterns of the "new conservatives," "socialists," and "communists" have been fully discussed above, repetition of this discussion will be avoided in this section. Thus, the discussion in this section will reach the three largest categories--rightists, centrists, and leftists--only. The pattern of the "old conservatives" can still be discovered if the figures of the Liberal Democratic Party (discussed in the last section) are subtracted from the "rightists combined."

Table 10 and Table 13).

The average strength of the leftists combined in the period ranged as high as 45.23 per cent (Hokkai-do) to as low as 14.67 per cent (Tokushima-ken). The leftists increased their strength in thirty prefectures and decreased only in sixteen prefectures (see appendices, Table 11 and Table 14).

The average strength of the centrists combined in the period ranged as high as 25.23 per cent (Osaka-fu) to as low as 0.23 per cent (Yamagata-ken); no vote was reported in the prefecture of Iwakaya-ken. The centrists increased their strength in twenty-three prefectures and decreased in twenty-two prefectures (see appendices, Table 12 and Table 15).

Finally, regional distribution of strength is presented (at party level only).

The LDP's regional strength was found to be distributed in the following manner:¹⁸

	<u>Upper 25</u> ¹⁹	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido				1 (100%)	1 (100%)
Tohoku	1 (17%) ²⁰	2 (33%)	2 (33%)	1 (17)	6 (100)
Kanto	1 (14)	3 (43)	1 (14)	2 (29)	7 (100)
Chubu	4 (40)		3 (30)	3 (30)	10 (100)
Kinki	1 (17)	1 (17)		4 (66)	6 (100)
Chugoku	1 (20)	2 (40)	2 (40)		5 (100)
Shikoku	1 (25)	2 (50)	1 (25)		4 (100)
Kyushu	2 (29)	1 (14)	3 (43)	1 (14)	7 (100)
Total	11(162)	11(197)	12(185)	12(256)	46(800)

¹⁸From appendix, Table 1.

¹⁹Upper 25 stands for the strongest eleven supporting prefectures; second quartile, from the twelfth to the twenty-second strongest; third quartile, from the twenty-third to the thirty-fourth strongest; fourth quartile, the rest of the prefectures.

²⁰The percentage was computed by a formula:

$$\frac{\text{Number of prefectures in the category (e.g., upper 25)}}{\text{Total number of prefectures of the respective regions}}$$

In other words, the party's strength was shown in the upper 25 per cent in one of the six prefectures of Tohoku region, one of the seven prefectures of Kanto, four of the ten prefectures of Chubu, one of the six prefectures of Kinki, one of the five prefectures of Chugoku, one of the four prefectures of Shikoku, and two of the seven prefectures of Kyushu; in the second quartile in two prefectures in Tohoku, three in Kanto, one in Kinki, two in Chugoku, two in Shikoku, and one in Kyushu; in the third quartile in two prefectures in Tohoku, one in Kanto, three in Chubu, two in Chugoku, one in Shikoku, and three in Kyushu; and in the fourth quartile in Hokkaido, one prefecture in Tohoku, two in Kanto, three in Chubu, four in Kanto, and one in Kyushu.

Suppose one applies a grading system to the measurement of the parties' regional strength, giving four points to the full support (i.e., 100 per cent support) in the upper 25 per cent, three points to the full support in the second quartile, two points in the third quartile, one point in the fourth quartile, one discovers that the Liberal Democratic Party's supporters in Shikoku received the highest score (3.00 points). Next to Shikoku was Chugoku (2.8 points), followed by Kyushu (2.58 points), Tohoku and Chubu (2.50 points each), Kanto (2.42 points), Kinki (1.85 points), and Hokkaido (1.00 point).²¹

²¹The LDP's regional strength was graded as shown below:

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido				1.00	1.00
Tohoku	0.69	0.99	0.66	0.17	2.50
Kanto	0.56	1.29	0.28	0.29	2.42
Chubu	1.60	0.00	0.60	0.30	2.50
Kinki	0.69	0.51	0.00	0.66	1.85
Chugoku	0.90	1.20	0.80	0.00	2.80
Shikoku	1.00	1.50	0.50	0.00	3.00
Kyushu	1.16	0.42	0.86	0.14	2.58
Total	6.48	5.91	3.70	2.56	18.65

The JSF's regional strength was as follows:²²

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	1 (100%)				1 (100%)
Tohoku	3 (50)	2 (33%)	1 (17%)		6 (100)
Kanto	1 (14)	4 (58)	1 (14)	1 (14%)	7 (100)
Chubu	3 (30)	2 (20)	1 (10)	4 (40)	10 (100)
Kinki		2 (33)	3 (50)	1 (17)	6 (100)
Chugoku	2 (40)		1 (20)	2 (40)	5 (100)
Shikoku			1 (25)	3 (75)	4 (100)
Kyushu	1 (14)	1 (14)	4 (58)	1 (14)	7 (100)
Total	11 (248)	11 (158)	12 (194)	12 (200)	46 (800)

In other words, the party's strength was shown in the upper 25 per cent in Hokkaido, three of the six prefectures of Tohoku region, one of the seven prefectures of Kanto, three of the ten prefectures of Chubu, two of the five prefectures of Chugoku, one of the seven prefectures of Kyushu; in the second quartile in two prefectures in Tohoku, four in Kanto, two in Chubu, two in Kinki, and one in Kyushu; in the third quartile in one prefecture in Tohoku, one in Kanto, one in Chubu, three in Kinki, one in Chugoku, one in Shikoku, and four in Kyushu; in the fourth quartile one in Kanto, four in Chubu, one in Kinki, two in Chugoku, three in Shikoku, and one in Kyushu. Accordingly, by the given grading system, the party's strength in Hokkaido was graded four points, highest among the regions. After it came Tohoku (3.33 points), Kanto (2.72 points), Chubu and Chugoku (2.50 points each), Kyushu (2.28

²²From appendix, Table 2.

points), Kinki (2.16 points), and Shikoku (1.25 points).²³

The DSP's regional strength was as follows:²⁴

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido			1 (100%)		1 (100%)
Tohoku		3 (50%)	1 (17)	2 (33%)	6 (100)
Kanto	2 (29%)	1 (11)	2 (29)	2 (28)	7 (100)
Chubu	1 (10)	2 (20)	4 (40)	3 (30)	10 (100)
Kinki	5 (83)			1 (17)	6 (100)
Chugoku	1 (20)	1 (20)	3 (60)		5 (100)
Shikoku		2 (50)	1 (25)	1 (25)	4 (100)
Kyushu	2 (29)	2 (29)		3 (42)	7 (100)
Total	11 (171)	11 (183)	12 (271)	12 (175)	46 (800)

In other words, the party's strength was distributed in the upper 25 per cent in two of the seven prefectures of Kanto region, one of the ten prefectures of Chubu, five of the six prefectures of Kinki, one of the five prefectures of Chugoku, and two of the seven prefectures of Kyushu; in the second quartile in three prefectures in Tohoku, one prefecture in Kanto, two in Chubu, one in Chugoku, two in Shikoku, and two in Kyushu; in the third quartile in Hokkaido, one in Tohoku, two in Kanto, four in Chubu, three in Chugoku, and one in Shikoku; in the fourth quartile in two prefectures in

²³The JSP's regional strength was graded as follows:

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.00
Tohoku	2.00	0.99	0.34	0.00	3.33
Kanto	0.56	1.74	0.28	0.14	2.72
Chubu	1.20	0.60	0.20	0.10	2.10
Kinki	0.00	0.99	1.00	0.17	2.16
Chugoku	1.60	0.00	0.40	0.10	2.10
Shikoku	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.75	1.25
Kyushu	0.56	0.42	1.16	0.14	2.28

²⁴From appendix, Table 3.

Tohoku, two in Kanto, three in Chubu, one in Kinki, one in Shikoku, and three in Kyushu. Accordingly, the party's strength was headed by Kinki (3.49 points), followed by Chugoku (2.60 points), Kyushu (2.45 points), Kanto (2.44 points), Shikoku (2.25 points), Tohoku (2.17 points), Chubu (2.10 points), and Hokkaido (2.00 points), in that order.²⁵

The Komeito's regional strength was as follows:²⁶

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u> ²⁷	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido		1 (100%)			1 (100%)
Tohoku				6 (100%)	6 (100)
Kanto	4 (58%)			3 (42)	7 (100)
Chubu		3 (30)		7 (70)	10 (100)
Kinki	3 (50)			3 (50)	6 (100)
Chugoku	1 (20)	1 (20)		3 (60)	5 (100)
Shikoku	2 (50)			2 (50)	4 (100)
Kyushu	1 (14)			6 (86)	7 (100)
Total	11 (192)	5 (150)	0 (0%)	30 (458)	46 (800)

In other words, the party's strength was distributed in the upper 25 per cent in four of the seven prefectures of Kanto region, three of the six prefectures of Kinki, one of the five prefectures of Chugoku, two of the four prefectures

²⁵The DSP's regional strength was graded as follows

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	0.00	0.00	2.00	0.00	2.00
Tohoku	0.00	1.50	0.34	0.33	2.17
Kanto	1.16	0.42	0.58	0.28	2.44
Chubu	0.40	0.60	0.80	0.30	2.10
Kinki	3.32	0.00	0.00	0.17	3.49
Chugoku	0.80	0.60	1.20	0.00	2.60
Shikoku	0.00	1.50	0.50	0.25	2.25
Kyushu	1.16	0.87	0.00	0.42	2.45
Total	6.84	5.49	5.42	1.75	19.50

²⁶From appendix, Table 4.

²⁷Those prefectures which the party did not participate in in the 1967 election are categorized as in the fourth quartile.

of Shikoku, one of the seven prefectures of Kyushu; in the second quartile in Hokkaido, three of the ten prefectures of Chubu, and one in Chugoku; in the fourth quartile in the entire region of Tohoku, three prefectures in Kanto, seven in Chubu, three in Kinki, three in Chugoku, two in Shikoku, and six in Kyushu. No strength was shown in the third quartile category. The party's strength was headed by Hokkaido (2.00 points), followed by Kanto (2.74 points), Kinki and Shikoku (2.50 points each), Chugoku (2.00 points), Chubu (1.60 points), Kyushu (1.42 points), and Tohoku (1.00 point) in that order.²⁸

The JCP's regional strength is shown below:²⁹

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido		1 (100%)			1 (100%)
Tohoku		2 (33)	3 (50%)	1 (17%)	6 (100)
Kanto	2 (29%)	2 (29)	2 (28)	1 (14)	7 (100)
Chubu	3 (30)	1 (10)	3 (30)	3 (30)	10 (100)
Kinki	4 (66)	1 (17)		1 (17)	6 (100)
Chugoku		4 (80)	1 (20)		5 (100)
Shikoku	1 (25)		1 (25)	2 (50)	4 (100)
Kyushu	1 (14)		2 (29)	4 (57)	7 (100)
Total	11 (164)	11 (269)	12 (182)	12 (185)	46 (800)

²⁸The Komeito's regional strength was graded as follows:

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	0.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	3.00
Tohoku	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Kanto	2.32	0.00	0.00	0.42	2.74
Chubu	0.00	0.90	0.00	0.70	1.60
Kinki	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	2.50
Chugoku	0.30	0.60	0.00	0.60	2.00
Shikoku	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	2.50
Kyushu	0.56	0.00	0.00	0.86	1.42
Total	7.68	4.50	0.00	4.58	16.76

²⁹From appendix, Table 5.

In other words, the party's strength was distributed in the upper 25 per cent in two of the seven prefectures of Kanto region, three of the ten prefectures of Chubu, four of the six prefectures of Kinki, one of the four prefectures of Shikoku, and one of the seven prefectures of Kyushu; in the second quartile in Hokkaido, in two of the six prefectures of Tohoku, two in Kanto, one in Chubu, one in Kinki, and four of the five prefectures of Chugoku; in the third quartile in three in Tohoku, two in Kanto, three in Chubu, one in Chugoku, one in Shikoku, and two in Kyushu; in the fourth quartile in one in Tohoku, one in Kanto, three in Chubu, one in Kinki, two in Shikoku, and four in Kyushu. According to the given grading system, Kinki earned the highest score (3.32 points); it was followed by Hokkaido (3.00 points), Chugoku (2.80 points), Kanto (2.73 points), Chubu (2.40 points), Tohoku (2.16 points), Shikoku (2.00 points), and Kyushu (1.71 points), in that order.³⁰

Finally, one notes that in terms of net increase in regional strength, the JCP increased its strength in all regions, especially in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, and Shikoku, where the party increased its popular vote in all of the prefectures. In other regions (Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, and Kyushu),

³⁰The JCP's regional strength was graded as shown below:

	<u>Upper 25</u>	<u>Second Quartile</u>	<u>Third Quartile</u>	<u>Fourth Quartile</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	0.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	3.00
Tohoku	0.00	0.99	1.00	0.17	2.16
Kanto	1.16	0.87	0.56	0.14	2.73
Chubu	1.20	0.30	0.60	0.30	2.40
Kinki	2.64	0.51	0.00	0.17	3.32
Chugoku	0.00	2.40	0.40	0.00	2.80
Shikoku	1.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	2.00
Kyushu	0.56	0.00	0.50	0.57	1.71
Total	6.56	8.07	3.64	1.85	20.12

the party lost part of its strength, but the loss was not greater than the gain (see Table 15).

Next to the JCP, the JSF was another rising party. Among the eight regions, the party increased its strength in six. They were: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu; but it lost in strength in Kanto and Kinki (see Table 15).

The LDF lost ground in thirty-four prefectures and only increased in twelve, resulting in a net loss in twenty-two prefectures in terms of prefectural base. But in terms of regional base, the party lost its original strength in six regions, maintained its former strength in one and made a slight increase in one (see Table 15).

Most miserable of all, the DSP declined from its original strength in all prefectures (see Table 15). But one should be reminded of the fact that the party participated in forty-four prefectures in the 1960 elections. In the 1963 election, however, it only participated in twenty-nine prefectures. This fact of reducing election competition to the "favorable" prefectures may be due in a great part to the strategic maneuver of dynamic politics. Table 13, Section (a) has clearly supported this argument. In that table one notes that, although the party decreased 0.45 units of its original strength in popular vote, it increased 1.30 units in seats! If this reasoning is accurate, one should not belittle the potential of the party.

Table 15

Regional Expansion of Popular Support: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts and Average Turnouts in Vote in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967, by Party

	LDP			JSP*			DSP**			JCP		
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(A)	(B)	(C)	(A)	(B)	(C)	(A)	(B)	(C)
Hokkaido	0	1	-1	1	0	1	0	1	-1	1	0	1
Tohoku	0	6	-6	4	2	2	1	5	-4	6	0	6
Kanto	1	6	-5	3	4	-1	3	4	-1	7	0	7
Chubu	2	8	-6	7	3	4	2	8	-6	8	2	6
Kinki	1	5	-4	2	4	-2	2	3	-1	5	1	4
Chugoku	3	2	1	3	1	2	0	5	-5	3	2	1
Shikoku	2	2	0	3	1	2	-	4	-4	4	0	4
Kyushu	3	4	-1	4	3	1	1	6	-5	6	1	5
Total	12	34	-22	27	18	49	9	36	-27	40	6	34

Notes:

(A) = increased

(B) = decreased

(C) = (A - B) = net increase (+) or net decrease (-)

* JSP maintained its strength in one prefecture in Chugoku region.

**DSP did not participate in any of the three elections in one prefecture in Kinki region.

Sources: Appendices, Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.

CHAPTER IV

JAPANESE VOTING BEHAVIOR REFLECTED IN RECENT GENERAL ELECTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PARTY COMPETITION

A. INTRODUCTION

The average Japanese voter is very concerned with elections. For example, during the 1946-1958 period, the average voting rate in the general elections was 74 per cent, and the voting rates in the subsequent three elections were 73.51 per cent (in 1960), 71.14 per cent (in 1963), and 73.98 per cent (in 1967). Although the general elections are the primary arena for party competition, it is not in these elections where one can expect a high percentage of voting. The usual order of voting rate in Japan is, ironically, the lowest level of the local election (i.e., elections for town and village assemblies), highest followed by the elections for city assemblies, prefectural elections, general elections, and the elections for the House of Councillors. The election for assemblies in the metropolitan areas is usually among the lowest in terms of voting rate.¹

¹A comparison of voting rate in various Japanese elections is given below:

Year of Election	House of Representatives	House of National Constituency	House of Councillors		Prefectural Assemblies	Local Assemblies		
			Local Constituency			Assemblies of the five greatest cities	City Assemblies	Town and Village Assemblies
1947	67.95	60.93	61.12		81.65			
1949	74.04							
1950		72.19	72.19					
1951					82.99	72.92	90.56	95.92
1952	76.43							
1953	74.22	63.18	63.18					
1955	75.84				77.24	62.26	85.00	92.33

This order is a deviation measured by the American standard.² Another deviation was seen in the type of community. The rural folks always vote most frequently, whereas the city dwellers, particularly those who live in the metropolitan areas, vote least.³ Other demographic characteristics with respect to voting rates are, as a rule, consistent with the standard

Comparison of voting rate in various Japanese elections continued:

Year of Election	House of Representatives	House of National Constituency	Councillors Local Constituency	Prefectural Assemblies	Local Assemblies		
					Assemblies of the five greatest cities	City Assemblies	Towns and Village Assemblies
1956		62.10	62.11				
1958	76.99						
1959		58.74	58.75	79.48	65.09	85.31	92.50
1960	73.51						
1962		68.22	68.22				
1963	71.14						
1967	73.98						
AVERAGE	73.79	64.23	64.26	80.34	66.76	87.12	93.58

See (1) Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), Modern Political Systems: Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 65; (2) Komei Senkyo Renmei, No. 30 (1963) Sosenkyo no Jitta (Tokyo: Shinshushia, 1963), p. 5; (3) Japan Report, Vol. 13 No. 2, January 31, 1967, p. 2.

²For a summary of the American pattern, see page 44 of this work.

³A comparison of voting rate among different types of communities in the general election of Japan is made below:

	1947	1949	1952	1953	1955	1958	1963	Average
Metropolitan	61	63	56	55	62	65	77	62.7
Urban	65	73	76	72	74	75	86	74.4
Semirural	69	81	82	79	79	81		79.6
Rural	67	79	83	81	83	84	86	80.4

See: (1) Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 109; (2) No. 30 Sosenkyo no Jittai, op. cit., p. 7.

As to the American voting rates in various types of communities, see Robert E. Lane, Political Life (First paperback edition, New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 48.

patterns. For example, men vote more frequently than women; well-educated people vote more frequently than the less educated; middle-aged men vote most frequently, whereas young men and old women vote least; the professional and the managerial vote most, whereas the unskilled laborer and the housewife least; rich men vote most frequently, whereas the poor, least. An interesting fact should be noted: in Japan, although there is a gap between sex in voting rate, the gap is by no means as great as in America. Moreover, this gap is closing with the passing of time.⁴

Hitchner-Harbold assert that the greatest reason of nonvoting is "always indifference."⁵ But in Japan, as reflected in the 1960 and 1963 general elections, the uncontrollable factors such as conflicting hours of work (men), family responsibility (women), and illness, by far constitute the greatest bulk of nonvoting (42.5 per cent, average). Only 19 per cent of nonvoters can be classified as indifferent to elections. Moreover, strictly speaking, only 4 per cent are motivated by no confidence in the election system.⁶

Those people are most indifferent to voting: the metropolitan dwellers; men; people in their 50's, followed by 30's; high school graduates; businessmen and the white-collar class; and the poor people. These people are least confident in the election system: metropolitan citizens; people in their 50's, followed by 30's; college graduates; businessmen, followed by the white-collar class; and the middle class, followed by the lower middle and

⁴For an understanding of the demographic characteristics with respect to voting (or nonvoting) rate, see No. 30 Sosenkyo no Jittai, op. cit., pp. 6-9, and Japan Report, op. cit. for the Japanese pattern, and Lane, op. cit., for the American pattern.

⁵DeLL Gillette Hitchner and William Henry Harbold, Modern Government (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), p. 306.

⁶No. 30 Sosenkyo no Jittai, op. cit., p. 12.

lower classes.⁷

Mass communication media are widely used. For example, in the 1958-1963 period, 84 per cent of the Japanese electors exposed to the public a bulletin board on which the list of candidates (including names, background and experience, political views, etc.) was posted. Eighty-one per cent of the electors exposed election brochures. Seventy-one per cent read the newspaper advertisements, followed by radio and television broadcasts with regard to the candidate's background and experience (64 per cent), radio broadcasts of the candidate's political views (52 per cent), the candidate's street-corner speeches (36 per cent), and the candidate's meetings, jointly or individually (19 per cent). There is a strong tendency for the Japanese electors to rely on the newspaper advertisements for information with regard to elections. For example, the rate of reading newspaper advertisements in the 1958 election was 62 per cent. It jumped to 71 per cent in 1960, and 79 per cent in 1963. Others such as election brochures, street speeches, and candidate meetings, and broadcasts of the candidate's political views are consistently declining.⁸

As reflected in the 1963 election, these people are most inclined to rely on public bulletin boards to absorb information: rural people;⁹ men;

⁷Ibid., pp. 14-15.

⁸Ibid., pp. 17, 20, and 30.

⁹All demographic characteristics surveyed with respect to the exposure to mass communication media were as follows: (1) by type of community: metropolitan areas, urban cities, and towns and villages; (2) by sex: men and women; (3) by age, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 and over; (4) by education: graduates of grade school, junior high, senior high and college; (5) by occupation: owners of agriculture, forestry, and fishing, owners of business and service, professionals, management, technical and white collar, unskilled laborers; self-employed, agriculture, forestry, and fishing; self-employed business and service, housewives, others (including the unemployed).

people in their 20's; senior high school graduates: the white-collar worker, the managerial worker, and the self-employed businessmen. These people exposed themselves the most to election brochures: metropolitan citizens, men, people in their 40's, college graduates, and the white collar (including skilled laborers) and the managerial businessmen. These people exposed themselves most to the newspaper advertisements: the metropolitan dwellers, men, people in their 20's and 30's, college graduates, and the management and the white-collar workers (including skilled laborers). These people are most inclined to rely on the broadcasts of the candidate's background and experience: the urban city dwellers, men, people in their 50's, college graduates, and the business owners. These people are most inclined to rely on the broadcasts of the candidates: the metropolitan dwellers, men, people in their 50's, college graduates, white-collar workers (including skilled laborers) and owners of business and agriculture. These people exposed themselves most to street speeches: rural and semi-rural people, men, people in their 30's and 40's, senior high school graduates, and businessmen. These people exposed themselves most to candidate meetings: rural folks, men, people in their 40's, college graduates, owners of business and farms, and the management.¹⁰

Exposure to mass communication media, however, does not indicate that the voter will use these media as bases for making his decision. According to the surveys of the 1958-1963 period, the most contributory element to the elector's decision making is the election brochures (41 per cent), followed by newspaper, radio, TV and editorial comments (30 per cent), the broadcasts of the candidate's political views (23 per cent), newspaper

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 18-32.

advertisements (18 per cent), joint candidate meetings and street speeches (11 per cent each), the broadcasts of the candidate's background and experience (10 per cent), posters (8 per cent), individual candidate meetings (6 per cent), candidate's postcards (3 per cent), and the rest of the sources (28 per cent).¹¹ There is a trend for the average Japanese elector to take the newspaper advertisements into account rather seriously. For example, for the average rate of the 1958-1963 period, newspaper advertisements were rated as fourth. Yet, according to the 1963 election, they were rated as third.¹²

The election brochures contribute most to the following people's decision: people in the metropolitan areas,¹³ men, people in their 40's, college graduates, self-employed businessmen, the management and the white-collar worker (including skilled labor), and the upper class. Editorial comments contribute most to the people in the metropolitan areas, women, people in their 20's, senior high school graduates, the white-collar worker (including skilled laborers), housewives, and professional workers; middle, and upper-middle classes. The broadcasts of the candidate's political views contribute most to the rural folks, men, people in their 20's and 60's (and over), college graduates, owners of businesses and the rich. The newspaper advertisements contribute most to the metropolitan dwellers, women, people in their 20's, senior high school graduates, the white-collar

¹¹Ibid., p. 32.

¹²Ibid. The editorial comment was a new item surveyed in 1963. Hence, no comparison of this item can be made.

¹³All demographic characteristics surveyed with respect to the distribution of mass communication media to the elector's decision-making were as follows: (1) following items were the same as listed in No. 9, page 113: type of community, sex, age, education, and occupation; (2) by income: upper, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle, and lower classes.

workers (including skilled laborers), and housewives. Joint candidate meetings contribute most to the urban city dwellers as well as rural folks, people in their 60's and over, senior high school graduates, owners of business and management, and the rich.

Street-corner speeches contribute most to the urban city dwellers, men, people in their 40's, college graduates, businessmen, and the poor. The broadcasts of the candidate's background and experience contribute most to the people living in the metropolitan areas as well as in the urban cities, women, people in their 20's, college graduates, housewives, and the rich. These people are most affected by posters: the metropolitan dwellers, men, young people, least educated, self-employed businessmen, and the poor. These people are most affected by the candidate's postcards: the metropolitan dwellers, women of all ages except the 50's, people receiving all kinds of education except college, the self-employed classes (business as well as agriculture), and the lower middle classes. Those who are affected most by "other factors" are rural people, women, old people, least educated, professional people and the unemployed, and the poor.¹⁴

What is the most decisive factor which determines the elector's will? The past three surveys for the general elections (1958, 1960, and 1963) indicate that most voters vote for the candidate who, they think, has a good personality (character). This category of decision-making is followed by the consideration of the party, seeing the election brochures, household conferences, familiarity, hearing their campaign speeches, everyone's ideal person, reading newspapers, advice from unions or associations, watching television, listening to radios, requests from knowledgeable persons,

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 34-35.

advice from knowledgeable men, messages from the candidate, information from the village or town, indebtedness to the candidate, and relation to the candidate. Appreciable changes of the order were seen in the special weight of newspaper and television.¹⁵

These people placed the candidate's personality on the primary consideration: the metropolitan citizen,¹⁶ men, people in their 50's (men) and their 40's (women), least and less educated (male), all kinds of education except grade school (female), owners of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.

¹⁵The most decisive factor determining the voter's will in supporting a candidate is listed below:

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>Average</u>
Personality	29%	27%	24%	27%
Party Consideration	20	18	17	18
Election Brochure	10	12	11	11
Household Conferences	8	10	8	9
Familiarity	4	4	7	5
Heard Public Speeches	7	5	4	5
Everyone's Ideal Person	4	4	3	4
Read Newspapers	3	2	4	3
Listened to Radios	4	4	2	3
Advice from Union or Association	1	2	4	2
Television	—*	1	3	2
Request from Knowledgeable Men	1	1	2	1
Advice from Knowledgeable Men	1	1	1	1
Message from Candidate	1	1	1	1
Information from Village or Town	—*	—*	1	1
Indebtedness to Candidate	1	—*	0	1
Relation to Candidate	—*	—*	0	0
Others	3	1	2	2
Not Clear	4	7	6	6

Note: Those marked with (*) were not surveyed items.

See Ibid., pp. 56-57

¹⁶All demographic characteristics surveyed with respect to the most decisive factor determining the voter's will in supporting a candidate were as follows: (1) following items were the same as listed in No. 9, page 113: type of community, sex, age, education, and occupation; (2) by sex and age: men (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 and over), women (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 and over); (3) by sex and education: men (graduates of grade school, junior high, senior high, and college), women (graduates of grade school, junior high, senior high, and college).

These people placed political party on the primary consideration: metropolitan dwellers, men in their 40's and 20's, women in their 20's, college graduates (both male and female), the management, followed by the white-collar workers (including the skilled laborers). Within the category of "request from a knowledgeable person," the self-employed businessmen headed all others. Within the category of "election brochure," women with college educations led all others. Within the category of "advice from unions or associations," the unskilled laborers led all others. Within the category of "information from village or town," the businessmen and those people in their 60's or over (both male and female) headed all others. Within the category of "advice from knowledgeable persons," women in their 60's and over led all others. Within the category of "heard the public speeches," women with college educations headed all others. Within the category of "message from candidates," no appreciable difference is seen. Within the category of "relation to candidate," men in their 40's and 50's, women in their 60's, men with college educations, women with primary educations, and laborers had one per cent each. Within the category of "party consideration," men with college educations and the managerial led all others, followed by women with college educations, the white-collar workers, and the people in metropolitan areas.

Within the category of "personality," men with primary educations, owners of farms, forestry industries, and fisheries, and men in their 50's led all others. Within the category of "listened to the radio," professional people took the lead. Within the category of "watched television," again the professional people took the lead. Within the category of "read newspapers," the laborer, the metropolitan people, the young people (in their 20's), took the lead. Within the category of "familiarity," men in

their 60's took the lead, followed by owners of businesses, the professional people, and people with primary educations. Within the category of "indebtedness to candidate," the rural folks, men in their 50's, 60's, and 20's; women in their 50's; grade school graduates; and owners of businesses took the lead. Within the category of "everyone's ideal person," women in their 60's (and over) and 50's, women with primary educations, the unemployed, and self-employed businessmen took the lead. Within the category of "others," women in their 60's and over, women with primary educations, and owners of farms, forestry, and fisheries took the lead.¹⁷

B. THE VOTER AND THE PARTY

1. The Supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): By type of community, the largest supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, in the 1963 election, were the rural people, followed by the urban people, and the metropolitan dwellers, in that order. By sex, men supported the party more regularly than women. By age, the increase of supporters paralleled the increase of age. By sex and age, the same pattern persisted. By education, the degree of support reversed the degree of education. By sex and education, the same pattern persisted. By occupation, the largest supporters were found in the owners of agriculture, forestry, and fishing, followed by the self-employed businessmen, the owners of businesses, the self-employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing, the professional workers as well as the housewives and the unemployed, the unskilled laborers, and the technical and the white-collar workers. By income, the party was most supported by the upper class, followed by the upper-middle, the lower-middle

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 58-61.

the lower and the middle classes.

The supporters of the LDP had a strong identity in geography rather than occupation. The ratio was two to one in the former's favor. They preferred to vote for a political activist rather than a politically influential person. The ratio was four to three in the former's favor. Besides, they voted for a man of intelligence and a man of integrity. But the degree of such orientations was comparatively weak. The party's supporters had a strong orientation in personality, rather than political party. The ratio was two to one in the former's favor. In terms of the most decisive factor in making voting decisions, most of the party's supporters put the candidate's personality first, followed by party consideration, election brochures, familiarity, household conferences, public speeches, newspapers, and everybody's idea of him, radios, requests from knowledgeable persons, advice from unions or associations, television, and the "other" factor, information from village or town, advice from knowledgeable persons, and messages from the candidate. No sizable influence was found in other factors (Tables 16 and 17).

2. The Supporters of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP): By type of community, the largest supporters of the Japan Socialist Party in the 1963 election were the people in the metropolitan areas, followed by people in the urban cities, and the rural folks, in that order. By sex, the party was more supported by women than by men. By age, the degree of the party's supporters reversed the order of age. By sex and age, the same pattern persisted. By education, the supporters of the party paralleled the degree of education. By sex and education, the same pattern persisted. By occupation, the party was most supported by the technical and white-collar workers, followed by the unskilled laborers, the managerial workers,

housewives, the unemployed, the professional as well as the self-employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing, businessmen, and the owners of agriculture, forestry, and fishing. By income, the party's largest supporters were in the middle class, followed by the lower, the lower-middle, the upper-middle, and the upper classes.

In contrast to the supporters of the LDP, the supporters of this party had a strong identity in occupation rather than geography. The ratio was two to one in the former's favor. They also preferred to vote for the political activists rather than the politically influential persons. The ratio was three to one in the former's favor--a discrepancy greater than the LDP. The party commanded a considerable size of supporters who voted mainly for a man with intelligence and a man with integrity. In contrast to the LDP, the supporters of this party were more party-oriented than personality-oriented. The ratio was five to four in the former's favor. In terms of the most decisive factor in making voting decisions, most of the party's supporters put party consideration first, followed by the candidate's personality, election brochures, advice from unions and associations, household conferences, newspapers, public speeches, familiarity, radios, television sets, everyone's idea of person, requests or advice from knowledgeable persons, messages from the candidate, and "other" factors. No sizable weight was found in the other factors (Tables 16 and 17).

3. The Supporters of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP): By type of community, this party was supported most strongly by people in the metropolitan areas, followed by people in urban cities and rural folks. By sex, the party was more supported by men than by women. By age, the party was most supported by people in their 20's, followed by 40's, 30's, 60's and over, and 50's. By sex and age, the party was most supported by men in

their 20's as well as 40's, men in their 30's as well as women in their 20's, women in their 30's as well as women in their 40's, men in their 50's as well as women in their 50's and over. By education, the party commanded the greatest support from the high school graduates, followed by college graduates, junior high school graduates, and grade school graduates. By sex and education, the same pattern persisted in the category of male. Among women, the party's supporters paralleled the degree of education. By occupation, the party was most supported by the professional as well as the managerial and the unskilled laborers, followed by technical and the white-collar workers, owners of businesses as well as housewives and the unemployed, the self-employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing as well as the self-employed businessmen. By income, the party's supporters were most concentrated in the middle class, followed by the upper-middle, lower-middle, and the upper classes. There were no supporters in the lower class in 1963.

The party's supporters, like the supporters of the JSP, had greater identity in occupation than in geography. But the ratio was closer--five to three in the former's favor. More supporters of the party voted for the political activists than for the politically influential men. The ratio was greater than that of the JSP. For every seven supporters of the DSP, five voted for the activists, and two for influential persons. A considerable size of supporters voted for persons of intelligence and persons of integrity. More supporters of the party were personality-oriented than party-oriented. The ratio was five to three in the former's favor. In terms of the most decisive factor in making decisions, most of the party's supporters put the candidate's character first, followed by party, house conferences, advice from unions and associations, television and newspapers, election brochures, radios, public speeches, familiarity, the candidate's messages

and "other" factors, advice from knowledgeable persons, relation to the candidate, indebtedness to the candidate, everyone's idea of person. The others, such as requests from knowledgeable persons, or information from the town or village did not affect any in the final decision of the party's supporters (Tables 16 and 17).

h. The Supporters of the Japan Communist Party (JCP):¹⁸ By type of community, the party was most supported by people in the metropolitan areas, followed by urban city dwellers and the rural citizens. By sex, the party was equally supported by men and women. By age, the party was strongly supported by people in their 20's; there was no sizable support by people in their 40's. By sex and age, the party was most supported by men in their 20's, followed by men in their 60's and over as well as women in their 20's. No sizable support was seen in women in their 40's. No support was reported in women in their 60's. By education, the party was most supported by senior high school graduates. Others equally supported the party. By sex and education, the party was most supported by men with least education and women with education at the senior high school level. Others, except women with college educations, equally supported the party. Women with college educations did not support that party. By occupation, the party was most supported by the self-employed businessmen, followed by the professional, the technical worker (and the white-collar workers), and the unskilled laborers; the self-employed farmers and fishermen; housewives; owners of businesses or agriculture. No support was found in the managerial class. By income, the party was most supported by the lower-middle class, equally

¹⁸As the Clean Government Party (komeito) did not participate in the 1963 election or any previous elections, no survey of the party's supporters was made. The reader is advised to refer to the above for brief information.

supported by the middle and the upper-middle classes, and not supported by the upper or the lower classes.

The party's supporters had greatest identity in occupation. Three-fourths of the supporters identified the representatives by occupation, whereas only one-fourth by locality. Also, the party's supporters had the greatest support among political activists, followed by intellectuals, men of integrity, and only a small number of people gave support because of political influence. Moreover, a great portion of the party's supporters supported the party for some unidentified reasons! Again, the party's supporters had the greatest orientation in party instead of in personality. In terms of the most decisive factor in making decisions, the party's supporters overwhelmingly took the party interest and personality, (particularly the former) into primary account. Next to them came household conferences, requests from knowledgeable men and election brochures, advice from unions or associations, radios, and "other" factors. No supporters were reported in the rest of the categories except in the category of "unclear factors" (Tables 16 and 17).

5. The Independents and the "Minor" Parties: By type of community, the independents were equally supported, whereas the minor parties concentrated on the metropolitan areas. By sex, both independents and the minor parties were equally supported. By age, the independents were equally supported, whereas the minor parties were supported by people in their 20's, 30's, as well as 60's and over. By sex and age, the independents were most supported by men in their 20's, followed by men in their 60's (and over), and women in their 20's. The independents were equally supported by men from 30 to 59 in age as well as women in their 30's and 50's. No sizable support was reported in other categories. In contrast, the minor parties

lured the most supporters from women in their 40's. No support of the minor parties was reported in men in their 20's and women in their 60's and over. By education, the independents were equally supported, whereas the minor parties did not command support appreciably in the category of primary education. By sex and education, the independents were most supported by women with junior secondary educations, in the meantime, not appreciably supported by men with the same level of education. No supporters were reported in the category of women with college educations. In contrast, the minor parties received equal support from men with all levels of education except primary school and women with junior or lower level of education. No sizable support was reported in the category of women with senior secondary education. No supporters were reported in other categories. By occupation, the independents were most supported by the self-employed classes as well as housewives, and some were supported by the white-collar workers. No sizable support was reported in all other categories. The minor parties were equally supported by the owners of businesses, the technical and white-collar workers, the unskilled laborers, and the housewives. They were not supported in other occupations. By income, the independents were equally supported by the middle, upper-middle, and the lower-middle classes. No supporters of independents came from the upper and lower classes. In contrast, the minor parties were only supported by the middle class.

The supporters of the independents had strong feelings of locality. In contrast, the voters of the minor parties only had feelings of occupation. The supporters of the independents equally supported a man with political influence and a man with activity. In contrast, the voters of the minor parties voted more for the activists. No image of party was required by the

supporters of the independents. In contrast, the voters of the minor parties needed a weak party image. In terms of the most decisive factor in making decisions, the most supporters of the independents placed the personality of the candidate on the first consideration, followed by election brochures, requests from knowledgeable persons, as well as watching television, household conferences, advice from unions or associations, messages of the candidates, newspapers, familiarity, and everyone's ideal person. In contrast, the supporters of the minor parties placed the candidate's personality first, followed by party image and public speeches, household conferences, requests from knowledgeable persons, watching television, and "other" factors, etc. (Tables 16 and 17).

C. PREFECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTY (OR FORCE) SUPPORT

A prefecture (or any local unit) can be classified as either (1) rural-urban, (2) agrarian-industrial, or (3) poor-wealthy. These three terms are usually related to one another. For example, a rural prefecture has often an agrarian economy and its people are comparatively poor. In contrast, an urban prefecture has often an industrial society, and many of its people are comparatively rich. Below is a discussion of these three themes with respect to Japanese prefectures. After pinpointing the characteristics of each prefecture, the relation of the characteristics of each prefecture to the degree of support to each major party in Japan is given.

1. Methodology: In order to determine the degrees of urbanization, industrialization or income (or standard of living) at the prefectural level, indices for each prefecture are needed. Unfortunately, this writer did not have access to any ready information of such. Despite this deficiency, production of some workable substitutes has been attempted. By these

Table 16

Relation of Demographic Characteristics and Candidate Image
to the Political Parties in 1963 General Election of Japan (in Percentage)

Demographic Characteristic or Candidate Image	P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S					
	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Inde- pendents	Minor Parties
Type of Community						
7 metropolitan areas	41	41	10	3	1	2
Urban Cities	56	31	4	1	1	0*
Towns and Villages	63	28	2	0*	1	1
Sex						
Male	58	31	5	1	1	1
Female	54	32	4	1	1	1
Age						
20-29	43	43	6	3	1	1
30-39	48	40	4	1	1	1
40-49	56	31	5	0*	1	0*
50-59	69	22	2	1	1	—**
60 and over	71	15	3	1	1	1
Sex and Age						
20-29	39	46	7	3	—**	2
30-39	50	40	6	1	1	1
40-49 Male	55	33	7	1	1	—**
50-59	73	18	2	1	1	—**
60 and over	72	17	3	2	1	1
20-29	46	40	6	2	1	0*
30-39	47	39	4	1	1	1
40-49 Female	56	29	4	0*	2	0*
50-59	64	25	2	1	1	—**
60 and over	69	13	2	—**	—**	1
Education						
Grade School	64	20	2	1	1	0*
Junior High	59	30	4	1	1	1
Senior High	49	37	7	2	1	1
College	43	45	6	1	1	1

Table 16 (continued)

Demographic Characteristic or Candidate Image	P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S					
	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Inde- pendents	Minor Parties
Sex and Education						
Primary Education	66	22	2	2	1	--*
Junior Secondary	62	28	4	1	0*	1
Senior Secondary Male	49	36	8	1	1	1
College	46	42	5	1	1	1
Primary Education	63	18	1	1	1	1
Junior Secondary	56	32	3	1	2	1
Senior Secondary Female	49	38	6	2	1	0*
College	32	58	11	--*	--*	--*
Occupation						
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, owner	78	15	2	1	0*	--*
Business, service, owner	71	17	4	1	0*	1
Professional	60	24	7	2	--*	--*
Managerial	44	44	7	--*	--*	--*
Technical, White Collar	34	53	6	2	1	1
Unskilled Laborer	35	50	7	2	0*	1
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, self-employed	61	24	3	1	2	**
Business, service, self-employed	74	17	2	3	2	--*
Housewives	56	31	4	1	2	1
Others (including unemployed)	56	28	4	1	1	1
Income						
Upper	74	18	1	--*	--*	--*
Upper Middle	59	30	4	1	1	0*
Middle	54	33	6	1	1	1
Lower Middle	56	31	2	2	1	--*
Lower	55	32	--*	--*	--*	--*
Identity of Representatives						
Local Men	60	26	32	16	42	--*
Occupational Men	30	72	53	60	26	55
In-between***	6	9	11	40	21	18
Others	16	9	12	4	26	27
Assessment of Candidate						
Influential	29	17	20	4	32	27
Active	42	56	52	48	32	73
Intelligent	11	11	12	20	5	--*
Integrity	7	7	7	8	11	--*
Others	12	10	10	20	21	--*

Table 16 (continued)

Demographic Characteristic or Candidate Image	P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S					
	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Inde- pendents	Minor Parties
Party vs. Personality						
Party-oriented	25	46	34	52	***	18
Personality-oriented	57	39	52	32	74	82
Hard to Say	15	14	12	16	26	***
Unclear	3	2	2	***	***	***

Notes: (1) Those having less than one per cent of supporters were marked (*).

(2) No supporters were marked with (**).

(3) The so-called "in-between" includes identities of women, youth, and of same group (see ***).

Sources: Ibid., pp. 40-41, 44-47, 49-50.

Table 17

Voter's Most Decisive Reason to Support the Party in the 1963 General Election of Japan

Most Decisive Reason for Support	POLITICAL PARTIES					Minor Parties
	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	Independents	
Personality	26%	19%	26%	20%	32%	27%
Party Consideration	13	27	14	36	--**	16
Election Brochures	12	11	4	8	16	--**
Household Conferences	8	7	9	8	5	9
Familiarity	10	3	3	--**	5	--**
Heard Public Speeches	4	4	4	--**	--**	18
Read Newspapers	4	6	5	--**	5	--**
Advice from Unions or Associations	2	8	7	4		--**
Everyone's Ideal Person	4	2	1	--**	5	--**
Watched Television	2	2	5	--**	11	9
Listened to Radio	3	2	4	4	--**	--**
Requested by Knowledgeable Person	2	1	--**	8	11	9
Advice from Knowledgeable Person	1	1	1	--**	--**	--**
Message from Candidate	1	1	2	--**	5	--**
Information from Village or Town	1	--**	--**	--**	--**	--**
Indebtedness	0*	0*	1	--**	--**	--**
Related to Candidate	0*	0*	1	--**	--**	--**
Others	2	1	1	4	--**	9
Unclear	5	5	9	8	--**	--**

* Less than 0.5 per cent

** No supporter

Source: Ibid., pp. 60-61.

substitutes, it is believed that this study can be kept going. Introduction of the indices follows.

By the selected criteria, the degree of urbanization is determined by a formula as follows:

$$\text{Degree of urbanization} = \frac{\text{The total of population in 1965 in cities with population 100,000 and over in a prefecture}}{\text{The total of population in 1965 in a prefecture}}$$

Accordingly, the ranks and degrees of urbanization as follows were obtained:

(Tokyo (91 per cent), Kanagawa (86), Osaka (80), Kyoto (65), Hyogo (65), Aichi (58), Saitama (57), Fukuoka (54), Mie (42), Aomori (40), Nagasaki (40), Shizuoka (39), Hiroshima (39), Chiba (38), Miyazaki (38), Hokkaido (37), Toyama (37), Ehime (35), Yamaguchi (34), Ishikawa (34), Wakayama (32), Kumamoto (29), Oita (29), Gifu (28), Miyagi (27), Tochigi (27), Okayama (27), Kagawa (27), Kochi (27), Fukushima (25), Tokushima (24), Fukui (23), Yamanashi (23), Niigata (22), Nara (19), Tottori (19), Kagoshima (18), Akita (17), Gumma (17), Nagano (17), Ibaraki (16), Yamagata (15), Saga (15), Shiga (14), Shimane (14), and Iwate (13)).¹⁹

The degree of industrialization is determined by a formula as follows:

$$\text{Degree of industrialization} = \frac{\text{Persons engaged in manufacture in a prefecture in 1963}}{\text{Persons engaged in farming in a prefecture in 1965}}$$

Accordingly, the ranks and degrees of industrialization were secured as follows: Tokyo (1,524 per cent), Osaka (556), Kanagawa (328), Aichi (163), Kyoto (128), Hyogo (100), Shizuoka (82), Saitama (78), Fukuoka (70), Hiroshima (60), Ishikawa (56), Gifu (55), Fukui (53), Gumma (52), Toyama (51), Mie (51), Wakayama (46), Tochigi (42), Hokkaido (41), Okayama (39),

¹⁹Statistics of population in prefectures as well as in cities in 1965 were secured from Nippon: A Charted Survey of Japan, 1966 (Tokyo: Kokuseishia, 1966), pp. 19-23.

Yamaguchi (38), Shiga (36), Niigata (36), Kagawa (34), Chiga (34), Nagano (33), Ehime (32), Nara (31), Yamanashi (29), Ibaraki (27), Tokushima (27), Nagasaki (27), Yamagata (24), Fukushima (23), Miyagi (22), Saga (20), Kochi (19), Tottori (18), Miyazaki (17), Shimane (16), Akita (15), Kumamoto (15), Oita (15), Iwate (14), Aomori (12), and Kagoshima (12).²⁰

The degree of income is determined by a formula as follows:

$$\text{Degree of income in a prefecture} = \frac{\text{Deposits in all financial institutions in a prefecture in 1965}}{\text{Population 15 years old and over in a prefecture in 1962}}$$

Accordingly, the ranks and degrees of prefectural income were obtained as follows: Tokyo (106 per cent), Osaka (88), Aichi (59), Kyoto (46), Shizuoka (45), Wakayama (42), Fukui (41), Hyogo (41), Hiroshima (41), Ishikawa (40), Gifu (40), Kagawa (39), Toyama (38), Kagawa (37), Saitama (35), Mie (35), Nara (33), Yamaguchi (33), Gumma (32), Fukuoka (32), Shiga (31), Hokkaido (30), Miyagi (29), Tochigi (29), Nagano (29), Ehime (29), Chiba (28), Niigata (28), Okayama (28), Tokushima (28), Yamanashi (26), Yamagata (25), Kochi (25), Saga (25), Tottori (24), Oita (24), Fukushima (23), Ibaraki (23), Aomori (22), Iwate (21), Nagasaki (21), Akita (20), Shimane (20), Kumamoto (18), Miyazaki (17), and Kagoshima (17).²¹

Operationally, the levels of urbanization for the prefectures can be categorized as follows:

Group I (urban): 50 per cent of urbanization index and over.

Group II (semi-urban): from 25 per cent to 49 per cent of urbanization index

²⁰Both persons engaged in manufacture and in farming, see *ibid.*, pp. 341, 343.

²¹Both deposits in financial institution and population 15 years old and over, see *ibid.*, pp. 339, 347.

Group III (rural): 24 per cent of urbanization index and below.

Similarly, the levels of industrialization for the prefectures can be categorized as follows:

Group I (industrial): 70 per cent of industrialization index and over.

Group II (semi-industrial): from 30 per cent to 69 per cent of industrialization index.

Group III (agrarian): 29 per cent of industrialization index and below.

Likewise, the levels of prefectural income can be categorized as follows:

Group I (affluent): 41 per cent of income index and over.

Group II (semi-affluent): from 27 per cent to 40 per cent of income index.

Group III (poor): 26 per cent of income index and below.

Accordingly, eight prefectures are classified as urban prefectures; twenty-two as semi-urban; and sixteen as rural. Nine prefectures are classified as industrial prefectures; nineteen as semi-industrial; and eighteen as agrarian. Nine prefectures are classified as affluent prefectures; twenty-two as semi-affluent; and sixteen as poor.

2. Urbanization and Party Support: By the index of urbanization, during the 1960-1967 period the five major parties were supported as the table on the following page (Table 18) indicates.

Table 18 indicates that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was strongest in rural and semi-urban categories; the party was featured the least in the urban prefectures. In contrast, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was strongest in rural and urban support; the party was slightly weaker in the in-between (semi-urban) category. The other three parties--the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Clean Government Party (Komeito), and the Japan Communist Party (JCP)--were peculiarly prominent in the urban category; their support in the rest of the groups was extremely weak.

Table 18

Relation of Urbanization to Prefectural Support of Various Parties
in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Per Cent of 1960-1967			Average Vote	
		LDP	JSP	DSP	KOMEITO	JCP
I	Urban (8)	45.56	28.80	12.50	9.95	6.54
II	Semi-urban (22)	59.82	25.34	5.80	2.02	2.41
III	Rural (16)	60.50	28.78	4.19	0.76	2.24
All Japan (46)		53.68	28.16	7.85	5.38	3.90

*Urban prefectures included Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Aichi, Saitama, and Fukuoka. Semi-urban prefectures included Mie, Aomori, Nagasaki, Shizuoka, Hiroshima, Chiba, Miyazaki, Hokkaido, Toyama, Ehime, Yamaguchi, Ishikawa, Wakayama, Kumamoto, Cita, Gifu, Miyagi, Tochigi, Okayama, Kagawa, Kochi, and Fukushima. Rural prefectures included Tokushima, Fukui, Yamanashi, Niigata, Nara, Tottori, Kagoshima, Akita, Gumma, Nagano, Ibaraki, Yamagata, Saga, Shiga, Shimane, and Iwate.

Note: The figures of the Komeito were the turnouts of the 1967 election instead of the average turnouts of the 1960-1967 period.

Source: (1) Table 11, (2) appendices, Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The above table also differentiates that the LDP obtained a leading position in all groups by this index; followed by the JSP. The distribution of strength of the parties was:


Group I LDP > JSP > DSP > Komeito > JCP.

Group II LDP > JSP > DSP > JCP > Komeito.

Group III LDP > JSP > DSP > JCP > Komeito.

In order to give the reader a full concept regarding the impact of urbanization on party support, Table 18 is illustrated on the next page (see Figure 2).

Figure 2
Urbanization and Party Support



Source: Table 18.

Table 19

Relation of Urbanization to the Expansion of Prefectural Support
of Various Parties as Reflected in the General Elections
of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Expansion of Political Parties (%)			
		LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP
I	Urban (8)	-7.54	-1.82	-0.44	+1.13
II	Semi-urban (22)	-2.01	+0.58	-1.28	+0.48
III	Rural (16)	-1.99	+1.49	-0.09	+0.49
	All Japan (46)	-4.88	-0.27	-0.45	+0.86

*See Table 18.

Note: As the Komeito only participated in the 1967 election, no figures of expansion of the party can be presented.

Sources: (1) Table 13, (2) appendices, Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.


Table 19 indicates that the LDP was greatly undermined in Group I; Groups II and III did not escape from the trend of greater urbanization. In contrast, the JSP successfully penetrated Groups II and III although that party encountered the same fate as the LDP in Group I. The DSP, not unlike the LDP, negated its expansion in every group. In contrast, the JCP favorably expanded at all levels. For full understanding, the reader is asked to see Figure 3 on the next page.

3. Urbanization and Force Support: By urbanization (during the 1960-1967 period), the political forces were supported as Table 20 (page 137) indicates.

Table 20 indicates that the rightists' rural support was very sizable; nonetheless, they were featured in the in-between (semi-urban) category; the rightists were relatively weak in Group I. The centrists were, by far, the strongest in the first group as were the leftists, although by a smaller margin.

Figure 3

Increase of Urbanization and Expansion of Parties



Source: Table 19.

Table 20

Relation of Urbanization to Prefectural Support of Various Forces in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Per Cent of 1960-1967			Average Vote	Total
		Rightists	Centrists	Leftists		
I	Urban (8)	48.84	15.82	35.34		100.00
II	Semi-urban (22)	65.78	6.47	27.75		100.00
III	Rural (16)	64.54	4.45	31.01		100.00
	All Japan (46)	58.30	9.64	32.06		100.00

*See Table 18.

Sources: Table 11, (2) appendices, Tables 10, 11, and 12.

By this index, the rightists obtained a leading position in all levels of support, followed by the leftists and then the centrists. (See Figure 4, also)

Table 21

Relation of Urbanization to the Expansion of Prefectural Support of Various Forces as Reflected in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967


Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Expansion of Political Forces (%)			Total
		Rightists	Centrists	Leftists	
I	Urban (8)	-5.47	+6.20	-0.73	0.00
II	Semi-urban (22)	-1.55	+0.38	+1.17	0.00
III	Rural (16)	-1.88	+0.04	+1.84	0.00
	All Japan (46)	-3.73	+3.14	+0.59	0.00

*See Table 18.

Sources: (1) Table 13, (2) appendices, Tables 13, 14, and 15.

The above table indicates that the trend of urbanization was a great gospel to the centrists who greatly expanded in the urban prefectures. The leftists were also favored by this trend, but their urban trait was somewhat discounted. Such a trend of social development (urbanization) was most

Figure 4
Urbanization and Force Support



Source: Table 20.

unprofitable for the rightists whose strength was undermined at all levels, especially the first group. (See also Figure 5 on the following page)

4. Industrialization and Party Support: By the index of industrialization (during the 1960-1967 period), the major parties were supported as shown by the table below (Table 22):

Table 22

Relation of Industrialization to Prefectural Support of Various Parties in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Per Cent of 1960-1967			Average Vote	
		LDP	JSP	DSP	KOMEITO	JCP
I	Industrial (9)	47.10	28.17	11.94	9.26	6.04
II	Semi-industrial (19)	58.96	26.66	5.46	1.44	2.61
III	Agrarian (18)	61.16	26.70	5.23	1.42	2.08
All Japan (46)		53.68	28.16	7.85	5.38	3.90

*Industrial prefectures included Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Hyogo, Shizuoka, Saitama, and Fukuoka. Semi-industrial prefectures included Hiroshima, Ishikawa, Gifu, Fukui, Gumma, Toyama, Mie, Wakayama, Tochigi, Hokkaido, Okayama, Yamaguchi, Shiga, Niigata, Kagawa, Chiba, Nagano, Ehime, and Nara. Agrarian prefectures included Yamanashi, Ibaraki, Tokushima, Nagasaki, Yamagata, Fukushima, Miyagi, Saga, Kochi, Tottori, Miyazaki, Shimane, Akita, Kumamoto, Oita, Iwate, Aomori, and Kagoshima.


Note: The figure of the Komeito was the turnout of the 1967 election instead of the average turnouts of the 1960-1967 period.

Sources: (1) Table 11, (2) appendices, Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The above table indicates that the LDP was most typical in agrarian support; moreover, its "agrarian" flavor was a little stronger than that of rural (refer to Table 18). Although the least support was given to the LDP in Group I by this index, it was somewhat higher than the same group in Table 18. The JSP, though most featured in industrial support, was strong in all groups. The rest of the parties--the DSP, Komeito, and JCP--concentrated their support in Group I.

Figure 5

Increase of Urbanization and Expansion of Forces



Source: Table 21.

The LDP, similar to its showing as measured by the index of urbanization, strongly dominated all levels of competition, followed as usual by the JSP. The distribution of strength was in the following order:

Group I LDP > JSP > DSP > Komeito > JCP.

Group II LDP > JSP > DSP > JCP > Komeito.

Group III LDP > JSP > DSP > JCP > Komeito.

As usual, an illustration is given on the next page (Figure 6).

Table 23

Relation of Industrialization to the Expansion of Prefectural Support
of Various Parties as Reflected in the General Elections
of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Expansion of Political Parties (%)			
		LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP
I	Industrial (9)	-7.49	-1.62	-0.44	+1.04
II	Semi-industrial (19)	-1.25	+0.63	-0.69	+0.56
III	Agrarian (18)	-2.52	+1.36	-0.89	+0.41
	All Japan (46)	-4.88	-0.27	-0.45	+0.86


*See Table 22.

Note: As the Komeito only participated in the 1967 election, no figures of expansion of the party can be presented.

Sources: (1) Table 13, (2) appendices, Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.

The trend of industrialization not unlike the trend of urbanization was harmful to the LDP which decreased its support at all levels, particularly in Group I: Industrialization increased the support of the JSP in the second and the third groups but negated it in the first. Though negated at all levels, the DSP's loss was lightened with the elevation of degrees of industrialization. The JCP was favored by this index at all levels. Industrialization seemed to have strengthened the party's support. (For full understanding, see Figure 7.)


Figure 6
Industrialization and Party Support



Source: Table 22.

Figure 7

Increase of Industrialization and Expansion of Parties



Source: Table 23.

5. Industrialization and Force Support: By the index of industrialization, the political forces were, during the 1960-1967 period, supported as shown by the table below (Table 24):

Table 24

Relation of Industrialization to Prefectural Support of Various Forces in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Per Cent of 1960-1967			Average Vote Total
		Rightists	Centrists	Leftists	
I	Industrial (9)	50.76	15.03	34.21	100.00
II	Semi-industrial (19)	64.79	5.94	29.27	100.00
III	Agrarian (18)	65.71	5.11	29.18	100.00
All Japan (46)		58.30	9.64	32.06	100.00


*See Table 22.

Sources: Table 11 and appendices, Tables 10, 11, and 12.

Table 24 indicates that the rightists' stronghold was in the agrarian group; their support in the in-between group was strong, too. However, the weakest in Group I for the rightists, they were relatively light compared with the index of urbanization as shown in Table 20. Not unlike the index of urbanization, the centrists concentrated their development in Group I, so did the leftists, but not very typically.

As usual, the rightists dominated the competition at all levels, followed by the leftists. The centrists were the weakest. (See also Figure 3.)

Figure 8
Industrialization and Force Support



Source: Table 24.

Table 25

Relation of Industrialization to the Expansion of Prefectural Support
of Various Forces as Reflected in the General Elections
of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Expansion of Political Forces (%)			Total
		Rightists	Centrists	Leftists	
I	Industrial (9)	-5.14	+5.73	-0.59	0.00
II	Semi-industrial (19)	-1.51	+0.32	+1.19	0.00
III	Agrarian (18)	-1.83	+0.05	+1.78	0.00
	All Japan (46)	-3.73	+3.14	+0.59	0.00

*See Table 22.

Sources: (1) Table 13, (2) appendices, Tables 13, 14, and 15.


Not unlike the trend of urbanization, the trend of industrialization brought to the centrists more support than ever as shown in Table 25. The leftists were also favored in two of the three groups but by no means the industrial group. The rightists seemed to be a greater victim of such development. (See also Figure 9.)

6. Prefectural Income and Party Support: By the index of income, the major parties were, during the 1960-1967 period, supported as shown by Table 26 on the following page.

Not unlike the previous indices, the conservative LDP was supported the most by Group III as shown in Table 26. However, the least was the party's support in the first group: it was impressive compared with the corresponding group in the previous indices. This is an indication that the impact of economic prosperity influences the Japanese people to become less progressive. A strong evidence can be discerned by comparing the support of the JSP as it appeared in Tables 18, 22, and this table (26). While that party was supported the most by Group I by both the indices of urbanization and industrialization, it was not so by this index. In other words the

Figure 9

Increase of Industrialization and Expansion of Forces



Source: Table 25.

affluent prefectures were not so zealous as the urban or industrial prefectures in accepting the leadership of the left party. The rest of the parties--the DSP, Komeito, and JCP--though remaining strongest in Group I, responded less strongly to the index of wealth. This clearly shows that these smaller parties were not the images of the wealthy in the period discussed.

Table 26

Relation of Prefectural Income to Prefectural Support of Various Parties in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Per Cent of 1960-1967			Average Vote	
		LDP	JSP	DSP	KOMEITO	JCP
I	Affluent (9)	51.99	26.62	9.33	6.52	5.40
II	Semi-affluent (21)	56.85	26.86	6.77	3.06	2.80
III	Poor (16)	61.68	25.95	4.28	0.84	2.11
All Japan (46)		53.68	28.16	7.85	5.38	3.90

*Affluent prefectures included Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kyoto, Shizuoka, Wakayama, Fukui, Hyogo, and Hiroshima. Semi-affluent prefectures included Ishikawa, Gifu, Kanagawa, Toyama, Kagawa, Saitama, Mie, Nara, Yamaguchi, Gumma, Fukuoka, Shiga, Hokkaido, Miyagi, Tochigi, Nagano, Ehime, Chiba, Niigata, Okayama, and Tokushima. Poor prefectures included Yamanashi, Yamagata, Kochi, Saga, Tottori, Oita, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Aomori, Iwate, Nagasaki, Akita, Shimane, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima.

Note: The figures of the Komeito were the turnouts of the 1967 election instead of the average turnouts of the 1960-1967 period.

Sources: (1) Table 11, (2) appendices, Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The dominance of the LDP in all levels was most apparent by this index shown above, followed by the JSP. The distribution of strength of the parties was given below.

Group I LDP > JSP > DSP > Komeito > JCP.

Group II LDP > JSP > DSP > Komeito > JCP.

Group III LDP > JSP > DSP > JCP > Komeito.

The reader is requested to observe the order of the Komeito and that of the JCP in Group II. By the index of urbanization as well as industrialization, the JCP preceded the Komeito in such group but not in this index. This indicates that the middle class was more inclined to support the Komeito than the JCP. (See also Figure 10 and compare it with Figures 2 and 6.)

Table 27

Relation of Prefectural Income to the Expansion of Prefectural Support of Various Parties as Reflected in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefectures*	Expansion of Political Parties (%)			
		LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP
I	Affluent (9)	-6.14	-1.25	-0.55	+0.91
II	Semi-affluent (21)	-2.23	+0.47	-0.56	+0.60
III	Poor (16)	-2.15	+1.46	-0.87	+0.41
All Japan (46)		-4.88	-0.27	-0.45	+0.86


*See Table 26.

Note: As the Komeito only participated in the 1967 election, no figures of expansion of the party can be presented.

Sources: (1) Table 13, (2) appendices, Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Table 27 indicates that both the LDP and the DSP were victims of the trend of prefectural income accumulation. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference. While the LDP was characterized by light loss in Group I, the DSP, heavy (cf. Tables 19, 23, and 27). This difference tells two stories. First, the wealthy people were remaining the faithful supporter of the LDP rather than that of the DSP. Second, the cause of the LDP's loss in over-all support should be approached elsewhere than from this index. Moreover, the greater accumulation of income will bring to the conservative party less decline.

Figure 10
Prefectural Income and Party Support



Source: Table 26.

The JSP's loss in Group I was also moderate compared with the previous indices. This seems to indicate that the JCP's supporters were becoming more wealthy yet disliked to abandon that party's leadership. Nevertheless, the JSP would secure less and less support from the affluent prefectures.

The affluent prefectures were not so enthusiastic as the urban or industrial prefectures in supporting the most left JCP as shown in Table 25. (cf. Tables 18, 22, and 26, Group I.) Moreover, the constant elevation of the average people's economic status seems to weaken the commitment of the party's wealthy followers. (cf. Tables 19, 23, and 27, Group I.) Nevertheless, the JCP increased its support in all levels as a result of the changing of the income accumulation. (See also Figure 11 and compare it with Figures 3 and 7 for full understanding.)

7. Prefectural Income and Force Support: By the index of income, the political forces were, during the 1960-1967 period, supported as indicated by the table below (Table 28):

Table 28

Relation of Prefectural Income to Prefectural Support of Various Forces in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Per Cent of 1960-1967		Average Vote	Total
		Rightists	Centrists	Leftists	
I	Affluent (9)	56.47	11.51	32.02	100.00
II	Semi-affluent (21)	62.55	7.79	29.66	100.00
III	Poor (16)	65.55	4.56	29.89	100.00
All Japan (46)		58.30	9.64	32.08	100.00


*See Table 26.

Sources: Table 11 and appendices, Tables 10, 11, and 12.

The rightists were featured in the most support from Group III. Their support was the least in Group I as usual. However, weak though they were,

Figure 11

Increase of Prefectural Income and Expansion of Parties



Source: Table 27.

they were nonetheless impressive in comparison with the previous indices in the respective groups. This seems to indicate that the wealthy people were more prone to be rightists than the industrial workers or city dwellers. The leftists' first group support, though the most within this category, was the least among the three indices discussed. (See Tables 20 and 24 also.) This is evidence that the wealthy were less prone to be leftist in political orientation. The centrists, though concentrating their strength in Group I according to this index were least impressive in that group among the three indices employed. This is an indication that the emerging political idea (the middle-of-the-road idea) was accepted more naturally in classes other than the upper class. At any rate, the rightists remained most powerful in all groups. They were followed by the leftists and, in last place, the centrists. (See Figure 12 and compare it with Figures 4 and 8.)

-Table 29

Relation of Prefectural Income to the Expansion of Prefectural Support of Various Forces as Reflected in the General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967


Group	Characteristics of Prefecture*	Expansion of Political Forces ()			
		Rightists	Centrists	Leftists	Total
I	Affluent (9)	-3.44	+3.79	-0.35	0.00
II	Semi-affluent (21)	-2.46	+1.40	+1.06	0.00
III	Poor (16)	-1.57	-0.31	+1.88	0.00
	All Japan (46)	-3.73	+3.14	+0.59	0.00

*Sec Table 26.

Sources (1) Table 13, (2) appendices, Tables 13, 14, and 15.

The rightists' loss in Group I, though the greatest within this category, was the least serious among the three indices (see Tables 21 and 25 also). This might be due in part to the successful implementation of the so-called income-doubling plan adopted by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and

Figure 12
Prefectural Income and Force Support



Source: Table 28.


continued (though revised) by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. At any rate, the ruling party's economic measures were workable in coping with the increasingly powerful challenge in the opposition camps. The centrists' increase in the first group, though the greatest within this category, was the least sizable for the same group among the three indices. Thus, one may conclude that an accelerated economic prosperity will curtail the fast rising of the fashionable political force in present-day Japan. The loss of the leftists in the first group was not very serious, either. This statistic implies that the wealthy supporters in the left camp were no less than those of in the right camp not much affected by the current of ideological change shown in voting behavior. (See also Figure 13 and compare it with Figures 5 and 9.)

8. A Short Conclusion with Respect to Prefectural Characteristics and Party (or Force) Support:

a. It is widely endorsed that the metropolitan citizens are most apt to accept new ideas. This has been the case in the context of Japan. If so, then what is the most fashionable political idea in contemporary Japan? The rightist idea? Probably not, because the rightists have been steadily declining in the urban prefectures. The leftist idea? It used to be, but not now, because the leftists, though in lesser extent, have been decreasing in these prefectures as well. Now that both the left and the right ideas were rejected, the currently fashionable thinking should be the so-called "middle-of-the-road" idea. A comparison of the voting in the past three general elections in the three most urban prefectures, namely Tokyo-to (urbanization index: 91 per cent), Kanagawa-ken (86 per cent), and Osaka-fu (80 per cent), will certify this argument. (See the


Figure 13

Increase of Prefectural Income and Expansion of Forces



Source: Table 29

figure below.)²²



²²The voting records of the three prefectures are given below:


	Tokyo		
	Rightists	Centrists	Leftists
1960	47.7%	9.9%	42.1%
1963	46.58	10.23	43.19
1967	38.1	24.9	37.0

	Kanagawa		
	Rightists	Centrists	Leftists
1960	53.9%	15.8%	30.3%
1963	47.49	15.19	37.32
1967	38.5	28.7	32.8

	Osaka		
	Rightists	Centrists	Leftists
1960	45.7%	18.3%	36.0%
1963	39.7	20.53	39.67
1967	32.4	36.9	30.7

1960 and 1963 were furnished by the Ministry of Local Autonomy, Japan; 1967 was computed by the writer from voting records obtained from ibid.

It is in these most urban prefectures that multiplicity of party competition seems to have arrived as shown in the voting record of the 1967 general election (see figure below).²³



23

	LDP	JSP	DSP	KOMEITO	JCP
Tokyo	32.1%	27.1%	11.8%	13.1%	9.9%
Kanagawa	37.0	27.3	15.3	13.4	5.5
Osaka	28.6	21.7	18.9	18.0	9.0

See ibid.

b. What were the most and the least typical traits of the parties and the forces featured in the tests discussed, i.e., urbanization, industrialization, and prefectural income?

Political Forces	Rightists	Most typical: Semi-urban
		Least typical: Urban
	Centrists	Most typical: Urban
		Least typical: Rural
	Leftists	Most typical: Urban
		Least typical: Semi-urban

Political Parties	LDP	Most typical: Poor
		Least typical: Urban
	JSP	Most typical: Urban
		Least typical: Semi-urban
	DSP	Most typical: Urban
		Least typical: Rural
	Komeito	Most typical: Urban
		Least typical: Rural
	JCP	Most typical: Urban
		Least typical: Agrarian

Moreover, what were the most favorably and unfavorably expanded prefectures in the recent general elections?

Political Forces	Rightists	Most favorably expanded: Semi-industrial
		Most unfavorably expanded: Urban
	Centrists	Most favorably expanded: Urban
		Most unfavorably expanded: Poor
	Leftists	Most favorably expanded: Poor
		Most unfavorably expanded: Urban

Political Parties	LDP	Most favorably expanded: Semi-industrial
		Most unfavorably expanded: Urban
	JSP	Most favorably expanded: Rural
		Most unfavorably expanded: Urban
	DSP	Most favorably expanded: Rural
		Most unfavorably expanded: Semi-urban
	JCP	Most favorably expanded: Urban
		Most unfavorably expanded: Poor as well as Agrarian

c. Can any trend be suggested and/or recommended? First of all, all of the major political ideas in postwar Japan seem to have been introduced from metropolitan areas, especially the capitol, Tokyo, and the industrial Osaka, testing the left parties' support as well as the middle-of-the-road parties, both of which came primarily from the urban prefectures. Second, although the Japan Socialist Party was still characterized by the largest support from the urban prefectures, such trait seems to be soon blurred by that of rural. This may be due in great part to the powerful undermining from the central camp on the one hand and the effective political education of the rural people, possibly by their left relatives living in the urban or industrial prefectures. Third, the right was relatively very strong in the in-between prefectures (such as semi-urban, semi-industrial, and semi-affluent prefectures). This may be due to the fact that most of the small businessmen, local bosses, landlords, war veterans, as well as the traditionally dominant classes were still quite reactionary. As to their relatively light loss in the agrarian prefectures, one may trace its cause to the ruling party's systematic attempts to subsidize the major crops in recent years.

Since the accelerated economic prosperity tends to maintain the strength of the rightist party, the present ruling party should stick to its effective business-first policy. But since the industrialization and urbanization are not productive for the conservatives, it is advisable that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party focuses a bit on the rescue of the medium and small businesses as well as the encouragement and modernization of intensive farming, thus consolidating the support of these two sectors while economic prosperity is not sacrificed.

As the rural people have become more acceptable to the socialist idea,

it is advisable that the Japan Socialist Party revise its class-based image as a truly national party. Otherwise, they would soon be overwhelmed by the rising middle-of-the-road parties.

The emergence of the two middle-of-the-road parties, i.e., the Democratic Socialist Party and the Clean Government Party, was only a matter of the turn of this decade. Their needs are probably to strengthen their party image and broaden their party base. They should strive to expand their strength throughout the whole territory, poor as well as affluent, agrarian as well as industrial, rural as well as urban, and all in-between prefectures. For the time being, a period of developing, it is advisable that they concentrate their strength in those areas where every test indicates that they may have the chance to win at least a seat.

The dogmatism-oriented Japan Communist Party still remained negligible in the rural and agrarian prefectures. This may be due in great part to the party's over-emphasis in the responsibility and indispensability of the working class dictatorship. In fact, the so-called working class dictatorship which is universally professed as a "must" seems not necessarily to be the sole road to Communism testing the Chinese model (which has featured a strong farmer orientation). For maximum development it is advisable that the party merge with the Japan Socialist Party--the leading party in the left camp--so that a better chance of realizing the left idea may be brought about. Otherwise, the party's engagement in a thorough revision of its radical commitment may possibly be a good remedy.

Finally, for the convenience of some readers who may value more details, information relating the prefectural characteristics to the rank of the party or force support or expansion is presented below (see Tables 30, 31, 32, and 33).

Table 30
Prefectural Characteristics and Rank of Party Support

Rank	P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S											
	LDP			JSP			DSP			Komeito		
	Character- istics	Per Cent	Character- istics	Per Cent	Character- istics	Per Cent	Character- istics	Per Cent	Character- istics	Per Cent	Character- istics	Per Cent
1	Poor	61.68	Urban	28.80	Urban	12.50	Urban	9.95	Urban	6.54	Urban	6.54
2	Agrarian	61.16	Rural	28.78	Industrial	11.94	Industrial	9.26	Industrial	6.04	Industrial	6.04
3	Rural	60.50	Industrial	28.17	Affluent	9.33	Affluent	6.52	Affluent	5.40	Affluent	5.40
4	Semi- urban	59.82	Semi- affluent	26.86	Semi- affluent	6.77	Semi- affluent	3.06	Semi- affluent	2.80	Semi- affluent	2.80
5	Semi- industrial	58.96	Agrarian	26.70	Semi- urban	5.80	Semi- urban	2.02	Semi- industrial	2.61	Semi- industrial	2.61
6	Semi- affluent	56.85	Semi- industrial	26.66	Semi- industrial	5.46	Semi- industrial	1.44	Semi- urban	2.41	Semi- urban	2.41
7	Affluent	51.99	Affluent	26.62	Agrarian	5.23	Agrarian	1.42	Rural	2.24	Rural	2.24
8	Industrial	47.10	Poor	25.95	Poor	4.28	Poor	0.84	Poor	2.11	Poor	2.11
9	Urban	45.56	Semi- urban	25.34	Rural	4.19	Rural	0.76	Agrarian	2.08	Agrarian	2.08

Sources: Tables 18, 22, and 26.

Table 31
Prefectural Characteristics and Rank of Force Support

Rank	P O L I T I C A L F O R C E S					
	Rightists		Centrists		Leftists	
	Characteristics	Per Cent	Characteristics	Per Cent	Characteristics	Per Cent
1	Semi-urban	65.78	Urban	15.82	Urban	35.34
2	Agrarian	65.71	Industrial	15.03	Industrial	34.21
3	Poor	65.55	Affluent	11.51	Affluent	32.02
4	Semi-industrial	64.79	Semi-affluent	7.79	Rural	31.01
5	Rural	64.54	Semi-urban	6.47	Poor	29.89
6	Semi-affluent	62.55	Semi-industrial	5.94	Semi-affluent	29.66
7	Affluent	56.47	Agrarian	5.11	Semi-industrial	29.27
8	Industrial	50.76	Poor	4.56	Agrarian	29.18
9	Urban	48.84	Rural	4.43	Semi-urban	27.75

Sources: Tables 20, 24, and 28.

Table 32
Prefectural Characteristics and Rank of Expansion of Parties

Rank	P O L I T I C A L P A R T I E S					
	LDP			JSP		
	Characteristics	Per Cent	Characteristics	Per Cent	Characteristics	Per Cent
1	Semi-industrial	-1.25	Rural	+1.49	Rural	-0.09
2	Rural	-1.99	Poor	+1.46	Urban	-0.44
3	Semi-urban	-2.01	Agrarian	+1.36	Industrial	-0.44
4	Poor	-2.15	Semi-industrial	+0.63	Affluent	-0.55
5	Semi-affluent	-2.23	Semi-urban	+0.58	Semi-affluent	-0.56
6	Agrarian	-2.52	Semi-affluent	+0.47	Semi-industrial	-0.69
7	Affluent	-6.14	Affluent	-1.25	Poor	-0.87
8	Industrial	-7.49	Industrial	-1.62	Agrarian	-0.89
9	Urban	-7.54	Urban	-1.83	Semi-urban	-1.28
					Agrarian	+0.41

Sources: Tables 19, 23, and 27.

Table 33
Prefectural Characteristics and Rank of Expansion of Forces

Rank	P O L I T I C A L F O R C E S					
	Rightists		Centrists		Leftists	
	Characteristics	Per Cent	Characteristics	Per Cent	Characteristics	Per Cent
1	Semi-industrial	-1.51	Urban	+6.20	Poor	+1.88
2	Semi-urban	-1.55	Industrial	+5.73	Rural	+1.84
3	Poor	-1.57	Affluent	+3.79	Agrarian	+1.78
4	Agrarian	-1.83	Semi-affluent	+1.40	Semi-industrial	+1.19
5	Rural	-1.88	Semi-urban	+0.38	Semi-urban	+1.17
6	Semi-affluent	-2.46	Semi-industrial	+0.32	Semi-affluent	+1.06
7	Affluent	-3.44	Agrarian	+0.05	Affluent	-0.35
8	Industrial	-5.44	Rural	+0.04	Industrial	-0.59
9	Urban	-5.47	Poor	-0.31	Urban	-0.73

Sources: Tables 21, 25, and 29.

CHAPTER V

PROSPECTS OF JAPANESE PARTY COMPETITION

A. THE CHANGING SOCIETY AND THE POSSIBLE FLUCTUATION OF PARTY STRENGTH

In previous chapters--particularly the last two--an endeavor has been made to identify the supporters of, and to determine the extent of their support to, each party. But Japanese society, like any modern or modernizing society, is in a process of change. Consequently, the strength of the Japanese parties must be in a process of fluctuation, too.

First, Japanese society is in a process of urbanization. The rate of increasing urbanization seems to be about one per cent annually. In 1950, for example, only 53.5 per cent of the people lived in urban cities; it jumped to 56.3 five years later, and 63.6¹ another five years later. If the trend continues, the urban parties, such as the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Clean Government Party (Komeito), and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), will have spontaneously expanded their bases of support; meanwhile, the rural Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will be suffering.

Second, the society is in a process of industrialization. The rate of increasing industrialization seems to fluctuate around 1.68 per cent annually. In 1955, for example, persons employed by the primary sector of industry, such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing, were 41.0 per cent; ten years later, it had declined to only 25.5 per cent. In contrast, people employed in the secondary sector, such as mining, construction, and manufacturing

¹Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), Modern Political Systems: Asia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 48.

were 23.5 per cent in 1955; it increased to 40.3 ten years later.² If the trend continues,³ those industrial or labor-oriented parties: the JSP, the DSP, the Komeito, and the JCP will benefit spontaneously; in the meantime, the agrarian LDP will suffer.

Third, the average Japanese people is raising his standard of living. Thanks to the restless economic prosperity, he earned as much as the pre-war ceiling in 1954, but more than redoubled (224 per cent) nine years later.⁴ As a result, he is continuously upgrading the image of his own status, as shown in governmental surveys:⁵

	1958	1964
Upper Class	0 %	1 %
Upper-middle Class	4	7
Middle Class	37	50
Lower-middle Class	32	30
Lower Class	17	8

If the Japanese economy continues to accelerate its growth, the rich people's parties, The LDP and the DSP, will be strengthened indeed, but the JSP and the JCP, images of poor men, will suffer.

Fourth, thanks to the capitalistic economic system which has brought to Japan not only full employment but an increasingly grave shortage of labor supply which, in turn, has greatly increased the offer of starting salaries and wages. A great number of young people, particularly those in

²Nippon: A Chartered Survey of Japan, 1966 (Tokyo: Kokusei-sha, 1966), p. 32.

³The official prediction was that in 1980 persons employed in the primary sector will decrease to a new low: 15.8 per cent but in the secondary sector will increase to a new high: 40.3 per cent. See Nippon, 1964, p. 33.

⁴G. C. Allen, Japan's Economic Expansion (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 280.

⁵Japan Report, Vol. 11, No. 3 February 15, 1965.

their 20's and with college educations, have shifted their left views to become champions of capitalism.⁶ This shift will undoubtedly increase the conservative LDP's support and, in the meantime, will undermine the support of the leftists.

Fifth, although the per capita income is increasing year by year, the gap of income distribution is enlarged as the statistics indicate:⁷

	1955	1958	1961
Richest (20%)	35.46	37.47	37.84
Richer (20)	23.50	23.01	23.31
Less Rich (20)	18.41	17.91	17.51
Poorer (20)	14.21	13.82	13.45
Poorest (20)	8.37	8.01	7.81

Unless this gap be closed immediately, the responsible LDP, which has governed the political scene since 1948, will be alienated by the people suffering from this income gap. Meanwhile, it is only reasonable to assert that some of its former supporters will locate better images in other parties, central or left.

Sixth, thanks to the ever greater income, the Japanese people are becoming more and more enthusiastic in pursuing attainment of higher education. For example, in 1956, only 51.3 per cent of the junior high school graduates continued their education at higher levels; it jumped to 70.6 nine years later. In the same duration, the senior high graduates increased the number to continue education at a higher level from 16.1 per cent to

⁶Ibid., No. 2, January 31, 1965.

⁷Kozo Yamamura, "Growth vs. Economic Democracy in Japan--1945-1965," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, August 1966, pp. 713-728.

25.41⁸ If the same trend continues, those parties: the JSP, DSP, and the JCP, will be expanded for they are strongly supported by well-educated classes. Meanwhile, the LDP will be weakened for the party finds its stronghold in the less-educated classes.

Seventh, thanks to the development of medical techniques, the Japanese people are able to live a longer life. In contrast, however, the new generation is expanding with a very slow pace because of the extremely low birth rate. As a result, the composite ratio of old men in Japan is increasing with every decade. In 1955, for example, only 5.3 per cent of the population was in the category of sixty-five years old and over; it jumped to 6.3 ten years later. And it is officially predicted that in 1975, it will jump to 8.1 per cent--setting a new height!⁹ If this prediction is reliable, the old men's party, the LDP, will be rejoicing; meanwhile, the DSP, the JCP, and the JSP--images of young people--will be suffering.¹⁰

Eighth, thanks to the high level of technology, television in Japan is very popular. Statistics indicate that in 1961 the ownership of television was 71.9 per cent in urban cities (in household base), and 28.5 in rural areas. But in 1965, 90.3 per cent of urban households and 89.2 per cent of rural households owned such goods!¹¹ The voting survey conducted in 1963

⁸Nippon, 1966, op. cit., p. 302.

⁹Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁰But according to Mannheim's findings, "common experiences at a given point--largely, ... late adolescence--create a common frame of reference within which people of the same age group tend to view their subsequent political experiences." If this is accurate, "people are likely to retain the perspectives and loyalties of their youth for the rest of their lives," says Professor Lipset. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Anchor Books Edition, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), pp. 280, 284.

¹¹Nippon, 1966, op. cit., p. 69

indicated that a greater number of people were relying more and more on television for absorbing political information, particularly housewives, women, and college educated sectors. If the same trend continues, the less well-off parties, such as the JCP, will be benefited¹² because each candidate is officially scheduled to announce his background and experience at government expense.

Ninth, due primarily to the elevation of educational attainment, the consumption of newspaper reading has been increasing. In 1959, for example, some 384 copies per 1,000 population were consumed, but the consumption in 1963 was 449!¹³ This is a great help to the JCP, DSP, and JSP, according to the voting survey.¹⁴

Tenth, the Buddhist sect, Soka Gakkai, has been expanding with an unbelievable speed. In 1952, for example, its membership was only 11,000 households. Eight years later, it reached 1,500,000 households.¹⁵ It is said that the highly disciplined members of the religious organization are overwhelmingly loyal supporters of their political arm, the Komeito. If such expansion remains uninterrupted, the only benefited party will be the Komeito; meanwhile, all other parties will be greatly undermined.

Now the writer will proceed to give a balance sheet for the spontaneous fluctuation resulting from the changing of the society. (The balance sheet is given at the top of the following page.)

¹²Komei Senkyo Renmei, No. 30 (1966) Sosenkyo no Jittai (Tokyo Shinshu-sha, 1963), p. 35.

¹³Nippon, 1966 and Nippon, 1961, pp. 292 and 255.

¹⁴No. 30 Sosenkyo no Jittai, op. cit.

¹⁵See No. 76 in Chapter 1 (pp. 34-35).

Number	Item	Benefit	Loss
1	Urbanization	DSP, Komeito, JCP	LDP
2	Industrialization	JSP, DSP, Komeito, JCP	LDP
3	Increase of income	LDP, DSP	JSP, JCP
4	Growing conservatism	LDP	JSP, JCP
5	Negation of economic democracy	JSP, DSP Komeito, JCP	LDP
6	More education	JSP, DSP, JCP	LDP
7	More old people	LDP	JSP, JCP, DSP
8	Reliance on television	JCP	
9	Greater newspaper consumption	JCP, DSP, JSP	
10	More Gakkai believers	Komeito	LDP, JSP, DSP, JCP
Total	LDP (-2)	3	5
	JSP (0)	4	4
	DSP (4)	6	2
	Komeito (4)	4	0
	JCP (2)	6	4

The writer would rather add one more point to the Komeito because of the rapid expansion of the Soka Gakkai. Thus, the expansion rate of the parties may be graded as: Komeito (A), DSP (B), JCP (C), JSP (D), and LDP (E). This finding is, in the main, consistent with the previous findings (see particularly Tables 10 and 11 in Chapter III and Section C (8) in Chapter IV). However, it is felt that some adjustments should be made for the LDP. On the one hand, the party is credited for the image of capability to bring about stability and prosperity to the society, thus one more point ought to be added. On the other hand, the continuous governing of the party on central government has aroused a number of "protest votes,"

resulting in a reasonable deduction of half a point. Consequently, a fair grading is said to add half a point to the original grade (-2). Therefore, it is felt that the LDP's heyday will soon be over. Aware of this, the party has been engaged in a series of reforms, although most of the suggestions were turned down either to inter- or intra-party politics. The most famous abortive suggestion was made by the Hatoyama Cabinet in 1956, intending to gerrymander the election districts. His proposed, single-member district system encountered not only strong resistance in the opposition camp, but the public opinion polls as well.

A successful reform intending to correct the poor image of being a captive of big business was made by the LDP in 1961. The reform was to form a money-raising organization with popular base. The Citizens Association, or Kokumin Kyokai, engaged in "collecting clean funds for clean government" so that the "voice of the people would be directly reflected in government,"¹⁶ finally pioneered the possibility of reform. The succeeding attempts, such as the Niki Report, aiming at dissolving the intra-party rival of factionalism, were not responded to very favorably, yet the pressures within and without the party have been increasing. Besides, a drive for increasing dues-paying membership has been under way since 1964. The party's automatic abandonment of rightist ideals, such as the restoration of the imperial system and the revival of legal buttressing of the patriarchal family system, was a token that the party is pragmatic enough to make itself refreshing and viable.

Unfortunately, due directly to the unpleasant series of black mist last year (1966), a violent blow calling for the immediate limitation of the

¹⁶Warren M. Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 142.

amounts of contributions to political parties by corporations, labor unions, and other organizations, as well as by individuals, may greatly curtail the party's finances if the pressure is accepted. Without a doubt, it will be a mortal blow because the party's financial support has been 99 per cent from corporate bodies.¹⁷ At any rate, only by taking a revolutionary measure to modernize the structure of the party can it maintain its dominant position in the next decade.

The JSP has been conscious of the fearful confrontation of the centrists. Saburo Eda, former secretary-general of the party, has begun to articulate for a structural reform. Quite aware of the fading of the image of socialism, Eda advocated the necessity of creating a new vision of socialism to fit the party's policies and activities to the ever-changing conditions of the Japanese society. For the time being, however, his major opponent, Chairman Sasaki, an outright leftist, has turned a deaf ear to Eda; yet, it is predictable that the party will, in the long run, switch its principle more toward the center.

The DSP, formerly the JSP's right wing, has been pragmatically following the changing of the society in adopting a middle-of-the-road policy. The party's growing conservatism was noted recently in its co-sponsoring of candidates with the LDP for the mayoral elections in Kyoto and Kita-Kyushu and the gubernatorial election in Tokyo this year. Moreover, a strong consciousness of needing younger leadership in the party is openly advocated by Nishio, the party chairman. Despite this fact, the DSP will not become a major threat to the other parties in the next decade considering its weak strength and slow growth rate in the last three elections.

¹⁷The Mainichi Daily News, Monthly International Edition, May 1, 1967, p. 4.

Nishio's vision to realize his ideal of establishing a democratic socialist regime in 1965 was utterly a house in the air, yet his vision may be realized if he will cooperate closely with the conservative LDP and the middle-of-the-road Komeito in the next decade.

Komeito, a political arm of the Soka Gakkai, was the most oft-talked about party with two extremely contradictory views regarding its future development. One school, led by Herbert Passin, optimistically predicts that a coalition government centering around the Komeito, bringing in the socialists for added strength, will be the most possible alternative in the 1960's.¹⁸ The other extreme, led by William Helton, predicts that the Soka Gakkai will slow down its strength and might decline in the near future.¹⁹ At any rate, it is felt that the Komeito should be able to become a mass-based, rather than a religion-based political organization. But this seems not an easy thing considering its shallow base of political involvement and the weak image of the party.

The JCP showed a great viability in the last election. But since the party's strength is too scattered, it seems not able to challenge the political power except there be a drastic deterioration of the society. However, this assumption seems to be almost groundless. Therefore, the party ought to be content as an agent of the Communist International because the dogmatism-oriented JCP seems not to be able to adapt itself by revising drastically its party principles to fit the growing conservative Japanese society.

¹⁸Herbert Passin, "The Future," The American Assembly, Columbia University The United States and Japan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 161-161.


¹⁹William Helton, "Political Prospects of Soka Gakkai," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 and 4, Fall and Winter, 1965-66, pp. 231-244.

Thus far, the writer has tried to present a picture: a quick-rising of the centrists, a stagnation of the leftists, and a decline of the rightists. (See Figure 14 on the next page.) Then can one say that the centrists will dominate the political scene in the next decade? The limited source available to this writer supports the argument that the centrists will become a formidable bargaining power, but the writer is not in a position to predict that the centrists will take the leading position in the 1970's. Rather, it is predicted that the multiplicity of the party system will be the rule and bipolarity the exception (see Section C (8) in Chapter IV). Probably, the stable government seen in the past two decades will not appear again in the next decade unless a revolutionary merger at the party level occurs. A merger between the LDP and the DSP will be possible, for the latter has become increasingly conservative. The neutrality in taking sides to oppose the normalization of the Japan-South Korea relations in 1965 was a good example for the two parties' sincerity to cooperate. The co-sponsoring of candidates for the mayoral as well as gubernatorial elections last April was another. Moreover, Sasaki's charge of the DSP as a "second Liberal-Democratic Party" was not purely groundless, although Mishio refuted it as "in every way groundless."²⁰ Furthermore, the DSP almost shared the view of the LDP to favor the U. S.-Japan Treaty and other defense programs unlike all the leftist parties which demanded immediate abolishment of these programs, especially the Treaty.²¹ The merger between the two left parties will be unthinkable, although they have

²⁰The Mainichi Daily News, op. cit., March 1, 1967, p. 5.

²¹Japan Report, op. cit., Vol. 13, No. 6 (March 31, 1967), pp. 5-7, No. 8 (April 30, 1967), pp. 2-8.

Figure 14
General Elections of Japan, 1946-1977, By Vote, By Percentage*



Sources: From 1946 to 1959, see Table 6; from 1960 to 1967, see Table 11; from 1968 to 1977, predicted by the writer.

shown willingness to cooperate, as reflected in the co-sponsoring of Dr. Ryokichi Minobe to run for the governorship of Tokyo-to in the last (April, 1967) election. If there should be a day for their merger, the right-wing socialists will bolt from the party under the oyabun of Saburo Eda, a rising star in the socialist camp. Can the Komeito merge with the other parties? It is rather hard to say. But, because of the unique nature of the party, an agent of the Soka Gakkai, the possibility is not great. However, viewing the ever pragmatic approach of the party, an exceptional cooperation between the Komeito and other parties is not unthinkable. In fact, only by close cooperation can the coalition government--a typical feature in the 1970's possibly--be stably maintained.

B. THE NATURE OF PARTY COMPETITION IN THE REST OF THE AREAS (HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT) AND THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE PARTY DEVELOPMENT

In previous chapters, the discussion has been focused upon the most significant areas of the party competition--general elections. There are two other areas of competition, however, the elections for the House of Councillors and the local elections.

The House of Councillors was originally designed to attract well-known people who were not necessarily professional politicians. Some pressure groups, such as the Small Business Political League, the Expropriated Farmer's League, and the Soka Gakkai, have been able to send their officers or members to this House. However, since the latter part of the 1950's, a greater politicization has been penetrating the house. Today, only 2.4 per cent of the Councillors is not affiliated with any partisan group. Fifty-six per cent is affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); 29.2 per cent with the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP); 8 per cent with

the Clean Government Party (Komeito); 2.8 per cent with the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP); and 1.6 per cent with the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Moreover, even the independents themselves have formed two loosely organized groups: the Green Breeze Society (Ryokufu-Kai) and the Second Chamber Club (Dainiin Kurab). Consequently, the feeling that the original design to attract well-known people is being substantiated should be discarded. Rather it may be asserted that greater multiplicity of partisanship than in the lower house is featuring the upper house of the national Diet.

In the local elections, there is a remarkable difference with elections on a national level. Party images have been very weak, especially on the lowest level--town and village elections. In 1960, for example, 72 per cent of prefectural governors, 82 per cent of city mayors, 74 per cent of city assemblymen, 95 per cent of town and village headmen, and 94 per cent of town and village assemblymen succeeded in the elections under the banner of "independents." There is an exception, however. A deep penetration of partisanship was seen in the 1960 election of prefectural assemblymen, in which only seven per cent of the successful candidates had participated in the competition as "independents." The conservative LDP by far dominated the prefectural assemblies, in which as of August, 1960, 67 per cent were members of the LDP; 17 per cent were members of the JSP; 6 per cent were members of the DSP; 3 per cent were members of local parties; and 7 per cent were independents.

A strong trend of politicization is under way in local elections as much as in national elections. A comparison between the local officials in two separate years, 1960 and 1964, indicates that the independent governors decreased 40 per cent; the independent prefectural assemblymen, 14 per cent; the city mayors, maintained the same size; the city assemblymen decreased

10 per cent; and the town and village headmen, 9 per cent.²²

To conclude, Seito (political party) was blamed as something associated with a bandit gang when the term was introduced to the Japanese society in 1871, as pointed out in Chapter I. But can the modern Japanese people get rid of this "necessary evil" as some Meiji elites preferred to call it? Evidently not. On the contrary, party politics have been deepening with the passing of time. Though Japanese politics today is still personality-centered or oyabun-kobun-oriented, it is predictable that an impersonal party politics will sooner or later penetrate all levels of competition. Once that day comes, the writer will be glad to assert that the Japanese party development has entered a period of maturity instead of "maturity" as one puts a quotation mark on it when defining the present stage of party development.²³ An early arrival of real maturity will be possible if and when the major parties--particularly the conservative camp--are sincere enough to automatically disintegrate the notoriously rooted factionalism, which is the most typical characteristic of the Japanese parties in present-day stage.

²²The above statistics are computed from (1) pp. 21, 26, 32, 37-38, and 52 in this paper, (2) Tsuneishi, op. cit., p. 198, and (3) Department of the Army, U. S. Army Area Handbook for Japan (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 426.

²³See page 10 in this paper.

APPENDIX

Table 1
Average Share of Liberal Democratic Party in Popular Vote in Percentage in
General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region
1	Kumamoto	70.31	Kyushu	24	Nagasaki	60.21	Kyushu
2	Shimane	67.62	Chugoku	25	Iwate	59.57	Tohoku
3	Tohushima	67.23	Shikoku	26	Shizuoka	59.48	Chubu
4	Yamagata	65.91	Tohoku	27	Miyazaki	58.93	Kyushu
5	Nie	65.26	Chubu	28	Oita	58.63	Kyushu
6	Wakayama	65.11	Kinki	29	Kochi	58.33	Shikoku
7	Kagoshima	64.42	Kyushu	30	Fukigata	57.49	Chubu
8	Toyama	64.28	Chubu	31	Gifu	57.20	Chubu
9	Fukui	63.81	Chubu	32	Okayama	56.21	Chugoku
10	Yamanashi	63.73	Chubu	33	Saitama	55.45	Kanto
11	Chiba	63.71	Kanto	34	Akita	55.31	Tohoku
12	Kagawa	63.07	Shikoku	35	Ishikawa	54.62	Chubu
13	Gumma	62.33	Kanto	36	Aichi	53.67	Chubu
14	Niime	62.13	Shikoku	37	Iagano	50.54	Chubu
15	Kara	61.41	Kinki	38	Miyagi	50.24	Tohoku
16	Aomori	61.37	Tohoku	39	Shiga	46.75	Kinki
17	Tochigi	61.20	Kanto	40	Iyogo	45.67	Kinki
18	Hiroshima	60.81	Chugoku	41	Fukuoka	45.15	Kyushu
19	Saga	60.78	Kyushu	42	Kanagawa	45.11	Kanto
20	Tottori	60.66	Chugoku	43	Hokkaido	44.12	Hokkaido
21	Ibaraki	60.54	Kanto	44	Kyoto	41.14	Kinki
22	Wakushima	60.49	Tohoku	45	Tokyo	40.83	Kanto
23	Yamaguchi	60.27	Chugoku	46	Osaka	37.42	Kinki

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Local Autonomy, Ministry of, Government of Japan.

Table 2

Average Share of Japan Socialist Party in Popular Vote in Percentage in
General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region
1	Hokkaido	42.41	Hokkaido	24	Kyogo	27.18	Kinki
2	Nagano	35.09	Chubu	25	Aomori	26.49	Tohoku
3	Tottori	34.35	Chugoku	25	Ibaraki	26.49	Kanto
4	Tokyo	33.67	Kanto	27	Iizayaki	26.35	Kyushu
5	Akita	32.04	Tohoku	28	Shimane	26.10	Chugoku
6	Niigata	32.96	Chubu	29	Kumamoto	25.58	Kyushu
7	Iwate	32.52	Tohoku	30	Nara	25.24	Kinki
8	Fukui	31.53	Chubu	31	Kechi	25.10	Shikoku
9	Fukuoka	31.16	Kyushu	32	Osaka	24.33	Kinki
10	Okayama	30.90	Chugoku	33	Toyama	24.14	Chubu
11	Iiyagi	30.58	Tohoku	34	Oita	24.11	Kyushu
12	Shiga	30.44	Kinki	35	Kagawa	23.86	Shikoku
13	Gumma	29.96	Kanto	36	Gifu	23.54	Chubu
14	Aichi	29.51	Chubu	37	Kagoshima	23.45	Kyushu
15	Yamanashi	29.43	Chubu	38	Shizuoka	23.17	Chubu
16	Yamagata	29.41	Tohoku	39	Shire	22.63	Shikoku
17	Kanagawa	28.36	Kanto	40	Sakayama	22.49	Kinki
18	Kyoto	28.14	Kinki	41	Yamaguchi	21.85	Chugoku
19	Saitama	28.02	Kanto	42	Pie	21.59	Chubu
20	Tochigi	27.85	Kanto	43	Ishikawa	20.37	Chubu
21	Fukushima	27.45	Tohoku	44	Chiba	20.05	Kanto
22	Saga	27.38	Kyushu	45	Hiroshima	19.59	Chugoku
23	Nagasaki	27.30	Kyushu	46	Tokushima	13.01	Shikoku

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 3

Average Share of Democratic Socialist Party in Popular Vote in Percentage
in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region
1	Osaka	19.28	Kinki	24	Kochi**	5.25	Shikoku
2	Yamaguchi	15.74	Chugoku	25	Saitama	5.21	Kanto
3	Kanagawa	15.43	Kanto	26	Yamanashi***	5.03	Chubu
4	Iiyogo	14.83	Kinki	27	Mie	4.76	Chubu
5	Kyoto	14.62	Kinki	28	Hokkaido	4.61	Hokkaido
6	Tokyo	10.64	Kanto	29	Nilfata	4.38	Chubu
7	Fukuoka	10.56	Kyushu	30	Toehigi***	4.07	Kanto
8	Nara	10.52	Kinki	31	Shimane*	3.93	Chugoku
9	Miyazaki	9.77	Kyushu	32	Okayama**	3.73	Chugoku
10	Shiga	9.68	Kinki	33	Iwate***	3.27	Tohoku
11	Miehi	9.45	Chubu	34	Tottori*	2.70	Chugoku
12	Thine	8.85	Shikoku	35	Nagano***	2.60	Chubu
13	Akita	8.77	Tohoku	36	Kagawa*	2.07	Shikoku
14	Chiba	8.26	Kanto	37	Guma*	1.87	Kanto
15	Fukushima	8.15	Tohoku	38	Nagashima*	1.83	Kyushu
16	Tokushima	8.15	Shikoku	39	Toyama*	1.73	Chubu
17	Nagasaki	7.51	Kyushu	40	Saga**	1.68	Kyushu
18	Cifu	7.45	Chubu	41	Ibaraki*	1.40	Kanto
19	Shizuoka	7.43	Chubu	42	Fukui*	1.03	Chubu
20	Oita**	7.25	Kyushu	43	Kumamoto*	0.87	Kyushu
21	Niigata	6.87	Tohoku	44	Nomori*	0.63	Tohoku
22	Hiroshima	6.70	Chugoku	45	Yamagata*	0.23	Tohoku
23	Ishikawa***	5.57	Chubu	46	Wakayama***		Kinki

Notes: (1) The party only participated in the 1960 election in those marked with (*). (2) The party only participated in the 1960 and 1963 elections in those marked with (**). (3) The party only participated in the 1960 and 1967 elections in those marked with (***). (4) The party only participated in the 1967 election in those marked with (****). And (5) the party did not participate in any of the three elections in those marked with (*****).

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 4

Share of Clean Government Party in Popular Vote
in Percentage in 1967 General Election of Japan

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Region</u>
1	Osaka	18.0	Kinki
2	Kenagawa	13.4	Kanto
2	Kochi	13.4	Shikoku
4	Tokyo	13.1	Kanto
5	Tokushima	12.2	Shikoku
6	Hyogo	10.0	Kinki
7	Fukuoka	8.4	Kyushu
8	Chiba	7.6	Kanto
9	Okayama	7.3	Chugoku
10	Saitama	6.9	Kanto
11	Kyoto	6.2	Kinki
12	Gifu	5.1	Chubu
13	Hiroshima	4.1	Chugoku
14	Shizuoka	3.7	Chubu
15	Aichi	3.6	Chubu
16	Hokkaido	3.3	Hokkaido

Notes: The party did not participate in those prefectures which did not appear in the list.

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 5

Average Share of Japan Communist Party in Popular Vote in Percentage
in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Region
1	Kyoto	12.27	Kinki	24	Toyama	2.24	Chubu
2	Osaka	11.13	Kinki	25	Shizuoka	2.03	Chubu
3	Tokyo	7.19	Kanto	26	Miyazaki	2.00	Kyushu
4	Nagano	6.94	Chubu	27	Shime	1.98	Shikoku
5	Kochi	6.85	Shikoku	28	Yamaguchi	1.97	Chugoku
6	Ishikawa	5.76	Chubu	29	Ibaraki	1.91	Kanto
7	Fukuoka	5.67	Kyushu	30	Iwate	1.88	Tohoku
8	Kanagawa	5.11	Kanto	31	Gifu	1.74	Chubu
9	Aichi	4.42	Chubu	32	Fukushima	1.73	Tohoku
10	Nagayama	4.41	Kinki	33	Miyagi	1.68	Tohoku
11	Hyogo	3.48	Kinki	34	Nagasaki	1.68	Kyushu
12	Saitama	3.08	Kanto	35	Tokushima	1.66	Shikoku
13	Shiga	2.88	Kinki	36	Oita	1.62	Kyushu
14	Hokkaido	2.83	Hokkaido	37	Yamanashi	1.58	Chubu
15	Gumma	2.59	Kanto	37	Mie	1.58	Chubu
16	Fukuoka	2.55	Tohoku	37	Nagawa	1.58	Shikoku
17	Hiroshima	2.51	Chugoku	40	Nara	1.54	Kinki
18	Niigata	2.43	Chubu	41	Yamagata	1.47	Tohoku
19	Okayama	2.30	Chugoku	42	Saga	1.40	Kyushu
20	Fukushima	2.37	Tohoku	43	Fukui	1.39	Chubu
21	Shimane	2.32	Chugoku	44	Kumamoto	1.17	Kyushu
22	Tottori	2.30	Chugoku	45	Kagoshima	0.96	Kyushu
23	Chiba	2.25	Kanto	46	Tochigi	0.95	Kanto

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 6

Expansion of Liberal Democratic Party: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region
1	Saga	+9.02	Kyushu	24	Fukui	-3.61	Chubu
2	Kagawa	+8.63	Shikoku	25	Nagano	-3.94	Chubu
3	Shiga	+1.45	Kinki	26	Kagoshima	-4.02	Kyushu
4	Nie	+1.04	Chubu	27	Fukunaka	-4.15	Kyushu
5	Kiikata	+3.71	Chubu	28	Aomori	-5.27	Tohoku
6	Ehime	+1.97	Shikoku	29	Miyagi	-5.34	Tohoku
7	Yamaguchi	+1.53	Chugoku	30	Tochigi	-5.50	Kanto
8	Nagasaki	+1.39	Kyushu	31	Tokushima	-5.63	Shikoku
9	Oita	+0.47	Kyushu	32	Kyoto	-5.94	Kinki
10	Okayama	+0.39	Chugoku	33	Aichi	-6.27	Chubu
11	Ibaraki	+0.26	Kanto	34	Iwate	-6.77	Tohoku
12	Shimane	+0.18	Chugoku	35	Wakayama	-7.01	Kinki
13	Toyama	-0.38	Chubu	36	Shizuoka	-7.08	Chubu
14	Hiroshima	-0.51	Chugoku	37	Hyogo	-7.27	Kinki
15	Ishikawa	-0.52	Chubu	38	Kochi	-7.33	Shikoku
16	Gumma	-0.83	Kanto	39	Cifu	-7.60	Chubu
17	Yamanashi	-1.03	Chubu	40	Chiba	-7.81	Kanto
18	Iizazaki	-1.83	Kyushu	41	Kenagawa	-8.11	Kanto
19	Kumamoto	-1.91	Kyushu	42	Nara	-8.31	Kinki
20	Fukuoka	-2.19	Tohoku	43	Yamagata	-8.71	Tohoku
21	Hokkaido	-2.42	Hokkaido	44	Tokyo	-8.73	Kanto
22	Akita	-2.91	Tohoku	45	Osaka	-8.82	Kinki
23	Tottori	-2.96	Chugoku	46	Saitama	-11.05	Kanto

Note: The size of favorable or unfavorable expansion is determined by subtracting the average turnout of the 1960-1967 period from the marginal (i.e., 1967) turnout of vote in percentage.

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 7

Expansion of Japan Socialist Party: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region
1	Oita	+6.39	Kyushu	24	Kagawa	+0.54	Shikoku
2	Fuku	+6.17	Chubu	25	Ibaraki	+0.31	Kanto
3	Tottori	+5.75	Chugoku	26	Shizuoka	+0.13	Chubu
4	Kumamoto	+4.72	Kyushu	27	Hiroshima	+0.11	Chugoku
5	Yamagata	+4.59	Tohoku	28	Okayama	0.00	Chugoku
6	Nara	+4.26	Kinki	29	Chiba	-0.55	Kanto
7	Shimane	+4.00	Chugoku	30	Miyagi	-0.58	Tohoku
8	Iie	+3.51	Chubu	31	Aomori	-0.69	Tohoku
9	Fukushima	+3.45	Tohoku	32	Kagoshima	-1.05	Kyushu
10	Shiga	+3.36	Kinki	33	Kanagawa	-1.05	Kanto
11	Gifu	+2.56	Chubu	34	Yamaguchi	-1.15	Chugoku
12	Nagasaki	+2.40	Kyushu	35	Fukuoka	-1.16	Kyushu
13	Aichi	+2.09	Chubu	36	Saitama	-1.12	Kanto
14	Gumma	+2.04	Kanto	37	Hyogo	-1.18	Kinki
15	Kochi	+1.80	Shikoku	38	Miigata	-1.56	Chubu
16	Tokushima	+1.79	Shikoku	39	Nagano	-1.59	Chubu
17	Akita	+1.66	Tohoku	40	Kyoto	-2.14	Kinki
18	Saga	+1.52	Kyushu	41	Osaka	-2.63	Kinki
19	Hokkaido	+1.39	Hokkaido	42	Falme	-2.33	Shikoku
20	Iwate	+1.28	Tohoku	43	Miyazaki	-1.05	Kyushu
21	Ishikawa	+1.23	Chubu	44	Tokyo	-6.57	Kanto
22	Toyama	+0.96	Chubu	45	Makayama	-6.59	Kinki
23	Tochigi	+0.55	Kanto	46	Yamanashi	-8.73	Chubu

Note: Ibid.

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 8

Expansion of Democratic Socialist Party: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region
1	Yamanashi	+10.07	Chubu	24	Miyagi	- 1.07	Tohoku
2	Miyazaki	+ 5.53	Kyushu	25	Tokushima	- 1.15	Shikoku
3	Nara	+ 4.48	Kinki	26	Seitama	- 1.31	Kanto
4	Chiba	+ 1.94	Kanto	27	Mie	- 1.36	Chubu
5	Nagano	+ 1.60	Chubu	28	Ibaraki	- 1.40	Kanto
6	Techigi	+ 1.53	Kanto	29	Aichi	- 1.55	Chubu
7	Tokyo	+ 1.16	Kanto	30	Fukushima	- 1.65	Tohoku
8	Akita	+ 0.53	Tohoku	31	Niigata	- 1.68	Chubu
9	Hyogo	+ 0.37	Kinki	32	Saga	- 1.68	Kyushu
10	Kanagawa	+ 0.13	Kanto	33	Toyama	- 1.73	Chubu
11	Iwate	- 0.17	Tohoku	34	Kagoshima	- 1.83	Kyushu
12	Yamagata	- 0.23	Tohoku	35	Gumma	- 1.87	Kanto
13	Osaka	- 0.38	Kinki	36	Gifu	- 2.05	Chubu
14	Shiga	- 0.42	Kinki	36	Fukushima	- 2.05	Shikoku
15	Shizuoka	- 0.43	Chubu	38	Kagawa	- 2.07	Shikoku
16	Ishikawa	- 0.47	Chubu	39	Nagasaki	- 2.11	Kyushu
17	Kyoto	- 0.62	Kinki	40	Hiroshima	- 2.50	Chugoku
18	Aomori	- 0.63	Tohoku	41	Tottori	- 2.70	Chugoku
19	Yamaguchi	- 0.64	Chugoku	42	Okayama	- 2.73	Chugoku
20	Fukushima	- 0.87	Kyushu	43	Shimane	- 3.93	Chugoku
21	Hokkaido	- 1.01	Hokkaido	44	Kochi	- 5.25	Shikoku
22	Fukui	- 1.03	Chubu	45	Oita	- 7.25	Kyushu
23	Fukuoka	- 1.06	Kyushu				

Note: Ibid.

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yanamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 9

Expansion of Japan Communist Party: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Region
1	Tokyo	+2.71	Kanto	24	Nagasaki	+0.42	Kyushu
2	Kyoto	+2.31	Kinki	25	Kenagawa	+0.39	Kanto
3	Aichi	+2.08	Chubu	26	Oita	+0.38	Kyushu
4	Kochi	+1.85	Shikoku	27	Shizuoka	+0.37	Chubu
5	Shiga	+1.62	Kinki	28	Wakayama	+0.36	Kinki
6	Settsu	+1.52	Kanto	29	Yamagata	+0.33	Tohoku
7	Hokkaido	+1.37	Hokkaido	29	Yamaguchi	+0.33	Chugoku
8	Iyogo	+1.12	Kinki	31	Miyagi	+0.32	Tohoku
9	Akita	+1.05	Tohoku	31	Mie	+0.32	Chubu
9	Chiba	+1.05	Kanto	31	Okayama	+0.32	Chugoku
11	Fukuoka	+1.03	Kyushu	34	Toyama	+0.26	Chubu
12	Gumma	+1.01	Kanto	35	Ibaraki	+0.19	Kanto
13	Fukui	+0.81	Chubu	36	Niigata	+0.17	Chubu
14	Nagano	+0.76	Chubu	37	Tochigi	+0.15	Kanto
15	Yamanashi	+0.72	Chubu	38	Kumamoto	+0.13	Kyushu
16	Miyazaki	+0.70	Kyushu	39	Iwate	+0.12	Tohoku
17	Aomori	+0.63	Tohoku	40	Fukushima	+0.07	Tohoku
18	Shimane	+0.62	Shikoku	41	Gifu	-0.04	Chubu
19	Hiroshima	+0.59	Chugoku	42	Tottori	-0.10	Chugoku
20	Nara	+0.56	Kinki	42	Saga	-0.10	Kyushu
21	Kagawa	+0.52	Shikoku	44	Ishikawa	-0.16	Chubu
22	Toyoshima	+0.44	Shikoku	45	Shirane	-0.22	Chugoku
22	Kagoshima	+0.44	Kyushu	46	Osaka	-2.13	Kinki

Note: Ibid.

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 10

Average Political Force as Reflected in Vote in 1960-1967
General Elections of Japan (in Percentage)

Rightists Combined

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage
1	Kagoshima	77.77	24	Nagasaki	63.51
2	Wakayama	77.37	25	Nara	62.70
3	Tokushima	73.12	26	Fukushima	62.48
4	Kagawa	72.50	27	Iwate	62.33
5	Kumamoto	72.38	28	Miyazaki	61.89
6	Mie	72.08	29	Saitama	61.39
7	Toyama	71.89	30	Iiyagi	60.87
8	Aomori	70.51	31	Tottori	60.66
9	Ibaraki	70.20	32	Okayama	60.56
10	Hiroshima	69.84	33	Yamaguchi	60.43
11	Saga	69.55	34	Niigata	60.23
12	Yamagata	68.89	35	Kochi	58.33
13	Ishikawa	68.30	36	Shiga	57.00
14	Shimane	67.65	37	Akita	55.64
15	Tochigi	67.13	38	Aichi	55.42
16	Cita	67.02	39	Nagano	55.37
17	Chiba	66.81	40	Hyogo	51.18
18	Shime	66.54	41	Fukuoka	49.80
19	Shizuoka	66.14	42	Hokkaido	49.06
20	Fukui	66.04	43	Kanagawa	46.63
21	Gurua	65.53	44	Tokyo	44.13
22	Gifu	65.57	45	Kyoto	42.91
23	Yamanashi	63.96	46	Osaka	39.26

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Setoru Yamanoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 11

Average Political Force as Reflected in Vote in 1960-1967
General Elections of Japan (in Percentage)

Leftists Combined

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage
1	Hokkaido	45.23	24	Nagasaki	28.98
2	Nagano	42.03	25	Aomori	28.86
3	Tokyo	40.86	26	Tochigi	28.80
4	Kyoto	40.40	27	Saga	28.77
5	Fukuoka	36.84	28	Shimane	28.42
6	Totteri	36.64	29	Ibaraki	28.40
7	Akita	35.59	30	Miyazaki	28.34
8	Osaka	35.46	31	Nara	26.78
9	Miigata	35.39	32	Kumamoto	26.75
10	Iwate	34.40	33	Wakayama	26.63
11	Aichi	33.93	34	Toyama	26.38
12	Kanagawa	33.47	35	Ishikawa	26.13
13	Shiga	33.32	36	Oita	25.73
14	Okayama	33.28	37	Kagawa	25.43
15	Fukui	32.93	38	Gifu	25.28
16	Gumma	32.55	39	Shizuoka	25.20
17	Miyagi	32.26	40	Ehime	24.61
18	Kochi	31.95	41	Kagoshima	24.40
19	Saitama	31.10	42	Yamaguchi	23.83
20	Yamanashi	31.01	43	Mie	23.16
21	Yamagata	30.88	44	Chiba	22.30
22	Hyogo	30.66	45	Hiroshima	22.09
23	Fukushima	29.17	46	Tokushima	14.67

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 12

Average Political Force as Reflected in Vote in 1960-1967
General Elections of Japan (in Percentage)

Centrists Combined

Rank	Prefecture	Percentage	Rank	Prefecture	Percentage
1	Osaka	25.28	24	Miyagi	6.87
2	Kanagawa	19.90	25	Okayama	6.16
3	Hyogo	18.16	26	Hokkaido	5.71
4	Kyoto	16.69	27	Ishikawa	5.57
5	Yamaguchi	15.74	28	Yamanashi	5.03
6	Tokyo	15.01	29	Mie	4.76
7	Fukuoka	13.36	30	Niigata	4.38
8	Tokushima	12.21	31	Tochigi	4.07
9	Chiba	10.89	32	Shimane	3.93
10	Aichi	10.65	33	Iwate	3.27
11	Nara	10.52	34	Tottori	2.70
12	Miyazaki	9.77	35	Nagano	2.60
13	Kochi	9.72	36	Kagawa	2.07
14	Shiga	9.68	37	Gumma	1.87
15	Gifu	9.15	38	Kagoshima	1.83
16	Ehime	8.85	39	Toyama	1.73
17	Akita	8.77	40	Saga	1.68
18	Shizuoka	8.66	41	Ibaraki	1.40
19	Fukushima	8.35	42	Fukui	1.03
20	Hiroshima	8.07	43	Kumamoto	0.87
21	Setsuma	7.51	44	Aomori	0.63
21	Nagasaki	7.51	45	Yamagata	0.23
23	Oita	7.25	46	Wakayama	----

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 13

Expansion of Rightists: A Comparison Between Marginal (1967) Turnouts
and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in
General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)
1	Wakayama	+6.23	24	Tochigi	-2.23
2	Shime	+4.76	25	Mie	-2.48
3	Hiigata	+3.07	26	Shizuoka	-2.54
4	Kagoshima	+2.43	27	Tottori	-2.96
5	Yamaguchi	+1.47	28	Kyoto	-3.21
6	Miyagi	+1.33	29	Akita	-3.24
7	Kagawa	+1.00	30	Saitama	-3.39
8	Ibaraki	+0.90	31	Gifu	-3.87
9	Aomori	+0.69	32	Hokkaido	-3.96
10	Toyama	+0.51	33	Kumamoto	-3.98
11	Oita	+0.48	34	Fukuoka	-4.40
12	Saga	+0.25	35	Yamagata	-4.69
13	Shimane	+0.15	36	Aichi	-5.02
14	Nagasaki	-0.41	37	Shiga	-5.40
15	Ishikawa	-0.60	38	Fukui	-5.94
16	Nagano	-0.77	39	Tokyo	-6.03
17	Hiroshima	-0.94	40	Hyogo	-6.68
18	Gunma	-1.18	41	Osaka	-6.86
19	Iwate	-1.23	42	Kochi	-7.33
20	Okayama	-1.46	43	Chiba	-7.51
21	Fukushima	-1.88	44	Kanagawa	-8.13
22	Yamanashi	-2.06	45	Tokushima	-9.22
23	Miyazaki	-2.19	46	Nara	-9.30

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 14

Expansion of Leftists: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts
and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in
General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)
1	Fukui	+6.97	24	Hiroshima	+0.71
2	Oita	+6.77	25	Tochigi	+0.70
3	Tottori	+5.66	26	Ibaraki	+0.50
4	Shiga	+4.98	26	Chiba	+0.50
5	Yamagata	+4.92	26	Shizuoka	+0.50
6	Kumamoto	+4.85	29	Okayama	+0.32
7	Nara	+4.82	30	Saitama	+0.10
8	Aichi	+4.17	31	Aomori	-0.06
9	Mie	+3.84	32	Fukuoka	-0.14
10	Shimane	+3.78	33	Niyegi	-0.26
11	Kochi	+3.65	34	Kyoto	-0.30
12	Fukushima	+2.53	35	Hyogo	-0.36
13	Gumma	+3.05	36	Kagoshima	-0.60
14	Nagasaki	+2.82	37	Kanagawa	-0.67
15	Hokkaido	+2.77	38	Nagano	-0.83
16	Akita	+2.71	38	Yamaguchi	-0.83
17	Gifu	+2.52	40	Niigata	-1.39
18	Tokushima	+2.23	41	Ehime	-2.71
19	Saga	+1.43	42	Iizasaki	-3.34
20	Iwate	+1.40	43	Tokyo	-3.86
21	Toyama	+1.22	44	Osaka	-4.76
22	Ishikawa	+1.07	45	Wakayama	-6.23
22	Kagawa	+1.07	46	Yamanashi	-8.01

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

Table 15

Expansion of Centrists: A Comparison between Marginal (1967) Turnouts
and Average Turnouts in Vote in Percentage in
General Elections of Japan, 1960-1967

Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)	Rank	Prefecture	Expansion (%)
1	Osaka	+11.62	24	Iwate	-0.17
2	Yamanashi	+10.07	25	Yamagata	-0.23
3	Tokyo	+ 9.89	26	Ishikawa	-0.47
4	Kanagawa	+ 8.80	27	Aomori	-0.63
5	Hyogo	+ 7.04	28	Yamaguchi	-0.64
6	Chiba	+ 7.01	29	Kumamoto	-0.87
7	Tokushima	+ 6.99	30	Fukui	-1.03
8	Miyazaki	+ 5.53	31	Miyagi	-1.07
9	Fukuoka	+ 4.54	32	Mie	-1.36
10	Nara	+ 4.48	33	Ibaraki	-1.40
11	Kochi	+ 3.68	34	Fukushima	-1.65
12	Kyoto	+ 3.51	35	Miigata	-1.68
13	Saitama	+ 3.29	36	Saga	-1.68
14	Shizuoka	+ 2.04	37	Toyama	-1.73
15	Nagano	+ 1.60	38	Kagoshima	-1.83
16	Tochigi	+ 1.53	39	Gumma	-1.87
17	Gifu	+ 1.35	40	Ehime	-2.05
18	Hokkaido	+ 1.19	41	Kagawa	-2.07
19	Okayama	+ 1.14	42	Nagasaki	-2.41
20	Aichi	+ 0.85	43	Tottori	-2.70
21	Akita	+ 0.53	44	Shimane	-3.93
22	Shiga	+ 0.42	45	Oita	-7.25
23	Hiroshima	+ 0.23	46	Wakayama	-----

Source: Computed by the writer from voting records furnished by Mr. Satoru Yamamoto, Ministry of Local Autonomy, Government of Japan.

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PARTY COMPETITION IN RECENT JAPANESE ELECTIONS

by

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This thesis is to study the relationship between parties and elections in contemporary Japan.

The concept of the political party (seito) was introduced to Japan in 1871. Ten years later a party of "modern" nature was born. After a century's development, Japanese political parties have entered the stage of "maturity."

The Japanese political parties are shallowly organized. They are characterized by extreme factionalism competing for intra- rather than inter-party ascendancy--particularly within the ruling party--the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Factionalism is regarded as "inevitable" and "unavoidable."

In addition to the ruling party, there are four more major parties: the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Clean Government Party (Komeito), and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Their strength is roughly in that order. Komeito, a religious-political party, made a debut in participation in the last general election with remarkable success, thus being regarded as a rising star.

Japan has entered the age of universal suffrage. All adult citizens aged 20 and over are eligible to vote.

The Japanese representation system is not unique. The basis provided for the general election is a geographical one: one voter casts one ballot, and each district returns three to five members.

There are three major elections: the general election (i.e., election for House of Representatives), the election for House of Councillors, and the local elections.

From 1945 to 1959, the general elections were characterized by the predominance of the conservatives. Since 1960, however, the conservatives

have been weakening. Despite this fact, they are still supported more than the opposition combined.

A new force, centrists by the writer's term, is promisingly arising in Japanese politics. This new force, described as "middle-of-the road" in Japanese terms, will possibly be the dominant power in the near future.

The rightists, traditionally the dominant power, have been steadily declining, especially the old conservatives. The leftists, particularly the socialists, are threatened by the rising centrists, too.

A meticulous examination of party competition on the national level, cross-checked by the competition on the prefectural level, reveals that this statement above is trustworthy. Another check from the angle of voting behavior, either as an individual or as a collective entity (prefecture), further strengthens the argument. Finally, the writer checked the accuracy of the new party system: a central power, absorbing both the rightists and the leftists, but particularly the former, influences the development of Japan's total culture. This check again proves the argument correct. If, then, the old forces are doomed to being sacrificed, what will be the possible scene in the next decade?

The writer has pointed out that, being aware of their fate, both the rights and the lefts, particularly the former, are struggling with utmost endeavor for their survival. Their drive of recruiting more dues-paying members is applaudable. Other reforms are already under way, too. As a consequence, the writer is optimistically awaiting for the arousing of the over-all enthusiasm in making structural reforms of the parties, by which he means a revision of too much ideology orientation in the left side and a dissolution of the notorious factionalism in the right side. In short, what the Japanese parties need most today is to broaden their base and

their image of popular support to become a truly modern party system. If and when the day comes, the maturity of the parties will have arrived.